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s u n y s e r i e s i n c o n t e m p o r a r y f r e n c h t h o u g h t s u n y s e r i e s i n c o n t e m p o r a r y f r e n c h t h o u g h t

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PHILOSOPHY

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M alabou

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THE HEIDEGGER CHANGE
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On the Fantastic in Philosophy

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Behind Martin Heidegger’s question of being lies another one not yet sufficiently addressed
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in continental philosophy: change. Catherine Malabou, one of France’s most inventive

The Heidegger Change
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contemporary philosophers, explores this topic in the writings of Heidegger through the

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themes of metamorphosis and migration, exchange, and modification, finding and articulating
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a radical theory of ontico-ontological transformability. The Heidegger Change sketches the
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implications of this theory for a wide range of issues of central concern to the humanities—

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capitalism, the gift, ethics, suffering, the biological, technology, imagination, and time. Not
since the writings of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas has the work of Heidegger
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been the subject of such inventive interpretation and original theory in its own right.

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Catherine Malabou is Professor at the Center for Research in Modern European
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Philosophy at Kingston University in London. She is the author of many books, including

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Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic, Destruction, Deconstruction and The Future of Hegel:

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Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic. Peter Skafish is Postdoctoral Fellow at the Laboratory

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of Social Anthropology at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences in Paris.
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A volume in the SUNY series in Contemporary French Thought
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David Pettigrew and François Raffoul, editors C at her ine M a l a bou

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Translated and edited by
SUNY
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Pet er Sk a f i s h

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SUNY

P R E S S
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State University of

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New York Press
www.sunypress.edu

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s u n y s e r i e s i n c o n t e m p o r a r y f r e n c h t h o u g h t s u n y s e r i e s i n c o n t e m p o r a r y f r e n c h t h o u g h t

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THE HEIDEGGER CHANGE

SUNY series in Contemporary French Thought
—————
Edited by David Pettigrew and François Raffoul

THE HEIDEGGER CHANGE
On the Fantastic in Philosophy

Catherine Malabou

Translated and Edited by
 

© 2004 Éditions Léo Scheer
Le Change Heidegger

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

© 2011 State University of New York

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any
manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of
this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted
in any form or by any means including electronic,
electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying,
recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing
of the publisher.

For information, contact State University of New York Press,
Albany, NY
www.sunypress.edu

Production by Diane Ganeles
Marketing by Fran Keneston

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Malabou, Catherine.
[Change Heidegger. English]
The Heidegger change : on the fantastic in philosophy /


              .

ISBN 978-1-4384-3955-6 (hardcover : alk. paper)      !" # . Includes bibliographical references and index. cm. — (SUNY series in contemporary French thought) “Bibliography of Heidegger’s works”—P. p.

 $  .

H49M271213 2011 193—dc22 2011007665 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 . B3279. II. Title. Peter.

—Ovid. inspire this undertaking (which you’ve changed as well) and guide my poem in its epic sweep from the world’s beginning to the present day. Metamorphoses I. 1–4 .My mind leads me to speak now of forms changed into new bodies: O gods above.

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and Verwandlung (W. & V) 1 More than a Title 3 The Situation of the Question of Change in Heidegger’s Thought 14 The Migratory-Metamorphic Articulation 19 The Janus-Head Gestell 24 Heidegger and the Others 26 PART I: Metamorphoses and Migrations of Metaphysics 31 Change at the Beginning 31 The Double Process of Schematization 32 1. The Metabolism of the Immutable 37 The Structural Traits of Philosophy 38 The Whole-Form and Its Particular Trajectories 43 Change—and Change 46 2. Contents Translator/Editor’s Preface xi Introduction: Wandel. W. Wandlung. The Mound of Visions: Plato Averts His Gaze 53 “Heidegger’s Doctrine of Truth” 54 Miming Bildung 63 History and Change 65 .

. . the Very Look of Things. Surplus Essence: Gestell and Automatic Conversion 155 “A Change in Being—That is. Outline of a Cineplastic of Being 99 From One Change to the Other: Persistence of Form and Trajectory 102 Continuity and Rupture 104 The Two Turns (of Phrase) of the Heideggerian Cineplastic 112 PART II: The New Ontological Exchange 123 How Is There Change from the Beginning? 124 Ereignis as Interchange 127 Gestell: The Essential Mechanism 128 5. Now. Being—This Is What Changes” 77 W. W.viii Contents First Incision: Geltung 71 3. “Color. W. Presencing. in the Essence of Gestell—Comes to Pass . & V.” 158 What is a Changing Alterity? 169 . & V in Time and Being 130 Ereignis and Donation 143 Second Incision: Gunst 149 6. Their Eidos. or the Real Foundation of Inversion 80 The Will and Its Fashioning 87 The Inclusion of the Thinker in What Is Thought 90 The Transformation of Transcendence 94 4. Changing the Gift 129 The Appearances of W.

The Fantastic Is Only Ever an Effect of the Real 179 The Crossing of Essences 180 A Form Whose Homeland Is No Longer Metaphysics 187 Third Incision: Changing the Symbolic 197 PART III: % & ' *  #+ What Cannot Be Left Must Be  . Contents ix 7. < #+=    >@.

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x Contents Notes 291 Bibliography of Cited Works by Heidegger 327 Other Works Cited 333 Index Nominum 337 Index Rerum 339 .

but her work itself abandons one of the chief presuppositions that made that its preferred form. receive. Making the capacity of things to give.” Not only does Malabou belong to a moment (which she calls “la génération d’après”) when long. The consequences for writing and translation are almost immediate. What fails to withstand the other will never be able to integrate enough from it to undergo change. The power of each individual to resist and change the other becomes just as important as (if not more crucial than) the capacity to be affected by the other. and even closed down to certain meanings turns out to be more effective at conveying this new ontologi- cal and politico-ethical status of identity than the xi . Translator/Editor’s Preface Bringing Catherine Malabou’s philosophy into English form involves very different problems than did the translation of the generation of intellectuals and phi- losophers associated with “French theory. not so much polyvalent as subtly ambiguous. intricate sentences and self-referential language no longer provide the basic structure of theoretical thought. and change their own and each other’s forms the basic character and condition of the real results in a very different understanding of things than one that grants differences that role. Language that is stable.

xii Translator/Editor’s Preface old fragmented and plurilinear style. As for translation. Malabou thus often renders her prose (especially in this book and her part of Contre-Allée/Counterpath1 in terms so deliberate that the polysemy necessary for its read- ing and interpretation is kept from feeding back on and endlessly amplifying itself. the *>>@ **`Š*.

.

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 strong traces of the cadence. tone. Reminding readers of the inadequacy `      . and grammatical structure of the original language is no longer self- evidently good.

  .

Cast in such familiar language. €  ˆ  @* * ` the original becomes less useful for transmitting its thoughts than bending them into idioms more ordi- nary in the other language. the translation takes on the sort of sharp   .

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 the duplicity or untranslatability of the original needs to be exposed. whether     *>> @@@. the translation is strong enough to sustain punctures and gaps. Translating in such a “plastic” fashion allowed the character and meaning of Malabou’s writing to emerge more than would have the methods.

 @.

calm and volatile.*  texts. and invitingly open and unyieldingly stern in its refus- als—simultaneously “modest” and “cunning” was how Jacques Derrida put it—readers who have encountered Malabou in person know this contradictory affect to be the source of her credibility as a thinker. Instead of conveying genius through intellectual speed and . I preferred whenever possible natural phrasings over constructions whose “accuracy” would have mostly stiffened the original’s sense. At once personally unassuming and philosophically demanding. So while precision was my concern throughout. What was initially most important to me was to preserve the distinctiveness of Malabou’s voice.

Translator/Editor’s Preface xiii agility. or philosophical authority through “classical” †   *.

 *‡ > .

   *  .

 .

- ing streak with a humility that suggests the point of philosophical sparring is to share in wisdom. These would have made it seem literally foreign instead of the internally uncanny force I believe it would be in many languages. Malabou’s contention here is that Heidegger offers a conception of change that can more effectively think difference. the other. This claim †€. the gift. and time than the philosophies of his greatest and also most critical readers. ethics. A less estranged English also proved suitable to the book’s novel line of thought. Because her voice is par- ticularly evident here—the reader is both ordered and anticipated by it through the form of direct address employed for the entirety of the book—it seemed best to render it into an English disencumbered of heavy Gallicisms. not attain academic triumph.

*.

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which more or less correspond to “change.” “transformation. W. Heidegger employs these terms.” to express how each of the vari- ous philosophical dispensations through which being is revealed in and as history is the transformation of the dispensation it succeeds (such that being is a continuous. the series of dispensations that is the history of being is thus substitutive (and even prosthetic) in nature. and Verwandlung to make other. and Verwandlung (W. But he also ends up using Wandel. .” and “metamorphosis. Wandlung. & V)—in nearly everything he wrote after Being and Time. unbroken transmission). Wandlung. more radical claims about change and being that are rarely ascribed to him: the “it” in the “it gives” (es gibt) with which he eventually characterizes being never transcends what it gives.*    €    controversial) hinges on his persistent use of three words—Wandel.

like Geist and Gestalt. at the center of the French debates over Heidegger).” leftover philosophical >     .” Wandel. Wandlung. nothing but its changes.xiv Translator/Editor’s Preface and change is therefore originary. and Verwandlung are instead just left dangling. Yet despite how much being thus turns out to be. Malabou even characterizes the triad as “textual pulp. most neglected threads in his writings (although more promising than others. without being able to anywhere begin. as Malabou puts it. some of the loosest. Heidegger never fully elaborates this thought or comments on what this text calls “the triad of change.

and concept are initially foreign to and can only afterward express. So even as Malabou was only able to perceive the  |   * **  `. One instead ordinarily gleans from them (this was at least true for me) only a picture or image of the processes of change and transformation they express—a “fantastic.” almost hallucinatory vision of the real as metamorphosis that analysis.   * ` @ readers (when they have managed to notice them) are unable to connect to the major problems of his work. argument.

The text’s routine. This required of her a poetic style rich enough to evoke a vivid picture of transformation but unobtrusive enough to not make the image seem like an artifact of language. argumentative sentences and adorned. per- `>  @.@€ and plasticity. she approaches them less by tracking how they both exclude and open certain philosophi- cal possibilities in Heidegger’s texts than by simply conveying this strange vision.

    .

This is not to say.    `> >@ renderings that would not distract readers from this image of change. that the text’s marked words. technical expressions. however. and neologisms could .

Terms like l’articulation migratoire-metamorphique and la cinéplastique de l’être—which emphasize that change and molding are movement (and movement therefore change)—or l’édition imaginale de la présence. required the same >} `     . which plays on the fact molding leaves the prints or imprints so important in deconstruction. Translator/Editor’s Preface xv somehow be simply transferred into English.

 > *.

*  ` * @.

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*        Z .

“Donner le change” car-  .” and échange.) One recurrent and particularly untranslatable phrase—donner le change or donner le change origi- naire—deserves special note. “exchange. the latter terms also appear in brackets next to their cognates.” Since there was thus no way to consistently translate the term. would not have made for much of a title. (“The Heidegger (Ex)Change. The reader should be aware.” the originals are kept in brackets. In certain cases where change appears in close proxim- ity to changement and échange.   not so rife in the text as to have made my method impossible. “change. I most often resort to “(ex)change. that The Heidegger Change is also an “exchange. (Where they prove particularly “untrans- latable.” and Mal- abou frequently plays on both senses throughout the text. then.) The word that features the most this way is the French noun change.” while occasionally using “change” (and placing change in brackets) when the meaning or rhythm of a sentence calls for it. it carries a double meaning— both “change” and “exchange”—nearly impossible to evoke with the English substantive “change. sometimes even using the term interchangeably with two other frequently appearing words: change- ment.” and that the politico-economic sense the French title would thus seem to insinu- ate is indeed intended.” though.

  > `Œ.

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 *q and Malabou has in mind both this sense and the .

teleological path.xvi Translator/Editor’s Preface more literal one of “to give change” when she uses the phrase to convey that the changes being makes prevent it from ever following an entirely predeter- mined.” <. The phrase is thus usually rendered as “to throw off the trail and give change.

 >  *     €   ` what might have otherwise been the most linguistically and technically demanding dimension of this transla-    €€.

Seyn. There was. however. rarely a compelling need for either thing. Wandlung. and the problem is only compounded when texts that are already working between his German and another language have themselves to be translated. Even if Malabou does not for the most part focus on the  * * `` €   `     |  lexicon have for understanding him. Deciding on how to render all the central and peripheral terms and even retranslating the passages from Heidegger used here obviously would have been huge tasks unto themselves. and Ereignis.> ` * of the canonical modern philosophers to translate. Malabou’s focus on Wandel. whose different senses and implications thus become less important. the modi- *    . and Verwandlung has her stressing and often retranslating elements of the quotations that concern these themes and their consequences and deemphasizing major terms. Lichtung. both the breadth of her engagement with his texts—most of the major published works are read closely or examined—and the sheer number of quotations from them (400+) result in a book that engages nearly the whole gamut of his principal concepts and terms. like Sein. The existing English translations could therefore be used here.

> .

 € .

  *  
bring out Malabou’s argument bear on their renderings
of the triad and related terms, which she is usually

Translator/Editor’s Preface xvii

already compensating for in her own translations and
retranslations of Heidegger. Small adjustments to the


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 €    `
* ` -
ing out what she stresses in the originals.
Translating with more “disloyal loyalty” to the
French than the “loyal disloyalty” preferred by the
best translators of the old theoreticians had much
to do (as some readers may by now suspect) with
the recently “(ex)changed” statuses of French and
American thought. A phase of obeisance to French
literature, human science, and philosophy is no
longer the almost obligatory aspect of an intellectual
formation in the United States that it was even ten 

`     %>*      
Deleuze once implied we had become, the “credu-
lous Americans” that often greeted deconstruction
and “French theory” as almost permanent truths,  
 
 @@

     %>* 
ideas as démodé. Theory has ceased to be, for the
most part, a foreign import, and we Americans, hav-
ing extricated it from Continental philosophy and
transferred it into critical theory and other manifestly
political modes of analysis, are no longer at risk,
as William James put it, of “listening to the French
and not talking back” (“the French” not now always
having much to offer to such endeavors). The situ-
ation thus reversed, what is left of French thought
needs to be rearticulated in an idiom that, however
estranged from itself (philosophy will probably never
sound right in any language), is far closer to English,
and perhaps especially a generally American English,
than yesterday’s “translationese.” Otherwise, its for-
eignness will most likely leave it unheard.
But not for good reasons. Although there are
*  ‘ 
*   ` 

 € ** 
accorded French thought, the current aversion to it

xviii Translator/Editor’s Preface

has much more to do with an aversion to theory (a
new resistance to theory) than the politics on which it
is supposedly based. The newly incredulous America
has become so incredulous that theoretical inven-
tion (and sometimes theory itself) is often greeted as
gratuitous pretention, as if the revolution were over,
nothing new could be added to its guiding ideas, and
analyses based on them were all there is left to do.
Even when the books sell well and the lecture halls are
full, new theoretical ideas—not just those of “French
philosophers” like Malabou and Stiegler or Rancière
and Badiou but those of younger “Americans” pro-
ducing critical theories of globalization or decolonial
thought (like Pheng Cheah and Nelson Maldonando-
Torres)—are not seriously engaged in some of the
very quarters that distinguish themselves as “theo-
retical” (but where analyses guided by a few nearly
* *  

*  €     ` * ` .

This has undoubtedly had the effect of freezing theoretical inquiry by restricting its chief references to (some) French thought circa 1970. the contin- ued predominance of analytic philosophy in philosophy departments. when . the climate of fear and severe economic hardship of the 00’s. Benjamin and sometimes Adorno. a few modern canonical philoso- phers (Nietzsche and some Hegel).or post-philosophical theoreticians (Marx and Freud). title). More likely. the situation is that theory as such does not receive such a reception because theory—thought of a scope so general that it illumines contexts exceeding those of its own problems—is useless. the basically ideological fetishization of local questions—the notion that new French theory and philosophy is not receiving a wide reception because it is politically backward is highly dubious. and the anti. Whatever the exact conditions for this—the recent retrenchment into the disciplines. even perturbing.

it should be apparent that an approach to thinking capable of . The cosmopolitan and often polyglot space of thinking that America in fact is often took critical distance from French philosophy precisely when the latter failed to recognize racism. Rather. Although the question remains open as to whether the exact kind of broad view needed for such a vision can be found in “Continental philosophy” (especially when it includes “Heidegger”). theoretical vision. Yet the United States’ own neglect of devel- oping philosophical approaches to these issues is often making it. attempting to create one out of empirical research alone is proving quite dangerous. then. and thus the possibility that the myriad. and therefore far from the still philosophical kind of thinking that could dialogue with and eventually cede them author- ity in the humanities. and thought of the many peoples once or still domi- nated by Europe often remain objects of scholarly neglect. The problem is not that the histories. My hope. the neocolonial character of global capitalism. political liberalism. the problem is that what attention is paid them is usually far too scholarly. literatures. “French theory. Translator/Editor’s Preface xix it is mostly particular questions that are being asked. is thus easily rejected. I believe. and thus epistemic pluralism as profound questions. mostly delinked questions it works on can indeed be illumined by a general.” because its style is an index (and its form of thought still exemplary) of the theoretical. is that some part of theory-weary “America” will feel addressed enough by this translation to allow back some of its old credulity. Now that capitalism. far more epistemically European than were (whatever their political limits and failures) the European philosophers. and technoscience have become the chief modes of thought of much of the planet. the legacy of colonialism.

The general tendency in the humani- ties. however.” “histories. “Subjects.xx Translator/Editor’s Preface engaging anything outside them will have not only to critique their basic categories (this of course happens) but to operate both at and beyond the limits of the metaphysics on which they are based. and of truth) used to interpret them are enough at the borders of meta- physics to cross them and thereby become estranged by the other. of history. is to assume that such basic terms of analysis can be employed (even simply “applied”) without being revised. The disturbing result is the silent and thus all the more insidious reinstatement `> @.” and “truths” not belonging to the West can be listened to and understood only if the con- cepts (of the subject.

 *    .

” and the neutralization and “exhaustion of the outside. or geopolitically marginal event.”2 A “terrible” time in which it seems that “everything has already happened” that could and when.” as Malabou characterizes it. * Š*  the basic condition of the “new world order”—“the impossibility. isolated. The only means of accessing and bespeaking the thatness of things—change—is through the whatness of a spe- * *  >  . the commodity and technology. intellectual thought seems destined to remain forever European. reveal being qua change entails that being and beings—that there is something and what each element of it is— have effectively become indistinguishable.3 The aspect of this book bearing on this situation is its rehabilitation and transformation of the Heideg- gerian question of being. Primary among Malabou’s claims is that the fact certain profoundly transform- able beings. one can add. “of any exotic.

 *.

   > ` *.

 @* *<.

 * > .

 .

and thus even to be beings. transgenderings. biotechnologies .” Beings become merely formal and thus almost completely indistinguishable. to change themselves and the other. Translator/Editor’s Preface xxi capacity of beings to be distinct from each other. which is irreducible to the value derived from it. nearly all of them have already been brought into “conformity” with (techno-)capitalism’s regime and form of value. cultural hybridizations. . Viewed apart from its eco- nomic recuperation. this plasticity entails that what a being is changes as it integrates into itself character- istics of the other (through a process of habituating itself to these and thereby becoming estranged from  `‡ ~. ontic approach to ontology. and thus mere “content changes. What their transformations involve is of almost no importance given that they occur along a route that almost automatically converts them into exchange and surplus value (or “standing reserve”).” religious conversions. which in turns necessitates the development of a new.). No matter how various and radical the changes beings are made to undergo (shifts in global power. “Change We Can Believe In. The fact that capitalism relentlessly forces beings to transform into each other nonetheless also foregrounds their capacity. . Countering this situation requires showing that transformation is a power inherent to each being. which thus renders them mere tradable equivalents.

    .

     .

But this is no longer a purely ontological or capitalist statement. . Being-as-change never entirely . show that what beings are is just (that there is .) change.  an ultimate genre nor a corresponding fundamental form but by the sheer fact that they will always transport each other out of their present genres and into other forms. once again. Their changes. .

xxii Translator/Editor’s Preface   *  @* * *.

  <.

   .

   .

 @  @* *   `> @ to its position: change as such can only be said .

.

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   *.

the plasticity of beings only seems ontological because the beings now mas- ’  * .  *  up playing that role. In fact.

*.

what change will instead?—be constantly. which can deliver us from given. the pervasiveness and self-evidence of “ontological capitalism” instead requires that a renewed and metamorphosed version of the question of “being”—given that there is change. apparently inevitable forms. Thinking thus becomes the double task of expressing. not just. such changes show that plasticity is a capacity that belongs to beings as beings. Although it could seem that deconstructing the reigning form would be enough to liberate change. vigilantly addressed. but also. Our greatest resource against capitalism therefore rests in our power to integrate from and impose on each other forms. Making this power explicit. Yet when seen from outside those value-forms. and being itself is always in turn subject to being changed by beings.  *` @* * change in techno-economic terms. What beings can become is not entirely or primarily determined by being. what change now passes for it?. however.   . requires opposing the ontologico-capitalist form of transforma- tion with a counterform.

 .

 Œ` *q .

 .

   *.

 *      >   `  @* * *.

Such an “ontico-ontological” mode of thought would preserve the uniqueness of each change by conceiving change as a “global” form whose shape is always in tension with the casts of its local parts. that can say this without at the same time casting all other changes in its terms alone. .   ` - ing a change. second.

and the plasticity of . Translator/Editor’s Preface xxiii The reader will have to discover for herself why Malabou regards biological life.

   @* *   .

  €.

  > ` *.

>   .

 Z .

the reciprocity of understanding and changes in perspective sought will have to be carefully distinguished from the coercive universal- ization of perspective typical of capitalism. effectively ontological position. not thinking that all thoughts are already shared in common. domination. It would certainly allow modern theory . and of liberty. Conceptions of what might be minimally common to all thought will be needed.€ @@ - ent why Malabou elsewhere conceives the plasticity of life as the image of a future “alter-globalism” in which people(s) will “exercise transformative effects on each other through the demands of recognition. Not only will the humanities have to stand down from their dominant.”4 If disputation and dia- logue across historical and epistemic lines—exchanges of thought—are to take place under the current onto- logical conditions. Although what such common “concepts” could in the end be is largely unforeseeable. the idea that thought can always cast itself into form at the same time as it is being profoundly shaped by the other might be one. but dia- logue will have to take a form in which the terms of discussion—the “neutral” terms by which divergent and often incommensurate positions could speak to and change each other—can be furnished by all and negotiated along the way.

If this concept is indeed germane across .  * `   Z plasticity might also prove an assumption basic to other formations of thought. which may in their own ways agree that being productively estranged by the other occurs only when it can also be integrated to some degree.

” some translations would indeed be best done in a spirit of resistance. And “Heidegger”—Malabou’s and perhaps even he himself—may in that fortunate event be looked back on as one of the weathered women who played mid- wife to the terrible agony of its birth. which would thus be left strong enough for the profound and dangerous transformations ahead of it. (ex)changing. someday constitute with it the think- '  * >'` a free. and ever metamorphosing planet. “Philoso- phies” that will all. . The original could be more easily received by its audience.xxiv Translator/Editor’s Preface different “epistemes. should we together survive the next decades. The philosophy of plasticity may thus turn out to have been one of the theories most suited to holding together what was left of metaphysics so that it could open out to and take back in thoughts from other “philosophies” that were never part of it.

the change of language. symbolic. and existential regimes: the mutation of metaphysics. This decision consists in the empowerment (Ermächtigung) of three linked notions that. an instrument of variable structure that can function as a retort transforming cast iron into steel. as a grist mill that       Š    * ` - sion—both analog to digital and digital to analog—and of monetary value. In fact. seem to sleep in them on account of the conceptual pen- umbra that holds them together. It works within and beyond it. The Heidegger change carries out conversions of ontological. the Heidegger change both belongs to it and does not. the metamorphosis of man. It operates in thought as a converter (Wandler). Wandlung. Introduction Wandel. the transformation of the gaze. Because it operates at once in and on Heidegger’s thought. the Heidegger change is an invention resulting from a decision of reading—my own. transformations (Wandlungen). It concerns precisely 1 . and even the molting of Heidegger himself. although omnipresent in his texts. the metamorphosis of God. and Verwandlung The Heidegger change is a machine that accomplishes changes (Wandeln). and metamorphoses (Verwandlungen).

“The proper and original meaning of _’ a_´ eki refers to what is good (or suitable) for something. transformation. W. and possible. Still unnoticed despite its decisive importance and never distinguished by Heidegger himself. the triad has been left waiting its exegetical switching- on. The good is the sound. I am borrowing the word “empowerment” from the 1931–32 lecture course on Plato entitled On the Essence of Truth. . what can be put to good use.2 The Heidegger Change the notions of Wandel. Wandlung. The Good. capable. ‘Good!’ means: it is done! It is decided! (es wird gemacht! es wird entschieden!). Heidegger declares there. the enduring. & V would then be what confers on Heidegger’s thought its power and vigor. W. and what at the same time makes it good for something and     . the triad W. and which I will most often simply designate with their initials: W. .”1 Constituted as a philosophical machine and through that empowered. and Verwandlung— “change. is “empowerment” in the sense that it makes able. . & V. and metamorphosis”—which constitute what I will call the triad of change.

 else.   . an energy greatly needed in the world of today for reasons the present work has the task of devel- oping.

to speak of Heidegger to some- one already comes down to engaging his philosophy. In effect. and remobilizing. to address the reading. . The Heidegger change—It is done! It is decided! It is done through us—meaning by you and me. its actual opening to the other. in its own transformation(s). and the one you will be. The Heidegger change can only be put to work on condition of a shared mode of speach. . The other: the one that you are. the very one said to be completely void of address (of the “you” [toi] and “all you” [vous]).

” You came to Heidegger only after these damning. are possible. the polysemia of this strange title—The Heidegger Change—which is above all made possible by its syntactic mutability. in order to start. you have the strange feeling that Heidegger’s thinking is always right before you. Nevertheless. It is high time. More Than a Title THREE “CHANGES” IN ONE Let’s unpack. So having doubts or illusions about them is unacceptable to you. and you know them in detail. holding itself back like a shadow waiting to be freed. then. unappealable biographical and political revelations. Introduction 3 You—neither “Heideggerian” nor “anti-Heidegge- rian. for a new perspective on what is waiting there. and you are not afraid to move against consensus—you are free. You are not guilty for wanting to continue to think. “Change” at once has the value of a substantive and a verb.” you all know about “the affair. and three principal ways of understanding the formula. you are not guilty for realizing you cannot make it without Heidegger or for being a philosopher. then. If change is taken    Œ.

  *.

In Old French syntax. if change is heard as a verb. secondly. the elision of the preposition “de”—as in “le Change [de] Heidegger. it indicates a trade name: the change called Heidegger. “the Heidegger change” then designates a device whereby Heidegger is changed.” . Genitive tie. q }@     a genitive tie: the change of Heidegger. and third.

   _*.

  ` .

 '}@     - tion of belonging. Read in this manner (the change .

the title announces a study devoted to the Heideggerian concept of change.4 The Heidegger Change of Heidegger). which is to say.   `   |     ` *.

” while the steel industry has “the Bessemer converter. magic formula hidden within it: “Heidegger. 2 Trade name.” A proper name becomes a sort of common noun bearing the imprint of a style or idea. The Heidegger change announces. and he alone. there is “the Fischer defense. If the “change” in “the Heidegger change” is understood to be the imperative form of the verb “to change. “the Tobin tax. Seen from this point of view. “The Heidegger change” can be just as much interpreted as a trademark or proprietary name. change!” The success of this utterance   * >  . a project that aims to discover what Heidegger. through another. the title can be read as the name given a unique and particular change.” and eco- nomics.” the title can be characterized as a means of commanding Heidegger to transform or change. Verb machine. has changed—to the point that it can be given his name.” particle physics has “the Geiger counter. In chess. then.

 _*.

then. is an exegetical approach that will construct. this change-machine. and metamorphosing the interpretation of Heidegger’s thought in its entirety.” Announced. . you begin to understand that touching upon the triad of change.” that is. It is urgent that we proceed today to this meta- bolic crossing. page-by-page.  * “change” can be understood to be in the present indicative there: “Heidegger change. and taking stock of what Heidegger has changed and how he himself is now changing comes down to changing. inquiring into the Heideggerian understanding of change. “Heidegger changes. transforming. At this inchoate stage of the inquiry.

It is true that Heidegger does not offer the least @* *  ` . Introduction 5 AN UNTRANSLATABLE DISCRETION Quite surprisingly. God. Dasein. this crossing and resource for change [change] in and of Heidegger’s thought has never really been examined. language. beings. & V touches the essential—in its relating to being. W. Although the triad W. and metaphysics—it has not yet been made the object of a thematic analysis.

The names for change never partake in the glorious destiny of “historical decisions” but instead remain. `>. but does so without distinguishing between them or specifying their import. or interpretations. deriva- tions. He frequently makes use of the three terms in the same paragraph or phrase. he seems not to vest them. nor does he have recourse to High German. and Verwandlung. >  ` Wandel. Wandlung. Even though he constantly mobilizes these words. He never submits them to etymological research or a thinking translation.

 |      .

Werden/ becoming) as well as from those changes to a new time that promise “the other thinking”: the turning (Kehre). as though they were unburdened of all care for exactitude. In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Veränderung. & V no doubt explains why the translators do not pay any particular attention to the triad. they seem to keep at a respectful distance from the traditional.3 The nontechnical. and the leap (Sprung).ordinary words. They contend with it in a perfectly casual manner. hypocategorical status of W. In a disquieting manner. W. the term Verwandlung is sometimes translated as . the playing-forth (das Zuspiel). for example. technical concepts of change (Änderung.

sometimes as mutation. Wand- lung is variously translated as “revolution.6 The Heidegger Change transformation. change. and some- >  > * $The Essence of Truth.  q €.

mutation. in both languages.  }@    ‘  *  As we will very often see. in English. changement and transformation. nor from one translator to the other. every attempt at subjecting the triad to a uniform translation produces quite contestable effects. there is no concern for consistency in the translation of the three notions of the triad—neither inside each text. and Verwandlung than it is to make apparent the differences between. This becomes evident when reading.4 This looseness can be easily understood. A sort of textual @@ . Moreover and reciprocally. and. the American translation of Beiträge zur Philosophie— Contributions to Philosophy—where all three notions are rendered as “transformation. It is in fact no easier to establish in German a rigorous dis- tinction between Wandel. and muer or molting/turning into.” The point is not to fault the translators but to express surprise that they neither noticed nor commented on this baseline untranslatability. or even those between. Wandlung. metamorpho- sis. in French. change and transformation. nor attempted to examine it closely. for example.

happens to major philosophemes: they change.      * @       € way—without dazzle but very surely. you see . between slack- ness and rigidity and at a distance from major philosophemes—what. W. & V Now that you are beginning to make out in the pen- umbra the uncanny tentacles of the triad. THE BASIC OCCURRENCES OF W. however.

Introduction 7 .

then. W. that is. to take account `  €. & V could be the secret agent of Heidegger’s philosophy. an unsuspected suppleness that has foiled the vigilance of the commentators and translators. it demands being treated as merits it—to be recognized. what sustains and clandestinely guides the destiny of the essential. Since it has been trying to get our attention. You are beginning to understand that W. It is up to us. In which case you understand as well that our work will not consist in brutally summoning this agent and making it appear in full day.    `    Š} @ an incredible capacity for mutability and convertibil- ity. to create an unprecedented approach to change. without being presented.

        €.

 .

  - *@ *.

}  €.

however.    *  and vague use Heidegger makes of the triad and the decisive importance of what it is tied to. Such an approach. as the double foundation of Heidegger’s philosophy. the mysterious space of the fantastic in philosophy. MAN’S METAMORPHOSIS INTO DASEIN $ . opens. as much through its form as by what it moves toward. it would be useful to adumbrate the basic domains where the triad is deployed. Before circumscribing this space.

Wandlung. In The Fun- damental Concepts of Metaphysics or the 1929 lecture “What Is Metaphysics?” Heidegger announces the metamorphosis of man into its Dasein: “This requires [hierzu wird verlangt] that we actively complete the transformation of the human being into its Dasein [die . Man is going to change. man is going to metamorphose. and Verwand- lung express what happens to man.   @ * Wandel.

Prepared with “the other beginning” is “the metamorphosis of man himself [die Verwandlung des Menschen selbst]” or the “transformation of man itself [vollige Verwandlung des Menschen]. from the overcoming (Überwindung) and transformation of metaphysics: “If our thinking should succeed in its efforts to go back into the ground of metaphysics.”7 But this metamorphosis and transformation are also confounded with the movement of the Destruk- tion or destruction of metaphysics. is not annihilation but metamorphosis (Verwandlung).8 The Heidegger Change Verwandlung des Menschen in sein Da-Sein . . . Œ~ q . he says. a change accompanied by a transformation [Verwandlung] of metaphysics.”6 THE DESTRUCTION OF METAPHYSICS AND THE METAMORPHOSIS OF PHILOSOPHY The metamorphosis of man into Dasein is inseparable. it might well help to bring about a change in the human essence [einen Wandel des Wesens des Menschen mitveranlassen]. furthermore. In “What Is Phi- losophy?” Heidegger insists on the positive meaning of the Destruktion that had already been brought to light in Being and Time. destruction.” Heidegger declares there. nach- vollzieben].”5 This metamorphosis is just as much a recurrent motif in Contributions to Philosophy: “Man metamorphoses [der Mensch verwandelt].

 *   Œ.

  €  .

 ’  ‘What is philosophy?’ not through historical asser-   .

  `@.

 @.

.

.

but is an appropriation and metamorphosis of what has been handed down to us . conversing with that which has been handed down to us as the being of being. no repudiation of history. The path to the answer to our question is not a break with history.

a simultaneous mutation of the metamorphosis of the human and its Dasein.”8 Destruction should be understood. Introduction 9 [Aneignung und Verwandlung des überlieferten]. Wandlung. as the movement by which thinking hence- forth “prepares its own transformation [seine eigene Wandlung vorbereitet]. What promises itself to thought is “a complete change of the relations to beings and to being [ein volligen Wandel der Bezüge zum Seien- den und zum Seyn]. and the transformation of metaphysics. then. . “The relation to being . .”9 MUTATION OF THE RELATION TO BEING Wandel.” Heidegger declares in Contribu- tions to Philosophy.”10 >`@ `. Such an appropriation of history is what is meant by the term ‘destruction’ [solche Aneignung der Geschichte ist mit dem Titel ‘Destruktion’ gemeint]. as a transformative rupture. changes [der Bezug zu Sein wandelt sich]. and Verwandlung are also used to characterize the mutation of the relation to being that arises with the other thinking.

Heidegger again ` >  .   time in the conclusion of “The Essence of Truth” and taken up again in the “Summary” of the seminar on Time and Being. In Contributions.

 Œ> >@.

 q Dasein is capable of “transforming” the “separation” of being from beings into a “simultaneity [Gleichzeitigkeit]. the announcement of “the other thinking. Heidegger asks: “Can a new language for Being be invented? No. [Kann eine neue Sprache für .”11 THE TRANSFORMATION OF LANGUAGE The coming of this simultaneity or contemporane- ousness.” In Con- tributions.” implies. a “metamorphosis of language. too.

”12 In The Question of Being. Z  @*   .” What would thereby appear is a “transformed say- ing [gewandelte Sagen].10 The Heidegger Change das Seyn erfunden werden? Nein. he wonders: “In which language does the basic out- line of thinking speak which indicates a crossing of the line?” This crossing carries with it a “necessary metamorphosis [Verwandlung] of language and a mutation in the relation to the essence of language” [ein gewandeltes Verhältnis zum Wesen der Sprache].]” It is only possible to metamorphose [verwandeln] the sole language that would be available to us: “the language of beings.

 Œ.

  > >@.

the gods: if they return.” The last God appears .”13 Imposing itself here is the idea of a metamorphosis of language right on language.   [Verwandlung] does not come back to the exchang- ing of an old terminology for a new one. they will return changed. so that no one recognizes them. METAMORPHOSIS OF THE GODS At last. Heidegger effectively announces their “hidden metamorphosis [ihre verborgene Verwandlung].

* `.

   Š.

`.

 * gods. In Sojourns.  ` > X Œ<. It does not arise as would a new divinity but is born from the secret transformation of the previous gods.

OR THE WEIGHT OF LIGHTNESS You can see that locating the trace of W. W. if they ever come.”14 THE FANTASTIC.   ` Greece and their supreme god. & V in Heidegger’s texts immediately raises a formidable dif- . will return only transformed to a world [nur Verwandelt in eine Welt verkehren] whose overthrow [umstürzenende Veränderung] is grounded in the land of the gods of ancient Greece.

Introduction 11 *<.

 * *  .

.

.

the change of man. God. it is left to us to unfold the general economy of this mutability.—which unveil the originary mutability of being while revealing at the same time that being is perhaps nothing . To the extent that the mutability of being is not—not. Simultaneously a mode of visibility and manifesta- tion. much like the mystery of a body—its energetic expenditures and phenomena of assimilation and degradation—regulates the changes. if by imaginary we understand. as Heidegger invites us to. but its mutability. Heidegger never pauses over it. exchanges. a being—its reality is necessar- ily imaginary. then. In fact. of God. the relation to being. thinking. heavy burden of expressing. and phenomenality form and determine in the same move a philosophical inquiry aimed at these. Seeing the change of being—being as . that is. language. god. visibility. But what is just as clear is that it bears this load lightly. I call such a point of access fantastic. of thinking.” Empowering W. Such a reality. the fantastic here designates the phenomenality of ontico-ontological transformations—those of man. & V entails conferring the reality proper to them on the philo- sophical system that. of the relation to being. mutations. This task corresponds precisely to an elaboration of “the Heidegger change. once again. and of language. It is up to us. the very conditions of its mobility and life. . . Empowering the triad grants us access to the ontological metabolism that renders possible all its changes. and transformations. etc. to produce its gravity by determining exactly in what way man. and language are for Heidegger trans- formable and convertible instances. as I have already indicated. a nonobjective modality of presence free of every reference and referent. and substitutions at work in Heidegger’s thought. W.

God. that is. Ereignis  . historicality. Otherwise than conceptually. and thinking is only possible for the philosopher if she invents a manner of ensconcing herself in this hole or cavity in thought that always refuses itself to concepts and that the triad. through the very emptiness of its name—W. & V—constantly invites investing as merits it: otherwise. W.12 The Heidegger Change (ex)change [change]—seeing that which changes. seeing the incision of the other in man. and otherwise than through the Heideggerian philoso- phemes that are nonetheless immediately available for expressing change in the full day of the text— time. which means two things: otherwise than through recourse to traditional philosophical techniques.

  `.

 turning or leap. Constructing the Heidegger change therefore demands that we both locate and create the level  .

 .

.

.

.

  .

         .

Ereignis) and the scarcely nameable—W. the fantastic “in philosophy” designates at once a kind of approach to change and the very strange- ness of what changes and is going to change. time. & V—background movement that is their obscure support and indispensable accom- plice. Both the mode of visibility of ontological metabo- lism and the intelligibility and evidence of the never seen. What matters is that we experience and test the metabolic potential of this thought. from the forgetting of being to the coming of the other thinking. of what is never seen. history.     structure of Heidegger’s thinking itself inasmuch as it opens in itself this distance or gap between the manifest character of its aims (the overcoming of metaphysics. It   . the sole one to have only ever spoken to us. W.

            .

  the fantastic to itself: its irreducibility to a genre or .

”15 The philosophical fantastic is contemporary with the bringing to light. of the onto- . to what Roger Caillois calls “the fantastic of principle or obligation. in the twentieth century. Introduction 13 category of discourse. its resistance to every relega- tion of itself to a conventional domain.

 .

the irrup- .                possibility of thinking being without beings. infernal fawns. It never designates “an element exterior to the human world” (that of “composite monsters.

   .

  .

.

undat- able. it is what gets displaced with it. constantly changing motility. and unthinkable. a limit that it also its reality. the fantastic characterizes the apprehension and the regime of existence of what cannot be presented. . whether it admits it or not. Eclipsed by the metaphysical tradition and only prepared by the other thinking.16 As an imaginary production without referent and pure ontological creation. to engage together its unforeseeable. This point is the phantasm of our philo- sophical reality. unlocatable. this conceptually depatriated place— the very enigma of our philosophical moment—this point of rupture and suture between metaphysics and its other that imposes upon philosophy. it is nonetheless the motor of thought. of. the very face of being that concepts cannot say without losing face. the whole of the metabolic force that sleeps without sleeping in what is. I would like us now. its limit. that is. change risks being an unprecedented mode of being. with Heidegger and beyond him. you and me.    describes the foreigner on the inside. Lodged at the heart of the triad. what can only ever change. Constructing the Heidegger change therefore involves elaborating the schematizing instance that will alone permit us to perceive.

I felt that the French word change had the merit of exactly situating the space of deployment of the     *   ` .14 The Heidegger Change The Situation of the Question of Change in Heidegger’s Thought “CHANGE”: CHANGE. SUBSTITUTION This surprising image of an ontological metabolism in which the dividing line of change (which runs between the ancient and the new) is constantly changing is what imposed the title The Heidegger Change on me. EXCHANGE.

The substantive change``*      *. exchange. and Verwandlung in Heidegger’s thinking—an intermediary space between change. and substitution.   Wandel. Wand- lung.

  .

it is in French a name for the place where economic negotiations are carried out. An old term of venery. or variability: that of seasons. and objects of desire.   ` succession. By extension. alternation. “change” is also of course given following transactions that involve paper money. it designates (a sense largely missing in English) barter. change     . the exchange of one object for another. Second. affections. and what is given for and can also replace what one gives up or be through that its equivalent. such as le marché des changes or foreign exchange market (the Bourse’s stockbrokers thus being agents de change). moods.

 substitution of a new animal for the one initially put  ` .

 .

 <.

     *  *    heard in the expression donner le change—to dis- simulate. It must nonetheless be admitted that these _*. as well as to pass the torch or to relay. in the sense of throwing off the scent or trail.

  *  `}*.

barter. and substitu- . currency exchange or change (Wechsel). †Tauschung).

Why then am I authorized to make use of the word change. Wandlung. which  _*. Introduction 15 tion (Austauschen) do not precisely coincide in Ger- man. as etymology immediately shows in the case of Wandel. and Verwandlung.

 €  ` .

 *Š  ` 
*  
that German distinguishes more clearly?

ANOTHER READING HAS ALREADY BEGUN

My response is to say that tracking Heidegger’s think-
ing of change necessarily leads one to take account
of an exchange.
     

       

 


Now that your attention has been drawn to the triad,
the same thing will happen to you as did me: you
will see it and nothing else but, and no longer be
able to ignore it—you will see it everywhere in Hei-
degger’s oeuvre, throughout each of his books and
lecture courses. From here out, the triad will pre-
dominate in your readings. In fact, another reading
has already begun. In letting yourself be taken by
the strange rhythm of the triad, in letting yourself be
put under the spell of the leitmotif of W, W, & V—by
the fantastic announcement of a change of man, god,
being, language, and philosophy—you are already in
the course of reaching another Heidegger. An almost
imperceptible but nonetheless vertiginous difference
has begun to open up right on the ontological differ-
ence. This self-difference of difference is nothing but
its ontological dimension.
From the moment you decided to follow the occa-
sional pulsation of change, you have without noticing
it been distracted from the difference between being
and beings. It no longer monopolizes or snatches
up, as was its habit and as you had been taught it
should, all your energy as a reader [lecteur/lectrice]

16 The Heidegger Change

of Heidegger; it no longer holds you. Henceforth, you
will no longer be able to keep in focus the difference
between being and beings but only the difference
between differing and changing. The center of gravity
of your reading has already been displaced. You have,
without realizing it, exchanged difference for change.
An ontological exchange, secondly. In spite of
this, you have not abandoned difference. Quite the
opposite: you are about to discover that exchange is
its origin. Meaning? From within the clear-obscure
fantastic that has become our abode, you start to
make out the silhouette of a sort of go-between. W,
W, & V progressively draws your attention to this
traveler, this runner or mule [passeur] that until
now you would have only ever distractedly glanced
at: essence or Wesen. The difference between differ-
ing and changing directs your gaze to the difference
between being and essence—for to behold essence is
to witness change.
When Heidegger heralds the change, metamor-
phosis, and mutation of man, gods, being, the rela-
tion to being, language, and philosophy, he does not
have in mind a transformational event that would
suddenly come to affect from the outside instances 

€

  
 * -
tical to themselves. Man, God, philosophy, and the
rest indeed are, as we saw, changing and changed
from the outset, which is to say originally exchanged.
What else is metaphysics besides the history of an
exchange—Heidegger calls it eine Verwechslung, a con-
fusion—between being and beings? “From its begin-
ning to its completion, the propositions of metaphysics
have been strangely involved in a persistent confusion
of beings and being,” one reads in “Introduction to
‘“What Is Metaphysics?’ ”17 Heidegger further speci-

Introduction 17  

     

 }  = 

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” he writes. Auswechslung. ‘interchange’ [Wechsel]. Wechsel. “One always stands in the other and for the other [im anderen und für das andere]. and exchange. ‘exchange’ [Auswechslung•   .  must be heard in Verwechslung is change. “Confusion: remaining tied to passing over to Being and back to beings [das Hinüber zu Sein und das Herüber zu Seiendem].

Unwandelbarkeit.” Seinendheit.”19 and essence.  €  then the other [bald so. Throughout the metaphysical tradition. of instances that dif- fer. Now essence is precisely their point of convertibility.”18 Difference. & V) of originary mutability into immu- tability. Beingness takes being’s place. and is the most basic resource of metaphysics. which “enters its service. This exchange of mutability for its opposite is exactly what origi- nally gives change [donne le change] in philosophy. Although the difference between being and essence is different from that between being and beings. he furthermore says. outside the originary possibility of being and beings changing into each other. The essence of a thing is effectively what in it does not change. must be understood as “beingness. then. Ontological difference therefore remains unthink- able outside the very possibility of its occlusion. This being-in-drag corresponds to a transforma- tion (W. not be located within the foyer of another difference— . Heidegger writes. and thus the nondifferentiation. you must grant me. “essence is only the other word for being. it should nonetheless. throwing it off the trail. bald so]. W. that is to say.”20 This originary (ex)change—onto- logical mastery and servitude—corresponds to the going-in-drag [travestissement] of essence. presupposes the exchangeability.

A new exchangeability that does not occlude their difference but instead frees essence from the burden of its old immutability so that it is rendered forever unrecognizable. W. An exchange without violation [rapt]. and philosophy. understood once more as a trade name (“the change called Heidegger”). I invite you to discover all the surprises that Hei- degger’s thought has in store when read as a think- ing of mutation. language. as could be believed. TOWARD AN ONTOLOGICAL REVOLUTION The mutation (W. What takes place at the end of metaphysics is not. and to see everything that difference      .18 The Heidegger Change neither within some other ontological difference nor within a difference different than the ontological difference. The entirety of Heidegger’s thinking is thus devoted to uncover- ing the conditions of a new ontological exchange. and domination but an exchange nonetheless—one that Ereignis @   The Heidegger change. & V) of the mutable into the immutable that presides over metaphysics’ destiny will. god. The problematic of change brings to light a differing that is not the alternative to ontological dif- ference. Heidegger declares. the rela- tion to being. is nothing less than the instrument of an ontological revolution. undergo yet another change: the putting back into play of originary mutability that occurs with the transformation of man. usurpation. but which constitutes the site of Heidegger’s thinking of change. the end of exchange but rather   "            —a new exchange- ability of being and beings.

    .

.

 .

Introduction 19 The Migratory-Metamorphic Articulation <.

    `>     > ` *  .

 because of the fact it governs a double economy. Each of these " #         . You have perhaps caught on that there are effec- tively  " #   . One where essence doubles being—is given for it—and another where essence is the coming and advent of being itself.

  .

   .

the history of metaphysics’ epochs as a sequence of “transformations [Abwandlungen]” and “mutations [Wandlungen]. Heidegger conceives. & V. . . W. for instance. and yet both express it using the same words: W.”21 $  .” while “the other thinking” is also said to open a “transformation [Wandlung] of Western history. proper to it .

.

.

 .

. and Verwandlung. it threatens to appear and disappear. turning-into. and commutation.        " #    is nonetheless decisive—relentlessly imprinting and effacing itself. Wandlung. . then. mutation. transformation. FORM AND PATHWAY How. . All three obviously sig- nify change. conversion. can this line be rigorously apprehended? We will consider more closely our three terms Wandel. We immediately  –.

€.

.

   *    along two principal axes that together reveal a fun- damental articulation constitutive of all change: a migratory axis. and a metamorphic one—as though “change” always means at once change of route and change of form. A certain proximity indicated by the dictionar- ies ties Wandlung—transformation—to Wanderung. .

”22 Change takes shape. and inces- sant and directionless change. This is what elsewhere authorizes Kafka’s Verwandlung to be translated into French as La Méta- morphose and into English as The Metamorphosis. the trace of a development that weaves around and tacks. If the register of form (+klqd́) is not present in the etymology of the three terms. iterative forms of wenden.” Heidegger declares: “Change has here the sense of migrating. the concourse or waiting area [salle de pas perdus]. Wandeln and wandern are. and Verwandlung are equally employed in contemporary German to designate processes of metamorphosis.20 The Heidegger Change migration or peregrination. too. then. the title of a chapter from Thus . We can see. aber zugleich als Ändern. which means to turn. In the same manner. and Verwandlung always for Hei- degger convey an advance that is at the same time a turning back. as happens in the Wanderhalle. & V outlines.” Apropos the “migration [Wanderung]” of “the stream” that Hölderlin calls “the changing [der Wandelnde]. Heidegger himself insists on the kinship between wandeln and wandern that Hölderlin brings out in his poem “Der Ister. Wandlung. a progress without aim. as a way forward while paths. are revealed to be continually changing. that Wandel. going. there is nonetheless little difference in Ger- man between the usages of Metamorphose and Ver- wandlung. a progression that is also a roaming or rambling. Wandlung. then. but at the same time of becoming other [Wandeln hier als Wandern und gehen. W. strolling about. Fortnehmen]. Wandel. The triad of W. Wandern     - ing without destination. die Wende      23 and Wandeln is to change by following a series of bends and turns or revers- ing course. reciprocally. moreover.

” The Dudden dictionary also clearly emphasizes the synonymy of Verwandlung and Metamorphose  @*   . Introduction 21 Spoke Zarathustra. “Von den drei Verwandlungen.” is generally translated as “Des trois Métamorphoses” or “On the Three Metamorphoses.

 the two can signify: “First. the development of the egg from an independent larval state to the maturity @* *   † >  *  ` } >@‡  .

”24 Wandel and Wandlung can also express these two senses of metamorphosis as biological phenomenon and. transformation of the basic form of a vegetable organ into an organ endowed with a particular function. or stone. plant. in the tradition of Ovid and Apuleius. under Wandel: “1.  * . most often an animal. the fantastic transformation of a being into an animal. as the incarnation of a man or god in another being. Hence one can read. second. to become other.

sich verändern. every real change is partly com- prised of a metamorphic dimension.”25 For Heidegger. `>   #   > - morphosed into something. bekommen. zu etwas sich verwandeln. eine andere Form. 2. Gestalt. So that in each € @*. zu etwas anderem werden]. to become something else [1.

 ` > @.

 * '   †}‡*.

. while in the same way—second change—“the grounding-question” that orients the other thinking “transforms in itself [einverwandelt] the guiding-question.” which is that of metaphys- ics. 'Œ  essential metamorphosis [wesentliche Verwandlung]”26 is accomplished.27 This is to say that Heidegger characterizes metaphysics as a “form [Form]” that changes form from epoch to epoch by being re-formed. even as he just as much promises “the other thinking” to be a transformation in the literal sense—a passage or transition to another form.

migratory and metamorphic. the metamorphosis of man appears as a displacement and a transformation.28 The two changes are correlative: each loop of the road has its corresponding form (Form‡   †Gestalt).” is in effect “a displacing [of] its site among beings [Ver-rückung seiner Stellung im Seienden]. in its about-turns and changes of course. inversely. On the one hand. for example. the advantage of rendering change of route and change of form indistinguishable from each other. Hence. the Wandlung announced by Heidegger as pathway and turnaround always doubles as an adventure of trans-formation. W. the Verwandlung announced by Heidegger is indissociable from a Wan- derung in the world. we “need a preliminary thought of . just as Kafka’s Verwandlung is indissociable from a change of form. & V.”31 As for the gods. in its proximity with Wandlung.”30 The other beginning is likewise presented as an “ändersförmig” or different form at the same time as it is cast as following “another direction. this is perhaps only because Verwandlung offers. Reciprocally. animal ratio- nale. The other (ex)change is likewise structured according to the double. this renewal involves. “das ‘vernüftige’ Tier. a change of itinerary. Just as Kafka’s Verwandlung is indissociable from a Wanderung around a room. the abandonment and re-formation of the traditional form (Form) of man: the form of the rational animal.”29 On the other. articulation presiding over the destiny of W. while every formal muta- tion is.22 The Heidegger Change While it should be acknowledged that Heidegger never employs the word Metamorphose. the “transformation of human- ness [Verwandlung des Menschseins].

  ` .

       `>  [gewandelte Gestalt]”32'   .

.  €  `  given in the movement of a very singular migration.

Introduction 23 one that would be at once an arrival (Ankunft) and Š.

from Dasein to language. enters the adventure of form at a curve in the road. †Flucht).33 What we will have to analyze is the movement of this future metamorphosis to come. ONE TRIAD. and beings to god. TWO CHANGES %. which. being to thought.

      * .

@`—$`.

& V) with the second—the other thinking—then €       `  @> € can we establish the dividing line between change and change? If one and the same articulation (the migratory-metamorphic) governs the economy of the two changes. and this only by grace of the metaphysical metabolism that holds one last surprise in store for them? Or must one. being. at bottom. than the structure of transformation? Will we ever know this? Will we ever know if we have changed? Will we ever know if migration and metamorphosis have already taken place. or if they remain always to come? These questions cast Heideggerian thought in a strange.  > - physical change shares the diction of its kinesis (W. God. From the one change . on the contrary. how can we establish the dividing line between self-metamorphosis and self-metamorphosis. between migration and migration? If man. must they be understood as exchanging their traditional determinations for others that have not yet appeared. disquieting light. presume that the very idea of an ontological metabolism emerges only once things have changed. beings. only after there is acceptance of the clearly ultrametaphysical idea that ontology designates nothing other. and language all change. W.

24 The Heidegger Change [change] and regime of exchange [échange] to the other. in fact. W. a circulation that can appear to be absolutely uncontrollable because it has nei- ther limits nor strict determinations. “The sixth and last session concerned    >’    €.” It alone may help us here. the both migratory and metamorphic mutability of everything that is. a metabolic circulation takes place between man and Dasein. and Verwandlung themselves is found in “The Summary of a Seminar on the Lecture Time and Being. we verge on danger itself—on ontological transformability. W. and essence (Wesen) and essencing or swaying (Wesung). in truth. We touch the core of this plasticity. & V. where every other changes into every other.” and the sense of these “transformations” is precisely what the seminar focuses on. The Janus-Head Gestell The only exposition manifestly devoted to the terms Wandel. what endow Heidegger’s thought with its vertiginous dimension. God and god. then. The succession of the epochs of being is presented there as “the abundance of the transfor- mation [Wandlungsfülle] of being. but without at the same time knowing from whence comes the other or if. W. what is both fasci- nating and dangerous about it. despite its brevity. there could be another way of changing. & V are doubtlessly. being (Sein) and be-ing (Seyn). Wandlung. With W.

*.

.

€.

 the meaning that lies in the words ‘transformation’ [Wandlung].”34 The same terms. . ‘transmutation’ [Verwandlung. metamor- phosis] when the fullness of the transformation of being is spoken about [wenn von der Wandlungs- fülle des Seins gesprochen wird].

thus as an extreme formation of being. one might say. characterize at once both the course of metaphysics (the succession of epochs that unfurl upon the substitution of beingness for being and the occlusion of this substitution) and the advent of the other beginning or other change [change]. on the one hand.”36 Each epoch of the history of being thus accomplishes a Wandlung or Verwandlung of metaphysics’s guiding question. the meaning which is intended when we say that being is transformed—to Ereignis [das Sein verwandelt wird—nämlich in das Ereignis]. “Transformation. express both of the two (ex)changes? The “Summary” provides this decisive response: “Between the epochal formations of being and the transformation of being into Appropriation stands Enframing [Ge-stell].”37 “The abundance of the transformation [Wand- lungsfülle] of being” should be heard. It can be understood as a kind of continuation of the will to will. At . Wandlung. The Enframing is an in-between stage [Zwischenstation]. However. It offers a double aspect. or metamorphosis]. predicated within metaphysics about metaphysics. a Janus head. then. Wandel. which refers to metaphysics. transmutation [Verwandlung. Yet how can the same words. so to speak. is. epochally and historically. Introduction 25 continue the authors. Here it is not a matter of a manifestation [Manifestation] of being comparable to the metaphysical formations [Gestalten] of being and following them as a new manifestation. in two radically different senses.”35 All the different philosophical doctrines constitute through time “the changing forms [wechselnden Gestalten] in which being shows itself [zeigt]. “[w]e must sharply distinguish from this meaning of transformation. and Verwandlung.

26 The Heidegger Change .

 >>.

to assimilate it $ @> > `  @ *  . beings and beings. again.”38 If the Gestell plays this role of the go. Heidegger and the Others Yet what does insisting on the change in Heidegger’s oeuvre. My ambition with this inquiry is at once modest and inordinate: I believe it is possible to assert that until now. and being and being—then our inquiry should borrow from it its power of machi- nation and liberation. To identify means both to recognize—like when a naturalist recognizes plants or mineral samples— and to consider something identical. man and Dasein. to identify it. above all. language and language.and in-between for the philosophemes of the two (ex)changes—between. God and god. you ask me. really at bottom change? Perhaps nothing. philosophers have merely paralyzed Heidegger’s thought in an immobile apparatus by seeking. essence and essence. perhaps everything. Constructing our approach (the Heidegger change) as a writing-Gestell will therefore enable us to attempt to precisely account for the changes in Heidegger’s thought.€    `>`Ereignis itself.

 *  * -  .

  ` .

      .

 >@   a periodization of Heidegger’s work—those analyses .

 >       } .

39 . does the question of being truly get abandoned in the last texts?. what mutations does aletheia undergo?. Those asking where and when should the turning (Kehre) be located?. > *   displacements. but without precisely relating these transformations to Heidegger’s understanding of transformation itself. evolutions. or ruptures constituting the living tissue of his thought.

Introduction 27 *$  *€.

.

     .

and to determine through that its duration   * *  €. Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism. all of which intend to reveal.  essays claiming an ontologico-political periodization. right on the philoso- phemes themselves.

   ** ` .


fundamental role of the triad.40
I consider last, under the heading of the second
meaning of recognition, analyses that aspire to make
Heidegger look like a thinker of the identical. Hei-
degger’s thinking, even though it has difference at its
core, supposedly lacks the other, and lacks it for not
making it, exactly and explicitly, its decisive question.
This is the powerful—ethical and metaphysical—objec-
tion that his most eminent readers will address to
him in different ways during the second half of the
twentieth century; his thought will for this reason
only be for them, at bottom, a supplementary version
of metaphysics.
Exploring the motif of change in Heidegger’s
oeuvre, following, that is, its multiple migratory and
metamorphic turns as well as the destiny of the triad
Wandel, Wandlung, and Verwandlung, should allow us 
*†* 

 
*  ‡  

that it is impossible to immobilize the evolutions of
his thought, and, second, that   

    


the other is very much in evidence in it—an other
irreducible to the same but irreducible as well to
absolute alterity, the Other so fecund in Levinas’s
thinking. If there is something other in Heidegger, it
is something other than the Other. The phenomenon
of this other alterity should be sought in the tight
articulation uniting change and difference.
So as to discover this other, I invite you to have
an experience of and with Heidegger. “To undergo an
experience with something,” Heidegger writes, “be it a
person, a thing, or a god, means that this experience

28 The Heidegger Change

befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms us,
and transforms us [daß es un widerfährt, daß es un
trifft, über uns kommt, uns umwirft und verwandelt].”41
I invite you, therefore, to see just how Heidegger
metamorphoses and turns us upside down, and at
the same time to take measure of what a migration
and a metamorphosis in philosophy can be.

READING HEIDEGGER CHANGING

But how are we going to read Heidegger changing?
How are we going to traverse the densities of his
thought, respecting its constant molting while not
dividing it into rigid stages? My proposal is that the
steps of our itinerary be situated in the paradoxical
space opened by two great changes that happened
in Heidegger’s thinking of change.
First, the change that happened to the very lexicon
of change, and second, the change in his understand-
ing of the origin of change.
Change of lexicon. I said earlier that it is possible
to see W, W, & V at work in all of Heidegger’s books
and lecture courses. But this is not exactly true: one
work, Being and Time, is an exception to the rule,
the triad being found nowhere in it. The existential
analytic knows nothing of Wandeln, Wandlung, or
Verwandlung; only %

'

 
†>
*  ‡<


*  `>
*  ` **  @ -
ent in Being and Time, with the change in the lexicon
of change taking place immediately after its 1927
publication. Beginning with “What Is Metaphysics?”
there is effectively a transfer of power from %

-
kation to W, W, & V. We should therefore attempt
to determine exactly what the difference separating




 from migration and metamorphosis is.
Change in the understanding of change. In the
lecture entitled The End of Philosophy and The Task

Introduction 29

of Thinking*  

.

.

those founders of metaphys- * ' . He had therefore long perceived a coincidence between the forgetting of being and the change or mutation of the essence of truth. @  regarded the commencement of the metaphysical tradition as proceeding from a “transformation of the essence of truth” (Wesenswandel der Wahrheit).

   †}‡*.

Instead we must say: Aletheia.” he declares. as the cor- rectness of representations and statements. from unconcealment to correctness. that is. But then the assertion about the essential transformation of truth. as opening of presence and presencing in thinking and saying. “the fact that ™h‹e¡f_.  Now it is to this conception that philosophy returns. originally comes under the perspective of homoiosis and  . to close: “[W]e must acknowledge. unconcealment in the sense of opening of presence. was originally only [sogleich und nur] experienced as orthotes. is untenable.

that is. far from leading Heidegger to expulse change from the sphere of the origin. I will scramble chronological order by taking as my point of depar- ture Heidegger’s reversal of his views on the subject of originary change. to envisage the retreat of being itself as a power of originary change. allowed him. As if it must be supposed that being has an originary aptitude for giving change. on the contrary. and by keeping for the end an     ` > *   Being and Time.”42 There would not be a mutation princeps of the essence of truth. since being and truth are from the outset given only in their withdrawal. The inquiry will unfold through three principal moments. the perspective of adequation in the sense of the correspondence of representing with what is present. entitled Metamorphoses and Migrations of . So as to envisage these changes. We see that this new consideration..

The New Ontological Exchange.30 The Heidegger Change Metaphysics. and At *+%.

.

Burrowed away in our writing-Gestell. From one exchange to the other. we will ask ourselves what changing can mean in the epoch when epochal changes mean nothing anymore. We will ask ourselves what transformation and transformability mean when history is over. we will let ourselves be guided and diverted. . The Heidegger change: Onward! It is decided! . trans- formed and disoriented by the fantastic caprices of the point of suture and rupture between (ex)change and (ex)change.

—Heidegger.C.” the latter coming “under the yoke [unter das Joch]” of it. So goes the organization of the economy of the confusion (Verwechslung) of being (Sein) and beingness (Seiendheit‡<. The foundational event of metaphysics is. The Principle of Reason Change at the Beginning It all starts with a change. philosophy has been reigning [waltet] and transforming itself [wandelt sich] since the sixth century B. the exchange takes place. Part I Metamorphoses and Migrations of Metaphysics In the west.”2 “Truth becomes k’ lekod́n. a mutation.”3 and “f’b¡´ _ gains dominance over _’ hd́e¡f_.1 Plato. change is immobilized.4 With replacement the inaugural force. A “change of the essence of truth” [Wandel des Wesens der Wahrheit] comes to pass. that is. brings about “a trans- formation in the essence of truth. In this turn—or revolution—of the first (ex) change. the correctness of apprehending and assert- ing. essence molts into an immutable instance. indeed.

31 . *  }- ity of substitution—“being as immutability” [Sein als Unwandelbarkeit]—which is necessarily accompanied by a blindness to the ontological dignity of substitution.

In What is Called Thinking? Heidegger states that “it remains obscure how the shaping of the essence [Wesensprägung] of traditional thinking takes place [ereignet]. . The Double Process of Schematization $   >@     . he continues. The history of metaphysics is a long metamorphosis and migration of the immutable. . the guiding idea changes place. “the essential nature of thinking. not stop- ping. We will contemplate the build of the solidarity between the re-formation and displacement of metaphysics through asking ourselves exactly what makes possible the at once morphological and topographical perspective through which Heidegger views the tradition. the essential origin of thinking. its taking form—Heidegger in fact always characterizes metaphysics as either a form (Form‡    †Gestalt)—and its taking a direction: Heidegger also always in effect characterizes metaphysics as a pathway [Weg]. and by that very fact are what gives us . . the essential possibilities of thinking that are com- prehended in that origin—they are all strange to us. According to a paradox that can only be apparent. .”6 I invite you to consider the impossible possibility of grasping hold of the living tissue of metaphysics in the course of its taking . the occlusion of the metabolic origin of metaphysics decides the metamorphic and migratory structure of metaphysics. thought before all else and always. this form changes forms.”5 Nonetheless.32 The Heidegger Change constitutes for Heidegger the form and guiding idea of metaphysics. The history of philosophy is very much that of a transformation (Wandlung). Never stopping.

   *.

  .

 transformations proceeding from it without inter- .

Metamorphoses and Migrations 33 rogating the conditions of visibility of the structural whole of metaphysics. How can the articulation of the migratory and metamorphic. appear? It is imperative for you. that these questions be posed. who refuse to regard the reduction of “the tradition” and con- sequently its Destruktion as self-evident operations. <. What matters is to show that the appearance of the structure of metaphysics is the result of a double— archi. the conjunction of form and pathway soldered together in(to) the tra- dition.and ultra-philosophical—process of schematiza- tion that sews and tears the very same tissue.

    ` .

  @*  .

and expose there their skin. of not seeing—the primordial (ex)change from which it proceeds.” which analyzes the emergence of meta- physics as the arising of a way of seeing—which is also to say.) meet their end by being forced to appear before their own eyes. From the cavern to the mountain peak and from the prisoners of the shadows to Zarathustra’s silhouette. the form of the divine and its migrations. and those of the relation to being. in a picture. From the begin- ning. for Heidegger. an auto-schematizing instance. It is in this way that metaphysics is. of thought and of philosophical language . the power to make itself appear. one that renders into an image its own transformations and peregrinations. €   immanent to metaphysics. . . it must be that metaphysics possesses. the beginning is (self-)given to being seen. . If there is a phenomenon of metaphysics (of its form and meaning). metaphysics will not stop its auto-imaging until all the   and displacements of ontological confusion (the human form and its migrations. at the beginning. It is to this scenic fascination of the origin that Heidegger devotes his great text “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth.

come of late and freed by and from this chrysalis-play. which pits its own power to imagine against the old scheme and stages anew a scene of the Ereignis of the beginning. there must be another gaze. The appearance of the structure of metaphysics is thus the result of a second process of schematization that has been somehow   to .34 The Heidegger Change But if the far path of this self-envisaging molting is to be followed.

  .

the other has to be given with the same and the uncanny included (eingerückt‡.    `>  @ * What this double perspective constitutes is precisely the fantastic intimacy of Heideggerian thought. For the entirety of metaphysics to appear.

` > '.

this transformation (Wandlung) names the secret labor of difference—   `      `>    @*  heterogeneities—which also constitutes the meta- bolic resource of the history of being. the meaning of “transformation” in the West.” “The genuine image.” On the other.”7 The image of the birth of metaphysics is thus always. in a certain way. as the reworking and revision of one and the same form and the continual reverting to this one same path: metaphysics. metaphysics appears. in effect. another image at the same time as it is the image of something other than metaphysics. “remains what it is across its transformations [durch alle Abwandlungen hindurch bleibt].” he says there. in place of the fantastic convergence of the two schemas. On the one hand. This union of the familiar and the alien alone permits for understanding. “If changing . lets the invisible be seen and so imagines the invisible in something alien to it. “as a sight or spectacle. in all its complexity. * - tion Heidegger gives of the Ein-bilden of “imagining” in “Poetically Man Dwells. writes Heidegger.

Metamorphoses and Migrations 35 [weschselnde] fundamental positions of metaphysical thinking develop. “then their > `   * >  .” Heidegger also writes.

 *.

Along our way. being. this unchangingness is only an illusion under whose pro- tection metaphysics occurs as the history of being. essence will take shape as the place of exchange between the two images. As we go. W. I will enter with you into the serpentine windings of philosophical metamorphosis and migration (W. until that turnaround sets off in the same move the W. and the form of metaphysics. and the rest . . .”8 It is through casting this double gaze upon trans- formation. In departing from the initial event of the change that arose in the essence of truth.   ` the underlying determinations of being. & V) up to the advent of the change in the direction. However. W. then. this locus of exchange will reveal itself as the secret foyer of the Heideggerian imaginary. . that we will follow the sharp turns of       . & V of man. God. the form of meaning.

This page intentionally left blank. .

the emergence of a form. 1 The Metabolism of the Immutable “We ought not . . in their simul- taneity and contemporaneousness. precisely because of these changes [transformations/Wandlungen] throughout their course. overlook the fact that philoso- phy from Aristotle to Nietzsche. the three constitutive . . For the transformations [metamorphoses] are the warranty for the kinship in the same [denn die Verwandlungen sind die Bürgschaft für die Ver- wandschaft im Selben].”1 You suggest that I begin by exposing. These are the three terms of the taking place of metaphysics. and the trail of a displacement. has remained the same. the turning point     .

This gaze shows the unity of metaphysics to be both the continuity of a form that gets deformed and reformed without changing form. This close articulation of form and meaning attests to the historical cohesion endowing upon the entirety of the tradition        37 .        "    . There exists between these instances a solidar- ity. one Heidegger subjects to the morphological and topographical gaze that has continued to divert so many of his readers. and the stability of a road that opens out without changing direction.

the essential morphological and topographi- cal characteristics of metaphysics. capable of setting  `. Prägung.”2 In effect. They take form in being “in eins mit”—“at one with”—“each other. an imprint (Prägung): these are. or Leitfrage.38 The Heidegger Change being for beingness—the understanding of essence as immutability. a direction (Richtung). and determines from the outset its guid- ing question. enumerated as succinctly as possible. The Structural Traits of Philosophy A MOBILE CONFIGURATION A question (Frage). An orienting that strikes and fashions. the substitution of beingness—Seiendheit—for being forms the form of metaphysics. an imprint.

  *.

. path and direction are confused.  impresses its movement upon metaphysics. until the end. Heidegger writes: “If we inquire into beings as beings and thus inquire into the being of beings in this starting point [Ansetzung] and direction [Rich- tung]. . So at the beginning. what is kp’ mf́_ as the being- ness of a being? Being here means beingness. In Contributions to Philoso- phy. as of́ ok̀ k‘´i. This says at the same time that. the type set on its way . Therefore we call this question concerning being (of beings) the guiding question. despite rejection of the species-character. then whoever inquires stands in the realm of the question that guides the beginning of Western philosophy and its history up to its end in Nietzsche. the pathway sealed. Its most general form [ihre allgemeinste Form] received its imprint [Prägung] from Aristotle. being (as beingness) is always and .

” is “a word that Plato uses to refer to a looking that catches sight not of that which is changeable and can be perceived by the senses. but of the unchange- able. being. The expression “form of metaphyics. i. the f’b¡´ _. f’b¡´ _.4 Essence. sees its own history cast in the form of a form. so changed into formal immobility.”3 A GENERAL IDEA You see it: the form of metaphysics in general is inti- mately linked to the elaboration of generality as form.e. form is what perdures.”5 The “idea” or form of a thing is what is stable and constant in it: “Das ‘Sein’ als Unwandelbarkeit”—“ ‘being’ as immutability. In both cases. Metaphysics is the “determination of essence (quiddity) as essentiality of being (kp’ mf́_)” and the community of all beings of the same genre. “Pb¡fi.”6 Such   .” then. des- ignates at once the structure of the tradition and the   concept of form immanent to this same tradition.” Heidegger tells us in “On the Question of Being. what is common and thus common for every being. The Metabolism of the Immutable 39 only meant as the gkfpḱp.

 *     ` .

   }*.

‘being’ (the actuality of the actual) is thought as pure becoming and absolute move- ment.” he continues. at its source. then. . are represented from the perspective of a ‘being that is at rest.  “In accordance with metaphysics. changeable and moved. as in Hegel and Nietzsche. “[m]etaphysics is in all its forms [Gestalten] and historical stages a unique .”7 At rest. mobile and mobi- lized. .”8 Of what does this fate consist? Contributions furnishes the following response: “In all variations and secularizations [in allen Abwandunglen und Verweltlichungen] of Western . “all beings. fate [einzige Verhängnis].’ and this even where.

solidifying the form (Form‡    . one again recognizes [erkennen] that being is at the service of beings. even when being appears to be dominating as cause [das Sein in Dienste des Seienden.”9 It is therefore always in the direction of a servitude that throws off the trail. auch wenn es als Ursache scheinbar die Herrschaft hat].”10 reviving the imprint. that those particular philosophical thoughts spread out which never cease. giving change. “from Anaximander to Nietzsche.40 The Heidegger Change metaphysics.

In Contributions  > ‘ ` >  ` .” A “RE-FORMULATION” This being so. . the historical change that arises with each new epoch of metaphysics appears a simple “reformulation” (Unformung) of the same form. “FROM DESCARTES TO HEGEL . .  †Gestalt).

slightly further down: “What lies between Hegel and Nietzsche has many shapes but is nowhere within the metaphysical in any originary sense—not even Kierkegaard [was zwischen Hegel und Nietzsche liegt ist vielgestaltig.” Each philosophy. umändern]. a renewed refor- mulation. nirgends ursprünglich im Metaphysische. is a simple reformulation of the pre- ceding.  *   found: “From Descartes to Hegel.”11 And then.” Yet the Unformungen . auch Kierkegaard nicht]. once again. but no essential change [von Descartes bis Hegel.” “to change in form [in der Form verändern. The verb umformen    Œ   € form [eine andere Form geben]. eine erneute Umformung aber kein wes- entlicher Wandel].”12 “No essential change” should here be understood to mean “no change in essence.” or “to formulate otherwise [anders formulieren].

The Metabolism of the Immutable 41 or reformulations of metaphysics in effect change it €.

 ``*  `>    .

as a transformation but also as a displacement . A DISPLACEMENT Each epoch of metaphysics makes its appearance. * > it. & V thus designate here a metamorphosis and migration that brings about an identity instead of altering it. W. W. then.

"   .

 .

 of the preceding one. Every new epoch. the route of metaphysics depends on the metaphysical conception of a “change of location [Ortwechsel]. Heidegger in fact says. is a “displacement [Verlagerung] of the structure of essence [Wesensfüge] of the preceding [vormalige].”13 So that in the same way the form of metaphysics depends on the meta- physical concept of form.” The wealth of meanings of Aristotlelian +¡o_`khd́    ` *  .

 @*.

Henceforth movement is understood on the basis of the mover. with the predominance of the mechanistic thinking of the modern sciences. but it in no way counts as movement pure and simple. . which is in turn known as what provides the energy required for a displacement. movedness in terms of place or location—is for Aristotle only one kind [Art] of movedness among others. The very mobility of the concept of mobility is thereby lost.”14 Moder- nity carries out the reduction of the metabolic to the phoronomic. “we are inclined both to hold that the basic form of movement is movedness in the sense of motion [Forthebung] from one position in space to another.” Heidegger declares. That kind of movedness—gf́idmfn g_o_` oḱ/ki. ` >   single one of its modalities: local movement: qkl_´ . “Today. and then to ‘explain’ everything in terms of it.

change of position (Lageänderung) hencefor- ward. appear to be original. veritable forms of movement. In Contributions. This restriction occludes the metabolism of +¡o_`khd́ and restrains the movement of its dif- ferent identity.15 What must nonetheless be seen is that this transformation (Wandlung) of the concepts of move- ment and change is.42 The Heidegger Change that is a change of place. in reality.” Displacement. then. already prepared within Aristotle’s philosophy itself. transportation from location to location.  ` > . change of place (Ortwechsel).

.

>@ .

that the reduction of the meta- bolic to the phoronomic (inscribed as it is from the beginning) governs. wholeness [Ganzheit]. It started at the beginning This can even be discerned in the Presocratics. In The Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy. . on the basis of this fundamen- .”17 It is evident.> * of +¡o_`khd́ into qkl_´ (which the Greeks nevertheless regard as something quite different from rectilinear trajectory) constitutes “the kernel of Aristotle’s ontol- ogy [der Kern der “Ontologie” des Aristotles]. cannot be thought as change.” Notions of the “multiform [mannigfaltig]” and “self-changing [sichwandelnder]” are at the very outset distanced from every discourse on “unity [Einheit]. then. uniqueness [Einzigkeit]. . Heidegger shows that the pre-Socratic understanding of change (Wandel) as “generation and corruption [Enstehen und Vergehen]” and “mixing and separating [Mischung und Entmischung]” is already inhabited by an “ontological tendency [ontologische Tendanz]” which makes it so that change’s “characteristics of being [Seinscharak- teristik] . and immutability [Unveränderlichkeit].”16 The change (Wandlung) of change (+¡o_`khd́) never properly commenced.

W.” the traditional understanding of the “displacement” of the structure of essence that takes place in each new epoch of the history of philosophy. The Metabolism of the Immutable 43 tal “tendency. when they are in charge of expressing the movement of metaphysics. The metaphysical conception of metamorphosis as a simple Umformung—reformation or reformulation—nec- essarily works in tandem with metaphysics’ concep- tion of migration as a simple passage from one place to another. W. seem then to conjugate the placidness of a “ . & V.

”20 . Yet transcendence is at the same time a migra- tion. and the energy of a “mover. it leads and passes toward. however. “refers to the relation proceeding from beings and passing over to being. of the form and meaning of metaphysics. Transcendence indeed appears as “the inner form of metaphysics [die innere Form der Metaphysik]. and which transpires between the two [die hinübergehende Bezie- hung zwischen beiden].” Heidegger writes.  ” that does not itself change. “Transcendence. that is a change of place.” an instance that “provides the energy for a displace- ment.”19 which remains invariable despite its reformulations. At the same time. transcendence refers to the relation leading from changeable beings [verändlichen Seindes] to an entity that is at rest [ruhenden Seienden].”18 The Whole-Form and Its Particular Trajectories TRANSCENDENCE AS THE STRUCTURAL UNITY OF METAPHYSICS “Transcendence” is the name Heidegger gives the “immutable” articulation of the mutable and the mover.

”22    @*  . . and theology. the inaugural exchange of being for beingness: “Metaphysics is in a twofold and yet unitary manner. It is in this sense that he will speak of “the ontotheological struc- ture of metaphysics. the truth of beings in their universality and in the highest being. metaphysics is at the same time both ontology . .”21 and this essential origin is. According to its essence. precisely.44 The Heidegger Change This analysis of transcendence as the solidar- ity between a form and displacement which neither deform nor displace the substitution from which they proceed will lead Heidegger to specify that the very meaning of this substitution is structure.” The morphological-topographical gaze has for its task “turn[ing] our thought to the essential origin of the onto-theological structure of all metaphysics (die Wesenherkunft der onto- theologischen Struktur aller Metaphysik).

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and there they stay. must indeed be grounded in the way in which the »i opens up in it. Thus the theological char- acter of ontology is not merely due to the fact that Greek metaphysics was taken up and transformed [umgebildet] by the ecclesiastic theology of Christian- ity. namely as »i. “beings enter philosophy” as “the deity enters”24 too. No historical innovation is susceptible to disorganize the ontotheological struc- ture. Right at the start. - theological essence of philosophy proper . . Whether Greek or Christian. the common source of ontology  .”23 Hence the upheaval producing the sudden appearance of Christianity is for Heidegger merely the reformu- lation (Umformung) and phoronomic displacement of the Greek spiritual universe. Rather it is due to the manner in which beings as beings have revealed themselves from early on. .

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25 “THE FUNDAMENTAL METAPHYSICAL POSITIONS” Just what. “the twofold char- acter [Zweigestaltung]” and guiding thread (Leitfade) of metaphysics. requires that we account for how “the meaning is changing at any particular time and  . Heidegger tells us. The Metabolism of the Immutable 45 but without any essential upset. is a particular epoch of metaphys- ics? How is the general movement of transformation economized in it? Responding to these questions. then.

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.” Heidegger writes. 2.  *>  }   particular time [inwiefern jeweils die Bedeutung sich wandelt und sich jeweils geschichtlich festliegt]. . himself [die Art und Weise. wie der Mensche Mensch und dh. The essential interpretation of the being of beings. . The manner and way in which man is man. .”27 This principle “comprehensively governs all decisions distinctive of the age. “What is essential to a fundamental metaphysical position.”28 The “essential shape” of an epoch consists of four basic elements.”26 Each epoch of the tradition constitutes a “fundamental metaphysical position [metaphysische Grundstellung]” that corresponds to “a particular interpretation of beings [eine bestimmte Auslegung Seienden]” provid- ing the principle or “ground of its essential shape [Wesensgestalt]. “embraces [umfaßt] 1. that is. er selbst ist]: the essential nature of selfhood [die Wesensart der Selbstheit].

in any given instance.”29 What is decided in each epoch of metaphysics is: the manner of being of man. 4. by itself. the essence of truth   . Each. the concept of being. namely the particular way being is understood in terms of beings. The essential projection of truth [den Wesensentwurf der Wahrheit]. “man is the measure” [Maß ist] None of the essential moments of the fundamental metaphysical position can be understood apart from the others [läßt sich abgesondert von den anderen begreifen]. as a consequence. The sense in which. indicates the totality.46 The Heidegger Change 3.

      .

or orientation of this truth. measure. and God. The triad express- . you notice a certain trembling pass through W. Every fundamental metaphysical position thus in itself rep- resents a change of man and of the relation to being. why speak of transformation (Wandlung)? Just as you ask this question. “ESSENTIALLY TRANSFORMED” So if it is true that metaphysics is a unique sense. an inevitability. a change as well in the relation to transcendence. Change—and Change THE SAME. and also an alteration of the relation to thought and the determination of the essence of philosophy. sense. & V. and if it true as well that every fundamental philosophical position reproduces and guarantees the essential structure of philosophy. beings in general. and a singular historical cohe- sion. W. a form.

the reformulation and maintenance of metaphysical direction even as it sends this into the € `   *  >   ` >  . in effect. The Metabolism of the Immutable 47 es.

  in saying that “[t]he history of being is . “All great and genuine philosophy. This transformation lends a properly primordial historicity to the occurrence of the history of philosophizing. Different not in any merely external sense. so that he is seeing double. . exactly. self-subsistent being [kein abrollender Verlauf von Verwandlungen eines losgelöst für sich bestehenden Seins]. But then what.”30 Historical metamorphoses are not the ava- tars of one substantial form. Heidegger has a vision of the con- tinuous “shrouding” of the meaning of being. is the meaning and true import of the triad of change? SOME METAMORPHOSES AND MIGRATIONS What must be seen is that the gaze through which Heidegger views the structural whole of metaphysics splits. “MOVING SIDEWALKS” On one side.”31 Transformation into the identical at the same time opens the identical to its alterity. to . “moves within the limited sphere of a few questions which appear to common sense as perennially the same.” a passage in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics reads. not some rolling-on series of transformations of a detached. . although in fact they are necessarily different [anders] in every instance of philosophizing. but rather in such a way that the selfsame [das Selbe] is in each case essentially transformed [verwandelt] once more. Only in such transformation [Verwandlung] does philosophy possess its genuine selfsameness.

48 The Heidegger Change .

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Hence. for example. Despite its new beginning. it attends to the very same question: what is being? That this question is not explicitly posed in Descartes’ Meditations only goes to prove how essentially the fundamental position determines a transformation in the answer to it [abgewandelte Antwort]. “[t]he metaphysical foundation of Descartes’ position is taken over [getragen] from Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics. It is Descartes’ interpretation of beings and `.   only the byways of one and the same forgetting.

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 possibility of a theory or metaphysics of knowledge.”32 Metamorphoses and displacements affect only the responses that have been provided to the question of being. not the question itself. Heidegger says that “the essential > *   š> >@. Continuing.

This change (of the) immutable is exactly what authorizes Heidegger to draw up so frequently his . just as Descartes himself did in his era.”33 Descartes’ successors. yet not. metamorphose the fundamental position they inherit so that it is no longer recognizable—despite its not having essen- tially changed.  • ` ƒ *  | `- damental position [die Verwandlungen der Grund- stellung Descartes] which have been achieved by German thinking since Leibniz in no way overcome this fundamental position. They only expand its metaphysical scope and establish the preconditions of the nineteenth century—still the most obscure of all the centuries up to now. They indirectly reinforce Descartes’ fundamental position in a form [Form] that is scarcely recognizable [fast unkenntlich]. on that account. any the less real [aber deshalb nicht weniger wirklich].

the essentia of the Middle Ages 4. did you ever recall Proust’s characterization of Flaubert’s style as a “moving sidewalk”?35 Have you never realized that Heidegger likewise scrolls through historical change? I will limit myself to just one example of this. possibilitas in Leibniz (Leibniz seminars) 5. we can initially discuss the historical consequence of the concepts of essence. enable the essential to be unwound by displaying. kp’ mf́_ as f’b¡´ _  2. . those brief inventories which summarize in a mere few lines twenty centuries’ worth of the his- tory of philosophy. the continuous movement of a metamorphosis and migration of thought. of the way differ- ent philosophers “interpret” essence as “beingness” but without thereby changing its sense: Oriented by this mindfulness. as guid- ing threads for the questions of beingness:  1.”36 Such “guiding threads. as they appear within the history of the guiding question. the “condition of possibility” in Kant. in Contributions. the dialectical-absolute idealistic concept of essence in Hegel. The Metabolism of the Immutable 49 lists of the metamorphoses and migrations of meta- physics. which is the exposition.” through following closely a certain understanding of essence. the transcendental concept of essence 6. kp’ mf́_ in the Aristotelian discussion in Metaphysics MNO 3.34 In reading these. on the same sidewalk.

As Heidegger asks.50 The Heidegger Change THE OTHER QUESTION The other vision opened up by Heidegger nonetheless and at the same time allows these transformations of the same to be considered otherwise than as simple additions to it. for instance. does not complete Parmenides’ thought in bringing out €  *   `  He actually changes the question. “does Aristotle deny  €. Aristotle.

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       this truth in becoming a truly philosophical truth. . an actual question. Those who believe that Aristotle merely added other meanings onto a meaning of being are clinging to appearances. It is a matter not just of embellishment but of a trans- formation of the entire question [eine Verwandlung der ganzen Frage]: the question about o‘ ’i as ¡‘’i *>   . . . that is.

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it is a radical change of Dasein [Grundstürrzender Wandel des Daseins]. Heidegger states that “this reversal of the meanings [Umkehrung der Bedeutungen] of the words subjectum and objectum is no mere affair of usage. i. the evil. But the sense of being thereby had to shift [so mußte sich der Sinn des Seins wandeln].”38 . .   > šdas Nicht-seiende]. the false.e. . Plato attained the insight that nonbeing [Unseinde]. a history which always concerns the openness [Offenbarkeit] of being—or nothing at all. .”37 And apropos Descartes and the change of mean- ing (Bedeutungswandel) the concepts of subject and object are forced to undergo with him. It is a stretch of the way of history [Geschichte] necessarily hidden from the naked eye. the transi- tory—hence unbeing—also is. the illumination [Lichtung] of the being of what is on the basis of the mathematical.

it is: changing. in truth. the essence of truth. the concept of being. consent to be apprehended only as a reformation or reformulation of one same form or a reversal of course that stays the (same) course. moreover. it is paradoxically deployed as what. when it is surpassed. as I asserted at the outset.”39 Metaphysics truly has exhausted these forms and trails. and make it the articulation of beings themselves. Hei- degger. but in so doing. are questions that cannot be asked by and through metaphysics. In each one. essence essential- izes—immobilizes some more—its immutability. and the manner of standard giving determine in advance a fundamental metaphysical position. since it is also a rupture and radical overturning of this logic of reorganization itself. says so overtly: “Why and to what extent the selfhood of man. Which means:  . It “is completed [vollendet]. The Metabolism of the Immutable 51 Each epoch of metaphysics cannot. Each epoch is at once the main- tenance of a roadblock and a way through opened by its being run. sustain metaphysics as such. therefore. This double vision shows that it is only possible to account for the structure of metaphysics.

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So would it. even be possible to envisage metaphysics as a form without remaining prisoner to this same form? Not unless taking account of the metamorphic and migratory structure of metaphysics liberates both formal resources that no longer belong to the . *  power.’ ”41 and would seem for that reason to be meaningful only from within the limits of metaphys- ics. in that case.

one capable of carrying out. You now see. & V functions as a historical interchange.52 The Heidegger Change hylemorphic heritage and other. metabolic resources not coming from its sole qkl_´ . Such a nonmetaphysi- cal surplus of form and migration would alone allow metaphysics to be envisaged as a form and migration. I think. in the shadows and unostentatiously—the same words. always—the conversion of two guises of        0       . W. how the triad of W.

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The fact that this turnaround does take place. and what gets grounded through the change of the essence of truth [was durch diesen Wandel des Wesens der Warheit begründet wird]—all of . what it consists in. 2 The Mound of Visions* Plato Averts His Gaze What remains unsaid [was ungesagt bleibt] in Plato’s thinking is a turnaround [Wendung] in what determines the essence of truth.

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to the fantastic point where “a change takes place [ein Wandel ereignet]. where it lets itself be seen. *  appear together. Come to the place where being juts up in its structure. in a startling contemporaneousness. let me take you to this peak. remember this: what I call the fantastic is the visibility of being granted by the latter’s molting. this rise in the exposition. Come with me to the mound of visions.” 2 As we go. Come. *La Butte aux Visions †‚#‡   .

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.54 The Heidegger Change the visibility of the molt of being through which being is revealed to be nothing—but its mutability. . “The change [Wandel] is brought about in the determination of the being of beings as .”3 We will enter the movement of the “turnaround” of truth. which leads  . f’b¡´ _. Come with me to the mound of (ex)change.

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Thomas Aquinas’s thesis holds good: veritae proprie invenitur in intellectu humano vel divino (Quaestiones de Veritate. .*        remarks that “the essence of truth as the correct- ness of both representation and assertion becomes normative for the whole of Western thinking. quaestio I. . articulus 4. For medieval Scholasticism. . responsio‡X›<.

”33 This idiomatic (ex)change is not a structural overturning. $        .’ The intellect is where truth has its essential locus. @@* in the human or in the divine intellect. In this text truth is no longer _’ hd́e¡f_ but k̀+kf́tmfn (adaequa- tio).

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& V enables Heidegger to express the contemporaneousness of the arising of what changes and the very movement of its change. neither man nor god and not even _’ hd́e¡f_ exist prior to their change. And it is just . of the pure possibility (or phantasm) of the mutation of unveiledness. above all not (ex)change. the coincidence. from the fact that nothing precedes it. Only through the veil of a mutation can there be a reading of pure unveiledness. of exchangeability and the event (Ereignis) of exchange. The enigma of change stems from its origi- narity. The change invents what it changes. > >   understanding that neither being nor beings. that is. The triad of W. W.

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When Bildung >       @@  *  . Heidegger settles his gaze upon the locus of this fantastic correspondence between the metabolism of Bildung and the histori- cal transformation that it makes appear without the latter realizing it. *  change from which it proceeds.

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which reverses the former’s course.” In the note appended to the lecture On the Essence of Truth.  @   `>the other change. The expression “essence of truth” gets its meaning from its inversion (what is also sometimes called its Kehre): “the truth of essence. Heidegger makes this celebrated declaration: “The question of the essence of truth arises from the question of the truth of essence [Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Wahrheit entspringt aus der Frage nach der Wahrheit des Wesen].”43 Hence the gaze that discerns “the change in the essence of truth” in the Platonic gesture is  ` @    .

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”45 Heidegger presents this last change as a transformation of thinking (the “indication of an essential connection between truth as correctness and freedom uproots these preconceptions. a transformation of the relation to being (“the course of the [new] questioning   * .  *Œˆ   freedom. granted of course that we are prepared for a transformation [Wandlung] of thinking”46).

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in a word and last. and. experiences and tests itself as a transformation of its relatedness to being”47). as a “metamor- phosis [Einverwandlung• ` .   ` furnishing representations and concepts.

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    three words having no particular (neither inaugural nor terminal) historical status? The fantastic. and the wholly other scene—and the historical . as I said before. is ever playing upon two different pictures—the picture of metaphys- ics.

& V. the great historical turning . In entrusting these three words that have no particular destiny (W. and therefore do not form an essen- tial link in the conceptual chain of the tradition) with the task of bringing into language.68 The Heidegger Change and philosophical neutrality of the triad is just what enables these two pictures to be converted into each other. once more. are not philosophemes. W. in the least inad- equate fashion possible.

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is the spatial and temporal location of the point of col- lision between philosophy and what it is not. with images of these extra. The enigma of his- tory. in the double sense of Historie and Geschichte. Heidegger points toward the conceptually and historically depatriated place of the point of con- vertibility between metaphysics and its other. This point. W. the moment of the exchange takes place. between metaphysics and its destruction. can only be invested with phantasms. W.or hypo-historical processes. in both the light and the shadows of the philosophical imaginary. where the metamorphosis of metamor- phosis or migration of migration is achieved. the event of the exchange of the inaugural  +  . & V inscribe in Heidegger’s text the possibility of a fantastic mar- gin where. (ex)change.

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its essence) but also from the ultrameta- physical arrangement (Einrichtung) of the image of this image as well. that is. An exchange of visions. . then. The fantastic of the visibility of being. an exchange of mutations.     other beginning. What is fantastic is the >   metaphysi- cal and nonmetaphysical visibility of being. stems not only from the metaphysical production of its image (of.

W. The Mound of Visions 69 W. & V: RELIEF TO THE HISTORICAL Conceiving the change that arose in the essence of truth as both the movement and result of a histori- cal decision will illumine nothing so long as we do   €.

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it is almost impossible to pass over without comment another basic declaration of . q49 Moreover.

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\ ’  . Without the seeming philosophical grisaille of the triad. historicity would have to call for help. qua ontico- ontological convertor. Without the formula and its relief. the historical would go without relief. which.70 The Heidegger Change metaphor it merely seems to be. alone allows for imagining what something like a historical change could be.

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The Einbildung.52 $ >      . . do not forget. . remember.”51 The triad of change is precisely the imaginary dimension of the historical. and one of the great motifs in Heidegger’s thought. “are imaginings in a distinctive sense: not mere fancies and illusions but imaginings that are visible inclusions of the alien in the familiar [als erblickbare Einschlüsse des Fremden in den Anblick der Vertrauen]. is creative within the ontological order. Genuine images.  indeed .

But was it ever so in his? What I am calling fantastic is precisely what can- not be seen through Heidegger’s eyes. .    of them all.

one prior to money. nor mythic prior of the prior where everything seems (ex)changed. First Incision* Geltung We have arrived before the astonishing economy of an exchange before exchange and prior to all economy. price. to commerce. even. Where everything that comes comes about only to be exchanged. and sex—prior. passing into the strange vestibule that is                  . nor classic. Heideggerian philosophy unceasingly transports us back to this neither archaic.

the difference between being and beings. as its structural sibling. The fantastic: the locus of originary (ex)change can only be invested with images. but fantastic.  Neither archaic nor classic nor even mythic. The concept falls forever short of it. properly speaking. Such would be the image of this originary tendency toward convertibility necessarily accompanying. Because on the one hand. the com- mencement of metaphysics—the setting into form and   .

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on the other. picture. $   . But also because. essence. face. the retrospective apprehension of this investment exceeds and breaches the concep- tuality and metamorphic and migratory resources of metaphysics.  vesting of the image as the inaugural event of being (exchanged): idea. a posthumous image that can only touch up the colors of a picture of their birth. It no longer belongs to them since it is possible only in the place of their disappearance.

scenically possible for thought.0                themselves only imaginable. whose difference is always at the same time mysteriously shrouded by the nondifferentiation and gray neutrality of the names of its mobility and pulsing. always comes down to having one’s gaze perturbed by two changes. When convertibility is econo- mized differently. at the moment when metaphysics itself is exchanged for its other. Reading Heidegger. Wandlung. and ¢€ †~~£¢‡ As if it was up to the reader to illumine. in every instance. in the glow of the triad’s own imaginary  3 . then. which are always. Wandel.

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which is continually agitated by a double metamorphic and migratory wave that makes the apparent wisdom and gleam of the differentiating of difference tremble. to you and me. and introduce distinctions into it.- cation of this bloc. On account of the latter alone do we retrospectively understand that . archiprecious. As if it was up to us. and archisexual. always after: such is the rhythm marking the time of our sojourn with Heidegger. to cross through this space of the two exchanges. archisocial. yet it could not be made out until the end of metaphysics. to navigate visually. The exchange of essences is archimonetary. then. Always before.

5  . a gender. to other metamorphoses and other migrations. First Incision: Geltung 73 transformation is what makes identity. bodies. or a currency exists only by virtue of its trans- formability. that a body. and genders. our objects of thought—all things promised. the merchandise we buy and sell. and convertibility. And we so much better understand that this retrospective gaze is relieved by a prospective gaze that is freed by the former and directed at our essences. quite obviously. exchangeability.

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it too. It must be repeated: what Heidegger thinks under the heading of ontology is the structure of transformation alone. this locus has got to and will change.  than the taking place of every ontic exchange. indeed. Being is nothing but (its) transformability. without and beyond value. In its turn. in other words. sacred—all these being clichés ascribed today to alterity. its value for exchange—its exchange value. escapes (ex) change or convertibility. or. 6     . It has. this is not because it would itself be priceless or outside price. for Heidegger. Nothing.

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This forgetting has for its name “of value for. to apply. to pass for. $         "    + . . gelten als: to pass for. gelten für: to be of value for. to have the value of . q Keep the following in mind: gelten: to be valid. worth. To be of value for.q4 What difference owes to change is its forgetting. The verb gelten and the substantive Geltung—validity. in force and effective. currency—are of considerable importance in Heidegger’s texts. .

A fundamental complicity. capitalism—is a system of generalized equivalence ruled by Geltung. links Geltung to Wert (value) in Heidegger: Œ< . moreover.

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First Incision: Geltung 75 essence of truth as the correctness of the represen-    .

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at departure. according to me. meaning in the cave.šdas Aufgehen der Rechnung mit dem Seienden gilt als die Erklärung seines Seins•q6 The question raised by the end of metaphysics is that of its coincidence with the end of (ontological) capitalism. being. The end of the one is no more datable. a rush of presence to the door . or effective than the end of the other. Do the other change and exchange remain to come? Will they ever arrive? Faced with these abyssal questions. it will also go by the very name of what it overturns. The revolution will declare W. This is. Is the rev- elation of the ontologically transformable character of everything ancient history or does it instead come from the future? The answer. locatable. W. and truth. W. We have seen how vague instances were at the beginning. the point of suture and rupture. & V. Its event will remain indeterminate. as we have seen. & V. which unceasingly displaces. men. what explains Heidegger’s recourse to the triad of change. offered up to the exchange through which they received their determi- nations as beings. the divine. Heidegger replies. we are left only with the enigma of our transformations. is both: W. But given that. There is.

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so grave and onerous. Which means that from the dawn of the West.” Whoever.                  alliance. whoever announces himself by declaring “I am” has always in reality been saying. the passage into the convertor. All this is so heavy. And this is the   . “I am originally changed.

.  %              5   what I am. from the very outset. Nothing and nobody ever comes or ever will without being changed. exchanged. (ex)changed in advance. without being.

Their Eidos. where another pathway takes shape. where one last look at metaphysics gets exchanged for a     ` . —Nietzsche. Being— This Is What Changes”* “Better to remain in debt than to pay with a coin that does not bear our image” says our sovereignty. Presencing. and the bulge of a turnaround rises in the middle of the road. the Very Look of Things. 3 “Color. We are headed to the place where Nietzsche and Heidegger meet. The Gay Science §252 I will now lead you to the critical point where the other form slightly surfaces from form.

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1 Heidegger nonetheless judges the migratory and metamorphic power of Nietzsche’s thought to be incor- rectly located (erörtet . On the Third Shedding Already cracks and breaks my skin.    into the scene of philosophy. My appetite unslaking Is fueled by earth I’ve taken in: This snake for earth is aching.

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 unquestioned. Nietzsche does not in fact inquire into which of the essential changes the serpent is born from and thereby omits the “changing” (wandelbar)                 .

“Nietzsche does not pose the ques- tion of truth proper. the question concerning the essence of the true and the truth of essence.”2 5       . and with it the question of the ineluctable possibility of its essential transformation [ihres Wesenswandel].- sophical mutation.

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& V over all the movements or “countermovements” (Gegenbewe- gungen).    reason superimpose the triad of W. W.

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Although the triad is more vague in appearance than the Nietzschean determinations of    .     the instances of metamorphosis and migration present in Nietzsche’s texts.

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. This Is What Changes” 79 What does “retake” mean here? This retaking. should be understood as the result of the strange     . “. which constitutes for Heidegger the veritable meta- morphic and migratory force of Nieztsche’s thought. .

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without which it would remain teetering and unstable. $ . . is a reinstallation. .  its own traces. a reestablishment of the tradition. of somehow coming back upon itself so as to “go beyond . therefore.”4 This retake. the complete determina- tion of its whole nature.

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Because of this repeating that traces and reforms— a repeating itself repeated in its reinterpretation by Heidegger—being is made to appear as it is: changed   . Such reinvestment of self as change of self constitutes for Heidegger one of the most profound motifs of the doctrine of eternal return.

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     original gaze (Plato’s) and the ultrametaphysical gaze (Heidegger’s) to converge. In Nietzsche’s thought.”5 and “all the themes of Western thought. The terminal image of metaphysics Nietzsche creates is the condition of the “inclusion of the uncanny in the familiar” that we previously encountered. the beginning reappears “in a metamorphosed form [in verwandelter Gestalt]. fatefully gather together [alle Motive des abendlän- . though all of them transmuted.

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80 The Heidegger Change as designating this regime of the visibility of being         .

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So that throughout the four volumes of Nietzsche. inversion (Umdrehung). Inversion as well as transvaluation in general are for him only effects of a more profound. “We are now ask- ing what new interpretation and ordering of the sen- sible and nonsensible results from the overturning of Platonism [Umdrehung des Platonismus]? To what extent is ‘the sensible’ the genuine ‘reality’? What transformation accompanies the inversion? [welche Verwandlung geht mit der Umdrehung zusammen?] What metamorphosis underlies it? [welche Verwand- lung leigt der Umdrehung zugrund?]”7 If Nietzsche’s thought is in Heidegger’s eyes the most powerful thinking of change in the history of phi- losophy.     †Verklärung). this is primarily because this change always . radical.              exposure of its skin. X X ^ _ or the Real Foundation of Inversion WHAT HEIDEGGER SEES The play of gazes between Nietzsche and Heidegger is no less disturbing than the one we saw deep in the cavern. reversal (Umkeh- rung). and originary metabolic dynamism. transmutation. This disturbance is born from Heidegger’s unceas- ing denial of the importance of the motif of inversion (Umdrehung) to Nietzschean thought. and countermovement (Gegenbewegung) are constantly referred to the triad of change—X X ^ _—which is alone capable of leading back to their foundation. transvaluation (Umwertung).

Heidegger’s interpretive strategy consists in unceasingly exhibiting the alterity of change to itself and. this is. “. the alterity of Nietzsche to himself.”8 He is not seeking to renew the content of the “old schema of hierarchy [Ordnungschema]” but to metamorphose (verwandeln) the value of this schema itself. to confuse it with its own metamorphosis. Heidegger states of “overturning” [Umdrehung] that “to be sure. but in order. but not at all to make manifest some “contradiction” in his thought. the veritable reason for the Umdrehung. The metamorphosis of schematism: for Heidegger. . . This is a point on which I will have to insist: schematism will henceforth. This Is What Changes” 81 concerns something else besides what it changes and thus resides elsewhere than in its abode. with Nietzsche. no longer simply be a mechanism permitting the becoming-      ` >    >*. . although he is aiming at something else [etwas anderes sucht]. . . in the last instance. on the contrary. Nietzsche himself often expresses the state of affairs that way . by way of conse- quence.

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> –  itself. The “philosopher-artist” puts to the proof the muta- bility of transcendental mechanisms and in the same >    @ *  . With Nietzsche. schematism itself appears in its schemes.

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“characterizes Nietzsche’s thought as Heraclitean . “One often.” he writes. ` € Heraclitus and Nietzsche.

” “everything is change”—is Heraclitus’ master phrase. as is known.82 The Heidegger Change and in citing this name dissimulates [vorgeben] hav- ing thought something. to accept that /_´io_ /’ ¡f—“everything melts away. the source of the motif of change is paradoxically enough not   `  .”9 Heidegger refuses. In Heraclitus as well as Nietzsche.

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and to come—is the power of the essence of truth. in the thought that truth is illusion. at present. . nor is Heraclitus a Nietzsche for the age of pre-Platonic philosophy. In it. what ‘is. . The fundamental question of change has its origin not in the thought of becoming but in that of the image. beings as such show themselves.’ what is still hap- pening in Western history—hitherto. In contrast. As Heidegger declares: “neither is Nietzsche the Heraclitus of the waning nineteenth century.  <   becoming strangely enough appears to be a concept devoid of future. What is and what occurs consist in the strange [Befremdliches] fact that at the beginning of the consummation of > . In particular. .

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”10 Illusion of course has “image” as one of its pri- mary meanings. Heidegger has no  . It is this understanding which imposes the distinctions between both the stable and the changing and the immutable and the moving. which call into question the relation between the true and apparent worlds. Once again. via the image and the imagination.     ‘   decisively their dominion is established. Nietzsche’s thinking of change draws its resources from a singular under- standing of both schema and schematization.

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what is true is held fast. aspect. to guard the sight [Anblick] as the ‘view’ [Ansicht] that something prof- fers. what is true is the in-formed image [die ein-gebildete Bild]. the ‘image. In knowing. the image. idea. Heidegger says. what shows itself. the word thought now in a Greek way.”11 *>@  .’ not epistemologically in the modern sense. knowing means to take hold of what shows itself. that “[f]or Heraclitus. is taken up and into possession. . and form.’ in the designated sense of q_io_mf́_ [phantasia]. since this is already the case in Heraclitus’s thought. “. not ‘psychologically. . Truth is imaging [Wahrheit ist Ein- bildung]. in effect. This Is What Changes” 83 essence as image.

to appear.”14 The image is the (true) subject of change. forms that show themselves. Heidegger recalls. bringing into image and  p’ mfn—growth. presencing and birth are thought as appearances in the image.”13 Illusion. watching over / holding fast to a view [bkg¡´kio_ a_´l k’ bkgf+t́o_okn afit́mg¡f. and shows itself. Indeed. “does not consist in what is fabricated. “to show itself. means “what shows itself.” Heidegger contin- ues.  @ `` ># of Heraclitus—“for having views / is also / the know- ing of the most highly regarded one. from the dawn of philosophy. Originally. qphh_´ mm¡f]”12—with fragment 602 of “The Will to Power”: “the honoring of truth is already the consequence of an illusion [Illusion]. 6kg¡´kio_. qua image. is also something that shows. blooming—are one and the same thing. like a copied imitation [das Bildhafte besteht nicht im Zurech-     . “What is image-like.” and bkg¡fi.

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”15 <. understood as ‘coming to presence’ [in die Anwesenheit tretten]. q_io_mf́_.]. The Greek sense of ‘image’—if we may use that word at all—is a ‘coming to the fore’ [zum Vorschein-kommen].

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  @  ` the break opening to the other thought. the one accomplishing the history of metaphysics as the history of the idea. the image in that case not being related to any essential perma- nence. who appears in it as both the last philosopher. and the   . Hence the avowed ambivalence of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche.

according to Heidegger. ' . in the main line of the meta- physical interpretation of truth as correctness and ` . On the one hand. of the metamorphosis and migration. that is. Nietzsche can be situated. of the image.

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In antiquity. ‘Image’ means: .’ ‘image’ is different not only in regard to content and name but also with regard to essence. in the Middle Ages. in the modern ‘period. the West- ern concept of the image changes accord- ingly [verwandelt sich].   ‘     “reformulation” (Umformung) of it: With the transformations [Abwandlungen] of the Greek concept of being in the course of the history of metaphysics.

. . This Is What Changes” 85 1.  { @    ‘* šVorstellender Gegenstand]. “.  # `  š  *  • * @- dence within the order of creation [Ver- weidendes Entsprechen innerhalb der Schöpfungsordnung].16 ¡– *. coming to presence [Hervortreten in die Anwesenheit].

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Hence. 6   5   . it is possible to say that with Nietzsche. the poetizing essence of reason appears in its imaginal issue.”19 And Nietzsche will carry this freedom to its highest expression. to resume with these two movements. in such a way that it grants itself the law of its essence.86 The Heidegger Change profound sense that Kant understood its essence—is in itself poetizing [Dichten]: the groundless grounding of a ground.

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”20 Heidegger insists on the astonishing proximity of the will and Aristotelian +¡o_`khd́. will is the very structure of change and because of this shares something (of the) essential with organic metabolism: its “vascular changes. and secretion”—its “changes in the body. alterations in skin tone. he . temperature. in Nietzsche.

are con- ‘.88 The Heidegger Change writes. . . “basic determinations of being .

What Heidegger discerns in the will to power is a device for self-transformation lacking     *  `>~   ‘ . Will is only the (ex)change it wills. or rather because it is wanted in them. beings. Not through the play of some intention. this is because they want it.”21 If there is change. it is because the will wants it—simply. *`>†gf́idmfn. If men. God. and even being are exchanged in the inaugural cavern. if they acquire their essence through exchange. +¡o_`khd́). naturally. but through the originary movement of a self-desire of desire which hurls and catches itself midair.

”22 _ ¡– *.  change of self. this exchanging of the self for nothing. “Self-assertion is original assertion of essence [Selb- stbehauptung ist ursprüngliche Wesenbehauptung].

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which is to say prior to (ex)change.  `  * changing of essence itself. absorbing and transforming [metamorphosing] him into and along with itself [der Wille den Wollenden gerade auffängt und in sich mit hereinnimmt und verwandelt]. }  ‘      šBestehende].”23 Willing is not given before what it wills.” yet “ ‘oneself’ is never meant as what is at hand [Vorhandene]. ‘oneself’ means €. but goes way beyond itself [ein Über-sich-hinweg]. The very present of what is exchanged is carried off into its future: “willing is to want oneself [sich-Selbst-wollen]. If the will is the “revelation of essence which unfolds of itself. in such surpassing itself [sich-Überholen] the will cap- tures the one who wills.” it is in the sense that it metamorphoses and displaces essence: “Willing proper does not go away from itself [ein Von-sich-weg].

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but the will is €.”24 What wants itself in willing. then.   ist]. is always essence.

So insofar as essence is in Nietzsche changing through the self-casting of willing. Nietzsche calls this play of essence with itself creation. Willing comes down to creating essence.       `  * through casting the latter far from itself. which he would otherwise like to keep completely settled in itself. it is possible to consider the philosopher as having come very close to the truth of essence. which is to say at once .

What is decisive is not production in the sense of manufac- turing but taking up [hinaufbringen] and transforming [metamorphosing: verwandeln]. . . in man. new: “will to power is something creative. making something other than [dieses Anders als] .e. The philosopher is only an artist “in that he gives form [Gestalten] to beings as a whole [indem er am Seienden im Ganzen gestaltet]. Whether a man can remove himself far .”25 The unity of destruction and creation within the will’s metamorphic and migratory throwing allows us to understand why art is for Nietzsche the fundamental structure of the will to power. is deployed and transformed in Nietzsche in such a way that art must be understood as the possibility of creating beings in their entirety. Higher concept of art. . This power. which has been disclosed from Kant onward in the transcendental imagination. i. The will is effectively the power of ontological creation. beginning there where they reveal them- selves. . It is with this thought in mind that we are to read number 795 of The Will to Power: “The artist-philosopher. .  and destroying it until it becomes radically other. other in an essen- tial way [und zwar im Wesentlichen anders].

The Inclusion of the Thinker in What Is Thought ANOTHER FIGURE Heidegger shows that the metabolic structure of the will to power presiding over this creation brings into play a concept of form at once both traditional and unprecedented. in order to give them form [um an ihnen zu gestalten]. On the one hand.’ Although     . in an aside as ‘giving itself up. . “Nietzsche explains such becoming-form [das Form-werden] .’ ‘making itself public.”26 Ontological determination as the result of a cre- ation: this is the Nietzschean version of change and exchange. .90 The Heidegger Change enough from other men.

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¡fbkn.” Heidegger continues.”28 On the other hand. and achieves pure radiance. scintillates. so that it stands in itself: its *  š Xdie Gestalt].   corresponds to the original concept of form as it devel- ops with the Greeks. through which and in which it emerges. “form” is not only the form   . It is the enclosing limit and boundary. stations itself there as publicly present. “corresponds to the Greek +klqd́. what brings and stations a being into that which it is.”27 “Forma. Whatever stands in this way is what the particular being shows itself to be. its outward appearance.

but the .  the aspect of such and such a being.

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as I said before. “. . . This Is What Changes” 91 ability or transformability of form that enters presence.”29 The crevice that opens between essence and its fashioning in the orbit of the will to power allows the ontological anteriority of fashioning over essence to come into view. The schema’s coming to presence in what it schematizes entails. immediately the form of the work” but is primarily the result of a process of schematization which constitutes its “inherent ten- sion. . “The essence of form is not . . So that it is schematization itself that shows itself. the thinker   . the mutability of the schematism itself. At the same time.

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wills himself into his will. “That the one who wills. than with the inclusion of her image in her thought.”31 THE PHYSIOGNOMY OF ZARATHUSTRA Willed. means that such willing itself. and exchanged. and in unity with it he who wills and what is willed. exchangeable. becomes manifest [sich offenbar werden] in the willing. essence shows itself to be what it is: a \¡– *.

the thinker can . Henceforth. concludes by stripping essence of its character of generality. The power of repetition inherent to metaphysics. which leads it to go back through its own traces.   name: Zarathustra.

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”38 The eternal  .  of the old man and that of “another man [anderer Mensch]”36 or a “transformed man [gerwandelter Mensch].”37 Indeed. “the thinking of this thought [eternal recurrence] transforms [metamorphoses/ verwandelt] life in its very grounds and thereby pro- pounds new standards of education.

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who unceasingly makes volte-faces. and the serpent. He lives always in the heights. who endlessly changes his masks. Even when he plunges into the depths. *    @   €. This dual unity is symbolized by Zarathustra’s two animals: the eagle. “The eagle is the proudest animal. these are depths among mountain heights. and for them.* and migratory unity of the other change.

holds itself in      `  >   Š}  its own pitfalls [Schlinge]. Discernment does not betray itself. Discernment suggests the mastery of actual knowledge concerning the sundry ways in which knowing announces itself.”39 The migration is announced in Zarathustra’s descent. Proper to such discernment are the power to metamorphose and disguise oneself [zu dieser Klugheit gehört die Kraft der Verstellung und Verwandlung]—a power that cannot be reduced to vulgar falsehood [niedrige Falschheit]—and the mastery of masks [die Herrschaft über die Maske]. The serpent is the most discerning animal [das klügste Tier]. it wields power over the play of being and semblance.    Š    equalized. It haunts the background while playing in the foreground. “Downgoing [Untergang•q ` >  Œ>  €.

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become merely one form among others.” does “a thinking become necessary that represents Zara- thustra as Gestalt [das Zarathoustra als Gestalt vor- stellt]”?42 “[T]he essential Gestalt of Zarathustra within the metaphysics of the will to power. within modern metaphysics. is very well the human form become particular.” he continues. from this coming to presence of the schema. and hence a change of the form of metaphysics..43 Why has humanity *>    ` in this fashion? What necessity is there to this speculation. What follows from this inclusion of the thinker in what is thought. “In what way. is in effect a transformation of transcendence. this “appearing of the ‘* ‘* ` .” Heidegger asks in “On the Question of Being.

 subjectum?”44 The answer is as follows: when the human form is represented in a particular physiognomy.”45 and “the inner form of metaphysics becomes transformed [demzufolge wandelt sich die innere Form der Metaphysik]. “transcen- dence is transformed [sich wandelt]. .”46 Hei- degger explains: “the meta-physical in metaphysics— transcendence—comes to be transformed whenever.

. The kind of descent via the Gestalt [Rückstieg durch die Gestalt] occurs in such a way that the presence of the latter represents itself. Transcendence. understood in its multiple meanings. This Is What Changes” 95 within the realm of these distinctions. turns around [kehrt sich um] into a corresponding rescendance [Reszendenz] and disappears therein. “. . the Gestalt of the human essence appears as the source that gives meaning [die Gestalt des Menschenwesens als Quelle der Sinngeburg].”47 The integration of the thinker in the thought becomes visible and thinkable from the moment the        . becomes present again in what is shaped by its shaping [im Geprägten ihrer Prägung wieder anwesend wird].

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96 The Heidegger Change precisely the phenomenon of the achievement of meta- physics (“rescendance” imaging in some fashion “tran- scendence”): a continually growing “anthropologization” of the being of beings.”49 The history of metaphysics in its whole entirety ends in . which is analyzed without respite in the second (German or French) volume of Nietzsche   ` > that “metaphysics as such is nihilism proper. an increasingly pronounced “humanization” of beings.”48 This humanization.

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5 .` * * of “the self-fashioning [Selbstprägung] of man.” which aims at “absolutely empower[ing] the essence of power for dominion over the earth. change being neither our doing nor our work.”50 It is at the same time possible—now the second possibility—for a skin to grow back that would not be that of “man” and that would allow for seeing that “being is no fabrication [ein Gemächte] of human beings and humanity no mere special case among beings.”51 It is possible that transformation and ontological transformability ever remain unmaster- able and authorless.

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you say. We have so far explored together the economy of both the initial and termi-   >>  ` . while it does change [verwandelt] the direction of their motion [indes verwandelt es ihre Bewegungsrichtung]. but without ever truly clari- fying what all this means. of migration. thus creating for whatever force is available new laws of motion [neue Bewegungsgesetztze der ver- fügbaren Kraft].1 Who could tell what the difference is between a structural. and the migratory structure of metaphysics. metamorphosis. differential opposition and an imagi- nary archetype whose role is to differentiate itself?2 You protest. I’ve been speaking the whole time. 4 Outline of a Cineplastic of Being A burden creates no new forces.

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Yet it is true that I have not asked which kinetic and metabolic regimes govern metamorphosis and migration. indicated the 99 . turning into. and self-displacement. we do not yet know exactly what Heidegger means by transformation. self-trans- formation. We also. W. In fact. moreover. mutation. `> >  >'  >@ to make apparent the fundamental importance of W. & V. displacement.

100 The Heidegger Change possibility of a bond between the historical and bio- logical. that he Š* . . but without specifying its stakes. It must not be forgotten that Heidegger never explains his constant use of the triad . .

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imprinted onto metamorphosis its fantastic character.  q4 And that he never turns toward the great tradition that. whose Metamorphosis (Die Werwandlung) he doubtlessly never read. Or that he just ignores Kafka.5 ¡. And that he made no allu- sions to Goethe’s Metamorphosis of Plants. from Ovid to Apuleius.

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then it is up to me.   € out explicitly the possibility of originary transformation and displacement. Yet if it is true that every great thinking of change leaves to its reader the care of mobilizing as she understands it the space of mean- ing it unfolds before her. so as  ** .

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I am now undertaking. with both it and you. moreover. ~. drawing on all my poetico-rational powers. the core of the experiment which. Outline of a Cineplastic of Being 101 tutes.

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or .  @`* lends itself to the description of forms in movement.

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precisely allows for an interrogation of the plastic value of dis- placement $ ` *  $ *   `>'Form or Gestalt'  €  `.Œ*@ *q*    about a displacement of plastic processes.

` @ .

€  or peregrination. is creative of forms. insofar as it crosses thresholds. & V     *'   †}‡*. since W. The problem is that for Heidegger. this migratory and metamorphic solidarity doubles. W. every course. Inversely.

'the continu- ous passage from one form and loop of the path to another '.

 †}‡*.

on the one hand. There are then two cineplastics at the core of the Heideggerian cineplastic. This duality has been our problem from the start. 'a dislocation of this very continuity. the long moving sidewalk of metamorphoses and migrations . Heidegger winds forward.

interruptions that are themselves metamorphoses and migrations of another time and type. and reveals. irreparable interruptions originally disturb- ing this series. How can these two regimes of change coexist? This is what we now have to envisage.102 The Heidegger Change in(to) the identical. on the other. the multiple. From One Change to the Other: Persistence of Form and Trajectory The question has not ceased haunting us this whole >X~.

.

the metamorphic and the migratory retain their primacy in determining the meaning of change. and the ultrametaphysical gaze (Heidegger) to fantastically converge in the very place of their divergence? One thing is sure: from metaphysics to the other thought. From the succession of epochs up to the upsetting of the very idea of the epoch or epochal-  *. its terminal gaze (Nietzsche).and extra-metaphysical change? How is it pos- sible for the inaugural gaze of metaphysics (Plato). >€ 'W. & V'   intra. W.

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 form and direction. then. the same meaning. The triad is therefore not reserved for the struc- tural and historical description of metaphysics alone. as one goes from the one (ex)change to the other. one can only be struck. in reading . On the contrary. The entire problem. is to know if changing form and changing direction have.

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q  .

for example. the triad is constantly resorted to. metamorphic and migratory. In Contribu- tions. . the frequency of its occurrence and the fact that W. & V continue to shelter the double. articulation of change. W.

the mobil-  @* *  Ereignis. all at once. Outline of a Cineplastic of Being 103 since it characterizes. and the new exchangeability €. the change leading from metaphysics to the other thinking.

*.

.

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   beginning [erster Anfang•q  Œ.

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  [anderer Anfang•q'Œ.

@ `>> @.

 *  ontohistorical thinking [Übergang von der Metaphysik in das seyngeschichtliche Denken•q'  @   Œ   `> šgroße Wandlung].” Heidegger *   .

 Œš•` .

 .

the greater its occurrence [umso verborgener je größer das Geschehnis]. then this preparation is concealed as a great transformation [al seine große Wandlung verborgen].      prepared. and the more hidden it is.”8 Now this change itself also consists in both a *.

 ` * '.

 €  `  @ .

 ` in the drift of a Wanderung'   *.

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      * out by the crossing [Übergang] to the other begin- ning. into which Western thinking is now entering [erst gebahnt wird].”9 <.

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”10 Heidegger ` >  . `> šandersförmig].

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 ` the crossing can only and must be a passage [Gang] in both senses of the word: a going and a way at the > >'.

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somit ein Weg.”11 <. der selbst geht].   `   šein Gehen und ein Weg zumal.

    >'     € '   some way              Dasein. <.

 Œ> >@.

at the edge of the text as         '. in effect.   ` Dasein” appears.

A mobile metamorphic decision: Π   `> >    .  place on the way.

`  .

in die Entscheidung des Da-seins und des Weg-seins . *  to be-there and be-away [der Mensch verwandelt.

104 The Heidegger Change gerückt].”12 It is on the way. en route. that the form of what has never before been shown begins to @@   @   .

  €  ` Œ.

”13 %     . > shape of sheltering beings [die aufscheinende Gestalt des bergenden Seienden].

.

A new form comes forth. the sign of  € . one that is always at the same time precisely the index of an itinerary. from beneath one that had been occluding it.

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 shapes . . . The @. but must instead carry it along with itself. if they are its metamorphosis and displacement. could migratory and metamorphic structure itself be identical within both their regimes? DESTRUCTION. Continuity and Rupture So if this form whose shape is decided along the way or this way that takes form in being decided on are wholly other than the form and path of metaphys- ics. it cannot abandon what it changes.”14 The metamorphosis of metaphysics lets another form appear at a detour in its road. change has con- tinuity as one of its essential dimensions. If change is to be creative. SAVING It is undeniable that for Heidegger. is the spur for the utmost historicity and the veiled ground for decidedness of the shortest path [in den verhülltesten Gestalten ist der Stachel höchster Geschichtlichkeit und der geheime Grund der Entschiedenheit zur kürzesten Bahn].

 @.

” Heidegger writes. Œ  `> šverwandelt] what is past into something that is not lost [das Vergangene in das Unverlorene . Œ *> šzukünftig].

16 The other thinking can-  *>    > @. Outline of a Cineplastic of Being 105 verwandelt].”15 Metamorphic displacement is never an absolute rupture. moreover.” transforming.  ’ * € ŒWandlung. Heidegger establishes.” or saving.  ŒRettung.

 *  Œ.

  [hinter sich zu lassen•q   .

” which      Œ @ . *  Œ>  accomplish its end [hinter sich zu bringen].

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   time in what is ownmost to it [erst in seinem Wesen zu fassen] and letting this be transformed and played into the truth of being [d. h.”17 It is € € . und gewandelt in die Wahrheit des Seyns einspielen zu lassen].

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18 The other .  done with it.

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”19 Z ` . *  Œ contains [einschließt] within itself the transformed [einverwandelt] guiding question.

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q      *-  Œ*   šScheidung•q  .

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In several reprises.` being [Besinnung der Wahrheit des Seyns]” is not the entirely new. Heidegger opposes *.

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Œ     ` >  >@    ›@| . With the other change. that is. with the passage from one beginning to the other.  has not. happened.

as a consequence.’ sondern in einen ganz anderen Bereich der Geschichte]. but the very metamorphosis of the concept of domain and.”21 This wholly other domain is not a new domain.  has not yet been. Heidegger even   . but it is rather that man enters a totally different domain of history [in eine noch nicht gewesene ‘Periode. of the concept of novelty as well.

 Œ.

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106 The Heidegger Change not a historical addendum to and a portending of  ›€| ›  >|   .

confounding change with the simple production of novelty comes down to believ- ing naïvely in the power of inverting or overturning a state of things. & V.”22 For Heidegger. as we saw in the pre- **. W. W. Verwandlung anstoßende Vorbereitung des anderen Anfangs].     `     transformation-initiating preparation for the other beginning [die wesentliche.

@*  Œ šUmkeh- rung].”23 The Wandlung of one commencement into .

.

*    Œ   [große Umkehrung•q  `    Œ’   .

.

”24 $    . strength for creating and questioning [eine höhere Kraft des Schaffens und Fragens]” that is inherent Œ  > q¢   `>   Œ complete transformation of relations to beings and to be-ing [völliger Wandel der Bezuge zum Seienden und zum Seyn].

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The power of a turning is in fact always measured by its power of metamorphosis (Verwand- lung) or essential transformation (Wesenwandlung. Œq †Kehre) should be rigorously distinguished from inversion (Umkehrung). should be organized according to a Œ  `>* šgewandelte Notwendigkeit].”25 Œ~. Its route. wesentliche Wandlung). far from either following the mechanical movement of a rotation  Š*@†Wendungspunkt) or being a formal reversal.

    .

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    *   *   by a saying that seems only to play with a turning around [or inversion] whereas in truth everything is transformed.”26 The coming of the other thought should. admit- Œ €   .

this . šStoß].”27 However.

Outline of a Cineplastic of Being 107 .

  €.

   Œ*>> [Gegenbewegung•q Œ *>> `- * `     `> `.

 šgenügt eine Gegen-Bewegung niemals für eine wesentliche Wandlung der Geschichte].”28 % Œ.

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*ˆ*`.

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”29 The countermovement is always caught in comparability. in Hebel: Friend of the House. sondern steht als anderes außerhalb des ‘gegen’ und der unmittelbaren Vergleichbarkeit]. So the movement of the triad of change recalls in certain respects the process of Hegelian subla- tion. that is. It is this equivalence that must be metamorphosed and displaced. Moreover. it stands outside the counter and out- side immediate comparability [der andere Anfang ist nicht die Gegenrichtung zum ersten. in the logic of the of value for. Aufhebung. Heidegger also stresses. the proximity between sublation and metamorphosis: Johann Peter Hebel’s Œ > @>   . in a sense. as the other.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel . und dadurch: verwandeln]. This type of aufheben. But this aufhe- ben in turn only receives strength and endurance by provenance of a still more originary aufheben whose >  X    '  consequently metamorphosis [hinaufheben.šaufgehoben] in the triple meaning this word carries in the thinking of one of the poet’s the great contemporaries. Aufheben  >  X** from the earth what lags. .”30 Metamorphosis €     `. veredeln. how- >  }     @*  an aufheben that means to conserve. . verklären.

.

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  holding aloftX Œ~.

   *     @* in the sense of manufacturing but taking up [das Hinaufbringen] and transforming [das Verwandeln].”31 It is only by virtue of this power of elevation and .

108 The Heidegger Change     .

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the continuist schema sees itself endlessly contradicted by the thought of an erratic displacement made of irreparable ruptures. *  be fundamentally transformed. and. both retreat movement. however. ERRING What has to be acknowledged. indecision between advance and retreat. above all. is that change at the same time dislocates its own power of sublation. roaming. and caesuras. circling. when reading Contributions for example. which designates. PASSING. One is struck. by the profusion of verbs conveying aim- less movement and displacement. retrogression. depending on the context. The verb rücken effectively >   Œ>q Œ@ . turning back around. gaps. In effect. and progression or advance. wander- ing. Attesting to this is the whole play Heidegger opens around the word Rückung.

 q Œ @ *q Œ@ >- .

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is always a wandering [errance] or Verrückung.  *   `Œ *šRücken•qŒšRückkehrt•q Œ  [Rückgang].” Heidegger discovers a type of mobility that consists of advancing in retreat or withdrawing in the advance. the latter being a neologism most often translated into English as errancy. the adjective verrückt    >  <.32 This advance that is withdrawn or detoured from what it goes toward. It should be recalled that if the verb verrücken     displaced.

  strange movement of an aimless wandering. Contributions announces . of a displacement that hesitates between coming and going. precisely corresponds to the uncoiling of the metamorphosis of Dasein.

Outline of a Cineplastic of Being 109 Π   `>  ` .

>    .

this crazed Wanderung by which man changes place and form exactly contradicts the dynamic of saving.   ` dis-placing its site among beings [eine Verwandlung des Menschseins im Sinne einer Ver-rückung seiner Stellung im Seienden]. of conti-  @}>  . erratic displacement.”33 Now this errant.

 @      replacement. In Contributions Œ.

 *.

 ` q  Œ*.

 ` q  ` *   .

improvising a replacement. and without  . other beginning appears as a swaying between two banks. a crisis concerning the proximity of the past that causes an abyssal distance to arise and puts Dasein before the necessity of working with an impro- vised replacement. Einspringen signi-    ``* leaping into the breach. and making do with what is at hand—however one can. One would have to examine patiently the entire movement of the Einspringen insofar as it is precisely opposed to that of the Aufhebung. jumping in to substitute.

   .

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.

 Now it is also in this manner that the passage to the other begin-    **>@ .

X Œ& @     .

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 ` . retrieval’) is not displacement into what has passed.

  *  >  › * |    .

.     .

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  precisely distancing [Entfernung] from it. is taking up that distance-positioning which is necessary in order to experience what began in and as that beginning.”34 In the same manner. it is by following the movement of this makeshift sublation that the metamorphosis of being (Sein) into be-ing (Seyn‡  *.

XŒ<.

.

 beginning is the leaping into be-ing’s more originary .

”35 The replacement leap   . which transforms be-ing [der andere Anfang ist der das Seyns verwandelnde Einsprung in seine ursprünglichere Warheit].110 The Heidegger Change truth.

      ` .

 Œ>  q .

 >.

 >@ '  last-minute relief. migration is not directed toward any goal. We do not migrate as migrating birds do. Heidegger tells us this in What Is Called Thinking?X Œ~. Envisaged from this point of view.

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.

It withdraws [entzieht] from .  turns away from man [das zu-denkende wendet sich von Menschen ab].

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or at all.- drawal is an event [Entzug ist Ereignis]. what withdraws may even concern and claim man more essentially than anything present that strikes and touches him. draws [zieht] us along by its very withdrawal. In fact. Once we  €. . What withdraws from us. whether or not we become aware of it immediately. . .

€.

 € € '*>@ differently than are migrating birds [nur ganz anders als die Zugvögel•' €€ €.

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• attracts us by its withdrawal. And once we. being so attracted. are drawing toward what draws us. our        .

. . To  › € € |     ›@ €  €. . we ourselves are pointers pointing toward it.  >@`› € toward.’ As we are drawing toward what withdraws.

’sagt schon: zeigend auf das Sichentziehende].  €. Heidegger. Wandlung. remains forever tribu- tary to a relation to immutable presence. indeed. Movement.  withdraws [‘Auf dem Zuge . . and Verwandlung are still even movements. .”36 We can even ask ourselves apropos this passage if Wandel.

X Œ@  Ereignis and history can never .

.

  `›>> |šniemals als Arten .

Outline of a Cineplastic of Being 111 von ‘Bewegungen’ gedacht werden] because movement (even when thought as +¡o_`khd́) always relates to the k›¨i as kp’ mf_' €.

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W. then just what do W. advance and retreat confused. and every move- ment made of false starts.”37 So if migration is not comparable to the travels ` Š*   @ *>     @  - tion. Regarding the thinking to come. & V mean? Contributions provides on this point a discon- certing response.@ bṕi_+fn and ¡’ i¡´la¡f_ and their later progeny belong. €.

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This thinking can also  `€ . `>}@*  the light of what is simple out of the gathered rich- ness of its enjoined darkness.

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”38 ¡.   throw of its thrownness and carry it into the open.

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Transformable. it . It no longer grips the ground supposed to be our identity.            before us. dashing in full stride.

112 The Heidegger Change 7.

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in getting it settled for a bit in an aspect.      consists in the fact of succeeding at provisionally catch- ing a face. The Two Turns (of Phrase) of the Heideggerian Cineplastic But how. once again. ought we understand the two essential modalities of the articulation of the migra-   > >@.

*'` the replacement'  .

think of anything but the architecture of Ovid’s Metamorphoses. Moreover. in considering the history of metaphysics as Heidegger describes it. the Heideggerian determina- tion of metamorphosis and migration incontestably presupposes a continuity of forms and a contiguity of thresholds. of which. see the form that changes us? We will pause more patiently over the regime of mobility proper to the two changes. interior of each change? How can we at the same time change form and chase after form. then. THE POEM AND BIOLOGY IN SERVICE TO THE ONTOLOGICAL FANTASTIC \¢$ƒ| %%  On the one hand. how can one. however. he never speaks? These Metamorphoses'Œ*.

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@ € forms”39'  @  .

a god. or a demigod exchanges its essence for that of an animal @ †.  passages from one form to another and voyages from one end to the other of one and the same form. A man.

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40 Either animated beings . text is the nymph Daphne’s).

Outline of a Cineplastic of Being 113   .

 `> `  >   '    *>  a mountain. constella- *. a goddess becomes a spring.

41 These passages. always take place in the course of a displacement   `  Š.'*  >  *> to life. which seem so extraordinary to us. as with Pygmalion’s statue.

the slow putting in place of its motor schemes. circle around it. the growing within a body of another body. Every character must go the full length of this trial. with its different rhythms. and €*. experimenting with each degree. its suffering its own pushing out. pre- cisely. or voyage in the air.42 This solidarity between advancing and transformation reveals. their absolute convertibility. meta- morphosis is always progressive. The body’s change takes place as a new growth. If you go look at the statue of Apollo and Daphne in the Galleria Borghese in Rome. despite its apparent instantaneity. the perfect exchangeability of essences. promenade. Ovid made the body the place of a trial of cross- ing limits.

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the foliage that had been her hair.   and foot-stalks. .

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embracing therein every turn. degree of intensity.  to explore the form that it itself is. and age.   .

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    .

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      .

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Meta- morphosis and trailcutting. lacking cause. come into view as the originary ontological condition. which is terribly violent. What Ovid already accomplishes is the stripping bare of the exchangeability of beings. intention. that is. . Don’t metamorphic @   €. and author.

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  €  `  - ure the ontological send-off in the course of which .

in effect. The triad of change also allows a complicity with nature to be discerned in Heidegger’s philosophy. as its unconscious? How can one not. always allows us to tread the same soil? Z$¡  %¡ƒ &%¡< Continuity of forms. think of the Metamor- phoses when witnessing in Heidegger the morpho- logical and topological mise en scène of metaphysics as perpetual Umformung. contiguity of thresholds . . displacing and conserving it at the same time? How can the call of being not be heard as the weeping of the mother nymph is? How can a certain contiguity of ontological space not be evoked. Heidegger explicitly opposes his thinking of qṕmfn  . one with the tempo of the growth of living beings. from the one change to the other and in the leap from one form to the other.114 The Heidegger Change the nudity of being gets clothed in the forms of its chronicle and dressed with epochal changes? Isn’t metamorphosis always necessarily hidden in the folds of metaphysics. each epoch reforming the preceding. Granted. . one which.

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”43 But if it is true that Dasein   Œ >  .    [Goetheschen Sinne].

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of the sea- sons.” he also lives amidst the metamorphosis of plants and animals.44 Isn’t there a secret kinship between ontogenesis and ontology? Couldn’t the occlusion of the meaning of being emerge as the primordial form of philosophy. amidst the alternating [Weschel] of day and night. . . amidst the wandering [Wandern] of the stars.  šWandel] .  .

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 Œ@>  form [Urform]” of the plant?45 .

the movement of the continuous formation of an individual. . which evoke. the slow and gradual Umformung reveals that it is not the mutation of one Urform. as do the fable and biological growth. The Heideggerian cineplastic is far from being limited to these pro- gressive slidings. an animal or arborescent essence of philosophy? HISTORICAL MOOD SWINGS Yet there are ruptures and gaps. Unceasingly. like an organism in metamorphosis. Isn’t it precisely something like a metabolic constitution of metaphysics that Heidegger is seeking to bring out. Unceasingly. see its equilibrium constantly adjusted?46 I like imagining that being and beings form. the metamorphic crisis . don’t these basically evoke ontogenetic temporality? Doesn’t metaphysics. Outline of a Cineplastic of Being 115 The continuity at work in the history of phi- losophy as Heidegger envisages it. an interregnum whose fate quite closely resembles that of the insects known as metaboles. on account of their exchangeability. the re-formation that unites being’s epochs and renders possible their succession. . the structural whole which forms the tradition .

   `>  .

the bridge . There is no Heideggerian invariant. for Heidegger. certainly always involves crossing. Unceasingly. the passage from one form or side to another is threat- ened with sudden collapse. and maturing. displaced toward a model of growth bearing no fruit. throwing.        * > the species sees itself transformed. growth. like pins a ball might strike. and maturation' reveal it. Change. throwing. The four principle motifs of passage and transi- 'crossing.

ripeness or maturity (Reife) and incubation (Inkubation) are `. the pass (Zuspiel).116 The Heidegger Change (Brück). the leap (Sprung).

>  €*.

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* .  >`  however. are ambivalent inasmuch as they invalidate the course or advance they nevertheless permit. and prohibit that way every continuous transformation.

how the bank is to be gained remains unknown.     €     Œq the leap holds itself back. the ripening does not inevitably follow the picking. ¡\ Z. Œ<. Heidegger ` >  . nor the hatching the incubation. the passage to the other beginning. %. implies the crossing of a river.$ƒ q Even if the other (ex)change.

  `> .

   ` ContributionsX Œ.

 are no bridges [die Brücken fehlen]. but this metamorphosis crosses ontological space with- out seeing the form it transforms. Dasein. declares Œ*> .”47 What enables the crossing to take place remains metamorphosis.

”48 <. as it were.  €ˆ  '  if there were two riverbanks needing to be bridged [nicht indem es zwischen dem Seyn (der Seiendheit) und dem Seienden als gleichsam vorhandenen Ufern eine Brücke schlägt•'  >     - forming be-ing and beings in their simultaneity. not.rtlfm+ḱn.

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but instead creates an absolutely novel hybrid of being and beings. The latter no longer evokes the transformation of a natural being or the fabulous passage going from one essence to another. No one knows what the simultaneity or contemporarity of being and beings could resemble.  ` the broken or absent bridge and the in-between of metamorphosis. .

the leap takes us abruptly to where everything is different [wo alles anders ist]. einspringen (to stand in for or to step into the breach). and catches itself mid-leap. and abspringen (to jump off or bail out) clearly indicates that all forward momentum is at the same time held back. stay in place. vorspringen (to leap forward). ateleological. < &% &ƒ Z% ¦ But is to leap or jump to move forward. crossing the limit. every throwing a recoiling. para- }*      €  Œ~. The path is discontinuous. Migration responds precisely to the urgency of the crossing but resembles at times a leap into the  Œ$ * q   ` * €  Œ  steady progress [stetigen Fortgang].”49 The point of arrival does not preexist the leap. The reason why is that it only ever leads us back to the place from which. Though we may not founder in such a leap. It materializes from and with the latter. Outline of a Cineplastic of Being 117 and nonetheless it takes place. in effect. It is. or go backward? The lexical movement at work in Contributions around the verbs springen (to leap). what the leap takes us to will confound us. thrown. discrete. Abrupt means the sudden sheet descent or rise that marks the chasm’s edge. all progress a manner of remaining in retreat. so different that it strikes us as strange [befremdet]. and nonetheless it happens. where we move unawares from one thing to the next and everything remains alike [alles sich gleich bleibt].

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indeed unearthly thing that . if we are honest with ourselves. A curious.   upon which we live and die.

118 The Heidegger Change € >     @  .

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in effect. This metamorphosis and migration resemble a change of tonality or key. €   stand. When anything so uncanny [unheimlich] as this leap becomes necessary. a change of tonality (Wechsel der Tonart) that metamorphoses (verwandelt) the meaning of the principle of reason. It is.”50 Why should we henceforth irrupt into the place we already are? Because it is neither the soil nor the place. that has changed. In The Principle of Rea- son. but the manner of investing or inhabiting them. Heidegger endeavors to say precisely what such a change can be. Heidegger writes . something must have happened that gives food for thought.

.

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’”51 Henceforth. the principle ` ` *   *        ** * €.- ing is without reason.

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the principle is instead a principle concerning being:  `€. concerning beings and establish- ing that for every being. that is. *   *    principle. a reason can be furnished.

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 q52 The transition from one understanding to the .

Œ’ .

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.

.

> ` .

  `>š> >@.

 'Verwandlung] itself such that it responds to the state of affairs that the principle of reason means when speaking as a principle of being.”53 The path is not marked in advance. In so doing. it becomes clear that such paths themselves belong to the state of affairs. but only by setting out on a path. nor through some sort of sorcery. We arrive at this transforma- tion of thinking [Verwandlung das Denkens] neither through an exacting theory. Migration and metamorphosis meet and are articulated together in . by building a path that leads into the vicinity of the state of affairs we have mentioned.

Outline of a Cineplastic of Being 119 the very place of the urgency of change. that is and   `  .

wear- ing away. derivation. Heidegger insists on the fact . @ * ` the absolute break with the metaphysical understandings of metamorphosis and migration as continuous progression. and elevation.

 .

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  q$``*Œš•.

 *  rings out on its own without having any support in .

the leap brings thinking into another realm and into another manner of speaking [in einem anderen Bereich und in eine andere Weise des Sagens]. The change of tonality is sudden [ein jäher]. Therefore. €  Œ. we admit that the course of the previous sessions did not chart a transition from the realm of the principle of reason into the realm of being.”54 If a leap is necessary. Behind the change in tonality is concealed a leap in thinking.     šklingt für sich und aus sich]. that is. Without a bridge [ohne Brücke]. Heidegger once again says. it is. without the steadiness of a progression [ohne die Stetigkeit eines Fortschreitens].

that in some sense we leap over in the leap or.  ›€| šdieses Zwischen] . more cor- *. . .

€ @.

.

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.

”55 The urgency of passing through this . Š >šwie eine Flamme].

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if the change of tonality is possible today. this is because metaphysics is now consummated and has. In Contributions.     are left no longer the same. the enigma of this in-between remains absolute. as a result. reached maturity (die Reife). To be sure. if the time of the other (ex)change has arrived. AN INCUBATION WITH NO OUTCOME Movement of impeded incubation. Heidegger precisely characterizes >   . Nonetheless. exhausted geneal- ogy.

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not: as not-yet and no longer.”57  ` *. . . there lies at the same time the most hidden . eine Frucht zu werden und eine Verschenkung]. In the fullness. in the vigor for the fruit and the greatness of gifting. . . .Œq56ŒšZ•ˆ `*>  maturity. Maturity is preparedness for becoming a fruit and gifting [die Bereitschaft.

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which had  €  ` &–|          . We will take the example of the long period of the incubation of the principle of reason. this maturity never truly reaches maturity. Yet at the same time.' is because being is ripe for it.

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then this ending of the incubation must be due to the fact that. Indeed. presumably in the sense that being as such has awakened and come to the fore. the Geschick of being has taken a turn. in the meantime. when the principle hatches after its . But it is precisely at this point that the end of the incubation period of the principle of reason does not come to an end [doch gerade kommt es am Ende der Inkubationszeit des Satzes von Grund nicht]. something in the Geschick of being has taken a turn [gewendet]. but in a totally different sense [in einem ganz anderen Sinne]. setting up of the principle of reason as one of the supreme fundamental principles.”59 In fact.

it hatches occluded. Outline of a Cineplastic of Being 121 time of incubation. It hatches without opening _ &–  ``*  >   .

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the gestation of the meaning of being is an immature maturation. and they separate without being  ‘ <. The thinking of the truth of being only matures through its hatching being detoured. into a still more deci- sive withdrawal of being as such. but since the other thinking profoundly detours the very idea of wait and development.”60 So it can very well be said that the history of metaphysics corresponds to a time of incubation. back into a still deeper sleep. There are therefore two paired migrations and metamorphoses.

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the only question.” and where the terms exchanged [ausgetauscht] are “true equivalents [wahre Äquivalente]. Mindfulness There is another (ex)change—an other (ex)change. An other—nonmetaphysical—(ex)change. augenblicken. a change—W. ~        . An other (ex)change that owes nothing to the Geltung. Part II The New Ontological Exchange The least [das Gering] that may perhaps remain is . W. . This is inconstestable. which no longer involves “quick and fleeting circulation [schnel- len. Verkher]. . & V. An other—non-capitalist—(ex)change. —Heidegger.”1 Nonetheless. and Heidegger never stops announcing it.

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In its own way. then. This peculiar “way” will completely occupy us here. It has to be repeated: the passage to the other thinking and the conquest of another way of being 123 .                  into what it is—a place of exchange. the other (ex)change continues to give change and throw off the trail.

god(s). or things—continue to change. And as long as they endure.”2 But despite all of this. ontological mutability does not play the role of an immutable instance. As long as there is essence. In effect. and destinal mutability and exchangeability endure. Heidegger ` > . mutability itself changes. Original. We have already said it: there is no Heideggerian invariant. in fact. there will be change. They only endure. Being and beings per- sist after their exchanges. because there is change. structural. Beings—whether men.124 The Heidegger Change does not mark the suspension of conversion and transformation. metamorphosis “never rests. animals.

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the beginning no longer changes in the same way. at the moment   .  and that this is how we ourselves started. And it is precisely from the end that we are going to start. At the end. it is through reading the “late” texts that we will be able to envisage the other (ex)change. But in the end. this phrase changes meaning.

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How Is There Change from the Beginning? Which means what? I could have and perhaps should have here broached what the analyses of the pre- ceding chapter seem to announce: the passage to the other (ex)change that Contributions presents as a passage to the other thinking and the other begin- ning. I could and perhaps should have broached the other change by way of the famous “turning” that led Heidegger to elaborate the thought of Ereignis.      . I could and perhaps should have examined “the transformation [Wandel]” of Heidegger’s thought via “the Saying of Appropriation [Ereignis]” and by ask- ing “what happens in this movement [was geschieht in dieser Bewegung]? What does the transformation .

The New Ontological Exchange 125 of questioning and answering [wie sieht der Wandel des Fragens und Antwortens]”3 that comes with the turning looks like? $ .

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I would like to show you how Ereignis itself    ' . for me. to identifying Heidegger’s thinking—an approach that can only end up freezing it. The Heidegger Change should itself also obey the double cineplastic regime that governs the mobility of metamorphosis and migration: the continuity and contiguity of constantly reformed forms as well as the emergency leap through the ring    The other (ex)change is of course explicitly bound up with Ereignis. or as that from the guiding question to the fundamental question. But instead of attempting to envisage how things have turned in the sense of Ereignis. The passage from one epoch of Heidegger’s thought to the other is as wholly mysterious—as continuous and discontinuous—as the passage from one epoch of the history of being to another.    - ing on this type of change comes down.

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the thinking of fundamental mutation that is Ereignis (advent and coming) no longer presupposes the Ereignis (or event)    . in my view. Texts like “Time and Being.” “The Turning.   —how Ereignis was changed from the start. can be what leads the philosopher to go back on his conception of an originary mutation (a Wandel or Wandlung) of the essence of truth. Now it is precisely in his mature writings—those that come well after the Kehre—that Heidegger changes mutability. If a change in Heidegger’s thought must be accounted for. then it alone.” and “The Question Concerning Technology” are motivated by an under- standing of (ex)change that no longer presupposes an originary “change of essence.” “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.” At the end.

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“In the scope of this question. is also untenable. as the correctness of representations and statements. we must say: _hde¡´f_.126 The Heidegger Change Recall that in The End of Philosophy and The Task of Thinking. Heidegger very clearly accounts for this change of perspective.” he writes. that is. “we must acknowledge the fact that _hd́e¡f_. the perspective [Hinblick] of adequation in the sense of the correspondence of representing with what is present. originally comes under the perspective of k’ +kf́tmfn and adaequatio. unconcealment in the sense of the opening of presence.”4 $   . Instead. as opening of presence and presenc- ing in thinking and saying. was originally only experienced as k’ leḱod́n. But then the assertion about the essential transformation of truth. that is. from unconcealment to correctness.

”5 The structural bond uniting giving and withdrawal henceforth allows change at the beginning to be thought. but without our climbing back to the beginning of change. Thought cannot go back to the origin of the withdrawal. Change comes about by being put into play.           "     properly speaking. meaning as soon as being is given—as soon as it “holds itself back and withdraws [zurückhält und entzieht]. as though it had occurred `    >  .

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” as The Principle of Reason ` >  Œ.   nothing to think. “In the most extreme withdrawal of being [im äußerten Entzug des Seins].

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” I will be concerned in what follows to bring to light the inti- .”6 Yet what I want to convince you of is that the thinking of originary withdrawal does not dismiss that of an originary (ex)change but instead economizes it differently. Starting with an analysis of the occur- rences of W.  * of being into view. & V in “Time and Being. W.

The New Ontological Exchange 127 mate bond uniting giving. retreat. to approach Ereignis  . a giving of change at the origin that metamorphoses giving itself by transforming the ordinary understand- ing of it. It seems pertinent to me. and change so as to show that giving is a structure of substitution. It is impossible to think what giving change might mean without changing the gift. then.

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Ereignis as Interchange My proposal is that Ereignis. when cast in and clari- . Nothing: not even—especially not—giving. where it is a question of its innate complicity with withdrawal and giving—which is to say in the circula- tion of a new exchange from which nothing escapes.

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Ereignis is only the name given the possibility of an exchange without violence between the elements that it appropriates: Dasein. world. earth. | @  of himself. This “exchange” leaves no room for . must be envisaged as an interchange in which the elements that circulate or “play” stop seek- ing to exercise mastery on each other and being of value for each other. God.7 The possibility of such an exchange constitutes for me the ethical dimen- sion of Heidegger’s thought. At bottom.

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in the triple sense of a contemporaneousness.” Metaphysical “of value for” is the result of the substitution of the beingness of beings for being. a mutability. What is at stake is an exchange. and a pas- sage into the other.8 The . and is a compensating exchange: essence for being. At once “neither this nor that” and “everything at once.

But which displacement(s)? And which form(s)? In order to provide a response to these ques- tions. At stake in Ereignis is a structure of address and reception. We will eventually see that Gestell is not only a fabrication of domi-   `>      . in turn presupposes the double articulation of change—its being at once both migratory and meta- morphic. man-God-animals-things). Once again. & V in order to speak itself. Gestell: The Essential Mechanism The other (ex)change also reveals. The new ontological convertibility (being-beings. the instances at work in it remaining unique and mysteriously incomparable. abandoning the idea of an originary mutation of truth does not lead Heidegger to rule out a change of the origin. change is at the origin. The new ontological exchange proceeds both by displacement. a new exchangeability between being and beings. then. If there is not an originary change. changing Gestell in its metamorphoses and displacements—the Janus- headed essence-apparatus of technology that stands between metaphysics and its other. which must also borrow from W. and through a change of form.128 The Heidegger Change other (ex)change is. There is change. W. we will watch the turning. on the contrary. being-essence. an exchange through address.

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undone forms that give the last god. . emergence of the jagged trajectories and displaced. and being their new visibility (Sichtbarkeit). beings. Dasein.

as if it pro- ceeded from nothing. which lets appear in its own way—through the fan- tastic phenomenality we will henceforth be contend- ing with—this improbable place where donation and change are confused. an improvised stand-in—here goes. then. for itself. making visible the originary withdrawal of all provenance. Despite so much having been written on the gift at the end of the twentieth century and the many interpretations of the “there is. A brusque. & V) are intimately interlaced. Together. You can see. no bridge below. it gives” (es gibt). which is to demonstrate how one of the essential  *   ` *. there is not one single analysis of the central role Wandel. W. As if it leapt from the withdrawal of its own provenance. and Verwandlung play in this 1962 text. emergency leap. Wandlung. we will read the lecture Time and Being. where the gift and change (W. what we are going to have to do. 5 Changing the Gift Envisage the other (ex)change. From nothing other than itself.

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But in what sense. this time. should we under- stand this “metamorphosis of being?” Recall this 129 .     @   X Ereignis.

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whatever Heidegger might say. a register that we would in fact have never left? . doesn’t the gift stop giving? Doesn’t it receive its ultimate appellation. at bottom.   on account of the very stability of its name—its stature as foun- dation and regime—leads us right back to the register of beingness † as summum ens).> - morphoses of both being and time come to a stop? With Ereignis. the metamorphosis of being has not taken place? And what if at bottom. which suspends the substitution of names and the exchange of gifts? And what if.

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Rather. it means that the manner of movement most proper to Ereignis [is] turning toward us in withdrawal .  * `   ` Ereignis [das Geschicklosigkeit des Ereignisses] does not mean that it has no movement [Bewegtheit].

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Second Incision Gunst There is an originary exchange of presence with itself    " .

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there is indeed no “authentic” thinking of giving in Heidegger. however.”5 Perhaps.   X   verbirgt]. Perhaps the Heideg-  .

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”1 This metamorphosis is not at all an occlusion of their difference but respects. Indeed. Could some other power than the one that proves to be the mutability of being and beings be revealed in this metamorphosis? Another power than this power enabling them to grant favors to each other. But the possibility of suspending the exchange of being and beingness— of giving the change that governs the entire history of metaphysics—only serves to liberate the play of a new ontological substitution: the “favor. “transforms [verwandelt] be-ing and beings in their simultaneity [das Seyn und das Sei- ende zugleich in ihre Gleichzeitigkeit verwandelt].” Dasein. We have come back to the metamorphoses and migrations (W. then. writes Heidegger. W. we recall. The new ontological exchangeability. on the contrary. 155 . & V) announced in Contributions when the “other beginning” is. their “separa- tion” (rtlfm+ḱn). the other thinking does stop taking beingness as its foundation.” the structure of a mutual (ex)change involving neither hierarchy nor domination between being and beings. come down to serving notice to all exchangeability between being and beings. 6 Surplus Essence Gestell and Automatic Conversion Thinking being in its own right does not. is often called the “simul- taneity [Gleichzigkeit] of being and beings.

becoming confused? “Just what are you getting at?” you ask impatiently. Returning to §32 of Contributions€  writing that “being itself. Ereignis as such. Metamorphosed beings give being its visibility.156 The Heidegger Change exchange themselves. and pass (in)to each other while not. will be   ` . What I am saying is that beings are not only given(s) [étant donné] but also something giving [étant donateur]. for that.

”2 And in what sense should “visible” be understood here? The  @    * X   >         X Œ<. erstmals sichtbar wird].   > šdas Sein selbst. das Ereig- nis als solches.

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. .   >    [in einer Gestalt .”3 What I dub “fantastic” is precisely this new     . ertsmal verwahrt wird].

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reveals in the same instant the .  as originary molting.

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as a result of naming the “there is/it gives. which responds to ontological mutability as though it were the latter’s echo or shadow—as the narcissism of a new era and time. They remain ’ `|  ` > . if they venture only the least risk of ontico-ontological confusion or bastardization.” could be a new intrusion of beingness into the very heart of the originary gift. it is because they are behind on the metamorphosis of beings. If certain readers of Heidegger are made uneasy by the fact that Ereignis.

because it is transposable from one his- . yes. It is surprising to notice that the majority of Hei- degger’s commentators think beings do not change. they too. beings. have changed. Being.

but not beings. Surplus Essence 157 torical regime to another. or novel social arrangements like pactes civils de solidarité (PACS)4—that ontic structure itself might also be mutable is not. for instance. the internet. like clones. >        . Although the possibility of novel beings is everywhere acknowl- edged—technical beings.

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Being can only show itself “in altered   `   šin den veränderten Gestalten des Seienden].”5    . No: the whole of beings is henceforth something else entirely.  longer the imprint or body and sensible translation of being.

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” says Heidegger: . Just as there is a withdrawal of being. There is an exchange between being and beings that is not an incarceration of the ontological differ- ence.”6 and this interpretation accompanies. remain blind to this new visibility? Because it is hiding. even while it at the same time precedes. Asking after. but its liberation. with regard to both of the changes. So then why does it go habitually unseen? Why do philosophers. the metamorphosed interpreta- tion of being. you yet wonder. “[B]eings as such also [auch das Seiende als solches] undergo a trans- formed interpretation [verwandelte Auslegung]. so too is there a screening of beings: “das bergende Seiendes.  The metamorphosis of beings renders the metamorphosis of being visible. the migrations and metamorphoses of being also necessarily involves asking after the migrations and metamorphoses of the beings contemporary with them—an interrogation that aims at the point of a new convertibility of being and beings.

158 The Heidegger Change “sheltering beings. then beings as metaphysics under- stands them are not anymore in their truth beings. are withdrawn. they too.”7 Beings. The new visibility of being—the metamorphosis of being    . Now what was it you believed to be the case? A secret simultaneity at all times governs the relation between the withdrawal of being and the withholding of beings. If being as understood by metaphysics is not in its truth being.

           .

+.

what Heidegger calls the Gestell. In effect. Heidegger. in the Essence of Gestell—Comes to Pass .”8 BETWEEN TWO CHANGES The Gestell clearly appears as a currency exchange located between two changes. metamorphoses effacing the traces of each other. is an ontological hybrid. Now. in fact characterizes it as an intermediary. “A Change in Being—That is. or enframing. and everything in it is exchanged. Migrations are born from each other there. Everything in it changes. What reveals the Gestell is this: the essence of modern technics. And all of this happens by grace of a convertibility inscribed in its very name—Gestell. Another ontico-ontological convertibility can thus be deployed. . neither being nor beings. “Between the epochal formations of being and the . the “Janus-head” between the two (ex) changes. a “Janus- head” between two understandings of change. we recall. . it is both at once. (in) the image of a double withdrawal that exits the forgetting.

At the same >       `> šVorform] of Ereignis itself. It offers a double aspect. thus as an extreme formation [Ausprägung] of being. a new epoch that will be  *  . a Janus-head. and opens. Enframing is an in- between stage. on account of that. It can be understood as a kind of continuation of the will to will.” “stands enframing. as an instance under- going a mutation. one might say.” one can read in the “Summary of a Seminar on the Lecture Time and Being. then. so to speak. It      € Œ>@q  Prägung of being. Surplus Essence 159 transformation of being into Ereignis.”9 Gestell itself appears. a process enabling an exchange between the two fundamental modalities of mutabil- ity—the metaphysical and the ultrametaphysical.

authorizing the absolute mastery of energies that are as much natural (mineral.10 Modern technology bears in its achieve- ment of itself the very concept of will. hydraulic. man that commands.11 The Gestell     * . “Continuation of the will to will.” Gestell is the consummation of the logic of domination governing metaphysics in its entirety: beingness that commands (as ground of being). and atomic resources) as intellectual (cybernetic domination) and as much economic (industrial agriculture and industry itself) as social (the exploitation of “human resources”). God that commands.  |   **  ` - ures.

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of a gathering involving neither violence nor domination. it is a mode of unveiling.” This mode indeed “unveils the real as [a] fund.12 But it at the same time . The Gestell is therefore not only the terminal form of the unleashing of the will. In itself. @    *  `> of Ereignis.” a reserve (or “standing reserve”—Bestand) of available and masterable energy. of “eventness” in whose midst “is shown what is. which is to say a mode of advent.

originally. between. as the re-formation or re-formulation (Umformung) of one and the same form. following its metaphysical understanding. in ** *€. between two manners of changing. the intra- and extra-metaphysical modalities of migration and metamorphosis. that is.160 The Heidegger Change reveals the properly ontological texture of this fund. the Gestell not only lies between an epochal change (one epoch more) and the change of epochality itself but is also the midpoint. it appeared. one could even again say the turning point or hinge. a mode of being. Metamorphosis has here been characterized. As to migration. BETWEEN TWO MODALITIES OF THE METAMORPHIC AND MIGRATORY Janus-headed. Technology is always.

 > @.

The Š€ ` €     *  } *  and exported. no less follows the route set at departure. distributing. what is stored up is distributed. on the one hand. a series of displacements. and switching about. over a constant metamorphic enchainment: “what is transformed [das Umgeformte] is stored up. a displacement (Verlagerung) that.”14 And these transformations also trigger. re-formation (Umformung) and displacement (Ver- lagerung) correspond to the kinetic regimes privileged by the essence of modern technology: “unlocking.”13 Enframing presides. on the other. transforming [umformen]. Now it is true that when understood in this sense. and energies as such are directed to follow one direction and one alone: “This setting-upon [das Stellen] that challenges forth [herausfordet] the . *     - jectory. while being erratic. and what is distributed is switched about. storing.

limit crossings. *@ `>    ` * @@ €. maturation. are abandoned. These new modalities of change can be characterized as the form of the estrangement of form.”15 But it can just as much as be seen that a type of metamorphosis emerges with the Gestell that is not the disguised prolongation of this one same form.e. on the other hand.    ` **>    > `> other bodies. “The Gestell lets the ground command. . The Gestell therefore renders visible. . and the course of the estrangement of teleological coursing. right on the world itself. but rather a type of coursing that is no lon- ger of the order of a simple phoronomy. These are cineplastic equivalences—a form by displacement. Visible in it.”16 Also seen there. regulated and oriented displacements. energetic transforma- tions. are organic growths. clear directions. signposted routes. i. on the one hand. morphogenetic orientations. the two aspects of the cineplastic constituting the Heideggerian imaginary. lets the absence of ground exercise its mastery. Everything is of value. and a displacement by form—and cineplastic equiva- lences: every form and displacement are of value. toward driving on to the maximum yield at the mini- mum expense [bei geringstem]. Surplus Essence 161 energies of nature is an expediting [Fordern]” and “it expedites in that . it is always directed from the beginning toward furthering something else.

  unmanaged exchanges—cineplastic favors. “When we once open ourselves expressly to the essence of *.

It is this that is the interme- diary. . between the two changes.”17 What is “ambiguous [zweideutig]” here is the essence of technology.€   }@*  a freeing claim [in einen befreienden Anspruch]. or relay.

Everything I just recalled on the subject of the median character of Gestell. we have seen. a form of the essence of being: the reign of the “triggering” that is deployed today. the mean- ing of the verb “to change” in the phrase “enfram-     *. remains an imprint or epoch of being. However. the Janus-head between two manners of changing. das Wesen.162 The Heidegger Change BEING-BEINGS-ESSENCE: THE GESTELL “CHANGES” (IT ALL) Essence. It is. in this sense. Heidegger writes that “[i]f Enframing is a destining of essence of being itself. changes [wandelt]. then we may venture to suppose [vermuten] that the enframing. In The Turning. and Gestell is the name of this (ex)change. can now be brought back and reduced to its source: the metabolism of the essential. The essence of technology and the essence of being are from a historical point of view the same thing. as one of the modes of being’s essence. The Gestell. is indeed the nerve center of the Heideggerian thinking of Gestell.”18 A new epoch of being comes forth. Being changes destinies.

 q   > ` *  @@.

. not grammatical—being. What Heidegger “ventures . as one of the modes of being’s essence. the veri- table subject of the verb “to change” (wandeln) here can be regarded not as Gestell but rather as—philo- sophical. accordingly. In fact. then. to an epochal change of being. AN INCOMPARABLE DESTINY First reading.” In a certain way. changes in the manner of a destiny [sich geschichtlich wan- delt]. “Being ever comes to presence as a destiny. “Gestell . changes. it is quite equivocal. than it would seem. and. authorizing two readings. .”19 The Gestell simply corresponds.

Surplus Essence 163 to suppose [vermuten]” in saying that “the Gestell changes” is that the reign of modern technology     ` .

   ` .

contrary to what is too often believed. the @> ` > *.   `  and that.

    .

 the interruption nor annihilation nor liquidation of being’s sending but rather its accomplishment. Yet Heidegger does not for that minimize the @* * ` . A risky presumption. the Gestell as ontological change.

 ` > Œš~•.

since it has become today the foundation of our relation to being.     - ing its character as destining. . now. “If a change in being—i. . and it most certainly will not be destroyed.” he elaborates. whose essences lies in Gestell. it can be asked if the role of the Gestell is limited to being only an ontological aggra- vation.”21 Despite this. will be done away with [werde beiseitigt]. then this in no way means that technology.”20 The singularity of Gestell is irreducible. “is that it takes place so as suitably to adapt itself to the ordaining that is ever one.e. Technology will not be struck down. a severe consummation of the forgetting of   . ereignet]. in the coming-to-presence of the Gestellq  ` >  Œ*>   @  šwenn ein Wandel im Sein sich .

   †}‡*.

not in general nor of each being but rather as that which accomplishes the oblivion of the essence of being. such as this one: “The Gestell is the essence of modern technology. being is in the mode of Gestell. The event of this accomplishment of the oblivion of being determines in a primordial way the epoch in which.”22 What is dangerous. today. is not tech- nology in itself but the forgetting of being revealed . Heidegger repeats. The essence of Gestell is the being of beings itself.    ` |  statements lean in this direction.

164 The Heidegger Change by it. that it no longer recognizes itself in any way. “Gestell as the essence of being. Being is what is dangerous. “exposes being on the basis of the truth of its essence. also. originally withdrawn. and indifferently turns its back on its possible capitalizations and history. subtracted.”23 ª  Œ  .” writes Heidegger. to the point. so that it becomes afraid (of itself). and ready to give change (through its throwing off the trail) to the point that it forgets itself amid its metamorpho- ses. due to its being mutable.

as one of being’s modes of essence.”27 Ontological mutability is completely indifferent to itself. We return to the claim that “Gestell . “It is technology itself that makes the demand on us to think in another way what is usually understood by ‘essence. it changes (the essence of) being. Isn’t the Gestell. then. The Gestell itself changes. and in that way simultaneously turns counter to the preservation of its essence.”26 Being “denies its own essence.”25 The mutability of being is its horrible truth: “Being turns away from its own essence into the oblivion of this essence.”24 “Being in its essence is the danger of itself [Das Seyn ist in seinem Wesen die Gefahr seiner Selbst]. “Something astounding strikes us. it changes this very change. Which is to say that it makes no sense.  [entsetzt] by its own truth.’ ”28 . . changes ([wan- delt].” while considering this time the possibility that Gestell is the veritable—now both philosophical and grammatical—subject of the verb wandeln. . So that rather than being just one of the changes of being. merely the epochal and phenomenal servant of this forgetting and indiffer- ence of being? AN ESSENCE-TRANSFORMER Second reading.” writes Heidegger.

     . Which means what? In several reprises. the word Gestell [frame] means some kind of apparatus [ein Gerät]. a transformation. Gestell is also the name for a skeleton. essence in general. e. a bookrack. “the essence of technology [is] led into the change of its destining [in den Wandel seines Geschickes geleitet werden]”30) but all essence. Surplus Essence 165 “But in what way?” we must ask with him. Gestell no longer designates a technological object but rather the essence of technology. right down to its very name. Heidegger writes. Why? We broach here what for me constitutes the decisive point of Heidegger’s thinking of technology: the Gestell is in itself.g. “Gestell” can name ontological con- vertibility because its very name has been converted.29 The Gestell is an essence-transformer affecting not just its own essence (with the Gestell. Heidegger declares that he always twists Gestell’s ordinary sense when employing it: “According to ordinary usage.”31 Yet in philosophical language.

 .

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The truth of the essence of technology . would be in this way capable of letting its essence speak instead of and for it. But what sort of being could do this? If this substitutability attests to a metamorphosis and migration of essence. is a “transformed meaning (gewan- delte Bedeutung). THE OTHER BEINGS Gestell is the mode of being by which the withdrawal of being appears. it at the same time reveals a metamorphosis and migration of beings themselves. without further ado: this is the sign that something in technology is originally ready for ontological conversion. The Gestell is a being that lets its essence be given for it.”32 That a being.  says Heidegger. a “technological” object or Gestell in the ordinary sense. and could immediately cede its place.

therefore. .” but one that is “transformed [gewandelt].” “The Thing.” then “oblivion as such turns in and abides [einkehrt]”35 so that it is “is no longer the oblivion.”36 In an appendix to the 1949 lecture “Das Ding. which are what let it appear. . Technological beings are no longer the beings of beingness. . If the oblivion “expressly comes to pass [ereignet]. but also beings. With the Gestell. which is given with the Gestell—revealed and unveiled with it—pro- vokes a displacement of the difference between being and beings. Ontological mutability. inasmuch as it is phe- nomenalized. “in the essence of the danger there conceals itself. the possibility of a turning in which the oblivion belong- ing to the essence of being will so turn itself that. essentially porous. . the essence of being will turn .166 The Heidegger Change is the phenomenon of the withdrawal of being. and this lets the truth of being pass across them without this rendering it present (vorhanden).”38 Beings are then no longer the same.”34 If the truth of being shows itself in the Gestell. as we saw. . “as the danger. . On one side. turns away from this essence. In the lecture entitled The Turning  *    this point. then the oblivion. being turns about into the oblivion of its essence. it should be repeated. the truth of the essence of being will turn in—into whatever is [in das Seiende eigens einkehrt].”33 And on the other. the truth of being makes its entrance into beings: “with this turning. into whatever is [in das Seiende eigens einkehrt].” Heidegger writes that the oblivion “remains all the same a for- getting [bleibt auch eine Vergessenheit].”37 Yet it is not only the oblivion that is transformed. is no longer an oblivion. and in that way turns counter to the truth of its essence. Beings have become porous. with this turning. which is of capital importance.

I am never holding it alone. An essence lies between        . the essential. but the precipitate of an ontological mutation as well. When I hold a technological object in my hands. What the Gestell bespeaks is precisely this point of indis- tinction between program—automatism—and promise. automatically opening the door to the essential. Surplus Essence 167 This is why a technological being is never simply a program. It is always at the same time a promise.

which is also grounding and solidifying. sitting in the palm of one’s hand.”40 The essence of technology might be nothing tech- nological. “that makes the demand on us to think in another way what is usually understood by essence. let pass for them. in a certain fashion. An entire history. . “It is technology itself. . “Because we no longer encounter what is called the Enframing within the purview of representation [nicht mehr im Gesichtkreis des Vorstellens] which lets us think the being of beings as presence . the Enframing no longer concerns us as something that is present [als An-wesende]” and “therefore seems at     šbefremdich].”39 THE OTHER ESSENCE This estrangement is also. This is the new (ontological) state of things. “The essence of modern technology” no longer corresponds to the traditional   `  *     . their circulating and passing into each other. what of essence metamorphosed beings let pass into them. . of course.” recall. like Dalí’s soft watches. of (an) essence anymore. the sequential blinking of a being and its essence. but it also is not at all. 5    idea.

   generic or common to several beings. which would belong as .

technological objects are no longer particular cases. of being and beings.”44 So that the Gestell (the essence of technology).”42 Consequently.”41 The latter do not “fall” under the law of the “concept” of Gestell. the metamorphosis and displacement of Wesen. The Gestell is certainly a “gathering. What appears in the Gestell is the sameness of being. but never in the sense of genus and essentia. is indeed the essence of technology. Essence.” but it does not constitute the beingness—or quiddity—of technological beings. within Enframing. essence.” then reciprocally. once again. the essence of being. Each of these in its own way indeed belongs . This mobile gathering is precisely the one Heidegger calls the Gleichzeitigkeit. as a destining of revealing.”43 The Gestell is neither a law nor a case of its own law. If “the word Gestell does not mean here a tool or any kind of apparatus. being. this time understood as Wesung. and essence. They are. in a different way. the essence of being [sie sind unterschieden das Wesen des Seins]. is not “the common genus [gemeinsame Gattung] for everything technological. The sameness. or simultaneity. a co-belonging (Zugehörigkeit) that is not plurivalidity. . “machines and apparatuses are no more cases and kinds of Gestell than are the man at the switchboard and the engineer in the drafting room. “The world and Gestell are the same [Welt und Ge-stell sind das Selbe]. .168 The Heidegger Change a result under its jurisdiction. and beings (of the world) are all differently the same. of these ontological instances is not their equality but the revelation of . is a sameness (Selbigkeit) that is not equality (Gleichheit). “Thus Enframing.” writes Heidegger. “Enframing. beings. but Enframing is never the essence of technology in the sense of a genus. not children of the same family.

precisely. The same is even less the . which is precisely an attempt to locate (in the fantastic spiral of a mise en abyme) the Heidegger change. the Gestell reveals the originary mutability of ontology. This sameness is the “meaning” of the new metamor- phosis and the new migration. This mutual convertibility. their ability to be metamorphosed and displaced into each other.”47 What Is a Changing Alterity? “THE SAME IS NOT THE EQUAL” We should linger for a moment with the pair of the same and the equal.” Heidegger states. what it is (Wesung): the metabolic identity of being. essence. “is in no way the equal [aber widerum: das Selbe ist niemals das Gleiche]. or present-at-hand. its beingness. instead. Beings are transformed. Essence stops being “of value for” beingness and becomes. As an ontological mutant. it is no longer being pres- ent. They stop being “of value for” particular cases rationally grounded in being- ness. The Gestell is the rev- elation of the point where being. Being. Surplus Essence 169 their interchangeability and simultaneity. shows several faces: Being is dislodged from its meaning as the “ground of beings”45 so that the being of beings stops being “of value for” being. and beings are each susceptible to losing (or ceding) their position. the meaning of the other (ex)change. The essence of the whole of beings dismisses. and beings “lose those qualities with which metaphysics has endowed them. The world and the Gestell are not there in the manner “two present objects [vorhandenen Gegenständen]”46 would be. “The same. essence.

The same is rather the relation of the different [das Selbe ist vielmehr das Verhältnis des Unterscheides]. The same (ok _p’ oḱ) does not presuppose the equal- ity of “two terms.”49 The same is always the same ` > . which is exactly what equality conveys.”48 Being the same does not mean being the same as the other.170 The Heidegger Change coincidence without difference of the identical [das Selbe ist ebensowenig nur der unterschiedlose Zusam- menfall des Identischen].

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  .

In the dialogue The Sophist. in effect. “Opposition appropriates itself. Plato speaks of mo_´mfn and gf́idmfn. Plato doesn’t just say ‘each itself the same. So in this sense the same is the metamorphosis of the equal. a word that points back to a still older word. At play in the Gestell are both the equal and the same. The dative ÷_pot means: each thing itself is returned to itself. rest and motion. but the same for itself. an incision that remains occluded within relationships of equality. Heidegger writes that “we are reminded of an old word by which Plato makes the identical perceptible.”50 In sameness. is a gift of self.’ [jedes selber dasselbe] but says ‘each the same for itself’ [jedes selber ihm selbst dasselbe]. 254d. It appropriates itself in the same as the essential of being [die Entgegensetzung ereignet sich. each itself is the same for itself with itself [für es selbst mit ihm selbst]. The same is dative—for (für) itself and with (mit) itself—in relation to itself.”51 This “opposition” is the incision of the other in the same. there is thus differ- ence—opposition (Entgegensetzung) to self. and therefore of a different self-relation.     `   `  self-same. Held together in it are the two regimes . Sie ereignet sich im Selben als das Wesende des Seins]. The same. In Identity and Difference. Plato has the stranger say at this point ‘Each one of them is different from the (other) two.

on the other. the reign of equality—all things being equal. the relation of exchangeability between instances that are nonetheless unique and incomparable. in a sense that I will have to elucidate before we are  . Surplus Essence 171 of change and exchange: on the one hand. and that have no equivalent but are metamorphosable and displaceable by each other. everything equivalent (alles gilt gleich)—that also fundamentally governs the metaphysical conception of essence. sameness.

 The new convertibility at work in Gestell’s core (which prefigures the circulation of essences in Ereignis|  *‡   ` *  @@.

 ` >   @   the alien. with being? Being has its equal nowhere and nohow. How does it stand. plant. unique [einzig]. however. Being. the unique. incomparable with any other distinction. is everywhere the same [das Selbe]. However. Being is distinguished by uniqueness in a unique way. . “as a being it remains equal to the other. . namely itself [es selbst]. .52 “However one being might surpass another. the house is other than the man. over and against all beings. being is never merely what is equivalent in the manifold beings stone. but a being. animal. the one and only.” he writes in Basic Concepts. by contrast. . the surprising. . The uniqueness of being has incomparability [Unvergleichbarkeit] as a consequence. Every being has in every being. *  is incomparable         * > capable of entering the circle of any exchange. man. Being. Being in its . . . The tree in front of the house is a different being than the house. God. its equal [seinesgleichen]. For to be what is equivalent it would have to be multiple. . insofar as it a being. hence it has in the other its own equivalent [und hat so am anderen das Gleiche seiner selbst]. . Being is. but a being.

it cannot designate even the slightest characteristic common to beings.”53 If being is incomparable (to beings).172 The Heidegger Change uniqueness—and in addition to this. nor be of value for some reference situated beyond or outside the sphere of exchange so as to }. beings in their multiplicity.

but it cannot be just like itself in that it originally differs from itself. originally. The sameness of being.” this suture and rupture of identity that makes each thing simultaneously an essence. | > Z*  *>@    not the standard. or norm of either equivalence or comparison. a dative self-difference that prevents every self-enclosure. then the incomparable character of being simply designates the impossibility. Yo_´mfn and gf́idmfn very well are the   €  ` @ * This indentation or incision opened in that which is. The complicity between being. a being. The being of beings is what inscribes in beings the difference of beings from themselves. of being equal to itself. Giving circulates. and beings revealed by the other (ex)change stems from this “trademark. When I encounter you. for everything that is.” If being the same originally means being self- (ex)change (the withdrawal of oneself in self-giving— the play of the dative) and letting the other be in the self. this mark of being (which it itself bears in the difference it maintains with its own essence) is a mark of the other. rule. and if. identity is a metamorphosis. and the difference between the two. essence. So that it will always be in the play of circulation and exchange and not in the distant horizon of an inaccessible transcendence that being “is” or could be called “incomparable. A being could be just like another being. when we start . does not make it a fetish. its incomparability.

”54 “On its way. being-beings. friends. In the midst. between lovers. groups of resemblances and “resemblants. at that place. The other changes me because I change myself in it. the relation to being. announced by Heidegger corresponds neither to the sudden appear- ance of new monsters nor to what are ordinarily called fantastic creatures. There is no alterity without change. again. the singular play opened in you between your essence and itself.” and clusters of metamorphoses that all have such-and-such an aspect. Alterity is transformation—fashioning of and by the other.” receives a new meaning. there where there is some room—room for the way of the other. and live the same novel ontological condition: being-essence. exploring your difference. It is exactly there. of this gift form mobile.” that is. Yet the metamorphosis and migration of Dasein. migrations and metamorphoses. There are. it should be recalled. The new metamorphosis and migration results from the way in which all things. and being the difference between the two. God. breathe the same air. beings. etc. as you know. strange resemblances between people who live together without being kin. I move into you. “The Principle of Identity would have undergone a transformation [gewan- delt]. and children. its “principle. “What would have become the title of our lecture?” Heidegger asks. This welcome and arrival or passage into the other neither is pure transcendence. that you welcome me. Identity itself. What Heidegger calls Ereignis is also the place where this can happen. Surplus Essence 173 becoming attached to each other. it provokes. from here out. nor does it form a transcendental hospitality. “from the principle as a statement about identity to the principle as a leap . nomad assemblies..

174 The Heidegger Change into the essential origin of identity. is not the closed circle of generic community or commonal- ity but a gathering that precisely does not generalize.”55 THE ACCORD Identity and the thinking of identity are changed to the extent that essence. Essence is henceforth a remaining open. as the Gestell shows.<. thinking has undergone a transformation [hat sich das Denken gewandelt]. the revolving door of the house of being through which the exchange of the favor passes.

It means the city hall inasmuch as there the life of the community gathers and village existence is constantly in play. circulate. Johann Peter Hebel. to occur. for which Goethe had a special fondness. by unwinding. “we do not speak of a generic type. i. develop and decay—the way in which they ‘essence’ [wie sie wesen]. uses the old word die Weserei.e. “ESSENCE IN ITSELF IS CHANGEABLE” \      . in effect. rather. in a poem.”56 Entering and exiting.” Heidegger writes in The Question Concerning Technology.   Š > “If we speak of Hauswesen [household affairs/ essence of the house] and Staatwesen [affairs of state/ essence of the state]. and form itself in passing. identity is destined to tra- verse. comes to presence [west]. administer themselves. we mean the ways in which house and state hold sway. ‘Ghost on Kanderer Street’ [Gespenst an der Kanderer Straße].

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the one that set our book in motion? .          volume of Nietzsche.

§110 of Contributions ` > . Surplus Essence 175 The traditional understanding of essence as generality or plurivalidity is not originary but derived.

Œ * [nachträglich]” character of the idea understood as beingness and community or commonality. the gkf́iki. subsequent determination of f’b¡´ _ as beingness. “this after the fact [nachträglich]. not a  @*@  ` *ªŒ  q says Heidegger. Generality is a subsequent determination (Folgebestimmung).

*> .

Heidegger elaborates.”59 “Real unity does not disturb the transformation” since the one in it is not (the) immutable. that which changes could still be a ‘one’ that holds for ‘many. he continues.”58 The decisive question is that of a “unifying unity” having neither a unifying character nor the power to generalize or assimilate. dann kann das Gewandelte immer wieder. daß das Wesen in sich nicht wan- delbar sin könne]. das Eine werden. “would of itself not have been so fatal had it not for centuries barred the way to a decisive question. that “the notion of a change of essence leads to rela- . For. das Wesen der Wahrheit wandelt sich. this is the ‘most general!’ ”57 This identifying of essence. It will be said in response. But from that it by no means follows that the essence in itself cannot be changeable [aber daraus folgt keineswegs. Originary unifying unity can only unify the multiple and the changing through remaining itself multiple and changing in its very (same) unity—through only lasting for a while.    >  of beingness (of being).’ that relationship not disturbing the transformation [denn gesetzt. was für vielen gilt]. unbeschadet der Wandlung. supposing that the essence of truth did change. “The essence in which the many dovetail must be one and the same thing for them.

”60 But “the right to such an objection to the change of essence of truth stands and falls with the appropriateness of the representation of the ‘one’ and the ‘same’ therein presupposed. which is called the   €.176 The Heidegger Change tivism.

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The   `>   `  * €. the indifferent inequality pertaining to the understanding of the unity of essence as generality (Einerlei). The objection that the change of essence leads to relativism is possible only on the basis of deception [Verkennung] concern- ing the essence of the absolute and essentiality of essence.”61 The latter appears as ipseity (Selbstheit) and self-sameness (Selbigkeit).   of essence as manifold validity. which have nothing at all to do with empty identity and uniformity.

*.

and that gathers without enclosing. that of a face that is exchangeable and divisible without being general. The unity of the same is a different unity. traditional essence. phenomenal crossing of things. giving change—that is. The identical is no longer the common. that is. what no longer.     the unicity (Einzigkeit‡ ` >    genus and genre (Gattung). Although this unity sometimes still hap- pens to be called “genre.” this word (which in French. corresponds to a “metamorphosed interpretation (verwandlete Auslegung)” of community. has a genre. A plastic. also conveys what “gender” does in English) henceforth designates precisely the transformation of genre. when he thinks Ereignis as the gift and circulation of sameness—simultane- ity and co-belonging—he has in mind the metabolic unity of a holding together that is not a rigid framing but a changing bond and supple relation. but only lives through displacements and metamorphoses of generic. again. When Heidegger characterizes the Gestell as the locus of another exchange. . alterity.

on the other. which is to say as the latter’s occlusion—being made the object of beings in the enframing. The ontological reality of technology occurs to the extent its power of derealizing traditional ontological divisions does. <. is our world itself. on that account. an expression that can be understood in a double sense: as an objectivation. from here out conceived as the sameness of being. to be the real of the ontological difference. The Gestell can be said. on the one hand. but also. Ontological difference. Surplus Essence 177 The conversion of metaphysics into its other condenses itself into every technological object (into everything. as will be seen a little later). essence. and beings. of ontological difference. as a liberation of the ontological difference. as its (fantastic) coming into print on things.

  @€   .

and beings.   - tions of being. essence. is change. What the real is. .

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1 Why speak of the “reality” of the ontological difference? What is the bond uniting change to the real. especially since their very concern is of a precursory nature. They should not be imposed on anyone. and why keep this old word “real. 7 The Fantastic Is Only Ever an Effect of the Real Initially these questions concerning form and Gestell remain peculiar considerations [zunächst bleiben diese Fragen nach Gestalt und Ge-stell absonderliche Überlegungen].” which Heidegger seems in Being and Time to dismiss forever? Does my understanding of the “real” have some-  .

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to the fantastic. What is the +klqd́ proper to these metamorphoses? What is it that the shape of the pathway of these transformations resembles? 179 . which is to say to a certain way of imag- ining or imaging change—the two changes at once—in a place where every concept comes up lacking? At this point. if I am to address these questions. the relation to being. language. the gods. you tell me. somehow.  [recueil] of its visibility? Does it pertain. and philosophy. attempt to interpret what Heidegger announces under the title of the metamorphosis and migration of Dasein. I must.

180 The Heidegger Change Off we go again. we’ll make ourselves as little [petit(e)] as can be. What should be . But before we do.

 .

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 .

 .

   .

What takes place with such beings. What Heidegger describes under the rubric of thingness—which is itself a metamorpho- sis of objectivity (Objektivität)—is less “the being of things” (the essence of the thing in the traditional sense: wassein. reveals what arises in the midst of beingness in general in the epoch of the consummation of metaphysics. pass into. is a being that lets its essence be given for. Beingness henceforth characterizes itself as essential ductility.” I am referring to this thingness.0 - metaphysical thought is coming to grips with the little. The thing. and (attempt to) pass for it. I am after the fashion in which the ontological difference becomes visible right on things. for Heidegger. It holds the fourfold together: “Thinging. This capacity for ontico-ontological conduction characterizes. gathers. The Crossing of Essences THE LETTING PASS OF THINGS The Gestell. earth and . solely the privilege of technological beings. are constantly changing in(to) their essence. for Heidegger. we saw. the movement of being in things. the thing stays the united four. in an immedi- ate manner and as a primary fact of our everyday experience with them. Beings. Heidegger tells us. It is clear that this ontological porosity is not. When I speak of “reality. its conductive body. wie sein) than the thing of being. thingness—Dingheit—in general: things are the mirrors of being. when inside the economy of the other change.

which is therefore a meeting and exchange between two regimes of visibility. All this. two images meet and are exchanged: the metaphysical image (the visibility) and the ultrametaphysical image of being. its essence shows itself to be an exchange- able instance. their point of convergence. of essences. The thing is their crossing. which appears with it. I also insisted that this point of convergence is depatriated. quite precisely. on the fact that it could only be invested with images. The meeting between these two images. or place of exchange. is obscure. The thing lets the essential pass through gathering. is itself visible. a visibility of the suture. in the simple onefold of their self-united fourfold. Nothing in it checks the evidence of its own essence. a movement toward the other. So understanding it will require returning to the issue of schematism. of the point of convertibility between metaphysics and its other. divinities and mortals. The presence of things reveals the (ex)change of presence. The Fantastic Is Only Ever an Effect of the Real 181 sky. then. The term “fourfold” designates nothing else but the dimension of the new convert- ibility. you are right to say. stateless in relation to concepts. In this place.”2 What the thing gathers and shelters this way is a circulation—that. I ` >. There is. and from this very fact. I have tried from the start to show that essence is the imaginary place of convergence (or focus point) of ontology. Essence comes out of things.

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to cross back through itself. from metaphysics’ irrepressible and structural drive to re- present itself to itself. on one essential side. to schematize itself in such a way that the schema ends by entering into presence.  thinking of imagination was motivated by this focus imaginarius that is the suturing of the two changes. This new visibility results. the visible slough .

which is to say visible on and among things. which reveals the structure of the favor.3 The suture between the two changes “is” not—this is why it is (ontologically) imaginary—but it is not for that any less real. Heidegger never stopped insisting on the paradoxical reality of the imagination as power of “nihilation” (Nichtung). as if through the middle and in its body. then. the new ontological gift. essence. Not in the sense that what it thinks would not exist. lets the other be shown in and for it—the schematism of another era and time. encounter each other in this real image and intersect in each and . Philosophy is henceforth and necessarily fantastic thinking insofar as. by an imagi- nary line.4 The two (ex)changes. that of the real image of thingness. the convertibility between the two (ex)changes. on the other side. from the movement of the other (ex) change. and the new exchangeability are not pure abstractions. The fantastic. Ontological difference. because it is itself included in the crossing that it must think (the crossing of the two (ex)changes and the circulation of the two modalities of the triad of change) it can only imagine what it thinks.182 The Heidegger Change of visibility. which in turn appropriates being. I have from the start dubbed fantastic the meeting point of these two imaging processes. characterizes precisely the real of the phantasm. but in the sense that the reality of what it thinks is divided. and beings to each other such that each stands down on behalf of the other. They constitute our real. far from designating a simple logic of the phantasm or an intrusion of the phantasm into the real. an image-line lying between two histories. the way the real registers the impact of its deconstruction and change: it renders itself visible in a different way. The fantastic is another dimension. Yet the new visibility also results.

Everything—you and me as well (of course). Every- thing has two presences. as these are inscribed directly into it) separates them—a line of transformation. It is up to the philosopher to discriminate between and think together these two sorts of being and these two images. these two images of being. This double physiognomy is presented to the gaze at the moment when the favor of the other exchange lifts the  . All things let the fantas- tic suture of metaphysics and its other be seen in them. The Fantastic Is Only Ever an Effect of the Real 183 every thing—in everything. A sort of improbable line (like the ages of a shell. an improbable tipping point. we could again say. Everything is in itself both metaphysical and destructuredly-deconstructedly metaphysical. Everything has a double face: metaphysical and nonmetaphysical.

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along with philosophy itself. This point of articulation—the soft point and living tissue of thought. then. “The play of the world” (which is precisely what makes things glimmer5) is the play. an exchange between two changes that is rendered possible by the ontological ductility revealed with the new gift. in effect. as Deleuze and Guattari say with such pertinence and lucidity. Philosophy’s thing. of a passage. is becoming imperceptible. the favor of Ereignis. an entirely little world within the world. so fantastically real—is typically abused and ignored. There is. Who truly pays it any attention? It is so small. there is a becom- ing minor of sense. We have seen how the Gestell loosens the meta- physical bolt by giving beings back their ontological porosity. without . the point of suture mostly goes unnoticed. A “MODEST” DIFFERENCE Although visible. something entirely little in and for philosophy.

in favor of their essence. and opened to the other. Each thing. us philosophers. “weserei. and essence. Recall the enigmatic declaration from Contribu- tions according to which “the last god will show itself [der letzte Gott sich zeigen wird]. Essence is nothing but the mobility of the incision of the other in essence. an opening through which it is exchanged with itself and with the other. to become the least. beings. essence. Ereignis  *. is merely one possible name for this ontologi- cal circulation. This mark cor- responds to what we together characterized as the incision of the other in being. Essence. To migrate and be metamorphosed. being itself. everything.6 We have become the very least. in favor of being. is always.” as we saw in the preced- ing chapter. the tiny indentation through which each thing is crossed and exchanged with itself. I said before that everything has two presences. in a sense. In its hinting. that the improbable suture between metaphysics and its other is marked on all things. in turn. has in it an incision. and beings. being. our reality is now imaginary. beings. and the fourfold. in favor of beings. and being. scarcely exist anymore. is a play of doors.184 The Heidegger Change publicity and well off to the side. We.

and this lighting-up [dieses Leuchten] needs the grounding of the essential sway of truth as clearing  .  *>  šerstmals sichtbar].

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”7 The visibility of being found amid transformed beings is born precisely from the new ontologi- cal exchange.      of beings [ihrer letzmaligen Bergung in der veränderten Gestalten des Seienden]. being as a being. and a being as a god. Dasein as god. but without any of these essences either gaining . where god can be shown as Dasein.

in a thing. the thing. We saw together that “Wesen understood as a verb is the same as währen. reveals in each of them. The Fantastic Is Only Ever an Effect of the Real 185 power over or trying to alienate each other. once more. Dasein. is the most exposed. the living tissue of a constant autotransformation: a thing’s capacity to take leave of itself so as to be crossed and exchanged with another. In this new exchange. the divine. This point. and being from time to time show in each other. the most frag- ile. Essence—stand-in. man. double.”8 ~. a suppleness that permits them to fold into and substitute for each other while remaining what they are. are installed in each other in passing. halo. where things are at once upright and capsized. The littlest. is nothing but being’s self-difference). Heidegger even says—the modest. or animal and in being itself (the essence of being. aureole—is the other name for what. to last or endure. There can be no “co-belonging” without this suppleness of gath- ered terms. god. the least. in everything.

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This suppleness and plasticity constitutes what.” “the suppleness of what is small”? What does this addition mean? Is it some- how legitimate? “Nestling. limber—in Old German.”11 Das Gering therefore designates the little. littleness as suppleness or plas- ticity. both . fügsam. The modulatable aspect. can change. schmiedbar. Why. malleable. “these are called ring and gering [schmiegsam. then. geschmeidig. compli- ant. in a thing.” Heidegger says.    €  >  and modest. have the French translators chosen here to render das Gering with “la souplesse de ce qui est petit. leicht heißt in unseren alten deutsche ‘ring’ und ‘gering’]. pliant.

The round of essence is what makes (the) Heidegger change. @* for the other is respect for this fragility. The fantastic is destitute.”14 Guarding is loving. which main- tains itself changing. Being. in turn. since being itself pays it little regard. Essential destitution results from what we previ- ously characterized as the indifference of being to its own mutability. gods. and mortals. of its aspect. worlding the world [also schmiegsam fügen sie fügsam weltend die Welt]. we now know. is a power of trans- . Something else is begun with this disinterest or distinterestedness. This is the sense of the meta- morphosis and migration of Dasein that Heidegger conceives as its becoming-shepherd: “the ‘subject’ in man must transform itself into the founder and guard- ian of this abode [Erbauer und Wächter das Subjekt des Menschen sich verwandeln muß]. enabling thereby the ethical dimension of his philosophy   ` > . earth. the four nestle into their unifying presence. we have seen. in which each one retains its own nature [schmiegen sich die Vier in ihre einiges und dennoch je eigenes Wesen]. So philosophy will henceforth have to be concerned with the essential’s character as the least and the minor. a fragility that is only given modestly. When all is said and done. we can only be watchful. they join together. and love. has any interest in exchange.”12 This round of essence is the living tissue of change and exchange. When there is nothing left to lose or gain. “denies its own essence. there is nothing at all to be gained from it. in the poverty of a gaze. Apropos the fourfold of sky. And no one.”13 Ontological convertibility takes no inter- est in itself. Heidegger writes that “in the ringing of the mirror-playing ring [im Gering des spiegelnd-spielenden Rings].186 The Heidegger Change migratory and metamorphic. So nestling.

but not alteration (_’ hhkf́tmfn. It is necessary to look after and protect what is supple. Veränderung). without completely congealing. you ask. loving being. a running fox. the fox changes place but remains the same. since it changes direction (qkl_´). at work in the heart of Aristotle’s thinking of change (+¡o_`khd́) and movement (gf́idmfn). Observe. THE RUNNING OF THE FOX But how. that what does not change in the fox appears thanks to a change. without the least concern for oneself. qkl_´ . in its place. It is engaged in change. “the fox is at rest in that it keeps the same color [dieselbe Farbung behält]. _’ hhkf́tmfn. However. Just as rest. is a trait that binds together. A Form Whose Homeland Is No Longer Metaphysics What is supple—in Greek. in its place.”16 Its running is displace- ment. S¡o_`khd́. then. declares Heidegger. Heidegger says. “as it was constituted. so can the fox be said to conserve its form (+klqd́)—continue having the face and air of a fox—only to the extent that it is in itself a change that never stops changing meaning and direction. The fox only is what it is in changing. Love for being. Heidegger recalls. is itself only ever a modality (and the most accomplished) of movement.”17 It can be said. The Fantastic Is Only Ever an Effect of the Real 187 formation. +¡o_`khfgḱn—is the cross- ing of change in a being. is the form of suppleness.15 Essence. in the blinking of the four regimes of mobility of _p‘´cdmfn and qef́mfn. . then. by his account. can one still speak of form? Hei- degger distinguishes between two understandings of form that are already.

we gain an insight into their fundamental character. which Aris-  } .188 The Heidegger Change several modalities of being-moved: “If we perceive all these overlapping ‘appearances’ [durchkreuzenden ‘Erscheinungen’] as types of movedness.

The essence of the fox is what streaks the animal.”18 The identity of the fox-form is born from the incessant U-turns of metabolic routes of identity. right on its run €.€ **@`+¡o_`khd́.

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* * So the air of a fox. translating +klqd no longer as “form” but with “Gestellung.” “installa- tion. then.” or. more precisely. Heidegger again says. owes its essence solely to a perpetual metamorphosis. “installation in the aspect [Gestellung in das Aussehen].”19 S¡o_`khd́. there is a metamorphic understanding of form bound up with the vision of coming to pres- ence. Heidegger proposes. moreover. In Aristotle. its ¡fbkn or +klqd́. is the unity of a movement of throwing  €.

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¡fbkn is genuinely understood as ¡fbkn only . words.

”20 Form is a “composi- tion.” one that installs the essence and the particular thing that lodges in it for awhile: the face “installs itself into a given thing that is ‘there for awhile’ (the ‘appearance’ ‘table.’ because as an individual thing ‘it stays for awhile’ in its aspect and preserves the ‘while’ (the presencing) of this appearance. that puts itself forth into this table here).’ for example. The Fantastic Is Only Ever an Effect of the Real 189 when it appears within the horizon of one’s imme- diate addressing of a being. We call an individual thing das Jeweilige. ‘that which is there for awhile. stands forth in and out of it—which means that it ‘is.’ ”21  .

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Heidegger wants   `   }@  € >   . the most recent translation of Greek +klqd́. is a seal that imprints its mark onto movement and stops it in order to render it thinkable. “installation in the aspect”). In translating +klqd́ not by Form but by Gestellung in das Aussehen (again. heart of Aristotle’s thought between this mobile-form and the idea-form. to the fragility of the essential. which is always already installed. “as something independently present and therefore as something common (gkf́iki) to the individual beings that ‘stand in such an appear- ance. when understood this way. Heidegger recognizes that the German word Form. Aristotle also at the same understands the ¡fbkn. Moreover. has completely devolved into meaning this logic of impression and thus does no justice to the movement of installation.’ ”22 Form. in Plato's fashion.

”23 . installing into the aspect is a mode of presenc- ing. kp’ mf́_. Second. but a way of being. gf́idmfn.’ First. ` ’  value. “that are thoroughly lacking in our word ‘form. ‘installing in the aspect’ is movedness. Sklqd́ is not an ontic property present in matter. which ‘moment’ is radically lacking in the concept of form.

Heidegger recognizes Jünger’s oeuvre for causing a metamorphosed sense of form to emerge from within this very concep-  ` .24 On the other hand.190 The Heidegger Change FORM’S DIVORCE SUFFERING Heidegger’s address to Jünger in “On the Question of Being” largely bears on the possibility of renew- ing this sense of form from right at its traditional understanding. Heidegger says of the latter’s oeuvre. thereby. “it remains housed in metaphysics [in der Metaphysik beheimatet bleibt]” precisely for not hav- ing perceived “the way in which Gestalt. f’b¡´ _ and being belong together [die Zusammengehörigkeit]” and for remaining. at the same time dependent on this. though unwittingly. On the one hand. Heidegger shows how Jünger’s work itself attests. to this remodel- ing.

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which as the intensivum of h¡´at means ‘´ ´ intimate gathering. Presumably _ ‘´ hakn is related to _h¡at. [T]he Greek word for pain. “and to bring to light the intrinsic connection between ‘work’ and ‘pain. In that case.” continues Heidegger.’ .@ * go into your treatise On Pain [Über den Schmerz]. pain would be that which gathers most intimately.”26 This passage is fundamental. . It effectively enables us to understand . namely. _ ‘´ hakn€   come to speak for us. .

[donné(e) brut(e)] that is at the same time the new meaning of form. The supple. for itself and outside of every system and synthesis. this suffering miniature     ` *@. and exposed fashion. An essential bond would in this way unite suffering and gathering. the resource of every sys- tem and synthesis. or even co-belonging (Zugehörigkeit). which is to say the changing gathering. meaning with gathering. “Pain would be that which gathers most intimately. a gift. The Fantastic Is Only Ever an Effect of the Real 191 that pain and suffering maintain a natal tie with the logos. would be thought’s thing—logoalgia. The coming to presence of this minimum. in the end. the pathetic minimum given.” in the littlest. most fragile. precisely. A brute given.

alternatively. appearing in what it holds together. effectively requires a bringing into form. a transformed sense of form. Now the validity of this transformed sense—its future. Or.” The least is installed in gathering. depends on an essential alternative quite clearly distinguished by Heidegger. in which case there would be an originary non-ideal resource of form. a  whose concept relinks with the Aristotelian determination of “installation. if you will—this proof for an ultrametaphysical viability of form. Corresponding to the metamorphosis of suffering (this emergence of the originary complicity of logos and pathos) is a metamorphosis of +klqd́ itself. this synonymy could    . The traditional synonymy between form and f’b¡´ _ might be derived. which we are reconnect- ing to its essentially metabolic meaning.- nomenality. which would henceforth request only to live and show itself.

immutability. in that case.   @   `> €    to outlive its idea—essence. community. generality—and forever remain. the form of metaphysics. Heidegger develops the alter- native in these terms: is “f’b¡´ _ a terminus ad quem .

is form an endpoint—a derivation—or an origin. from which all particular “forms” proceed? ~ € .192 The Heidegger Change for us” or “a terminus a quo”?27 In other terms (you understand).

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. that of both the entirety of Heidegger’s philosophy and even the philosophical. again. . well beyond it. which are in fact political. The era in which European thinking came to this opinion continues to cast its shadow on us. then the essencing of being and above all of the being of beings would be a product of human representation. what paths can this question concerning the essential provenance of f’b¡´ _ and Gestalt take? To put it in a formulaic manner. but also. the idea ceases to be what it is. This alternative takes on some particularly grave accents. . the alternative uncovered in the conclusion to our chapter on Nietzsche. political.”28 IS THERE AN ALTERNATIVE TO “ONTOTYPOLOGY”? We encounter. . There is a way in which everything hangs in its balance: not just the fate of the book you have in your hands.  @*  X`   Œ> ad quem for us and a terminus a quo in itself [als Letzes für uns und als Erstes an sich] . does the essence of Gestalt spring in its origin from the realm of what I call Gestell? Does the essential provenance of the f’b¡´ _ accordingly belong to the same realm from which the related essence of Gestalt stems? Or is Gestell only a function of the Gestalt of a particular humankind? If the latter were the case.

the action of man putting his stamp on everything (on himself foremost). then metamorphosis and migration. a new language—to a bricolaged ontology. Everything. or more exactly. a series of metamorphoses throughout which one and the same form is reformed. a new god. If this is the case. The Fantastic Is Only Ever an Effect of the Real 193 social. and economic future of originary ontological mutability. kinds fash- ioned. and with which one would then have to think. a manipulation.29 If. that is. that is. an endless Umformung. even when decked in the beautiful hues in which I have tried here to clothe them. exhausting and failing to exceed its (tradi- tional) form. (2) Perhaps form can cross the line. once more. would overtly mark the start of a new bricolage. break metaphysics’ hold. and would still be within the limits of the categories of metaphysics— the categories of form—that would accomplish this transformation. depends on the fate of form. what in him leads to the worst. all this is the case. and essences fabricated. to the fabrica- tion of a new Dasein. meaning not think. So that the coming forth in the epoch of the Gestell (as its fundamental effect) of originary ontological mutability. I am indeed quite certain he knew that everything . (1) Perhaps form remains form (the form of meta- physics). of the evidence. at bottom. type and stamp out an essence. then Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe is right to diagnose form as Heidegger’s ontotypological symptom. and makes us believe that it is possible to form. Of this. In that event. So that the revela- tion of ontological transformability (which indicates the accomplishment of metaphysics) would not. for the transformability of being (for being as nothing other than its transformability). leads to the unnameable. I have long been persuaded—hence my attachment to the concept of plasticity. types typed. everything would be different—and Heidegger knew it.

.194 The Heidegger Change depends on this possibility that form exceeds presence by going beyond its presence. Heidegger in fact denounced ontotypology and came to impugn . Lacoue-Labarthe even seems to concede this when he recognizes that “in the letter to Jünger . the whole @*  . . . .

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moreover. illustration. of the stamping and the imprint (Prägung.     (Gestalt). a letting-through without mimeti- cism.”30 But what Lacoue-Labarthe apparently does not acknowledge is that this “impugnment” (a word.” then this means that form can rightly designate. unperceived link between Gestell and Gestalt. in multiple fashions and according to multiple senses. which had nonetheless been his from 1933 on. along with all the typological metaphors—brand. as we saw before. the nontypological schematic mode of being of things. Form and  *   `  . incarnation. or symbol. imprint. stamp. a source so archaic that f’b¡´ _ itself. that does not seem to me particularly suitable here) is undertaken in the name of another thinking of form. Perhaps form can cross the line. their nonreferential ontological porosity. I do not believe that Heidegger had to wait until his letter to Jünger to have an inti- mation of it: we have seen from the start that this other form has at all times been. a metamorphosis of form that has its source in an ancient. Geprägung). in which event everything is different. Heidegger’s fellow traveler. If form “springs out in its origin from the domain of the Gestell. wax seal—result from it.

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this grievous gathering of the small and the least. mode of appearing of the fragile round of exchanges. if one understands by form the beautiful pattern of . This suffering is without form. of a minimal suffering.

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the last god is a swaying between arrival (Ankunft‡ Š.   >   @  and installed just for a time. The metamorphosis of Dasein is a swaying (as Wesung has been translated into English) between Dasein (being-there) and Weg- sein (being-away).

both a swaying and 7 .†Flucht). being. and beings. a swaying between the closest (Nähe) and the farthest (Ferne).

This transformability or permanent convertibility of related things constitutes the suffering heart of gathering. One or many?31 Each thing is the fox of itself. a poros- ity of limits having nothing to do with the possibil- ity of fabricating or “ontotyping” an essence. sliding toward the other and over it. is the installation of self in the other. . a passage into the other: god-Dasein-beings-being- animal-thing. Each thing. An ontological transformability there is.  of the doors of their essence. an installation of self in the animal simultaneity of movement and rest. in other words. They pass into each other because they are passers-by seen only in passing. and signing through that its body—dedicating it.

”32 The transformation brought on by serenity is located precisely at the articulation of the migratory and metamorphic. W.196 The Heidegger Change the kernel of the mobile. or serenity. As much as does the W. Nonmetamorphosed philosophical thought sees in the Gestell only a simple menace.” serenity nonetheless involves “the possibility of dwelling in the world in a totally different way [eine ganz andere Weise in der Welt aufzuhalten]. a transformation of thought that molds in its movement the transformation occurring in the Gestell. & V of thought. If form crosses the line. then serenity is possible. Gelassenheit. Although it is true that “the rootedness [Bodenständigkeit] of man is threatened today in its core. is conceived by Heidegger as a Wandlung. serenity opens “a new path that leads to a new earth”33 €. supple. and changing favor of the essential—the plasticity of an incomparable exchange. the cal- culation of possibilities of destruction.

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 and now rapidly disappearing rootedness in changed form [in einer gewandelten Gestalt].”36 So many things pass through it.”35 This migration is precisely “multiform [vielge- staltig] and rich in transformations [reich an Wand- lungen].”34 A novel form and pathway. . metamorphosis and migration lead “to the last bridge [zur letzten Brücke]” and enjoin us to contemplate “the way mortals carry out on earth and under the vault of the sky their migration [Wanderung] from birth to death.

We have not stopped emphasizing their hybridity. W. . Third Incision Changing the Symbolic We come back. of imagistic language. They touch everything because they are of such little consistency. thought. The end of the symbolic in general and the emergence. As we saw at the beginning. The end. that is. a ~ . god. Of this. again. No doubt these  €  which say every- thing in their very simplicity. & V. and (owing to these facts) their capacity to plug the holes in history and seal together epochs or. the end of meta- phor as noetic clothing and vehicle. Heidegger remarks that this claim is neither a comparison nor a metaphor and neither a symbol nor an image. being. er sei 197 . First change or other change. neutrality. . of a new form of the real. the origin . from that fact. you are now convinced. “We are not saying that it is an ‘image’ of peregrination [wir sagen nicht. Nothing can be done without it. on the contrary and because they themselves have no history. to break up all continuity. Dasein. are living proof of what Heidegger announced about philosophy and poetry: the end of the sensibilization of the concept as the essential poetico-schematic resource of discourse. to the triad of change: W. Hölderlin says in the hymn “The Ister” that a river is a peregrination. Gestell. the three terms touch everything: the essential.

198 The Heidegger Change ein ‘Bild’ der Wanderung]” or peregrination an “image ` .

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. over everything. 9 “The Thin Partition That Separates Dasein from Itself .” He began now to crawl to and fro. . €   `  *     .

The Metamorphosis This witness-form exists.1 —Kafka.  despair. of very little thickness. Of a quasi-imperceptible separation. Of an articulation even more intimate than the one forming the joint between the existentials. fell down on the middle of the big table. ontological. or partition. It is a question of a wall. when the whole room seemed to be reel- ing around him. Of a limit without any analytic. or existential status €.

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  partition appears only once in Being and Time. as .

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once more. upon each cut taken from its transitions. It does not. trembling. `> * - tion depends on it. curiously. The witness-form tightens. Take note. of the hybrid. conceptu- ally depatriated character of the places in Heidegger attesting to our metabolic reality. 233 .

 * |  & $  _}  .234 The Heidegger Change close the exits but instead renders a crossing pos- sible and therein promises Dasein a different fate than that of being an insect stuck crawling the walls.

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where there is an inside   — ~.    since the call of moral conscience proceeds from nowhere. it being neither the work of a person nor something occurring. again.

”3 The call comes neither from “the heart” nor from “elsewhere” since “Dasein is at the same time the caller and the one summoned.  *   € €   >@ ŒDasein in its uncanniness.”56 €.

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It would only serve to verify the hypothesis    . `>* ** €‘ > *  more.

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paradoxically. Z . > *  Dasein. could not change.

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 ` *- science. says Heidegger. is “a way out [Ausweg] for .

”5 The wall is what Dasein7 ~. from the uncanniness of its being [die gleichsam das Man von der Unheimlichkeit seines Sein trennt]. so to speak.“The Thin Partition that Separates Dasein from Itself” 235 Dasein along which it slips away [wegschleichen] from the thin wall [dünne Wand] that separates the they.

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    Š.

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 |  € Œ   @  šglei- chsam•q. a third term that economizes the transitions. but in this “slipping away” from the very division between the authentic and the inauthentic. Something here is indeed in between—between Dasein and itself.  *      @ - ing from one mode to another.

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from the uncanniness of its q‡* > . so to speak [gleichsam].

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“metaphoric” status of this wall would not     >@ * ~. Insisting on the simple. sudden appearing of this separation.

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we can be certain that this mysterious fron- tier .   call it.

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 and thus wrests it from the humdrum procedure and incessant repetition that sometimes seems to send Being and Time off in a direction Heidegger obviously neither chose nor envisaged. and where error € *    Š . of ethical possibles in particular. even if it constitutes the fabulous shadow of his book: a metamorphosis deprived of possibles.

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binary character is to be evaded. The meanings of both . >  `      €  *   Š if its unbearable.

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then. on the wall. and resolu- tion depend. This wall is not a    .

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- rize transitions from one mode of being to another €.

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 the appearance of a locus of exchange that does not just enable the mutual transformation of the modes .

236 The Heidegger Change of being. but also .

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  its passages. “Thin partition” thus makes for a more satisfactory translation of dünne Wand than does Œ.

€ q† € `> @@  > than do equivalents to WandŒ€ qŒ q‡ and will accordingly be used from here out. Jean- &*¡ *’.

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“remain[s] right at a wall. he writes. a wall whose pres- * *   . Dasein.@   once marks the “incommensurability” and possible “osmosis” of the instances it separates.

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but whose thinness *   .| with its uncanniness of being.

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Dasein occupies its space—the space of its nil and impenetrable thickness. .”6 As much watertight as porous. one with the other. By not pulling away from the wall †`>``*‡>  *   thinness.

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the transit from one mode to another will basically just be an absurd mechanism.       Unless one assumes the existence of an ontico- ontological membrane that transforms to the extent that the modes pass. <.

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everything does not come back to the same. The improper is not “of value for” the proper. The adjective dünn    Œ q Œ.- less. The wall already introduces the favor  >   exchange.

q Πq Π.

q $   >   Œ> q †gering‡ <.

 partition already inscribes in Dasein the possibility of a modest difference. a snip opening each exchange. @  > *   *  <.

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- ness” or denseness without density of the partition spaces Dasein. This is why Dasein can desire “to slip away”: so as not to suffer. The partition is the living tissue of exchange. . distancing it from itself while also at the same time uniting it to itself and gathering it.

“The Thin Partition that Separates Dasein from Itself” 237 € *  .

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the structure. @   their hinge or jointure. that is. of their structure—€*.

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the plastic destiny of its individual adventure. Dasein would be able to resolve itself or make a choice. finite transformation. cross the boundaries between the existentials without some kind of exchange with itself occurring. and *. without. that is. the weft of its history.

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Dasein may not burst open.  Dasein is neither formed nor displaced (by itself) in its exchanging (with) itself? I am not sketching here the broad strokes of some inner depth or psychological space where Dasein would negotiate. its articu- lations bending. I am simply attempting to show that crossing from one mode to another is not a depthless operation but one that creates fur- rows and reliefs for the quite simple reason that it takes time. that it pulls taut. rather. and speculate on itself. but it does tighten when it passes. debate. something that .

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what meaning could reso- Š. then. Minus this sensitivity. The partition appears.  even as it wears out _   ``  *  of its existence. to be an articulation in the articulation that renders the structure sensitive]—to itself.

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. or suffering” for “[t]he fall is what is most alive in sensation.”8\  XŒ. The fall is precisely the active rhythm.”7 “In short. .” he says. —$Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. . failure. that through which the sensation is experienced as living. Deleuze shows that the very “idea of the fall implies no context of misery. “everything that develops is a fall.

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All tension is experienced in a fall. difference in level as such.”9 Can these statements really hold given that .

238 The Heidegger Change they make no reference to Heidegger and fallenness †¢` .

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9  we not noticed that the fall is neither a collapse nor a tumble insofar as existential space is without high or low? And that the fall instead involves a change of intensity? $ |  .

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~.” The partition separating Dasein from itself is vibratile.” then it must be added that “all fall is experienced in a tension. it reacts as an instrument does.  “Dasein plunges out of itself into itself [aus ihm selbst in ihm selbst•q—10 And if it is true that “all tension is experienced in a fall. marking differences of level in the midst of the modes of being.

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In striking . the putting into relief of differ- ence itself qua difference of thresholds. ` >  ` differences in level.

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 which difference would effectively only be a mecha-  >     .

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which are rendered possible by the existential resonance of the wall.      ‘  levels of intensity. the zone of \ . The absence `   }   >   Š* and abolished in this intermediary zone between the modes.

of the transit of identity which   . <s perpetual deconstitution and reconstitution.

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contrac- tion. of distancing and gaps. and concentration. of stress. of pressure. } *   † `ˆ‡€ % *  of tension.11 Beyond interior  }  . differences of power. and contraction. resistance.

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 is the mobility and suppleness of the partition—of the sensitive string. .

This trait. the affect or feeling of dif- ference. the connecting link. the spot where the modes join. constitutes what I will call the existential fonta- nelle. which quickly closes up again. a tiny opening.“The Thin Partition that Separates Dasein from Itself” 239 Molding and Movement The partition is the ontico-ontological articulation itself. where the beating of existence occurs. however. is not. and slight mark. modest. leaving forever its thin. made of bony membrane but of clay and movement.” It is necessary to relate the problematic of modi- *   Œ. The fontanelle. This mobile ontological materiality is what Heidegger dubs “care. Of clay en route. which never takes the same form twice.

 `  ` * q `> ¬=# ` Being and Time. the fable wherein it comes out that molding is   *    >@  Œ\* €.

she thoughtfully took a piece and began to shape [formen] it. › | was crossing a river”—a border—“she saw some clay [tonhaltiges Erdreich].”12 You are familiar with the rest. Each of them wants to name the statue †Gebilde‡ ` `Xž@`.

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have given its body. which seemed to be just: ‘Since you Jupiter. and since you. you should receive that spirit at death. dispute. have given rise to its spirit. you shall *    Z * › |   . Earth. “gave them the following decision.

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  creature. And because there is a dispute among you as to its  >    *  ›. she shall possess it as long as it lives.

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‡q13 The fable says in a preontological mode. to take @| }@ .

man is a sculpture in .

240 The Heidegger Change movement. working as much as enduring his existence  .

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 . that is. A striking occurrence of Wandel in Being and Time occurs here: “The preontological characterization of the essence of human being expressed in this fable thus has envisaged from the very beginning the mode of being that rules its temporal change in the world [seinen zeitlichen Wandel in der Welt]. This molding in movement. time. as change—temporal (ex)change.”14 Das- . the invisible joints—the thin partition of a fourfold come before its time. is nothing else but change. this clay-rhythm and partitioned care.

<s temporality corresponds to “the turning of the   q `   > *    }*.

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A naïve reading of the fable could allow one to think that existence molds Dasein like earthen clay. ~ . and its attempts to “slip away” from this very division. rhythm of the negotiations taking place in it between the authentic and inauthentic.

The herme- neutic sense the image of molding impresses onto the existential analytic is not that of self-sculpting. just evoked. The form attesting to the passages—the zone.        |  >   of the concept of form when it is understood as a       @@  >   *    not the alteration of a preexistent form. that is the place and trace of change—is the @€.

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as changing ~.     @     }   *   ` @@   under such-and-such a mode.

in reality. Care-ful molding is the scar tissue of differ- ence—not its monument.    molded and. itself neither being . The scar.” is only the degree of relaxation or vibrational intensity of the partition. modulated “according to the mobile and projectile character of thrownness.

This then is what.“The Thin Partition that Separates Dasein from Itself” 241 nor beings. of being and beings. from one Dasein  .

   >  >  The partition is the form within structure. it at the same time con- > . and in being put into play this way.

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recovered. as though it were perpetu-  >  @@   @ *  @@  metamorphosed.   threatens the latter by deforming it. sometimes inauthentically—but without ever encountering itself.  < farewell to itself. and discovered  . bid each time both hello and farewell to and also intersected with itself—sometimes authentically. it does not simply pass from room to room. unrecognizable to our- selves and always covered. in effect. Modifying the thresholds of time or modes of being. as though Dasein. The partition marks. exchanging and self-exchanging. It is instead. opening and closing their doors. How many times must we pass over the partition like smugglers. in passing. as we saw.

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tense. `> imprint into this hidden. and sickly @     — € >    `>    *       — ƒ . sensitive.

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 already indicated that Heidegger sometimes employed the word Umschlag. as though it were synonymous with %. or mutation.

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and obstinacy [Auffäligkeit]. . in the conspicuousness of what is unusable. Such a “mutation” is that which is produced. this farewell also being an encounter. this is because it can break with its * >   . signifying its mutation. “In its conspicu- ousness. “what is at hand [das Zuhandene] loses its character of handiness. obtrusiveness. surprising light. It does not just disappear. . As though the two ways of being of the tool intersected at some improbable point that marked the time of their exchange. as though its crossing the threshold of usability rendered visible its bidding itself farewell. If the tool is indeed capable of surprising us. Handiness shows itself once again [noch einmal] and precisely in doing so the worldly character of what is at hand also shows itself. when the tool “falls damaged” and appears thereby in another. for instance. but bids farewell. too. later: “The understanding of being guiding the heedful associa- tion with innerworldly beings has been mutated [hat umgeschlagen].” writes Heidegger. turnaround.”15 And then. so to speak. passage.”16 Everything takes place as though the tool emitted a sign prior to its disappearance. .242 The Heidegger Change the latter and Aristotelian +¡o_`kh– together in some of their shared senses: thrown.

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  > All of these analyses in Being and Time secretly prepare the last mutation of Dasein.”17<. its “mutation [Umschlag] into no-longer -being-there [Nur-noch- vorhandensein].

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The secret insistence in Being and Time on the plasticity of the partition already displaces and metamorpho-   . `‡  the possibility of a farewell of structure to itself.

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“The Thin Partition that Separates Dasein from Itself” 243 introducing into it. against all expectation. a line of Š.

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demands much fuller development because it already exceeds the framework of the existential analytic. in the texts immediately following Being and Time. will be bound up with the thinking of Stimmung. Stimmung.  presence nonetheless so very well “slips away” in the text. Announcing itself here is what. resolutely takes in those writings the @ |  @ * $    . or affective tone.

which further complicates the dif- ference between the authentic and the inauthentic. As the inscription of the fantastic in Being and Time   3. an equivalence not yet drawn in Being and Time. passing over the parition means surpassing metaphysics. @    * a place of division and exchange at the heart of which the existential and the historical are no longer distinguishable. Henceforth. as we will see.

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0 the one separating metaphysics from its other. ~ >€`    Being and Time from the same movement as falling prey. that is. right on Dasein. It already impresses. the improbable wrinkle of the difference of time. if what is at issue. is the same modi- .

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” if a paral-  € . >  `    separated from itself by a “thin partition.

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as the former already inscribes on \ .244 The Heidegger Change This ontico-ontological fontanelle makes the emptiness of this question apparent.

W. <s body the temporal and historical articulation between the tradition and its destruction. but all the epochs as well. It announces a crossing where not only the ecstasies will be exchanged. & V`> * ~. This is what remains to be examine through the becoming-W.

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 fate of being an immutable routine. and how some- thing like the forming of Dasein.

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.> *  can be outlined—a formation precisely corresponding to its metamorphosis.

Boring Each Other In the philosophical concept [Begriff]. Thus man in the ground of his essence is some- one in the grip of an attack. —Heidegger. to consider another line `   *  €  . attacked by the fact ‘that he is what he is. and indeed man as a whole. then. Yet the attacker is not man. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics1 Analyzing the meaning of the wall or partition in Being and Time leads us.’ and already caught up in all comprehending questioning. 10 Man and Dasein. man. is in the grip of an attack [Angriff]—driven out of everydayness and driven back into the ground of things. in philosophizing the Dasein in man launches the attack upon man. the dubious subject of the everyday and of the bliss of knowledge. Rather.

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This separation is clearly marked  |  € €.   which separates the two understandings of change from each other.

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. Finitude. And then. after 1930. Solitude attest.246 The Heidegger Change and last time as texts such as “What Is Metaphys- ics?” and The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: Word.

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This disappearance can certainly be explained by invoking the necessity (which imposed itself on him with increasing clarity) Heidegger felt of no longer taking recourse either to properly phenomenological terminology or. such  ** €  ’    ` * $ . to technical philosoph- ical language and concepts. Yet considering what is at work in this change in the lexicon of change. more generally.  @- pear from Heidegger’s oeuvre.

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a discrete but . a change .  > ` > *  for the triad of change corresponds to a complete overturning (here again. . .) of the under- standing of what it is that changes. In 1929’s “What Is Metaphysics?” and in the 1930 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.

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 off: the substitution of the Dasein-man pair for that of the authentic and the inauthentic. When the process of Dasein’  > *    *  €.

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or differences of level.  ` its metamorphosis (Verwandlung) or transformation (Wandlung). that it is with the latter no longer a question of Dasein’s experience of unevenness. one notices. in fact. on the same existential soil or plinth but of its carving out the  @ †.

.

        > € ‡ € itself and what is not itself. what no longer at all moves on the same soil. In “What Is Metaphysics?. what is its most intimate other: man.” Heidegger tells us that “This requires we actively complete the transformation [metamorphosis] of man into .

We previously recalled the statement. it promises. and the historical and metaphysical thickness of this concept of man as animal rationale bores into each Dasein. Boring Each Other 247 its Dasein [die Verwandlung des Menschen in sein Dasein . nachvollziehen]. Every Dasein bears man inside itself. to secretly undergo the experience of the accomplishment of metaphysics and what. into each of us. Man and Dasein. the history of phi- losophy in its entirety. this distance from us (through our relation to ourselves) that destines every existence. in Being and Time. . . “it was necessary from the outset to change the direction [herausgedreht werden] of our analysis from the @@ *.”2 Yet what separates man from Dasein is no longer the thin partition but rather . . even the most modest and least concerned with philosophy. . that with the existential analytic. beyond that.

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the need to think in a more profound manner this “change of direction” and to constitute it into a constant. but the crossing from the one tradition to the other. of the impossible possibility of metamorphosing philosophy. Stimmung. on the part of each Dasein (the least philosophical of them included). Which also means. the experience. instead. is the originary possibility . by a tonality: Stimmung. the transition from one mode of being to another. or attunement. the everyday experience and test. The distance opened between man and Dasein stops being marked by the form attesting to the par- tition and now is. then.      ` the human being. or no longer only. metabolic expe- rience for Dasein imposed itself on Heidegger very quickly. in other words. of the impossible possibility of overcoming metaphysics. since he will henceforth show that change is not.”3 Evidently.

” Heidegger writes in the The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. “without ori- enting ourselves toward any particular metaphysical question. .248 The Heidegger Change of the migration and metamorphosis of man into its Dasein. “We attempted. by awakening a fundamental attunement of our Dasein.”4 The deployment of the analysis of Stimmung that goes from Being and Time to The Fundamental Con- cepts of Metaphysics by way of “What Is Metaphysics?” accomplishes the metamorphosis and migration of > *  . to transform [metamorphose: verwandeln] the humanity of us human beings into the Dasein in ourselves. . .

”5 Stimmung and Metaphysics THE MIXED LEXICON OF CHANGE <. €  €€ the existential and the historical. I now invite you to return to the affective. sources of what The Fundamental Concepts calls “the possibility of a completely new epoch of philosophy. even musical.

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the fundamental affec- tive tone closely analyzed in this text. Boredom.  still sometimes coexist in this period. Solitude. as can be seen in the 1930 course collected under the title of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: Word. appears to be  >   >    *  >*. Finitude.

   power of metamorphosis or transformation. on the one hand. Heidegger effectively conceives boredom. as   .

.

“cut off from our having-been and from our future.” in boredom. This . : “we are.

. but means a dis- solution of the future and having-been into the mere present. . Boring Each Other 249 being cut-off . Man and Dasein. a . does not mean that the latter are factically removed or taken away.

.

 of having-been and future.”6    ` > .

.

.

Œš•.

  > to which we give expression in ‘it is boring for one’ has already transformed [gewandelt] Dasein.”7 The two vocabularies join and intersect so often that the    – .

> Œ> * qŒ*.

q and “transformation” interchangeably. It is true .

 .

as the latter mood is indeed characterized there  > * %.     ` >     * *  resembles the one of anxiety developed in Being and Time.

.

>    to be. like all attunement. a “mode” of “availability [†  .

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since.•q >  Œ > * ` complete being-in-the-world” that belongs. but the slippage between the two vocabularies to become noticeable. permits not the equiva- lence. as we are going to see. .8 So the mixing together of the concepts of change would itself appear to be quite unremarkable. An attentive reading. however. to care. on account of that.

 }* ` > *        *.

while the triad intervenes each time it is a question of the .  *- terize the modes of being of one and the same tone (the different “forms” of boredom for example).

.

.

 .

   .

.

“What Is Meta- physics?” shows this clearly. . as anxiety is conceived there as what brings about the metamorphosis of man into his Dasein  .

 > >   @ - ures the overcoming of metaphysics. And the 1930 * * >XŒ.

  ` > ultimately demands of us a transformation [Wandel] in our fundamental conceptions of man.”9 .

250 The Heidegger Change MODES AND MODALITIES The question that must initially be posed here con- cerns the relationship Stimmung maintains with > * <.

. . Affective tonality is not added to the modes as one mode more but is. . but a way [Weise]—in the sense of a melody that does not merely hover [schwebt] over the so-called proper being at hand of man.”11 Stimmung emerges.” of a particular type.”10 These claims immediately raise a particular line of questioning. not merely a form [Form] or mode [Modus]. An attunement is a way. . then. Stimmung enjoys no existential priority. would be destined to “hover” over the others? An attentive reading of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics could allow for a positive response to the question. What. whatever else might be said of it. the mode of being .” an archimode that. in fact. as that which ties Dasein to itself. But in reality. Heidegger in fact writes there that affective tonality is a manner of “binding [binden] ourselves to our Dasein. Œ ``*q>   > a “manner” or “way. insofar as Heidegger dubs it the “fundamental genre” or “fundamental modal- ity. but that sets the tone for such being [den Tone angibt]. In The Fun- damental Concepts of Metaphysics. rather. . . attunes and determines [stimmt und bestimmt] the manner and way of his being. [A]ttunement is a fundamental manner [Grundart]. Heidegger declares that “attunements are ways of the being-there of Dasein. a characteristic that seems to confer upon it a privileged status. that is. is the precise status of affective tonality in relation to the other modes? Should it be considered. the fundamental way [die Grundweise] in which Dasein is as Dasein.

” what Heidegger dubs their “fabric. Their milieu or “between. If the thin partition is always found to have such and such a temperament and if Stimmung is what lends the tone to these temperaments. a particular modality. Man and Dasein. Stimmung is always changing. as Heidegger says in “What Is Metaphysics?. neither is it ontological. what turns up attuned as a result of an affective tone or a particular mood— anxiety or boredom. In effect. This is €.”13 But this does not confer on Stimmung a position over them. it constantly itself changes atmospheres. Hence the transition from one mode of being to the other itself always takes place under a particular mode. of >       >    The existential fontanelle or ontico-ontological articulation is always “tempered” in a certain way and for a certain time. since Stimmung is unstable on account of its ontologically hybrid character: though not ontic. Boring Each Other 251 of the partition itself. Indeed.” “joy [Freude]”12—is the community of Dasein’s modes of being. but also.

PHILOSOPHY IN EXCHANGE Being in a mood is always being in the mood to change moods. In multiple reprises. again.  ` > The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics when he writes that “boredom—and thus ultimately every attunement—is a hybrid [Zwit- terwesen]. the way we slide from one to another or slip into bad moods . He declares in Being and Time that “both the undisturbed equanimity and the inhibited discontent of everyday heedfulness. Heidegger makes Stimmung seem less like a mood than the very pos- sibility of a swing in mood. but a manner or way.”14 Attunement. is not a being.

“Dasein as Dasein is always already attuned in its grounds. There is only ever a change of attunement [es geschieht nur immer ein Wandel der Stimmungen]. As we just saw. time. “what we have in mind is an ‘alteration’ [Änderung]. are by no means ontologically nothing.”15 Moods always “can be spoiled and change [Umschlagen]. . when he comments.” he writes.   . and even to the transit of goods and merchandise. Heidegger comments on what the “meta- bolic” is in relation to changes of mood. or Seinsverfassung. in “On the Essence and Concept of  ṕmfn. and the seasons. Mood makes manifest ‘how one is and is coming along. then. .”18 Changes of mood.”17 Attunement emerges.” on his decision to translate +¡o_`khd́ with Umschlag. We also speak of exchange points [Umschlageplätzen] where commercial goods change hands in business transactions [im Verkehr]. as the inscription of +¡o_`khd́ right on existence. attunement is what permits Dasein to be tied or bound to itself. play a fundamen- tal role at the core of Dasein’s being-constitution.”16 Moreover. which traditional philosophy never accorded any real attention.252 The Heidegger Change [das Ausgleiten in Verstimmungen]. “When we speak of a change in the weather [schlägt um] or a change of mood. .

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but that which gives Dasein consistence and possibility [Bestand und Möglichkeit]. because attunement is the originary way in which Dasein is at it is. Rather.*  Š merely subjective.”19 In effect. it is not what is most inconstant [das Unbeständigste]. “[i]n attunement [†  .

 ' .

that the essential is changing.”20 The analysis of Stim- mung. Dasein is always already brought before itself [vor es selbt]. reveals to Dasein the essential. namely. which is.]. . then.

occurs in freedom. and. . which grant Dasein its world. Possibility.”21 So if it is true that it is characteristic of metaphysical questioning for the questioner to be included in her question.22 Dasein can think only on the basis of the (ex)change (of who thinks) in it. If Stimmung is susceptible to completing the metamorphosis of man into its Dasein. Wandel. Everything that belongs to the existence of Dasein belongs just as essentially to the truth of philosophy. their being outside themselves in relation to each other is also necessary. Man and Dasein. Stimmung alone renders this rapture possible. Changes of mood. however. Boring Each Other 253 This revelation allows us to understand why Stim- mung is presented in both “What Is Metaphysics?” and The Fundamental Concepts as a fundamental condi- tion of philosophical questioning. change. Its truth is essentially that of human Dasein. It constantly moves in a predicament it does not have power over. “has meaning only as human activity. and predicament are obscure [Möglichkeit. This Dasein. in this sense. “Philosophy. It is subject to a change [Wandel] it does not know. Dasein stands before possibilities it does not foresee.” writes Heidegger. summon philosophy. disclose the meaning of the mutability of existence as freedom. und Lage sind dunkel].

through its power of rap- ture. then. The veritable root of philosophy is precisely this affective rapture. We could even go so far as to say that the origin of philosophy is the affective rapture of change granted by the essentially changing character of affective rap- ture. another foundation of philosophy.      of all because it reveals. In changing. one differ- . Stimmung announces not only the advent of another mode of being but also that of another animal. The root of philosophy is. “the affect (of the) metamorphic” as such.

.”24 This metamorphosis. of something quite other [ganz anders]. as you by now understand. of that which we call Dasein. . but also from the rational animal” and thus prepared “the metamorphosis of the human into its Dasein. is not separable from a metamorphosis of philoso- @. It casts upon man “the shadow . Heidegger tells us that the analysis of anxiety that was developed in 1929 permitted “liberating [her- ausnehmen] the determination of the essence of the human from subjectivity.”23 In the introduction appended to “What Is Metaphysics?” in 1949.254 The Heidegger Change ent than both the rational animal and man.

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The attunement “in which we ‘are’ in one way or another and which determines us through and . Stimmung enables Dasein to experience the ontological difference. it might well help to bring about a change in the human essence [ein Wandel des Wesens des Menschen].” More surely than would a lesson in philosophy.”25 Why? “Anxiety.   that “if our thinking should succeed in its efforts to go back to the ground of metaphysics. a change accompanied by a transformation [metamorphosis: Verwandlung] of metaphysics.” he continues. “grants an experience of being as the whole of beings.

.

Rather. The receding of beings as a whole. in their very receding [Wegrücken]. In the slipping away of beings only this ‘no hold on things’ comes over us and remains. oppresses us.         >     whole. This.”26 As with anxiety. Anxiety makes manifest . however. We can get no hold on things. closing in on us in anxiety. during profound boredom. is not in the sense of mere disappearance. things turn toward us. beings in their entirety “slip away” and “recede”: “All things and we ourselves slip into indifference [Glei- chgültigkeit].

Seindheit.”31 allows us to understand that beings can be of value for being and that this is precisely what happened in and as traditional metaphysics. the nothing becomes manifest in and through anxiety. “is no kind of grasping of the nothing.” Heidegger continues. All the same. Man and Dasein.”28 “Anxiety. The experience of the indifference (Gleichgültigkeit) of the whole of beings. its “everything being equal. which “is encountered at one [in eins mit] with beings as a whole. Stimmung . the nihilating of the nothing. “In the being of beings the nihilation of the nothing occurs [in Sein des Seienden geschieht das Nichten des Nichts]. . beings and being are absolutely dissociated from each other.”30 In the same stroke.”27 The nothing. strangeness [Befremdlichkeit]. the mutual exchangeability of being and beings is revealed.” the whole of beings as “radically other” to being. but as Unwesen or nonessence. Boring Each Other 255 the nothing [die Angst offenbart das Nichts]. The being of beings no longer appears qua being- ness.”29 How ought this to be understood? In anxiety. .” reveals “beings in their full .

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In the deepest intimacy of Dasein and the grip of ``*  @ .     other (ex)change.

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It can be granted that §40 of Being and Time had already brought to light the ontologico-pedagogical character. also frees the fantastic phenomenon of a possible alterity of man.   that. if it can be put that way. and the fact the expression “the ontological difference”  ` . because it makes a possible alterity of meta- physics appear. of anxiety.

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opens before it. “a central methodological function analogous to the transcendental reduction in the intentional analytic of subjectivity: it reveals Dasein to itself in its being- in-the-world toward death. “Anxiety assumes in the existential analytic.”32 However.” Didier Franck writes. in effect.    '  .256 The Heidegger Change in an instant. These movements of transformation exceed. in Being and Time the thematic of the metamorphosis and migra- tion of the human into its Dasein is not developed.

.

  .

  .

       -  . In Being and Time.

the problem rapidly changes. in order to get a grip on the nothing announced there as it makes itself known.” “is that we actively complete the transformation of man into that Dasein that every instance of anxiety occasions in us.”33 From here on. “What is required. In the subsequent texts. the analysis of Stim- mung applies less to Dasein than to the adventure of metaphysics affectively inscribed in its core. In “What Is Metaphysics?” it is less a matter of insisting  }|  @€ ` > *   €. though.*  `> * - tion restrains the metamorphic force of anxiety.” Heidegger declares in “What Is Metaphysics?.

. the way in which I go after a matter.” he adds. the furthest intimacy of Dasein) redoubles the originary turnaround to which metaphysics owes its name.” Heidegger recalls that “in Greek. method. During a discussion in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics linking the term to an elucidation of the meaning and history of the word “metaphysics.”34 But the @ } Œ+¡o_´ . behind [hinterher]. i. +¡o_´ means after [nach]. . as in .     Dasein to cross the wall than of following the strange turnaround through which Stimmung (in.e. +¡´ekbkn. “has a further meaning in   . again.

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   If I go behind a matter and go after it. in so doing .

i.”35 It is clear. I turn myself ‘around’ [umwenden] in a certain respect. but that which deals with whatever turns away from the  pmfg_´ and turns toward other beings. and this original swerve decides its destiny. of ‘turning away from one matter toward another.’ came out of a purely positional meaning. toward beings in general and toward that being which properly is.e. It is the act of turning from one thing to another. that at the origin. then. Metaphysics owes both its name and meaning to a change of direction alone. In condensing the Greek title +¡o_´ o_´  pmfg_´ into the Latin expres- sion metaphysica. the +¡o_´ has altered [geändert] its meaning. The meaning of changeover. o_´ +¡o_´ o_´  pmfg_´ now no longer means that which comes after the doctrines on physics. We have this meaning of +¡o_´ in the sense of ‘away from something toward something else’ [von etwas weg zu etwas anderem] in the Greek word +¡o_`khd́ [changeover.’ of ‘going from one over to another. Boring Each Other 257 I move away [bewege] from one matter and over to another. Umschlag]. metaphys- ics is nothing but a turnaround (Umwendung) or a changeover (Umschlag). Man and Dasein. If Stim- mung    .

 ` > ` .

If overcoming always comes down to being diverted from the very thing overcome. in an overcom- ing to the second power that grants to the concept of transcendence its authentic meaning. the turning around toward the other of . while taking this curve. Metamorphosed metaphysics is thus no longer the act of thought that consists in turning away from beings toward another conception of them (toward being understood as beingness) but the very detour of this detour. *> ` metaphysics—an overcoming that is also its meta- morphosis—this is because it imprints. a new torsion and reversal. overcoming metaphysics comes down to overcoming the overcoming itself.

It is a question of metaphysics led back to its ground. metaphysics becomes what it is: overcoming. truth.258 The Heidegger Change every being. This is why the Heidegger of the period of “What Is Metaphysics?” still calls metaphysics the outcome of the metamorphosis of metaphysics. a movement of turning toward something else and other. to asking “what is meta- morphosis?” This question. and essence. By grace of this metamorpho- sis. you have to admit. in a sense. brings into play something entirely different from the one that     '. of metaphysics metamorphosed into itself. It is in this way that asking “what is metaphysics?” comes down. toward being in its astonishing strange- ness (Befremdlichkeit).

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  Time’s Forms. Crossing the Depths ª*  *.

” The passage from each form to the other—the “descent” from surface to bottom—is    . where something imme- diately grabs our attention: boredom is presented there as taking three “forms” that correspond to its “degrees of depth. you ask. * > * €> *  and W. & V. really be established? We will start from the analysis of boredom developed in The Fundamental Concepts. W.

  Œ> * q   Œ  `> - tion [Wandlung]” or “change [Wandel]. must begin by “recording provisionally these moments of distinction with respect to depth [die Momente des Unterschiedes der Tiefe].” It is right here. on this lexical hybridity. that the border you are questioning me about is drawn. The analysis of boredom.”36 Boredom’s three “forms [Formen]”—“becoming bored by something.” “being bored with something and the kind of passing the . Heidegger tells us.

Boring Each Other 259 time belonging to it.”38 This *>* @    * .” and “profound boredom as ‘it is boring for one’ ”37—are organized into the hierar- chy of a “becoming deeper [Tieferwerden]. Man and Dasein.

since each of boredom’s “degrees” is also a degree of authenticity. the passage from one “form” or “degree” of boredom to another is brought about . So in a sense.    much ontological as affective.

.

Nonetheless. > *   *    Dasein to cover. through the rhythm of the mobility we already examined in Being and Time. the impalpable but real distance separating its authentic potential to be from its inauthentic potential to be. the introduction of the motif of depth considerably changes the analysis. as it allows for another per- @*.

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q ` >  that “comprehending the genuine context [der echte Zusammenhang] for these transformations of boredom” is of the greatest import. . this “transformation . is  >   `ˆŠ  *. .

 ` `>  [kein beliebiges. freischwebendes Verändern von For- men]. but bound to the occurrence [Geschehen] of Dasein in which boredom in each case arises in such and such a way and thereby clings to the surface or     €   *  .

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it is not just the partition between Dasein’s different modes of being that is displaced but also the historical distance separating man from the Dasein tensed up inside it. Existence is “historicalized” between distance and depth. man and Dasein bore (from inside) each other such that it would appear that the differ- ence between the forms of boredom is never only the gamut of possible relations deployed between man . In boredom. q39 The schema of articulation cedes its place here to a schema of differ- ence of altitude. Each time a form is transformed.

or into the dimension of Dasein as such [in die Dimension des Daseins als solchen]. and become bored in this contact—the metaphysics of presence become bored. is always at the same time Dasein’s transfor- mation as it leaves behind the essence of man. avoiding each other from not knowing what to do (with each other).” says Heidegger of boredom’s forms. in effect. that they are not rigid standards [starre Maßstäbe]. that of existing proper [des eigentlichen Existierens]. and Dasein.”44 “We now know . The transformation of the intensity of Stimmung. “In truth and fundamentally. which modulate the partition. . has already “changed [gewandelt] Dasein.41 Hence each form of boredom. a corresponding displacement [Verlegung] of man’s existence always occurs in advance here—either toward the surface and into the realm of his busy activities [Umtreiben]. . two different modalities of presence intersect and exchange with- out blending. are   . then.”40 Man becomes the surface of Dasein. reveal only the “depths [Tiefe]” of Dasein itself. “are in each case transformed [jeweils gewandelt]. the bottom of man.260 The Heidegger Change and Dasein.”43 Stim- mung is in this sense the “basis of a transformation of Dasein itself [aufgrund einer Verwandlung des Daseins selbst]. They cross past each other in boredom. Between man and Dasein. The degrees of boredom’s depth do not. not a } ` >€ šein festes Gerippe] that we can lay at the basis of every form of boredom. that these structural moments. a gap hollowed out between them.”45 Yet these “supple” forms. inasmuch as it is revealed to be a “changed form [gewandelte Form]”42 of the preceding.

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but of the other of man. .   not of another man.

passages.46 All the exchanges. in fact. Boring Each Other 261 STIMMUNG AND TEMPORALITY This cleavage brings us to time. and differ- *  `     . Man and Dasein. is “how times resonates” within Dasein. Boredom. transformations.

Boredom is a “relation to time. a feeling of time. a way in which we stand with respect to time.”47 Without being . Boredom and the question of boredom thus lead us to the problem of time. `  in temporality.

Œ *qŒ*  q> >> >  with its “capacity for transformation”: “time can oppress us or leave us in peace. This is ultimately bound up with its own capacity for transformation [ihr eigene Wandlungsfähigkeit].” a dull monotony that will progressively gain in depth.51 <. sometimes in this way. then time and the way in which it is as time [wie sie als Zeit ist]. sometimes in that. What is more—if boredom is an attunement.”50 The analysis of boredom begins with time that “becomes drawn out” and “long. “Becoming bored and boredom in general are then evidently entirely rooted in this enigmatic essence of time. plays a peculiar part in Dasein’s being attuned in general. i. the way in which it temporalizes [zeitigt] itself.e. Stimmung mani- fests in its changes only the manner “in which we stand with respect to time.”48 In reality.” the way in which “our own temporality temporalizes itself [sich zeitigt].”49 A strict connection links temporalization and changes of temperament in their essences.

   Œ`>q ` > .

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”52 The example Heidegger gives of it is a four-hour wait in a small train station where there is nothing to do: “We read the timetables or study the . feeling of “being held in limbo” and “left empty” as “time drags.

54 Boredom’s second form—“being bored with something and the kind of passing the time per- taining to it”55'Œ  `> q . We look at the clock—only a quarter of an hour has gone by. in reality.262 The Heidegger Change table giving the various distances from this station to other places we are not otherwise acquainted with at all.”53 ~    > Œ@ >q'€ seek. to “overcome the temporalization of time” (to kill time).

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“We have been invited out somewhere for the evening. no being can really be incriminated. Still. Yet in the boring din- ner party Heidegger now discusses.   form. we have been tense all day. So we go along.” he writes. “We do not need to go along. <. and we have time in the evening. Dasein has the impression that its boredom comes from the station itself.

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And already it is time to leave. having a chat. not merely when leaving. Thus we come home ’   ~ *   ’*  *  . nor the people. The ladies assure us. Afterward people sit together having a lively discussion. neither the conversation. There is nothing at all to be found that might have been boring about this evening.      conversation. but downstairs and outside too as we gather to leave. everything is not only tasty. perhaps listening to music. or that it was terribly charming. Indeed. and things are witty and amusing. nor the rooms. but tasteful as well. that it really was very nice. as they say.

” and the “emptiness” that so “forms [bildet]” is thus an . we are told why: we were “leaving ourselves behind. on the occasion of this invitation.”56 A little later. € we interrupted that evening. make a rough assess- ment of things and look ahead to the next day—and then it comes: I was bored after all this evening.

our proper self.”57 The prevailing feeling is of having wasted time. <. “namely. Boring Each Other 263 “abandoning [of] ourselves.” of. Man and Dasein.

 .

an “indifference enveloping beings as a whole.’ ” Heidegger says for example. Heidegger says. and “feels timeless”— Œ> `> .” we read. “Passing the time. `>  'Œ@` >  ‘it is boring for one’ ”58—is even more indeterminate. to drift. of beings recoiling in their entirety.”59 Such boredom is quite close to anxiety. “‘It is boring for one.”60 There is a feeling. “is missing in this bore- dom. “to walk through the streets of a large city on Sunday afternoon. Dasein’s pos- sibilities seem to be “left unexploited”62 such that it does not know what to do with itself.”61 In it. as during anxiety. Dasein seems here.

in shutting possibles away. but at the same time. unmeasured. and sees “transforma- tions” that show it to be. it reveals them as “given to be free. changes intensity. the possibility of a 7.”64 There is. Boredom seals off every possibility. of course. narrows. between rigid- ity and slackness. It is here that the ambiguity constitutive of boredom emerges. Š€ ` >q63 The trait common to all three of boredom’s forms is the fact that time seems to be in each of them at once stuck in the now (which is set on not passing) and irreducible to this same punctuality—it drags.

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Dasein can resolve and concentrate itself in the original. He quite sim- ply gives to it this way the time of being possible: “being held in limbo” is “being impelled toward the originary possibilization [Ermöglichung] of Dasein as such. like a now that lasts too long while no longer being able to take place. authentic point of the Augenblick. or “instant.”65 At once stuck to man and dissociated from him. between man and Dasein. Man at once holds Dasein in place and lets it out.”66 Thus “the Dasein in .

264 The Heidegger Change us oscillates out into the expanse of the temporal horizon of its temporality and thus is able only to oscillate into the instant [Augenblick] pertaining to essential action. this boredom as attunement.”67 The different forms and transformations of bore- >€. This oscillating in between [dieses Schwingen im Zwischen] such expanse [Weite] and such extremity [Spitze] is our being attuned.

*.

In effect. This dimension of metaphysical and historical doubling. Heidegger shows there the tight correlation unit-  . enable Dasein to undergo the experience of a strange kind of doubling. who is bored. reciprocally. the Dasein in man. it is not really Dasein but the man in Dasein and. though. The two forms bore each other from opposite sides of the affective parti- tion.` ** @>@ > * - tions. is absent from Being and Time.

 > *   ` Dasein’s comportments to .

The “tempo” between the expanse and the point appears in Being and Time  . in reality. > *  ` >  `  ``*    €   the passage from originary temporality to leveled or “derived” time that provides. the rhythm of the circulation of the modes of being.

 >  > *  ` .

* temporality and vulgar time.68 and it is thus always Œ>@  .

for that. that of a metamorphosis and migration. . authentic temporality is the future. and the establishment of W. In spite of this. Stimmung is not yet treated in Being and Time as an affective fracture splitting Dasein from man.” Heidegger does not yet conclude that Dasein is the future of man.  @>  > * q69 and on temporality that the properness and improperness of Dasein is ontologically grounded. From his “the primordial phenomenon of origi- nary. W. It will still take time. & V in thought. however.

Man and Dasein.”70 You are now able to under- stand this phrase and to see just how considerable . Boring Each Other 265 The Event of Existence “Going beyond beings occurs in the essence of Dasein [das Hinausgehen über das Seiende geschieht im Wesen des Daseins].

*.

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which is its epochal  * X “the fundamental attunement of metaphysics in a @* * *   .    migration is. but we have not at all dealt with what is decisive. in other words. with the boredom that today perhaps determines our Dasein here and now. Heidegger now states that “[h]itherto we have dealt with boredom in its various forms” and “have even dealt with a profound boredom. to boredom. with one form thereof. Having illumined its different forms. We come back. “has man today in the end become boring to himself?”72 What the question gets at is not whether people today are bored by certain things or more bored than they were in other eras but the historical (geschichtlich) determination of boredom: is boredom. once more. the Stim- mung of our epoch? A major dimension of Stimmung is exposed here.”71 The fundamental question that arises here is. in other words.

 >   >  `   attunement. that is.”73 Yet what is it that reveals Stimmung today? Why is there boredom today? Just why should man and Dasein be separated on account of this boredom? Hei- degger’s response is that the meaning of existence has been transformedXŒ€   q. is a matter of fate [Schicksal]. something which can change [wandelt] and does not remain binding for every era.

  Œ`* to adopt another language because of a fundamental transformation [metamorphosis] of existence [wir sind zu eiener anderen Sprache gezwungen aufgrund einer .

Ereignis.266 The Heidegger Change Verwandlung der Existenz]. existence on recess from man. man and Dasein. between being (Sein) and be-ing (Seyn).”75 What is “suddenly unveiled” is also at the same time the answer to our initial question. the term most suited to the dividing line we have sought to characterize from the start. Boredom is the affect of a historical [geschichtlich] rupture. the line between metaphysics and its other. and exis- tence and its metamorphosis? Our reading of Being and Time   *   *  pos- sible master term for change. which gets detached from it through an unappealable ontological and historical boredom. the metaphysical concept of existence). It is “suddenly unveiled. existence for itself. is . we asked. Isn’t structure.”74 This “metamorphosis of existence” is not a new existence but existence less metaphysics (less. Today. is the genuine event. that is. No structure. indeed.

In relating .  @ `> >   *  being the profound mark of its variability.

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as you will now acknowledge.   of retrospectively illumining the entire course of our journey in light of this structural mutability. perhaps. to two modes of being of one and the same structure. From the outset. is ever shattered in Heidegger. The two axes of the Heideggerian cineplastic—continuous. contiguous change and sharp rupture—correspond. Perhaps the withdrawal of being is itself a structure. After all. just as much as giving’s sequencing and the possibility of passing from one mode of presence to the other are. This logic being. migration and metamorphosis proceed without rending anything apart and operate according to a logic of replacement that has neither an inside nor outside and that works right on what it replaces. nothing. . the task proper to technology. moreover.

Boring Each Other 267 We should not forget. that migration and metamorphosis started with a . Man and Dasein. then.

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the structural whole itself) that is * @  ` *. . for him. Heidegger did not in all likelihood forget this. every- thing can change since for him it is only everything (in other terms.

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each time we incline structure in one direction or another. ineffaceable memory of metamorphosis. Very quickly. each time we modify ourselves. At the same time. a movement by which struc- ture says farewell to itself will always be evident in  * }*  `$} % very quickly after Being and Time. toward  *. Very quickly.

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a distance between them that can never be crossed. and dissociated from itself. whether they match up or if there is. W. @* *` > *  €. The difference between > *   W. There is something else besides us in us. Which is another change.         undone—unglued. that is. . the division between the proper and improper modes of being ends up substituted for by the division between metaphysics and the other thought. In effect. An entire history in the structure. & V is situated in precisely this distance. The whole secret is knowing whether these four terms form a chiasm. instead. A locus of exchange that distends the unity of the latter.

 the triad allows both the coexistence and incompat- ibility of these four terms to be tested. on the one hand. the proper and the ultrametaphysical really be so summarily addressed? The answer is both yes and no. which . But can the synonymy between. the improper and the metaphysical and. on the other.

268 The Heidegger Change explains the simultaneously fecund and sterile char- acter of the motif of structure in Heidegger: it is a jointure uniting everything as much as an irreducible gap that fragments this unity. This fecundness and sterility or strength and  ` **€.

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. Bd. in other words. 1989). respectively. Dialectic. G. 34. as happens in instances of the Old French genitive. Stanford University Press. translated by David Wills.” “transformation.. for the sake of consistency. translated by Lisabeth During (New York: Routledge.” 291 . G.A. Bd. The title. 65. Jacques Derrida and Catherine Malabou. Wandlung. Notes Translator/Editor’s Preface 1. It is intentional and with awareness of the fact that my decision is somewhat arbitrary that I have cho- sen to translate. Catherine Malabou. Temporality. 3. Catherine Malabou. Wandel. 4. New York: Fordham University Press. Ibid. 106. The Future of Hegel: Plasticity.A. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und The- aetetus. The Essence of Truth: Plato’s Allegory of the Cave and Theaetetus (New York: Continuum. 2005). 2007). Das Zuspiel and der Sprung are the titles of the third and fourth parts (or “jointures”—Fügungen) of Con- tributions to Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Beiträge zur Philosophie: Vom Ereignis. 3. 77.” and “metamorphosis. 2. elides the preposition de. 192. 2002). 2. 31. 2004. and Verwandlung as. Introduction 1. 4. Counter- path. such as hôtel-Dieu or the French title of Joseph Conrad’s Almayer’s Folly—La Folie Almayer. “change. Hereafter cited as CP. What Should We Do With Our Brain? Translated by Sebastian Rand (Bronx.

2005).” . §39. 57 (82). Aufenthalte (Frank- furt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. Hölderlins Hymne “der Ister. Hereafter cited as HHI. Bd. “Introduction to ‘What Is Metaphysics?’ ” in Path- marks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 33–34.   ¬"" #+# †#‡ <    >  20. 58 (84). 12. 113. 39. Hereafter cited as WP? 9. 73. IWM?.” in Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer. translation > Œ¥ ` qG. §41. Hereafter cited as EP. 2002)..” Winden. Was ist das. means “turning. “Die Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens. “What Is Metaphysics?” in Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 1989). Hereafter cited as WM? 6. CP §5. Caillois. Hereafter cited as IWM?. 1996).. 1956). “On the Question of Being. 71. 53. Bd. 1961).. wind- ing. Bd. 1999) 279. As in the phrase das Schiff wenden—“the boat turns or tacks. similarly. CP §37. CP §7. “screw thread. “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Think- ing. 10. 129 (184).A. 54 (77–78). 67. 16.A. Sojourns. Hereafter cited as S.. 19 (26). CP. 10–11 (14). 22.292 Notes to Introduction 5. 60. “Was ist Metaphysik? Einleitung. 3. What Is Philosophy?. 9.A. translated by Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1973). die Philosophie? (Pfullingen: Neske. “Was ist Metaphysik?. 23. 10. Bd.” in G.” and die Wendung. 368. 9. 77. §53 (113). CP §36.A. 89. Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister” (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 13. Hereafter cited as Caillois. 8. 11. 39. 7. 18. 21.€   &  ‚"‡ 71. 17. 15. 9. 281 (370).” G.” in Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cohérences aventureuses (Paris: Gallimard. Roger Caillois. 173. CP §166.” in G. 14. translated by William Kluback  ž  < ~ †\}`X . translated by John Panteleimon Manous- sakis (Albany: SUNY Press. Hereafter cited as QB.” in Time and Being. Ibid.

CP. 29. “Age of the World Picture. 1950). translated by Joan Stambaugh † . Time and Being. 27. is sometimes used in biology to indicate the displacement of an organism during the course of its development or metamorphosis. CP §256. 30. moreover. Notes to Introduction 293 24. (409). 55 (79). 34. 288. 99. moreover. 26. CP §38. CP §213. The Dudden dictionary. is an illusionist or “quick-change artist. Die Zeit des Weltbildes in Holzwege (Tübingen: Vittorio Klos- termann.” in The Question Con- cerning Technology (New York: HarperCollins. A Verwandlungskünstler. Hereafter cited as AWP. 28. {  ¬ =‚ †‚‡ <    >  {#  = <    >  33.” 25. 237 (338). 3 (3). 1977). Migration. Dudden dictionary.

* X¤ ` .

52 (56).) In effect.” The Kehre. 37. Habermas *   . for example.” in Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer. following the political engagements of 1933 and Contributions. 52–53 (56). Jean Grondin. in the elaboration of “a philosophy of passivity” destined to relieve philosophy of “all responsibility. Saying much more about these questions than the `€€   €` *X\± Der Denkwerk Martin Heideggers (Stuttgart: Neske. 1986). TB. (This text does not appear in the English translation of Farias’s book. 35. these “transformations” essentially result. TB. 53 (56–57). 11–37. treats a series of “transfor- mations” (Wandlungen) in Heidegger’s thinking as the fruit of mere opportunism. Heidegger und der Nazional-Socialismus (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag. Hereafter cited as TB.*  #++#‡‚Œ¥ Sein. 1963). Le Tournant dans la pensée de Martin Hei- degger†  X¤_!‡  ²¥  Heidegger et les paroles de l’origine (Paris: Vrin. 1961). Ibid. 36. 1989). 56. 38. See his preface to the celebrated work of Victor Farias. 40. 39. TB. Habermas.

   `.

 Œ*.

. q@  ` an initial—“ideological” and “neoconservative”—turn that began in 1929. “In 1929 . . there begins [in Heidegger] .

these Œ * q    . It is during this period that themes tied to a confused diag- nostic of the epoch and a neoconservative style insinuate themselves into the heart of his philosophy” (23). Remarkably enough. This Œ  `> q    `> Œ   *     >> - nent to Being and Time” (25).294 Notes to Part I a transformation [Wandlung] of the theory of ideology.

If “the vision of the philosopher itself changes [wandelt]” and “the existentials metamorphose themselves [verwandeln sich die Existentialen]. .A. Part I 1.” Heidegger is obviously acknowledging this criti- cism. 57. 1982). Habermas points toward the absence of a thinking of change in Heidegger: Dasein.. 41.” Heidegger’s change would simply be a function of his circumstances. ostensibly “invariable” and closed in on itself. .). On the Way to Language (New York: HarperCol- lins. EP. Bd. “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth. 149. who declared himself in favor of National Socialism in 1933.” in Pathmarks (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press. G. 1999). “did not undergo a mutation trans- forming the unhiddeness of being into the correctness of perception. and that it instead already corresponded to our “coherence” and “correctness.” he concluded. interpreted Hitler’s accession to power via the fundamental and unchanged concepts of his analysis of Dasein” (ibid. is “unable to oppose fascism. Unterwegs zur Sprache. the Plato specialist Paul Friedländer developed a critique of Heidegger that showed that _’ hd́e¡f_ did not mean “unveiledness” or “unhiddenness” even in Homer. Hereafter cited as OWL. . but without calling into question the mutability of being or truth.” the invariable “ground” of Being and Time remains intact (21). 42. In other words. It would moreover be for this reason that “Heidegger. “Platons . 177. 70–71 (66). ends up removed from the domain of true transformation—the sociohistorical—and Heidegger.” “The Greek concept of truth. In 1954. 12. not having an authentic con- cept of change.” In “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking. **@ `  Œ   *- dition of Dasein [invariante Grundverfassung des Daseins]” that kept Heidegger from “moving from historicity to real history” in his thought.

7. 16. 1954). 9.A. Hegel.” Heidegger also here says about this change that “even though the linguistic formulations of the essential constituents of being change. 11. 162 (229). . 60. Hereafter cited as WT? Was Heißt Denken? (Tübingen: Niemeyer.€   &  2003). “Metaphysics as History of Being. 2001). Notes to Chapter 1 295 Lehre von der Wahrheit. Bd. 2003). . Bd. 45. HarperCollins. G. 231. 5. 7. 2003). 6. 298. . Hereafter cited as PDT. 4. 176. Poetically Man Dwells .” in Vörtrage und Aufsätze. CP §34. 6. 299 (395).” in G. Bd. .. Hereafter cited as QB. . §18. 67. 61 (28). 8. What Is Philosophy?. Hereafter cited as OM. Bd. translated by Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1968). Bd. 45. What Is Called Thinking? (New York: HarperCol- lins. Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausegwählte “Probleme” der Logik G. 4. translated by ž  < ~  ~ > ¦ * †. “. WT?. .” in Pathmarks (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press. CP §117 (“Leap”). “On the Question of Being. 1999). 374.” in The End of Philoso- phy. 7.” in Poetry. WP?. the constituents—so it is said—remain the same.2. 45. 52 (75). 89–90 (37).” Chapter 1 1. 9. 204. Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected Problems of “Logic” (Bloomington: Indiana University Press: 1994). This passage is found in the section entitled “Der Wandel der ¡i¡la¡f_ zur actualitas.. translated by Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. .A. 2. Dichterisch Wohnet der Mensch . Hereafter quoted as WP? 2. Heidegger.A. 6. G. “Overcoming Metaphysics.” in The End of Philosophy. 223. 3. 8. “. 90 (75). 61. 68. 5. My translation..A. Thought (New York. (395). Ibid. Lan- guage. Nietzsche II.A. .. . PDT. G. Ibid. 3. QB.. Hereafter cited as PMD.

296 Notes to Chapter 1 +  ¬ "= †#{#‡ Œ<.

”  ¬"=†#{#‡<    .       end encompasses the entire history of the guiding question. from Anaximander to Nietzsche [Der erste Anfang und sein Ende umfaßt die ganze Geschichte der Leitfrage von Anaximander bis zu Nietzsche].

>  # $ <    .

41. 2008). .A. and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. II. 64–65.” What Is a Thing?.A.e. Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie. CP § 158. i. W. Heidegger makes use of W.B. 85. 190. 198 (281). Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 84.” in Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bd. 1969). §25 (“Being and the multiplicity of changing beings in the latter philosophy of nature”). >  13..” WTh?. 9.#{+   > †#""‡ 14. 1999). Also. 16. Anaxagoras. Hereafter cited as OECP. 15. 87 (88). Jr. & V in order to characterize the transition from the Greek to the modern concept of change: “Herein there appears an essential transformation [change] of the concept of physis [wesentliche Wandlung des Physisbegriffes]. 4 (“The Later Phi- losophy of Nature: Empedocles. You will notice that this occlusion—the change of the Greek concept of change. Heidegger analyzes the role of the capax mutationum in Descartes in terms of an invariable variability: “what constitutes the being of the res corporea is extensio. 78–79. Hereafter cited as WTh?.. translated by W. further down: “Corresponding to the change of the con- cept of place [Wandlung des Ortbegriffes]. Barton. the reduction of the metabolic to the phoronomic—is expressed in terms of the triad of change. and Atomism”). 248. motion is only seen as a change of position [Lageänderung] and relative position [Lagebeziehung]. vol.. G.. 22. Bd. In Being and Time. Bd. Physik B” in G. 18. G. the omnitudo divisibile. “Vom Wesen und Begriff der  ṕmfn: Aristotles. Nietzsche.A.. 17. “On the Essence and Concept of  ṕmfn: Aristo- tle’s Physics B.. Die Frage nach dem Ding. chap.

what persists throughout all these changes [Veränderun- . what can change in every kind of divisibility. plasticity [Gestaltung]. the capax mutationum. and motion.  et mobile.

56. IWM?.” 35. 85. 1995) §41. Notes to Chapter 1 297 gen].” in Identity and Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. metaphysics has a twofold character [Zweigestaltung]. By the way in which each respective man takes and gives ‘measure’ for the truth of beings. Ibid. Sein und Zeit. AWP. By circumscribing the essence of the truth of beings. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: Word. AWP. 287 (379). 2. 300 (397).” Being and Time. 33. 288 (379): “As the truth of beings as such. 28. OTCM. “Die Onto-Theo- Logische Verfassung der Metaphysik. Martin Heidegger. 287–88 (379). 79 (104). 29. 3. Off the Beaten Track. in such a way that it characterizes the substantiality of substance. 25. Hereafter cited as OTCM. Finitude. Bd. “Et il n’est pas possible à quiconque est un jour monté sur ce grand trottoir roulant que sont les pages de = Œ  .” in Off the Beaten Track. 31. whose title is “The Change of Natural Science [Wandel der Naturwissenschaft]. 2. 19. §18 of WTh?. 175 (259). and 4. In a corporeal being what is capable of such a remaining constant is its true being. 57 (75). 22. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit-Eisamkeit. trans. By the projection of beings on being. for example. By the way in which man as man is himself and thereby knows himself.A. 122–23. 74–75 (99). 1996) §19.. AWP. QB. 132 (214). “The Ontotheological Constitution of Metaphysics. 93 (139).. “Introduction to What Is Metaphysics?” in Path- marks. 20. 34.. QB. 32. G. 23.. 47.” 30. 1999). Hereafter cited as IWM?. 21. G. Bd. Solitude (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 71 (306). The Principle of Reason. 300 (215). Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press.” in Identität und Differ- enz (Stuttgart: Neske. AWP.A. 2002). remanet. The same characterization can be found in Nietzsche IV. 57 (75).” 26. 75 (99). Hereafter cited as OTCM. 29–30. 27. “Hegel’s Concept of Experience. 92: “A fundamental metaphysical position may be determined by: 1. Cf. AWP. 24.

     .

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37.. et Morand (Paris: Éditions Complexe. Bd. G. { ~<.298 Notes to Chapter 2 de méconnaître qu’elles sont sans précedent dans la littéra- ture. CP §166. Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta 1–3. Metaphysiks O 1–3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft.” Marcel Proust. Aristotles. 1987). 36. Flaubert.A. 33. 65. 22. 27. 203 (289). Sur Baudelaire.

— +" †+"‡ <    .

 >  39. NIII. =+ \ ‚ †‡ <    . 93 (120).

2002) (G. 155 (203). Parmenides. >  41. PDT. 2. QB. Nietzsche. trans. 176 (230). Chapter 2 1. The appearances of this particular change— “Wandel der Wahrheit. and the 1948 course. is substituted for the ‘ontological’ truth conceived by the Presocratics and Heraclitus as outside the withdrawal of beings..A. 299 (395). Bd.” “Wesenswandel der Wahrheit”—are numerous. Hereafter cited as P. G. Bd..” “Wandel des Wesens der Wah- rheit. 176 (230). PDT. conceived as the agreement of proposition and thing. =‚ <    >  Parmenides. translated by Ted Sadler (New York: Continuum. 66. I am intentionally using Form and Gestalt interchangeably since Heidegger. PDT. Bd. Nietzsche: Der Europaïsche Nihilismus (G. sees little reason to distinguish between them. 1992). earlier conception cedes its place to another. or rather that an original. as we will discuss. ‘Logical’ truth.. As Alain Boutot indicates in the preface to his trans- lation of The Essence of Truth: “Heidegger contends [here] that a new conception of truth attempts to manifest in Plato. derived one that will be from that point on preponderant. They are most developed in the 1932 course on Plato. 54. 3. 48).A.” . On The Essence of Truth: Plato’s Cave Allegory and Theaetetus. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 34). 5. 4.A.

justice. and uprightness. Notes to Chapter 2 299 Parmenides (1942–43) is where Heidegger’s most exten- sive development of the motif of the change of essence of truth is to be found. He conceives of it in terms of a double historical articulation: Greek—the change of the essence of truth achieved with Plato’s philosophy—and Roman: the change accomplished with the romanization of _’ hd́e¡f_. which is to say the interpretation of “exactitude” (Richtigkeit) as accuracy. See also .

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 Π  * `.

and goes ¡fn’ o_po_. . the ‘ideas. iusticia. 7. 170 (215). ‘out toward’ those things. the Primacy of the Subject and its Deployment. 1998). which is entitled “The Uttermost Transformation of Metaphysically Conceived Truth [Der aüßerte Wandel der metaphysisch begriffen Wahrheit]. Nietzsche et l’ombre de Dieu (Paris: PUF.” and “The Trans- formation of p/kg¡f+¡ikiinto subjectumq    @  III of the 1948 course. 165. 39–52.’ ” PDT. Wahrheit. On these changes. “Der Wesenwandel der Wahrheit und des Seins als der verborgene Grund des Vorrangs der Subjektivität und ihrer Entfaltung”—“The Change of the Essence of Truth and of Being as the Foundation . 10. 9. certitudo.” 6. namely.” “The Change of energeia to Actualitas. PDT. . 11. PDT. PDT. The two volumes of Nietzsche are rife with discussions of the thematic of the change of the essence of truth. rectitudo. PDT. PDT. “Metaphysics as History of Being. 180 (235).” See also the text from the second German volume (available in The End of Philosophy in English).” whose initial chapters are “Whatness and Thatness in the Essential Beginning of Metaphysics: fb¡_ and ¡i¡la¡f_. 8.” The opposition of the true and false becomes the opposition between the just and unjust and is fully achieved in the Roman determination of the imperium. 167 (218). 167 (218).  `>  [Wandels] of _’ hd́e¡f_ (veritas. “Thinking goes +¡o’ ¡´r¡fi_ ‘beyond’ those things that are experienced in the form of mere shadows and images. See in particular chapter 20 of part I of book 3 of the English edition. see the analyses of Didier Franck. (215–16). 180 (235). Gerechtigkeit). .

34. CP §110. 181 (236). PDT. PDT. “Bildungq  @*   Œ>   `> [Bilden] someone in the sense of impressing [Prägung] on him a character that unfolds. PDT. 15. 180–81 (235). 13. 14. P. 181 (237). Thus at one and the same time “formation” [Bildung] means impressing a character on someone and guiding someone by a paradigm [Geleit durch ein Bild]. 17. 168 (218). But at the same time this forming someone “forms” (or impresses [prägt] a character on) someone by antecedently taking measure in terms of some paradigmatic image [an einem maßgebenden Anblick]. 180 (235). QB. 151 (216). {‚ ƒ< !" †#{+‡ <    . 180 (235). PDT. PDT. 166–167 (217). 181 (236). PDT. 19.300 Notes to Chapter 1 12. 18. 177 (230). 181 (236). 32. 22. 175 (227). 23. 26. 299 (395). 28. 180 (235). 16. which for that reason is called the proto-type [Vorbild].” PDT. PDT. 166 (216). 29. PDT. 27. PDT. PDT. 178 (233). 25. PDT. #+ ƒ< "! †#‡ <    >  21. 31. 24. PDT. PDT. PDT. 164 (214). Ibid. PDT. 30. PDT. 33. 167 (218). 180 (235). 181 (236). 51 (75). PDT.

42. PDT. 177 (231). 182 (238). PDT. 167 (217). 40. PDT. 167 (218). 37. 38. 181 (237). 177 (231). . PDT. 41. PDT. >  36. PDT. PDT. 39. 164 (213).

30: “the metamorphosis of humanity in meaning.A. 47. 69). Bd.A. “On the Essence of Truth. hier und heißt nur: die Wesung der Wahrheit des Seyns]. §31. 45. 44..” =  ‚‚ †+‡     . 48. 9 201.” d. 154 (202). Notes to Chapter 1 301 43. 46. 1938–1940 (G. See Die Geschichte des Seyns. ET. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. 154 (202). 143 (185). ET. Bd.” in Pathmarks. 154 (202). Hereafter cited as ET. which is. G. ET. 153. and only means: the ‘essence’ of the truth of be-ing [die Einverwandlung des Menschentums in den “Sinn. ET. h.

. G.A. . On the difference between the reproductive . translated by Albert Hoftsader (New York: HarperCollins. h.’ wesentlich begriffen. 42–43 (63). ist der Wandel des Wesens des Wahrheit. . . Thought. Sie ist ‘nur’ dieses. und d. that is. 1997): “if in the imagination the . where Heidegger says that “the power of imagination is . . . 1997). P. it is a free power of invention [Dichtung]. Lan- guage. . in its enactment it gives freely. objectness. Thus the productive power of imagination is original. appearance of an object is freely composed [frei gedichtet]. Bd.”) 50. aus dem Wesen- grund des Seins selbst gedacht. . 3. 417). 2001). the power of imagination is called ‘productive’ ” (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. (“Die Rede vom ‘Wandel der Wah- rheit’ ist freilich ein Notbehelf. .. .” in Poetry. . . . Hereafter cited as PMD.’ ”) 51. denn sie spricht noch gegen- ständlich von Wahrheit und nicht aus der Weise. 130). “. G. Poetically Man Dwells . See the 1927–28 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Blooming- ton: Indiana University Press. Bd. in that it freely forms the universal horizon of time as horizon of .A. . . 283 (Phänomenolo- gische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 52. ontologically creative. >  †“ ‘Die Geschichte. then . 223 (204). 25.. wie sie selbst west und die Geschichte ‘ist.” The same characterization of the productive imagination can be found in Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

1. First Incision 1. Heidegger also says here that “such thinking lets all being count only in the form of what can be set at our disposal and consumed [nur in der Gestalt des Beistellbaren und Verzehrlichen zur Geltung bringt]. 1999). 2. PDT. 2002). “This change [Wandel] in the essence of truth is present as the all-dominating fundamental reality—long- established and thus still in place—of the ever-advancing world history of the planet in this most modern of times. 6. Hereafter cited as NI. 2001). 1999). Ibid.. 3. 3. Hegel et l’idéalisme spéculatif (Paris: Vrin. Friedrich Nietzsche. 9. 68 (66). . Glenn Gray (Harper: San Francisco. The Gay Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 69. Hereafter cited as WT?. Nietzsche G.” in Off the Beaten Track (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press. 2.A. 308–9. WT?. Hereafter cited as PWM?.” Chapter 3 1. Martin Heidegger.A. NII. Here- after cited as AS. Martin Heidegger. 275 (365). 181–82 (237). translated by David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco. Bd. trans- lated by J. see Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron. 1968). 148–49. 6. Bd. 4.” PDT.” in Holzwege. 235. “Postscript to ‘What Is Metaphysics?’ ” in Path- marks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche Volume I: The Will to Power as Art. 274. “Anaximander’s Saying. AS. What is Called Thinking?. 151. x (417). “Nachwort zu: ‘Was ist Metaphysik?’ ” in G. 364. 12.302 Notes to Chapter 3 and creative imaginations. 5.. 5. 4. “Der Spruch des Anaximander. 182 (237). especially page 77. 1991).

211 (213). NI. 136 (138). 118 (118). 24. 29 (454). 16. 15. 6. 24 (449). 28. NIII.. NI. 119 (118–19). Hereafter cited as NIII. 30 (249). {= ¡$$ #{ Œ~   ¡– *. NI. NI. 25. Notes to Chapter 3 303 6. NII. 29 (454). 7. NI. 34 (254). translated by David Farrell Krell (Harper- Collins: New York. NIII. 17. 20. NIII. NI. NI 61. WT?. NII. 27. NI. NIII. 18. 51 (21). 29. 120 (120). 8.A. NIII. 10. 31). 135 (137). 200–201 (203). 30 (455). 95–96 (526). 12. 73. NI. NI. (57). 13. 26. 119 (551). 19. Nietzsche G. 33.2. 31 (456). 31. 183 (401). 23. NIII. NII. 115 (115). NI. NI. 96 (526–27). NIII. 31. 21. 61 (57). 456. 14. NIII. 9. Bd. Nietzsche III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics. 51 (49). 22. NIII. 24 (454–55). NI. 11. 32. 136 (138). 30. 28 (453). NIII.

  ¥  .

Ibid.. 158 (252). 7. Hereafter cited as GID. 1950). 38. G. 208. 193. 262. “Nietzsche’s Word: God Is Dead.A. NII.’ in Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. . 47 (266–67). Bd. 121–22.  —q  Vörtrage und Aufsätze. 37. “Nietzsches Wort: ‘Gott ist tot. On the relation between the Overman and the metamorphosis of man. 39. 2002). 35. 36. NII.” Off the Beaten Track (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. see NI.

300 (397). 44. Nietzsche. 300 (398). 228 (275). 41. 205. Ibid. NIII. Nietzsche Volume IV: Nihilism. Ibid. 45. 301 (398). 32 (252). NIII.. QP.304 Notes to Chapter 4 40. G. in the main line of this ambiguous relation: the domination of the worker corresponds to the > ` @     €. QB. Bd. NII. translated by David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins. 59 (279). 6. 47. 49. Jünger’s Der Arbeiter is inscribed. 309. NII. 48. 230.2. 42.A. 299 (396). QB. My emphasis. (277) See on this point the analysis of the links between Protagoras’s position—man as measure— and Descartes’ cogito. according to Heidegger. 50. 1991). Hereafter cited as NIV. QB. 43. 46.

Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. NII. 52. 196–97: “The contrasting concepts of Apollonian and Dionysian that I introduced into aesthetics—what do they mean. 2005) §10. 173. on the other hand. Hereafter cited as KML. Twilight of the Idols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. so that it gets the power of vision. as types of intoxica- tion? Apollonian intoxication stimulates the eye above all. 51. In the Dionysian state. Chapter 4 1. sculptors. 22 (241). self-certain will to power. translated by Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Friedrich Nietzsche. Painters. 7. 2. 1986). 3. CA. On this power. poets are visionaries par excellence. `   Œ  of measure”—a new. 231 (122). see in particular. the entire system of affects is }*    X  . NII.

   *.

>        `>    @  of mimicry and play acting. releasing the force of presentation.     >  of expression at once. all at the same time. The .

Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. especially the  *  ` . he will not miss any affective signal. He enters into any skin.” 4. into any affect: he constantly transforms himself. he has the most highly developed instinct for understanding and guessing. the inability not to react (—similar to certain hysterics who can take on any role at the drop of a hat). Notes to Chapter 4 305 essential thing is the ease of metamorphosis. 1991). just as he possesses the art of communication to the high- est degree. It is impossible for a Dionysian to fail to understand any suggestion. See on this point Marcel Détienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant.

 > >@.

 " Œ~ €|    *. On Heidegger’s relation to Kafka.   ` ¥     5. below. see chap. note 15. 8.

@  .

8. 306 (434). CP §40.” KML. 15. . 13. whereas our method works only where only a rupturing and heterogeneous line appears). 18. CP §7. 122 (173). 14. CP §259. or his bestiary (the archetype works by assimilation. . We believe only in a Kafka experimentation. The text is also reprinted in his Fonc- tion du cinéma (Paris: Gonthier Méditations. +  ¬ = †‚‡ <    >  11. 16–36. 131 (186). Élie Faure. 57 (83). 1922).  € @- resent Kafka’s imaginary. 17. CP §8. his dynamic.” in L’Arbre d’Eden (Paris: Crès. CP §1. CP §160. CP §32. 20 (28). 198 (282). “The talk of the end of metaphysics should not >       . 12. 9. 50 (72). and thematics. 7. 7. 16. . 1964). 19 (26). “De la cinéplastique. homogenization. CP §92. CP §85. 3 (4).

 @.

 @.

    .

 €.

124. 119 (169). die Philosophie sei mit der ‘Metaphysik’ fertig]. CP §38. CP §82. 162 (227). 55 (78). 22. 19. CP §89. 21. 20. CP §116. . ‘metaphysics’ ” [Die Rede von Ende der Metaphysik darf nicht zu Meinung verleiten.” Ibid.

Ibid. #‚  ¬#{ = †‚‡ <    . 24. 129 (184).306 Notes to Chapter 4 23. CP §91.

My translation. The verb einrücken means both “to go back (into)” [rentrer] and “to go (in)” [entrer]. 197 (280). 37. 130 (186). 33. CP §117.” in Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens. 29. >  26. 128 (183).. 130 (185). 30. CP §92. 162 (229): “Das ganz Andere des anderen Anfangs gegen den ersten läßt sich verdeutlichen durch ein Sagen. “Hebel—der Hausfreund. CP §91. 61 (58). Here- after cited as HHf. das scheinbar nur mit einer Umkehrung spielt.” 27. Translation slightly modi- †“Dieses Denken darf nie in eine Gestalt des Seienden 7”     . WT?.A. 171 (242): “Seine Wesung muß wie ein Stoß erwartet werden. 38. 137–38. 31. 8–9 (5–6). CP §259. Bd. CP §91. 298 (422). 34. 35. CP §157. 13. während in Wahrheit sich alles wandelt. NI.” 28. CP §125. 131 (186). 32. 36. CP §213. 237 (338). CP §92. G.

 .

   *.

     |.

\.      gesammelten Reichtum seines gefügten Dunkels erfahren.

 \ ' '   .

 7‹ .

1–145) or the Lycian peas- ants who are turned into frogs (OM VI. Hereafter cited as OM. 243–97. Minerva’s transformation of Ariadne into a spider (OM VI. for example. Ovid. Metamorphoses. translated by David Rae- burn (New York: Penguin Books. See also.”) 39. X. 5. OM. 331–38). 40. } - losen folgen. 2004). Dieses Denken muß diesseits von Gestalt und Gestaltlosem (was ja nur im Seienden ist) im Abgrund des Gestaltgrundes den Wurfschwung seiner Geworfenheit auf- fangen und in das Offene des Entwurfs tragen. =# \ . 41.

 >@ * ` .

 >` ` Š.

  .

 Metamorphoses. see Jacqueline Fabre-Serris. Mythe et poésie dans les Métamorphoses d’Ovide (Paris: Klincksiek. .

For a description and analysis of represen- tations of the Metamorphoses in Renaissance painting. 225. see this remarkable work: Michel Jeanneret. sculpture. Notes to Chapter 4 307 1995). !‡  @*    `. and gardening. Perpetuum mobile: Métamorphoses des corps et des oeuvres de Vinci à Montaigne (Paris: Macula.

 *.

@ ŒGrotesques et corps monstrueux. 45. 25 (39). See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.” The metamorphosis of plants is ordinarily conceived of as the process of their internal differentiation into parts  Š€ @   >  @  `  . Ibid. 2009). §4. FCM. The Metamor- phosis of Plants (Cambridge: MIT Press. 6: “the process by which one and the same organ appears in a variety of forms has been called the metamorphosis of plants.” 43. 44.

     and the same primordial form—Urform or Urgestalt—that @@    .

none arouses our curiosity more than metamorphosis. As common as they are. . this primordial form nature plays with. to develop “into a plastic image . .” 46. Goethe’s project is. as Rudolph Steiner says in his commentary on the text. the transformations of the caterpillar  .   > `   @    that particularizes itself in them. The biologist Marcel Abeloos declares that “among the spectacles offered by the development of animal forms.

 Š  .

  @  .

Out of a larva capable of leading for some months an independent existence sud- denly arises a completely different being. how is it conceivable that a       @* *  ` ` *  . ` >  defy the ordinary rules of life. If it is admitted that there is a general tendency to imagine the course of ontogen- esis as the preparation of an adult adequately equipped for its particular type of life. and its sexual reproduction makes it so that each generation can be seen repeating this same sequence.

Les Métamorphoses (Paris: Armand Colin. . where life undoes what is has engendered in order to reconstitute it on a new plane?” Marcel Abe- loos. 5.  of an organism destined for a completely different kind of existence? What is the meaning of these erasures of embryogenesis. 1956).

23 (32). CP §11.308 Notes to Chapter 4 47. It is most often through his dia- logues with Nietzsche (both explicit and not) that Heidegger @ .

 Š* .

 `.

’ <. he emphasizes that Nietzsche thinks passage and transition as the bridge to the superman: “three simple matters . right after this. ‘he is a rope strung between the animal and the superman. The passing over [das Übergehen] 2. is a passage.$What is Called Thinking?. the last man. Man. a transition. . The site to which the passage goes [Wohin der Übergang geschieht]” (WT?. He also says. seem to suggest themselves by the word ‘superman’ understood in its plain meaning: 1. 60). overpasses man as he is. he is a bridge. . The site from which the passage leaves [Von wo weg der Übergang geht] 3. unless he stops with the type of man he is. that “the superman goes beyond [über].

 @>  *  .

  `> [Gestalt] of man to which he who is passing over passes  ¥  .

   .

> `     .

 @>    .

     @    .

>'.

   .

CP §5. 60) Finally. the crossing of this bridge remains for Hei- degger a far too continuous/continuist motif. PR. WT?. 11 (14). 70) Nonetheless. 51. 50. for instance.” (WT. he never presents the metamorphosis of man as a bridge leading from the animal rationale to Dasein. ‚# . this is why. WT?. 50 (75–76). ‚ †!"‡     >  <. 49. @- man in the process of becoming. 41–42 (16–17). 12 (48).” (WT. 48. also: “The superman constitutes a transformation [Verwandlung] and thus a rejection [Abstoßen] of man so far.

53 (77). ‘Being’ does not fall within the orbit of the principle of reason. 54. PR. CP §256. Being ‘is’ the abyss in the sense of such a remaining-apart of reason from being. @  this phrase comes from reads: “Ground/reason remains at a remove from being. 56. PR. ‚! $ <    . it remains groundless. 60 (80).” 53. 53 (79). 288 (410). To the extent that being as such grounds. PR. rather only beings do. 55.

53 (80). PR. . >  58.

PR. The phrase “true equivalents” is taken here from a passage from Goethe that Heidegger places at the end of this text: “If someone regards words and expressions as sacred testimonials. Part II 1. QB. 54–55 (81–82). 322 (425–26). PR. 60. 56 (83). rather than bring-  . Notes to Chapter 5 309 59.

“Von dieser Bedeutung von Wandlung. “is made of value [sich geltend macht] for being” and beingness “of value for kp’ mf́_. 8 (8). where Heidegger says that essence. seeking instead to employ them as true equivalents in intellectual exchange [im geistigen Handel und Wandel]. or beingness. 27 (29). The economy of the “of value for” makes an appearance in Contributions in §132. 7. f’b¡´_” and also. CP §7 (26): “diese übereignende Zueignung ist Ereignis.” CP §132. TB.” Heidegger declares that “the point [here] is not to listen to a series of propositions. augenblick Verkehr] like tokens [Scheidemünze] or paper money [Papiergeld]. . but rather to follow the step of an approach that shows [sondern dem Gang des Zeigens zu folgen•q<    . 5. then one cannot chide him.>  ’*  Š **  šschnellen. bleibt jene scharf zu unterschieden. consequently. die im Hinblick auf die Metaphysik gesagt ist.” 2. PR. 2. TB.” TB. Chapter 5 1. 4. Here at the end of the prologue to “Time and Being. for “objectness . TB. EP. 6. 176 (25). die in der Rede gemeint ist. 56 (100–101). as condition for the possibility of the object. 52 (56). 78 (78). daß das Sein verwandelt wird—nämlich in das Ereignis. Cf. . 2 (2).” 8. TB. 3.

>   { <Z " †"‡ <    >  .

52 (56). Fission: the division of an atomic nucleus into two or several nuclides then capable of undergoing a series of transmutations. #+ <Z # †#‡ <    >  # <Z # †#‡ <    . TB. 18. TB. 5. 8 (7–8). 6 (6). 16. 6. 19. 9. TB. 10 (10). 10. 8. 6 (5–6). TB. 14. TB. TB. 6 (5–6). 6 (6). TB. TB. 8 (8). 9 (9). TB. 7. 7–8 (7). 8 (8). 13. TB. 2 (2). 11. 12. TB. TB. TB.310 Notes to Chapter 5 4. 5 (5). TB. TB. 5 (5). 17. 15. 9 (9).

TB 16 (16). TB. 17 (18). 15 (16). 23. TB.” 27. 26. 19 (19). 19 (20). TB. TB 40–41 (22): “Eine aufgewandelte Auslegang des Seins. 12 (12). 28. TB. 25. 29. >  22. TB. 24. {+ <Z #+ †#+‡ <    . TB. 19 (20).

20 (21). 40–41 (44). TB. >  31. TB. 33. 21 (22). TB. {= <Z = †==‡ <    . 32.

27 (24). >  35. TB. 8–9 (9). TB. TB. 36. 41. TB. TB. . 37. TB. 39. 38. 5–6 (5–6). 17–19 (18–20). 45 (48–49). 5 (5). 22 (22–23). 40. TB.

48. BG. PWM? 236 (310). . And accordingly essence means Ereignis.” 44. Geschehnis der Wahrheit des Seyns. 50. CP §164–66. . TB. TB. 2. 53. Und demgemäß meint Wesung das Ereignis. das ist Wesung]. . 3. 202 (288). . 38. BG. . . 9 (9). TB. Cf. 52. BG. 6 (6). Occurrence of the truth of be-ing—that is essential swaying [Wesen ist hier nur das andere Wort für Sein (verstanden als Seiendheit). 8 (8). Kosky (Stan- ford: Stanford University Press. 36.” TB. BG. for example. BG. Being Given: Toward a Phenom- enology of Givenness. translated by Jeffrey L. 46. 47. Notes to Second Incision 311 42. 37. BG. 45. Heidegger writes in the last of those sections that “essence here is only the other word for being (understood as beingness). 49. 4. 37. 41 (44). in the “Summary. TB.” CP §166. BG. 43. Hereafter cited as BG. 37. See. TB 22 (22): “Being vanishes in Appropriation [Ereignis]. See also. TB. 41 (44). 43.” the reproduction of this statement from “The Letter on Humanism”: “For the ‘It’ which gives here is being itself. 2002). 34. 51. Jean-Luc Marion. 35. Second Incision 1.  ‚ $ <    .

Heidegger reproduces this sentence in FCM. . 174. Bd. 2001). G. 178. translated by Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.A. 7. “Das Ding. 7.. “The Thing.” in Poetry Language.” in Vorträge und Aufzätze. Given Time I: Counterfeit Money. >  6. Hereafter cited as TTh. See Jacques Derrida. Thought (New York: HarperCollins. 7. 1992). 8. 72 (108).

A PACS is established through a * *  € @  €     . 2. CP §5. CP §139. 183 (260).312 Notes to Chapter 6 9. CP §32. 49 (70). translation slightly altered: “Das Sein selbst. Anfall means assault or attack as well as beginning and debut.” 3. It grants certain rights once only associated with marriage to couples who do not wish to marry or are not legally allowed to. BG. das Ereignis als solches erstmal sichtbar. The “Pacte Civil de Solidarité” (PACS) is a new form of civil union that was established by French law in 1999. 4. Chapter 6 1. 114. 11 (14).

 *  .

.

“The Turning. CP. 6. translation modi- Œƒ¦. 144 (207). 8. 7.” in The Question Concerning Technol- ogy (New York: HarperCollins. 50 (72). §32. §107. CP. 1977). CP §32. 5.  ` @@  * `  ‘*  ` *   can be dissolved fairly easily. 38. 49 (72).

15 (15). QT. 53 (56–57). 9. 79. 16 (16).” which reprises and further develops the 1949 lecture “Das Gestell” (G.” See P. “Die Gefahr. 16. 17. Hereafter cited as QT. 38. The former appears in Die Technik und die Kehre (Pfullingen: Neske. 12. den Bestand . “Das Ge-stell läßt. 13. Bremer und Freiburg- er Vorträge . 11. QT. 1962). 40 (58). Bremer und Freibürger Vorträge). Ibid. 14. The Christian God is a “god who commands [ein befehlender Gott]. . . 79. 52.A. Bd. See on all these points the 1955 lecture “Die Frage nach der Technik.. .” in G.A. 10. TB. Bd. Hereafter cited as TT.qDie Technik und die Kehre (Stuttgart: Günther Neske. QT. 15. and can be found in English in The Question Concerning Technology under the same title (“The Question Concerning Technology”). 1962)..

20. TT. TT. 24. 38 (38). 26 (25). my translation. 51. TT. DG. DG. Alles gilt gleich. 42 (40).” Hereafter cited as DG. indem jetzt das Sein in der Weise des Ge-stells west. 54. Das Ereignis dieser Vollendung der Seinsverges- senheit bestimmt allererst die Epoche. 38 (38). nicht überhaupt und nicht von jehrer. das Abtsandlose herrschen. 25. 52. 22. 37 (37). #! << ={ †=#‡ <    . Das Wesen des Ge-stells ist das Sein selber des Seienden.  << {! †{!‡ <    >  19. QT. 44 (42). QT. 17. 26. sondern jetzt. “Das Gestell ist das Wesen der modernen Technik. DG.” 23. da sich die Vergessenheit des Wesens des Seins vollendet. TT. Notes to Chapter 6 313 bestellend. 21.

The passage in its entirety reads: “The essence of technology. QT. {! <. The transformed meaning of the word ‘enframing’ [Gestell] will perhaps become more familiar to us now if we think enframing in the sense of destining [Geschick] and danger [Gefahr]. QT. 30 (26). 43 (42). 31. TT. >  28. 43 (42). 20 (19). 32. 38–39 (37). QT. 36. 30 (26). is the danger. as a destining of revealing. TT. QT. 28.” {{ << = †=+‡     >  {= $ <      >  35. 29. QT. 30.

1999).” in Identity and Differ- ence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hereafter cited as PI. 35–36. 39. . QT. 30 (29). { †##‡ <    >  38. TT. 2002). 41. in Identität und Differenz (Stuttgart: Neske. 29 (28). 42. QT. 30 (29). “Der Satz der Identität”. 40. 269–270. 41 (40). “The Principle of Identity. QT.

DG. See PI. I develop this point in “Pierre Loves Horranges: Levinas-Sartre-Nancy—An Approach to the Fantastic in Philosophy” (Umbr(a) no. 2. C §110. 52. 52. QB. NI. 54. 48. 52. DG. 24 (10–11). 47. 99–114). 147 (149). 37 (26). PI. PI. 3. Chapter 7 1. 49. DG. where I char- acterize the philosophical fantastic as the appearance in   ` . 23–24 (9). and §121 in particular. BC. 58. QT. 51. Ibid. ‚ ¡$ =!= †{!‡ <    >  60. 36 (26). 177 (179). Ibid. DG. 45. 57. 148 (139). 1: 2006. 55. 30 (30). 52. PI. 4. Cf. the analysis of the Befremdlichkeit of being in Contributions to Philosophy. 146 (209). 53. TTh. See in particular WM?. 40 (28). 44. PI. 61. 46. NI. PI. 303 (401). 39 (28). 50. 53.314 Notes to Chapter 7 43. 44. 56.

 *  ``* @* *  $ >@ to show how Sartre conceived the real effect of existence in both Being and Nothingness (in “Quality as a Revelation of Being”) and NauseaX  > *  ` .

   .

 roots of a chestnut tree. the ontico-ontological difference. See TTh. as their new form. Two passages from Deleuze and Guattari are rel-   . that cause them to reveal. 5. 177 (181). 6.

 <.

vol. trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: .   **  Œ*>ˆ>@*@q and comes from A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 2..

Notes to Chapter 7 315 University of Minnesota Press. 279: “The impercep- tible is the immanent end of becoming. For example. to become an   @ * > . slips through molecules. 1987). its cosmic formula. Matheson’s Shrinking Man passes through the kingdoms of nature.

   Morand’s Monsieur Zéro Š  .

forming the particle + €. and dies imperceptible. establishes an anonymous society in Lichtenstein of which he is the only member. descends the scale of states.   *  *   the smallest ones.

 .

   X ›$ >  >  €.

 Š   €>> €    €.

>  .

indisernible. Becoming-imperceptible means many things. €|  Š      $ must no longer offer a target. What is the relation between the . . .’ But what does becoming- imperceptible signify? . . . impe- ceptible. . . . impersonal? %    @  € X      q <. . and the . the .

 second passage is from Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature ** Œ*>ˆ>q€.

*.

  .

  > X Π .

  € @ ` @> .

TT. Ibid. be the merely negative sign of a crossing out. TTh. 18. rather. +¡o_`khfgḱnX †‡ ** *.  own patois. his own third world. Ibid.” the “crossing out” of being is also treated as an index of exchange: “the sign of this crossing through cannot. 178 (182). 9. however. In “On the Question of Being. his own desert. QT. 8. 30 (31). 10. 15. toward the four regions of the fourfold and their being gathered in the locale of their crossing through” QP. See also the last chapter.” KML. 11. 43. 13. 7. 12. §32. It points. 33 (34). C. QT. 14. 171 (242). 311 (412). C §125. 49 (70).

211 (276). OECP. 191 (249). OECP. OECP. OECP. markets. of variable quantity. 16. bargaining. (2) Of or pertaining to exchange. 21. inconstant.  \  # <    >  20. Ibid. 17. 190 (249). 210 (275). 18. X @@ Š}- ible. changing. .

Heidegger’s thinking of the history of being largely draws its resources from the metaphysical conception of form (as Form.316 Notes to Third Incision 22. here- after cited as FP. According to him. 2009). 305–306 (404). 26. Lacoue-Labarthe again characterizes Heidegger’s thinking ` *®  † . QB. Massachusetts: Blackwell. So for Heidegger. QB. 1990). Art. Bildung.” See Heidegger. In Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry (Champagne-Urbana: the University of Illinois Press. etc. Lacoue-Labarthe coins the expression “ontotypol- ogy” to characterize Heideggerian destruction. 299 (395). OECP. 25. and Politics: The Fiction of the Politi- cal (Cambridge. 211 (276). 305 (404). Prägung. 24. QP. OECP. # °Z {+{ †=++=+‡ <    >  29. 239 (345) 23. 27. QB. Gestalt. 303 (400–401). “politics is derived from a plastic operation.) that it nonetheless pretends to destructure or destroy.

49 and 55. 32. 30. 1966). Discourse on Thinking (New York: Harper & Row. Here- after cited as DT. 9 (9): “When thinking attempts to pursue something that has claimed its attention. Cf. 33. it may hap- pen that on the way it undergoes a change [daß es sich unterwegs wandelt]. FP. 1992). It is not known. 308 (437). ƒ   ). 86. 16.” CP §259. striking (Schlag). 31. whether the last god is “one or many”: “ob eines Einen oder Vieler. PI. fashioning. Gelassenheit (Neske. Heidegger writes in Contributions. and typing as ontotypology.” {= ƒ< ‚‚ †#=‡ <    .

Translation mine. 138–39. DT. My translation. >  35. 55 (24). 36..” translated by William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University   "‡ {+ <    . Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister. HHf. Third Incision 1.

 >  Hölderlins .

” G. Ibid. as we know. Lacan. Hereafter cited as TI. 5. Bd.A. Notes to Part III 317 Hymne “Der Ister. TI. 33 (39). 35. 4. that is. Ibid. elaborates a concept of the real as resistance to symbolization—to idealization.  "  ¬# # †{#‡ <    . 53. 2. 3.

die Frage nach der Warheit. This. Part III 1. 107. 4. from 1925–26. Theodor Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2010) (Logik.. 58 (84). 3. Marie-José Fourtanier. 1992) (Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. 1979). trans. See in particular the 1912 Neuere Forschungen über Logik. Le Tournant dans la pensée de Martin Heidegger (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1995).. >  7. 10 (14). Bd. G. for example.. Bd. according to the Index zu Heideggers “Sein und Zeit” (Tübingen: Niemeyer. Delfosse. G. where Heidegger speaks of “the danger of misinterpreting Being and Time . 2. 60–61 (87). 1987). and Logic: The Question of Truth. Bast and Heinrich P. 21). the 1925 History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena. 6. Cf. §42 of Contributions.A. CP §5. G. Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heideggers “Sein und Zeit.” where Heidegger thematizes the necessity of a change of the ground and soil (Wan- deln aus Grund) of the question of the meaning of being by relating the latter to the site he assigns it to in Being and Time. “From Being and Time to Ereignis.A.. 1. 1968) and Rainier A. CP. See Contributions §43. Com- mentaire (Paris: Bertrand-Lacoste. Metamorphosis. 5. 9.A. 20). Jean Grondin. The texts that precede Being and Time attest to this. 1: Stellenindizes Philologisch-kritischer Apparat (Stuttgart: Fromann-Holz- boog. translated by Thomas Sheehan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ovid.” Bd. Bd.

Ziel. See La Revue Philosophique 4: 403–16.” The “ground of Dasein [die Gründung des Da-seins].und Wertsetzungen. [vorhandene Quelle der Leiden- schaften. BT §30.]”—which Being and Time did not entirely overcome. 131 (186). I would like to refer the reader to my article “Une différence d’écart: Heidegger et Lévi-Strauss. Heidegger lays out the traditional metaphysical determinations of the concept of man—“the thinking animal [denkende Tier]. + _ ¬=#+{†#‡<    . requires something else besides “the moral-anthropological [das ‘Moralisch- Anthropologische’]. as extant *`@       ˆ    out with a character. 167 (186). On this point.318 Notes to Chapter 8 in this direction.” which analyzes the provenance and meaning of structure in Being and Time.e.” he says. 346 (492). ‘Sein und Zeit’ in dieser Richtung ‘existenziell’- ‘anthropologisch’ zu mißdeuten].” In §272. 9.” 7. ausgestaltet mit einem Charakter usf.. BT §38. Triebe. ‘existentiell-anthropologically’ [die Gefahr. etc. The concept of structure is itself also partly taken from the phenomenological lexicon. 8. i.

“The Metamorphosis. Hereafter cited as M. 53. 1952). 2.>  Chapter 8 1.” in Selected Short Stories of Franz Kafka (New York: Modern Library. We will see in the course of this analysis that Heidegger often resorts to the term Umschlag to express Œ*. Kafka.

q .

Ibid. BT §44. 5. 205 (223). BT. 94. “The Decision of Existence. 6. 7. BT §5. 8. 16 (19). BT §7. 1993). 28 (32). Jean-Luc Nancy. 148 (159). §7. Hereafter cited as BP.” in The Birth to Presence (Stanford: Stanford University Press.   >`> * .>>- ber that Heidegger elsewhere uses Umschlag to translate +¡o_`kh–. 9. BT §33. . 3. 4. 29 (33).

misgiving. 1998).” 12. In a letter dated June 27. Heidegger writes the following: “The Kafka volumes have arrived. All > *   ` `  š%. anxiety. 19. shyness. See Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger. Thank you so much for this great gift. Cf. 15. See the analysis of fear in BT §30. 183 (261). 14. 1950. Notes to Chapter 8 319 + Z< ¬! {     >  11. is what can be concluded from reading his correspondence with Hannah Arendt. 1967. but I could tell that it will take a great deal of work to really read them. 133–134: “We are familiar with further varieties [Abwandlungen] of fear. such as timidity. This. translated by Andrew Shields (New York: Harcourt. M. BT § 42. 2004). I started to leaf through them. Briefe 1925–1975 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.” The letter from September 24. this statement from §27. 13. 122: “the sameness of the authentically existing self is separated ontologically by a gap from the identity of the I maintaining itself in the multiplicity of its ‘experiences’ [Erlebnismannigfaltigkeit]. in any event. Letters 1925–1975. in which Arendt again insists on the importance of Kafka goes unanswered. 91 and 97 (Hannah Arendt–Martin Heidegger.

'.

. chapter III: “The Authentic Tem- porality Potentiality-for-Being-a-Whole of Dasein. See Part One. BT §27. 24. note 5. See Part Two. 58 (62). 167 (238). 21. The three fundamental existentials.’ ” Heidegger also says here that “the factors constitutive of the full phenomena of fear can vary [können variieren].” (This is also referred to in chap. 170 (241). BT §13. BT §38.” 470. 4. 22. 58 (62). chapter VI: “Care as the Being of Dasein. 122 (173). BT §13. 17. BT §69. BT §39. 464 (464). moreover.) 16. above. 23. 300–301 (327).    = ] as pos- sibilities of attunement point to the fact that Dasein as being-in-the-world is ‘fearful. 25. 19. and Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care. 18. BT §65. appear only after the analysis of the everydayness of Dasein has been elaborated (via being-in-the-world).” particularly §39–41.

“is not how does ‘derivative.320 Notes to Chapter 8 26. 121 (171). The analysis of temporality again clearly dem- onstrates this. BT §60.’   > › €. 30. 29. 31.” writes Heidegger. BT §27. 32 (36). “The problem. BT §41 (182). BT §7. 28. 27. 274 (394–95). BT §31 (37).

*.

become primordial/originary  >@    .| ‘* present things come into being and pass away.

 .

as inauthentic.€ does inauthentic temporality. temporalize    >  `  >q Z< ¬"‚ {+= †{{+{‡ {#  *    >  @   ¬‚= †Œ<.

: Humanities Press. §65 (“Temporality as the Authentic Mean- ing of Care”). 57. Dastur rightfully recalls that Eigentlichkeit and Uneigentilichkeit are terms that emerge in “The Logical Investigations of Husserl. 34. 39. 37. and §69 (“The Temporality of Being-in-the-World and the Problem of the Transcendence of the World”). De Kafka à Kafka (Paris: Gal- limard. 38. N. This latter text—which for Heidegger represents the height of Husserlian phenomenology—demonstrates how the ‘empty’ intentionality of symbolic thought. and the Preliminary Sketch of Its Temporal Interpretation”). . §67 (“The Basic Content of the Existential Constitution of Dasein. 40. 35. §60 (“The Existential Structure of the Authentic Potentiality-of-Being Attested in Conscience”).J. translated by François Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Atlantic Highlands. 1981). 303 (329). 73. 23. BT §27. - lem of an Attestation of an Authentic Potentiality-of- Being”). Heidegger and the Question of Time. who himself found the distinc- tion between the authentic mode of intuitive thought and the inauthentic mode of symbolic thought in the work of his master Brentano (see . 122 (130). M. Françoise Dastur. §64 (“Care and Selfhood”). the Sixth Logical Investi- gation). BT §54. Hereafter cited as HQT. M. 36. 27. which . 33. . 1998). BT §65. Maurice Blanchot. 247 (267).

Notes to Chapter 9 321   @    €  ` .

6. tranquilizing. BT §54. 48. 52. . 41. becoming thereby an ‘authentic’ thought. 256 (369). . LOS. BP. The full passage where this phrase is found reads: “The phenomena pointed out of temptation. 7. “On disparaît sur place . Transposed to Dasein as a whole. 99. 68. M. 261. and originally found in Emmanuel Levinas. 51. “Mourir pour . 106.” HQT. which is rendered as “the they” in English. Ibid. . 4.” The pronoun on corresponds in French translations of Heidegger’s thought to German das Man. 68. 45. BT §38. Ibid. . 42. 82–83. BP. and self-entangling † >‡ *. BT §54. translated by Daniel W. 8. 5. BT §44. 49. Chapter 9 1. 167 (179). 256 (369). Gilles Deleuze. 248 (268). LOS. 23. 46. BP. BT §57. 47. 1988). Hereafter cited as LOS. 2002). this distinction accounts for the non-substantial character of Dasein. 255 (369). 43. Francis Bacon: Logic of the Sensible. 248 (268). Quoted by Nancy on 401. 10. 9. 2. alienation. 50. 67. BT §38. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. *   `   an intuition. 167 (178).” in Heidegger: Ques- tions Ouvertes (Paris: Collège International de Philosophie- Osiris. 256–257 (369). Ibid. BT §57. 3. 61. 248 (268). 44. BT §57. 204 (222). BT §57. BT §54.

 *– .

 @* *  `  ` falling prey. We call this kind of ‘movement’ of Dasein in .

BT §41. OECP. For Heideger’s analysis of stress. 178. 22. 10. 185 (263). 128 (135). 126–27 (134). 21 (31). see his Zollikon Seminars: Protocols—Conversations—Letters. BT §16. FCM. 17. 11.322 Notes to Chapter 10 its own being the plunge [Absturz]. 330 (477–78). 21. This inclusion of questioner and question in each other corresponds to the awakening of a basic attunement . 183 (261). 82 (123). 14. Ill. BT §42. BT §29. 14. 184 (263). 4. 67 (101). Dasein plunges out of itself into itself. 3. 18. 89 (113). 7. 9. 88 (132). FCM. 13. 2. BT §29.” 11. FCM. WM. BT §42. 124–25 (187–88). 13. 135–36 (204). FCM. BT §42. translated by Franz Mayr (Evanston. 67 (101). Ibid. 20. into the groundlessness and nothingness of inauthentic everydayness. 19 (28). FCM. 68 (102).: Northwestern University Press. BT §42. 19. 150 (225). 15. FCM. 2001). 17. 132–43. FCM. FCM. 69 (100). 15. 16. 12. 93 (110). 5. 191 (249). Zollikoner Seminare (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. FCM. 350 (509). 77 (116). FCM. FCM. 184 (262). BT §69. WM. 12. 8. FCM. BT §41. 6. 1987). Translation slightly >  ! Z< ¬=! ## †{!‡ <    >  Chapter 10 1. 182 (196).

27. Notes to Chapter 10 323 allowing for this “gripping” (which is both a gripping and being gripped). See FCM. WM. IWM. 279 (368). WM. IWM. 87 (110). 24. IWM. 89 (112–13). 30. FCM. WM. 282–83 (372). 88 (111–12) 28. 91 (115) 31. 23. WM. 7 (9). 29. 90 (113). drifting here and there in . 26. 6 (9). “Profound boredom. 25.

respectively. 73–74. and 4 of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. 34. FCM. WM. 130 (196). FCM. from the headings for chapters 2. —Trans. 3. 33. This boredom manifests beings as a whole. 87. 37. 36. FCM. Heidegger et le Problème de l’Espace (Paris: Éditions de Minuit.    `  } *   >`Š ` >  all things and human beings and oneself along with them into a remarkable indifference.” WM. 1986). These three phrases are. 38 (58). { $     >  <. 39 (58). 89 (113). 32. 35. Didier Franck.

in part.” Heidegger writes. 40. 42. albeit in a transformed [changed] form [in gewandelter Form] and not so conspicu-    .  ` ¬# `> which this material comes is entitled. FCM. 155–56 (233). “but of learning and understanding how to move in the depths of Dasein. “The becom- ing deeper of the second form of boredom [das Tieferwerden der zweiten Form der Langweile]. 128 (194). 157 (233).” FCM. “[T]he second form of boredom has the struc- tural moment of being left empty. = Œ$     >  `      ` - dom home with you. 39. 131 (198). FC.” FCM.

  q _  ## †‚‡ ={ _  {‚{"     >  ¡ .

 the French translator of the seminar sometimes renders Œ€ q  Œ> ­q †    @*  .

. *   ¬#‚‡ and sometimes. as “transformé”. as he does in this passage.

60. 49. FCM. 48. Hegel. 51. FCM. 127. 65. 68. Jean-Paul Sartre. WM. 55. 307 (396). 141 (213). 50. 78 (118). We can see here how time. 182 (270). FCM. 52. 67. FCM. FCM. FCM. 64. FCM. 98 (148). 70. FCM. 46. FCM. the dinner party. as Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron puts it. 119 (180). 98 (149). FCM. FCM. See his Le Temps: Platon. 109 (165). In a sense. 72. 149 (223). 80 (120). BT §67. These terms are repeated throughout FCM. Nausea. 132 (199). Heidegger (Paris: Vrin. FCM. and exchanges. “So . 135 (204). and the city) are all place of encounters. 74. 58. 144 (216). 56. FCM. 59. 99–105. FCM. FCM. 75. 1978). 47. Cf. Notice that the examples for each of the three forms of boredom (the train station. My translation. 161 (242). FCM. 96 (121). FCM. 69. crossings. FCM. 66. FCM. 138 (207–8). FCM.324 Notes to Chapter 10 44. 62. 137 (206). FCM. 157 (235–36). 98 (148–49). FCM. 61. FCM. translated by Lloyd Alexander (New York: New Directions Publishing. 53. 352 (511). 141 (213). 45. FCM. 54. FCM. 63. 127 (191). 57. 2007). 80 (120). 73. 71. 151 (226). 203 (298). 106 (160). FCM. “detaches” from its “concept” (Begriff) and becomes confounded with its own transformability. the only thing the novel contends with is this metamorphosis of existence into an event. BT §65. 93 (140). FCM. 151 (227). 135 (204).

Notes to Conclusion 325 a change has taken place. “[A] small crowd of metamorphoses accumulate in me without my *   .” says Roquentin.

Heidegger also sees National Socialism.” “Heidegger . 169. translated by Ewald Osers (Boston: Harvard University Press. Martin Heidegger: A Political Life (New York: Fontana. and on all before whom. Also: “I had never understood what it >    }  Œ†#!     > ‡  Œ }  is simply to be there” (131). “Spiegel-Gespräch mit Martin Heidegger (23. One could say that he spiritualizes National Socialism. 1999). and political life are concerned. See just as much. 5. 3.” which is to say its form and force: “Heidegger says sometimes Prägekraft or prägende Kraft” (40). R. on everything he thus sanctions and consecrates at such a height. Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2006). imprint. Martin Heidegger. 16. Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges. 4. 38. 47. Hereafter cited as R.A. on page 41 (676): “I know of no paths to the immediate transformation of . In Of Spirit. he commits himself. 6. 300. 302. Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil. . of the German people. Derrida notes. Conclusion 1. confers the most reassuring and elevated spiritual legitimacy on everything in which.” in Martin Heidegger: Philosophi- cal and Political Writings. Bd. 10–11 (12).” in Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges. and spirit in “The Rectorship Address. Jacques Derrida underscores the structural tie joining the motifs of force. IM. Where the rela- tions between Heidegger’s biographical. I have made frequent refer- ence to both Hugo Ott. 671. philosophical. 1989). Hereafter cited as DS.” See Jacques Derrida. R.         takes place” (4–5). . “Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel’s Interview. 2. 39 (673). 1994) and Rüdiger Safranski. 7. as “the imprint (Prägung) . G. DS. September 1966). edited by Manfred Stassen (New York: Continuum.. . .

160. NII. 9. 131 (353). 13. + ~& =# †{+‡ <    >  11. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. assuming that such a thing is humanly possible at all. 12. 11 (12). 1993). translated by Frederick Law- rence (Cambridge: MIT Press.” 8.326 Notes to Conclusion the present situation of the world. Jürgen Habermas. 142 (361). NII. IM. TB =‚+ †‚{‡ <    .

the aspect is dissociated from the appearance. the visage is made absent right in the face. and resurrec- tion as they are treated in “The Gardener. 23–25. . Jesus. >  14. and Michael Naas (New York: Fordham University Press. Nancy writes. 2000). sliding under it. He has already left. The departing [la partance] is inscribed onto presence. Créer.” the admirable chapter of the book devoted to the “unrecognizable” face of the resurrected Christ. Giorgio Agamben. the body is sinking into the body. 110. 2003). migration. is “the same that is no longer the same. 17. he is no longer where he is. translated by Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. The Future of Human Nature (London: Polity Press. I regret that I cannot discuss at length here the ties between metamorphosis. Jürgen Habermas. translated by Sarah Clift. he is no longer as he is. He is properly only his impropriety” (28). . Is metamorphosis the past or future of resurrection? 16. presence is presenting its vacating. Means Without End: Notes on Politics. 2008). The latter formula—plasticité d’errance—is found in Thierry Davila’s very original work Marcher. \Œ 7œ . . Pascale-Anne Brault. 29. 15. Jean-Luc Nancy: Noli me tangere: On the Raising of the Body.

 .

99. Thought (New York: HarperCollins. 190 (249). 18. 279. “What Are Poets For?. Hereafter cited as WPF? # ~_— + †#‡ <    . Language. 2001). 22–23. OECP.Œ <  XXe siècle (Paris: Éditions du Regard. “Wozu Dich- ter?.” in Holwege.  \  #! †#‚‡ <    >  20. 2002).” in Poetry.

. >  22. WPF?. 132–33 (314–15).

“Age of the World Picture. trans. 33. and when relevant. G. “Der Spruch des Anaximander. of Heidegger’s complete works are to the German edition: Gesamtausgabe (G. 1995). trans. Metaphysiks O 1–3: Von Wesen und Wirlichkeit der Kraft. 1977).) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. . 327 . Bibliography of Cited Works by Heidegger The titles of German works follow those of their English counterparts.`*    @* * >  Band (Bd.” in Holzwege (Frankfurt/Main: Klos- termann. Die Zeit des Weltbildes in Holzwege (Tübingen: Vittorio Klostermann.” in The Question Concerning Technology.. Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek (Bloomington: Indiana University Press.).A. Bd. Aristotles. Listed works are limited to those cited in the text.A. abbrevia- tions for English titles come at the end of each entry. Hereafter cited as AS. William Lovitt (New York: Harper- Collins. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Uni- versity of Cambridge Press. Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force. trans. “Anaximander’s Saying. 2002). 1950).” in Off the Beaten Track. 1975 to the present). 1950).

Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press. trans. 69 “Hebel—der Hausfreund. Discourse on Thinking. 1995). Fini- tude. Cited as DT. Cited as BT.” trans..” in Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge.. Metcalf and Mark B. Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie. G. trans.. G. 1992). 22. . Bd. trans. G. Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausegwählte “Probleme” der Logik. 29–30. Bd. Bd. “Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung.328 Bibliography of Cited Works by Heidegger Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy. Die Geschichte des Seyns. 1961). Parvis Emad and Ken- neth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 65. 1938–1940. Contributions to Philosophy. trans. 2... 79. Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt-Endlichkeit- Eisamkeit.A. G. Hans Freund (New York: Harper & Row. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloom- ington: Indiana University Press: 1994). Gelassenheit (Pfullingen: Neske. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1989). Bd.” in Aus der Erfahrung des Den- kens. 1950). trans. trans.A. Bd. 2002). Bd. Bd. Hereafter cited as DG.. Bd. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Being and Time.A. Hereafter cited as CP. Bd. Sein und Zeit.A.. 13 “Hegel’s Concept of Experience. Tanzer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press.A.A.. Hereafter cited as FCM.A. 1966). The Essence of Truth: Plato’s Allegory of the Cave and Theaetetus. 34 “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking. Robert D. Solitude. “Die Gefahr. 2002).” in Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.. John Anderson and E. Beiträge zur Philosophie: Vom Ereignis.A. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: Word. G. G. trans.” in Off the Beaten Track. 45. EP.A. Ted Sadler (New York: Continuum. G. Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected Problems of “Logic.” in Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer. Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlen- gleichnis und Theaetetus. 2008). G. 1996). 2002).” in Time and Being. G. “Die Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens. trans.

. Volume. trans. Besinnung. die Frage nach der Wahrheit.A. Walter Kaufmann. G. 2006). trans.. 6. “Metaphysics as History of Being. Nietzsche Volume I: The Will to Power as Art.. The- odor Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press.” G.. Hölderlins Hymne “der Ister. Hereafter cited as NIII..A. 1992). 6. “Introduction to ‘What Is Metaphysics?’ ” trans. 309. Logik. 6. trans. 2010). 1991). 1996). 3. Bd. Bd. David Farrell Krell (HarperCol- lins: New York. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. trans. Nietzsche Volume III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics. 1991). Nietzsche. G. Nietzsche.A.” in The End of Philoso- phy.” G. 1997).. 20. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco.2.2.. 21. History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena. IV: Nihilism.. Hereafter cited as HHI. Logic: The Question of Truth.” Off the Beaten Track. G.. Nietzsche G. Bd. Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. 368. Bd. Nietzsche. 6. Bd. Nietzsche Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same. 66. Hereafter cited as WM?. William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Bd. Hereafter cited as NII.A. Nietzsche Volume II. 53. 39. trans. in Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. trans. 1991). “Nietzsches Wort: . Bibliography of Cited Works by Heidegger 329 Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister. 31).A. Bd. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.A.2. G. Bd. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.A. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco. Bd.” trans. 9. “Was ist Metaphysik? Ein- leitung. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press.1. David Farrell Krell (New York: HarperCollins. Thomas Sheehan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. Hereafter cited as NI. trans. G. trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (New York: Continuum. trans...1. Bd.A.A. trans. Nietzsche. G. 1999). G.A. 6. 2003). Hereafter cited as NIV. Mindfulness.. “Nietzsche’s Word: God is Dead.. 2002). Bd.A. G.

.” G..A. “On the Question of Being. Thomas Sheehan. 9.A. 1999). ed. “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Manfred Stassen (New York: Continuum. 9. Thomas Sheehan. 2002). Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.” in Identity and Difference (Chicago: University of Chi- cago Press. G. G.A. Parmenides. “On the Essence of Truth. 1982). John Sallis. 9. “Die Onto-Theo-Logische Verfassung der Metaphysik. trans. “Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit.” trans. 1.. 1999). trans. 2006). Language.. Thought. Cited as P. “Spiegel-Gespräch mit Martin Heidegger (23. William McNeill. trans. 1997). Par- menides.” trans. Bd. Cited as OET. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. “. Neuere Forschungen über Logik.” in Poetry. Bd. 262. “. “On the Essence and Concept of  pmfn: Aristotle’s Physics B.A.” in Martin Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Writ- ings. “Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel’s Interview.” in Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges. Bd. 54. 1999). . in Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cited as OTCM. . Bd. . Cited as OWL. 25. Dichterisch Wohnet der . 9. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press...” G. “Vom Wesen und Begriff der  pmfn: Aristotles. .” trans.’ ” in Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Klos- termann.” trans.” in Identität und Differenz (Stuggart: Neske. Bd. Poetically Man Dwells . Physik B” in G. trans. in Pathmarks. Bd. Bd... Cited as PDT. 1950). Hertz (New York: HarperCollins. 47. . in Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.” G. 1999). Albert Hofstadter (New York.. “The Ontotheological Constitution of Metaphysics. Unterwegs zur Sprache.A.A.A. Harp- erCollins. “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth. September 1966).330 Bibliography of Cited Works by Heidegger ‘Gott ist tot. Peter D. Cited as OECP. 1992). G.A. On the Way to Language. Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. “Zur Seinsfrage. Cited as OQB. in Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2001). Bd. 12. G.

.” in Identität und Differenz (Stuggart: Neske. “Was ist Metaphysik?. Cited as WT?. 1954). “The Thing. Cited as WM?. 2002).. “The Principle of Identity.. John Panteleimon Manoussakis (Albany: SUNY Press.” trans.” in Vorträge und Aufzätze.A.A. “Zeit und Sein. Cited as TT. .” Holwege (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. . ~†\}`X. “The Turning. trans. William McNeill. Cited as PI. 1999).. 2001). “What Are Poets For?.” in Poetry Language. G. trans. Was Heißt Denken? (Tübingen: Niemeyer. J.€  &  . G. 1962). “Nachwort zu: ‘Was ist Metaphy- isk?’ ” G. Cited as S.” in Vörtrage und Aufsätze. trans. “Wozu Dichter?. Glenn Gray (New York: HarperCollins. Bd. “What Is Metaphysics?.’ ” trans.A. 9. Albert Hof- stadter (New York: HarperCollins. William Kluback and Jean T. 1977). 1950). 1989). Aufenthalte (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann. 1968). “Postscript to ‘What Is Metaphysics?. What Is Called Thinking?. Bd. Bibliography of Cited Works by Heidegger 331 Mensch . Bd 7. David Farrell Krell.. “Der Satz der Identität. trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bd. trans. Language. 279.” in Poetry. Cited as R. 2001). trans. Thought.” Die Technik und die Kehre (Stuggart: Neske. 7.” in Identity and Difference (Chi- cago: University of Chicago Press. “Die Kehre. 16.” Zur Sache des Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer. Thought. Time and Being. Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges. 1999). Cited as TB. 2002).A. Cited as WPF?. 9. What Is Philosophy?. Cited as TTh. G. “Das Ding.” in The Question Concerning Technology (New York: HarperCollins. Albert Hofstadter (New York: HarperCollins. Bd.A. Sojourns. 1961).” in G. 2005). Cited as PMD. in Path- marks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1999). in Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press.

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trans. Zollikoner Seminare (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.332 Bibliography of Cited Works by Heidegger Zollikon Seminars: Protocols—Conversations—Letters. 2001). 1987). Franz Mayr (Evanston. .: Northwestern University Press. Ill.

R. Agamben. H. Gallimard. M. Paris. M. Means Without End: Notes on Politics. «Folio Essais». P. 2000). Vicenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Other Works Cited Abeloos. 1956). M. De Kafka à Kafka. A und Delfosse. Handbuch zum Textsudi- um von Martin Heideggers «Sein und Zeit» (Stuttgart: Fromann-Holzboog.. Bast. Blanchot. G.. 1979). 1981.. Butor. Les Métamorphoses (Paris:Armand Colin. trans. *%..

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Caillois. 1998). F. Heidegger And The Question Of Time. Second Thoughts (UK title.S. François Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Atlantic Island. Cohérences aventureuses (Paris: Gallimard. trans. Jean Stewart. trans. (Paris: Editions de Minuit. % Œ \Œ 7œ .: Humanities Press. Jean Stewart. 1958) / A Change of Heart (U... title.J. Dastur. 1957). 1973).. Davila. T. 1959). N. trans. R.

Œ.

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333 .¡ (Paris: Editions du Regard. Deleuze. Guattari. Kafka. 2002). trans. ———. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Daniel W. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.. 1987). Deleuze. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. G. trans. G. vol.. trans. F. 2. Francis Bacon: Logic of the Sensible. 1986).. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minne- sota Press. 2002). Toward a Minor Litera- ture.

———. J. trans. Counterpath. 9 . 1995). ———. Paris. Farias. J. 2004). Galilée. L’enseignement de Nietzsche et la politique du nom propre. in Fonction du cinéma (Paris: Gonthier Médiations. M. Fabre-Serris. Mythe et poésie dans les Métamorphoses d’Ovide (Paris: Klincksieck. Ovide.. Given Time I: Counterfeit Money.. Heidegger und der Nazional-sozialismus (Frank- furt/Main: Fischer. Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. E. V.. Commentaire (Paris: Bertrand-Lacoste. Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Détienne.. P. Fourtanier.. 1995). Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.334 Other Works Cited Derrida. 1991). M. J. ———. et Vernant. Otobiographies. Métamorphoses. 1989). «De la cinéplastique». Franck. David Wills (Stanford: Stanford University Press.. 1989). D. With Catherine Malabou. 1984. 1964). trans.. Faure. 1992). J.

1997). Habermas. The Future of Human Nature (London: Polity Press. 1983). J. 2009). 11–37. 1958. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. 1961. Goethe. . herausgeben von Dorothea Kuhn und Rilke Wankmüller. L’Horizon herméneutique de la pensée contem- poraine (Paris: Vrin.. J. ———. W.. 1986). ———.. 1989). The Metamorphosis of Plants (Cambridge: MIT Press. 2003). Grondin. %     87 @ in Naturwissen- schaftliche Schriften I. M. Métamorphoses des corps et des œuvres de Vinci à Montaigne (Paris: Macula. Foreword to Victor Farias’s Heidegger und der Nazional- sozialismus (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer. 1968). Le Tournant dans la pensée de Martin Heidegger (Paris: PUF. Hamburger Ausgabe. Heidegger—Werk und Weltanschauung. ———.      ¡    <   (Paris: Editions de Minuit. trans. Jeanneret.. J. Bd 13. 1993). ———. 1987). Index zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Nie- meyer. Perpetuum Mobile.

Maréchaux. P. ———..” in Selected Short Stories of Franz Kafka (New York: Modern Library. «Mourir pour». Levinas. trans. Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political. “Pierre Loves Horranges: Levinas-Sartre-Nancy. Der Arbeiter (Stuttgart: Klett. Other Works Cited 335 Jünger. Lisabeth During (New York: Rout- ledge. Über die Linie (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann. Chris Turner (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1990).. E. in Heidegger. 1988). Kafka.. 1981). trans. 2007). 2005). trans. Lacoue-Labarthe. P.. Heidegger. Dialectic. 1952). 1: 2006. C. F. ———.. ———. Heidegger and the Politics of Poetry. “The Metamorphosis. The Future of Hegel: Plasticity. Questions ouvertes (Collège International de Philosophie-Osiris: Paris. Jeff Fort (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Malabou. 8 . E. 1950) (Stuttgart: Cota. 1980).. 9–114). An Approach of the Fantastic in Philosophy” (Umbr(a) no. Temporality.

J.).. ———. Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness. trans. Paris.L. Jeffrey L. herausgeben von G. L. 2003). Twilight of the Idols (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press. Simon Sparks (Stan- ford: Stanford Univeristy Press. 2002). ———. Marion. Coli und M.. R. Proust. J. Lloyd Alexander (New York: New York Direction Publishing. Kritische Studien- ausgabe.¡   £     Métamorphoses d’Ovide (Paris: PUF. 1987). Noli me tangere: On the Raising of the Body. Flaubert et Morand (Paris: Edi- tions Complexe. 1963). Pascale-Anne Brault. Safranski. Nancy. Sartre. Heidegger et son Temps. 2005)... Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press. O. 1996. 2008). Sarah Clift and Michael Naas (New York: Fordham University Press. The Gay Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.. Montinari. M. F. ed. Nietzsche. P. Sur Baudelaire. . 2001). ———. Grasset. Sämtliche Werke (S. Nausea. Der Denkwerk Martin Heideggers (Stuttgart: Neske.. trans. Pöggeler. trans. 1999).. A Finite Thinking. J. W. 2007).

1986–1990). ———. Marlène Zarader: Heidegger et les Paroles de l’origine (Paris: Vrin. L. 1978). . Hegel et l’Idéalisme spéculatif (Paris: Vrin. J. Hegel. Heidegger (Paris: Vrin. 1999)..336 Other Works Cited Vieillard-Baron. Le Temps: Platon.

286 Guattari. 228. G... P. 298 Friedländer. 286 Boutot. 291. 304 Eckhart. 42. M. 326 Habermas. G.. 305 Badiou. M. 314 Dastur. 48.. 37. 309 Cheah. 152. 81–83.. J.. Descartes... Caillois. 323 Blochmann.. G. W. 306 50. 280. 307. 297. 200. xiv. 317 Cronenberg.. 284. 304. 152 Aquinas. 292 174. 326 183... 305 Adorno... T. 282. 298 Faure. F. 201... 227. 206. 298 337 . 85.. xii. 183.W. 49. xvii Daphne. V. 100. Meister. R. 107. 273 Freud. 298. 40. 112. 293. Benjamin.. 62. D. xvii Fourtanier. 223 Goethe. 38.F. 101. 50. Farias... 41. P. 314. Fabre-Serris. F. A.. xviii. 13.. 307 Détienne. XVII 317 Blanchot. 101. 325 279. M.W. 237. Th. 113 Agamben. 39. 294 Butor. 328 296 Heraclitus. 256. 327.... 291. 275.J. 304. 330 Flaubert. J. 101.. Derrida. E. 285.. xxvii Grondin. 311. M. xvii. 293.. 299. xviii. 288. A. 227. Index Nominum Abeloos. 320 Franck. 293 296. T. E.. 297. 326 Apollo. 49. 320 Davila. 113.. D. 281. 251. J. 62 Aristotle. 295. R. 321 Hegel.. J. 40. J. 187–189. Deleuze. G. 302. S. M.. 324. 114. 294.

264. 20. 101. 299.338 Index Nominum Hölderlin. 50. 286. 277 Vernant. 294. J-L.. 287. 33. 325 Samsa. 273. 305 Nancy. 146. 2. 330 328. F. 293 77–91. 314. 152. 303. 298 Lacoue-Labarthe. Vieillard-Baron.. J-L. 21.M. M. 307 Odradek.. Maldonando-Torres. 287 xvii Sandman (The). B. 318.. 329 302–304. Jupiter. 286. 102. 305.P. F. M. Kant. Ovid. 60. 198. 315. xvii Marx. 21. 289 121 Levinas. 152. 324 321. 239 128. 214.. xvii Leibniz.. 324 153. 314. Plato.P. 298. 329. 85. 211. 197. 174. 329 Jeanneret.W. vii. J.. Zarathustra. 286. 49. G. 121. xi. 111–113. 314. M. 45.. E. 318–320 82. E... R.... 79. ix. 228. 316. 100. 233. 99. I. 39. 189. 286 Jünger. 304 48. 291.. 216. 57. 239. N. 203. 229.. 190. 170. 317 Kafka. 193. J. 37–40. J. 200.. 286 Marion. 270. 308. 100. 301. R. 95. 27. 99. 22.. 326 Nietzsche. 143–146. 225. 330 Proust. 48. K. Zarader. 227. 53–70. 86. 321 Safranski.. 96. 120. 102. 91–94. 225. 295–299. 33. 308 .. 194. 227. 48.. 324. 192. 316 Rancière. 49. 20. 80. 302.. Rilke.. 200. 100. 286.L. xviii. 304. 311 Stiegler. 217.. 43. J. 292. P. 41. 194. 282. Sartre. 49. 306. 216. 100. G. 31. F. v.

xxii. 240. 289 Bridge. 202. 105. 324 287. 104. 32. v. 327–331 247. 106. 204. 224. 251. 69. xix. 285. 192. 271. 25. 119. 61. 284. 248–266. 196. 42. viii. 221. 101. 271. 70. 55. 204. 59. 266. 66. 55. vii. 263. 116. 256. 149. 287–290 57. 65. vii. 115. 323. 205. 100. 34. 85. 107. 161. 197. 249. 92. 73–75. 275. 135. 82. passim 125. 155. 299 124. 89. Change of the essence of 38. 211–214. xxi. 110. 311 299 Bildung. 109. 328 Beginning. 302–304. 62. Boredom. viii. 55. 254. 312 112. 276. xiv. 226 88. 115. 129. 99. 213. 75. Capitalism. 33. 68. 31. 255. 155. 292. 212. 53. Change. passim 22. 109. 277. 281. truth. 283. 249. 126. 319 294–296. Christian. 114. 215. 155. 75. 271. 113. 106. 67. 199. 24. 298. 60. 77. 33. 319. 54. 31. Cineplastic. Alternative. 250–254. 5. 111. 79. 314 Automatic. 61. 291. 294. 56. 37. 248. 223. 307. 121. 80. 191. 273. Cave. 288. Care. 278. 65. 218. 240. 319. xiii. 28. 223. 280. 286 339 . 112. Anxiety. 281. 261. 57. 266. 210. 116. 167 205. viii. xxi. 299. 64. 62. 300. passim Continuity. 126. 264. 200. 54. 265. 119. 103. 89. 111. 308. Attunement. 31. 296. Being. 75. 83. 280 Beings. 283. 18. Beetle. Be-ing (Seyn). 63–65. 116. 103. 316 269. 109. 63. 278. ix. 239. 44. Index Rerum Aletheia. 66. 197. 69. 192. 312 161. 63. 101. 322 xxiii. xxiii. 156. 320 Balance (Wage). 29. 6–8. 115. 60. viii. 301. 125. 279.

135. 228. 237. 269. 207. 294. 282–287. 72–77. 63. ix. 240. 24. 124–130. 108. 315. viii. 140–147. 35. 183. 321. 24. Empowerment. 123. xvi. 211. 145–147. 242. 139–142. 110. 324 . 91. 328. 101. 11. 309 153. 26. 152. 210. 115. 141. Destruction. 311. 37. 130. 109. 261. 30. xxi. 37. 244. 318. 41. 203. 99. 173. 185. 40–69. 313. 24. 41. 31. 315. 330 160. 279. Exchange. 181. 227. 309. 18. 276–278. 121. Displacement. 16–19. 24. viii. ix. 155. Ereignis. 260. 10. 236. 290. 4. 23. 85. 19. 142. 311. 9. 32. 146. 31. 30. 281. 35. 252. 233– 39. 265. 96. 79. 260. 25. 88. 171. 144. 130. 195. 260. 135. 115. 242. 113. 278. 90. 327. 173. 284. 22. 179. 180. 109. 8. 40. 5. 103. 112. 143. 74. 9. 186. 180. 64. 283–284. 245–268. 200. 399. 87. 18. xv. 103. 209. 197. 265. 200. 100. 271. 248. 293 31. 258. 183. 270–274. 243. 223. 168. 280–282.340 Index Rerum Crossing. 201. 180. 124–128. 11. 328 108. 205. Economy. 159. 127. 139. 63. 150. 235–237. 133. 21. 104. 320. 71. 245. 239. 150. 203. 247. 301. 56. 53. 280. 267. 59. 324 176. 302. 1. 214. 322. 121. 125. 309. 203–210. 205. 149. 219. 284–287. 71. 50. 121. 25. 103. 276. 58. 255. 81. 294. 184. 44. 128. 240. 128. Epoch. 112–116. 291. 68. 206. 296–299. 147. 282. 12. 113. 16. 203. 2. 234. 6. 194–196. 114. 78. 255. 252. 316 239. 137. 147. 244. 7. 72–75. 169–172 182. 208. 38. 266. viii. 176. 136. 10. 244. 29. 193–199. 2. 55. 291. 133–137. 39. 191–193. 82–96. 32. 61. 221. 211. 207. 23. 54. 92. 313 117. 149– 270. 258. 19. 156. 261. 26. 207. 11 181. 115. 150–189. 26. 231. 205. 5. 102. 43–51. 116. 42. 317. 114. 89. 136. 323 138. 155–161. 103. 9. 254. 26. 312. 196. 48. 193. 33. 153. 116. 245. 63. 199. 105. Dasein. 87. 44. 161. 184–186. 171–176. 109. 287. 251. 213–231. 103. 243. 241. Equal (The). 244. xxii. 123–131. 308. 14–18. 319. 43. 313. Essence. 69. 279. 158–164. 166. 34. 199. 104. 244. 72. 209. 99. 8. 272. 176. 68.

iv. 272. 290 179–183. 188. 191. 312. 176. 73. Index Rerum 341 Existence. 30. 271–275. 104. 26. 210. 191. 54. 174. 307. 128. 100. 179. 279. 37–68. 13. 25. 61–63. 104. 163. Flexibility. 298. 173. 186. 156. 79. 53. 101. 90. xiv. 177. 10–12. iv. 187. Gender. 127. 89. 92. 94. 18. 60. 21. 128. 7. 100. 56. 194. 180. 250. 34. 202. 297. 71–74. 12. 196. vii–xxiv. 283. 278. 197. 188. 171. 61. 203. 182. 255. 121. 290. 285 Favor (Gunst). 285. 76. 179. 184. 318 111. 319 163. 296. 240. 269. 144. 80. 141. 128. 66. 100. 59. 16. 102. viii. Gaze. 202. 174. 53–58. 289. 33. 277. 176. 145–147. 137. 304. 34. 1. 72. xiv. 186. 21. 153. ix. 284. 26. 187–196. 35. 21–24. 22. 187. 113. 247. 157. 194. 87. 39. 12. 51. Gestalt. Figure. 215. 313 287. God. 92. 156. 61. 247. 63. 188. 97. 116. 244. 195 265–268. 176. 302. 79. 91. xxi. 314 272 Fantastic. 191. 183. Fox. 70. 236. 63. v. 67. xiii. 90–96. 183. 71. 215. ix. 16. 64. 1–11. 32. 179. 272. 228. 236–241. 170. 190. 103–121. 37. 294 101. ix. 183. 263. xxi. 10–13. 195. 215–217. 308 Gift. 307 202. 255. 191. 16. 112. 155–177. First (ex)change. 129–153. 184. 260. 306. 127. vii. 258. 39. 128. 57. 79. 57. 219. 272. 184. 103. 18. viii. 158. 86. v. 129–153. 200. 161. 260–265. 204. 307. 133. 228. 83. 185. 141. 243. 45. 88. 286. 44. 156. 269 Given. 241. 283. 40. 68. 201–210. Fragile. 54. 171. 73. 45. 159. 226–230. 259. 276. 161. Gestell. 203. . 95. 97. 149–155. 97. 152. 243. 193. 222. iii. 37. 242. Form. 287–300. 156. 207–209. 1. 95. 216. 190. 227. 157. 271. 102. 311 16–29. 156. 182– 32. 40. xvii. 196. 60–62. 176. 120. 203. 101. 287. 5. 21. 100. 288. 192–197. 192. 159. 314 250. 101. 21. 42. 316. 126. 285 165. 22. 24. 214. 157. 199. vii. 189. 194. 124. 141. 81. 112. 84. 283. 323–326 252. 308. 199. 46. 29. 196. 269. 30. Genre. 27. 72. 279. 68. 216. 192. 290. 253. 312–316. 87. 286. 94. 35. 206. 90.

181–183. 19. 45. Language. 274. 311. 92. 272. 294. 172. 42. 331 167. 272. 274. 19. 169. 68. 102. 47. 203. 80. 32. 83. viii. xx. 286. 213. 38. 115. 77. 151. 279–282. 276. 5. 110. 157. 277. 256. 287. 49. 25. 214. 183–186. 42. 223. 188. 82. 264. 187. 189 190. 279. xiv. 26. 266. 60. History. 64. xv. ix. 44. 299. 325 Going-in-drag. 294. 141. 195. 17. 5. . 17. 109. 35. 64–70. 150. 305 240. 325. 237. 264–268. 66. 73. 111. 89. 105. 257. 241. 191 205. 121. 271 Historical. Latin. 96. 299 249. 16. Incubation. 255. 87. 110. 26. Idea. 288. xvi–xviii. 107. 112. 200. 96. 182. 280–284. 173. 127. 8. 257. 197. 60. 202. 12. 326. 79. 203. 277. 23. 39. 284. xv. xv. 288. 237. 317 Last god. 199. 86. 330 272. 330. 247. 41. 165. Imagination. 115. 31. 195. 246. 167. 207. vii. 206. 141. 194. 162. 299. 82. xxiii. 33. 134. 294–299. 100. 179. 278. 193. 189. 247–249. 212–214. 167. 316. 15–18. 141. 281. 187–189 9. 197–199. 294. 55. 51. 193. 300. 137. 52. 33– Greek. 84. 110. 136. 60–62. 210. 281. 87. 121. 62. 210. 162. 35. 179. 92. 243. 121. 265. 197. 6. 12. 25. 150. 12.182. 14. 196. 72. 128. 298 Historicality. 57. 269. 49. 69. 39. 271. 102–106. 60. 184. 256. 4. 23. 116–121 244. 40. 145. 195. 156. 34. Line. 195–198. 198. 30. 201 Kinesis. 317. 155. 83–85. 18. 201. 65–72. 82–87. xii–xvii. Interchange. 5. 84. 8. 125. 279. 173. 145 Image. 133. 40. 49. 238. 329. 277. 285. 75. 128. 129. 210. 44. 90. 131–134. 181. xxiii. 191. 115. 202–206. 210. 302. 70. 125. 95. 75. 43. 159. 243. 4. 303. xiii. 84–87. 275. 170. 272. 316 32. 273. 91. 312. 57. 295 175. 301. 38. 158. 46. 38. 189. 317 266. 302 100. 329 290. Immutability. 52. 199. 296. 39. 142. 10. xi–xvii. 69. Leap. 12. 192. 5. 1. 183. 65.342 Index Rerum God (continued) Imprint (Prägung). 114–121. 257. 62. 9–11. 37. 85. 299. 133. 189. 47. 307 Imaginal. 201. 39. 267.

239. 256. 330 165. 284 32. 46. 305. 157. 42. 173. 162. 35. 41. 25. 33. 186. 100–104. 256. 137. 52. 284. 132. 117–121. 32. 20–23. 273. 271. Modest (gering). 112. 89. 64. 39. 206–223. 172. 22. 276. 286. 169. vii. 191 285–287. 51. 158. vii. 210. 125. 152. 284. 8. 234–238. 211–231. 314. Migratory. 28–35. 293. Migration. 121. 59. 99. 285–287. 134. 7. 72. 168. 212. Mutability. 28. 1. 54–57. 96. 168. 138. Metaphysics. 21–27. Metamorphic. 203. 269. 249. 86. 80–83. 78. 72. 288 186. 49. 112. 297. ix. 270. 264. 124. 33. 193. 144–146. 207. 68. 318. 89. 9. 15–24. 271. 212. 168 Metaphysical positions. 192. 7–10. 245–268. 318 200. 130–134. 248. 84. 18. 269. 203. Index Rerum 343 282. 33. 38. 240. 193. 186. 48. 277. 242. 39. 203. 307. xii. 264–267. 90. 46. 226. 74. 301. 291. 22–27. 57 45. 79. 215. 129. 63. 86. 271. 32. 47. 60. 191 131. 43. 159. 270. 45. 248. 41. 34. 10. 100–109. 64. 258–269. 155–161. 324. 87. 278. 285–290. 43. 152. 103. 179. vii. 235. 199. 125. 295. 216. 196. 78. 204. 201–210. 93. 128. 139. xiii. 273. 132. 87. 51. 5. 3. 78. 285–288. 19. 185. 1. 254. 95. 2. 11. 280. 235. 196. 192. vii. 4. 110 110. 305 265–271. 54. 14. 150. 277. 51. 130. 63. 114. 160. Morphè. 142. 92–97. Metabolism. 326 199. 283. 187–189. 253. 179. 109. 191–201. 24. 276. 73. 112. 198. 63. Man. 49. 273–277. 203. 110. 49. 89. 7. 256. 244. 160. 188. Migrating birds. 74. 54. 195. 239. 278. 45. 100–115. 240. 187–189. 91. 49. 242–250. 196. 318–320 119. 51. 87. 131. 188. 102. 79. 301. 288 247. 225. 94. 285. 275.  *  } " #" xiv. 170. Moving sidewalks. 47. 272. 234. 11. 160. 70. 37. 111. 225–231. 68. 215. 51. 128. 99. 326 Machine. 99. 201. 31. Metabolè. 155. 236. 28–30. 258. 23. 131. 19. 42. 101. passim 67. 233. 17. 195. 41–43. . Logoalgia. 93. 171. 124–127. 196. 286 Metamorphosis. 78. 303–311. 183–186. 315. 93. 1. 293. 225. 318. 212. 246. 101 165. 26. 173.

xvii. 147. 115. 18. 275. 283. Poem. 43. 155. 269–272. 184. xxi. 17. 106. 54. Ontotypology. 89. 182. xix. 277. xxi. 203. 197. 125–128. 9. 44. 179. 183. 71. 293. 135. 141. 273. 316 291. 179. 38. 278. 50. 125. 241. 112. 46. 174. 243. 97. 236. 284. 12. 29. 273. 203. Plant. 215. 105. 65–69. 63. 192. 119. 103. xxi. 31 32. 81. 73. 153. 255. 163. 6. 252. 251. 131. Pain. 196. 227. 24. 272. 92 101. 74. 186. 330 Other thinking. 139. Nazism. xvii–xx. 95. 96. v. 102. 307 270. 167. 284. 20. 155– 125. 78. xvi. 2–18. 9. 159. 21. 114. 83. 115. 239. 202 Poetic essence of reason. 5. 314 Plasticity. Mutation. 167. 49. 22. 283. 296 Other beginning. ix. 23. 171. iii–xxix. 155. 80. Other (ex)change. 224. 101. 77. 206. 287. 31. 314. 152. 103. 193. 12. 284. 91. 11. 28. 193. 57. 319 328. 193. 33. 27. 240. 8. 242. 283 19. 1. 273. 21. 190. 273. 100. Philosopher. Ontology. 197–200 109. 276 325. 126. 209. 186. 182. 310 294 Philosophy. 128. 271. 83. 42. 216. Partition. 193. 60–65. 15. 177. 305. 114. 30–31. Presencing (Anwesung). 172. 287. 124. 192. 299. 191. 183. 251–254. 182. 53. 112. 26. 198 99. 169. 146. 85. 259. 121. 294 251. 54. 129. 23. 97. 197. 180. 93. 255. 294. 244. 165. 82. 260. 283. 11. 107. 25. 68. 266. 199. 123–125. 218–219. 296. 158. 272. 211–214. 274. 70. 100. 270 185. 272 166. 77. 114. 97. 156. 275. 13. 169. 191. 233–247. 61. 26. 314. 325 44. 285. 273. 29. 20. 331 Ontological difference. 134.344 Index Rerum Mutability (continued) 103. 156. 164. 242. 128. 96. 104. 227. 301. 18. 121. ix. 19. 291–296. 106. 3. 210. . 307 203. 87. 113. 24–29. 47. Peregrination. 180. 202. 293. viii. 181. 78. 254. 248. xxiv. 177. 22. xxii. 97. 169. 49. 253. 3. 73–75. 100. 27. 157. 116. 47. 271. 284. 84. Ontological. 202. 304. 192–194. Political. 68. xxiii. 247.

81. 78. 44. 283 Technology. 206–210. 81. 293. 13. 91 44. viii. Reformulation 203. 243. 151. Structure. 9. 279. 131. 202. 195. 31. 1. 127. 96. 84. 286 87–91. iv. 35. 284. 34. 73. 181. 237. 285 (Umformung). 313. xi. 38. 174. 46. 91. 66. Thing. 250–256. 151. 149. 84. 160–168. 65. Symbolic. 269 325 Swaying. 61. 188. 12. Sex. 24. 324 Soul. 113 172. 43. 143. 80. 26. ix. 134. 259 278 Schematism. 96. Index Rerum 345 133–136. 266–268. 95. 82. 51. Revolution. 320 115. 107. 73. Schema. 102. 257. 51. 320 284 Transformability. 327. 113. 272. 104. 93 24. 173. 109. 43. 316. 63–67. 18–26. 127. 71. 180. 75. 159. 220. 172. Queer. 40. viii. Time. 145. 109. 75. 183. 288. 197. 38. 241–243. 144. 155. 126. 285. ix. 16. 159. 265 78. viii–xxiii. 258–268 Schematization. 45–50. 266. viii–xxiv. 239 311 Rupture. 182 105. 177. 314 Suffering. 55. 125. 11. 157. Scheme. 128. 283 142. 136. 189. 75. 155. 34. ix. 200 Transformation. 175. Stimmung. 182. 67. 42. 37. Substitution. 18. 197–200. 14. 210. River. 128. 101. 135–138. 213–231. 271 31. 130. 121. 81. 264. 177. 39. 307 272. 209. 312. 25. 78. 55–58. 88. 274. 23. 269. 261. Transcendence. 277. 179–199. 138. 91. 213. 116. 169–172 266. 203. 88. 44. 62. 277–279. Serpent. 108. 103. 248. 73. 124. xvii. 1–11. 34. 41. 260. 276. 320 290. 142. xii. Self-transformation. 104. ix. 92. 271. 30. 2–12. Real (The). 11. 46. 137–165. 273–274. 137. 113. 247. 18. 272. 106. 72. 94. 181. 99. 193. 195. 94. 82. 19. 147. 32–34. 22. 283–285. 75. 190–195. 47. 91. 64. 96. 108. 29–34. 61. 51–53. vii. 271. 41. 43. 116. . 270. 91. 201. 166–169. 237. 99. 207. vii. 246. xx. 318. 95. 58. 143. 41. 277. 221. 198. 32. 331 94. 260. Same (The). 100. 221. 65.

245. 294. 28. 227. 125. 285–289. 299. 67–69. 269. 284. 59. 206. vii. 197. 229. 149. 69. 129. 19. 46. 127. 203. 60. 129. 97. 72. gelten). 311 111. 101. 18. 147. xiv. 126. 185. 280. 224. 159. 277. 55. 241. 2. 287. 284. 24. W. 277. 312. 273. xx. 77. 15. 89. 166. 213–214. 29. 329 Value for (Geltung. 46. 121. 270. 164. 19. 195. 204. 121. Truth. 130. xvii. 158. 264.346 Index Rerum Transformation (continued) Vision. 265. 264. Turning (Kehre). 172. 5. 155. 158. 75. 196. 127. 258. 47. 218. 279. 129. 248. 114. 96. 130. 196. 199. 53–56. 306. 32. 140. 273 50. 110. 298–299. 35. 157. 294. 165. 61–62. 160. 331 267. 41. Withdrawal. 6. 2. 172. 9. 126. 87–89. 70. 205. 5. 84. 50–57. 273. 73–75. Wandel (change). 67. 135–137. 173–176. 125. 76. 10–12. 298 . 307. 145. 10. 241. xiv. 165. xiii 204. 253. 211. 79. 126. 248. 177. 5. 4. 35. 31. 159. 56. 255. Wall. ix. 106. (metamorphosis). 7. 291. 142. 146. 293. 296 46. 208. 243. 25. 193. 110. 102. viii. 281. 56. 33. 210. 269. 197. Unrecognizable. 246. 67–70. 47. 304. 260. 75. 20. 86. 112. 22. 78. 128. 203. 72. 198. 245. 123. 147. 246. 211. 309 266. W. ix. 145. 26. 63. 132–137. 302. 166. 2. 256 304. 325 Wandlung Triad of change. 63. 64. 34. 188. 106. viii. 91–94. 256. 294. 207. 175. 64. 301. 141. 150. 107. 235. xiii. 59. 211. 216. 254. 75. 29. 183. 271. 69. 78. 99. 135–136. 296 282. 6. 208. 48. 240. xix. 275. 277. 209. 206. 293. 137. 196. (transformation). 52. vii. 203. 275. 303. 7. 198. 267. V. 43. 152. vii. 169. vii. 283–285. 310 259. 235. 128. 249. Verwandlung 107. 244. 210. 283. 80. 258. 1. 220. 66–67. 66. 236. 82. 245. 14–27. 290. 61. 237. 326 Will. 233–238.

Not since the writings of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas has the work of Heidegger f c been the subject of such inventive interpretation and original theory in its own right. Peter Skafish is Postdoctoral Fellow at the Laboratory m of Social Anthropology at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences in Paris. the biological. The Heidegger Change sketches the e implications of this theory for a wide range of issues of central concern to the humanities— n r capitalism. Temporality and Dialectic. suffering. Catherine Malabou. Destruction. o y n Catherine Malabou is Professor at the Center for Research in Modern European r Philosophy at Kingston University in London.s u n y s e r i e s i n c o n t e m p o r a r y f r e n c h t h o u g h t s u n y s e r i e s i n c o n t e m p o r a r y f r e n c h t h o u g h t t s PHILOSOPHY u h M alabou n g y u THE HEIDEGGER CHANGE o s h On the Fantastic in Philosophy e t r n i Behind Martin Heidegger’s question of being lies another one not yet sufficiently addressed h e in continental philosophy: change. explores this topic in the writings of Heidegger through the s themes of metamorphosis and migration. imagination. the gift. Deconstruction and The Future of Hegel: e r Plasticity. ethics. o p p o m r e a t r n y o c f r n e i n c s A volume in the SUNY series in Contemporary French Thought e h i David Pettigrew and François Raffoul.edu h u t s s u n y s e r i e s i n c o n t e m p o r a r y f r e n c h t h o u g h t s u n y s e r i e s i n c o n t e m p o r a r y f r e n c h t h o u g h t . including t a Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing: Dialectic. and time. and modification.sunypress. editors C at her ine M a l a bou t r h e Translated and edited by SUNY s o Pet er Sk a f i s h u SUNY P R E S S y State University of g n New York Press www. one of France’s most inventive The Heidegger Change c contemporary philosophers. exchange. She is the author of many books. technology. finding and articulating n i a radical theory of ontico-ontological transformability.