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JANUARY 25, 2016

G.R. NO. 205472


AMADO I. SARAUM, PETITIONER,
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FACTS

A telephone call was received by PO3 Larrobis regarding the illegal drug activities in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega,
Cebu City. A buy-bust team was then formed composed of PO3 Larrobis, PO1 Jumalon, PO2 Nathaniel Sta. Ana, PO1
Roy Cabahug, and PO1 Julius Aniñon against a certain "Pata."

During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside the house, which was
divided with a curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum and Peter Espcranza, who were holding drug
paraphernalia apparently in preparation to have a "shabu" pot session. They recovered from Saraum's possession a
lighter, rolled tissue paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter).

By way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. He testified that on the date and time in
question, he was passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to the house of his parents-in-law when he was held by
men with firearms. They were already with "Antik" and "Pata," both of whom were his neighbors. Believing that he
had not committed anything illegal, he resisted the arrest. He learned of the criminal charge only when he was
brought to the court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the officers are justified in seizing the objects.

HELD: YES

Here, the Court is unconvinced with Saraum's statement that he was not committing a crime at the time of his
arrest. PO3 Larrobis described in detail how they were able to apprehend him, who was then holding a disposable
lighter in his right hand and a tin foil and a rolled tissue paper in his left hand, while they were in the course of
arresting somebody. The case is clearly one of hot pursuit of "Pate," who, in eluding arrest, entered the shanty
where Saraum and Esperanza were incidentally caught in possession of the illegal items. Saraum did not proffer any
satisfactory explanation with regard to his presence at the vicinity of the buy-bust operation and his possession of
the seized items that he claims to have "countless, lawful uses." On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses have
adequately explained the respective uses of the items to prove that they were indeed drug paraphernalia. There is,
thus, no necessity to make a laboratory examination and finding as to the presence or absence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or any illegal substances on said items since possession itself is the punishable
act.

The valid warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating to the crime and
seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their lawful intrusion, they inadvertently saw the
various drug paraphernalia. As these items were plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them.
Considering that Saraum's arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise lawful.
The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the shanty are, therefore, admissible
in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are
the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction.

Even if we consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have waived any objection thereto when he did not
raise the issue before entering his plea. "The established rule is that an accused may be estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment.
Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection is deemed waived. In this case, counsel
for Saraum manifested its objection to the admission of the seized drug paraphernalia, invoking illegal arrest and
search, only during the formal offer of evidence by the prosecution.

G.R. NO. 170672


JUDGE FELIMON ABELITA III,
PETITIONER,
- VERSUS –
P/SUPT. GERMAN B. DORIA
AND SPO3 CESAR RAMIREZ,
RESPONDENTS. AUGUST 14, 2009

FACTS

Judge Felimon Abelita III (petitioner) filed a complaint for Damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code
against P/Supt. German B. Doria (P/Supt. Doria) and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez (SPO3 Ramirez). Petitioner alleged in his
complaint that on 24 March 1996, at around 12 noon, he and his wife were on their way to their house in
Bagumbayan, Masbate, Masbate when P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez (respondents), accompanied by 10
unidentified police officers, requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano,
Masbate, Masbate. Petitioner was suspicious of the request and told respondents that he would proceed to the
PNP Headquarters after he had brought his wife home. Petitioner alleged that when he parked his car in front of
their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him, forcibly took the key to his Totoya Lite Ace van, barged into the vehicle,
and conducted a search without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun. Petitioner
presented the shotguns license to respondents.Thereafter, SPO3 Ramirez continued his search and then produced a
.45 caliber pistol which he allegedly found inside the vehicle. Respondents arrested petitioner and detained him,
without any appropriate charge, at the PNP special detention cell.

P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident
in Barangay Nursery. He dispatched a team headed by SPO3 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SPO3 Ramirez later
reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while petitioner, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife
just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for petitioner and when he found him, he informed him of
the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested petitioner to go with him to the police headquarters as he was
reported to be involved in the incident. Petitioner agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his
residence. P/Supt. Doria and his companions chased petitioner. Upon reaching petitioners residence, they caught
up with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the
vehicle beside the driver’s seat as petitioner opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver’s
seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested petitioner. P/Supt. Doria alleged that his men also
arrested other persons who were identified to be with petitioner during the shooting incident. Petitioner was
charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. An administrative case was also filed against
petitioner before this Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal.

HELD: NO

Petitioner alleges that his arrest and the search were unlawful under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Petitioner alleges that for the warrantless arrest to be lawful, the arresting officer must have
personal knowledge of facts that the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense. Petitioner alleges that the alleged shooting incident was just relayed to the arresting officers,
and thus they have no personal knowledge of facts as required by the Rules.
We do not agree.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.

For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just
committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds
of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers,
the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally
witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the
alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was
involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to
shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to
give chase. Petitioners act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough
to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.

Plain View Doctrine

The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for
an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the
chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just
took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers
that the firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.

Civil Liability Under Article 32 of the Civil Code

Petitioner alleges that respondents are civilly liable under paragraphs (4) and (9) of Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Paragraphs (4) and (9) of Article 32 of the Civil Code respectively state:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;

In this case, it was established that petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant and that firearms were
validly seized from his possession. The trial court found that petitioner was charged with illegal possession of
firearms and frustrated murder. We agree with the trial court in rejecting petitioner’s allegation that he was merely
framed-up. We also agree with the trial court that respondents were presumed to be performing their duties in
accordance with law. Hence, respondents should not be held civilly liable for their actions.

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E.


MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P.
SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN DE
LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALES, JR.,
AND BEN YU LIM, JR., PETITIONERS,

- VERSUS -

MAGDALENO M. PEA AND HON.


MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., AS JUDGE DESIGNATE OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BAGO CITY,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 143591
MAY 5, 2010

Facts

Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses, damages,
and attorney’s fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros
Occidental, Bago City.- Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency, allegedly
entered into with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any
intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.-
Petitioners filed a MD arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel.-Attached to the MD
were the following documents:1. A letter dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad
on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property;2. An unsigned letter
dated December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong;3. A letter dated December 9, 1994
addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and4. A Memorandum dated November 20, 1994
from Enrique Montilla III.- The above stated documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent
was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners.- Respondent Peña filed his Complaint-
Affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City. He claimed that said documents were falsified because
the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor
officers and employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing
that they were falsified.-City Prosecutor’s Report (Sept 23, 1998) : In the report, the Prosecutor concluded that the
petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that
the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the
respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories were mere
dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by
petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later, in their Pre- Trial
Brief. Subsequently, the corresponding Information were filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago
City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685,and 6686. Thereafter, Judge
Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners. Petitioners (Oct `1, 1998) filed an Omnibus
MQ : They insist that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of a proper procedure on
preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court; since no such counter-affidavit and supporting
documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and
attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Moreover they
claim that the respondent’s affidavit was not based on the latter’s personal knowledge and therefore should not
have been used by the court in determining probable cause.-On the same day that the Omnibus MQ was filed, the
petitioners posted bail. Their bail bonds expressly provided that they do not intend to waive their right to question
the validity of their arrest. On the date of arraignment, the petitioners refused to enter their plea, for the obvious
reason that the legality of their information and their arrest was yet to be settled by the court.-MTCC’s answer (in
response to Omnibus MQ filed by petitioners): They upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was
issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides, (according to the MTCC) petitioners could no longer question the
validity of the warrant since they already posted bail.

Issue:

1) WON petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the denial of their right to
preliminary investigation and to submit their counter-affidavit;
2) WON the Information charging the petitioners were validly filed and the warrants for their arrest were properly
issued;
3) WON this Court can, itself, determine probable cause
4) WON the petitioners posting a bail constitutes a waiver of their right to question the validity of their arrest.

Held:
Petition granted; MTCC is ordered to dismiss criminal cases against petitioners.

Decision

ISSUE 1 and 3 The following sections of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure are relevant to
theaforesaid issues:

“SECTION 1. Definition. – Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. …SEC. 3.
Procedure. – Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the
following manner:(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied
by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies
as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies of the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any
fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a
notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. …SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. –(a) Where filed with the fiscal. – If
the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule
shall be observed. The Fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant.”
-Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the affidavits submitted by the complainant and did not
require the petitioners to submit their answer. He should not be faulted for doing such as this is sanctioned by the
rules. Moreover, he is not mandated to require the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then be
determined on the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant, without infringing
on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.-Regarding the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners contend
that the warrants were illegally issued as they were solely based on the affidavits of the complainant. Section 2 of
Article III of the Constitution underscores the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the
basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not
satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. There
is no provision or procedural rule which makes the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge
could determine probable cause.

ISSUE 2:- For the issuance of a warrant of arrest, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. It is one of the requisites for a warrant of arrest to be valid.
- On the basis of the above-stated documents (in the facts) and on the strength of the affidavit executed by
the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable cause exists. These same affidavit and documents were
used by the trial court in issuing the warrant of arrest.
-The SC finds the complaint-affidavit and attachments insufficient to support the existence of probable cause. The
respondent’s claims of the falsity of the documents were mere assertions.
- It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall allege facts within their
(affiants) personal knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that the signatures were falsified does not qualify
as personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state that he was present at the time of the
execution of the documents. Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the signatures of the signatories. He
simply made a bare assertion
-A finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the
determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least
be more than mere suspicion. While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need
to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right to
liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary
expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.

ISSUE 4- The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of
Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after
arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking
his objections thereto. Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it
cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of
arrest issued against herby the respondent judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had
an actual intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of
intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to
voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x
x.Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on
the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not
waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to
enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus,
when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude
them from raising the same with the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of
imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail their
arrest.
G.R. No. 176830 February 11, 2014

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner,


vs.
HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte,
Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his capacity as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO,
in his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Justice, Respondents.

FACTS:

On August 26, 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army
at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. The mass grave contained skeletal remains of 67
individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.

P C/Insp. Almaden of the (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of
the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte
through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero). The letters requested appropriate
legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the Communist Party of
the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder,
including petitioners herein along with several other unnamed members. Also attached to the letters were the
affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,Leonardo C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and
Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were former members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP. According to them,
Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee. Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C.
Ocampo (Ocampo),Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),Rafael G. Baylosis (Baylosis),and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad) were
then members of the Central Committee. From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied,
tortured and executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDF pursuant to Operation VD.
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena requiring, among others,
petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses. Petitioner Ocampo submitted his
counter-affidavit. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis did not file counter-affidavits because they were allegedly not
served the copy of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made a
formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary investigation. However, petitioner Ladlad
did not file a counter-affidavit because he was allegedly not served a subpoena.
In a Resolution, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder
against 54 named members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein. Prosecutor Vivero also
recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be dropped as
respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital to the success of the prosecution. The
Information was filed before the (RTC) of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge
Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando).
On March 6, 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in the commission by all mentioned
accused of the crime charged." He ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended
bail for their temporary liberty.

On March 16, 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the Resolution of
Prosecutor Vivero. The petition prayed for the unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as
well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of
further proceedings during the pendency of the petition. Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion
against him and 44 others (including petitioners Echanis and Baylosisand Ladlad) was then pending before the RTC
Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati). Putting forward the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that
common crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a
necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by
Judge Abando. On 1 February 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/
Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/
Suspend Service of Warrant.
Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order transmitting the records of
Criminal Case to the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.
Petitioner Ladlad and Baylosis filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail and a Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail
respectively. The OSG interposed no objection to the grant of a P100,000 cash bail to them. The Court granted the
motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the amount of P100,000, subject to the condition
that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual participation in the peace negotiations

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners denied due process during preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the
warrant of arrest?

HELD: No.

"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of one's
defense." What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to
present ones own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.

Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no longer be found in their
last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim,
Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin
Jerusalem failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their respective counsels.

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on the
evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were
made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains
valid.

In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents at
their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no
longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence. Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the
complaint after his counsels formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary
investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.

Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampo’s contention that he was denied the right to be heard. For him to claim
that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad
would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted
that the indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other witnesses attesting
to the allegation that he was a member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of
Operation VD.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce."

Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of the Constitution in finding
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested" (Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994). Although the Constitution provides that
probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof. In
fact, the judge’s personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable
for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.

It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and supporting documents showing the
existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the
basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the
submission of additional affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. (Delos Santos-Reyes v.
Montesa, Jr. 317 Phil. 101)

The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners is addressed to the
sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.

Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
divested of their character as "common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which
they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty." People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus, when a killing is
committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political
complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it becomes crucial for the court to
determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the
act to be conclusively demonstrated.

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, 401 Phil 905 if during trial, petitioners are able to
show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides the remedy of Amendment or substitution.

Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial court
shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners
would not be placed in double jeopardy.

[G.R. NO. 117321. FEBRUARY 11, 1998]


THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. HERSON TAN Y VERZO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS:
Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, a to inform her that he will drive Lito Amido and
appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time that Freddie was seen alive. His body was later
found sprawled on a diversion road with fourteen stab wounds.
Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the
instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. During their conversation,
appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and
co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra.
Moreover, he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa. With
the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same.
Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder.
Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant
for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but
also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing
inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing.
In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police investigator upon invitation and without the
benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence against him.

HELD, No.

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is
derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. R.A. No. 7438 reenforced
the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a pertinent provision of
which reads:
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of
the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial
investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of
interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating officer, the
duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a meaningful
communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such
rights to the accused would thus not suffice.
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be "voluntary, knowing and
intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel."

Any statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the
assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had
been voluntarily given. The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for questioning at
the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict him,
however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel,
are impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. "This Court values liberty and will always insist on the
observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and
prosecutory powers of government."

17. AAA vs Carbonell 524 SCRA 496

G.R. No. 171465 June 8, 2007

AAA *, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando
City, La Union and ENGR. JAIME O. ARZADON, respondents.

Facts

This petition for certiorari1 assails the December 16, 20052 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San
Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 6983, dismissing the rape case filed against private respondent Jaime O.
Arzadon for lack of probable cause; and its February 3, 20063 Order denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center from February 28, 2001 to
August 16, 2001. On May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m., Arzadon asked her to deliver a book to an office located at
another building but when she returned to their office, the lights had been turned off and the gate was closed.
Nevertheless, she went inside to get her handbag.

On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He told her to go near him and upon
reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe and forced her to lie on the pavement.

Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her family. But when she
discovered that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape, she narrated the incident to her parents. On July
24, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for rape against Arzadon.

On September 16, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Imelda Cosalan issued a Resolution finding probable cause and
[4]

recommending the filing of an information for rape. Arzadon moved for reconsideration and during the clarificatory
hearing held on October 11, 2002, petitioner testified before the investigating prosecutor. However, she failed to
attend the next hearing hence, the case was provisionally dismissed.

On March 5, 2003, petitioner filed another Affidavit-Complaint with a comprehensive account of the alleged rape
[5]

incident. The case was assigned to 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo. During the preliminary
investigation, petitioner appeared for clarificatory questioning. On June 11, 2003, the investigating prosecutor
issued a Resolution finding that a prima facie case of rape exists and recommending the filing of the information.
[6]
Arzadon moved for reconsideration and requested that a panel of prosecutors be constituted to review the
case. Thus, a panel of prosecutors was created and after the clarificatory questioning, the panel issued on October
13, 2003 a Resolution finding probable cause and denying Arzadons motion for reconsideration.
[7]

An Information for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union on February
[8]

6, 2004, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6415. Thereafter, Arzadon filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance All Court
Proceedings Including the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and to Determine Probable Cause for the Purpose of
Issuing a Warrant of Arrest. On March 18, 2004, respondent Judge Antonio A. Carbonell granted the motion and
[9]

directed petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand for determination of probable cause.

ISSUE

W/N respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack
of probable cause.

HELD. Yes

The leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar, the Court explained that this constitutional provision does not
[22]

mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to
personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the
prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.

In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 without taking into consideration the
June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003 Resolution
of the panel of prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005 Resolution of the Department of Justice, all of which sustain a
finding of probable cause against Arzadon.Moreover, he failed to evaluate the evidence in support
thereof. Respondent judges finding of lack of probable cause was premised only on the complainants and her
witnesses absence during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial determination of
probable cause.

It is clear therefore that respondent Judge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No.
6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to take the witness
stand. Considering there is ample evidence and sufficient basis on record to support a finding of probable cause, it
was unnecessary for him to take the further step of examining the petitioner and her witnesses. Moreover, he
erred in holding that petitioners absences in the scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of interest in
prosecuting the case. In fact, the records show that she has relentlessly pursued the same.
G.R. NO. 183700 OCTOBER 13, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,


VS.
PABLITO ANDAYA Y REANO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The non-presentation of the confidential informant as a witness does not ordinarily weaken the State's case against
the accused. However, if the arresting lawmen arrested the accused based on the pre-arranged signal from the
confidential informant who acted as the poseur buyer, his nonpresentation must be credibly explained and the
transaction established by other ways in order to satisfy the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt because the
arresting lawmen did not themselves participate in the buy-bust transaction with the accused.

Antecedents
On February 7, 2003, an information for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 91651 (RA 9165) was filed
charging Pablito Andaya y Reano (Andaya). The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about December 16, 2002 at around 9:50 o'clock in the evening at Brgy. San Jose Sico, Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by
law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell, dispense or deliver, more or less 0.09 gram(s) of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, which is a clear violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

FACTS

8:00 o'clock in the evening of December 16, 2002, their asset who was conducting surveillance of Pablito Andaya in
Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas City, arrived at their station. Said asset reported that he had arranged to buy shabu
from Pablito.

A team composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal, Eric de Chavez, PO1 Lindberg Yap, Edwalberto Villar and
asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a buy-bust. Two (2) pieces of 竄ア 100.00 bills both duly marked "X" were
recorded in the police blotter. Alea gave the marked bills to the asset. Upon reaching the designated place, the team
members alighted from their vehicles and occupied different positions where they could see and observe the asset.
The asset knocked on the door of Pablito's house. Pablito came out. Pablito and the asset talked briefly. The asset
gave Pablito the marked money. The asset received something from appellant. The pre-arranged signal signifying
consummation of the transaction was given. The team members approached Pablito and the asset, introduced
themselves as police officers and arrested accused.

ISSUE:

W/N the search of his house and his person and his arrest by the police officers violated his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; and that the Prosecution's nonpresentation of the confidential informant
was adverse to the Prosecution, indicating that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD. YES
To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as defined and
punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), the State must
establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place between the
accused and the poseur buyer; and ( b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in
court as evidence of the corpus delicti.10

We reiterate that a buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of entrapment of the drug pusher. In such 11

operation, the poseur buyer transacts with the suspect by purchasing a quantity of the dangerous drug and paying the
price agreed upon, and in turn the drug pusher turns over or delivers the dangerous drug subject of their agreement
in exchange for the price or other consideration. Once the transaction is consummated, the drug pusher is arrested,
and can be held to account under the criminal law. The justification that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust
operation is that the suspect is arrested in jlagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in the act of
committing, or is attempting to commit the offense in the presence of the arresting police officer or private
person. The arresting police officer or private person is favored in such instance with the presumption of regularity
12

in the performance of official duty.


The presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution in those instances could be excused
because there were poseur buyers who directly incriminated the accused. In this case, however, it was different,
because the poseur buyer and the confidential informant were one and the same. Without the poseur buyer's
testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate Andaya.
Another mark of suspicion attending the evidence of guilt related to the reliance by the members of the buy-bust
team on the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. To start with, the record does not show what the prearranged
signal consisted of. It is fundamental enough to expect the State to be clear and definite about its evidence of guilt,
particularly here where the conviction of Andaya would require him to spend the rest of his natural life behind bars.
Nothing less should be done here. Secondly, the reliance on the supposed signal to establish the consummation of
the transaction between the poseur buyer and Andaya was unwarranted because the unmitigatedly hearsay character
of the signal rendered it entirely bereft of trustworthiness. The arresting members of the buy-bust team interpreted
the signal from the anonymous poseur buyer as the sign of the consummation of the transaction. Their interpretation,
being necessarily subjective without the testimony of the poseur buyer, unfairly threatened the liberty of Andaya. We
should not allow that threat to perpetuate itself. And, lastly, the reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the
right to confront and test the credibility of the poseur buyer who supposedly gave it

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on February 11, 2008;
ACQUITS accused Pablito Andaya y Reano for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and ORDERS
his immediate release from confinement at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City

[G.R. NO. 123595. DECEMBER 12, 1997]


SAMMY MALACAT Y MANDAR, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS

On August 29, 1990 at about 6:30 in the evening, allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven
days earlier, Rodolfo Yu and three other police officers are on foot patrol along Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-
looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner.
N
The policemen approached the group and conducted “stop and frisk, a warrantless arrest, and had
found a grenade from Malacat’s waist, which was considered as incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court
thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to a “stop and frisk”
RULING
NO.

The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to
validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures
refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions.
As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. -- Arrest, without warrant; when lawful -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as
one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.

WARRANTLESS ARREST
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following:
(1) customs searches;
(2) search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) a "stop and frisk."

In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a stop and frisk with the seizure
of the grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest, hence necessitating a brief
discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN "STOP-AND-FRISK" AND SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST

At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental
search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest
was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made -- the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may
reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in
the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which
might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in
light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on
the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was
going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on
petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:

“We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior
he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing
of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.”

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and
frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest:


(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

WHY IS THE STOP-AND-FRISK INVALID?

Here, here are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid:

First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yus claim that petitioner was a member of the group which attempted
to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.
Second, there was nothing in petitioner’s behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even
mere suspicion.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a
deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the
front waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any
telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioners rights solemnly guaranteed
in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of
reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is
REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately
released from detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.
G.R. NO. 185719 JUNE 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS.
MARCELINO COLLADO Y CUNANAN, MYRA COLLADO Y SENICA, MARK CIPRIANO Y ROCERO,
SAMUEL SHERWIN LATARIO Y ENRIQUE,* AND REYNALDO RANADA Y ALAS**, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
FACTS

On October 9, 2004, PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses Marcelino
and Myra were engaged in selling shabu and that drug users, including out-of-school youth, were using
their residence for their drug sessions. A surveillance on the couple's residence was conducted and after
confirming the reported activities, a buy-bust operation was ensued.

Upon reaching the target area, the asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular buyer of
shabu. During negotiation, Marcelino took from his pocket a small metal container from which he brought
out a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and gave the same to PO2 Noble. While
PO2 Noble was inspecting its contents, he noticed smoke coming from a table inside the house of the
couple around which were seven persons. When PO2 Noble gave the pre-arranged signal, the backup
team rushed to the scene. Simultaneously, PO2 Noble introduced himself as a policeman and arrested
Marcelino. He frisked him and was able to confiscate the metal container that contained another sachet
of white crystalline substance.

Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the house of Marcelino and Myra, where
they found Apelo, Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and Latario gathered around a table
littered with various drug paraphernalia such as an improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil with
traces of white substance, disposable lighters, and plastic sachets. The buy-bust team arrested all these
persons.

The RTC rendered judgment finding the accused MARCELINO and MYRA GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime possessing and selling of dangerous drug while the rest of the accused were found
guilty for possessing drug paraphernalia in violation of Section 14, Article II of RA 9165.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification. Hence, the appellants appealed to the
Supreme Court arguing that irregularities attended their arrest and detention as well as the procedure in
handling the specimen allegedly seized from them.

ISSUE
Whether or not there was irregularity in the arrest of the appellant-spouses because there was no
warrant of arrest.

HELD
NO.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties must be upheld in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence to overturn the same.
Appellants argue that the arrest, search, and seizure conducted by the police were illegal since it was not
supported by a valid warrant. They thus posit that their right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides for lawful warrantless arrests, viz:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid,
two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and,

(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." A common example
of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after conducting a buy-bust operation.

This is precisely what happened in the present case. The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in
flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was effected
after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada
of having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia. Thus, there is no other logical conclusion
than that the arrest made by the police officers was a valid warrantless arrest since the same was made
while the appellants were actually committing the said crimes.

The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a] person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant." The factual milieu of this
case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were lawfully arrested. Pursuant to the
above-mentioned rule, the subsequent search and seizure made by the police officers were likewise valid.
Hence, appellants' claim of unreasonable search and seizure must fail.
The appealed Decision should be affirmed.

G.R. NO. 188133 JULY 7, 2014


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE,
VS.
OLIVER RENATO EDAÑO Y EBDANE, APPELLANT.

FACTS

August 6, 2002, members of the Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement Group, composed of PO3 Corbe, PO3
Nelson Javier, PO3 Dennis Padpad, PO3 Marcelo Alcancia, Jr., together with a female informant, went to
the parking area of McDonalds, West Avenue to conduct an entrapment operation against a certain alias
"Nato."
At around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi. The informant
approached the appellant and talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waved at PO3
Corbe. When PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellant, the latter went out of the vehicle and ran away.
The police was able to grab the accused, causing the latter to fall on the ground. A "knot-tied"
transparent plastic bag from the appellant’s right hand was recovered, while a gun tucked in the
appellant’s waist was seized. The other members of the police arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the police
brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized items to the police station for investigation.

The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of shabu under
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. It also
ordered him to pay a ₱500,000.00 fine.The RTC, however, acquitted Siochi on the ground of reasonable
doubt.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

ISSUE
Whether or not the arrest was valid and the items seized were admissible for evidence.

RULING

NO.
Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is known an arrest in flagrante delicto.20
"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delictoto be valid, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer."

In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly
attributed to the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just
committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe testified
that the appellant and the informant were just talking with each other when he approached them. There
was no exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car. He also admitted on cross-
examination that he had no personal knowledge on whether there was a prohibited drug and gun inside
the space wagon when he approached it.

That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by
itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge that the appellant
had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity.

In other words, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot
be evidence of guilt.

Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted from
it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline substances seized from
him is inadmissible in evidence, having come from an invalid search and seizure.

In sum, we hold that the appellant’s acquittal is in order since the shabu purportedly seized from him is
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Corollarily, the prosecution's
failure to comply with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of custody requirement of
this Act, compromised the identity of the item seized, leading to the failure to adequately prove the
corpus delictiof the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the October 16, 2008 decision and the
December 23, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01142. Appellant Oliver
Renato Edaño y Ebdane is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless he is otherwise legally
confined for another cause.

G.R. NO. 205741 JULY 23, 2014


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELIEE,
VS.
REYMAN ENDAYA Y LAIG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS

On 11 November 2002, police operatives of Mataasnakahoy Police Station, acting on a report from a
barangay official that appellant is involved in illegal drug activities,conducted surveillance operations on
appellant. A week of surveillance confirmed the veracity of the report.

The police operatives and the civilian asset proceeded to the place of operation: the Golden Luck
Beer Garden located at Barangay2-A, Mataasnakahoy, Batangas. At a distance of about ten (10) to fifteen
(15) meters from the beer house, the civilian asset alighted from the vehicle and proceeded on foot to the
establishment where appellant was a regular customer. In the meantime, the buy-bust team positioned
themselves ata place outside the restaurant not far from where the civilian asset was. Appellant
subsequently arrived and approached the civilian asset, who was standing in front of the beer house. The
two talked for a while, after which, the police operatives saw the civilian asset hand the marked money to
appellant who, in turn, handed something to the former which later turned out to be a plastic sachet
containing shabu.

After receiving the plastic sachet from appellant, the civilian asset made the pre-arranged signal of
touching his head to signify that the transaction had been completed. The police officers then
immediately approached appellant. Appellant was forthwith brought to the Mataasnakahoy Police Station
where police officers again searched his body to look for an identification card. This body search yielded
another eight (8) plastic sachets of shabu, found in his wallet by PO2 Chavez aside from the other sachets
confiscated during the buy-bust operation.

The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt which was affirmed by the CA.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not the there was a lawful arrest and the sachets of shabu confiscated were
admissible as evidence.

RULING

YES.

The sachets of shabu are not fruits of poisonous tree; hence, admissible in evidence against appellant.

Appellant continued to crave for acquittal claiming that, assuming without conceding that he had in fact
sold and possessed the plastic sachets of shabu, they cannot be admitted in evidence for being fruits of a
poisonous tree, having been obtained after an unlawful arrest and search. Appellant’s insistence on the
illegality of his warrantless arrest lacks merit. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court allows a warrantless
arrest under any of the following circumstances:

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In this case, the arrest of appellant was effected under paragraph (a) or what is termed "in flagrante
delicto." For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicate under paragraph (a) of the
afore-quoted Rule, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

Here, SPO4 Benedicto, SPO2 Babadilla, and PO2 Chavez personally witnessed the exchange between
appellant and the poseur-buyer of the marked money and the plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance which subsequently tested positive for shabu.At the time he was arrested, therefore, appellant
was clearly committing a crime in full view of the buy-bust team. As held by the CA:

Because [appellant] had been caught in flagrante delictoby the apprehending police officers, they, as the
arresting officers were duty- bound to apprehend the culprit immediately and to search him for anything
that may be used as proof of the commission of the crime. The search, being an incident of a lawful arrest,
needed no warrant for its validity.

G.R. NO. 189272, JANUARY 21, 2015


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, V. CHI CHAN LIU A. K. A. CHAN QUE AND HUI LAO
CHUNG A.K.A. LEOFE SENGLAO, APPELLANTS.

FACTS

At 10:00 a.m. of December 3, 1998, SPO2 Lazaro Paglicawan and SPO3 Isagani Yuzon, the officers-
on-duty at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Station, Looc, Occidental Mindoro, received a radio
message from the Barangay Captain of Ambil Island, Looc, Maximo Torreliza, that a suspicious looking
boat was seen somewhere within the vicinity of said island.

Immediately thereafter, the police officers headed towards the specified location wherein they spotted
two (2) boats anchored side by side, one of which resembled a fishing boat and the other, a speedboat.
They noticed one (1) person on board the fishing boat and two (2) on board the speed boat who were
transferring cargo from the former to the latter. As they moved closer to the area, the fishing boat
hurriedly sped away.
Due to the strong waves, the police officers were prevented from chasing the same and instead, went
towards the speed boat, which seemed to be experiencing engine trouble. On board the speed boat, the
officers found the appellants Chi Chan Liu a.k.a. Chan Que and Hui Lao Chung a.k.a. Leofe Senglao with
several transparent plastic bags containing a white, crystalline substance they instantly suspected to be
the regulated drug, methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as “shabu.”
They requested the appellants to show their identification papers but appellants failed to do so.Thus, the
police officers directed appellants to transfer to their service boat and thereafter towed appellants’ speed
boat to the shore behind the Municipal Hall of Looc, Occidental Mindoro. On their way, the police officers
testified that appellant Chi Chan Liu repeatedly offered them “big, big amount of money” which they
ignored.

The RTC found the accused guilty of RA 7659 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The
same was upheld by the CA. Hence this petition.

ISSUE
Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest and the seizure of the evidences falls within
the principle of plain view doctrine.

RULING

YES.

In this case, appellants were actually committing a crime and were caught by the apprehending officers in
flagrante delicto. As previously stated, the records reveal that on the date of their arrest, the
apprehending officers, while acting upon a report from the Barangay Captain, spotted appellants
transferring cargo from one boat to another. However, one of the boats hastily sped away when they
drew closer to the appellants, naturally arousing the suspicion of the officers. Soon after, the police
officers found them with the illegal drugs plainly exposed to the view of the officers. When they
requested appellants to show proper documentation as to their identity as well as their purpose for being
there, appellants refused to show them anything much less respond to any of their questions. In fact,
when the officers were transporting appellants and the illegal drugs to the shore, the appellant Chi Chan
Liu even repeatedly offered the arresting officers “big, big amount of money.” Hence, the circumstances
prior to and surrounding the arrest of appellants clearly show that they were arrested when they were
actually committing a crime within the view of the arresting officers, who had reasonable ground to
believe that a crime was being committed.
In addition, this Court does not find the consequent warrantless search and seizure conducted on
appellants unreasonable in view of the fact that the bags containing the regulated drugs were in plain
view of the arresting officers, one of the judicially recognized exceptions to the requirement of obtaining
a search warrant.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an officer, who has a right to be in the
position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.45 It applies when
the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery
of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery
inadvertent.

In the case at hand, the apprehending officers were performing their duty of ascertaining whether a
criminal activity was indeed happening at the time and place reported by the Barangay Captain. In broad
daylight, appellants were seen in the act of transferring bags of illegal drugs from one boat to another
and thereafter caught in possession of the same, which became inadvertently and immediately apparent
from the point of view of the arresting officers. It is undeniably clear, therefore, that the seizure of illegal
drugs conducted by the officers falls within the purview of the “plain view” doctrine. Consequently, the
confiscated drugs are admissible as evidence against appellants.
SALVADOR V. REBELLION V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 175700. JULY 05, 2010

FACTS

This petition for review assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City finding petitioner guilty of violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425 (otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended).

An Information was filed charging petitioner Salvador V. Rebellion of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. On July 27, 2000, the Mayor’s Action Command (MAC) team of Mandaluyong witnessed petitioner
handing a piece of plastic sachet to his companion Clarito Yanson. Suspecting that that the substance was
“shabu,” team members PO3 Garcia and PO3 Sotomayor alighted from their motorcycles and approached
them. Clarito was not able to completely get hold of the plastic sachet because of their arrival. Upon
inquiry by PO3 Garcia what petitioner was holding, the latter presented three strips of aluminum foil
which the former confiscated. There and then, petitioner and Clarito were apprehended and brought to
the CID for investigation. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the
plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
Petitioner denied the charge against him. On appeal, petitioner insisted that his warrantless arrest was
unlawful since he was not committing any crime when he was arrested.

On September 26, 2006, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC with modification. The appellate court
sustained the validity of the warrantless arrest of petitioner holding that the latter was caught by the
MAC team in flagrante delicto or while he was in the act of giving to Clarito a plastic sachet of shabu.
Petitioner challenges the legality of his warrantless arrest by asserting that at the time he was
apprehended, he was not committing or attempting to commit an offense. Petitioner argues that since his
arrest was illegal, the eventual search on his person was also unlawful. Thus, the illicit items confiscated
from him are inadmissible in evidence for being violative of his constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizure.

ISSUE
Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid.

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The Supreme Court made it clear the even if the warrant was
not valid, it would still prevail because petitioner did not file a motion to quash regarding this before
entering his plea. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity
of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the
court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. In this case, petitioner was duly arraigned, entered a negative
plea and actively participated during the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in
his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case.

In answering the petitioner's issue, the Supreme Court rules that the arrest was valid and it was an
arrest in flagrante delicto. After the suspicion of the officers was aroused, they introduced themselves and
from a distance of the officers saw a sachet with white crystalline substance which they confiscated.
Consequently, the results of the attendant search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove his
guilt of the offense charged.

In any event, the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was lawful because he was caught by the
police officers in flagrante delicto or while he was in the act of handing to Clarito Yanson a plastic sachet
of shabu. Upon seeing the exchange, PO3 Sotomayor and PO3 Garcia approached accused-appellant and
Clarito Yanson and introduced themselves as members of the MAC. PO3 Sotomayor confiscated from
accused-appellant the plastic sachet of shabu while PO3 Garcia confiscated the aluminum foil strips which
accused-appellant was also holding in his other hand.

Jurisprudence is settled that the arresting officer in a legitimate warrantless arrest has the authority
to search on the belongings of the offender and confiscate those that may be used to prove the
commission of the offense.

ALVIN COMERCIANTE Y GONZALES V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. NO. 205926, JULY 2 2015

FACTS

At around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan of the NARCOTICS group
and P03 Bienvy Calag II were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend
at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along
Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante
and a certain Erick Dasilla - standing and showing improper and unpleasant movements, with one of
them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately
stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance of around five (5) meters, P03 Calag
introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that
said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

ISSUE

Whether or not the warrantless search is valid.

HELD

No, the search was not valid and the accused was acquitted. Under Section 2, Article III21 of the
Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a
judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such
search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, unreasonable within the meaning of said constitutional
provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III 22 of the
Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the
occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. On the basis
of such testimony that P03 Calag cannot identify which hand of Comerciante is holding the shabu, the
Court finds it highly implausible that P03 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able
to identify with reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a
motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline
substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201363 March 18, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NAZARENO VILLAREAL y LUALHATI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an appeal from the May 25, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320
which affirmed in toto the December 11, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 123 (RTC), convicting appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati (appellant) of violation of Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of
₱300,000.00.

FACTS

On December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, as PO3 Renato de Leon (PO3 de Leon) was driving
his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10
meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon, a member of
the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) in Caloocan City, alighted from his
motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested
for illegal drug possession.

Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the help of a
tricycle driver. Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3 de Leon was able to board appellant onto
his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession. Thereafter, PO3 de Leon
brought appellant to the 9th Avenue Police Station to fix his handcuffs, and then they proceeded to the
SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon marked the seized plastic sachet with "RZL/NV 12-25-06,"
representing his and appellant’s initials and the date of the arrest.
Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as the person of appellant to the
investigator, PO2 Randulfo Hipolito (PO2 Hipolito) who, in turn, executed an acknowledgment receipt and
prepared a letter request for the laboratory examination of the seized substance. PO2 Hipolito personally
delivered the request and the confiscated item to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory,
which were received by Police Senior Inspector Albert Arturo (PSI Arturo), the forensic chemist.
Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of white crystalline
substance, tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Consequently, appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of December, 2006 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control,
METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.03 gram which, when subjected to
chemistry examination gave positive result of METHYLAMPHETAMIME HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous
drug.

ISSUE

Whether or Not the CA erred in affirming in toto the RTC’s Decision convicting appellant of the offense
charged.
RULING
Yes. The appeal is meritorious.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful
warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its application
that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.

Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer or
functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act or
deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty, it cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously
exercised without unduly compromising a citizen’s constitutionally-guaranteed right to liberty.

As the Court succinctly explained in the case of People v. Tudtud:


The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of
his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations
when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We
cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases
specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so
often violated and so deserving of full protection.
Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is
rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated
shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and exonerated from
all criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the offense charged
and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by
some other cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES


SUPREME COURT
MANILA
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 200951 SEPTEMBER 5, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE,
VS.
JOSE ALMODIEL alias "DO DONG ASTROBAL," Appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

THE CASE

Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00632-MIN . The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City,
Branch 4 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 9840 convicting appellant Jose Almodiel alias "Dodong Astrobal"
(accused) of violation of Section 5, Article II (Sale of Dangerous Drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA
9165) or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

FACTS

Jose Almodiel was alleged to have violated the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act for the saleof shabu.

Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. During pre-trial, the defenseadmitted all the
allegations in the Information except the specific place of the alleged incident andthe allegation of the
sale of dangerous drugs. Thus, trial ensued.

The accused denied the allegations during the trial and averred that he was with his girlfriend in
CadezLodging House. He further alleged that the sachets of shabu were planted to him by the police
duringthe search.The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of RA 9165.

The accused filed aMotion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in its Resolution 9 dated 22
July 2008. The accused filed an appeal to the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Aggrieved the
accused filed an appeal before the SC assailing the decision of the CA.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE
Whether or not the arrest and search of the accused without warrant would fall under the doctrine of
warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest.

RULING

Yes. The appeal lacks merit.

Arrest During a Buy-bust Operation

Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." The accused was caught in the
act of committing an offense during a buy-bust operation. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante
delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police officers are not only authorized but duty-bound to
arrest him even without a warrant. An arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a
warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid "warrantless arrest."

The accused argues that force and intimidation attended his arrest when four police officers arrested him
and one of them pointed a gun at him. However, his allegations were not supported by evidence. On the
contrary, the CA found that the defense neither objected to the accused’s arrest nor filed any complaint
against the police officers.

Considering that an arrest was lawfully made, the search incidental to such arrest was also valid . A person
lawfully arrested may be searched, without a search warrant, for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense. Accordingly, the two sachets of
shabu seized in the present case are admissible as evidence.

Under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the crime of unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of the quantity
and purity thereof, is punishable with life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from five -hundred
thousand pesos (₱ 500,000.00) to ten million pesos (PI 0,000,000.00). Hence, the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of 11500,000.00 was correctly imposed by the RTC and the CA on accused Jose
Almodiel alias "Dodong Astrobal" for illegal sale of shabu.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 November 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00632-MIN in toto.

SO ORDERED.

JOEY M. PESTILOS, DWIGHT MACAPANAS, MIGUEL GACES, JERRY


FERNANDEZ and RONALD MUÑOZ, petitioners, vs . MORENO
GENEROSO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 182601. November 10, 2014.]

FACTS

On February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the
petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station to report
the incident. Acting on this report, the Desk Officer dispatched policemen to go to the scene of the crime
and to render assistance. The policemen arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the
alleged altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to the
petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to
the Police Station for investigation. The petitioners went with the police officers.
At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso
with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. The petitioners were indicted for
attempted murder.

The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that
they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the
police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed
that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a
regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court.

RTC denied the motion. The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the
RTC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.
CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.

RULING
Yes, petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant.

For purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present
petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the
crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) Did the arresting officer have personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? And 3) based on these
facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a
reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was
committed by the petitioners?

From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a
warrantless arrest against the petitioners.
The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his
alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the
alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners
reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and,
notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly,
when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the
incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime
until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers
had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These
circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of
the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their
personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
Personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision,
does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that
evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has recently committed the crime.

EN BANC

[G.R. NO. 127755. APRIL 14, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL,


ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Accused Joselito Del Rosario was found guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
he was sentenced to suffer the death penalty and to pay damages to the heirs of the victim.

Del Rosario alleged that he was just hired by Virgilio Santos to drive him to a cockpit. He was not aware
of the plan of Santos and his two companions to rob and kill the victim. He was not able to seek
assistance because Santos threatened to shoot him if he did. He also failed to inform the police
authorities about the incident because the culprits has threatened him and his family. He claimed
exemption from criminal liability as he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force.

The conviction of Del Rosario must be set aside and his claim for exemption sustained. He was then
unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving the crime scene
during the commission of the robbery and killing. He was also forced to help the culprits escape after the
commission of the crime. Further, Del Rosarios failure to disclose what he knew about the incident to the
authorities does not affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most people to get involved in a
criminal case is of judicial notice. Given his quite limited means, Del Rosario understandably did not want
to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he was threatened with physical harm
should he squeal.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Miranda Rights of the accused-appellant were violated
2. Whether or not the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful

HELD

1. YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the accused
should always be apprised of his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as this
is deemed the start of custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included “invitations” by police officers in
the scope of custodial investigations.

It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to the station, he was already
considered as the suspect in the case. Therefore, the questions asked of him were no longer general
inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit information about his participation in the
crime.
However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary, express, in writing and
made in the presence of counsel. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made
such a waiver.

2. NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless arrest:

(a) When the accused is caught in flagrante delicto


(b) When the arrest is made immediately after the crime was committed
(c) When the one to be arrested is an escape convict.

The arrest of the accused in this case did not fall in any of these exceptions. The arrest was not conducted
immediately after the consummation of the crime: rather, it was done a day after. The authorities also did
not have personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the
offense because they were not there when the crime was committed. They merely relied on the account
of one eye witness.

Unfortunately, although the warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not affect the 8urisdiction of the
Court in this case because the accused still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In
effect, ,he waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.

RIGHTS VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR

Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was invited for
questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation,
but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew
the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of
Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that Del Rosario had waived his right to remain
silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were
inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights.

ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; NOT LAWFUL IN CASE AT BAR

When a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby,
and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec.
5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view.

In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught
immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview
of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the commission of the robbery with
homicide. On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before
a warrantless arrest can be effected:

(1) An offense has just been committed


(2) The person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed it.

Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and
the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is
also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts
indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime. Again, the arrest of del
Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after
the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been just
committed at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense since they were
not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the
driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.