Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-30896 April 28, 1983
FACTS:
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner, having only acted for and in behalf of the Metal
Company as President thereof in dealing with the complainant Bank, may
be liable for the crime charged; and
2. Whether the violation of a trust receipt constitutes estafa under Art. 315 (1-
[2]) of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
The principle in People vs. Tan Boon Kong that for crimes committed
by a corporation, the responsible officers thereof would personally bear the
criminal liability applies only in a situation where the corporation was
directly required by law to do an act in a given manner, and the same law
makes the person who fails to perform the act in the prescribed manner
expressly liable criminally. The performance of the act is an obligation
directly imposed by the law on the corporation. Since it is a responsible
officer who actually performs the act for the corporation, he must
necessarily be the one to assume the criminal liability; otherwise, this liability
as created by law would be illusory, and the deterrent effect of the law,
negated. Thus, it is not applicable in this case contrary to the view of the
CA.
2. NO, violation of a trust receipt does not constitute estafa under Art. 315 (1-
[2]) of the Revised Penal Code.
Since P.D. 115 (Trust Receipts Law) was not yet enacted at the time
of the commission of the offense, the more feasible view was that a trust
receipt agreement gives rise only to civil liability. The transaction being
contractual, the intent of the parties should govern. The parties are
deemed to have consciously entered into a purely commercial transaction
that could give rise only to civil liability, never to subject the "entrustee" to
criminal prosecution. Consequently, if only from the fact that the trust
receipt transaction is susceptible to two reasonable interpretation, one as
giving rise only to civil liability for the violation of the condition thereof, and
the other, as generating also criminal liability, the former should be
adopted as more favorable to the supposed offender.
PEOPLE V. QUASHA
G.R. No. L-6055 June 12, 1953
FACTS:
The articles of incorporation likewise stated: that its capital stock was
P1,000,000, represented by 9,000 preferred and 100,000 common shares, each
preferred share being of the par value of P100 and entitled to 1/3 vote, and each
common share, of the par value of P1 and entitled to one vote; that the amount
capital stock actually subscribed was P200,000; that the subscribers named were
Baylon, the only Filipino, and five other Americans; that Baylon's subscription was
for 1,145 preferred shares and for 6,500 common shares, while the aggregate
subscriptions of the American subscribers were for 200 preferred shares, and
59,000 common shares. Clearly, Baylon did not have the controlling vote because
of the difference in voting power between the preferred shares and the common
shares. The articles of incorporation were accepted for registration and a
certificate of incorporation was issued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It is also admitted that the money paid on Baylon’s subscription did
not belong to him but to the Americans subscribers to the corporate stock. The
accused explained that in the process of organization Baylon was made a trustee
for the American incorporators.
The accused was found guilty after trial. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
HELD:
NO. What the Constitution prohibits is the granting of a franchise or other
form of authorization for the operation of a public utility to a corporation already
in existence but without the requisite proportion of Filipino capital. This is obvious
from the context of the constitutional provision that the franchise meant is not the
"primary franchise" that invest a body of men with corporate existence but the
"secondary franchise" or the privilege to operate as a public utility after the
corporation has already come into being.