Procedure In Regional Trial Courts

RULE 6

Kinds Of Pleadings

Section 1. Pleadings defined. — Pleadings are the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties
submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. (1a)

Section 2. Pleadings allowed. — The claims of a party are asserted in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth,
etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.

The defenses of a party are alleged in the answer to the pleading asserting a claim against him.

An answer may be responded to by a reply. (n)

Section 3. Complaint. — The complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. The names and
residences of the plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint. (3a)

Section 4. Answer. — An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his defenses. (4a)

Section 5. Defenses. — Defenses may either be negative or affirmative.

(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his
cause or causes of action.

(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the
pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of
limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other
matter by way of confession and avoidance. (5a)

Section 6. Counterclaim. — A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. (6a)

Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of
justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in
an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counter-claim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
(n)

Section 8. Cross-claim. — A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Such cross-claim may include a claim that
the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action
against the cross-claimant. (7)

Section 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-crossclaims. — A counter-claim may be asserted against an original counter-
claimant.

A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-claimant. (n)

Section 10. Reply. — A reply is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of
new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters. If a party does
not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted.
If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new matters so alleged, such claims shall be set forth in an
amended or supplemental complaint. (11)

Section 11. Third, (fourth, etc.)—party complaint. — A third (fourth, etc.) — party complaint is a claim that a defending party
may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.) — party defendant for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. (12a)

Section 12. Bringing new parties. — When the presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the
granting of complete relief in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in
as defendants, if jurisdiction over them can be obtained. (14)

Section 13. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)—party complaint. — A third (fourth, etc.) — party defendant may allege in his answer
his defenses, counterclaims or cross-claims, including such defenses that the third (fourth, etc.) — party plaintiff may have
against the original plaintiff's claim. In proper cases, he may also assert a counterclaim against the original plaintiff in respect
of the latter's claim against the third-party plaintiff. (n)

RULE 7

Parts of a Pleading

Section 1. Caption. — The caption sets forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the docket number if assigned.

The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be named in the original complaint or petition; but in
subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with an appropriate indication
when there are other parties.

Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated. (1a, 2a)

Section 2. The body. — The body of the pleading sets fourth its designation, the allegations of the party's claims or defenses,
the relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading. (n)

(a) Paragraphs. — The allegations in the body of a pleading shall be divided into paragraphs so numbered to be readily
identified, each of which shall contain a statement of a single set of circumstances so far as that can be done with convenience.
A paragraph may be referred to by its number in all succeeding pleadings. (3a)

(b) Headings. — When two or more causes of action are joined the statement of the first shall be prefaced by the words "first
cause of action,'' of the second by "second cause of action", and so on for the others.

When one or more paragraphs in the answer are addressed to one of several causes of action in the complaint, they shall be
prefaced by the words "answer to the first cause of action" or "answer to the second cause of action" and so on; and when one
or more paragraphs of the answer are addressed to several causes of action, they shall be prefaced by words to that effect. (4)

(c) Relief. — The pleading shall specify the relief sought, but it may add a general prayer for such further or other relief as may
be deemed just or equitable. (3a, R6)

(d) Date. — Every pleading shall be dated. (n)

Section 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either
case his address which should not be a post office box.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied
if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an
unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails
promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (5a)

Section 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath,
verified or accompanied by affidavit .(5a)

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct
of his knowledge and belief.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief", or upon "knowledge,
information and belief", or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (6a)

Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there
is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of
the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (n)

RULE 8

Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings

Section 1. In general. — Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of
the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of
mere evidentiary facts. (1)

If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof and their applicability to him shall be clearly and
concisely stated. (n)

Section 2. Alternative causes of action or defenses. — A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defense or in separate causes of action or defenses. When two
or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is
not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements. (2)

Section 3. Conditions precedent. — In any pleading a general averment of the performance or occurrence of all conditions
precedent shall be sufficient. (3)

Section 4. Capacity. — Facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of person that is made a party, must be averred. A
party desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity, shall do so by specific denial, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within
the pleader's knowledge. (4)

Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. — In all averments of fraud or mistake the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, or other condition of the mind of a person may be
averred generally.(5a)

Section 6. Judgment. — In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or
of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render
it. (6)

Section 7. Action or defense based on document. — Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or
document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof
shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like
effect be set forth in the pleading. (7)

Section 8. How to contest such documents. — When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or
attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the
instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to
the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused. (8a)

Section 9. Official document or act. — In pleading an official document or official act, it is sufficient to aver that the document
was issued or the act done in compliance with law. (9)

Section 10. Specific denial. — A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit
and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a
defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only
the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material
averment made to the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial. (10a)

Section 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted. — Material averment in the complaint, other than those as to
the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a
complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied under oath. (1a, R9)

Section 12. Striking out of pleading or matter contained therein. — Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these Rules, upon motion made by a party within twenty (20) days after
the service of the pleading upon him, or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order any pleading to be
stricken out or that any sham or false, redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter be stricken out therefrom. (5,
R9)

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

RAYMUNDO A. CRYSTAL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIA OCANG, PACITA, TEODULO, FELICISIMO, PABLO,
LYDIA, DIOSCORA and RODRIGO, all surnamed DE GRACIA, respondents. G.R. No. L-35767 | 1975-02-25

DECISION

BARREDO, J:

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-00506 entitled "Raymundo A. Crystal vs. Hon Pio
B. Ferandos, et al." dismissing the petition for certiorari which sought the annulment and setting aside of the order of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-1666 dated May 31, 1971 directing the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of herein private respondents Pelagia Ocang, et al. of four parcels of land situated at Toledo, Cebu, which said
respondents had purchased at an execution sale held in implementation of the judgment in said Civil Case No. R- 1666, upon
the ground that herein petitioner, as purchaser of the rights of the judgment debtors therein and who had previously taken
possession thereof, ceased to have any right to continue in possession when he failed to opportunely exercise the right of
redemption in the manner prescribed by the rules.

According to the Court of Appeals, this case arose from the following facts:

"In Civil Case No. R-1666, of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled Pelagia Ocang, et al. vs. Vidal Montayre, as
administrator of the estate of Nicolas Rafols, judgment was rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs P30,609.00
as damages. On appeal, this Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. After the judgment had become final, a writ of
execution was issued and five (5) parcels of land belonging to the estate, situated at Toledo, Cebu, were on May 24, 1957 sold
at public auction to Pelagia Ocang as the highest bidder for P10,000.00 (Annex "A"). On May 17, 1958, the heirs of Nicolas
Rafols assigned their right of redemption over four (4) of the five (5) parcels of land to Raymundo Crystal (Annex "B"), which
assignment was approved by the probate court on May 23, 1958. By virtue of the order, Crystal deposited a check for
P11,200.00 with the Provincial Sheriff of Cebu on said date and on May 28, 1958, the Provincial Sheriff issued a deed of
redemption (Annex "C"). Crystal took possession of the lands and cultivated the same.

In February, 1960, Ocang took possession of the four (4) parcels of land, claiming that since the cheek for the redemption was
dishonored for lack of sufficient funds, the redemption was null and void. Crystal then filed a motion in Civil Case No. R-1666
seeking to cite Ocang in contempt of court.

On June 4, 1960, the trial court denied the motion to hold Ocang in contempt of court, observing that another action, and not
contempt proceedings, is the proper proceeding where the validity of the redemption may be raised (Annex "D").

Following the observation of the trial court, Crystal filed Civil Case No. 62-I against Ocang seeking a declaration of ownership in
his favor, plus damages.

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 62-I, however, Crystal was able to regain possession of the four (4) parcels of land.

"On June 23, 1969, the trial court in Civil Case No. R-1666 granted a writ of possession of the four (4) parcels of land to Ocang
(Annex "F").

Upon Crystal's motion, the trial court set aside the order of June 23, 1969 and annulled the writ of possession issued in Ocang's
favor.

Ocang then moved to reconsider the order annulling the writ of possession, which motion was opposed by Crystal. The trial
court held in abeyance the various incidents of the case.

Subsequently, Ocang filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of possession and this was reiterated on August
15, 1970.

On May 31, 1971, the trial court issued an order reviving the order for the issuance of a writ of possession dated June 23, 1969
and declaring the definite deed of sale executed by the Provincial Sheriff of Cebu and the writ of possession issued by the clerk
of court on June 24, 1969 in full force and effect (Annex "I").

Crystal moved to reconsider the order of May 31, 1971, which was, however, denied by the trial court (Annex "K").

Hence, the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction which was given due course. Upon petitioner's filing of a
cash bond in the amount of P500.00, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued." (Pp. 24-26, Rec.)

As to the check for P11,200.00 delivered by petitioner to the Provincial Sheriff of Cebu to pay for the redemption of the lands
herein involved, the Court of Appeals found that:
". . . In the present case there is no dispute that the check was not honored. It is claimed by Crystal, the redemptioner, that the
check became stale and was consequently dishonored by the bank thereby blaming Ocang for its dishonor. It appears,
however, that the check became stale because Crystal opposed its release by the Sheriff to Ocang on the ground that Ocang
failed to render an accounting of the rents the latter received during the redemption period." (Pp. 29-30, Rec.)

Bound as this Court is by these facts found by the appellate court, there being no adequate allegation that the same are not
supported by substantial evidence, the only issue remaining for Us to resolve is whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed an error of law in holding that the redemption purportedly made by petitioner on May 23, 1958 by delivering the
aforementioned check for P11,200.00 to the sheriff is a sufficient compliance with the requirement of payment of the
redemption price under Section 30 of Rule 39. To properly put in issue whether or not a decision of the Court of Appeals has
substantial basis in the evidence, a general allegation to such effect is utterly insufficient, if only because the intermediate
court should be considered as having duly studied all relevant angles of the case before it, fully conscious of its obligation and
responsibility to the parties that its decision should be in accordance with law and justice. Thus, to warrant action on the part
of the Supreme Court, the petition for review must allege particular facts and circumstances discernible in the record
indicating the supposed inadequate foundation of the appellate court's questioned findings of fact. There are no such
allegations in the instant petition. Quite on the contrary, it is worth observing here that it is not disputed by petitioner, indeed
he emphasizes, that the sheriff has been keeping the check in question in his possession all the time up to the present, in the
sense that allegedly it has been periodically changed to avoid being stale. And this is not as it should be. The sheriff acted
irregularly in doing so and he has thereby prevented its being duly considered as payment. Indeed, in such instances, it is the
duty of the sheriff to encash the check without any loss of time in order that corresponding rights of the parties may not be left
hanging in uncertainty, and to enable the ones concerned to proceed in the prosecution or protection of their rights as the
resulting situation may demand. What is more, from the extant circumstances, the Court gathers the impression that indeed
the same had been or would be dishonored.

The decision under review holds that under Article 1249 of the Civil Code, "the delivery of promissory notes payable to order
or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or
when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired"; "that a check is one form of a draft or commercial paper"
and "its delivery by the debtor to the creditor can only produce the effect of payment if said check is honored by the bank; and
that "in the present case there is no dispute that the check (above referred to) was not honored." Upon these premises, We
can perceive no legal reason to disagree with the appellate court's conclusion that "the delivery of the check by Crystal (the
petitioner) to the sheriff did not constitute a valid redemption."

In so upholding the Court of Appeals, We do not mean to disregard the ruling laid down in Javellana vs. Mirasol, 40 Phil. 761,
770-771, to the effect that payment of a redemption price by means of a check for the amount due does not render the
redemption invalid. Indeed, the statement in Javellana that "the check as a medium of payment in commercial transactions is
too firmly established by usage to permit of any doubt upon this point at the present day" (id. at p. 771) still holds true. But
there is nothing in that ruling that changes the legal concept of a payment by check as defined in Article 1249 of the Civil Code,
invoked by the appellate court. In other words, the law is that a check produces the effect of payment only when it has been
cashed. In the instant case, the check in question was found by the appellate court to have been dishonored when presented
for encashment, and, as observed earlier, no ponderous reason has been shown to enable Us to hold otherwise.

Petitioner complains that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it decided the question of validity of the
redemption in dispute, considering that the issue raised in the petition before it was solely about the alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court to issue a writ of possession in Civil Case No. R-1666, while Civil Case No. 62-T, which was precisely
filed upon order of the court in the former case for the specific purpose of threshing out the issue of validity of petitioner's
redemption, is still pending and undecided. Indeed, it is true that private respondents were charged with contempt for having
taken possession of the subject properties after "the check for redemption was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds," (p. 2,
Decision, Court of Appeals, Annex A of the Petition) the trial court observed that another action not contempt proceedings is
the proper remedy, and pursuant to said observation, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 62-T. 1 Thus, while the point raised by
petitioner appears to be well taken, on the other hand, the question of whether or not the order of the trial court of May 31,
1971 reviving the writ of possession dated June 23, 1969 which declared definite the deed of sale in favor of respondents has
legal basis necessarily involves the validity of the redemption made by petitioner. The trial court must have found it
indispensable to resolve that issue in ruling on the right of possession which was being pressed upon it with apparent urgency.

Under these peculiar circumstances and taking into account that from what appears in the records of this case, it is, in the
mind of the Court, improbable that a different conclusion will result if We should leave the main controversy to be determined
in a final judgment in Civil Case No. 62-T, 2 in the interest of justice, the Court has decided to put an end here and now to the
quest of private respondents for satisfaction of the judgment they had secured in Civil Case No. 1666 against the estate of
Nicolas Rafols almost two decades ago by affirming the intermediate court's decision which is not without substantial support
in the evidence before it. After all, petitioner stands to suffer no material loss in the premises inasmuch as the P11,200 check
which he delivered to the sheriff is still just an unencashed check which he can get back and cancel anytime, while the other
alleged payments amounting to P10,114.00 stated in the petition are, in strict legal contemplation, irrelevant, assuming they
have been actually made, the same having taken place long after the period for redemption had expired. If at all, these alleged
payments strongly imply that actually, in the mind of petitioner himself, the check in question was not after all effective as a
redemption. Considerations of equity and justice compel Us to overlook in this case the technical flaws in the procedure
observed both by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, it being apparent to Us that to prolong this litigation further would
not alter its final outcome.

With respect to the point of jurisdiction raised by petitioner in connection with the action of the trial court of passing in Civil
Case No. 1666 on the efficacy of the redemption when that issue is precisely the subject of Civil Case No. 62-T, We do not find
petitioner's contention to be sufficiently well taken. Whether the validity of a redemption of property sold under a judgment of
a court should be determined by the court that rendered the judgment or by another court in a separate proceeding is not
actually a question of jurisdiction in its absolute sense. Indeed, it is not juridically proper that the court that has rendered the
judgment should be exclusively deprived of authority to clear up matters related to the ultimate satisfaction thereof.

There is in fact no law categorically providing a judgment debtor or a redemptioner or anyone acting in the place of either of
them must have to file a separate action whenever his right to the property is not respected. The jurisprudential rule to such
effect is founded more on convenience to avoid keeping open for an indefinite time the case wherein the judgment has been
rendered. Ideally, a case should be deemed terminated insofar as the court that has taken cognizance thereof is concerned the
moment the entry of satisfaction of judgment is made pursuant to Section 46 of Rule 39. As a general rule, therefore, any
question that arises after such entry should be the subject of another action, particularly when third parties become involved.
Obviously, the issues to be resolved in such subsequent proceedings are usually bound to be different from those of the main
action. And with such new parties and issues, it stands to reason that a new action in which the regular course of procedure in
actions may be observed would serve the interests of justice better. But that is not to say that the court that rendered the
judgment would be really acting without jurisdiction if it proceeds taking cognizance of the controversy regarding the
redemption when it finds that more compelling circumstances demand that it should so act, lest more injustice might result
from further delay in the final resolution of the issue and after all, it is already obvious that the ultimate result would inevitably
be the same and, moreover, due process has already been accorded to all parties concerned.

Withal, it cannot be said that the court from which the judgment proceeds is altogether excluded by the rules from acting on
matters subsequent to the execution sale, if only because the sheriff who conducts the sale and to whom payment of the
redemption price may be made by virtue of Section 31 of Rule 39 is under the supervision and control of the court, and,
accordingly, his acts in connection therewith are proper subjects of direction, scrutiny and correction when necessary, by the
court, upon complaint or reference to it by any of the parties. Then also, the judgment debtor whose property has been the
object of the levy ordered by the court is not a stranger to the original proceeding, and should he need protection in the
enforcement of his right of redemption it should be but natural that the same court should have the authority to grant him
relief as long as everyone concerned is duly heard before action is taken.

An analogous situation obtains in connection with the inclusion or exclusion of properties in or from the inventory submitted
for the approval of the probate court in the course of settlement of the estate of a deceased person. As a general rule,
questions of ownership of said properties raised whether by third parties or by any of the heirs contesting that of the estate or
the deceased are said to be outside of the jurisdiction of said court. Even so, the Supreme Court has ruled that when the
parties interested in such issue are all heirs, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court the question of title to
property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon, the reason being that questions of
collation or advancement are generally inevitably involved therein, and these are matters which are proper to be passed upon
in due course of administration. In Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-18148, February 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 367, the Court
ruled thus:

"The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having limited and
special jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.

"In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon
on testate or intestate proceedings, (Bauermann v. Casas, 10 Phil. 386; Devese v. Arbes, 13 Phil. 274; Franco v. O'Brien, 13 Phil.
359; Guzman v. Anog, 37 Phil. 71; Lunsod v. Ortega, 46 Phil. 644; Ongsingco v. Tan & Borja, G.R. No. L-7635, July 25, 1955;
Raquial v. Anihan, G.R. No. L-4377, January 23, 1953; Mallari v. Mallari, G.R. No. L- 4656, February 23, 1953.) except where one
of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court
may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. (Garcia v. Garcia, 67
Phil. 353; Guingguing v. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144.) However, we have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the
deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said
probate court may definitely pass judgment thereof (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Mañalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661);
and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of
by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo,
80 Phil. 229, 232).

"In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the
power of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to whether the properties
herein involved belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband
exclusively?

"At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by appellants
that the trial court had completely no authority to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the
subject is null and void and does not bind even those who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision because, it is
contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an action an not vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants' contention
is correct, then there an be no exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the case of Cunanan v.
Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: 'Determination of title to property is within the
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order
the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction.
It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived'.
Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not over the subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try
controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has
been recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the
liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all
the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. (Flores v. Flores, 48 Phil. 982.) Thereafter, distribution is
made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an
action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has in his
possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of
the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so long as
no interests of third parties are affected. (Garcia vs. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353, 355.)"
Similarly, in the case at bar, it was herein petitioner who first submitted to the court in Civil Case No. 1666 a motion to declare
private respondents in contempt of said court when the latter took possession of the subject property, claiming that since the
check for the redemption purported to be exercised by the former was dishonored for lack of funds, such redemption was null
and void. It is true the trial court at that time opined that the appropriate remedy is a separate action and that following that
observation petitioner filed Civil Case No. 62-T, but when, during the pendency of said separate case, petitioner was able to
regain possession of the property, the issue of possession pressed by private respondents in Civil Case No. 1666 acquired a
character of urgency, and inasmuch as anyway, in the aborted contempt proceedings all the parties had already been fully
heard, the court in the latter case, which is actually the same one having cognizance of Civil Case 62-T, must have realized that
it would be best in the interest of a more expeditious administration of justice and a more speedy disposition of the
controversy to resolve the urgent issue of possession by determining already in Civil Case No. 1666 the basic question relative
to the validity of the redemption made by petitioner by means of the check in dispute. It must be admitted that in a sense such
a step was inconsistent with the court's prior pose about an independent suit, apart from its being a deviation from the general
rule aforereferred to. The peculiar circumstances of this case, however, properly justified the resort to the exception to said
rule, for all the parties in the two actions are exactly identical, the issues and the evidence are also the same ones in both
cases, and even the court and the judge are one and the same, hence no one could have been caught unaware by the result
that eventually developed. No one can complain that he has not had his day in court in regard to the matter in dispute.

Petitioner tries to explain that the reason why the motion of respondents to withdraw his check was denied by the court was
because the latter have not made an accounting of the rents and profits they have received from the property in question
during the period of redemption as required by Section 34 of Rule 39. Again, such explanation cannot lend strength to the
cause of petitioner. There is nothing in the record to show that any "demand in writing" was ever made upon respondents by
either the petitioner or the administrator of the estate of Nicolas Rafols from whom said petitioner acquired the right of
redemption for "a written and verified statement of the amounts of the rents and profits thus received" "before the expiration
of the time allowed for such redemption" as specifically enjoined by that very provision of the rules being relied upon by
petitioner. From what can be gathered from the record, even if there had been any step in this direction taken by petitioner,
the same came too late after the redemption period to be of any legal significance.

As to the motion for contempt filed by petitioner, the allegations whereof have been duly denied by the respondents, the
Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the same, considering that anyway the restraining order invoked is being ordered lifted
in this decision and in their answer to said motion, accompanied by affidavits and other documents not impugned by
petitioner, respondents deny having entered the properties herein involved in violation of said order. Resolving said motion
would only make difficult the healing of the wounds of controversy borne by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is affirmed. The restraining order heretofore issued is ordered lifted. No costs.

Fernando, (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.