You are on page 1of 10

Perisai Wira Sdn Bhd

[2013] MLRHU v. Harum Minat Sdn Bhd & Ors 1

PERISAI WIRA SDN BHD


v.
HARUM MINAT SDN BHD & ORS

High Court Malaya, Kuala Lumpur


Mary Lim Thiam Suan J
[Writ Summons No: 22NCC-994-06/2012]
22 August 2013

Case(s) referred to:


Ayer Hitam Tin Dredging Malaysia Bhd v. YC Chin Enterprise Sdn Bhd [1994] 1
MLRA 201; [1994] 2 MLJ 754; [1994] 3 CLJ 133; [1994] 2 AMR 1631 (refd)
Chow Chin Thong v. Dr Chong Eng Leong [2010] 15 MLRH 252; [2012] 10 CLJ
273 (refd)
Chon Then Tick v. Metroplex Development Sdn Bhd [2009] 4 MLRH 238; [2010]
6 CLJ 572 (refd)
Charles Grenier Sdn Bhd v. Law Wing Hong [1996] 2 MLRA 188; [1996] 3 MLJ
327; [1997] 1 CLJ 625; [1996] 3 AMR 3533 (refd)
Chan Thiam Teng v. Bang Swee Heng Sdn Bhd [1992] 4 MLRH 277; [1992] 2
MLJ 583 (refd)
Ganam Rajamany v. Samoo Sinniah [1984] 1 MLRA 38; [1984] 2 MLJ 290;
[1984] 1 CLJ (Rep) 123 (refd)
Lam Eng Rubber Factory (M) Sdn Bhd v. Lim Beng Yew & 4 Ors [1994] 2 MLRH
564; [1994] 3 MLJ 405; [1994] 4 CLJ 376 (refd)
New Kok Ann Realty Sdn Bhd v. Development & Commercial Bank Ltd, New
Hebrides [1986] 1 MLRA 520; [1987] 2 MLJ 57 (refd)
Reignmont Estate Sdn Bhd v. Jaya Ikatan Plantations Sdn Bhd [2012] MLRHU
1436; [2013] 9 MLJ 1 (refd)
South East Asia Insurance Bhd v. Nasir Ibrahim [1992] 1 MLRA 304; [1992] 2
MLJ 355; [1992] 1 CLJ 295; [1992] 1 AMR 172 (refd)

Legislation referred to:


Contracts Act 1950, s 66
Specific Relief Act 1950, s 11(2)

Counsel:
For the plaintiff: Shahrul Amali Shafie; M/s A Azidin & Shahrul
For the defendants: Pramjit Kaur; M/s Mann & Associates

[Ordering that the defendants do pay the plaintiff RM10,000.00 as costs of these
proceedings.]

GROUNDS OF DECISION

Mary Lim Thiam Suan J:


Perisai Wira Sdn Bhd
2 v. Harum Minat Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] MLRHU

[1] This is a claim for specific performance of a resolution dated 27 May 2010
passed by the 1st Defendant. In that resolution, the Board of Directors
resolved that the directors be authorized to sell the 1st Defendant together with
its assets to the Plaintiff upon certain specified conditions.

[2] There was really only one asset that the 1st Defendant possessed, and that
was a piece of land that the Government of the State of Selangor had agreed to
alienate to the 1st Defendant. That land was located at Section 76 KTN
Mukim Labu, Daerah Sepang, Selangor ["the said land"]. At the material time,
the 1st Defendant had yet to pay the necessary premium and so title to the said
land had not been issued. One of the conditions was that the Plaintiff was to
settle the premium for the said land.

[3] At the trial, the Plaintiff's executive director, one Dato' Muhammad bin
Abdul Ghani [PW1] testified that no written sale and purchase agreement was
signed because he was approached by the 2nd Defendant a week before the
expiry of the payment of the land premium after which the alienation of the
said land would have lapsed. According to him, it was an oral arrangement
between him and the 2nd Defendant who had further provided him with
several documents as security and a reflection of how serious she was in the
agreement. The 2nd Defendant had further issued PW1 with a letter of
undertaking dated 31 May 2010 to inter alia sell the said land for RM10
million. Subsequently, she had also issued a letter dated 6 June 2010 inter alia
acknowledging the receipt of RM20,000.00 as part-payment of the sale of the
said land.

[4] According to PW1, he made all the necessary payments [through his son]
including payment of the premium as well as the sum of RM72,428.00 as quit
rent and RM59,967.50 as surveyors' charges for the 1st Defendant, all in
respect of the said land. He also claimed to have made a part-payment of
RM20,000.00 to the 2nd Defendant in her capacity as a director and he was
supposed to have been advised on the status of the issuance of title to the said
land so that the whole transaction could be completed.

[5] He claimed that he was never kept informed and he added that the 2nd
Defendant was insincere and had refused to complete the transaction. Despite
repeated demands including one sent through its lawyers, and the payment of
more than 35% of the purchase price, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants
had refused to keep up to its end of the bargain. Mohd Zullaimy bin
Muhammad [PW2] confirmed his father's evidence although he was not
present during the negotiations between the 2nd Defendant and his father.

[6] The 2nd to the 4th Defendants held positions as directors and in the case of
the 3rd Defendant; she was also the Company Secretary. All of them testified.
The 3rd and 4th Defendants claimed that only the 2nd Defendant was
involved in the whole matter, that they had signed undated copies of Form
32A for the transfer of their shares because the 2nd Defendant had asked them
to do so. Insofar as the deal or the transaction was concerned, although they
were made aware of the negotiations by the 2nd Defendant, they both claimed
that the terms had not been agreed; especially the price of the said land.
Perisai Wira Sdn Bhd
[2013] MLRHU v. Harum Minat Sdn Bhd & Ors 3

[7] As far as the 2nd Defendant is concerned, she claimed not to know English
and that the documents were all prepared by PW1. She too, claimed that the
parties had not agreed on the price of the said land. All the Defendants denied
that the parties had agreed on a price of RM10 million for the said land.

Findings Of The Court

[8] This is one of those unfortunate cases where the testimonies and evidence
led simply do not meet the pleaded case and where the Court was compelled
to then dismiss the claim. This case illustrates the importance of proper
pleadings and the role they play in any given case. This is how the Plaintiff has
pleaded its case. After the first half a dozen paragraphs, at para 7 to 20 of the
Amended Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff pleaded:

7. Pada tarikh 27 Mei 2010 juga, Defendan Kedua, Ketiga dan


Keempat telah menandatangani satu resolusi untuk menjual syarikat
Defendan Pertama kepada Plaintif dan melantik Dato' Muhammad
bin Abdul Ghani sebagai salah seorang pengarah di dalam syarikat
Defendan Pertama untuk menjaga kepentingan Plaintif.

8. Dalam masa yang sama juga, Defendan Kedua dan Keempat juga
telah menandatangani Borang 32A Akta Syarikat 1965 yang tidak
bertarikh bagi melepaskan jawatan sebagai pengarah dan pemegang
saham Defendan Pertama.

9. Dalam masa yang sama juga, Defendan Ketiga telah


menandatangani Borang 32A Akta Syarikat 1965 yang tidak bertarikh
bagi melepaskan jawatan sebagai pengarah dan pemegang saham
Defendan Pertama.

10. Premium yang dijelaskan oleh Plaintif beserta kos-kos yang


berkaitan dengan hartanah tersebut adalah menjadi sebagai bayaran
pendahuluan kepada pembelian saham Defendan Pertama oleh
Plaintif sebanyak Ringgit Malaysia Sepuluh Juta (RM10,000,000.00)
sahaja.

11. Plaintif kemudiannya telah di atas permintaan Defendan Pertama


dan/atau pengarahnya telah menjelaskan premium daftar pelan dan
CT pertama sebanyak RM3,419,842.84 bagi pihak Defendan Pertama
untuk sebidang tanah yang beralamat di Seksyen 76 Mukim Labu,
Daerah Sepang, Negeri Selangor dan kemudiannya dikenali sebagai
HS(D) 31981 PT 3990 Mukim Labu, Daerah Sepang, Negeri
Selangor.

12. Pada 05 Ogos 2010, Geran Individu Hakmilik Tanah tersebut


telah dikeluarkan oleh Pejabat Tanah dan Daerah Sepang atas nama
Defendan Pertama sebagai pemilik Hartanah tersebut, namun
Defendan Pertama telah gagal untuk memaklumkan akan pengeluaran
Geran tersebut kepada Plaintif.
Perisai Wira Sdn Bhd
4 v. Harum Minat Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] MLRHU

13. Defendan Pertama dan/atau orang yang diberi kuasa oleh


Defendan Pertama juga telah secara sembunyi mengambil Geran
tersebut akan tetapi telah gagal, enggan atau cuai untuk
memaklumkannya kepada Plaintif.

14. Pada 6 Julai 2010, Defendan Kedua atas kapasiti beliau sebagai
salah seorang pengarah Defendan Pertama telah menerima cek BIMB
536121 berjumlah RM20,000.00 yang merupakan sebagai sebahagian
bayaran untuk jual beli syarikat.

15. Plaintif juga telah menjelaskan cukai tanah bagi tahun 2010
sebanyak RM72,428.00 dan membayar kesemua kos yang berkenaan
termasuk kos juruukur tanah sebanyak RM59,967.50 bagi pengeluaran
Geran tersebut berdasarkan representasi dan perjanjian yang dibuat
oleh Defendan Pertama dan/atau pengarahnya.

16. Defendan Pertama dan/atau pengarahnya juga telah berjanji


untuk menandatangani Perjanjian Jual Beli saham syarikat Defendan
Pertama setelah kesemua pembayaran yang berkaitan dengan
premium dibuat oleh Plaintif dan setelah Pejabat Tanah dan Daerah
Sepang mengeluarkan Geran bagi Hartanah tersebut.

17. Defendan Pertama dan atau pengarahnya telah gagal untuk


mematuhi segala perjanjian dan akujanji yang dibuat kepada Plaintif.

18. Plaintiff telah beberapa kali meminta Defendan Pertama dan atau
pengarahnya untuk menandatangani Perjanjian Jual Beli syarikat
namun Defendan Pertama dan/atau pengarahnya gagal berbuat
demikian.

19. Plaintiff telah melalui peguamcaranya menghantar Notis Tuntutan


yang bertarikh 03 April 2012 kepada Defendan Pertama, Kedua,
Ketiga dan Keempat untuk mengarahkan supaya Defendan Pertama
meneruskan Perjanjian Jual Beli tersebut namun sehingga ke hari ini
tiada sebarang tindakan yang diambil oleh Defendan Pertama,
Defendan Kedua, Defendan Ketiga dan Defendan Keempat bagi
meneruskan Perjanjian Jual Beli tersebut.

20. Defendan Pertama jelas masih gagal sehingga ke hari ini untuk
mematuhi semua akujanji dan perjanjian yang dibuat walaupun wang
pendahuluan melebihi 35% telah dibayar oleh pihak Plaintif.

[9] From the Statement of Claim, it is quite clear that the Plaintiff is seeking to
enforce the agreement that it had made with the Defendants. That agreement
is housed in a resolution of the 1st Defendant and that is why the Plaintiff is
seeking the following reliefs:

i. that the 1st Defendant comply with the resolution of 27 May 2010;
Perisai Wira Sdn Bhd
[2013] MLRHU v. Harum Minat Sdn Bhd & Ors 5

ii. that the Defendants proceed with the sale and purchase of the 1st
Defendant;

iii. that the Defendants deliver the land title to "Section 76 KTN
Mukim Labu, Daerah Sepang, Selangor" to the Plaintiff's lawyers to
hold as stakeholders;

iv. costs; and

v. any other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

[10] According to these reliefs, the Plaintiff is seeking an order that the
Defendants do comply with a resolution of the 1st Defendant dated 27 May
2010; that the Defendants proceed with an agreement to sell the 1st
Defendant; and that the Defendants deliver the title deeds to the said land to
the Plaintiff's lawyers to hold as stakeholders.

[11] In order for the first three orders to be made, there must be proved at the
very least an agreement to that effect. Since the Plaintiff is premising its claim
of such an agreement in the resolution of 27 May 2010, I agree with the
submissions of the Defendants that this document, being an internal document
is not capable of being an agreement unless of course, if its contents are clear
and unequivocal. Similarly in Lam Eng Rubber Factory (M) Sdn Bhd v. Lim
Beng Yew & 4 Ors [1994] 2 MLRH 564; [1994] 3 MLJ 405; [1994] 4 CLJ 376,
the Court was perplexed as to how a resolution of a company could be
considered as a contract between the parties.

[12] Accepting for a moment that a resolution is capable of being construed as


the agreement, in order that this resolution may be considered as a valid
agreement in the terms claimed by the Plaintiff, it must contain the essential
elements of an agreement or contract. It must provide for the parties, the
subject matter, the price and most important, the intention to create a legal
relationship between these parties. Alternatively, the document must be
capable of deducing the intention of the parties to form a legal relationship and
the existence of a concluded contract. This was reminded in the oft-cited Court
of Appeal case of Charles Grenier Sdn Bhd v. Law Wing Hong [1996] 2 MLRA
188; [1996] 3 MLJ 327; [1997] 1 CLJ 625; [1996] 3 AMR 3533.

[13] After carefully examining the resolution which was signed by all the
Defendants, it is apparent that it falls far short of those requirements. This
contemporaneous document would generally be more reliable than any oral
testimonies given at trial, and it is no exception here, states as follow:-

Directors' Resolution No 1/2010

SALE OF COMPANY

RESOLVED THAT the Directors of the Company be and is hereby


authorised to sell the Company together with its asset (the Company)
Perisai Wira Sdn Bhd
6 v. Harum Minat Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] MLRHU

to Perisai Wira Sdn Bhd ... of ... subject to the following terms and
conditions:

1) The Purchaser will settle the premium (including other payments)


amounting to RM3,419,842.84 ... for the piece of Government land
under Section 76 KTN Mukim Labu, Daerah Sepang, Selangor;

2) The price for the sale of the Company will be determined and
subject to the agreement of both parties, after the issuance and receipt
of title for the abovementioned land; and

3) On settlement of the purchase price, the Company will be


transferred to the Purchaser and all the Directors of the Company will
resign, and the Purchaser be appointed as Directors of the Company in
their place.

APPOINTMENT OF ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR

RESOLVED THAT upon settlement of the premium by the


Purchaser, YBhg Dato' Muhammad bin Abdul Ghani ... be appointed
as a Director of the Company.

[14] From the contents of the resolution, I am compelled to agree with the
Defendants that the essential and basic elements for the formation of an
agreement are just not there. Although the Court is in agreement that
agreements do not have to be formalistic and need not be written, as expressed
by the Supreme Court in New Kok Ann Realty Sdn Bhd v. Development &
Commercial Bank Ltd, New Hebrides (In Liquidation) [1986] 1 MLRA 520;
[1987] 2 MLJ 57; these basic elements must be satisfied.

[15] All that this document evinces is merely an authorization to the directors
of the 1st Defendant to sell the 1st Defendant company subject to certain
express terms and conditions. There cannot be said that the elements of an
offer, acceptance and consideration are at all present in this resolution. It is
evident from the contents of the resolution that the price of the sale; if at all it
is even the sale of the 1st Defendant and its assets in the first place and which
will be discussed later; has yet to be determined and more importantly agreed
between the parties. Hence, this resolution is not capable of amounting to any
agreement between the parties in the terms as alleged by the Plaintiff.

[16] In his submissions, learned counsel for the Plaintiff sought to argue that
the offer and acceptance to buy and sell the 1st Defendant can be deduced
from the oral arrangements between PW1 and DW3 who is the 2nd
Defendant. The letter of undertaking issued by DW3 and the payments made
on behalf of the Defendants must also be taken as evidence corroborating the
existence of the agreement as pleaded.

[17] In the first place, where the facts and circumstances are ripe, the Court
can make a determination that an agreement exists, be it by an inference from
the language used in the document relied on; the parties' conduct having
Perisai Wira Sdn Bhd
[2013] MLRHU v. Harum Minat Sdn Bhd & Ors 7

regard to the surrounding circumstances, or from the object of the contract -


see Ayer Hitam Tin Dredging Malaysia Bhd v. YC Chin Enterprise Sdn Bhd
[1994] 1 MLRA 201; [1994] 2 MLJ 754; [1994] 3 CLJ 133; [1994] 2 AMR
1631. I appreciate that the Plaintiff has drawn my attention to the Supreme
Court's decision in South East Asia Insurance Bhd v. Nasir Ibrahim [1992] 1
MLRA 304; [1992] 2 MLJ 355; [1992] 1 CLJ 295; [1992] 1 AMR 172, 362
where the Court opined that "the essence of consideration is that the
promissee, that is the appellant, has taken upon itself some kind of burden or
detriment, ..." to say that because the Plaintiff has expended all those monies,
then there must be an agreement in the terms as claimed. The agreement
being, to sell the 1st Defendant together with its assets at RM10 million.

[18] However, as pointed out earlier, the pleaded case is that the agreement
which is sought to be specifically enforced is to be found in the resolution
itself. It is said to be complete and comprehensive of all the requisites for the
formation of a valid and enforceable contract or agreement. The acts of the
Defendants including the undertaking are merely executory acts corroborating
the claim that such an agreement exists.

[19] It is different if the Plaintiff's pleaded case is that there is an agreement


between the parties to buy and sell the company; and that such an agreement
is to be found partly in several material facts such as the resolution, the
undertaking, and the payments. That may well have been what the Plaintiff
intended in its plea but that is not what was actually pleaded. It is not the
function of the Court to guess or improve on any parties' plea or case. That is
the expertise of counsel. The plea is quite clear in that the resolution houses
the agreement which is sought to be specifically enforced. That is why the
reliefs which were set out earlier were couched in those peculiar terms.

[20] Therefore, with respect, the Court cannot agree with the Plaintiff that the
resolution here contains an intention to create legal relationship in the terms
now sought to be enforced. Unlike other situations where the subject matter of
the alleged agreement or the price of the subject matter [if the subject matter is
at all of the said land in the first place] may be determined from the
surrounding circumstances, it cannot be deduced in this case. As repeatedly
pointed out, this is primarily because of what the pleaded case is.

[21] Aside from it being a specific authorization to the directors to sell the 1st
Defendant and its assets, it is clear that the price of such a sale is to "be
determined and subject to the agreement of both parties, after the issuance and
receipt of title for the abovementioned land". Although PW1 has alleged that
the Defendants had concealed the issuance of the title to him, it does not alter
the fact that the price of the subject matter is yet to be determined. In any case,
the second part of condition 2 provides that the price of the sale of the
company is subject to agreement of the parties. Since there is no suggestion of
any figure being bandied between the parties or that there was agreement on
any figure, there are no circumstances for the Court to even consider
establishing what that price is; or that it is indeed RM10 million as claimed by
the Plaintiff.
Perisai Wira Sdn Bhd
8 v. Harum Minat Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] MLRHU

[22] Having heard the witnesses, I am inclined to find that while the Plaintiff,
through and in the form of PW1 may have believed the price to be RM10
million, there was no consensus ad idem between the parties on that price. I
did not find the 3rd and 4th Defendants to be untruthful witnesses; they are
elderly ladies [DW1 is 70 years old while DW2 is 71 years old] who appeared
to have no real interest in the running of the 1st Defendant and who were
directors and shareholders at the 2nd Defendant's behest. They referred to the
2nd Defendant as "Datin" and they told the Court that they did whatever
"Datin" told them to; especially in relation to the signing of the several
documents presented in Court.

[23] The real person behind the 1st Defendant would have to be the 2nd
Defendant who testified as DW3. Although I did not believe her to be ignorant
of the matters at issue, especially in relation to her understanding of the
English Language, I nevertheless believed her testimony that there was no
agreement on the price of the sale. That had yet to be determined and agreed
between the parties.

[24] The final critical matter that the Court is compelled to deal with concerns
the subject matter of the sale and this is rather fundamental: was it the 1st
Defendant company; or was it the land that was being sold between the
parties. At para 7 of the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff claimed that the
resolution was to sell the 1st Defendant company. Hence, the subsequent pleas
relating to the preparation of copies of Form 32A. At para 10, the Plaintiff
reiterated that the Plaintiff had paid for premium and costs related to the land
as advance payments for the sale of the shares of the 1st Defendant at RM10
million.

[25] However, in evidence and even in the submissions made, the agreement is
about the sale and purchase of land; and not the 1st Defendant company. Both
PW1 and PW2 testified about the sale and purchase of the said land. None of
them testified on any sale of the 1st Defendant with its assets which is how the
claim has been framed. This is evident in Q&A 7 of PW1's evidence-in-chief
where he said:

Defendan Kedua juga memaklumkan bahawa beliau dan Defendan


Pertama tidak mempunyai wang yang mencukupi untuk menjelaskan
premium bernilai RM3,419.842.84 tersebut dan meminta untuk saya
menjelaskan premium tanah tersebut dengan akujanji bahawa setelah
Defendan Pertama berjaya memiliki tanah tersebut, tanah tersebut dan
Defendan Pertama akan dijual kepada Plaintif dengan harga RM10
juta sahaja.

[26] To a question from his counsel at Q&A 9 about whether there was any
agreement for the sale and purchase of the land, he answered that there was
none. Later, at Q&A 12, 15, 16, 17 and 18, PW1 repeatedly referred to an
agreement to sell the said land at RM10 million.

[27] From the terms of the resolution, it is apparent that what would be
transacted or sold is the 1st Defendant and its assets; whereas the letter of
Perisai Wira Sdn Bhd
[2013] MLRHU v. Harum Minat Sdn Bhd & Ors 9

undertaking at p 18 and 19 of Bundle A refers to an agreement between the


Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant for inter alia the sale and purchase of the said
land at RM10 million. Similarly, the letter dated 6 July 2010 found at p 20
which was signed by the 2nd Defendant refers to the receipt of RM20,000.00
of Bundle A as "pembayaran sebahagian harga jualan tanah Seksyen 76 KTN
Mukim Labu Daerah Sepang".

[28] Furthermore, para 4 of this letter contains an undertaking by the 2nd


Defendant not to enter into any agreement or negotiations for the sale of the
said land other than with PW1. This in fact indicates the real interest of the
Plaintiff is in the land and not in the 1st Defendant. All references in both the
letter of undertaking and the letter of acknowledgment pertain to the sale of
land; and not the sale of the 1st Defendant company and its assets. Given such
circumstances, and bearing in mind the specific remedy sought by the Plaintiff
is for an order of specific performance, it cannot be readily concluded what
was the subject matter of the sale and whether there was any concluded
agreement between the parties, be it for the sale of the company together with
its assets; or the said land alone. If the sum was even agreed at RM10 million,
what was this sum for? The company or the said land? While the pleaded case
talks about the company, the oral and documentary evidence is about the sale
of the said land. If that is the case, how then can the Court begin to make any
order in the terms sought?

[29] I am fortified when the submissions of the Plaintiff are further examined
in that it was argued that specific performance ought to be ordered because this
was a transaction for the sale and purchase of land - Chan Thiam Teng v. Bang
Swee Heng Sdn Bhd [1992] 4 MLRH 277; [1992] 2 MLJ 583. This contrasts
glaringly with the Plaintiff's plea that it is a sale and purchase of the 1st
Defendant and its assets; not the sale and purchase of the assets, namely land,
belonging to the 1st Defendant.

[30] The remedy of specific performance is a discretionary remedy guided by


certain basic principles; one of which requires the Plaintiff to plead that it is
ready, able and willing to complete the relevant agreement. The Plaintiff has
also not suggested or explained why damages are not otherwise an adequate
remedy here and why the agreement must be specifically enforced. Given that
the Court does not find any valid and enforceable agreement for the purpose
and in the terms as claimed by the Plaintiff in the first place, this remedy is not
available.

[31] Furthermore, the Plaintiff is required to plead and "prove a continuous


readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the
hearing, to perform the contract on his part". The failure to plead "brought
with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit" as pronounced by the Federal
Court's decision in Ganam Rajamany v. Samoo Sinniah [1984] 1 MLRA 38;
[1984] 2 MLJ 290; [1984] 1 CLJ (Rep) 123; citing with approval the English
practice to be "adopted and applied by the Courts in this country". Not only
was there no such plea, there was no evidence at all of this readiness and
willingness on the part of the Plaintiff led, be it through PW1 or PW2. On this
ground alone, the claim must fail.
Perisai Wira Sdn Bhd
10 v. Harum Minat Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] MLRHU

[32] In submissions, the Plaintiff had also asked the Court to order damages in
lieu of specific performance. Again, this was not pleaded. The Plaintiff argued
that since the Plaintiff had taken the position that damages were not adequate
remedy or compensation, the decree of specific performance was sought. The
Plaintiff relied on the presumption to this effect under s 11(2) of the Specific
Relief Act 1950. It was further argued that the Court had discretion whether or
not to grant damages in the form of the return of the payments already made
by the Plaintiff in order to do justice between the parties. Section 66 of the
Contracts Act 1950 and several decisions were cited in support.

[33] Again, with the greatest respect, given that the claim is fraught with not
just this lack of fundamental pleas, but inconsistencies and more, it will be
requiring this Court to exercise moral justice in the facts of this case. That is
not the function of the Court. Since the Plaintiff itself is uncertain as to what
the agreement between the parties was for, how can the Court even begin to
make any order, let alone a pronouncement that the agreement is not valid or
enforceable? An order for return of any benefits received under s 66 of the
Contracts Act 1950 requires the Court to first make that finding before
proceeding to order that relief. The Court is impeded and constrained in
making such an order on the present facts and circumstances.

[34] I further agree with the Defendants that the Court cannot entertain this
relief certainly not under its omnibus clause of "such further or other relief as
the Court deems just and proper". A substantive relief in the nature of damages
cannot be said to fall within such parameters.

[35] The cases cited by the Plaintiff are quite readily distinguishable in that the
parties in those cases were seeking to specifically enforce agreements to buy
and sell immovable property. In Chow Chin Thong v. Dr Chong Eng Leong
[2010] 15 MLRH 252; [2012] 10 CLJ 273, Chon Then Tick v. Metroplex
Development Sdn Bhd [2009] 4 MLRH 238; [2010] 6 CLJ 572 and Reignmont
Estate Sdn Bhd v. Jaya Ikatan Plantations Sdn Bhd [2012] MLRHU 1436; [2013]
9 MLJ 1, the subject matter of the claim was for recovery of lands. As has been
repeatedly pointed out, this is clearly not the case here.

[36] Finally, the submissions of the Plaintiff on the rule in Turquand's case.
With respect, given all that has been considered and determined, that principle
really has no application in the facts of this case.

[37] For all the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has failed
to prove its case. The Plaintiff's claim is accordingly dismissed with costs.
However, it is not appropriate that costs follow the event here. Instead, I am
ordering that the Defendants do pay the Plaintiff RM10,000.00 as costs of
these proceedings.