POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
POWER OF IMPEACHMENT
ROMULO VS. YNIGUEZ
 Petitioners, representing more than 1/5 of the Batasan, filed Resolution 644 calling for the
impeachment of Pres. Marcos together with a verified complaint for impeachment. The resolution
and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Com. On Justice, HR and Good Government
which found the complaint not sufficient in form and substance. It dismissed all the charges and
sent to the archives.
 Ramon Mitra moved to recall Res. 644, but Batasan disapproved it.
 Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition to restrain from enforcing Secs. 4-6 and 8 of the Batasan
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment and mandamus to compel the Committee to recall from the
archives and report out the resolution together with the verified complaint.
• They allege that the provisions of the Rules of Procedure are unconstitutional because they
amend the Constitution by empowering a smaller body to supplant and overrule the complaint
to impeach endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all the members of the BP and that said
questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings by vesting the Committee the
power to impeach or not to impeach when such prerogative belongs to the BP as a collegiate
body.
• Sec. 8: it imposes unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that the complaint
can proceed to trial before the Batasan by requiring a majority vote of all the members as it
imposes a condition not required by the Constitution.
 Respondents:
• This is a suit against the Batasan itself over which this Court has no jurisdiction
• Political questions
• Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and even supposing
without admitting that the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, are not inconsistent with the provision of Sec. 3 of Article XIII of
the complaint for impeachment for the Batasan as a body sovereign within its own sphere
has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even without the benefit of said Rules
• SC cannot compel the Batasan to give due course to the impeachment complaint.
BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LEYNES, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
1
Can the SC compel the Committee to recall from the archives and order the conduct of trial? NO
When the Batasan denied the motion for recall, it had in effect confirmed the action of the Committee. Since the
Constitution expressly provides that "no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all its
members," a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan confirming the action of the Committee disapproving the
resolution calling for the impeachment of the President and dismissing all the charges contained in the complaint makes
mathematically impossible the required at least 2/3 vote of all members of the Batasan to support a judgment of
conviction. Dismissal of the impeachment proceedings would then be in order. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body
of the resolution and complaint for impeachment (which is what the denial by the Batasan of MP Mitra's motion to recall
from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment is tantamount to) makes irrelevant under what authority
the Committee had acted. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings
is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the
power of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by
petitioners. An order addressed to the Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself. An interference by
the judicial department of the government with the workings and operations of the committee of the legislative department
would be tantamount to an interference with the workings and operations of the legislative department itself. And, again,
we are called upon to say, that one branch of the government cannot encroach upon the domain of another without
danger.
Whether the Batasan’s Rules of Procedure is constitutional? YES
The Batasan pursuant to its power to adopt rules of its proceedings may adopt, as it did adopt, necessary rules of
procedure to govern impeachment proceedings. The rules it adopted providing for dismissal of a complaint for
impeachment which is not sufficient in form or substance, or when sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, or
probable cause has not been established, or requiring a majority vote of all members of the Batasan for the approval of
the 1973 Constitution. More specifically, the provision requiring concurrence of at least 2/3 votes of all members of the
Batasan for conviction is not violated by any provision of the Rules which authorizes dismissal of a petition by a majority
vote of the Batasan since with such number of votes it is obvious that the two-thirds vote of all members necessary for
conviction can no longer be obtained. Such being the case, the Batasan can specify in its rules how and when the
impeachment proceedings can be terminated or dismissed for Sec. 3, Article XIII merely provides for how a judgment of
conviction can be sustained but is silent on how a complaint for impeachment can be dismissed when it becomes
apparent that a judgment of conviction by the required number of votes is not possible. Neither is the Constitutional
provision to the effect that impeachment may be initiated by a vote of at least one-fifth of the members violated by the
provision of the Rules authorizing the Committee to dismiss the complaint for impeachment which it finds not sufficient in
form and substance (Sec. 4), does not have sufficient grounds for impeachment (Sec. 5), or where probable cause has
not been established (Sec. 6). All of said actions of the Committee refer to the disposition of a complaint for impeachment
initiated by at least one-fifth of all the members of the Batasan. Their purpose is to determine whether or not a complaint
for impeachment initiated by the required number of members of the Batasan warrants being referred to the Batasan for
trial. They are not properly part of the "initiation phase" of the impeachment proceeding but of the "trial phase", or more
accurately the "preparatory to trial" phase. Such actions are liken to actions taken by this Court in determining whether a
petition duly filed should be given due course or should be dismissed outright. That the Rules on Impeachment of the
Interim Batasan in the judgment of petitioners is better is no argument against the validity or constitutionality of the Rules
on Impeachment approved by the Batasan. Said Rules are always within the power of the Batasan to modify,
change or replace any time. They do not have the force of law but are merely in the nature of by-laws prescribed for the
orderly and convenient conduct of proceedings before the Batasan. They are merely procedural and not substantive.
They may be waived or disregarded by the Batasan and with their observance the Courts have no concern. The
rules of public deliberative bodies, whether codified in the form of a 'manual and formally adopted by the body, or whether
consisting of a body of unwritten customs or usages, preserved in memory and by tradition are matters of which the
judicial courts, as a general rule, take no cognizance. Rules of parliamentary practice are merely procedural and not
substantive. The rules of procedure adopted by deliberative bodies have not the force of a public law, but they are merely
in the nature of by-laws, prescribed for the orderly and convenient conduct of their own proceedings. The rules adopted
by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. The
rules of procedure passed by one legislative body are not binding on a subsequent legislative body operating within the
same jurisdiction, and, where a body resolves that the rules of a prior body be adopted until a committee reports rules, the
prior rules cease to be in force on the report of the committee.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 2

LECAROZ VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN
 Lecaroz, mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque was charged before the SB with grave coercion for
taking over the operation and control of the gasoline station owned by Pedro Par, selling gasoline
therein to the public, issuing invoices and some pieces of yellow pad paper and padlocked the
dispensing pump without authority of law. The information was amended that Lecaroz ordered his
policemen to sell gasoline.
 Lecaroz MTQ:
• Lack of jurisdiction
• The offense for which he was charged is not related to his office as a mayor.
SB – DENIED MTQ
 Lecaroz:
• Grave coercion is not among those mentioned in Sec. 4, PD 1486
• Ordinary courts should have jurisdiction because it would be too costly to transport witnesses
• PD 1486 is violative of the Constitution as it enlarges the what the Constitution limited.
DISMISSED complaints.
Whether SB has jurisdiction? YES
Sec. 5, Art. 13 provides for the creation of a special court known as the SB. The court has jurisdictional competence not
only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices by public officers and employees but also over
other crimes committed by them in relation to their office, though not involving graft and corrupt practices, as may be
determined by law. The constitutional provision delegates to the lawmaking body the determination of such other offenses
committed by public officers over which the SB shall have jurisdiction. Pursuant to the lawmaking authority and
prerogative vested in the President, he issued PD 1486 which mandates the SB to have jurisdiction over crimes or
offenses committed by public officers including those employed in GOCC, in relation to their office. When the law making
authority chose to include all public office-related offenses over which the SB shall have jurisdiction, the courts will not
review questions of legislative policy. It is enough that the act is within the constitutional power of the lawmaking body or
authority and if it is, the courts are bound to follow and apply. SB has jurisdictional competence not only over criminal
and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officers and employees but also over
other crimes committed by them in relation to their office, though not involving graft and corrupt practices, as
may be determined by law.
The information clearly alleges that Lecaroz took advantage of his position, if he were not the mayor he would not have
allegedly directed the policemen and the latter would not have followed his orders and instructions to sell Par’s gasoline
and padlock the station. SB has concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts and in case of concurrent jurisdiction, it is
axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction excludes the other courts.

PD 1861 amended PD 1606 and it provides that where the penalty for offenses or felonies committed by public officers in
relation to their office does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for 6 years or fine of 6k, they are no longer
within the concurrent jurisdiction of SB and the regular courts are now vested with jurisdiction—the information was filed in
1980 beofre the amendment which was on march 23, 1983 therefore the SB retains jurisdiction over the case.

Exceptions to the jurisdiction of the SB are like those constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removed by
impeachment. Sec. 2, Art. 13 of the 1973 Constitution provides:
The President, the Justices of the SC, and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions shall be removed
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other
high crimes, or graft and corruption.

The above provision proscribes removal from office of the aforementioned constitutional officers by any other method;
otherwise to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his
office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the
fundamental law.

Judgment in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor,
trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and
disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic. The party thus convicted may be proceeded
against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law. The party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall
nevertheless be subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and if the same does not result in a
conviction and the official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action “in accordance with law” may not prosper.

Petition DISMISSED.
POWER WITH REGARD TO UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
SEC. 2, ART. 12 All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With
the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LEYNES, VALDEZ

Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 3

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish- workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
SEC. 1, ART. 17 Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SEC. 2, ART. 17 Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this Sec. shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years
thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: REQUIREMENTS AS TO TITLES OF BILLS
SEC. 26(1), ART. 6 Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
DE LA CRUZ VS.  Petitioners – operators, hostesses, hospitality girls and dancers of night clubs, cabarets and Whether Ordinance 84 is constitutional? NO
PARAS dance halls
 Respondents – Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Municipal Council of Bocaue RA 938: AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
 Ordinance 84 of Bocaue, Bulacan: ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR
♦ Prohibits the issuance and renewal of permits of operators of night clubs, cabarets RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.
or dance halls nor to professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer for The municipal council hinges its power to prohibit under RA 938. Sec. 1 thereof gives the municipal or city board or
employment in any of the aforementioned establishments within the municipality. council of each chartered city the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night
♦ Revokes the licenses of these establishments and those of the professional clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places
hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers upon expiration of the 30 day of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction. Subsequently, it was amended to include the power to prohibit, but the title
period remained the same. Since the Constitution mandates every bill to embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title. Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute
♦ Penalizes such violations by 3 mos. imprisonment or a P 200 fine.
being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. Since the
 2 cases for prohibition with preliminary injunction were filed in the CFI Bulacan based on the amendment wasn’t expressed in the title thereof, it cannot be given effect. Also, in relation to the other pertinent laws, the
ff. grounds: allowed LGUs to merely regulate the mode in which it may conduct business in order precisely to put an end to practices
♦ No authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling which could encourage vice and immorality. What was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power
♦ Violative of the right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as the but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing
♦ PD 189 has transferred to the Department of Tourism the power to license and GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE
regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night club 1. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and
 Respondent’s Answer: regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the
♦ The Municipal Council is authorized not only to regulate but to prohibit the municipal council by law. With this class we are not here directly concerned.
establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs under Sec. 2243 of the RAC, 2. The second branch of the clause is much more independent of the specific functions of the council which are
CA 601, RAs 938, 978 and 1224. enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health
♦ Ordinance No. 84 is not violative of the right to due process and the equal protection of and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
the law, since property rights are subordinate to public interests municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.
♦ PD 189 did not deprive Municipal Councils of their jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be
night clubs reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws
 Petitioners’ Reply: or policy of the State.
♦ The hospitality girls are not allowed to engage in immoral acts and to go out with
customers TEST OF VALIDITY
♦ These hospitality girls are made to go through periodic medical check-ups and not one If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of
of them is suffering from any venereal disease validity. The following are the proper tests for validity: reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes
of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. The objective of fostering public
♦ The crime rate there is better than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan
morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
CFI – Declared Ordinance 84 as CONSTITUTIONAL in the name of police power under the General
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
Welfare Clause of the LGC.

BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LEYNES, VALDEZ

Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
LIDASAN VS.  Petitioner – a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a
COMELEC qualified voter for the 1967 elections.
 In 1966, Pres. signed into law HB 1247, known as RA 4790:
♦ The body of the statute constituted 21 barrios of Lanao del Sur as a distinct and
independent municipality, to be known as Dianaton, and placed the government seat in
Togaig.
♦ The mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the new municipality shall be elected during
the 1967 general elections for local officials
 Later, it was discovered that barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of
Buldon, Cotabato, and 10 barrios mentioned were parts of another municipality, Parang,
Cotabato
 COMELEC issued a Resolution:
♦ The new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur shall comprise of the barrios
mentioned in RA 4790 even though some of the barrios were part of municipalities of
Cotabato.
 As a result, 12 barrios - in 2 municipalities in Cotabato — were transferred to Lanao del Sur.
This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.
 Apprised of this development, the OPS, recommended the operation of the statute be
suspended until clarified by correcting legislation to the COMELEC
 COMELEC thru a Resolution, stood by its own interpretation, declared that the statute should
be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the SC.
 Petitioner:
♦ A bill should only embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
♦ Dual Limitations on Legislative Power:
1) Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of
heterogeneous subjects.
2) The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject
thereof.
BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LEYNES, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
4
Ordinance 84 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Whether RA 4790 is constitutional? NO
SUBJECT OF THE STATUTE TO BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE
This constitutional requirement breathes the spirit of command. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in
the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate
action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.
TEST OF SUFFICIENCY OF THE TITLE
 Whether it is misleading and, while technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in
express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or
which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
 Substance rather than its form should be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of
giving notice to all persons interested
INVALIDITY
The title of RA 4790 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of
Dianaton. No slightest intimation communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del
Sur town. The mention of Lanao del Sur makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation
has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from 21
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers 2 municipalities in
Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact
of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and Cotabato itself that part of
their territory is being taken away from their towns and province added to the adjacent Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in
the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. The lumping together of barrios in adjacent
but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the new
municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the two provinces may be made without necessarily creating
a new municipality and vice versa.
EXCEPTION TO THE RULE ON SEPARABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS FROM NULLIFIED
PROVISIONS
When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not
be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all
the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with them. A perusal of the RA 4790,
Congress intended Dianaton to be composed of 21 barrios and not 9 because they considered economic viability of the
municipality.
TWIN FUNCTIONS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
1. They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of government.
2. They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character
that they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of
maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income. It was apparently
these same factors which induced the writing out of HB 1247 creating the town of Dianaton.
LEGAL STANDING OF PETITIONER
The validity of RA 4790 is challenged because of the constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be expressed in
its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are impaired by lack of
notification in the title that barrio Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to a different provincial
hegemony. The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community affected by legislation creating a town to
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM  Tio, a videogram operator, in behalf of others also, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987, which
REGULATORY BOARD created the Videogram Regulatory Board that regulates and supervises the videogram industry.
 Sec. 11 thereof contains authority to the board to solicit the direct assistance of other agencies
and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of
such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board.
 Tio
• Such provision is alleged to be an undue delegation of legislative power.
• Sec. 10, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is
a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof
INSULAR LUMBER VS. Insular Lumber Company, a licensed forest concessionaire, purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel
CTA which it used in the operation of its forest concession, sawmill, planning mills, power units, vehicles,
water pumps, lawn mowers, and in furnishing free water and light to its employees, on which specific
tax was paid.
In 1964, the Company filed with the CIR a claim for refund of P19,921.37 representing 25% of the
specific tax paid on the manufactured oil and fuel used in its operations pursuant to the provisions of
Sec. 5, RA 1435.
CIR – DENIED refund because privilege of partial tax refund granted by Sec. 5 of RA 1435 to those
using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions is limited to a period of 5 years from June
14, 1956, the date effectivity. Consequently, oil used in such concession after June 14, 1961 are
subject to the full tax prescribed in Sec. 142 of the NIRC.
CTA – NOT THE WHOLE AMOUNT. The operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest
concession, hence, the refund provision of Sec. 5 of RA 1435 allowing partial refund to forest and
mining concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37
claimed, representing the 25% of specific tax paid, only P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging
operations. Respondent court, however, did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08
because the Company's right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid during the
period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, the Company was
credited the refund of P10,560.20 only.
 CIR contends that the first proviso in Sec. 5 of RA 1435 is unconstitutional because of Sec.
21, Art. 6:
No bill which may be enacted into a law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.
• The Commissioner contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund.
BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LEYNES, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
5
ascertain that the law so created is not dismembering his place of residence is recognized in this jurisdiction. Bara
Lidasan is a qualified voter and expects to vote in the 1967 elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was
annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the case here, to vote in a town different from his actual
residence as he may not even know the candidates of the new town.
RA 4790 is NULL & VOID
Whether Sec. 10, a tax provision, is considered as a rider and hence a violation of the one subject title rule? NO
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the regulation of
the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent
with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation, it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The
title, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes
expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the
title or that the latter be an index to the body of the decree.
IMPOSITION OF TAX NOT CONFISCATORY
The tax imposed is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that earnings of
videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make
available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the
theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting the
tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all videogram operators. The levy of
the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes.
Petition DISMISSED.
Whether Sec. 5, RA 1435 is constitutional? NO
Sec. 5. provided that whenever any oils mentioned above are used by miners or forest concessionaires in their
operations, 25% of the specific tax paid thereon shall be refunded by the CIR upon submission of proof of actual use of
oils and under similar conditions enumerated in subparagraph one and two of Sec. 1, amending Sec. 142, NIRC.
The title of RA 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund." However, Sec. 5 of, the Act
deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the
Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Sec. 5
provides for a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.
RA deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special
Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec. 5 of the law is in effect
a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel,
is not a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of the afore-quoted constitutional
provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or
the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. This does not seem to this Court to
have been ignored in the passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on precisely
the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by Congress which passed it. Furthermore, in deciding
the constitutionality of a statute alleged to be defectively titled, every presumption favors the validity of the Act. In cases
presenting other constitutional issues, the courts avoid declaring an Act unconstitutional whenever possible. Where there
is any doubt as to the insufficiency of the title, the legislation should be sustained. In the incident on hand, this Court does
not even have any doubt.
Decision of CTA AFFIRMED.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 6
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: REQUIREMENTS AS TO APPROPRIATION LAWS
SEC. 22, ART. 7 The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from
existing and proposed revenue measures.
SEC. 24, ART. 6 All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
SEC. 25, ART. 6 (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be
prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal
therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and
shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
SEC. 29, ART. 6 (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the
balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
GUINGONA VS. The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) Whether the appropriation measures enacted by the President violates Sec. 29, Art. 6? NO
CARAGUE and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President Marcos
appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD 81, "Amending Certain Provisions of RA 4860, became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the
Foreign Borrowing Act, by PD 1177, Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution
Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD 1967, An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion
and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.
They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Sec. 24, Article VI of the Constitution, i.e.,
Petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
budget. The petitioners seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of PD 81, Secs. 31 of PD and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur
1177, and PD 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under with amendments. (Emphasis supplied.)
the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees: whereby bills have to be approved by the President, then a law must be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic
appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Sec. 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as
Respondents contend that the petition involves a purely political question which is the repeal or follows ––
amendment of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative body and Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
not this Court.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service.
The Court is not persuaded.

An examination of the PDs show the clear intent that the amounts needed to cover the payment of the principal
and interest on all foreign loans, including those guaranteed by the national government, should be made
available when they shall become due precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws
appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.

The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management policies.

The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and are therefore inconsistent
with Sec.s 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which requires, among others, that "all appropriations, bills
authorizing increase of public debt" must be passed by Congress and approved by the President is untenable. Certainly,
the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing
presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the
legislative mill. The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is
BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LEYNES, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 7
that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof
were otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a more direct or express manner.

PD 81, 1177 & 1967 REGARDING AUTOMATIC APPROPRIATIONS REMAIN OPERATIVE UNTIL AMENDED,
REPEALED OR REVOKED
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked." The Court, therefor, finds that RA 4860 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations,
unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to
implement the same.

Petition DISMISSED.
REQUIREMENTS AS TO TAX LAWS
SEC. 28, ART. 6 (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable,
or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
SEC. 4(3-4), ART. (3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate
14 existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.

Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment.

(4) Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax.
TAN VS. DEL This is a consolidated cases challenging the constitutionality of RA 7496 – Simplified Net Income Is there uniformity of taxation? YES
ROSARIO Taxation Scheme (SNIT) and validity of Sec. 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93
Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation,
Case 1: similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.
Petitioners:
 Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed Uniformity does not forefend classification as long as:
in the title 1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary,
2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose,
 Rule of taxation should be uniform and equitable 3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and
 Progressive system of taxation 4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class.
 Due process and equal protection clauses
What may instead be perceived to be apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the
 The title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is a misnomer or at least deficient for being income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and
merely entitled “Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self- Employed and large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. This classification is not arbitrary and inappropriate.
Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession”
 RA 7496 desecrates the constitutional requirement that taxation shall be uniform and Whether RR 2-93 is constitutional? YES
equitable in that the law would now attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals
differently. A General Professional Partnership, unlike an ordinary business partnership, is not an income taxpayer. The income tax
is imposed not on the professional partnership, which is tax exempt, but on the partners themselves in their individual
Case 2: capacity computed on their distributive shares of partnership profits. There is, then and now, no distinction in income tax
Petitioners: liability between a person who practices his profession alone or individually and one who does it through partnership with
 Questions the authority to promulgate RR 2-93 others in the exercise of a common profession.
 They question the administrative interpretation of the public respondent in applying the SNIT Sec. 6 did not alter but merely confirmed the standing rule as now modified by RA 7496 on basically the extent of
to partners of general professional partnership. allowable deductions applicable to all individual taxpayers on their non-compensation income. There is no evident
intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in equal footing or in significant variance the
income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it through
GPP.
Petitions DISMISSED.
GARCIA VS. Ad Valorem Tax: a tax imposed proportionally on the value of something rather than on its quantity or Did the President violate the Constitution? NO
EXECUTIVE some other measure
BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LEYNES, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
SECRETARY
FACTS:
• Petitioner: then Congressman of the 2nd District of Bataan
• Respondents: Executive Secretary, Commissioner of Customs, NEDA, Tariff Commission,
Secretary of Finance, and Energy Regulatory Board.
• Then President, Corazon Aquino issued the following Executive Orders on the ff dates:
o EO 438 (Nov 27, 1990): imposed, in addition to other duties taxes and charges
imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% AD
VALOREM. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles,
including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines.
o EO 443 (January 3, 1991): This additional duty was subsequently increased from
5% to 9%.
o EO 475 (Aug 15, 1991): reduced the rate of additional duty on all imported articles
from 9% to 5% ad valorem.
o EO 478 (Aug 23, 1991): levied a special duty of Php 0.95 per liter of Php 151.05
per barrel on imported crude oil and PHp 1.00 per liter on imported oil products. This was in
addition to the ad valorem taxes.
• Petitioner now files a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, assailing the validity
of EOs 475 and 478 on the ground that the former are violative of Sec 24, Art VI of the 1987
Constitution.
Sec 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.”
•
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in
Congress, the President may NOT assume such power of issuing such EOs which are in the
nature of revenue-generating measures.
• Petitioner also claims that EOs 475 and 478 contravene the Tariff and Customs Code which
authorized the President to increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to impose additional duties
only when necessary to protect local industries or products but NOT for the purpose of raising
additional revenue for the government.
REQUIREMENTS AS TO JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
FIRST LEPANTO This is a MR of the decision of 2nd Div sustaining the jurisdiction of CA over appeals from the decisions
CERAMIC VS. CA of Board of Investments.
Petitioner contends Circular 1-91 cannot be deemed to have superseded Art. 82, Omnibus Investment
Code because the Code is in the nature of a substantive act of Congress defining the jurisdiction of
courts pursuant to Sec. 2, Art. 7.
Petitioner questions the holding of the 2nd Div that although the right to appeal granted by Art. 82 of the
Code is a substantive right which cannot be modified by a rule of procedure. Nonetheless, questions
concerning where and in what manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of procedure which
SC has the power to regulate.
BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LEYNES, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
8
Under Sec 24 of Art VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue of tariff bills, like all other bills is, of
course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that EO
475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the President, that they must
be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Sec. 28(2) of Art VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within the specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
There is thus EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL PERMISSION TO CONGRESS TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT
“SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS as Congress may impose, to fix within specified limits, tariff
rates and other duties or imposts.
Further, The Tariff and Customs Code was neither violated. Petitioner argues that the authority delegated to the President
must be exercised only in the interest of national economy, general welfare or national security. But it is precisely for the
protection of consumers, who constitute the very great bulk of the population that is being protected by protecting them
from high prices, shoddy quality and inefficient services.
Petitioner has not successfully overcome the presumptions of constitutionality and legality to which those Executive
Orders are entitled.
THUS, EOs 475 and 478 are CONSTITUTIONAL. Petition dismissed.
Is an appeal from the BOI a power granted to the SC? NO
Judicial review of the decisions and final orders of the BOI was originally provided for in the Omnibus Investment Code of
1981. It was thereafter amended by BP blg. 129 granting exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the IAC (now CA). when
Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 was promulgated, the right to appeal to the SC was granted. By then, however, the
1987 Constitution had taken effect. It provides in Art VI, sec 30 that “No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.” This provision is
intended to give SC a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction.
Now, Art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, by providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the
decisions and final orders of the BOI, increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Since it was enacted without the
advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it can never be deemed to
have amended BP Blg. 129, Sec. 9. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it
from the BOI must be deemed to have been conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9, to be exercised by it in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91. Indeed, there is no reason why decisions and final orders of the BOI must
be directly appealed to this Court. As already noted in the main decision in this case, the purpose of Sec. 9 of B.P. Blg.
129 is to provide uniform appeals to the Court of Appeals from the decisions and final orders of all quasi-judicial agencies,
with the exception only of those issued under the Labor Code and those rendered by the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals. It is, therefore, regrettable that in the adoption of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 the advice and
concurrence of the Supreme Court, as required by the Constitution, had not been obtained in providing for the appeal of
the decisions and final orders of the BOI directly to the Supreme Court.
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
TERESITA FABIAN VS. RA 6770 Ombudsman Act of 1989
DESIERTO
• Petitioner: Teresita G. Fabian = major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Devt
Corp
• Respondents: Hon. Anian Desierto (Ombudsman), Ombudsman Jose Guerrero, Nestor Agustin
(District Engineer of First Metro Manila Engineering District or FMED),
• Petitioner, through PROMAT, participated in the bidding for government construction projects
including those under the FMED. Respondent Agustin was then the District Engineer. During the
course of the transaction, they had a love affair. When the relationship turned sour, and when
petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, Agustin refused to the extent of harassing her.
Petitioner eventually filed an administrative case in 1995 with the Ombudsman.
• The Petitioner’s complaint sought the respondent’s dismissal based on Sec 19 of RA 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989)
SECTION 19. Administrative Complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:
(1)Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2)Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3)Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in
accordance with law;
(4)Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5)Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6)Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
• Ombudsman found Respondent Agustin guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of
suspension without pay for 1 year. (Ombudsman Guerrero later replaced Desierto, who had to
inhibit himself because the opposing counsel was his classmate)
• Upon appeal: Ombudsman Guerrero, EXONERATED Agustin.
• Petitioner now argues that while Sec 27 of RA 6770 provides:
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or
denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
 Sec 7, Rule III of AO 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman), when a respondent is
absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding, the decision of the
Ombudsman is final and unappealable.
 In effect, the AO limits the right of appeal allowed by RA 6770.
• Respondent:
 Petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of
the Ombudsman.
 The Office of the Ombudsman is empowered by the Constitution to promulgate its own
rules of procedure.
 Sec 13 (8) Art 11 provides that the Ombudsman can promulgate its rules of procedure
and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided
by law.
BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LEYNES, VALDEZ
Unauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.
9
Now, art. 82 of the 1987 Omnibus Investments Code increase the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
Since it was enacted without the advice and concurrence of this Court, this provision never became effective,
with the result that it can never be deemed to have amended BP Blg. 129, § 9.
The authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it from the BOI must be deemed to have been
conferred by B.P. Blg. 129, § 9, to be exercised by it in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91.
Is RA 6770 constitutional? NO
Sec 30, Art. 6 of the 1987 Constitution: No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence. Sec 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal
to the SC from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative and disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in the 1987 Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts,
abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If
the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
In the situation under consideration, a transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending
cases involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the Court of
Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure only. This is so
because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved.
Only the procedure by which the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that no
litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights,
hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.
JURISDICTION OF A COURT IS NOT A QUESTION OF ACQUIESCENCE BUT AN ISSUE OF CONFERMENT
The submission that because this Court has taken cognizance of cases involving Sec. 27 of RA 6770, that fact may be
viewed as "acquiescence" or "acceptance" by it of the appellate jurisdiction contemplated in said Section 27, is
unfortunately too tenuous. The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact but an issue of
conferment as a matter of law. Besides, we have already discussed the cases referred to, including the inaccuracies of
some statements therein, and we have pointed out the instances when Rule 45 is involved, hence covered by Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 now under discussion, and when that provision would not apply if it is a judicial review under
Rule 65.
THE SUPREME COURT CAN RULE ON MATTER SUA SPONTE WHEN ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION IS
INVOLVED
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question, especially when
the case can be decided on other grounds. As a general proposition that is correct. Here, however, there is an actual case
susceptible of judicial determination. Also, the constitutional question, at the instance of this Court, was raised by the
proper parties, although there was even no need for that because the Court can rule on the matter sua sponte when its
appellate jurisdiction is involved. The constitutional question was timely raised, although it could even be raised any time
likewise by reason of the jurisdictional issue confronting the Court. Finally, the resolution of the constitutional issue here is
obviously necessary for the resolution of the present case.
Petition was ordered transferred to the CA for final disposition. It is a case considered PRO HAC VICE (for this occasion
or particular purpose) in a petition for review under Rule 43.
Provisions of APPEAL are declared INVALID.