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X. DE JURE AND DE FACTO OFFICERS of his incumbency.

of his incumbency. The rule is that, where there is a de jure officer, a de facto officer, during
his wrongful incumbency, is NOT entitled to emoluments attached to the office. However, this
cannot be applied in this case. Monserate assumed under protest the position
GENERAL MANAGER, PPA V. MONSERATE, G.R. NO. 129616. APRIL 17, 2002 of Administrative Officer. Since then, she had been receiving the emoluments, salary and
other compensation attached to such post. Thus, she cannot recover full backwages for the
period when she was unlawfully deprived thereof. She is entitled only to backpay differentials.
In 1977, Monserate started her government service as Bookkeeper II in the Port Management
Office, PPA, Iloilo City. A year after, she was promoted to Cashier II. Two year after, she was
promoted to Finance Officer (SG 16). In 1988, PPA was reorganized and Monserate applied FUNA VS AGRA
for the permanent position of Manager II (SG 19) of the Resource Management Division, PPA. G.R. NO. 191644 FEBRUARY 19, 2013
In the Comparative Data Sheet, she ranked 1st among 6 aspirants to said position. Eventually,
the GM of PPA, Dumlao, appointed her to the position of Manager II (RMD). Consequently,
Facts: The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal Arroyo
she assumed office and discharged its functions. Months after, the CSC approved
appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation of Secretary
her appointment. However, Anino (ranked 2nd to Monserate), filed an appeal/petition with
Agnes VST Devanadera in order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon Province; that on
the PPA Appeals Board, protesting against her appointment. The PPA Appeals Board
March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a
sustained the appeal and rendered ineffective Monserate’s appointmentbased on certain
concurrent capacity; that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a
documents, which were not extensively discussed or explained. The new GM of PPA, Dayan,
concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced this suit to challenge the constitutionality of
issued a Special Order creating PPA’s Manager Pool, where Monserate was excluded from
Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section
the pool-list and placed instead the name of Anino as Manager II, RMD. Monserate filed with
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution; that during the pendency of the suit, President Benigno
PPA GM an appeal/request for clarification and questioned her replacement under the
S. Aquino III appointed Atty. Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz as the Solicitor General; and that Cadiz
Special Order, claiming that the proceeds were irregular since she was not notified of the
assumed as the Solicitor General and commenced his duties as such on August 5, 2010. Agra
hearing, she was not furnished a copy of the protest filed by Anino, she was not informed of
renders a different version of the antecedents. He represents that on January 12, 2010, he was
the reasons behind her replacement, and their Port Manager was not included in the
then the Government Corporate Counsel when President Arroyo designated him as the
proceedings. Pending her appeal, GM Dayan issued another Special Order, which officially
Acting Solicitor General in place of Solicitor General Devanadera who had been appointed
reassigned her to the position of Administrative Officer (SG 15), which was the former position
as the Secretary of Justice; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated him also as the
of Anino and lower than her previous post. Unheeded, she filed an appeal with the CSC,
Acting Secretary of Justice vice Secretary Devanadera who had meanwhile tendered her
protesting Anino’s appointment and the propriety of the Resolution of the Appeals Board.
resignation in order to run for Congress representing a district in Quezon Province in the May
After 6 years, CSC ruled in favor of the Appeals Board and sustained Anino’s appointment,
2010 elections; that he then relinquished his position as the Government Corporate Counsel;
contending that the appointing authority may still withdraw the appointment if a protest is
and that pending the appointment of his successor, Agra continued to perform his duties as
seasonably filed, in accordance with the Omnibus Rules. Monserate filed a petition for review
the Acting Solicitor General. Notwithstanding the conflict in the versions of the parties, the fact
with the CA, which it granted in her favor and nullified the appointment Anino, due to lack of
that Agra has admitted to holding the two offices concurrently in acting capacities is settled,
proper proceeding and evidence to support the PPA Appeals Board Resolution.
which is sufficient for purposes of resolving the constitutional question that petitioner raises
ISSUE: Whether or not there was due process when Anino replaced Monserato as RMD
Manager II .
Issue: Whether or not Agra’s holding of concurrent position is unconstitutional.

HELD: NO. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, Monserate was demoted, not by reason of the PPA
Held: Yes. At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII
reorganization, but due to the PPA Appeals Board Resolution, sustaining Anino’s protest
of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
against her appoiment. Unfortunately, the Court cannot accord validity to the Resolution of
the PPA Appeals Board upholding the appointment of Anino since there was
no appointment to uphold in the first place. Anino was appointed 2 months after the Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
Resolution. assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
Moreover, the Court found questionable the grounds for which the PPA Appeals Board employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
demoted Monserate as these were incomprehensible for lack of discussion or explanation to practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
enable Monserate to know the reason for her demotion. It upheld the findings of the CA that contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
the PPA Appeals Board Resolution was void for lack of proper notice to Monserate. Thus, her subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
demotion was deemed as tantamount to a revocation of her appointment as RMD Manager corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
II and was a patent violation of her constitutional right to security of tenure and due process. their office.
Although the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in the selection
and appointment of qualified persons, the moment the discretionary power of appointment is
A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987
exercised and the appointee assumed office, such appointment cannot anymore be
Constitution, to wit:
revoked by the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except for cause. In this
case, there was no evidence of justifying the revocation of Monserate’s appointment by
demoting her. The CA reinstated her to her post as RMD Manager II. Since her demotion was Section 7. x x x Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no
void, her post as such was never vacant. appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
BACKWAGES: CA reinstated her to her post as RMD Manager II without backwages. subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
Monserate, during the proceedings, assumed her lower position as Administrative Officer. corporations or their subsidiaries.
Although his appointment is void, Anino was considered a de facto officer during the period
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting the amount which was disallowed. On appeal to the Commission on Audit, the latter
Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, supra, sustained the stand of the Provincial Auditor. It was of the view that the petitioner was merely
whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold designated as an Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration in addition to his regular
any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the duties and as such not entitled
Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
ISSUE: his an additional salary. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the difference in
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. The text salary between regular
of Section 13, supra, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as
HELD: to position and the higher position to which he is designated. Petitioner is not entitled to
holding other offices or employments in the Government or in government-owned or
the difference claimed. The law applicable is RA 7160 or the Local Government Code. It did
government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means
not authorize the Provincial Governor to appoint nor even designate one temporarily in cases
to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office,
of temporary absence or disability or a vacancy in a provincial office. That power resides in
which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
the President of the Philippines or the Secretary of Finance. The designation made by Gov.
Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no reference to the
Mayo being defective, it confers no right on the part of petitioner to claim the difference in
nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices
the salaries and allowances attached to the position occupied by him. Moreover, what was
being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations,
extended to petitioner by Governor Mayo was merely a designation and not an
whether permanent or temporary, for it is without question that the avowed objective of
appointment. Appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to
Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department
exercise the powers and functions of a given office. Designation merely connotes an
officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their
imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by
deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to “open the veritable floodgates of
virtue of an earlier appointment. Designation is simply the mere imposition of new or
circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive
additional duties on the officer or employee and does not entail payment of additional
Department and of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the guise of
benefits or grant upon the person so Tan designated vs. the right People, to claim G.R. the No.
temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as
salary attached 115507; to May the position. 19, 1998
officers-in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or government-owned or
controlled corporations.
It is not amiss to observe, lastly, that assuming that Agra, as the Acting Solicitor General, was
not covered by the stricter prohibition under Section 13, supra, due to such position being RE: NOMINATION OF ATTY. LYNDA CHAGUILE, A.M. NO. 13-04-03-SC, DECEMBER 10, 2013
merely vested with a cabinet rank under Section 3, Republic Act No. 9417, he nonetheless
remained covered by the general prohibition under Section 7, supra. Hence, his concurrent
Atty. Marlou B. Ubano, IBP Governor for Western Visayas sought to invalidate the Resolution of
designations were still subject to the conditions under the latter constitutional provision. In this
the IBP Board of Governors which approved the nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as the
regard, the Court aptly pointed out in Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma:
replacement of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel. He noted that on the IBP
By-Laws which considers as ipso facto resigned from his or her post any official of the IBP who
The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official files a Certificate of Candidacy for any elective public office. Under the amended By-Laws,
to hold more than one office only if “allowed by law or by the primary functions of his the resignation takes effect on the starting date of the official campaign period.
position.” In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, “[t]here is no legal objection
to a government official occupying two government offices and performing the functions of Atty. Ubano alleged that the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel, filed a
both as long as there is no incompatibility.” The crucial test in determining whether Certificate of Candidacy to run for the position of Provincial Governor of the Province of
incompatibility exists between two offices was laid out in People v. Green – whether one Ifugao. Hence, he is considered ipso facto resigned from the IBP.
office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the
other. Atty. Ubano challenged the IBP Board of Governors' approval of Atty. Chaguiles succession as
IBP Governor for Northern Luzon on two grounds: First, there was, as yet, no vacancy. Atty.
Habawel was himself present at the meeting where his replacement was named. There was,
therefore, no need to name a replacement. Second, the right to elect the successor of a
resigned IBP Governor is vested, not in the IBP Board of Governors, but in the delegates of the
In November 1992, Petitioner Zozimo Dimaandal was then a Supply Officer Ill when he was concerned region; thus, the IBP Board of Governors approval of the nominee to succeed Atty.
designated Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration by Governor Vicente Mayo Habawel is ultra vires.
of Batangas. Pursuant to the designation, he filed a claim for the difference in salary and
Representation and Transportation Allowance LRATA] of Assistant Provincial Treasurer and In support of this second ground, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws provides:
Supply Officer Ill for the whole year of 1993. The Provincial Auditor disallowed in audit P52,908
of the claim. What was allowed was only the amount of P8,400 which corresponds to the Sec. 44. Removal of members. x x x x x x[x] In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor
difference in the allowances attached to the designation and the position he occupied. The for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor
disallowance was premised on reasons that Governor Mayo is bereft of power to fill the from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to
position of Assistant Provincial Treasurer because the power rests on the Secretary of Finance; serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term.
and that the designation made by Governor Mayo is temporary in nature and does not
amount to the issuance of an appointment as could entitle the petitioner Dimaandal to In its Comment, the IBP Board of Governors assailed the first ground raised by Atty. Ubano by
receive the salary of the position to which he is designated. Thus, he was required to refund saying that it was not necessary for a position to be absolutely vacant before a successor may
be appointed or elected.As for the second ground, the IBP Board of Governors argued that it Governors. Thus, she did so under "color of authority,Civil Service Commission v. Joson, Jr., 473
has been the "tradition"of the IBP that "where the unexpired term is only for a very short period Phil. 844 (2004). The IBP Board of Governors approval was secured through a process that it
of time, it is usually the Board of Governors which appoint a replacement or an officer in characterized as a "tradition," allowing it to appoint a replacement for an officer who vacates
charge to serve the unexpired term." his or her office shortly before his or her term expires.

Meanwhile, Atty. Ubano filed another motion seeking to prevent Atty. Chaguile from Although being in violation of the IBP By-Laws, this supposed tradition cannot earn our
exercising the functions as IBP Governor of Northern Luzon. imprimatur. Be that as it may, in all of the occasions cited by the IBP Board of Governors, the
authority of replacement governors was derived from a process, which, though
A.M. No. 13-05-08-SC irregular,enabled them to act as and be accepted as governors.

The second Administrative Matter assails the conduct of the election of the IBP Executive Vice Having said these, we agree with a point raised by Atty. Ubano. As with statutes, the IBP By-
President (EVP). In this election, Atty. Vicente M. Joyas was elected IBP Governor for Southern Laws "violation or non-observance [ought] not be excused by disuse, or custom, or practice to
Luzon. the contrary." CIVIL CODE, Art. 7.We do not validate the IBP Board of Governors erroneous
practice. To reiterate our earlier words: "We cannot countenance this. No amount of previous
Atty. Ubano sought to nullify the May 22, 2013 election claiming that the IBP election of the practice or "tradition" can validate such a patently erroneous action."
EVP was marred by inordinate haste, grave irregularities, patent hostility, manifest bias and
prejudice, as well as the presiding officers absolute lack of independence and that the Having established that Atty. Chaguile was the IBP Governor for Northern Luzon in a de facto
election violated Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws which requires that the EVP be elected by a capacity, we turn to the validity of her actions as a de facto officer. Accordingly, all official
vote of at least five (5) Governors. Atty. Ubano emphasized that Atty. Chaguiles vote in favor actions of Atty. Chaguile asde facto IBP Governor for Northern Luzon must be deemed valid,
of Atty. Joyas was invalid, as Atty. Chaguiles appointment as governor was itselfultra vires, and binding, and effective, as though she were the officer validly appointed and qualified for the
therefore, voidab initio. office. It follows that her participation and vote in the election for IBP EVP held on May 22,
2013 are in order.

Was the appointment of Atty. Chaguile as Governor ultra vires, therefore restraining her to
exercise functions relative to the position?
Is the election for the IBP EVP void in violation Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws and restrained
Atty. Vicente M. Joyas from discharging his duties? Fabruary 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor
sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative for the Sangguniang
HELD: As pointed out by the IBP Board of Governors in its Compliance, "the term of Atty. Lynda Bayan of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They both took their oath of
Chaguile as Governor for Northern Luzon expired on June 30, 2013."A new Governor for office on February 16 and 17, 1989.
Northern Luzon, Atty. Oliver Cachapero, was elected.As Atty. Chaguile is no longer serving as
IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, the matter of ousting or restraining Atty. Chaguile from
Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said
exercising the functions of such office is no longer an available relief.
designations. This was denied and enjoined Tuanda to recognize private sectoral
representatives. Estrallanes and Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC Negros
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not
Oriental for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed.
empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other
words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable. The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete City accusing Tuanda and others of taking
advantage of their official functions and unlawfully causing undue injury to Estrellanes and
(Pormento v. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988; August 31, 2010) Binaohan.

However, we recognize that the validity of Atty. Chaguiles appointment as Governor for
Northern Luzon affects the validity of her actions as the occupant of this office, especially her Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension of the Criminal Case on the
participation in the IBP Board of Governors election of the IBP EVP, which is the subject of the ground that a prejudicial question exists. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void
second Administrative Matter. We hold that Atty. Chaguile took on the role of IBP Governor for ab initio the designations issued by DILG for violation of the provisions saying that the
Northern Luzon in a de facto capacity. Sanggunian itself must make a determination first of the number of sectors in the
city/municipality to warrant representation.
To be a de facto officer, all of the following elements must be present: 1) There must be a de
jure office; 2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and 3) Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the private respondents
There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. Tuanda v. have rendered such services and the said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity;
Sandiganbayan, 319 Phil. 460 for these reasons, the private respondents were entitled to the slaries attached to their office.
Even if the RTC later declare the appointments null and void, they would still be given salaries
In the present case, there is no dispute that a de jure office, that of IBP Governor for Northern because of the period they acted as representatives has made them a de facto officers.
Luzon exists. Likewise, Atty. Chaguile took possession of and performed the functions of the IBP
Governor for Northern Luzon through a process, albeit "irregular or informal, so that she is not a
mere volunteer,"that is, not through her own actions but through those of the IBP Board of Issue: The legality of private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives.
Held: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting On January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a memorandum designating
decisions. 14 It has two essential elements: him concurrently as General Manager, effective immediately, until the President can appoint
a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance with this
memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against him to question his title. Subsequently,
while his original petition was pending, Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 15
April 6, 1990, the President of the Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as additional
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, respondent.
CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the
arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not, the petitioner was illegally removed from his designation.

All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case.
Whether or not , petitioner should be reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the
There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the
Philippine Tourism Authority
criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on
petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries
and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to Held: Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as
resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives follows:
were made in accordance with law.
SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. — The General Manager shall be
Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless
compensation for actual services rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court and as sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as
borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400)
representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with
the Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26
Where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall
February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. Hence, private
hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has
authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary
not been established.
appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that
The petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that
private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de
the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine
facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.
Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer.
Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following: delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise
1) There must be a de jure office; of that discretion as an alter ego of the President.
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption
being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that
Sandiganbayan Resolution was set aside. judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been
given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.
BINAMIRA VS. GARRUCHO, G.R. NO. 92008, JULY 30, 1990
In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer,
the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he
On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the composition
was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power
of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his
to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to
capacity as General Manager, approved by the President on the same date.
another. “

Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General
The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Head to be the acts of the President of the
Manager and Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors.
Philippines when “performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,” which was
true of the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor of the petitioner. But it also adds
On January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new that such acts shall be considered valid only if not ‘disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Secretary of Tourism. Executive,” as also happened in the case at bar.
With these rulings, the petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground. established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have
His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not but one domicile at a time.
acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be
and was authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met
could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason).i•t•c- the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
aüsl In either case, the petitioner’s claim of security of tenure must be rejected.
Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted
that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated
The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who apparently believed in good faith that he was
there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26
being extended a permanent appointment by the Minister of Tourism. After all, Minister
years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.
Gonzales had the ostensible authority to do so at the time the designation was made. This
belief seemed strengthened when President Aquino later approved the composition of the
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga
PTA Board of Directors where the petitioner was designated Vice-Chairman because of his
Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left
position as General Manager of the PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the
Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In
categorical appointment required to be made by the President herself, and not the Minister
addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
of Tourism, under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564.
the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in
The Supreme Court rule therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere
position and so has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.


JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 193314, JUNE 25, 2013
Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when on September 15, 1961, his
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired
certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming
Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and
elections was filed with the Comelec. Three days later, or on September 18, 1961, Monroy filed
lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return,
a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. The Comelec approved the withdrawal.
he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate
But on September 21, 1961, Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath
of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in
of office as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon
September 2009.
his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question. Did Monroy cease to be mayor of
Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy was filed on September 15, 1961?
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the
Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village,
HELD: Yes. The withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner to his former
Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB.
position. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code (which reads “Any elective provincial, municipal or
city official running for an office, other then the one which he is actually holding, shall be
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before
considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the
candidacy”) makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the
lower court's decision.
certificate of for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga
appointment can restore the ousted official.
Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure
to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to limitations set
therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
ISSUE: WON Comelec erred in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
RULING: The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile,
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following
guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.” 3.Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member His argument is that in view of the security of tenure enjoyed by the above-named officials, it
of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio was “beyond the prerogatives of the President” to require them to submit courtesy
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8. resignations. Such courtesy resignations, even if filed, should be disregarded for having been
submitted “under duress,” as otherwise the President would have the power to remove career
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional. officials at pleasure, even for capricious reasons

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the The respondents assert he is not entitled to the guaranty because he is not a career official
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding (the petitioner did not possess the necessary qualifications when he was appointed
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases Administrator of the POEA in 1987).
specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the ISSUE: WON Achacoso is protected by the security of tenure clause
primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive HELD: NO. The Court finds for the respondent.
officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; SECURITY OF TENURE; PERMANENT APPOINTMENT ISSUED
ONLY TO PERSONS QUALIFIED. — A permanent appointment can be issued only “to a person
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the
1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that appropriate eligibility prescribed.”
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications.
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting PERSONS APPOINTED WITHOUT THE REQUISITE QUALIFICATION DEEMED IN ACTING CAPACITY. —
them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his
XI. ELECTION eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position
cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be
XII. TENURE/TERM OF OFFICE appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles.

ACHACOSO VS. MACARAIG, G.R. NO. 93023, MARCH 13, 1991 TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT; PURPOSE. — The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment
is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge
Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment the same pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee.
Administration 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITION IMPOSED ON APPOINTEE. — The person named in an acting
In compliance with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines to “all Department capacity accepts the position under the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is
Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads,” and other government officials, called upon to do so by the appointing authority.
This was accepted by the President, “with deep regrets.” circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by a method of terminating official
The Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as relations known in the law of public officers as expiration of the term. His term is understood at
officer-in-charge. the outset as without any fixity and enduring at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
he protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office because his When required to relinquish his office, he cannot complain that he is being removed in
resignation was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the President’s directive. violation of his security of tenure because removal imports the separation of the incumbent
On the same date, respondent Jose N. Sarmiento was appointed Administrator of the POEA, before the expiration of his term. This is allowed by the Constitution only when it is for cause as
vice the petitioner. provided by law. The acting appointee is separated precisely because his term has expired.
Expiration of the term is not covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure.
Achacoso was informed thereof the following day and was again asked to vacate his office. LUEGO CASE (143 SCRA 327) NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — The case of Luego v. Civil
He filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. He then came to this Court for relief. Service Commission is not applicable because the facts of that case are different. The
petitioner in Luego was qualified and was extended a permanent appointment that could
The petitioner invokes security of tenure against his claimed removal without legal cause. not be withdrawn on the ground that it was merely temporary. In the case at bar, the
Achacoso contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and so petitioner was not eligible and therefore could be appointed at best only in a temporary
enjoys security of tenure, which is one of the characteristics of the Career Service as capacity. The other cases he cites, viz. Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate
distinguished from the Non-Career Service. 1 Claiming to have the rank of undersecretary, he Appellate Court, Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz, and Dario v. Mison, are also not pertinent
says he comes under Article IV, Section 5 of P.D. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service because they also involved permanent appointees who could not be removed because of
Decree, which includes in the Career Service: their security of tenure.
CUEVAS VS. BACAL, G.R. NO. 139382, DECEMBER 6, 2000 proscribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an
agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of
This case involves the appointment and transfer of career executive service officers the agency.
(CESOs). More specifically, it concerns the “appointment” of respondent Josefina G. Bacal,
who holds the rank of CESO III, to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorney’s DE LEON VS. G.R. NO. 127182, JANUARY 22, 2001
Office, which has a CES Rank Level I, and her subsequent transfer, made without her consent,
to the Office of the Regional Director of the PAO because of the appointment of Atty. Carina
Demaisip to the position of Chief Public Defender (formerly Chief Public Attorney). Atty. Bacal ONG VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. NO. 184219, JANUARY 30, 2012
filed a petition for quo warranto ruled in her favor by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUES Whether:
• (1) Bacal is entitled of security of tenure considering that she belongs to Career Gonzales was appointed as provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by
Service; then-Governor Roy Padilla on April 1991, with her appointment on a permanent capacity.
After almost 8 years, on March 1999, the then-Governor Jess Pimentel sent Gonzales a
• (2) security of tenure in the Career Executive Service is acquired with respect to the
memorandum to explain why administrative charges should not be filed against her for âgross
position or to the rank the officer is holding;
insubordination/discourtesy in the course of official dutiesâ and âconduct grossly prejudicial
• (3) CESOs may be shifted from one position to another without violating their security to the best interest of the serviceâ. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc
of tenure; Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges against her. Therefore, on September
• (4) Bacal’s unconsented transfer from Acting Chief Public Attorney to Regional 1999, Gov. Pimentel dismissed Gonzales. This decision of Gov. Pimentel was subsequently
Director constitutes a demotion; appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which issued a Resolution, which modified
the earlier decision, found Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspended Gonzales for 6
RULING months. A subsequent appeal from Gov. Pimentel was denied by the CSC. Upon motion for
(1) No. The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically execution, CSC through a Resolution directed the reinstatement of Gonzales upon
confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required clarification of service of the 6-month suspension. Gov. Pimentel reinstated Gonzales, however
qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn she was dismissed the next day for âlack of confidenceâ. Gov. Pimentel then wrote to the
depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications CSC of his compliance to the CSCâs order and Gonzalesâ subsequent dismissal as a
for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, confidential employee, citing an earlier CSC Resolution where the CSC held that the position
may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. of provincial administrator was highly confidential and coterminous in nature. The CSC
Here, Atty. Bacal has a rank of CESO III “appointed” to a position of CESO I. The appointment responded with another Resolution which directed Gonzalesâ reinstatement, stating that
extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. while the LGC (RA 7160) made the position of provincial administrator coterminous and highly
confidential in nature, the conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who were already
(2) Security of tenure in the career executive service is acquired with respect to rank and not issued permanent appointments as administrators prior to the effectivity of the LGC. Gonzales
to position.Theguarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the had acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment and is entitled to continue
particular positions to which they may be appointed a concept which is applicable only to holding the office despite its subsequent classification. The conversion should not jeopardize
first and second-level employees in the civil service but to the rank to which they are Gonzalesâ security of tenure guaranteed to her by the Constitution. Therefore, as a
appointed by the President. Here, respondent did not acquire security of tenure by the mere permanent appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice and
fact that she was appointed to the higher position of Chief Public Attorney since she was not hearing. Loss of trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent appointeeâs
subsequently appointed to the rank of CESO I based on her performance in that position as dismissal or discipline under existing laws. However, in a letter dated February 2005, Gonzales
required by the rules of the CES Board. wrote to the CSC alleging that the then incumbent Governor, Jesus Typoco, Jr., refused to
reinstate her. Hence, the CSC made another Resolution which ordered Gonzalesâ
(3) Yes. Members of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred from one reinstatement to the provincial administrator position, or to an equivalent position. As a result,
position to another and from one department, bureau or office to another;provided that such the Province, through Gov. Typoco, filed a petition for review with the CA. However, the CA
reassignment or transfer is made in the interest of public service and involves no reduction in sided with CSC and Gonzales, citing Aquino v. Civil Service Commission, which stated that an
rank or salary; provided, further, that no member shall be reassigned or transferred oftener appointee acquires a legal right to his position once he assumes a position in the civil service
than every two years. If a CESO is assigned to a CES position with a higher salary grade than under a completed appointment. This legal right is protected both by statute and the
that of his CES rank, he is allowed to receive the salary of the CES position. Should he be Constitution, and he cannot be removed from office without cause and previous notice and
assigned or made to occupy a CES position with a lower salary grade, he shall continue to be hearing. Appointees cannot be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of
paid the salary attached to his CES rank. Here, there is a valid transfer of Atty. Bacal to the removal, or without any cause. The CA then enumerated the list of valid causes for a public
Regional Office as it was made in the interest of public service and she is still compensated officerâs removal under Section 46, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Revised Administrative
according to her CES rank. Code, and noted that lack of confidence was not in the list. The CA concluded that
Gonzalesâ dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence violated her security of tenure, and
(4) No. Respondent’s appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney was merely that she has the right to be reinstated with payment of backwages. Hence, the petition for
temporary and that, consequently, her subsequent transfer to the position of Regional Director review on certiorari to the SC.
of the same office, which corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be considered a demotion,
much less a violation of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution. The rule that ISSUE/S: WON Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of
outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer Camarines Norte.
who is appointed – not merely assigned – to a particular station. Such a rule does not
HELD: NO Gonzalesâ right to security of tenure when she was removed without sufficient just cause from
her position, but the situation had since then been changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated
RATIO: A. The Court supported the CAâs conclusion that the position of provincial as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under the law prevailing at the
administrator has been re-classified into a primarily confidential, non-career position upon the time of the termination of her service. She was then already occupying a position that was
passage of RA 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) which took effect in January 1992. primarily confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and
In making the position mandatory for all provinces, the LGC also amended the qualifications confidence of the appointing authority. Thus, Gonzalesâ termination for lack of confidence
for the position. Further to this, the LGC made the provincial administrator position co- was lawful. She could no longer be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte
terminous with its appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-career service position that is or to any other comparable position. This, however, is without prejudice to Gonzalesâ
primarily confidential. Upon this, the Court took note of the argument that Gonzales has entitlement to retirement benefits, leave credits, and future employment in government
acquired a vested legal right over the position of provincial administrator the moment she service.
assumed her duties in April 1991, hence the argument that she cannot be removed from
office except for cause and after due hearing. According to the SC, the arguments reflect a MANALANG-DEMIGILLO V. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES,
conceptual confusion between the nature of the position and an employeeâs right to hold a G.R. NO. 168613, 5 MARCH 2013
The nature of a position may change by law according to the dictates of Congress. The right The Board of Directors of Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines
to hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that enjoys constitutional and statutory (TIDCORP), a wholly owned government corporation, formally charged Maria Rosario
guarantee, but may itself change according to the nature of the position. Congress has the Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo), then a Senior Vice-President in TIDCORP, with grave
power and prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the provincial administrator misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, insubordination, and gross
position and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential, non-career service position. When done discourtesy in the course of official duties. TIDCORP alleged that Demigillo engaged in a
in good faith, these acts would not violate a public officerâs security of tenure, even if they verbal tussle with Mr. Joel Valdes (Valdes), President and CEO of TIDCORP. Allegedly,
result in his removal from office or the shortening of his term. Modifications in public office, Demigillo also sent a memorandum addressed to Valdes which contained discourteous and
such as changes in qualifications or shortening of its tenure, are made in good faith so long as arrogant words.
they are aimed at the office and not at the incumbent.
Pending the investigation, TIDCORP placed Demigillo under preventive suspension for 90 days.
B. The Court also pointed out that Gonzalesâ reliance on the case of Gabriel v. Domingoâs
dissenting opinion (which stated that a permanent employee remains a permanent Demigillo assailed her preventive suspension. The CSC ruled that her suspension was not
employee unless he is validly terminated) was misplaced. First of all, the factual differences proper because under Section 19(2), Rule II, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
were pointed out to be dissimilar to the case of Gonzales, and even granting that they were the Civil Service (Uniform Rules), a civil service officer like Demigillo might be preventively
the same, the cited case (in Gabriel) of Civil Service Commission v. Javier actually proposes suspended by the disciplining authority only if any of the two grounds were present, to wit: (1)
that corporate secretaries in GOCCs cannot expect protection for their tenure and there was a possibility that the civil service employee might unduly influence or intimidate
appointments upon the reclassification of their position to a primarily confidential position. potential witnesses against him; or (2) there was a possibility that the civil service employee
These officers cannot rely on the statutes providing for their permanent appointments, if and might tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
when the Court determines these to be primarily confidential. Further to this, said dissenting CSC .
opinion in Gabriel cited EO 503, which provided safeguards against termination of
government employees affected by RA 7160âs implementation. According to the dissenting ISSUE: Whether or not Demigillo’s 90- day preventive suspension is proper?
opinion, EO 503 is an obvious indication of the executive departmentâs intent to protect and
uphold both the national government and the local government employeesâ security of HELD: The 90-day preventive suspension order issued against Demigillo was valid.
tenure. However, the Court emphasized that EO 503, however, does not apply to employees
of the local government affected by RA 7160âs enactment, as it only applies to National Under Section 51 of the Revised Administrative Code, the imposition of preventive suspension
Government Agencies whose functions are to be devolved to LGUs. by the proper disciplining authority is authorized provided the charge involves dishonesty,
oppression, or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are
C. Finally, the Court noted that both career and non-career service employees have a right to reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal
security of tenure. All permanent officers and employees in the civil service, regardless of from the service. Section 51 nowhere states or implies that before a preventive suspension
whether they belong to the career or non-career service category, are entitled to this may issue there must be proof that the subordinate may unduly influence the witnesses
guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by law and after against him or may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office.
procedural due process. The concept of security of tenure, however, operates under a
different rule for primarily confidential employees due to the nature of a âprimarily Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the CSC promulgated the Uniform Rules on August 31,
confidentialâ position. Serving at the confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily 1999. Section 19 and Section 20 of Rule II of the Uniform Rules defined the guidelines in the
confidential employeeâs term of office expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the issuance of an order of preventive suspension and the duration of the suspension It is clear
employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is not âremovedâ or âdismissedâ from Section 19, supra, that before an order of preventive suspension pending an
from office. The term merely âexpiresâ and the loss of trust and confidence is the âjust causeâ investigation may validly issue, only two prerequisites need be shown, namely: (1) that the
provided by law that results in the termination of employment. In the case of Gonzales, where proper disciplining authority has served a formal charge to the affected officer or employee;
the trust and confidence has been irretrievably âerodedâ, Gov. Pimentel only exercised his and (2) that the charge involves either dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in
discretion when he decided that he could no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales. the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of the
Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be charges which would warrant her removal from the service. Proof showing that the
suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It subordinate officer or employee may unduly influence the witnesses against her or may
cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature of the tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office is not among the prerequisites.
office held. The CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated
In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, we stated that preventive suspension pending investigation “is a Therefore, COA erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments. Gaminde and
measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against her co-terminus staff are entitled to receive their salary and other emoluments for actual
respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses service rendered.
against him.” As such, preventing the subordinate officer or employee from intimidating the
witnesses during investigation or from tampering the documentary evidence in her office is a
purpose, not a condition, for imposing preventive suspension, as shown in the use of the word XIII. PERSONNEL ACTIONS
“intended.” A. Disciplinary Action and Preventive Suspension

ADALIM V. TANIÑAS, G.R. NO. 198682, 10 APRIL 2013 BEJA, SR. V. CA, 207 SCRA 689, MARCH 31, 1992

GAMINDE V COA, G.R. NO. 140335, DECEMBER 13, 2000 Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in 1975.
and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21, 1988, the General
Thelma Gaminde was appointed by the President of the Philippines as Commissioner of the Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz for grave
Civil Service Commission, ad interim and assumed office on June 22, 1993 after oath of office. dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and
The Commission on Appointments (COA) and the Congress of the Philippines confirmed the conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they were preventively
appointment on September 7, 1993. Gaminde, on February 24, 1998, sought the Office of the suspended for the charges.
President for clarification on the expiry date of her term of office. In response to her request,
the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel opined that her term office will expire on February 2, 2000 After preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for region X, administrative
instead of February 2, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, Gaminde remained in office case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit. On December 13, 1988 another
after February 2, 1999. However, on February 4, 1999, Chairman Corazon Alma de Leon wrote administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager also for dishonesty grave
COA requesting opinion whether or not Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 2, 1999. The General the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive
Counsel of COA issued an opinion on February 18, 1999 that “the term of Commissioner suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was redocketed as administrative
Gaminde has expired on February 2, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it to the AAB for appropriate
constitutional intent.” Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas Felipe action.
issued a Notice of Disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments of Gaminde
and her co-terminus staff effective February 2, 1999. Gaminde appealed COA’s disallowance The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence.
but it was dismissed, and affirmed the propriety of the disallowance; and held that the issue of However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
Gaminde’s office term may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two days later, he filed with the ABB a
paper which set the expiration date of February 2, 1999, and that the Commission was bereft manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89
of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of on account of the pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the
the Office of the President. Gaminde moved for reconsideration, but was denied by COA. motion and continued with the hearing of the administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for
the dismissal of the certiorari case and proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
Issue: Whether the term of office of Thelma Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 2, 1999, as ISSUE: Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over
stated in the appointment paper, or on February 2, 2000, as claimed by her. administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.

Held: The term of office of Thelma P. Gaminde as the CSC Commissioner, as appointed by HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without
President Fidel V. Ramos, expired on February 2, 1999. However, she served as de-facto officer the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
in good faith until February 2, 2000. The term of office of the Chairman and members of the preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857
Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution under Article IX-D, Section 1 (2): but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the “Jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees
“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent in the PPA.
of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of
those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA was
years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council.
be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.” Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power “to appoint, discipline and remove,
and determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel”.
In Republic v Imperial, it was held that the operation fo the rotational plan requires two On December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created
conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3) the Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public
commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, Works, Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30,
resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled for the unexpired 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA
balance of the term. retained its attached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached
agency to the DOTC.
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control and sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that the
administrative supervision, “Attachment” is defined as the “lateral relationship between the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an
department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof.
and program coordination”. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized
from the Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that without the
supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral complicity of such officials, large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be
relationship” between the Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely carried out. The petition is dismissed and upheld the constitutionality of Section 44 of RA 8189.
for policy and program coordination.” With respect to administrative matters, the
independence of an attached agency from the department control and supervision is C. Detail
furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Department’s administrative CSC V. YU, G.R. NO. 189041, JULY 31, 2012
supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other
personnel actions “ in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions” under the In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution program pursuant to R.A. No.
administrative Code of 1987. The Law impliedly grants the general Manager with the approval 7160, (The Local Government Code of 1991), which affected the Department of Health (DOH)
of the PPA board of Directors the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant along with other government agencies.
Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the
PPA General Manager, may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The Prior to the devolution, Dr. Fortunata Castillo (hereinafter Dr. Castillo) held the position of
investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II) of the DOH Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City.
no. 807. The Decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of Respondent Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu (Dr. Yu), on the other hand, held the position of Provincial
the PPA General Manager to to subject petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED Health Officer I (PHO I).
insofar as it validates the 4 jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative
case no. PPA –AAB-1-049-89. The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and Upon the implementation of the devolution program, then Basilan Governor Gerry Salapuddin
VOID and the case is REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with (Governor Salapuddin) refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent of the PHO II position
dispatch its reinvestigation. that was to be devolved to the local government unit of Basilan, prompting the DOH to retain
Dr. Castillo at the Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City. She retired in 1996.

B. Transfer Meanwhile, in 1994, or two years after the implementation of the devolution program,
DE GUZMAN, JR. V. COMELEC G.R. NO. 129118, JULY 19, 2000 Governor Salapuddin appointed Dr. Yu to the PHO II position.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of On February 23, 1998, Republic Act No. 8543, otherwise known as ―An Act Converting the
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Basilan Provincial Hospital in the Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, into a Tertiary
Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996". Hospital Under the Full Administrative and Technical Supervision of the Department of Health,
Increasing the Capacity to One Hundred Beds and Appropriating Funds Therefor,ǁ was passed
SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular into law whereby the hospital positions previously devolved to the local government unit of
city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of Basilan were re-nationalized and reverted to the DOH. The Basilan Provincial Health Hospital
the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a was later renamed the Basilan General Hospital, and the position of PHO II was then re-
particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new classified to Chief of Hospital II.
station outside the original congressional district.
Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were reassigned to different While Dr. Yu was among the personnel reverted to the DOH with the re-nationalization of the
stations by the COMELEC. Basilan General Hospital, she was made to retain her original item of PHO II instead of being
given the re-classified position of Chief of Hospital II.
Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal
protection clause guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Aggrieved, filed a letter protest before the CSC claiming that she has a vested right to the
Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city position of Chief of Hospital II. The CSC denied the protest. On appeal, the CA reversed the
or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no substantial CSC.
distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid
classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack. ISSUES:

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause. Is the PHO II position previously occupied by Yu a devolved position?
May Dr. Castillo be considered to have abandoned her position for consistently failing to
HELD: No. The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election assert her rights thereto?
officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. HELD: As defined, “devolution is the act by which the national government confers power and
authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and
Lutz vs. Araneta: "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all responsibilities.” ADVERTISEMENT: Work from home! Be an online English tutor. Earn at least
or none". PHP100/hour.

This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true To ensure the proper implementation of the devolution process, then President Corazon C.
that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 503, otherwise known as the ―Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Transfer of Personnel and Assets, Liabilities and Records of National considered constructive dismissal as she maintained her position as Revenue Attorney IV and
Government Agencies Whose Functions Are To Be Devolved To The Local Government Units was designated as Assistant Chief of Legal Division.
And For Other Related Purposes, which laid down the following pertinent guidelines with
respect to the transfer of personnel: “The absorption of the NGA personnel by the LGU shall be Pacheo appealed to the CSC where the latter granted the same. However, the CSC held
mandatory, in which case, the LGUs shall create the equivalent positions of the affected that rules and so holds that the withholding by the BIR of her salaries is justified as she is not
personnel except when it is not administratively viable.” entitled thereto since she is deemed not to have performed any actual work in the
government on the principle of no work no pay. Still not satisfied, Pacheo moved for
On the basis of the foregoing, it was mandatory for Governor Salapuddin to absorb the reconsideration. She argued that the CSC erred in not finding that she was constructively
position of PHO II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Fortunata Castillo. Highlighting the absence of dismissed and, therefore, entitled to back salary. However, the motion was dismissed.
discretion is the use of the word “shall” both in Section 17 (i) of R.A. No. 7160 and in Section
2(a)(2) of E.O. No. 503, which connotes a mandatory order. The only instance that the LGU Undaunted, Pacheo sought recourse before the CA via a petition for review. The CA reversed
concerned may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel is when absorption is not the CSC decision, stating that Pacheo was constructively dismissed. Hence, this petition.
administratively viable, meaning, it would result to duplication of functions, in which case, the
NGA personnel shall be retained by the national government. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Pacheo was constructively dismissed and
entitled to backwages
Had Dr. Castillo felt aggrieved by her detail to the DOH Regional Office, she was not without
recourse. The law afforded her the right to appeal her case to the CSC, but she had not seen HELD: No.
fit to question the justification for her detail. Hence, the appointment of Dr. Yu to the position
PHO II. Political Law- transfer or assignment of personnel cannot be done when the same is a
preliminary step toward his removal or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent
*** position.

Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder with the While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the
intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. In order to constitute employee's prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his
abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstance as clearly to indicate removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or when it is designed to
an absolute relinquishment. There must be a complete abandonment of duties of such indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect
continuance that the law will infer a relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil
it springs from and is accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. There are, Service.
therefore, two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and,
second, an overt or 'external' act by which the intention is carried into effect. Significantly, Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, defines
constructive dismissal as a situation when an employee quits his work because of the agency
By no stretch of the imagination can Dr. Castillo's seeming lackadaisical attitude towards heads unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations which render continued work
protecting her rights be construed as an abandonment of her position resulting in her having impossible. Hence, the employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed. This may occur
intentionally and voluntarily vacated the same. although there is no diminution or reduction of salary of the employee. It may be a transfer
from one position of dignity to a more servile or menial job.
We rule, therefore, under the attendant circumstances of the case, that with Dr. Castillo's re-
absorption by the DOH which appears to bear the former's approval, her devolved position The CSC, through the OSG, contends that the deliberate refusal of Pacheo to report for work
with the LGU of Basilan was left vacant. Thus, we hold that Dr. Yu was validly appointed to the either in her original station in Quezon City or her new place of assignment in San Fernando,
position of PHO II in 1994 and, consequently, acquired a vested right to its re-classified Pampanga negates her claim of constructive dismissal.
designation – Chief of Hospital II. DENIED
It is clear, however, from E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7) that
D. Reassignment there is no such duty to first report to the new place of assignment prior to questioning an
REPUBLIC V PACHEO, G.R. NO. 178021, JANUARY 25, 2012 alleged invalid reassignment imposed upon an employee. Pacheo was well within her right
not to report immediately to RR4, San Fernando, Pampanga, and to question her
Pacheo was a Revenue Attorney IV, Assistant Chief of the Legal Division of the Bureau of reassignment.
Internal Revenue(BIR) in Revenue Region No. 7 (RR7), Quezon City. The BIR issued Revenue
Travel Assignment Order (RTAO)No. 25-2002, ordering the reassignment of Pacheo as Assistant Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employees security of
Chief, Legal Division from RR7 in Quezon City to RR4 in San Fernando, Pampanga. tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the
Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees
Pacheo questioned the reassignment through her Letter addressed to Rene G. Banez, then removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR). She considered her transfer from Quezon City to are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.
Pampanga as amounting to a constructive dismissal.
Having ruled that Pacheo was constructively dismissed, is she entitled to reinstatement and
Due to the then inaction of the BIR, Pacheo filed a complaint before the CSC- National back wages? The Court agrees with the CA that she is entitled to reinstatement, but finds Itself
Capital Region (CSC-NCR), praying for the nullification of RTAO No. 25-2002. The BIR, through unable to sustain the ruling that she is entitled to full back wages and benefits. It is a settled
its Deputy Commissioner for Legal and Inspection Group, Edmundo P. Guevara (Guevara), jurisprudence that an illegally dismissed civil service employee is entitled to back salaries but
denied Pacheos protest for lack of merit. It contended that her reassignment could not be limited only to a maximum period of five (5) years, and not full back salaries from his illegal
dismissal up to his reinstatement.