By Aul h ori!

y 01

The Co 'I'm r.ndl,,( G t"e ral Mmy Air '·or{;N

(/!~ .. ~~' .. {Y. .. .'!:.~~.

Dwto Inltl.lt

RESTRICTED

.'~

JOINT TARGET GROUP • WASHINGTON, D. C. 21. March 1945

GENERAL NOTE

Material contained in this folder is published in the office of AC/ AS, Intelligence, AAF, by combined personnel of United States and British services for the use of Allied Force~.

AIR TARGET SYSTEM FOLDER-TYPICAL JAPANESE MILITARY TARGETS is a reference work for use in planning air attack on typical Japanese military installations.

The recommendations herein are summarized at the beginning of each section. Detailed analyses and appendices are included for Operations Analysis Sections, Air Ordnance officers and others interested in the technical basis of the recommendations.

The recommendations are based on the information at present available from operations in all the,aters,. on the results of trials and experiments at proving grounds and other research centers, and on analysis of typical Japanese targets.

The material in this folder is divided into typical target categories as follows:

Part I AIRFIELDS AND INSTALLATIONS.

II RADIO AND RADAR.

UIFU.EL STORAGE. IV SUPPLY DEPOTS.

V LAND AND BEACH 08ST ACLES.

VI AMMUNITION STORAGE.

VII GUN POSITIONS.

VIII PERSONNEL.

Addenda consisting of revised sheets and additional sheeh will be issued from time to time. The folder is designed to permit ready substitution or addition of such. material.

When material has served its purpose it shall be destroyed in accordance with AR 380-5 or Art. 76, Nov. Reg.

Current distribution is shown on the final page of this folder. Any queries or requests should be addressed to:

Joint Target Group ACI AS, Intelligence

H. Q. Army Air Forces Washington 25. D. C.

v, t. OOYl~H"IH' ,.INTIMa DrrlCi

SECRET

ATSF1TMT 28 FEBRUARY 1945

Typical Japanese Military Targets

GENERAL ANAL YSIS

1)1' Authority 01

Th, CO"un.ndlnl G'n".1 Arm)!, Air 'ore ..

17MaJc:h .945 ~. 8-.1( ~

(D.t,l (111111 .... ;

JOINT TARGET GROUP WASHINGTON,D. C.

S:ECRET

JOINT TARGET GROUP, WASHINGTON,. o. c.

GENERAL ANALYSIS

Shut, ATSF/TMT

Dote: .IF.luuary ""

FOREWORD

All' attacks on military targets must generally be planned onths spot ..

This folder is intended to furnish assistance for such planning. Consequently, recommendations are given for a.ttacks oftypioo1, ra.ther than epecmctargeta ...

The recommendations are based on the information a.t present avai1able from .operations. in all theatera, on the resulteof trio.la and experiments at proving grounds and other research centers, and on annJysis of the cha.ra.c:teris~ tics of typical Japanese targets.. As more information becomes available, necessary revIsions in recommendations will be made and distributed to the holders of this folder.

Present plans c{)nteJD.plate consideration of the foUowlngtargsts:

Airfisldsand installations .. Guns, in open and proteoted. AD:ununi.tion and. fuel storage. Supply depots.

Mine fields ..

Personnel.

The recommendations on airfields and installations are included in the initial folder (part 1). PapeJ1l. 00. the .other targets will be issued as addenda.

All recommendations for the attack of .air.fl.·elds and installations with currenUy available weapons are stated in tbe Summnryof tbe Airfields paper. The det.ailedsections 01 the paper and the appendices a.re included for Operetions Ana.lysis Sections) All' Ordnance officers, and others interested in the tech~ meal ba.sis of tberecommenda.tions ..

II. o

i 9

o :t

SECRET

SECRET

JOINT TARGET GROUP, WASHINGTON, D. C. .GENERAL ANALYSIS

Shut: ATSF/TMT

[)g1~1 I,F ... , ... ,,1'4'

INDEX

1.. Ooncl1Uiona; Page

A. General_., , , ,_ 1

B,. Temporary NeutralizatWn __ , ,_______ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ 1

J. Wea,pon Ruommendat-urna ,_ __ _ _ __ 1

Il. ,Fot'<u .Retuirefl16nU __ , ,_ _ 1

S. Delay oj Repairs __ ._ _ __ _ _ 2

O. Su.Btaintd NewalizaWm.____ __ _ _ _ __ _ 2

1.Gr0'lL1IIitd Ala and Landing bea.s:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,2

S. Hangar8arui Repair Buildi:1I98_,., ,_ _ _ 2

8. ,Bto,rage Facilitie8 and Auxiliary In6tallationa_____ 3

II. Introdtiction., ,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4

Ill. TyyIMl Japanese Ai1fteld Targets • ~ • _. ~ _, ,_ _ 5

IV. (],.oundtd:A/O " __ . • _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ 6

A . .(}enerrd_, .... .. _ _ _ _ _ _ 6

B. Strafing Aua.ck • .. . ., _ _ 6

O. H. E. Attack • ., , • _ _ _ _ 6

D,., Incendiary Attack __ .,. ., .,. _'M _ 7

V. Landing Area.8 __ • _., •• _.,., __ ., __ ._.,., _ ~ • *., .,., • .,., .' • 8

A,. DescMp.lion ~ ~ ., • __ ., _., _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ 8

B.OriJlering Attack' • ., __ ., ., _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 8

VI" Ha,ngars .' •• . . 'M _, .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 10

A. Types oj .Hangar8 ., 10

1. Type 1 Hangar (Simple Truss) .,. _., 10

s. Type S HfJJnI}ar (Arch Type) * ., __ • __ ., 10

8. Type 8 Hangar (Umg Multiple-Span) _., • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 11

4. T'!JPe 4. Hangar (Simple Truss With .8ide Doors)__ 11

B. Type8 oj' Damage ., __ • _.,., • _.,._ _ _ __ _ _ 11

VII. Hewir Facilitie8_. • ., ., 12

A.Types ojStruct'Ure8 __ . ., ._ _ _ __ _ _ _ 12

1. Hangar T'!JPe Repair S'MpiL. . ._. 12

S. Factory Type Repair Shops . 12

8. SmtdlHepair Shops_., . .,., __ ., _ __ __ _ 12

VIII. srorage Facilities ., ., _., ., .,., _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ IS

A .. Kind' oj Storage ., _., __ ., 0_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 13

1. 00 and Ga.soline ., 0., • .,., • 0 _ 13

S. AmmunitiOn- •• ,., _. ... ., • _., _ _ _ _ _ 13

a.Engine and Airframe Parte: .. _ _ _ 13

4. Food Su,pplies . ._., .,., _. ., 13

6. ,lJrY Goods __ .. ., ., ., _., •• .. __ _ _ 14

IX. A_wry l1Ultallatinns_., _., • ~ ... " _ _ _ 15

A. Buildings .. ., _. • _ 15

1. Administration Building8,e.tc_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ __ _ 15

t. Limng Quarter8 ., __ • • _ .. ., 1.5

B. Other Inl1tallatian~ __ ., _., M'_., .. ., _ _ _ 15

APPENDIX A Fragment Damage to Grounded AIO:

1. Introd'ltCti'on • _,. _. _ ... App" ,A: '1

'.Fragment Densities. • ,_, "0 .. __ App. A: 1

. a. Fragment Densitiesjor.SO.Jb. F. Bomb, M41-- App. A: 2

8 . .Damage to f.1rO'lLndetlA/O App . .4.: 2

a. Mean Areas oj Eilecf.ivenulL .. .. .. __ ._., App. A: 2

4. Load Requirements_ .. .. _ .... _ .. _. __ .,., .. A.pp. A: 4:

6. Oomparison With Observations ... __ ., _., __ ., .App .. A: 5

.APPENDIX B

Load Beg:uireme'lU jo:r Orauring Lan4ing Areas .. .. .. App .. B: 1

PU!lC.I$HC n" (lf1JlCEOf!" AC/I>!J, I NTIlLLI 0 lNaf. A. A. 'F •• IlY OO,,"PINC P1!:1I· SONNE!.. OP U ... ANa ""ITISH !l£Rllleell'OlI "Ill!! VSE OP ALLIED f"OlICEliI

SECRET'

-. ,

. JOINT TARGET GROUP, WASHINGTON~ D. c.

. .

'. GENERAL ANALYSt,S

, . - "

SECRET

Sh~~t: ATSF/TMT

.oQt~: .1 F.bruarr " .. ,

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AT8F /TMT/DI ~ _ _ _ _ __ Type I Japanese, Hangar &ruciures.

A,T8F/TMTID£_~ Type S Japane~e Hangar8!ructures.

ATSF/TMT/Pl____ _ _ _ Type 2A Prgabricated Japanese Hangar.

ATSE/TMTjDB TypeS Japanese Hangar S'rudur6S,.

A TSF1TMTjD'4 1'ype 4. Japanese Hangar St.rwJI'llre,.

ATSF/TMT/D1J Japane8e Factory Type Repair ,Shops.

,A TSF1TMT/OI Curves 8howingplo' oj fr'a{/, density (number per sguare

foot) agai1l6ldidanu ,from ourst.

ATSF/TMTIOfL_, ,_ Probabilities of at least 4 fragment p,erjorWnIJ/IOO

square feet and at lea.sl 7 pe,rjQ1"atwns/l00 square jeet.

AT8F/TMT/OB Probabilitus of at least 4. fragment perjorations/lOO

sq:uare jeet agaiMl effective area in I,ooo's square je~.

ATSF/TMT/04 ,Probability oj at uasl r fragment perjorafiioos/l00

square jeet agai1l6t effedivearea in 1,000'8 square jed.,

A.TSF/TMT/Oo Defll'eeflj sa'uratWn agai1l6t fotal weigh' r)j bombs for

4. fragmen~ perjoratWm/1008quare, Jeet and? jragmem perjoraffiomjl00 square feet of target.

SECRET

SECRET

P.art I: AIR ATTACK OF JAPANESE AIRFIELDS

Shq,el, AT5F/TMT Dale, IIF •• uuarr " .. , P(lse' 1

A.. GENERAL

Weapon selection and target seleclwn for the attack of Japanese airfields will depend upon th.e nim ·of themission. GenerDlly this is neutra1.iza~ tiOD. of tbeenemy's air power. Each specific attack must have a. defi.n.ite aim and this should be clearly defined.

The aim oja specific miBsion may be umporary neutralization of the airfield fora short period of time, or B'WItained n.eutralization over a longer period of time, The choice of weapons a.nd. targets will be determined by this .specificllim.

For wmp()r~ryMUtralizatwn the chief targets are the grounded aircraft and the landing areas.

For8'IUtained neutrali2ation the list of targets. is extended to include, in. addition to the above, hangars, repair f.p.cilities, stomge mciJities, and o.uxilinry instnllations.

'0. o

~

'"

9

o .:1:.

8. TEMPORARY NEUTBA.LIZA:TION 1. Weapon Recommenda.tlons.

The primnryobjectives for temporn.ry neutralization. are groundedairerufb AndlandiDg arens. No other airfield installations (hangars,. ammunition and fuel dumps, etc.) are of .sufficient importa-nce in this ~ype of attack to recommend an,y particular weapons which may be more effective· againsttbem than those weapons selected QS the most ·effective against lo.od.i.Qg areas

TA.BLE. I.-Weapon recommBndalioM

I

0.1)1. If available. OJllIleO. crr 0.1 ,500.

O.IIIeO •.• _. • CJ):I6aoo.

I,

llomb

~Ia tho QpeQ or IiO-I)OUlul F. (AN- wt .. _

III Wloo"ered 1'600t· M41).

!ll1lllU.

A.lm'att III oovuOOm. lOO-pOunclO. P.'

%tmollts. (A.N-Moo).

Landla,.ueM ••• _. __ •. 10000pa!I.QdO. P.' (AI<oI-Moo).

'TbelOO-pOUlid O. P. bomb (AN-MOO) .. m Illoorellcally wfor&tG 2 feet of 4.000 p. I. I. re:laferoed oon_t.e .. htan. drl>pped. Jrom 20,000 tOlet eJUtude (.trlklllil volocltr BOO fll).. Howo"crtbcrc I~ a 111gb probBblllty WRtthO bomb will break liP on 4,000 p. I'. I. rei.nfo!Wd CODWIltG e!IIb$ of Ihlolm ... In!Iltcr tlum I foot .. ball relCUlld. nom ailltudes 0"" f,OOOfoot.

• Th811)O.paund O. P. bomb (AN-MOO) mBr btaak up If till) tbJalme$!l of M" ..... ta p"vIn~ 118 In"",," ",. mo"". The :lJlG.pOond O. P. bom h r A.N-M 6'1l brooommend.cd for pl\vod rUIl.W~" of 1hI~ IlI'8$Wr tlum 8 Inches (r~1) li;ll111d Inl.BpB!l).

PU];I1..151'1"'0 IN OFFICIO OF Ae/.A$INrnU.·IG!!Ncm·. A. A.!' .•• $V eQMIlI'U.D PER· SONNELOF U. 5. AND BRITISH S.I1NVICES FOR ·TRE USE 01' .... u..IEO FORC8S·

and grounded o.ircra.ft... Damage achieved to these subsidiary in.stuJla~ions may be considered as merely boous. Grounded aircraft are best a.ttacked by strafing with fighter aircraft. Where this is not opera~iono.Uy possible, bombing with high explosive bombs to give fragment damo.ge is most effective·. Landing areas are best attacked with high explosive oratering bombs.

2. Force RequIrements.

The weightol attack required to accomplish tem.porary neutraliza.tion will depend on the area of the airfield and the portion under attack .. Since there are considerable variations in size, individuol estimates must be made for each target. These can be made by uelngaa a basis the qun.ntibies given in tables 2 and 3 for nn airdrome areaeqnel to 10 million square feet (2,000 by 5,000 foettGr instn.nce). These give the total weight to be delivered to the target. Total weight to be dispatched must be determined in the field fro·m known operational conditions peculiar to each unit.

Load requirements to damage or destroy grounded aircraft' in the open,wi.th the desired level of damage are given in table 2. .An upper and a lower limit nre given. and it is believed tho.t the required weight will foll between these two limits. (See appendix A fer a.ssumptions.and cGmputations.)

Load. requirements for cratering landing areas sufficiently to destroy aU possible strips usable by fighterlliruaft. are difficult to determine with any degree of certainty. Operational experience is the most reliable baeis, but little exists, unfortunabely. Ana.nalytical means of obto.ining approximate requiroments can be based on the QSsumption that all usable strips are pn;raUel to eo.eh other; this is a reasonable o.ssumption for long, no.ITOW landing arena. The degree of temporary neutralization depends mo.inly on the number of bombs dropped, and only slightly on their size (provided they are large enough to perforate any aurface layer), since fer temporary neutralization, time o·f repair is uBunJly 0. Bcoonda.ry oonsid·l)l'Q.tion. To.ble 3 g11'GB recommended numbers of bombs per 10,000,000

SECRET

SEC.RET

Shut: ATSF ITMT

Date; 1.I'F'.brulu,.19~'

P(lse; I

I Total "eJaht f'Ilq,aJfed ID 10111 fcrbllpt .anla 10,000,000 ~1IIf8 feat of tara.t

. ~. Lowu.1llnI1 (4r~ODI Ped'o~~~ 100 IQUBlIl fOOl) Upper Umlt (7 fl'IIImont pert'omtk!ns 100' IQ_ fooO

I.. .. ._

damqo . . . . . ... . ... .

»':r''''IIJ.~:md lOO-cf."~d 2fJOo"lU!d ~o'."'l'''.''d 1iJI.~:m~' ge.~:md IlJOoo'."'l'''.''d 2fJOow,lU!d tilO-o'."':Fd

0.10 U a.~ 2.0 .. 0 4.0 2;0 "0 U U 11.6
.'a:., U La 4.0 8.0 U U 8. ~, 6.5 lao 12.0
.80 t.o 8.0 11.0 l2.0 It.O 11..& u.s V.O 20.0 :nO
.10 U l2..0 Q.O IIU :20.0 10.0 :nO 12.1 21.0 21.0
.50 &.0 111.0 J.2.0 :15.0 21.0 1&0 iI'7.0 18.0' au 37.0
.eo 10.0 go.a 11.0 aa.O MO 17.0 a,a,'0 24,.0 ro.O !iO.O
.10 1&0 21.0 aI.a ~O 'i8.0 :12.0 e.O 80.0 &to &to
•. 80 1&0 811.0 21.0 115.0 1!2.0 3:1:0 61.0 '11).,0 86.0 &e.a
I; .go 26.0 1!2.0 811.0 80.0 88,0 ao 88.0 67.0 !2e.O WOO square feet <hopped at random within targeta.rea fer achieving tempor,ary nGutralization of fighter strips.

T AlILEl3.-Number (II crolt:ring bomb~ PI' lO,OOD,OOO 'quol',

feet Jar I~mporor!l netltraliJ'olionol landing area.

Absolute m In Im u m (oper.atIonaJ. data) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 200

Recommended minimum (operational data) 350

MInimum tor 50 percent probability o.tsuccesB

(theoretioal) ~ . • _. _ .450

.9

::> a :I:

'"

3.. Delay of Repairs.

To. diacourageand interfere with the filling oJ crnters nnd other repfl,ir work in eddition to damaging grounded AIC, it is recommended tha.t Butterfly bombs (M83) and long delay G.. P. bombs be used against airfields. These would be po.rticulo.rly effec~ive if dropped just before dark to halt repo.ir work during the night. It is also believed tbnt night figbters carrying out smell njght raids would discourage repair work,

It is recommended tho.t 10 percent of the toto.l lead camed be composed of Butterfly bombs fuzed delay and entidisturbenee and that 5 percent of the toW lead be 100~po\lDd G. P.'s fuzed long delny in equal numbers at .2,6, 12, and 24 hours.

C. SU.STAlNED NEUTBALIZATION

1. Grounded Alrerart and LandJng Areas.

The mosteifective weo.ponsago..inst these two targets are those recommended fortempotary neutraliza.tion. Whereas grounded AIC are always an importo.nt target, landing areas are not a wo.rth-wblle target unless tbeyare bombed often enough to keep them inoperative.

2. HangJl.rs and Repair Buildings.

In the o.tto.ok on these installations it is generoUy agreed thll.tthe primary object is to des trey the.ir contents. Experience has shown that highe'xpiesive weapons are most effective against hangll.rs (unlesa the hangars themselves are of combustible construction), and inoendiary weapons axe mos~ often effective .o.go.1nat repair faoili'tiea.

The moat destructive ·eB'ectsof H. E. bombs to hangars, repair facilities, R<Dd their contents are bInst and fragmentation. H. E .. bombs lI1.By also start fires in hangars by frngm.ent penetration of fuel tanks in the aircraft:.. Contents may best be destroyed by H. E. bombs whlcb explode above or beside them, or by bringing tbe structure down upon. them. Experience has .showntbat small H. E. bombs (containing less tban200 pounds of explosives) de less damage per unit weight to structures and light lI1.Boh.inel'yLhan larger bombs. Theref'ore, the 500~pound G. P. bomb is the smollest H. E. bombt.hat should be used. On the basls ofn.vailable inforD1.n.tion, tbe 500M, 1,OOOM, and 2,OOO-pound. G.. P. bombso.re very nearly equo.lly effective, weight fer weight, against these structuJ:les.

In order to fuze the G. P. bombs for maximum blasteifect,. account must be taken of European and Fax EflStern expurience which shows that only 0. smell percentage (appromnately30 percent in Europe)! of the AN-MIOO series ta.n fuzes are initiated by the light roofs of these structures. The recommended fuzing, whersll.vailable,is 0.01 second nose/nondelay tail. Meximam blast and. f:rngmentation do.moge will result whichever fuze initiates the bomb, An alternate fuzing is 0.1 second nose/nonde1ay tail. With this fuzing, i1 the tail fuze is a.ctl:vated by the roef, maximum structural dlllD.age resultsaud if activated on the floor, very nearly maximum bleatsnd fragmen~ tation dam,age to contents results ..

Incendiary bombs are recommended fer the small repair shopa and the larger repair shops ef combustible construction. The AN-M50, 4- pound I. B .. is recommended because of the greater chance of multiple hits required to start sustaining fires. Second choice is the AN-M41,. 70~pound I. B.Thiswill be particularly effective· against the la.rger combustible structures if bombing techniques. give a high degree of acclll'acy. The ANM69, 6~pound I. B .. is an effective altern.ate if the roofing is not heavier thancorru.gated iron or asbestos.

I $00 BEN SlIIl and. to~ .. 'tBrg(ltvlIl!l~tabUJ1;l> noloa nil"'eIlCtl &10" (Mm.

I6Iry 01 Borne B&cw11;l».

SECRET

SECRET

JOINT TARGET GROUP, WASHINGTON, D. c.

GENERAL ANALYSIS '

N .. ft!.uI

D",

Bomb

III.a&atI:

trll41!' ,:Il,OOO MIIII'e 600-poIIDd O. P. ' O,.o! _~

_. (AN-M&t). if ,lvaIJao ble,orU.

..... 40 ••• _

2O,tm 1.0 .... '.000 ICIIlin ,_to

0 .. « to.ODOl!Ql!ICO fon. ~~IIdlIU.:

~1;nIII_ ••••••

l,ooo.J)OWIdQ., P. (AN.MG6). 2,OOO-PC)W!d O. P. • •••• 40 •• _ •• (AN-MMJ.

Bame .. for WI' 116m., III' for ,e&ine II 'ill:

"'" WpnI. twlJ&l'.

Factory 1m:

w.u beIrlDI.. ...f,(iOO.po!IIId L. C. (AN-M~).

Bt.lframod... •••• IIOGopo1!D.d a. P. (A1MJ&tI. "l101!Dd L B. (AN-M.60I. "llOand L B. (AN-M60).

wt .••••.••• ,' Nondelay.

0lI1 _~,a O;Ol_Dd. or 0.1.

Wood _1tJuco ~.

6tull~p' .

3. Storage FacUlt,lesand AmUJary InstallatloDS.

Weapons recommended are listed in table 5.

These are quite general and are to betaken merely as guides,Bmce each target mWit bea.naJ,yzed

Sh.nto ATSF/TMT

Dole: I. F.&nuuy tt4'

Pose, !II

Bepara.tely and in detail in order to determine the most effective wea:pO.n for au over-all attack.

Bomb

FUel dI'unUI, ID u.. 2O-pound F ·lIIIt .

ope)

Fuel W1b. III lila IOO-llOWid 0., P......... D.l_Dd... 0.1133 leO-

open;. end.

Under,II"Oillld '"el' Sl:nIJJat bomb lb.t· wID .

.Iorqe:lpometntc.

AmlIllmltlon [gtbe' 2O-powIdF... .••. bt '

open.'

Ammlmlt!oDl.!Ddl!l'·, SrnIJJed bomb tb" wW _ •••

'PDWld,' ,penelf'lte.

a"l.Nllw........... 4-polllld L B. (AN-MW) .•..•..•...•.. !!llaUte ·o-poUIIA L 11.

(ANwM6$'):

Fwd <10 .

Adlgbmlf'ltloo Im.Ud. : ....• <10 _ ..

J:np.

O])8l'lt!Ollli bnUdID.p <10 .

BO!I4qliVtell' bnU<I •••••• <10 •• _ .

IDp.

B.un.clu' •••••••..••..•...• do ..

M .. ,~ , ••••• do _ ••

, MQJeoomplate ~!o!l[g _tlon "Attack 01 IUd dorago"Olltbll 101<1«. ! Moreeomlll&te iI.IJ<!u.aIlollli:lletUon "Attack tlf e.mm1mlt!Ou. .1olaP" of tloU fOlder.

SECRET

SECRET

Sheet, A TSF JTMT

Ogle, t. :F.bl'ul!lrr 1945

PagO!, 4

D. INTRODUf;TION

The aim of at.ta.ck of airfields is the neutra.li:zfL-. tion. ·of the enemy's air power. This ma,y be accomplished. in a number of ways other than th.o attack of airfields. The other methods can. be th.o destruct jon 01 the enemy'.so.irc.raft· manuiootwing and 8.S8emb~y facilit.ies, the destruction of his sources of fuels and lubricants, etc. The tactical deciaion to attaclt the enomy's airfields will result from the need to neutro.lize his air power as a. prerequisite for impending occupation. of enemy held territory by our own ground forces, or when neces9ary to prevent the enelllJ'"ttilm mterfering with th.o movem.ents of our supp y forces or ourstrategi.c bombing operations 00 the eoetlly's military power.

Neutralization ·ofthe enemy's air power by &ttackinghisairfiel.ds is difficult. to accomplish, even for short. periods, but it is possible. Recent reports from the Pacific Theater have indicated the need. to accomplish neutralization with more certainty and less cost. The object of this report. is to present the accumulated arperience gathered from all parts 01 the wo.rlda.nd to utilize this experience to establish the guiding principles needed to determine the most profitable methods and points for attack.

Most effici.ent destruction of the component parts ·ofan enemy airfield will result from the proper choice of tactiesaad weapons. Thecho1ee of ttu;tics will be governed by the conditions peculiar totibe time and place of attaCk, and can best be determined in .M.e field. It is the purpose of this report toindlceteehose tactics which ha.ve proven successful in all thea-tara o·f war so that thisexpe.riencecen be u tllized to improve futureopera-tions. It is realized that in planning anyparticula.r attack the governing conditions will vary.. This .report can onlyeuggest guiding principles.

Weapons recommended will be limited to those whi.ch are immediately available in !luantitll in the field. Othe.rweapons, .now &nilable only in limited quantities, may become obtainable in greater amounteand restrictions on their employ~ ment lifted. An .attemptwill be made to assess their probable performance. Opora.tionaIcxpe.rience with these weapons is limited and therefore their probable performance can be based only on limited. experimental experiencea.nd theoretical re.asoning.

One outstanding tact, which has been eatablished by experience in all thea.ters .isthe necessity for 81l8fa.iudtd/or1 if the airfield is to be kept out of action for more than a short period. Welltimed attacks, both day end night, at frequent but i..ttegular intervals are essential to accomplish

IlL, o

sustainedneutroJization. Sp.asm.odi.c bombing is of little value.

The effect of repeatedattaoks in lowering the ejftcieru:y and morak of airfield personnel is attested to by experience drawn. from all the&ters o.f war. This ·effect can be an important factor in the neutralization ·01 the enemy's air power, even when the actual pbysical damage is reletivel,y small. This lowering of e.fIiciencyand morale from repeated attacks is intangible and di.fB.cult·to evaluate. Experience to date does not indicate that it has been overestimated.

One ·01 the chief aims of the &ttack of airfields is th.e destruction oJ air-cro,ft. .Aims whichlll'e usually secondary, such 118 the destruction 0.1 hangars, buildings, ins tallatio.ns , bomb and fuel dumps, ete., may, in certain circumstancea, Corm the primary object of the attack. It is the purpose of this report toprese.n.t a structuml. Q;nalysis of the component parts. of Japanese airfields and to indicate the effeots of damage or destruction of the sa compo.nent parts upon the operation of alromft and hence upon the strengtb of the enem.y's air power.

Fo.r tempor.ar:y neu tnilizati on of enemy airfields (o.fe.w hours to a few days at most) the two m.ost important targets are grounded aircraft and landing areas. Experience bas sh.ownth&t it is easier to destroy aircraft on the ground than in aerial combat. Tactical surprlse to catch the aircraft on the ground will pay dividends in planes destroyed. Th.e relative Importance of these two targets will be governed by the conditions peculiar to each airfield.. Where the landing areas are restrioted to paved or unpaved runw'lLys by the nature of the terrain, and alternate landing areas are not a.voilabls, the importance of the runways as a target increases. It must be emphaaiaed, however, that destruction of the landing ·area by cratering is extremely difficult to accomplish because of the great weight of homba required to assure damage to all possible strips which.co.n serve as runways. The ease with which runways can be repaired, eve.n with limited mecheaical equipment, does not make these desirable targets. Attack of landing areas is best accomplished at the begiDning of the attook when it is desired to prev.ent the groundedeiroraft from taking off for the balencso! the raid. They &re the.n vulnerable to attack from succeeding elements.

Ifc01Iti'nued neutralization is desired, tibe list of targets must include grounded aircraft, hangars, repair fo.cilities, storage facilities, personnel Iaeilities and defeneiveo.rmament.The sustained effort required for continued. neutrAlization. must be emphasized,

SECRET

SECRET

. ~.. .. .,.

."JO.I~T .TARGET GROUP1 WASHINGTO~, ,D~ C.:

. ';'," G' ENE R A-L A N'A L Y 5 I 5' .

Shu', AT5F/TMT Dole". F.brua,,, 19.5 PC!,e, I

HI. TYPICAL dAPANESti AIRFIELD TARGETS

The following targets a.re typical of major airfields in Japan, Manchuria, Korea, China, and enemy~held ialands of thePacifio.

a. Grounded Iliror&ft.

b. Landing areas.

c. Hanglll'S ...

1. Simple truss structures (small, nearly square) ..

2. Arch t.ype structures.

3. Long, continuous or multiple span structures ..

4. Simple truss structures (large, long and narrow).

d. Repair fncilities.

1. Hangar type structures.

2. Factory type structures. 8. Small repair sbops.

e. Storage fa.cilities·.

1. Fuel and lubricants. 2.. Ammunition.

s. Engine and airframe spare parts.

4. Food. ..

5. Dry goods.

j. Aux:ili&ry installations.

1. Administration buildings ..

2. Operations buildings.

8. Headquarters buildings .. 4. Control wWS.rs.

5 .. Bll.ttacks.

6. Mess balls ..

7. Taxiways.

8. Service aprons and hardstands.

NOTIl,.-De!eludve, annnm.ent (inoludlng AlA guns and auxillary equipment) is not CODS lde red In thlareportBlnoe It is covered In dtsou9Ilioll" Attaok of guns" olthia lolder.

SECRET

SECRET

Shut: ATSF/TMT

Dal,,: te ,hb'UCllf1 "'45

Page: 6

IV. GROUNDED AI£;

A.. GBNEBAL

When the tnctical decision bas been made to render un airfield inoperative by do.maging or destroying grounded aircraft, frequent a.tta.ckB, both day and night, o.ti:r:regula.r intervals, and opportunely timed (for example, when planes are being refueled) are essentio.l if th.eairfield is to be kept out of action for more than 0. short period. Spasmodi.o attaok bas proven of little value when~ ever used. Attack ofsatellite uirflelde, coneentro.ted in time, should be given due eeneideration in the over~all plan.

B. STRAFING ATTACK

9

:I o :I: <II

In general, whenever operational conditions permit, strafing is the most effici£nt met.hod of achieviI\g damage or destruction to grounded aircraft. The greo.t etrectiveness· of fighters sad fightorfbombers instl'EJJing attacks with machine guns (particularly with incendiary ammunition) and cannon. has been proven by experience in all then.t-ers of W&l'. Operational evidence is not sufficiently complete to assess t.he effectiveness of eir-bomerocket projectiles agn.inst grounded airCJ'!l.·ft·. Nevertbe1ess, consideration should be given to their employment. The oompM'8.tive accura.cy of the air-borne rocket projectile at longer ranges, and the possible decreased risk to the launching aircrnft because or this grea.ter l'n.nge, point to tbe possible advo.ntagesof this weapon.

C.-H.E. A.TT:A.CK

Damage or destruction of the grounded aircra·ft in the open 01' in uncovered retletment$ with H .. E. bombs is accomplished primarily by projected bo.mb fragments. Tbe20-pound frag. bomb is most efficient (except Ior minimum altitude atto,clts) for this purpose. One pound lor pound beals its superiority .is marked in that the total groundarea that can be covered with fragm.ents capa.ble or eJ'f·ective damage to grounded aircra.ft· is from one to three times that of any other H. E. bomb, The 20~pound frag. bomb is most effective when used from low to medium altitudea, From high aJtitudes an important percentage of effective fragments (perhaps up to 50 percent) is lost to usefulness because of the deeper penetration of the bomb intotbe ground before de tonation , and because ofthe greater downward deflection of the lro.g:m:ent.adue to tbe greater vertioal volocity of the bomb when the explosion occurs.

Oomparative ejJi.citncu.s of several H. E. bombs

are given by the curves of Sheet A TSFITMT105 in appendix A. These give tile to~o.l weigllt of bombs required to damage or destroy the grounded nir'crolt with the desired degree of assurance, It. is assumed thattheto.rget area covers 10,000,000 .square feet and that aU bombs are dropped at random within this area.

Where operational conditions permit its use from minimum altitttdt8.. the 2a~pound parafrflg. bomb may be more efficient than the20~poUDd !rag. bomb. Because of a striking angle nearer to the verliico.l and a lower st.rilting velocity, fragment density from the 23-pound perafrag. bomb may be as much as three times that ofthe .20~poUDd fTag. bomb.

Whereo.ircro.ft· are in 'U1t.copel'ed revelments, a bit (surface bw::st) within the revetment or at its mouth is required to damage or desLroy the aircraft within. The greater probability of 0. hit within the revetment with the 20-pound frag, bomb foUows from the greater number that can be earried per plane load. Oper,ational evidence hassaown tba.tn 20-pound frn.g. bomb which lands insidea revetment up to 80 feet in width will effectively damo.geor destroy the airoraft within the revetment.

Neitber present limited e."'t'Perimental evidence nor theoretioo.l reasoning point to o.ny superiority of t.he larger bombs airbur.st to the surface burst of anequivalent weight or 20-pound frag. bombs against aircraft in revetments, Although airburst will overcome shielding provided by natural ground contours or artificin1 revetments, the probability of dOomage or destruction. to aircraft in revetments bya surface burst within the revetment wi.th the 20-pound frag, bomb (for equa.! tot.alloads) is .s~ill two or more times greater than for the larger bombsairbursu at optimum height located over the target within effective range.

Grounded airorllJt may be destroyed or efi'ec~ tively damaged by debris resul~ing from cratering, The vulnerable radius for dnmage from debris may be from two to four times the orateI' radius, depending upon the depth of penetration bel ore detonation and the type of ground. Since, however, the .eff·ectiveground areo. for debris damage is less thanthe efl'·ecti.vo ground area for fragment damage, th.is type of attack is not recommended when the primary to.rget is grounded au'Crruft ... Where the objective is neutralizatlon oC landing areas and dumagato grounded aircraft,. tho successful eratering of the In.ndingareas may be necompacicdi by oonsidcrablo inoidion1in.l do.m!l.ge to dispel11edo.ircl'o.ft. in the landing area, particularly .if the debris is concrete 01' rock

SECRE.T

SECRET

Where the attack is directed again.staircraft in coveredrevetm~nts (ex.cept in those easea where the coveringllcts merelyo.s camouflage) the 20- pound hag. bomb (because of its instantaneous fuzing) wiJl Dot peb.etra.te the roof. The lOG-pound G .. P. bomb, fuzed O.Ol-second delay, will be most ·e£fective. If the roof cover is heavy enough to preclude the use of the lOO-"pound G. P. bomb, attack of these targets is Dot profitable and aeu-

i tmlization of theairfieId is best accomplished by . ~ attacks directed at other inetalletions.

~

·c

~ ii

I

~

~ .~ ~.

9 Ii:

E

t

~

t-

Il:

C

!!;.

Shul: A TSF /T.MT

OQh,: I.F.brl,lafJ t94'

PC!ge: ,

D. INCENDLlBY ATTACK

Attack of grounded aircra.ft with incendiary weapons is generally not recommended. Incidental damage may be obtained when incendiary weapons are directed at other installations. Where low-level or minimum wltitude attacks are operationally possible, consideration should be given. to the employment of napalm bombs. There is insufficien~ operational evidence at presentto draw any conclusions as to their cosaparativeefl'ectiveness ..

SECRET

SECRET

• I • -I

,JOINT TARGET GROUP" WASHINGTON, D. C.

. G E H,E R A~:L' A.'N A:'L,Y 5,I:S'" :. ','

.. ...

- - - - -

Sheet, ATSF/TMr

DClh~' .1 F.brUI!lrp' 1945

PClge: I

V. lANDING AREAS

A. DESCRIPTION

J.ll.p.llnese landing areas are of two types. One is the long, narrow "landing strip" with adjacent areas of cleared and leveled ground. Th.ere may be one or more paved or unpaved runways. whose orientation will- be dependent upon the limi ta~ tiODBOf the terrain and the direction 01 the prevailing winds, The dimensions of the runways are d.etermined by the type of a.ircraft usiDg the airfleld. Usuany I runways for fighter aircraft will be about 100 to 200 feet· in width and 3,00000 3,500108t in Jength. Runways for mediumand heavy bombers will generallJ' be 200 to 300 feet in width. and 4,500 to 6,000 feet· in length. The other type o·f landing al'ea.,kn.own as a "landing ground," is 0. broad rectangular, trio.ngular,or circular area which parmits a.irc·raft to take off or land in a variety of directions. It may .have paved runways similar to those for landing strips or the entire area may be '" cleared and leveled aurfo.ceofgrass, po.cked clay, or rolled earth.

The mo.terial used in surfacing the runway maybe!

(1) concrete, (2)aspbnlt, (3) macadam, (4) gravel,

(6) crushed stone,

(6) crushed coral, (7) packed. earth, (8) gross (turfed or

scdded).

II. o

Paving mnterial used at !lOY particular airfield can best be determined in the field from 0. knowledge or materials available, the amount and. type of traffic,gener.o.J climatic and geographic conditions, and any other intelligence informp,tion that ma.y be obtainable. Many of the JapGnese airfields do not have paved run.ways but theriil .is a definite trend towards paving to provide allweather fields. Informefion ebout the thickness of paving is limited, but in generru it will be thinner tbnn Americanpa,ving. The thickness will vary with the na.~ure o·f the eubeurface materialand the thickness olthe base course. Ooncrete pavements are probably 4 to6 inches thick, and Ilspho.lt paved runways (including base course) are probably 6 to 8 inches thi.ck.

B. CBATEBING A.TTA.CK.

Attacks on mndingaren.s are intended to deny their use to enemy aircraft. This is accomplished by cratering the Iendingsreas with high~exploBlve bombs. delBY fuzed, toassure p~netration into the ground before explosion. A successful attack requires a great weight of bombs, uniformly dis-

tributedover the area so that all possible strips in the nrea will be covered. In this connection it must be recognized that Japanese fighterair.craft require a comparatively small strip (50,...;75 feet in width and 1,50D-'2,OOO leet in. length) from which to operate, Beeauaeof the ease with which craters can be lilled and thesurfa.ce. repaired, even with limited meehanieal equipment,. themfield can be kept inoperative Ior onl_y sbort periods, Even with extensive cratering, it is only necessary to mak.eemergency rcepairs to the least cratered part of the landin,g area to enable .p,ir.. craft to take off and land.

Oaeeuocesslul attack on a landin_g area can be expected to keep the airfield. unserviceable for only a limited number of hours. Where there are ~errain restrictions upon the number of possible a trips, 0. euceessful uttaek may keep theair1i·eld out of oparatlon tor a. longer period of time. Extensively bombed Japanese o.:irfields which have bean occupied by our forces bave been. put into service in an average time of 2 to 3 days, during which ma,jor repairs were made to various installn.~ tiona and repairs to runways were ·ora permanent nature.

Whet'e surprise is an element of the attnck, ereteringof the landing area at the beginning of the strike will keepgroundedaircrolt on the ground and vulnerable to attack by succeeding elements of the attaoking forces BDd will also minimize the possibilities of attack. by air-berne fighters.

To insure effective aurface damage to the landing area it is necessary for the bombs to be spread uniformly over the whole area. This is most easUy accomplished by high-level pattern bombing, Cr.a.tering of the landing areas must be planned to do the greatest umountof damageto the surfaee area, a.ndlor to displace the largest volume ofmo.~erial. The decision as to which is more important must be based.' upon a knowledge of the ground etructure and tho eurCacin,g material. In certa.in instances damo.ge to the subsurface. drainage system may necessitate m.aj.orrepa.il's; for this., large craters ItrG required ..

The effectiveness of H. E. bombs in cratering of soils depends upon (1) the type of soU, (2) depth of penetration 01 the bomb before detonatlon, (3) the type of bomb (i.e., its charge/weight ratio, etc.). Landing areas Bre commonly constructed on ground consisting of a compacted mixture of soils rather thp,n only one specific soil, A vaUable information (table 6) leads to theconclusi.onthllt the small G. P. bombs do more damage weight for weight. DamageIs here d·efined to include both sudace area. destroyed and volume of material

SECRE.T

S£.C.Rn

Sheet: A TSF/TMT

Dale: I.F.\I, ... o" 1.945

Page: ,

TABLEI 6 .. -(jrom Dill. 9, N. D. R. C:) Craler'-.'Ur:face anl4 dtBlrOllud ant'lllOiume d.irplaced

Bomb

loo.poU!ld O. P.AN~M 30 0.025 or loor« .

260-potmd O. P. AN~M 61 ' 0.025 or JImIl"" ..

6OOoPotmd Q. P. AN~M 04 , 0.024 orlongor '

ilOOl)opound O. P. AN-M 65..... 0.10 (I.Io!>~r .

=:.!:~~ :~:::.f,L::::::::::: ~:~~'~;i~~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::

l,ooo.pound9AP AN-A!~ 0.01 .

o.oogl o.lMl 0.161
.. 090 . .149 .131
.083 .104 .117
.1»2 .1110 .143
.Ot? .087 .07G
.Im .1111 .10
.0761 .I~ .076 a.w .211 .~IG .211 .Ut .2211 .~

2. It I. til 1.IP .111

.83 "

•. 711 !

.(;7

2.60 1.78 1.41 I.:n 1.03 •. 00 .&2

NOT' .-Tbfllbove vlllllOS'l!l1l (or!>ollt I" ved Nil! unpaved I'UD1Q,YlWbOll'U!e bam III are drop[lO!d trem lIIt1tudJI, ~b ... 6,rXXJ f~t, Whl!D tbe· oJ Utu.do 01 ~1Ue 18 U!!.dCl '.000 fOOl, tbe vBlI!OI' are ool" for 1lDPB'01!dI:UllWllYl ..

displaced. The lOO .. pound G. P. bomb will be most effectiv·e for this purpose.

Recentrurperinients by N. D. R. C., Drviaien .2, do not indicateauya.ppreciable differences in crater dimensions between paved or unpaved areas for the common thicknesses of runway pavemanes when bombing from altitudes above 5,000 lee~. Hence, the lOa-pound O. P. bomb will be most effective for both paved or unpavedareas. However, where the paving is 6 inches or more of eoacrete, the lOO~pound G.P. bomb may break up underimpact, in this case the .250-pound G. P. bomb will prove more ·effective.

The crater dimensions depend 011 the depth of penetration before detonation. This will be determined by the delay in. fuzing and the striking angle Bod velocity. Recent experiments and actual field study show tho.t for hard ground the delo.y in fuzing (for O. P. bombs) is unimportant beyond a certain minimum, This results from the curved path of the bomb in the ground. Maximum altitudes of release aro therefore only of importance in de~ermi.ning aiming Ilccuracy and

dispersi.on of the bombs. The possibility of ricochet of the bombs when the striking angle is fiat· will fix a. minimum altitude of release, For the type oiground considered, it is believed that the maximum angle of impact should not exceed 450, which will fix a minimum altitude of release at 3,000 feet for level bombing ..

Since successful eratering of landing areas call accomplish only temporary neutralization because ot the ease with which repairs ean be made, means to interf·ere with these repairs will extend. the time the airfield is uneervicesble, Long delay bombs, with fuze settingssto,ggered from 2 to 24 hours and an tipersonnei, antidieturbance "butterfly" bombs can be used for this purpose. E.xperience with the German "butterfly" bomb has shown that it is effective when used. to disrupt repairs at night,and that this interference caD be aeeomplished ,vith considera.bleeconomy ·of effort·. Ccnsideraticnahould also be given to the use of "crow's-Ieet" since experience has shown that they have a. definite nuisance value, particularly at night.

5 EC.RET

SECRET

Shul, A TSF ITM.T

Dal~: I. February 1'4'

PClge, 10

VI. HANGARS

A. TYPES OFlUNGABS

The primary function of a hangur is to provide .8. covered area for the storage, maintenance, and assembly ofaircfaft. Bnngn:rs are desirable but not essential as evidenced by the fact· thata.ircrnft have been operated sueeessfully for long periods in tropicel, temperate, and aretie climates and through ellseasons with onlycllnvllS shelters or awnings. However, the hangars will contain aircraft, tools,and other repair and assembly equipment whose destruction will limit o.ircro.Ct mainteDan.ce and assembly.. In these cases the contents of the hangar will be the primary target and attack of the hanga;r should be directed towards this purpose ..

Since the hn.ngar serves only as a shelter, any structure having sufficlen.t strength to support its own wei.ghta.nd to resist theexternal Joada that mll:y be applied by the, weather and climate and bavingsuflicient clear span ·of rcofaad doors to accommodate theaircro.Ct will serve as a hangar. Asa result,a wide variety ·of etruetures have been used.

An analysis of about 250 hangars, located in Formosa, Manchuria, Korea, and. Southern Japan, from ae.riale;nd ground cover .. indicates tha.t Japanese hangars can be divided into four basic types ..

1. Type 1 Hangar (Slmp.le Truss).

This type of hangar,shown in figure ATSFI TMTjDl, is the one most commonly used by the Japanese. Appro.ximately70 percent of the total number of hangars investigated were ·of this type .. The basic shape is shown in ATSF1TMT/Dlo.., type of trusses in ATSF1TMTjDlb and veriaticns in roof details in ATSF/TMT,Dlc. Varied designs result from differ·ent combinations or trues selection and roof det.ails.

The roof trusses may be framed into columne which transmit the loads to the ground, In these cases the walls are merely panels whose function is to keep the building weather tight, hence they will be of relatively light mo.terirue. The roof trusses may n180 be supported on the external walls in. which case the walls are likely to be of fn.irly hen.vy masonry construction. In either event, in both Japan and Formosll., the structures can be expected to be securely braced ag.d<inst borizonta.l forces since these areas· aresubfect to earthquakes and. typhoons. The lateral brn,cing mo.y conawt. ·of cxtorno..} butt.rcoocsor extol'DBl tle-rodsor a system of internal bracing.

Roofs and nonload bearing walls will most fre-

quentIy be of corrugated asbestos or eerrugsted galvanized iron. In areas where wood is especially plentiful, the roofs and walls may besbeatbed in this Dll\teriaI. Trusses and columns for hangars having spans exceeding ISO feet will probably be made o.f steel; Hangars having shorter spans may be framed in either steel or timber. It is probable tha:t full usa will be made of locally available materials.

Dimensions of hangars v.o.ry considerably. The frequencies with whlch clear span dimeneions were observed are recorded in table 7.

T.AllLIil7

PN!l.I!e!ley

, "I' aooUrr"e.noe

60-70 ~:
704) 14
1lC-1I0 liS.
110-.130 16
11I11-I1IO t6
160-1lOO II
Over 200 '0 It will be noted that clear spans of approxima:te1y 100 and 140 feet are the most common. Lengths of hangera vary considerably and no attempt will be made at clnssification.. Truss spacing will genero.lly average 20 feet ..

2. Type 2 Hangar.s (Arch. Type).

TWa hangar is thenrurt most common type 0.1 structure,comprismgabout 25 percent of ell hanglll'S investigated. The basic shape is shown in sheet ATSF/TMT!D20.. The arches may be framed in 0. variety of ways. 81.'(. representatlve types of arch framing are shown onsbeet ATSFI TMT/D2b. The roof may be either gabled or curved, Since basically type 1 and type 2 hangnrs have the same ehape, they may be difficult to distinguish.. The rise to span ratio maybe IL dis~ tinguishing feature in identification since the ratio is generally lo;rgcl' for arches thaD for truases, averaging about 1:3 for the former and 1:1 for the latter. This statement only indicates average conditions since archeseen be built with a much smaller rise to span ratio.

Frequently,. arch type structures do not have walls that can. be distinguished from the roof. The arch frame may be carried down to ground level and covered throughout with thes&me material. This material may be wood sheathing,. corrugated asbestos, or corrugated iron. Where walls e:riot, t.hey will mo~t boqucntly be of tho panel type (nonload bearing) and the wall material similar to that on the roof. If woJls are used, the

SECRET

SECRET

Shul: ATSF/TMT

Delle:. 1.1 F.bruary 1'.'

Pase: 11

horizontal thrust from the arches will require external buttresses or in tern 0.1 tie rods ttl', ceiling level.'l'he latter will not be oftenenconntered because of the limitations on the clear height within the hangar.

Arches will most frequen.tly be 01 steel, Of the arch type hangars investigated about three-fourtha were of the type shown on sheet A'l'SF/TMT/Pl E Tb·····his dste~, dldamb··ondh· mJe8h arch apparfenbtl! ha.sd

Q . eeneVt;1opey Leo.po.nese as a pre Q.;ncate •

~. ha.nga.r of standard design. It has been particula.rly commonst advanced bases to which materials m.ust beshipped,sllch as the Kurile Islendeead Islands of the South and Centra.l Peeific, Clear spans are usunlly 100 or 140 feet.. This type of hangar is often found with attached sheds along one or both sides. These sheds .ar8 used to house the too1s and equipment required for maintenance and repairs to the aircraft.

The sho.:pe of the roof may conform to that of the arch, 01' it may be gabled byusing triangular framing above the true arch. The latter is particularly common. Monitors mayor may not be added to the roof. The frequency of occurrence does not lend to any conclusionaes to which is

more common.

8. TypeS Dangar (Long llultlple .. Span).

A hangar of this type is shown on sheet ATSF/ TMT/D3. It is similar to the assembly nod manufnctuEing buildingsco.mmonly found in aircraft plants. These hangars are most orten found at airfields associated witbairel'oCt manufacture or modification centers.

These s~ru.ctures vary so ma.rkedlyin size, shape, design, and material that no genernl description is possible. Doors may be either at the ends or along the sides. Clear spans may be aa great as 250 feet, though it is probable that clear spn.ns exceeding 150 feet will be very limited. These structures mny be Crnmed in either steel or timber though timber framing will generally not be used for clear apans exceeding 100 feet. Because of the variations in size, shape, and rnateriaIs., these etructuresehould be individually ana.lyzed to establish type of construction, rnateria.ls, and most effective· weapons.

"

I:;

iu", o

~.

o :I:

4:. Type 'HBngar (SI.mple Truss Wltb S.lde Doors).

This is the most infrequently encountered type of hangar. Only two examples of this style of hangar were found, one of which is shawn O.D sheet A TSF /TMT /D4. The hangars of this type were

constructed with wooden. trusses supported OD masonry bearing wa.lls. The roofs were covered with corrugated galvonized iron, Because of the few hangars or this type eneounteredvconclaaions DS to vulnerability .m.ust be arrived at individuo.lly.

B.TYPES OF DAMAGE

Attack of hangars of all types is intended to destroy contents. This may be done directlyor it may be done indirectly by collapsingthe hangar on ita content-s. The choice of weapcnawill be governed by the decision as to which method is moreeeonomieel of effort.

For structural dnlllD.ge to the hangar (to collapse it on its contents) II.n explosive charge over 200- pounds is required to cut any of the important members, The 500-pound G .. P. bomb is therefore the smallest that can be used, Detonation of the bomb is desired just below the roof level, since 0. bomb detonating in this position will also dlll:llI\lg'6 the hnngo.r contents with its projected fragmente. A nondelny tail fuze would be best for this purpose. However, the presently aVlI.ijable tail fuzes are of the inertin. type and function when the bomb is decelerated upon striking. The roofing meterial of the majority of the Japrmesehang.ars is extremely light (corrugated asbestos, corrugated iron, and wood sheathing) so that unless the bomb hi.ts a structural me.mber it will probl\bly not be .sufficiently decelerated to o.ctivate the fuze.. It is estimated thn.tonly about 30 percent of the bombs striking the roof will also strike a structuralmember. Consequently, unless the roofing material is heavy (over 3 pounds per square foot for small G. P. bombs) the inertia type fuze cannot be expected to Iunction, and the o..oI nose fuze should be used if available.

Structural damage to tbe hangar can also be accomplished by cruterlng at the supporting members. Since damage to the supporting members is limited to the area. of the crater, and undermining 01 only ODe support will Dot generally cause structural oollapse (because, of the .etability inherent in a continuous design), it is reoommended thnt the bomb be capable of Corminga crater large. enough to include two adjacent supports.. Usual spsoing for supports is approximately 20 feet. TWs indicates that the smoJJ:est bomb to be employed should be the SOO-pound G, P. bomb, Oontents of the ho.ngar maybe damaged by crater debris from this bomb thaugh this will usually be less tha.o damage to contents from the fragments ole. bomb exploding just below roof level.

SECRET

SE.CRET

Sheet: ATS'/TMT

Delle: II 'F.bruarr 1945

PC!9~: 11

VII. BEP AIR FACILITIES

A. TYPE OFSTBUCTUBES

Bepairshops are used for the o.ssombly of aircraft, major repairs, and overhaul. The buildings usually contain valuable machine tools, machinery, spare pa.rts,andsupplies. Destruction of the repair shops. will have no immediate effect upon theopera:tion of the airfield. Where sustained neutralization is desired, destruction of the shops end their contents will limit the amount of repairs that can be made to damaged aircra.ft.

1. RaDgarType RepalrShops.-These are si.m:ilar to the structures discussed under hangars and the structural o.nalysis and weapon recommendations will be the same ..

2. Factory Type Repair Sbops.---The factory type repair shop willg,eneraUy be found a:t pannanent rear bases which are used as modification centers. The buildings are single a to.ry , industrial type with light sLesIor timberIramed members. Saw-tooth roots, to provide natural interior lighting, are co.mmonly used in .sin_gle story Japanese f.actory conetructionand will often be used for repair shops. Inar~assubjeot to high winds and earthquakes thO!y can. be expected to be framed and braced to res.ist these loads. In other areas they may be of wall beo.ri..ng eonstruotion,

The limited number of st.ructures examined permite eubdivislon only into two clasees (1) short span. buildings, (2) long span buildings (see shoet AT,sF/TMT1D5)..Tbe short span buildings are characterized by small,practicolly square bays (o,pproximate dimensions 25 to 85 feet) and low ea.ve heights.. ,structural members maybe of steel or wood, The exterior walls may be of m.asonry oonstruction, in which case they will provide structural support for the extO"riortrusses,. or tb.ey may be light panels of wood,corrugated asbestos or corrugate d iron with the exterior supports for the trusses provided by exterior columns. The prineipal distinguishingch.aracteristics of long span buildings are the longer spans or the roof trusses and the greater height to eaves. The spEwing between trusses, which is governed by the economicaJspans for the roof purlina will not be mltterinUy different than for short SpltD buildings. This results in. long, narrow bays (approximate dimeneions afe20 to 30 feet in width and 60 to 90 feet in length). The roof trusses will more

orten be made .of steel in the long span buildings since they are more economical. Wood trusses should not be ruled out since the effort to conserve s~eel. may result in timber trusses for the newer buildings. Walls and roof covering will be similar to those used forshor~spll,n buildings.

Damage to the contents of the factory type repairshopa may be moreeconomicoJ1y achieved by collapse of the,structure. Where the eonstruction analysis indicates that the buildings are of the wall-beerlng type, demage tothestrueture is best accemplished by the blast effect of lo.rge H. E. bombs. Those st.ructures which are framed and braced to resist lateral loads are mere resistant to blast.. Structural damage can be accomplished by cutting tho structural members or undennining their .supports ...

3. SmaU Repair Shops are the most numerous.They are used principally to house the machine tools, machinery, apare parts, and. supplies, These repair shops vary coDsiderably in size and Iorm, The moat common type, however, isa rectangu1ll.r building (long and narrow) with 11 gabled. root. This permits the use of Il. simp.le triangular roof truss, of short span, which can be framed insteel or timber and supported on bearing walls or exterior columns...· Since 193.7 the Japanese have made a considerable ·effort to mmimize the use of steel. Repair shopa of this type will therefore be most commonly framed in wood, Inthose areaswbere wood is abundant the walla and roof will be alieathed in wood. In otberarens where wood is not easily available, the wall and coof covering may be or corrugated asbestos .or corrugated iron .

.Attack directed at the contents of the small repnir shops w'ill generally require the minimum effort. Since 0. large percento.ie of repair shops of this typelll'e frllmed in wood and have walls and l'oofssbeathed in. wood, incandiory weapens will be the most efBcient·for these structures.· Repair shops built of materials othol' than wood are not vulnerable to fire (unless the contents are inflammable) and H. E. weaponsare lndlcased fer these targets. Repair shops wit.h masonry bearing wolls are vulnerable to blast and damage to the contents can be accomplished by collapse of the structure. Medium size G. P. bombs are indicated for the noncombustible repair shops.

SEC.RET

SECRET

Sheet: A TSF ITMT

Dole, IIF.bruar,1945

Pogu: 13

VIII. STORe AGE FACRITIES

A. IDND.S OF STORAGE

Th.e Cacilities built to housastoreaat J.apanese airfields are designed to protect go 0 ds and sup~ plies from exposure. They wiII vary conaidero.bly in shape,size, and form depending upon the conditions peculiar to each individual site. Permanent roor bases may have well-constructed structures in sufficionL numbers to house most or the atores. Advanced buses are more likely to bave makeshift arrungements and only the more perishable stores will be housed. Other stores are likely to be dispersed in the open, covered with tarpaulins, and camouflaged where possible.

The important Il,irfi·eld items that require storage are 0) oil and gasoline, (2) ammunition, (3) engine and air-frame spare parts, (4) food, (5) dry goods ..

1. 011 and GasoUn.e may be stored either in small drums or lcrgetanks, Where the storage is in drums, the total supply is broken up nnd dispersed in dumps througbout the airfield aroo. The dispersed gl'oups of drums may be bidden from aerial identification by ca.mou11age or nt-rock made more difficult by protective revetments. In either cese, wide dispersal will make destruction 01 tho tarol supply exceedingly difficult, and since the totolsupply on hand Is normally in excess of immediate needs, deetruction of only part of this supply will be an inconvenience and not make tbe airfield inoperative.

Oil and gasoline may also be stored in large tanks. These will most often be found at the permanent rear bases, The tanks are usually buried Of dug into sides or hills. Identification from the air will be extremely difficult·. A successful o.tt.nck on these facilities mny bave 0. more pronounced effect on the operation of the airfield it flo large part of tho supplies is concentested in these tanks, but-this is unlikely slnes emergency supplies are usually kept available for thiseontingency ..

2. A.mmuoJtlon. of a.lltypes (including bombs) is usuoJ1y stored in heavy reinforced concrete structures, underground vaults o.nd/or diapersed in the open. At permanent rear basss the storage will ordinarily be in heavy concrete strueturee or underground vaults. The large amounts ·01 ammunition ordin!lorily kept on hand often exceed the co.p.o.city of the permnnentstructureso.nd the excess is piled inthe open in protective revetments, or stored in light sheds. At edvenced airfields porm.o.nent installo.tiona will bo!lo~ II> minimum o.nd storage will be in dispersed open revetments and in light,. camou.l:1nged sheds.

Ammunition stored in tho heavy concrete s tru 0- tures or underground vaults is a difficult target to II.ttack. The concrete structures will generally be small in plan (a. 50 by 50 foot building will seldom be exceeded) and have heavy roof slabs (4 to 5 foet thick) and side walls (2 to 3 feet thick). Underground vaults will be equally difficult to penetrate. Those subsurface vaults which are built into the sides of hills mo.y have 0. tunnel entrance 30 to 50 feet longand the thickness or cover will be sufficient to lTlCt.ke them bombproof to ordinary weapena,

Sines ammunition stored in the open is dispersed, destruction of tho en tiro supply is most unlikely.. Individual groups are vulnerable to o.ttackn.od can be destroyed. Destruction 01 only part or the supply willngain be only an ineouvenience and will not lI.fi'cct the operation of the field ..

3. Engine and Airframe Parts may be stored in a. variety of structures or if well crated or boxed may be stored in the open. Permanent storehouses are more likely at rear bases, and vary considerably in sias. Variations in form will be more limited. Usually they are long, narrow buildings, one story high, Tho variations in width of these buildings will be only from 30 to 50 feet but the vnriation in length will be much grcater, fl'om50 to 300 feet. Tile small span of these structures makes possible the useof simple, triangular roof trusses which may he of cit her steel or timber. The trusses m.ay be supported on the exterior walls (wall bearing construction) 01' framed into columns, The materials used. for roof covering may be wood sheathing, corrugated asbestos, orcorrugated iron, The framed buildings will hnve walls or materials similar to tbat used for roof co, ering, but the bonringtypc walls will be of brick or concrete masonry,

The spare parts, whether stored in tho open in their boxes 1111d crates or in storehouses, are vulnerable to attack by fire. Storage in the open will be in dispersed groups so that widecoverage of the allea is desirable. This indicates the employment o·f the small incendiaries to start many fires which can be mutunlly supporting. Attack of the storehouses will depend upon the taotios tho.tcnD boemployed.. Where only ano. bombing is possible the small incendiories are Ilgain indicn,ted but where .o..0Curncy can be improved and the bombs directed u.t individual buildings,the larger I. B.'s will give 11 fast starting, developing fu'o whiob is moro diffioult w control.

4:. Attae.k of Food SupplIes is normally not worth while. Destruction .of these supplies will

SECRET

SECRET

not affect the operation of the airfield except in those cases in which the target is isolated and supplies are difficult to replace. The effect on the operations of the field will only be felt sometime after the destruction of food supplies and only in decreased efficiency and morale. The food supplies are normnlly kept in special storehouses at permanent airfields. These will be similar in construction to those used to store spare parts. Weapon selection will be determined by the same principles. At advanced bases the

Sheet: ATSFjTMT

Dole: .1 F.bruarr 1945

Page: 14

food supplies will be stor d in wooden sheds or other makeshift shelters. Nonperishable supplies may even be stored in the open and simply covered with tarpaulins. Weapon selection will be as above.

6. Dry Goods fall in the S8.Ill6 category aa food supplies. They are less essential than food and their destruction can only be of nuisance value. Attacks dir cted at other targets may destroy these supplies. In no case are they of importance as a. primary target.

SECRET

SECRET

IX. AUX.ILI.ABY INSTALLATIONS

A. BUILDINGS

1. AdmJnistration Buildings, etc.

Administration, Operati~8, and Headquarters Buildings and Control Towers can be grouped together since their functions are relat d. Experience has shown that their destructlou is little more than an inconveneince since tempol'nry and makeshift structures can be readily improvised, H should be emphnsized Lhnt modern n.ircro.ft rely n great deal upon ground installaaions 101' their control so tha. destruction of these control centers will ha.ve Il. considerable, though only temporary, effect on the n my's flying orguniza ion. An individual analysis of each airfield is r quired to ass ss the degree of disruption to airfield ontrol due to destruction of thea structures,

The multitude of types oC buildings permits only the division into two classifications (1) combustible, (2) fire resistive and noncombustible. The former are likely to be found at new airfields (built since 1937), recent additions to old airfields and at advanced buses. The latter are more likely to be found at older airfields within the territories whicb ! t. ' Japan haa controlled at least 10 to 15 years. The

~ definition of these buildings into each classification ; will be determined by the type of material, ith ~ which bhey 0.1" built, Combustible stru Lures 15 will hav wooden Irames, timber roof tru ses and ~ wood, corrugated asbestos, or corrugated iron siding and roofing. The IlU\jority of these structures will also have wooden floors. The fire resistive and noncombustible structures will have brick, stone or concrete load bearing walls, steel roof trusses, and tile, corrugated asb stos or corrugated iron roofing. Floors mny be of ither wood or concrete.

...

ti

i

OJ

9 e

9 5

:t III

... o

m 9

o :I:

Sheet: A TSF ITMT

Date: J8 Februa" 1945

Page: 15

2. Living Quarters.

Destruction of barracks and mess halls will have no immediate effect upon the operation of the airfield. Temporary quarters can be readily improvised and only wher sustain d neutralization is rcquir d and th airf ld is under continuous and repeated attack will destruction of these facilities result in decreased efficiency and morale of the airfield personnel, with consequent decreased

ffiaioncy of the airfield organization,

No fixed description of these components is possible because of tb wide variations a various airfields. At permanent bas s hey are built principally of wood and ramble American construction. At advanced bases there will be en less uniformity of type and will be built of locally available materinls. ''''hare locally available mnterials arc limited and have to be shipped in tbey will most often be canvas tenting.

B. OTHER INSTALLATIONS

Taxiwovs nod service aprons are unimportant us 0. target in themselves. D struction of these facilities will in no wily nfl'e t the operation of the airfield nod can only result in a small amount of inconvenience. They ar important only in the sense thnt there may be grounded aircrafb on thorn.

R vctmonts lUG constructed of f1 variety of materials nod in II. vnriety of shapes. They are used to provide protective screens for grounded aircraft or material stored ill the open. Attnck should never be directed nt the revetments but at their contents.

n general, the auxiliary installations are secondnry targets which may b damag d or destroyed by wenpons dir cted at other targets. Because of the combustible nature or the majority of structures and their cont nts, inc ndiary weapons will be most effectiyo. The wide diepersion or the individual elements calls £01' the employment of area bombing techniques with small incendiaries.

SECRET

SECRET

SI.eel: .A TSF 11MT

Dale: II 'Febru • ." 194'

P(lgt: App. AI1

APPENDI~.A~FBAGMBNT DAMAGE TO GB01JNDED A/C,

1. Introductlob.

These notes are intended to provide working data. for the computation of loed requirements for attack of airfields to accomplish deatruction or effectiv·e daIllflge with high "explosive bombs to grounded aircraft in the open or in uncovered revetments. Destruction or ·effective damage is assumed to be attributable to the projected fr{l.g~ ments of the high explosive bombs, Load requirements lor alrcmft in covered revetments or pens are n.ot treated inthesa notes since damage or destruction will be limited to a direct hit on. the revetment with a. bomb capable of perloratingthe roof. Attacks directed. prima.rily against aircraft in covered revetm.ent.aor pens are .not considered. economical, because of the heo,vy load requirements to insure .a reeeoneble probability of direct ruts. Since theprimDiIY purpose of o.tt:.ack of grounded aircraft is to neutralize the enemy air force, other methode of attack will prove more profitable. Aircraft in covered. pens mny be destroyed or dameged if the point of burst is opposite the mouth of the pen, but tbis is unpredictable and results sccomplished ura fe be considered as Il bonus to t.heatt.ack.

Load requirements for attack of airfields for d.estruction - or damage to grounded aircraft are given on sheet A.TSF/TMT/C5. The target is considered to be 10,000,000 square feet in area. and the load requirements are given in total numbel' of pounds carried. The requirements a.re presented in this form, because the stowage Iaetora for the various planes are continually cha[lging and the dat.a. presented this way can be readily interpreted in terms 01 operational requirements.

Because of the uncertaintyot anadequete defi~ nition as to what constitutes destruction or effective damage, the load requirements are OX9 pressed in terms of an upper aDd a. lower limit. It is believed that these limits adequately express the presentst.ate of knowledge on this .subject. The lower limit is taken as four effective fragment bits per 100 aquare feet ot vulnerable area and the upper limit as seven effective fragment hits per 100 square fest of vulnernblearea. An effective hit is defined as that caused by a. frngment with sufficient mass and velocity to perfora.te one~eigbth inch mild steel.

The eurves on sheet ATSF/TMT/C5 are baaed on assumed random distribution of bombs in tbe target !trea. It is assumed that all bombs strike within the ta.rgetarell and allowance should be made for aiming errors. These allowances are best Cllliima.ted iIi tbe field whe.o bQmbingtl.cou~ raGY can be currently evaluated.

Whentbe 20~pound Crag. bomb is to be used from high altitudes, the total load requirementssbould be increased, ,up to 0. factor .of 2,. to allow Cor the loss or eB'ective fragments.

Where substantial numbel1l of greunded aircro.lt are in revetments, the mean areas of ·effectivencss of the larger bombs are reduced (Iereurface burets) from the values given in table lS.The limit of reduction wi1l be the area. of the revetment when aU aircl'ait are in reve tlr . en lis. In this Iimlting CIl.S13 the total number of bombs of any weight that will be required will be the aame, and the number can be obtained by use of the, formula

A (. 1 )

N=]Rlog. I-P

N=Number of bombs required. M=MAE=Al'ea. or revetment. P=Pel'cent satW'ation. A=Target area ..

2. Fr.agment De.bsU.le.s.

Basic to the computasion of density requirements is the establisbment ola mean effectiv·e area. for each bomb. Because 01 the uncertainties which enter into the compuLo.tion of !.he MAE it is possible only to give an upper and a lower limit which a.re "best guesses," but which reflect the present state of knowledge.

Theco.mputations for the MAE must take into consideration the expected density of eB'ec~ive fragments and their distribution from the point or burst ·01 the bomb. Sufficieut data. can be aceumulated tor the expected densities fromata.tie tletonaMon trials., but only meager information ie o.vailll>ble on espeeted densities and distributions for bombs dropped from nirernlt. Static detonntion trials do not take into considera.tio.n the cbange in direction and velocity of the fragment atLributo.ble to the striking velocity of the bomb.

Avn:ilable inform!l.tionconsists of data on expected densities prepared by the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Research and Materials Division, Balllstio Section (Fragment Damage From Typical Shelle and Bombs, TDBS Report No. 28,. 27 May 1944). Fragments capable of perforating K~ineb mild steel plnte are gen.eraUyconsidered eff·ectivenga:inst grounded !lircraft. TM t4ble8 giV6 average den'Bit~ jor diJIerent direclwn8 from tM burat alld are applicable only t{)a large number of bursts with random orientation oj the bomb axis to thetargef. They de not take into ccnsidemtioa tbe effect of penetration into the ground before detonation nor the fragment doositY£Lt different

heig.hts above the gT'Qund.. .

Comparison witb .severaI Incidents in whioh

SECRE.T

SECRET

llircl'af~WEll'e observed to be damaged or destroyed by German or British bombs, leads to the conclusion that the deesities used und the method of oomputetiongive mean etJectiveareo.s of the right order of magnitude ..

Veri little data on expected fragment densities has heen eollected from experimental trials for bombs dropped from aircraft in flight or from past milltQ.ry operations.. A vaiJo.ble datil. is limited to the 20-pound Crag .. bomb, M41. A comparison is made on Sheet ATSFjTMTjOI between observed trag_mo:nt densities and the caloulcted densities in TDBS Report No .. 28 as 0. check on the reliability of the llltter values.

(a) Fragment den8itie8 for the 20-poui1ld F. Bomb M41.-A surveyor fragment densities for the 20-pound (l'ag. bomb, :r..'!41, was made by the Bombing Survey Unit,. IVlediterro.nean Allied Air Force ("The performance of the US-M41 Frog. Bomb", AC 6644). The following table (table 8) is reproduced from the report.

TAllLEl 8.-Field oburuat;OJl.8 oj _'he jrO(Jll!elllafi(J"I! oj Ihe BO-pfn.lfld !of 4 J F. bomb

!

Frag-

:, ment

:'·r",W;

- &cUll nnglo

InCident

1 Dooc:a dl Pal"" AI. ncl~ •. _ (R"'" 01 bIImItkJ building)

~ ••••• do.; ..••....••••••••..

I •. iIO;j AU <, ILk.". bU!lil~ n hard surraee, LSlnd" .. tI,lrkoo"""'lo. Strllt",OIl Hoo\ high Pfl11!JlI)\ wall.

,1584 StrU,.. panel rutfn R K eentlmeter and mom of pnrBJlI)I. woll.

1582 V.IUCQ,I <llilanoooo·~<m1d 118 1001.

Durol on lalrly ,ort earth,

626 B \!!'!Ii !>II IIll'"DlIlO or .1I0oe. Wall

3 I~t 1,lah.

23C Do.

009 Do.

320 Do.

I.OC2 Do.

COO Do .•

n~ BUrll 00 eonerete, 'I'~I 6 loot hlllb·

·t01 BUrlil In 11011. 016)'. Target 0 root hlgh,

8 FI!!cme, i'eJermo •.•• • __

4 D_Jldl }·al"" ALr~.ld .•.

(" 1tlI.1d wall)

6 ••••• do •••••••••••••...••••. o •.•.. do •••••••••••••••••••• ·7 " ••••. do ••.••••••••.••••••• 8 , ••••• do ••••••••••••••••.••

9 ._._.do . • • ._

10 1"10.11", •. ), S laU"", Milo ••••

II Korth !.IdeM! TfI.!I-" •.•..•

I

Fragment densities for incidonts2-11 inclusive nrc averaged nnd plottedensheet ATSF jTMT/CI. Comparlsonwith Iragment densities plotted from TDBS Report No. 28 shows that the latter are not unreasounbleand qua.!itativelyand qUllntitati vely sre in the right direction.

3. D.amage to Grounded A/C.

The definition of effective damage is best related to the area oftha grounded aircraft which is vulnerable to fragments having sufficient mass and velocity to perforate )i-inch mild sLeel plate. Data on these vulnorable areas o.:ree,xLremelyscarce and the conclusions reached in these Dotes arB based on only Iragmentaryevidence.

Ordnance Memo 8-17, Eighth Air ForceSeptember 1943, categorically makes tho,sto.te-

Sheel, AUF ITMT

,ogle: II .Fd.ruQry 1945

PC!ge: App. All

mont that iii fighter plane bas a vulnerable Q.rea or 100 square leeL and LhEtt Iour effective hits in this area will effectively damn.ge the plane. No information is aVlliilEtbleas to how these figures wore obtained.

In a report issued by the British Ministry of Home Security ("The Vulnerability of Aircrafl:, to Fragments. From Heavy AntinircrnJt Shell Bursts in Flight, Witb Particular Reference to tho Junkers Ju88 Bomber, A. C. 5420") it is considered that the minimum ·effcctive frngment density should beseven per 100 square feot. These tests were made with heavy antiaircraft shells in flight anda Blenheim bomber. AJthough the problem is different, the conclusions can beapplied to give an indication of the requirements.

Tests ("Experiments on the Vulnerability of Milit,n.ry Aircraft to High Explosive SheJI Frngmeats," Section T I OSRD Report XR-205, 8 September 1944) can be used in arriving at n vulnerable 111'00. .Assessed results of these Lests give the vulnerable area as Q. {unction of the degree o.f damage. Considering that o.tJective damage can be describadas the inability of the plane La return to base wi thin 1" hours the vulnerable IlI'cns t1.re quoted in. table 9.

TABLE 9

Phw"

6"1llS OOlllm. 75mm. oomm.

EQ!!!vaJ.,,1 9l!luo",b!. !U"C:!I (for one

bll)

Squat< ,.<1 21.1 8.4 7.2 8.3

SD2A-4 •... _ .........•.....•........ --- .. - Sn1A-4 ...•. _ .•... _ ...•• _ ....••.•.............

SB2A-I ...•••..•.••. _ ••...•..... _. •

B-20-8 •• _ •• _ ...••.. _ .....••...••...•...••...

(a) Mean area of effectit·ene8s.-The computetiona for tho MAE will be made for an upper limit or seven hits per 100 square feet of Vulnerable tllTget area and a lower limit of four bits pel" 100 square feet. No adequate definition of effective dn.mage is aveilable and the indicated vQ.lucs nrc the best that can be given with present do.tn.

The probability of obtaining the required number of hits can be obtained us.ir~g tho Poisson distribution which is applicable when the probability of o.oy one fragment hitting is small, but because of tile lo.rge number of fragments tho average number of hits remains oonstant.

Let p(x)=probll.bility of exactly x hits. m=ll.vornge number of effective Cragments=fmgment density per square foot timeaarea

Tbecompu(,Ettions for ex.actly 0, 1, 2

SECRET

hits per 100 aquare feet of vulnerable area. are given in tables No. 10-14 inclusive. From these the proho.bility of at least four or II.t least seven hits are computed. Figure ATSF/TMT/C2 is

SECRET

Sheet: A TSF IYMY

Dote: II February 1945

Poge: App. A, J

plotted for these values. The radii obtained are then used to compute the areas in figures ATSFI TMT/Ca and ATSFjTMT/C4 and the MAE is determined from these curves. (See table 15.)

TABLF.l IO.-BO·poundlragmento.Uon bo~M41-Prt)babilit" 01 allea8t 4. AU. per 100 'quare/ed. and at lead 7 hil.ll per 100 'quare leel.

Dlst. If. Frill. dllD' Prob. at Prob.8t
&(1) &(1) &(.1) &(~) &(1) &!!l) &(1) least 4 pcr least 7 Jl"1'
bun~ .Ityper 100 -0) -I) -2) -3) _4) -0) 100 square 100 8Q.U&r8
(Ceet) 1QUM8 Ceet Coot Ceet
--.- --- ---- -- ... - ---
20 34..2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,00 0.00 0.00 a ......... ____ ••• .. _ ...... ~ - + - --
&I 14.1 ,00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .01 O,W o.W
40 7.Ig .00 .01 .0'lI .O~ .08 •. 12 .I~ .gg .117
110 B.IH .02 .08 .16 .JQ .19 .16 .10 .00 • ,)2
00 2.(1 .08 .:n .20 .Zl .13 ,00 ,03 .i!4 .02
10 US .23 .34 .'2.5 .12 .~ .01 .00 .011 .00
80 ,QI .40 .37 .17 .01 .01
go ,00
100 .83 E i ~

>II:

5

i

~

:!i

g

~ TABLE 11.-9().pound Irag. bom1r-M8Q-Probabilitie8 of at lead 4. hil3 per 100 t1!luare feet and al le(l$t 7 hil3 per 100 aqU(lre feet

9 e

DIsI. rr, =no Prob. al Prob. Be
bunt ':,.,rl~ &(~) &~~) rx (x) & (I) &(~) r. (x) fa (~) leASt 4 per l_t7 per
(lee') x-Oj x-2) -3) -4) 1-6) 1-0) 100 IiClWll'O 1000I'lUJlre
aquare foot loot r .. t
--- --- --- --.- ---
10 .130.0
30 !.I.O
40 i!4.5 o.W
!IO ]2.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0,01 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.119 .76
110 7.1& .110 .01 .02 .05 .1:8 .12 .15 .02 .57
TO ~.15 .01 .0( .10 .10 .18 .11 ,14 .TO .21
80 3.31 .04 .12 .10 .22 .18 .12 .07 .'12 .~
go 1.36 ,DD .22 .20 .21 .12 .00 .02 .22 .02
100 1.118 .1& .31 .211 • .15 .09
110 1.20 .30 .36 .22 .00 .03
110 .88
130 .00
.140 .61
UIO .40 ~

x

'" '"

~

~ ~

9 TABLE 12.-100-pollnd O. P. bomIJ-AN-MSD-Probabililiea 01 at lea.sl 4. hita per 100 square/cel and at i6MI 7 hi~per 100

a square Jeet

x

'"

Obi. It. d~~ Frob. at Frob. nt
blUllt r. (I) & (x) &!.XJ) r. (1)1 r. (.) r. (I) r. (x) 1_14por I_t 7 per
(root) pcrl 1-0) .,,1) .,,3) ''''') .-6) ,"0) IOOsquar(l 100 5QLI8I'1l
SQUM8Coo.t r .. , root
--- --- --- --- ---
20
30
40 83.8
00 18.2
110 12.1 0.00 0.00 0.011 0,00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.119 0. g~
TO s.n .00 .00 .01 ,02 .04 .00 .00 .9'1 .111
SO 0.20 .00 .01 .04 .08 .12 .10 .10 .87 .43
go 4.&1 .01 .0.1 .11 .17 .19 ,17 .IB ,00 .11
100 8.42 .03 .11 .10 .22 .10 .13 .01 .43 .00
110 2.118 .()8 .10 .25 .112 .14 .07 .03 .25 .01
120 I.~ • It .28 .27 .18 ,00 .03 ,01 .19
180 1.!IO .Zl . lit .'2.5 • IS .011 .01 .011
Ita 1.11 ,83 .30 .10 .07 .0'lI .02
IW .&11 SECRET

SECRET

Sheet: A TSF ITMT

Date: tI February 1945

Page, App. A. 4

TULE 13.-.eSO,pllund frau. bomlr-M81-PrQbabilitie. of at &ea., "' hit. per 100 square feet ana at l4ad 7 hit. per tOO 'quar' f~et

Dillt-fr. Fno. Prob. al Prob. at
bllr3t del •• lly r. (xl fx exl r. (II & (,I) r. (I) & (I) & (I) leant per 1l\&!!!7pu
(reet) 1l",100 I-D) I-I) 1-2) 1-3) .-t) -6) ... e) 100IQuare 100'Qul""
S(lua", reet leet laat
--- --- --- --- ---
20 '207 •. 0
(10 8s.o
40 4aoa
00 28.0
00 17.0
70 11.7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.119 O.~
SO 9.17 .00 .00 .01 .03 .00 .00 .12 .114 .68
uo 6.84 .00 .02 .05 .10 .14 .10 .1& .811 .31
100 4.84 .01 .00 .12 .IS .Ig .17 .12 .811 .15
110 3.28 .01 .12 .ro .22 .1 .12 .00 .42 .00
120 2.61 .OS .21 .20 .22 .14 .07 .02 .2:1 .01
1(10 1.00 .14 .29 .27 .11 .14
ItO I. !oil .21 .33 .28 .13 .01
100 1.26 .29 .811 .22 .00 .03
160 1.02
170 .as
180 .n
19o .150
200 .6~ TABLE 14.-600.pound O. P. bomlr-AN-M04-Probabilities 11/ at iea3t 4 hif3 per 100 'quare/eeL and (It iea.!t 7 kilos 1Mr 100 'quare feet

DIIL.lr. ::;r.. Prob. at Prob. at
burst d~ r. ell r. (x) &: (I) &(Zl r. ell r. (I) r. (1f1 twtt per leut 1 per
(loot) per I 1-0) I-I) -~l -3) ._t) .-6) )1:-0) 100 aq""", 100 aquare
5Quare fed roo I foel
--- --~ -~ .. -- --- ---
to IS!!. I
150 n1,3
00 &1
1'0 au
80 2H
00 17. g
100 12- 0.011
110 9.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.09 .83
1:20 lUIS .00 .01 .02 .00 .10 .13 .16 .01 .M
180 4090 .01 .01 .00 . I' .. 1 .18 .14 .71 .21
ItO 3. Gil .OJ .10 ID .~ . ~1 .16 .011 .46 II
1150 2. 2 .00 .17 ,24 .~ l~ .00 .01 .31 .02
160 2.~ .10 .2:1 .26 .ro .21
170 1.&2 .18 .~ .27 .16 .12
180 1.51 .22 .34 .26 .13 ..... ~ .011 ~

x III

!!!

~

I

9

:::I o X .,

TABLE IS.-Mean area' oj ejJectivent'B (MAE)

Bomb

Sqllar./(d 6,1iOO 11.800 :20.200 24,800 ~O. 700

$iJ.aro luI 0.200 19,000 ~.100 37,900 66,000

2O-pound F _ _ .. _ ••• _ ••

!Ml-pound 1' _ .

1!Ml-llOllIId O. P _ _.

2G(l.polllld F __ _ __ ..

IIOO-pound O. P .

4. Load RequIrements.

TotnJ weightrequirements (tables 17 and 18 and sheet ATSF/TMTjC5) are computed by use of the method developed in Report No. 14, Fo.r East Ail' Forces, Operationa Analysis ection (Number of Aircraft Neoessary for Proposed Military Operations, 15 August 1944).

Notation A=tlll'get area

M =menn area of effectiveness each bomb

N=number of bombs required P=percent saturo.tion (probebility of destruction)

N = ~ log. C ~ p)

The Table 16 gives values of log. (l~P) for vnrioua values of P.

TABLI!I 16

P log. (dJ.)
0.10 0.105
.ro .229
.80 .3~7
.40 .611
,61) • BOO
.60 .1116
.70 1.:204
.80 1.1lOO
.go 2.003 SECRET

SECRET

Shut: A TSF/TMT

Do;Il~1 I' F.brua" 1945

PQS~: A'pp.AI 5

'TABLE 17

Lower llmtt (t bill! ~T 100 Iql!8J'e leo!)

Upper lLQJI( (7 bltll pet 100 IQ 118!'" lbeU

OO-""W1d~~tl.Dd 1000POWld 12CC).P9W1d 6QO.pou.ad a..poundj_uo.II"und 1000_»CIWld 200-poWld : I5QO.pound

F'. ,F. (T. P. '1, N. O. P. 1'" 1'. D.P. P., a .. P.

~~.--,_-,-. ---.--,.- .. _, --- -----,'_._--,_._---,-_._-_._-,_.,-,

0.10 Ui $I $oj. \lit 1& IG! 89 ·62 t3 2'l
.:10 2t3 U~ 7~ 69 lit !IIl1 189 110 go:j !lit
.30 !Ill!! ISO 1110 iii M Mg B03 I "Ill 147 Ttl
.<ID UII 251 m liJII N 'Q28 ,om 2&1 ~11 10i
.60 7&1 &48 2lI3 183 !.07 1,:100 1181 8t3 :z&5 Jill
. 00 9118 461 IJ:N ~ . IU 1,.070 m 4.53 iITI 1!18
.10 I I.~IO OCtO (06 SIS 1118 2,1110 1,.0:11 roo 4!18 !1M
.IKI 1.7611 &8 M oiU 2'1 a.~lo l,lI4~ 706 66:1 lItt
.DO 2,oItC 1,100 m 008 8M C,IIKI I.IW 1,ltl IiIlt 'I jlil TAB liE 18

Total welJbt roqllircd 10 pouo.ds ,., larieilll"Cl,"IO,OOl,OOO lQuare f"el

0.10 2,300 4.,800 3., «JO 7,300 8,000 3,1m 8;1Xl:l 6,.llIO 1I,llIO 1l,1Xl:l
.m f., goo 10, llIO 7,.«JO 15,..00 nooo a 100 17.1Xl:l II, !KMI 23 .• goo ~,1Xl:l
.30 7,800 16,lJlO 12,000 2-1 • ..00 :n;,roo l3,1Xl:l 27,300 11,000 1I8,lJlO 38.1Xl:l
. !Ill 11,100 23,100 17;, lJlO 3&,Dl 89,300 18,600 38, goo 25,300 64,800 I 64 .• 600
.60 18, 100 31,400 23,300 41,000· 63,600 25,lJlO M,1lXI a.I,1lXI 74,200 74,000
.,00 w_ooo .t,ooo 30,Il00 '09,000 ;a,roo 83,600 611, IlXI 48,.300 118,000 1ill,0IXI
.70 1».200 &1..600 40,000 82,100 113',.00) 4D,.SOQ 112,100 111), !IOO l~OO) , 1~00)
.110 :M,OOO 72,700 64,200 110,600 123, 600 &1,200 In-BOO '7ii,fIiOO. I~OOO I I~OOO
•. 110 00,,200 101., «JO '1'/,1100 1M,BOO 177,000 113,.Il00 170.000 m,IOO 247,000 2U,IXl:l m

9

o ...

~

6. Com.parlson \\1th Observat.loDs.

The calculated distances from the paint of burst within wluchgrounded a.ircraftoon be considered destroyed or effectively damaged may becompnred with field ebservntlons to serve nsa check an the accuracy of the method of eomputation.

InC"ide:ntat Hilsea Airport, August 15/16, 1948 (REN f70) .-Ainpeed" Oxford" planes were destroyed or effectively damaged o.tnbaut 130 to 150 feet (rom £1. Germea 500 kg. S. C .. bomb, On the assumption thM the ·effective radius varies us the cube root of the charge weight the radii are compared in table 19,

TABLE 19

IL o

m 9

o ':1:

Bomb

600 -II. 9. c .

I'ffl-pouod O. P _

lao-pound a.p , ..

BO __

1I~ I" 122

09 g'T 80

"Bombing Trials at Ashley Wal.k Against Close Suppo.rt Targef.8" (British Qr,dn. Sd .. Proe. QS890) .. - "Blenheim" bombers and "Ki ttyho.wk" 6gh ters were tnrgets to determine the effectiveness olair burst SOO-paund M. (). bombs. Conclusions reached wore that tbe planes were effeotively

Upper Jimlt (1 hlto per lOOo:q_Q,II.fG fbel)

damaged or destroyed within 150 teet of the burst, whether air burst orsurface burst.

Summary of results were that 12/12 planes received substantial darnage within 150 feet of burst and 3/10 planes received substantial damage between 150 to 250Ccet of burst.

Comparison an a basis o.f charge weights is given in table 20.

TAULtil 20

BO.QJb

160 ..

1&2 I" lZi

In 117 80

ClIleuJa!cd

I5QO.peuod l\I. 0 ..

I5OO-<pound a. P .

lQO-pound (). P. _ ..

ZIO 261 ~1

Hepar' onlhe eO-pound Frag . .Bomb (0. A. S./5th

A. F., Mar ... 1944) .. -"The I!'ffective radius for damage to grounded aircraft for the 20-paund Frag. bomb is 60 feet." This is semewhatgreater than the calculated effective radii which are 42 and 54 feet for the upper and lower limits, respectively.

The rather meager data. an which eompariaon CIliIl. be made between calculated and observed effective radii does nat shaw any marked. disorepunoies and leads to the eoeolusion that the calculated vnJues 01 meanarea of cllectiveness are of the correct order of magnitude ..

SECRET

SECRET

Shlltt No., ,oatil' Pogt:

ASTF/TMT;.II IAMarch1MJ t

TYPICAl... JAPANESE· MILITARYTABGETS PART' II-R.ADIO AND RADAD

I .. S1aDIARY

Table J.- Weapon ·ftiectijm ,ftlmm!J1'I/ R ud Ill' Ins tall 0. tions

Radio Communications Direction Finders

N a.viglltionol Aids I

Flldn.B '. n,*,WI

MID. and low _._ ••••••• _.... StJ1!ft!lIICII' Nllllahn ••••••••

1,01"_ •• _ ••• __ ._ ••• _ ••• _. _ •• & In~ IIVAB .. _ .• •. _. __ .' lIND.

DI¥G •••••••••••.••..• _ ••.••• _.: 100 lb. Of I •.•••.• _..... ••.. lIND.

, Na,v!.iIBtlDJlIlI Ald. ,001 yol JrJlown to be used II! 1'p!lI!. Rooommeo!lllUo", b!l!Cd, on Wp 1cn1 Oerm8n InltalllltionJ. 100 lb. 0 P o&D be Il$\d from medl.um ulmudD!Ill81n11 NBvlll81!ona.l A.l<U>.

'10 pllUle5 Gb!e to ,carry U mOllt" Of non:lt u mall)' 2.lO tb.or r.oo lb, oombe as UIUb. (If,lh. i.aJ'll& bomb lucoommcnded.

Attack of Japanese radio and rader installations is best directed o.gai.ns~ the vulnerable small components and the skilled per,sonnel.The ta-rg,ets aresmull, fragile, lightly constructed, often. camouAo.ged" readily damaged bUh easily repairedor replaced. A successful attack demands high nccuracy in locating the Largetand adequate briefing oftbe pilot inaddition to selection of the, most efficient tactics end weapons. It is believed thatntta.ck by fighter/bombers stra~g with machine gun. firo or attacking with the 5 inch rocket will accomplish destruction of these installations with the minimum effort. Attack with 100 lb. GP bombs will require a greater effort, depending upon operatlonal conditions and plane loading characteristics.

D. GENERA.L A.NALYSIS

Japanese radio and radar installations are irnportent targets and are fairly vulnerable to air nttnck ..

In such attack, carefuland detailed planning is highly important. Definite targe~s' must be seleotedand the pilot fully briefed regn.rding them. Diversionary attfllok by other rurcraft to draw the anti-aircraft fire is recommended; consequently precise timing of thesteike is required to acbieve meximam results.

The targets to be treated nre limited to land. based installations: shipborne and airborne equipmenb is not cODl!idered.The i11$t&])o.(;ioll$ o..e grouped in. four main divisions, namely:

.1. Radar installations,

2. Radio communication installations.

3. Direction finder insto.1lations.

4. N a v iga tional aid in s to.1lo. ti ons.

Although these are nll functioll.ally differentand do not resemble each other closely, they have similar components and about equal vulnerability too.ttaok..Each ccneists or an antenna, a transmitter and/or receiver and a power supply .'I'he eleotronic po.rts in the tl'ansmitter and receiver arc the critical elern6Jltsand most vulnerable, Beonuse these oorgets are small and often camouflaged or concealed, identiflcation lromthe air is very difficult; eonsequeutly, thorough photo reconneissance is essentisl.

m. JAPANESE RADAR

10 FUDctlon and Use,

Radar development by t.he Japanese bas lagged far behind thn.t - of the Allied N n.tions or the Germans. Al.though the types developed to c:l.a.te by thaJapanes« are inferior to our own, it is known tho.t they have received Gelman aid in the form of technical information. andtccbuioiuDS. New and improved equipment co.n, therefore,. be axpeered to be in development and in operationo.l use in the future.

20 ;Structural AnalysiS.

Present Information on Japanese radar is far from complete, It is known th.n.t the Japa.nese No.vy has reached Il. much more advanced state along this line than the Japanese Army. Them is no present evidence to indicate that they ho.Vll anyspecilll aqnipment otbertho.ncarly warning, gun conteol und searohlightcontrol radar.. Nor is there evidence that the Japan.ese have usepnrate coast watehing ehaln similar totho.t employed by the Germans, but it is certain that radar sited on the coast will be used fOl'ship reporting as weD as l\irornft. traoking.

The Japanese normally locate early warning radar OD the highest accessible point to be defended. Installations frequently consist of two early warning radars, allowing one to search when the other has started to track, thus guarding against feints or divers.iono,ry attacks. Early wa.rning radars of both the 360° end sector sweep types. have been observed. There is also some indication that the radars are beamed in the direction from which attack is expected and do. not

_.... __ ._._ .. S.ECRE.l

SECRET

Shut No.: ASTF/TMT-II

Dole: 14 March 1945

Pose: I

l'oto:te. This ispoeaible with the wide beamed J apaneae radars.

'Known types of Japanese ea.rly warning radar consist of fixed, mobile o.nd portable units, Of ;;; these the fu:ed type is most easily identified and ~ . located. A typical ins~llation, illustrated in Fig.

ATSF,TMT....:21Dl,consists of a light steel or wooden framework mounted on a mtating base eet on a concrete foundation. Thecnbin,about 10 by 10 by 10 feet.,. which houses the operating personnel and the transmitter nod receiver, and the aerial array, 15-18 feet high and 25-30 feet wide, are fixed to the framework. Although the antenna. is the only part which must necessfl.rQy be expcsed, there is no evidence to indicate that the Japnnese bave built elaborate strucLures to hOUBe and protect the vital equipm.ent, as th.e Germans have sometimes done, Observed instoJlatioDB haveccneisted of a low, protective revetment, a few reetbigh and of dinmeter slightly larger than the radar screen,

Information obtained. from J.apane.ee POW's indicate that the mobile and portnhle early warning radars depend upon cODcealmentand cemouflage for protection. The aerial array is generally smaller and consists of a wooden framework which is orten manually rotated. The transmibter~ receiver is often housed in a. ten~. Figure ATSFI TMT .... 2/D2 shows one such early warning radar installation. A probable mobile early warning radar is shown in figure ATSFITMT-2/D3.

Although it is known that the Japansse have Ilnti.n.ircraJt rn.dafgu:n control and rndar searchligh~ control, not much is known to dateahout their conetruction. A probable fire control and searchlight control radar is illustrated in figure ATSF/TMT-2/D4. It isessent.ially similar to the sarIy w.nrn.ing radar except for th.e provision lor elevating the radar screen. Another type of fire control rsdnr is shown in figure ATSFI.TMT-2/ DS.This radar, which was captured on Peleliu Island, Palau Group, was located in the center of a 4~foot high reveLment. The large framework, whioh supports the aerial array,. thevitnl equipment and seats for four operators who ride the mount, was set on a concrete base level with the ground.

III

is 9

Q :Ii

3. Weapon Selection.

H is believed that the most vulnerable elements of the radar installations are the tra:osmitters and receivers. These are composed of many small lX'agile ports which are very lightly protected uat all. In addition, trained personnel are difficult to replaceand theattackshould be designed to kill as many as possible.

Data from past experience upon whlch to base weapon reeomraendationa are limited. E~ .. perience in the pre D~dQ;y o.ttaek5 on. German oon.atnl radQ.r inatallations iadieates that machine gun fire is a

very damaging form of attn.ck. In addition, the installations can beattll.cked successIun, with dive bombereoarrying small instantaneously fused OP bombs. Thc best bomb is the one tba:t can be carried in the greatest number.

The Napalm. filled droppabls tank ls unother weapon th.o,t can be employed profitably against these targets since many 0.£ the installatlons have wooden cabins and wooden frameworks lor the support of the aerial array. The equipment also is vulnerable to fire. It is known that the Napalm bomb willeover enarea of 20,000-30,OOOsqua.re fect with severe fire and will destroy nny inllammabie material in this area.. Atto.ck should be made from altitudes less than 150 feet in. order to obtain the greatest coverage. Current inlormetion on accuracy docs not permitn definite .state~ ment on the probability of hitting the targ.et, but in nlmose every instance any fire bomb that strikes 25-150 fect short of the target will prove effec~ive. Few Napalm bombs should prove complete duds since those ~bnt fail to ignite upon impact are ignited by the flames from adjoining fire bombs while, as a Inst resort, unburned Napalm gel can be ignited by strafing.

4:. Foree Requl.re.ments.

To iUustrnto tho calculation of the foree required to destroy lL typical radar installation the following computations are made. The target wilt be the radar cabin whose dimensions are 10 x 10 x 10 Ceet.This is enclosed in a protective revet.me:nt 30 leet in diameter. It is expected that a hit anywhere inside the revetment with a IOO~lb. GP bomb wi.1l destroy the ills tall ation , or that a hit on thecabin with the 5~incb rocket projectile will destroy it.

The following accuracies will be taken: (1) Dive bombing, CE·P=200 Ceet. (2) Medium level, OEP=600 feet. (3) .Rocket attack, OEP=30 feet.

NO>TR.-OEP .fo, '<>I1Ir.t ntt9cll III dotc,mL!>ed by (WIIm[Dg th.\. W70 win lond wlUlI n • c[,·ele of .20 ru II ra d lus, It 1:3. be1!ov·cd iht " &I(l y!U"'d r."J,lO Is n_ry to IdOJll!ty tills smglltarYtp,operly.

The single shot probabilities of destroying the installation are given in. Table 2. Two values l1re given for eacbtypa of attack. The more conservative is based upon an assumed random distribution ot bits; the other upon a normal distribution.

T,\.lILll 2.-Single81!ot probabili!i,"

O. 003D 1 .fXmB 1.02'16

Norl!!lli dIJlrlbUUQ!I

0 •. 0028 .0000L 1 .0177

DI"o bomblng - .•.•.....

Medium 101101. •••• _ .

Rooke!. attook .

, D hI. bombIng snd.ook.t bit.! 10U.w " no'm~1 d ilIlrlb utlo!l, wbUQ med 101m l.vol blU Glvo B. uO&l"I,)' ,.n4.", di.!lt,lbutlOD.

SECRET

SECRET

Sheet No.: ASTF /TMT-II

Date: 14 March, 1'''5

Pa.,e: J

Ta.bleS shows t,he number of bombs or projeetiles which must be individually aimed at the target (or each of senroJ probabilities that it will

be destroyed. -

TAB.LE a.-Number 111 bo.mb, or 'oc~t8,e!lui'ed 1(1 d~8tFoll typical r.ooa r $1WlklUatiO:M -

Prob ... b!U~y

Q.:M •••.•••••• III lZ lOll '74 D30 616
O.M ......... 3D 28 247 177 ,2010 l,IlllO
0,711 ••••••.••.• '78 66 ~'" 11M i,GOO 3.200
0.110 ......... 1211 ~ Ul 688 1,(00 6,4JO Most effici.ent selection of tactics and weapons depends upon operational conditione which can only be assessed in the field. To illustrate the metbod of ~eeiectio.n it will he assumed that a liD% probability of destruction is desirable, It will also be assumed that tbeaircraft assigned to the mission can carry the following loads: (1) rocket carrying aircraft, 8 rockets, (2) dive bomber, 2 or4 lOOlb. OF bombs and (3) medium level bomber, 20 or 40 100 lb. OF bombs. The number of sorties required will thereforo be:

:1 Randell! D!s1rlbuU"o Nomtal Dllltdbu tlon

Roo~l!t c !tB~ I, S9/S .. 611Ort'ElII. __ ••• •• •• • 2SfS .. t SOtUOII.

D I vo bomb;>t a UllelL. •• ..' 'fZt7~_IUBO'UOll" ••• - •• mil! -!Ill BOrtmt.

- - :1 U_1/t-62 BOrllao ••• __ •••• 177ft-t~ aorilOl.

Mf:dlUltllovcl suack ...... 2ZM/OO-11Z ao!llos ...... ,1,&10/00",82 aorUOII.

- - 2Z5()ftO .. se BOrtle.! ••••.• _ 16.iIIl/tO- tllIOrtlea •

. ~.

'J:'

"'

!!l

~

,~

s

::I o ,;[

"'

It is evident that, in this ease, rocketo.t.tnck will Il.ooomplish the desired results with the minimum effort. Stowage requirementeandeesumed accuraoies m,ay alter the indicated relative e£fi.cien.cies, particularly between the dive bombing and medium levelattnck. An additional advantage of dive bombing over medium level will result from the difficulty in locating the target from medium altitudes.

IV. RADIO COMMUNICATION

1 •. Functlon and Use.

Radio communication is an integral pu.rt of the Japanese military systemanrl. has been developed to a high degree, Equi.pment. ranges from Jow Ctequency (leng range) to high frequency (short range) types. The installations differ so widely that no. possible generaliaetione can be made. Although the installations are vulnerable to attack, improviaation is readily accomplished and

disruption of the radio communications system is most difficult.

2. Structural Analysis.

.A typical instnUationconsists of a small building, of apPl'O.ximate dimensions 2()-40 feet, one or two stories high, The structure may be of almost any type capable of housingtbe vital equip.ment and the operators. Many buildings are .of wooden construction. Pro t.ective measures are nonexistent or moat limited. The nntenna. towers are the most distinguishing features 0111. radiecommunieationa statio.n. .A single mast represents an installabicn of the high OJ" very high frequency range, "woor more masts less than 300 feet high prcbably belong too.. low frequency instaUation, while two or more towers 400-600 feet high are certain to belong to a low frequency system.

S.Weapon Selection.

The most vulnerable element of a radio. communications .eystem is the equipment housed in the control building, Since destruction of the building will also destroy the equipment, weapon selection and type of attack. should be based upon the nn.tureeftbis structure. Since most radio communications insto.Hatlons are boused insmall wooden. buildings, weapons and tactics rscommended are similar to those for radar installations, althougb a particular target may require other weapons.

V. DIRECTION .FINDERS 1. Function and Use.

.A direction finder is used to determine the direction and the distance of the source from which radio. impulses are being sent, .As such it can give bearings to. aircraft or ships and guide these craft to an .airport or harbor.

2. Structural Analysis.

Most identified Japanese direction finder sta~ tione are of the type illustrated in Fig . .ATSFI TMT..:2jD6. This consists of a arasll square etructure, shown in figuxe .A TSF/TMT-2jD7, of approximate dimensions 20 by 20 feet and 80 feet high, set in the center of a larger square at whose eornera are the towel'S supporting the antenna. The structure, which houses the equipment, is believed to be the most vulnerable component. The majority of euchetruotures encountered to date have been built of wood,

S.Weapon ;Selectlon.

It is believed that the weapons and tactics recommended fOl' radar installations areequslly applicable to. direction tinder installations.

SECREt

~ __ ~~~,~~, _~ __ ~~ ~_ .~~~ •.••.•• ~ _~ •• r.~ .~ _ •• ~~r~ •• _ •• _~ ~;,:.,.

SECRET

VI. NA. VIGATIONAL AIDS 1. Function and Use.

A na.vigational aid station transmite a radio beam of certain intensity and direction for aircraft or ships to ride to their objectives.

The Japanese have no lmown true navigational ~ aids but it is known that they ha.ve received Gert- man assistance and it is possible that German type S navigo.tionaJ aids may be encountered in the fu~ ture, Several German type na.vigational a.ids are ~ illustrated in figure ATSF/TMT-2./D8.

~ ~

" ..,.

~ ~

~

2

I

2. Structural AnalysIs.

These insliaUBtions are larger than those previously treated. Type 1 (Ruffian) consists of 0. spiral-like revelmec Ii which protects the equipment II.1ld a horizontal cross arm, 45 feet long, ex-

Shut No.: ASTF/TMT-II

Dote: 14 March 1945

Page: 4

tending outside the walls. Type 2 (Benito) consists of a. horizontal crass arm, 65-70 feet long, mounted on a. small rotating base which may be set 00 the structure housing the equipment or on ll. mound nearby. Type 3 (Knickbein) consists of a. 10.] ge horizon ta.l arm in 0. vel'Y broad V, mounted on two supports, span about 145 ret, which rotates on a peripheral track.

3. Weapon Selection.

iii is the German practice to protect their installsbicna as far BS possible with substantial antiblast walls. It is believed t.hat these instaUo.tions are best n.ttaoked by dive-bombing with fighter/ bombers !lImed with 100 lb. GP bombs or 5-inch rockets, fuzed instantaneous, since a direct hit is nee sary for d struction,

SECRET

. ' ; . .

JOINT TARGET GROUP, WASHINGTON, D. c,

GENERAL ANALYSIS

Sheet, A TSF /TMT

Date: IIF.t.rv.",1'4.

Page: A'p,p., II 1

APPENDIX B-LOAD REQUIREMENTS FOBCRATERING LANDING ABEAS

The number of bombs to be dropped on a. landingarea in order to crater it so that. no possible stripeuitable for fighter aircraft will remain, is difficult· to ccmputethccretically , By me.1:tiJlg cC.r~ain simplifying assump ticns , .approximate numbers can be derived,

A rsasonabla basic assumpticn will be that all landing strips are paesllelto the larger dimension of the landing area. Thisean only be true if the o.rea is restricted in wi.dth. It is also. assumed that oJl borabs are droppedat random and land inside the area.

The, problem may be approached by assuming that the a.r:ea is divided ioto parallel rectaagles, each the size of a fighter landing strip. By means oJ the area bombing calculator developed by the Appli.ed Mathematics Panel, NDRC, the number of bombs required to be dropped to obtain at least one hit in each rectangle can be determined. This will give the required number if the bombs land in the most fo.v·orable position in each rectangle. Since this is unlikely, because the requirement is only that the bomb Iand ,vithin the rectangle, the number determined will be the lower limit of the number required ..

U the dimensions or the rectangle are reduced so that each is half oft.h.e required dimeneione or the fighter strip, then a. hit anyw.here in each reotangle williellove no strip or the required dimensions uneretered, With 0. bit in each reduced rectangle, all possible strips will be cratered, but it ma.y still be possible, with a favorable distribution of bombs in the o.djllcent rectanglcs,to miss II. rectangle and still lell.ve no usable strip. The number of bombs determined using the reduced rectll.ngles is then the upper limit of the number required.

To illustra.te the computations to determine the number of bombs required, a landing area will be taken equal to 10,000,000 square feet. It will be assumed that fighter aircraft Will. require 0. minimum .str1p 60 feet wide and 1,500 feet long. H theo.ssumption is made that the craters will be 20 Ieet in diameter, the entire area can be divided into rectangles, each 70 feet wide and 1,520 feet long. For the 10-millicn-squn.re~foot area there will be 95 rectangles of these dimansions. The area bombingoolculator will then give the number of bombs required per rectangle to get o.t least OM hit in 6D.chsection with the desired degree of probability. The total number o.f bombs is then the product of the number per sectlon and the number of sections. This is the lower limit of the required number since the full dimensions of the strip were used.

The upper limit of the required number is det.ermined. in the same way., but since the dimensionst\re reduced, each rect1ngle will measure

35 by 760 feet. This will give 380 rectangles for the 10-millicn"square--foct area.

'l'A.llLll 21.-Numbtr (4 C'l'oler1ng bomba required Jor tempororg mutrfJlilalion 0) k.ndinll orto (10,000,000 rq. fl..)

-

. upper.· ... limit (redw.d 1.,,,1. IDutrlp 361

'160 foot)

0.60 '165 3;315
.00 m 2,600
.:70 e30 2,MO
•. 80 670 2,8&1
•. 00 1!t.3 3, no To evaluate the accW'acy of this method of computing the load requirements for eratering landing areas, compa.rison is made with a .study prepared by Divisien 2, N. D. R. C,., which analyzed ettacks o.f seven Japanese airfields. The conclusions of this study were that II. bomb density of 0 . .02 hit per 1,.000 square feet is the absolute minim.um that can be used, whiletbe recommended density is 0.033 hit per 1,000 square feet. Bomb bits on the landing strips of th.e sevenairfi·elds consisted of the following.:

182~1,OOO~pound G. P .. bombs, 146-500~ pound G. P. bombs, 127-100~pound G.P. bombs, and 76-1,.OOO-pound G. P. or 2,.oOO-pound G. P. bombs.

Th.e original computations (Table 21) used a serviceable strip 50 feet wide and 1,500 feet long and n. 20-foot diameterereter. Since the bombs landing on the strips of tbeseven airfields were 500-pound G., P. bombaor larger, tbe computntions were repeated, assuming 40·foot diameter craters. The 1O,000,OOO-square-lcot area is then made up of 74 reetangles, each 90 by 1,540 feet,. for the lower limit, and 296 rectangles, each 45 by 770 leet, for the upper limit of bombsrequired.

TAbLE 22.-Number oj bomb8 required l:o crater to million. .• quart,jool landing area

F'roba· bOlly

0.00 3111 0.032 I. '170 0·. J77
.00 35~ .035 1.871 .111&
.70 ·SSS .038 I.m .~
.110 418 .00 g .• 100 .. ~l3
.GO 410 .()41 ~.340 .2M An exam ino.tion of the above figures shows that the lower limit of the required bom.b density is approximately the SILD1G as that recommended by the study 01 the observed strikes on tbeseven airfields.

SECRET

SECRET

Sheet No. ATSF/TMT/Dl

JOINT TARGET GROUP - WASHINGTON, D.C. Date 25 Feb 194!S

TYPICAL JAPANESE MILlTARY TARGETS. PART I·AIRFIELDS

TYPE I JAPANESE HANGAR STRUCTURES

(a) BASIC SHAPE

~ ~

M .. onl)' III ... " •• d .. th.t th.n tru.I.d br.c •• In lome c ••••

(b) ROOF TRUSSES

(c) ROOF DETAILS

SECRET

PUIILlSHED IN OFF ICE OF ACIAS INTELLIGENCE, A.A.F •• 8Y COllelliED PERSONNEl OF U.S. AND

/'

SECRET

Sheet No. AtSF/TMT!b2

JOINT TARGn GROUP ... WASHINGTON, O .• C. Oate 215 Feb 1945

TYPICAL J.AP.ANESE MILITARY TARGETS .. PART l~AIRFIELDS

TYPE 2 JAPANESE HANGAR STRUCTURES

(I) BASIC SHAPE

.L~,

.1:.: .. ·

__ .. _ __ _ sa

~

~- '_ ._

(b) POSSIBLE .ARCH FRAMING

(el ROOF DETAILS

SECRET

,UILISH£D IN OFfIC( Of AtlAS INTELLIGENCE, A,A.f., I' CONBIN£O 'E~SO~NtL Of ~.5. A~D

JOINT TAROET OROUP

SECRET ATSF/TMT-I/Dt

JAPANESE FIXED EARLY WARNING RADAR

Soreen and cabin mounted on high concrete base, 10' x 10' cabin not shown. 2B' x IB' box-like metal sore en for aerial array; often Iound with low concrete base and low revetment with diameter slightly larger

tItaD screen.

SECRET

JOINT TAlalT aROUP

SECRET ATSF/TMT-IJDI


..
CI'
;:
i
e
'00:
~.
;
!
"

i C
~ a
'). c
~ "
,~ e
i Z
~ -
z
z •
if C
~ J:
.J
15 >-
e ..
"
~ C
9, .....
E1 .....
...
~ l1li
""
....
'" •

~ 0
A.
'I-
a:
:c .....
! lit
.....
m z
., C
!!! A.
~ c
I -
.9
B
~'
'~
@
..
a
~. SECRET

JOINT TAROET GROUP

JAPANESE MOBI.LE EARLY WARNING RADAR

Believed to be selI-eontained unit having own power supply-trailer requires separate tractor for mobility.

SECRET A TSF/TMT -I/DJ

SECRET

JOINT TARGET GROUP

PROBABLE JAPANESE A. A. & S. L. CONTROL RADAR

SECRET ATSFITMT-t}D4

SECRET

JOINT TA.an a.ou.

JAPANESE A. A. & 5. L. CONTROL RADAR

SECRET ATSF/TMT-tjD.

SECRET

Ii. o

JOINT TARGET GROUP

SECRET ATS~!TMT .. JjD6

TY.PICAL .JAPANESE DIRECTION FINDER STATION ADCOCK INSTALLATION

SECRET

J08lT TARGET GROUP

.. o

i

I . I

1!lil\\I"1

SECTION

ELEVATION

PLAN

TYPICAL JAPANESE STRUCTURE HOUSING D. F. EQUIPMENT

SECRn An'/TMT-I/D7

SECRET

JOM' TAIOIT OIOUP

SECIET ATlFJTM, ... ,D,

"

KNIC/(~£IN ~

GERMAN TYPE NAYIGATIONAL AIDS

SECREt

.SECRET

Shul No.: ATSF/TMT~m

Dole, U MOlCh1945

Pose, 1

TYPICAL d.APANESE MlL.lTABY TARGETS PART Ill-FUELSTOBAGE

TABLE 1.-IP'eapm recolmmmdalioni/or all'ack of military/ud iI()ra9~

I. SUftOfAB.Y

Oil and fuel stored for military purposes is frequently an unsatisfactory targ~t foraeriaJ attaok, unlike storage for naval and ciruin:n uses. This is becaussmilltary storage is generally disparsed in comparatively small units thnt Ilre difIioultto identify and sometimes resistant to attaok.

Exposed tanks are the best targets... They can be attacked .suocessfully with smell GP bombs or with rockets which will spill oontentsand start fires, Strafing should o,ccompany rocket attack.

Buried tanks are generally too difficult to identiIyand to atta,ck to be recommended as primary

targets. Some damage to them may be expected from large bombs intended for other instllllatiollS.

Bomb resistant structures, although too small and unimportant to be recommended as targets for bombing, can be expected to suffer seme damage from any very large bombs missing udjaeent primary targets. II these structures nrc to be prirnnry targets, the preferred weapon is the 5" HV AR (High Velocity Aircr.aft Rocket) I with slight delay fuz:ing,aimed ntsides ..

Fuel dumps are suitable for strafing with incendiary bullets.

.FRAO.

Fuzing 1I0111l11ll11

S",.,oufon to. (Steel; 2;I'~7V Mill. lovvi. &" a v AE an d ltraftl!l[. lIN D lit ed. and. b!Rbl~I'e1. Ally 01' bom btl.

dll:!lt. 80' blah). Lo.. and m«l. levI!.! 100 I b. a p (1,0,1>]0 ~). O. I/O. OZO

()lol belo .. 600').

Blah teval. NOll ••

B~rf<d fanlt. ~Stee.ll>rcon. NOllo •••••••••••••••••••• _ ••••• _ ••••• _ __ •••••• _...... Med.lIIld bllb le.eI·. .soo lb. or i!!l1O!'O P 01a~p 0. 1/0.'

_!ill.; 1'--11' earth"""",). provided porfor.BtloD 000UfII· (table 8].

Dela;

; III

SIlllllOF.

&"",1· III bo mb-mWo>ll II{ ill. lo·vel. V' B V A 11. nose plIlK.

ft'~d~r .. (OOllomlIO .. alla Mod. ""dbl,h IOJvcl. NOM.

1'-3'; rooll 2'-<Y) ..

I. 015 Moo . ...,,<1 blgb level. 1.1XKl I b or l!lfllw Q P or SAPO. 110, 026·

provided purollilon

0«UfII (tllble 3).

ell"" er dru:!n!' I,. liP'" 0' ,In. l(~111 oC1Vdutll.

tolln. 16'1', oJ. • . " I" (1,,) .. ,8t .. ro, wI L. b., 1ll00n!l.1,.

Il1" b!!llolll. i

~ V'BVAR.

Med.llJld blill Ie".!. Non!.

lIND

D. TYPES OF STORAGE

m. SURFA.CE TANKS

Most miJItn.I'Y installations have one or more

of the following types of fuel storage: ] .. Surface tanks.

2. Buried tanks.

3. Tunks or drums in bcmb-resistent atructures,

4. Drums or cans ill the open or in ligbt structures.

Although fuel is essentinl for the operation of any insliallaMou, fuel .storage is not w.way.s. n profitable primary target. The ta.nks are USlU\lly small and dispersed over a large Ill'ea,l'l'quiring hea.vy attaok for moderate euocess. They may be csmouflaged, hidden by natural covel' or buried, andere, in generw., bard to locate. Exposp.d tn-nks are good targets for strafing or rocket attuck. DOimage to luel supplies by bombs intended for other targets will. frequently be slgnlflonn t. Uvun ouuasion, i~ muy LllLlUl~ l)llut..nill.<lo.Liuu ul a. partioular installation can best be accomplished by destroying fuel supplies.

Surfa·oe tanks are primarily used for bulk gllsoliue,llnd to 0. less extent diesel oil. Tbey are usually of steel plate but occo.sional1y are of concrete. The tanks found at military bases usually I'llnge from 20 to 75 feet in diametsrand up to 30 loet in height. The plates of steel tal'ks vll.ry fl'om~s inch 00 roof and higher side courses to J' inch at bottom. Seflms may be either riveted 01' welded.

Such ~D..nks can best be destroyed by spilling the contents througb ruptured side plates, following !;his with ignition. Rupturing of steel tanks csn be accomplished by rockets 01' small HE bombs, but tho 5-inch HVAR is preferred because ofibs allnability. I tshould be fuzed instantaneous nose, Strafing with cal . .50 ineendiery ammunition. will prove effective and should olways UUUUUJJJIHly IU.i.UWIUIil u.lW.LuJu aLtauk by otlwl wea.pons .

.For bombing, the 100 lb. QP 0.1/0 .. 025 is

SECRET

SECRET

T,ABLE UI.-Hdght80J (,I~uel) bOIl,!b Ult, 0,86 (in. unifs oj 1,000) feet/or pcrJorol!01l Qlep,rtl~'P,ltAs rtinf, o,rcea conuel'e (6,400 p .. $. t.) hCll1il1s leu them 8,600 fedora not Tecommended beoause o/llkellllooa oj "~ochct

Bomb 100 or .200 01' 100 01' 1,000 01' WI SAP 1,000 SAP

~~.J(':'"'~I_:_I,,:,,~_. (U:',_ OJ, ("':~ ~_,__:~ _ _._I~~..:._: __

0.............................. II '..... 8.6 II ......3: '.6 ....... 4 & ••••• " 3.6 S It U, ...... '2.& II ,g It :Ill 'SO

2011...................... U 102.& 0 U U G 8 U. U P U a 12,:00 .... Ut 1.5 12.& IU! &0 ..

6- 6.0 26 11.6 g It :U 8,6 12 2.58 13 U 8 '16' &0 ,.... 2.6 II '10 16 &0 , ..

7.6 - 7.6........ $,.6 U .l1li 4 .. 6 12 16 :to 1I 2.! , .

10 ., 10.~ 22 7 .21 &0 ·6 ,20 t, 1.5 ·80 3.0, 10 15 30 i ., ...

f~~::::::::-.:~~·Hf::::: n:::··:·:: ( .. :.::.::. :f":··~: .. :,::- ::~:':H·:+· .~:LI:·:· ·:·:1:·:: ~ 1 :~::I:J:: .. ::· .. ::: ::.:. H

N01"

1,000 AI' pel'lomtoil gbout 2.!% mare thB!!I,OOOBAP. 1,600 1.1' IlOII"rOrD:toiI Dboul to% mOn! tbDIIl,ooo SAP. lnOll'ea8LOK CQDFCte ~1!'Cns1h 10 6,0001',' ,. I .. <iI~"" perlotlltloll by about 26%.

D6Cr~ OODcrolC Itr(;Dgtb 102,000 p .... 1.1n~ pellon!Uon by Qbout 2.1%.

D I~. bnmbl"~ (00" or OI ....... ')I •• nul "oIo"t. tatoo".1 rol ..... from abou t 1.600 root.,.""!,, oltJ tulia. LIM ID.dl""t~ mar!mum COl!!CTeki thlcbleM perforablo' wllbcut bulili:,up.

For ~. IblQ.lwoss I'om m to 3J2 w!Wm 1lID. Indiool4ld Ultra· IJ blab pro babUlly 01 bomb OOlblJlII to ,,"land 4. ton atlng In oon! 110;1 .. lib ='e1.cllab. tamped uplosloll' .8.IlIolmO$I:a:! elJej]t1 ve ail lObe!! jll'rtDmtioD._un.

-

'" e

c ..

recommended. For full tanka this fuzing will. result in detonation approximately 10 feet below the roof when bomb is dropped from 4,000 feet.

Bombs frilling outside a tank can do only negHgible damage to it, while those inside must explode within accrtain distance from the plates to cause rupture. Table.2 shows theexperted effectiveness of 100 OP bombs against steel. oil tanks.

TABLE 2'-E;O'edivenelil 0/100 pound (JP a.l1ai,,:d rlecllaflka

I . EUeatl Va JTOwll,ooo.OOO

Plato thlcl:· dlltBn"",. 1Q.1lBnI t •• t

_ J~ le"t . tin ward lrom i lor 60%

, bilolO' tapp]aUngj ~ .e>:pootod

. 1.00 lb. 0 P 'd",lmctl<l!l

Fttl 10.0 U 7.5 7.0

I

o.lI<llII"tO ..

45-W _ ••• _ ••• " '

!lG-1I0 .

111>-1110 ..

3M I/t !/IG 3/8

IV. BURIED TANKS

Buried tanks serve the same purposes as surface tanks. They mo.y be of steel 01' of reinforced concrete, the roof being suppo; ted by columns. Cover COIl sis t.s oJ 1 to 6 or more feet of eo.rth.

Such tanks are usurilly difficult to locate and are sufficiently well protected to be immune to a.ttack except by la..rge bombs, Danillgo can be produced only bya di:recthit or by a. very ncat miss. The proba.bility of tire ieama.U, while fJ. fire, ifs.tul't,od, will not spread to neighboring tanks and iscompo.ratively easy toextillguish. Thegrea.test clIect to be expected is loss of fuel through seepage. Theexl/en.t ·of such seepage depends on the nutureoChe subsoil which esnnot be Q!lcertamedi with any accuracy.

The selection 0.£ weapons depends upon the, amount of earth cover and upon the thickness of

Shul No.: A T5FiTMT-1ll

Dale: 14 .Matcll t945

Page: I

concrete slab (if any), This information is usually not Qvail.flbla. For this target the best w·eapoD will: be the smallest OP or SAP (fuzed 0.1/0.1) tbat will perfor.ate the tank cover. Table a gives combinations of earth and concrete penetrable by various bombs from different· heights.

At Sa:ipan, buried steel tanks 220 f:eet in diameter were found. Roofs were of 2 foot reinforced concrete, supported by steel I-beams, end covered with 6 to 6 feet of'earth. From Table 3, it ean be seen that nothing smaller than the 500 lb. SAP would be useful against sllch tanka.

In gentral, buried tank8are very unsatisjactory targe18 ..

M 23 20 17

V. TANKS OR DRUMS IN BOl\IBPROOF SHELTERS

Oilstored in bombproof structures is usually diesel oil used 10rel.ectric powergenera.tion. Storage is in steel tanks approXimately 10 feet in diameter and 10 feet high or in standard 50-gallon drums. Buildingsnre of reinforced concrete 20 to 50 feet square with 2~foot walls n.nd2~ to5-foot roofs. To destroy contents completely 0. weapon must perforate, explode inside, rupture the tanks,. and start Do fire.

The 5" HVAR with SAP nose and .015 tail fuze isthe best weapon due to its aim abilityand penetrating power. A.ttnck should be directed against the walls rnth.er than the roof smceS foet is about the upper limit for perforation.

OP bombs smaller thun 1,000 lb. will have no effect. Consequently, damage to this type of storage can only be expected when 1,000 lb. or larger OP are used against nea,rby insta.llations. Beca/use oj.the BiZ6 oj thesi'ructu'I'esQ,nd the reiativ{J unimportance oj this type oj stol'(J.ge, this should 1!~lJer be a primary bombing taTge.t.

Such

SECRET

SECRET

I. '. '

JOINT TARGET GROUP/ WASHIN'GTON, D. C.

G ENE R A LAN A L Y 5 rs ('

" '

Sheet No, ATSF/TMT-III

Oat. 14 March 1941

Page No. J

VI. CANS OR DRUMS IN THE OPEN OR IN LIGHT STRUCTURES

Cans or drums stored in the open or in light structures are generally used for gasoline, diesel oil, and lubricating oil for mecha.nized units or for ~ motor transport. At. outlying a.irfields they may :I be used for aviation gasoline.

t Con tamers are of light metal and easily dsmaged. Fuel dumps are usually small and dispersed over a considerable area to prevent fire spread.

cl z

.. o

The object of attack is to start 8. fire which will spread through IUl entire unit. The most effeotive attack is by strafing with incendiary bullets. The 5-inch HV AU with fragmentation nose and instantaneous fuzing is also effeotive.

These dumps are not suitable prima.ry targets for bombing attack. However, fragmentation and incendiary bombs tha.t miss nearby primary to.rgets can be expected to do useful da.mag .

SECRET

SECRET

TYPICAL

Sheet No.ATSF/TMT/Pl JOINT TARGET GROUP - WASHINGTON, D.C. Date 25 Feb. 19~5

JAPANESE MILITARY TARGETS. PART I - AIRFIELDS

TYPE 2A PREFA3RICATED JAPANESE HAHGAR

S[CRE T

fUBlIS~;:O IN 01f IC£ 0' AtlAS INHLLIGUCE, A.'.f .• BY COUINED PUSOMWEl Of U.S. Awe IRlllSH S(RYICES fOR lHE USE Of ALLIED 'ORCES.

SECRET

. Sheet No, AT$F/TMT/D3

JOINT TAR.GET GROUP .. W.ASHI"GTON, D.C.. De.te25 FIb 1945

TYPICAL JAPANESE MILITARY TARGETS. PART I-AJRFIELDS

TYPE S JAPANESE HANGAR STRUCTURES

(a) BASIC SHAPE

$~r .Io~ rn.~ .t.. aIIond ,,~============~~

(b) BASIC SHAPE

(c) POSSI'BLE FRAMING DETAILS

SECRET

PUDLISHEO I~ OH ICE OF .CIAS .IIIHUIUNCt,

SECRET

Sheet No. AlSF/TMVD4

Jonn lARGETGROUP -WASH I " GlON , 'D.C. Date 25 Flbl.94!

TYPICAL JAPANESE MILtTARYTARGETS .. PART l·AIRFlELDS TYPE 4 JAPANESE HANGAR STRUCTURES

HANGAR AT EAST AIRPORT., MUKDEN, MANCHURIA

~"lrIh77O' Width 78'

CC;Ul$tructlon: BrlckwaU5 with corrugated: ialvanl.~ed 'Iron :foof, probably supported on wood trusses.

SECRET

P.uBUUED IN O'f ICt: Df ~CI U INTHUGENCE, A_A"' .• ,I¥ tIllliIIMf.D '(R§!lUn !If U .• §. &lID

SECRET

Sh •• t No. ATSF/TMT/DIJ

JOINT TARGET GROUP - WASHINGTON, D.C. Date 25 Feb 1945

TYPICAL JAPANESE MILITARY TARGETS. PART 1-AIRFIELDS JAPANESE FACTORY TYPE REPAIR SHOPS

(a) SHORT SPAN BUILDINGS

(b) LONG SPAN BUILDINGS

SECRET

PUOLISHED IN O,,.CE OF ~CIAS INTELLIGENCE, A.A.'., 8T CONfiNED 'ERSONNEl Of u.s. ANO

_____ .u ~_~ __ .~_. _. __ .. _ .. ~_ ~ _

SECRET

Sheet No.A.TSF/M/Cl

JOI tiT TARGET GROUP • WASH.ltlGTOtl, D.C. Date 2.5 Feb.. 1945

mlCALJAPANESE Y!UTARY TARGETS. PART I ... AIRFIEWS

10 ~-
.9
.8
.1
."
.5
,
I
~~ I
'"
I
1'"\ I
•• ~~~
. 09
" .
,01
.0
Do
01)"1

: .... ,,'
I
I
It'jI. U!'~ II !lVl H I-

I
.0'
.009
,008
!J07
.00"
N'J""
.0

.002.
I I
: I I
I
.001 2.0 'It " rc UI '~ o o LL.

o

(I)

0:. W a.

d z

>....

(/J z w 0,

(,!) <I It:

LL.

DISTANCE F'ROM8URST IN FEET

SECRET

.U8 U S·KfOIN Off I C (OF AC I AS I NT[ L lIG !;.NC.(, A.A.'., 8Y tO~IIMEO PERSONNEL OF u.~. ANO

••• 'T 1,'11:111 c.~a'I;II."'~c .. "., ",,'wi>' ncr ftllC' II j. I 1.'",1\. ","'fU"l~/!-r_ _ __ ••• _

SECRET

Sheet No. ATSF/TMT/C2 JOINT TARGET GROUP - WASHINGTON, D.C. Date 25 F.b. 1945

rIPlCAL JAPANESE IIILITARY TARGETS. PART I - AIRFIELDS

SECRET

PUBLlSIIED Iii OFFICE OF ACIAS INTElllGEIICE,

_ •••• ,. _.ll • _._ .. 11'( en.w .. ttl 'oft ••• S:iII.l.·(1I1lU '1. I)~. 11_ ~- •... 1' .

Sheet No. J.TSr/m/c'j JOINT TARGET GROUP - WASHINGTON, D.C. Date 25 reb. 1945

TYPICAL JAPANESE IfILITARY TARGETS. PART I - AIRFIELDS

SECRET

'_

SECRET

'Ul'l.lSlIfO IN O"ICE OF ACIAS IIITHLlGUCf, A.A.f., BY COlillNED PERSONNEl OF U.S. AND

•• ,TI511 SE.VICES 'OR TilE USE Df ALLIED fORCES,

SECRET

Sheet No. ATSF/TJlr/C4 JOINT TARGET GROUP - WASHINGTON, D.C. Date 25 '.b. 1945

TYnCAL JAl'ANh:SE KIUTAR'r 'l'AIlGETS. PART I - AIRFIElDS

SECRET

'UILISUD IN OfFICE OF .. ClAS '",HUGENC[, A.A.' ••• , COW81NED '£ASONNEL OF u.~. AND

•• lfI5N SlAVIC'! '01 TNE USE Of ALLIED fORCES.

·1

Sheet No.ATSF/TMT/C5 ~OI~T TARGET GROUP - WASHINGTON, D.C. Date 25 Feb. 1945

T,IPICAL JAPANESE MIUTARY TARGETS. PART I - AIRFIEIDS

~++++++++++++++++++~~++++~++++++++++Tfl~~~++~r

I,

SECRET

\;

PUBlISHED IN OffiCE OF ACIAS II!TELLIGENCt,

.. ... ." ,." ... '''FA GC'D!"tUI.It, t\F Ii C. ... In

SECRET

" -

IT

COP, No. 292 .298 294

JOINT TARGET GROU.', WAS.HINGTON,D.C.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

CONFIDENTIAL Oat. Mardi, 'HI 111ut No. I

AIRTABGET INDEX-JAPANESE, WAR AND AlB TARGE.T ·SYSTEM FOl.DERS

-Cancel. aI.1 prevlouB l8eu_

No .. Cop I.

AIR FORCE DISTRiBUTION

CO, T'I'O'en.tieth Air Foroe._"""" _ _ _ _ _ _ 2

CO, Deputy Twentieth Air Foree,

POA (thru AAFPOA)"._. ••• _ 1

CO, XX Bomb. Comd • •• _ IS

CO, XXI Bomb. C,md.. (tbrn

AAFPOAJ • _ .. __ • .. 1'9

CO, Seventh Air Force (tbN

AAFPOA} ...... . 0__ 22:

CO,. Far Eaat Air ForeG .. __ • __ ._ S

co, Fiftb Air Force (tbru FEAFJ_..S CO, Thirteenth Air Force (thru

FEAF)._ •• _ _ ......•.. _ 6·

CO, Eastern Air Command._._ ••• _. 2

CG,Tenth Air Force (thru EAC)... I

CO, Eh:l\'entb Air Foreo _ I

CO, Fourteenth Air Force _._ 6

CO,316th Bo.mb. W.ing. _......... S

CO, Second Ail' Foree __ .• _ •• _ •• _ 1

CO, Third AIr Forco __ • •.•..• I

CO,. USST AF. . oo______ 1

CO, Eightb A.Ir Force .• __ ... 1

CO, MAAF .. • __ • 1

CO, Flfteentb Air Force_ ••.. _ _. 1

AAFSAT, Orlando .... __ • _.. 2

AC/AS, Intelligence, Jom.t Target

Group __ • MO •• • 15

WAR DEPARTMENT DISTRiBUTION

MIlL ~ ~. ~ ~ ~ •• _ ~ _ •. ~ ~ ~ .. ~ _ 3

u. ,so Strateglo BomblngSu.rvey __ ..... ~ 1

CO,. TraCly,Oalifornla,,_." ... __ • 1

aROUND FORCES

DiSTRIBUTION

CO, AF/SWPA •.•• _ •• " .__4

CO, Hq U. S. F. China Theater __ • __ SPECiAL AOENCIE-8 DiSTRIBUTION

Joint Chief of SWJJ Soo. Joint W.ar

Plane Committee .. _ .... ..... _. _ I

.Joint Intelllgenco Co.mm.Study Pub-

ilsbing Bd •.. _ .. __ • """ __ • _.. ..... 1

O. S. S. (thrll Servic6 Liaison Officer). 15

F .. E. A. (tbrn Service Liaison om.cer)_ O.S. R. D. (tbru Service Liaison

Officer} . . •.• __ • _ •• _ a

A .. T. 18., .Brubane .. ~. __ ~ .. ~ 1

A. D. V. A. T. J. .8 •• ... .. 1

COP, No.

a

4-10, 382-389 83.319, 340-356

11-24, 320-324

26-32, 825--839 as, 378-314 36--B8

39-44 46-47 48 55 49-64

314-318 807 381 56 67 68 59

296,370

297-306, 811 .. 1318, B9HOO

.265,267, 268 393 296

34,875, 891,392 tHO

872 269-:278, 369-862, B7l B08

309,357- 858 291 890

No.O'oPI.,

S. E. A .. T. I. C., New Delbi .. _. .•• 1

C .. S. D. I. C. (W), Aigler:s .____ 1

C. S. D. I. C. (E), Cairo •• _._. .• 1

Nil VY DISTRIBUTION

C. N. O. (OP'-I6-V-iS). " __ " _ •. __ 10

Ci.nGPac·CinCPOA ••. _ .•. __ •• •.. 5

ComAir·Pac ..... .____ 1

ComAlr Pae: Carrier DIv!sions (1 each) 17

AU Carriere (1 eaob) 98

Other unit.s (J each) 4.3

ComAirNorSols .•• _ •• ... 5

ComThitd Fleet.. .. ~ .. ~ .. _ __ .. 5

ComFifth Fleet. ... __ • ._. __ 5

ComSeventh Fleet- .. oo .. o .. ~ 1

1 I 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1

Com.Fimt Carrier Task Force, PM _

ComSecond Oaniel' Task Force, Paa,

ComPltAir, West Coo.st (OlnO) .. _

Co.mFl.tAir, Alameda (OlnC) ••• ..

ComFltAir, Seattle (OinC) .... 0 •••••• Ccmmandar, Navy No. 109 •• _ •••• _ ~

Commander, Navy No. 3233. _

ComForward Area, GenPac._._ __

Commander, Navy No. 3254 __

ComPhilippine Seahon ..•..........•...

OinC, JICPOA. •• _ _ •••

Naval Advanced Intelligence Center,

SoPnc. _ .. __ _. _. __

CO, InteUigllnce Genter 7th Fleet

(AU:. OinC) •...... _ _._

Na.val AdvfLoced Intelligence Clluter.,

NorPae (Att: OlnO) •••• _ _

ComAirLsnt, Iolonna.tion Center,

N AS, NorVa oo .. ~ .. .. _

NAOT'C, NAS, Je.aksonvlUe (Att:

OlnC NACl) .. _"~_ ... _ ... _ •• . __

GluG, NA Combat Intelllgenee Sehcc], NASQuo!lset RL_ • __ ._ ._ ..... __

B.lUTiS.H DiSTRIBUT10N

British Embw;sy, W!l.Sbington •••• _.. 2

Brl.tlllh Naval Sta..If, W.ashington

(N .. t. D. 18) •• •• __ _ a

Air Ministry, London: ADl (k)----- 2

AISe 0) •.• _.. 2

Ala (U .. S. A.)

25

London • 1

G. I. O. RAF Bomber C'omm.and

(England) _ _. _. 1

R. A. A. F. Representative, WWlhlng-

ton _ •... 0_. _ .. _ -1

R .. A. A. F. Command,.BrlaballC (tbru

RAAF rep) •• _ 1

A. C.S .. E. A. (India) _ _ .. _ 1

S .. A. 0 •. -8. E. A .. (India) .____ 5

NETHERLAND.S DISTIl! BUTION Representa.tlvo to the eomblned

Ohiefs of St.aff_ •• • .1

60--03,. 266, 364--,867., 376 65-69 64 70.-85, 308

86-183 184.-226 227:...231 232 .. 2$6 237-241

242 243 2c4.4 246 246 247

248--249 250-251 252,..258 25'1--255 256-257

268

1

269

1

1

261

2

262-263

1

264

369

286-286

288--290 280.-281 282-283

284

279

394.-398

287 4.5,311- 380

863

l'uel.ISHflQ IN oFFIarop Ae/AS .INTEL.1.IGENeE, A.. A. I .... fl·". eOM81NI>Q PlU!SQNNEL OF U. ,. AND OIl:I:rI$H SEIl:.vlew 'FOil: THK U$EOP JlL.1..IODFOR(:!;;!O.

CONFIDENT.A'L

Oc!Pl' No. 292 293 294

JOINT TARGET GROUP, WASHINGTON, D. C.

DISTRI!BUTION LIST

CONFIDENTIAL Dole March 1945 IJI\leNo.1

AIR TARGET INDEX_J .. "-PANESE WAR AND AIR T'ABGETSYSTEM FOLDERS

-Cancel 011 previous j88UIl&-

No. COpt",

Al.R FORCB DISTRIBUTION

CG, Twentieth Air 1"oT·oe____ _ __ 2

ca, Deputy Tweutil;lth Air 10rce,

PDA (thru AAFPOA), ~_ 1

CG, XX Bomb. Comd __ . ._______ 15

CG, XXI Bomb. Gom.d. (thru

AAFPOA) __ . ._. __ . . .• __ • _ _ _ 19

CO, Seventh .AII' Force (tbru

AAFPOA)____ _ 22

Co, Fo.r East Air Foreo________ _ il

GO, Fifth Air Force (tbru 1"EA1") _ _ _ 8

CG, Thirteenth Air Force (thru

FEAF}_. 0_ 6

GO, &.stern Air Command____ _ _ 2

CO, Tenth Air Force (tbru EAC)___ I

CG, Elev(l,nth Air Force . __ I

CO, Fourteenth Air 1"01'00 .____ 0

CG, 816t,b Bomb. Wing_ __ 6

ca, Second Air Force .__ 1

ca, Third AII' Foree____ _ __ __ I

CG, USSTAF .______ 1

CO, Eighth Air Foree ._

GO, M AAF • _

CO, FfCteenLh Air 1"ol'oc, • _ I

AAFSAT, Orlnndo..._____ _ 2

ACt AS, Intelligence, Joint Tnrget

Group • .__ 16·

WAR DEPARTMENT DIS TIUBUTION

MIB •• ._" __ • _ •• ~_

U. B. ,Bbrntegic Bombing Survey •• _

CO, Traoy, Cnllfornin • • • __

GROUND FORCES

DISTRIBUTION

CO, A1"/SWPA. • __

GO, Hq U.S. F. Chinn Theoter _

SFEClA.L AGENCIES

DI STRI B UTI ON

Joint Chlef of 8taffSec. Joint w.o.r

Plana Committee •• _ _ __ 1

Joint Intelligence Comm, Study Pub-

lIsbing Bd • .-_ .• __ • __ 1

O .. S .. S. (thru Service Llalscn Officer). 16

F. E. A. (thru Service Liaison Officer). 1

O. ,S.. n, D. (thru Service Liaison

Officer). . •• • _. •. _ 3

A. T. I. B., Brisbane •• ._ 1

A. D. V. A. T. r. S. _. ._. .___ I

C·oPl'NQ.

3

4--10, 382-889 8a.819, 340-856

11-24, 320-824

26-32, 325-339 85, 873--374 86-38

89-44 46-4.7 48 65 49--54

314-818 307 381 56 67 58 59

296,370

207-306, 311-313, 399-400

8 265,267,
268
I 393
1 295
<I 34,.875,
891,392
810 372 269-278,' 859-862, 371 808

309,357- 858 21H a90

1-2

No. Copta

S. E. A. T. I. C., New DclhL._.___ 1

C. S. D. 1. C. (W), Aigiero. . __ ._.__ 1

C. S. D. I. C. (E), Co-iro. __ •• _ •• 1

NA VY Dl.8TRI BUTlON

C. N. O. (OP-l6-V-S).___________ _ 10

eCHIS, 266, 364-367,. 876 6&-69 64 70-85, 308

86-183 184-226 227-2.31 232-'230 237 .. 241

242 243 244 245 246 247

24&-2,49 250-251 2621-253 25-1-255 256-'257

258

.259

260

261

211z...263

264

869

285-286

288--200 280-281 282--283

284

279

394-398

287 45.,377- 380

363

CinCPa(looCinCPOA._._______ _ 6

ComAirPac_. •• _ 1

C'omAirPao: Carrier Dlviaions (1 each) 17

All Gar.ricMl (1 each) 98

Other units (l each) 43

ComAirNorSoill ~ • • _ 5

OJmThird Flcot.. __ • __ • __ •• __ •••• _6

C'omFiftb Fleet_ _ _ 5

I 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1

ComSeventb Fleet_. e. _. _ .. _

ComFil'!lt Carrier Task Force, PM __ • C'omSeoond Carrier Task Force. Pac;

C'omFltAir, WCl!t Coast (OinG) _

ComFltAir, Alamedn (DiIlC) _

ComFltAir, Scat~lc (OinC) _

COlDmnnder, Navy No. 169 . . __

Commander., Nlwy N 0 •. 8233 •• __ • _._

Gom.Forward .uoo, CenPao _

Oommender, N!lvy No. 32M_. • __

GomPhiHppine SeaFron .. __ .. •• __

OinC. JICPOA • _

25

Naval Advanced InteUigence Center,

So·Pno ._. . _. ... _ _ _ _ 1

GO, InteJligence Center 7th Fleet

(Att: OinC) • •. _ 1

Naval Advanced Intelligence CCllt.er,

NorPllo (Att: OinC) ._ 1

C'omAIrLnnt, ID(ormntion Conter',

NAS, NorVo.. • ._ 2

NAOTC, NAS, JnokeonviUe (Att:

OinG NACll • __ .... ...... _ 1

Din 0', NA C'ombat IntclllgenceSehool,

NAB·Quonset RI.. _ ._ •••• ••• _

BRITISH DISTRIBUTION

Brit.ish EmbILSSY, W!labington_______ 2

.Britlsh Nnvlll .StaO', Washington

(N .. 1. D. 18) .. __ .. _ •• __ • ·8

Air Minlatry, London: ADI (k) •.• __ .2

AlSo (I) _. _ _ _ 2

Ala (U. S .. A.)

London • 1

C. I. O. RAF BomberC'ommand

(England) _ _ 1

R •. A. A. F'. Represen.tative, Washing-

ton .. • • __ ._ _ __ _ _ 4

R A. A. F. Commnnd, Brlabane (thru

RAAF rep) ••• ._ I

A. C. S. E. A .. (lndia) • .• __ •. 1

S. A. 0'.-8. E. A. (India) _~___ _ 6

NETHERLANDS DISTRIBUTION Representative to the combined

Chietaof Staff_ _ _ 1

PUBllStUlO 1"1 OFFICE OF ... e/AS; INTeLLIGENCE. A ..... '"BY COMBINEO "EIOSO"'N!;:!'" OP U. S. "'''D efllTlSH SERVICES FOR' THE US~ OF AI.I.H':D ,POlleES •.

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

JOINT TARGET GROUP. WA.SHINGTON, Do. C. 15 January 1945

GENERAL NOTE

Material contained in this fo,lder is pubHshedin, the office of AC/ AS, Intelligence, AAF, by combined personnel of United States and Br.itishservi.ce.s: for the use of Allied Forces.

AIR TARGET SYSTEM FOLD.ERS are designed for the use of operating air units in the field and are published in. a quantity to permi.tdistribution to I:evel of Air .ForceGroups (American Jand Na.val Aircraft Carriers.

Thema.teria.1 in thh folder is divided in.to three parts as follows:

GENERAL ANALYSIS

This gives an ever-ell appreciatio.n. of the target sys.tem so that the imporfan.ce of ind.ividual targets within. the system can be readily evaluated. I.talsolists the essential details of the M.ain targets in the .system ..

LOCATION MAP

This shows the location of the p.rincipal tatgets.

DATA ON INDIVIDUAL TARGETS

This is to contain Target Information Sheets and Illustrations and Eco.n.omic Dornase Assessment Reports as issued for individual targets in the system.

Addenda consist.ing of revised sheets on.d additional sheets will be issued from time to time. The folder is design.ed to permit ready substitution or additio.n of such material.

Individual sheds are classified as i.n.dicated and may be used accordingly. Classification of the fol·der as a wheleis stamped on the cover •. Such classification. refers to the data ,in assembled form.

When material has .served its purpose it shaH be destroyed in eeeerdance wit'h AR 380...;5 or Art. 76, Nav. Reg.

Orig.inal distribution list is the fin.al page of thisfo·lder. Any queries. errequesfs should be a.ddressed to:

Join.tTarget Group AC/ AS, Intelligence H. Q. Army AIr Forces Washington 25,0. C.