Pacifism and Fightaholism in

International Politics: A Structural History of
National and Dyadic Conflict, 1816–1992
ZEEV MAOZ
University of California, Davis
Can we put labels on states due to their history of conflict involvement? Popular
folklore as well as the rhetoric of politicians suggests that we can. Germany up to the
end of World War II and Japan in the same period were labeled ‘‘revisionist’’ or
‘‘aggressive’’ states. President Reagan called the Soviet Union ‘‘the Evil Empire,’’ due
to its seemingly expansionist ideology, but also due to its presumably aggressive
behavior. Israel is often depicted by many of its neighbors and other countries in and
outside the Middle East as ‘‘inherently expansionist.’’ These examples suggest a no-
tion that states can somehow be structurally characterized, independently of specific
policies, leaders, political parties or regimes in power, economic and social conditions.
If we can label states in structural terms, we can also label pairs or groups of
states. For example, President George W. Bush branded North Korea, Iran, and
Iraq as the ‘‘Axis of Evil,’’ due to these countries’ pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction. The Clinton administration identified Syria, Iran, and Iraq as a de-
stabilizing axis in the Middle East, confronting the latter two through a policy of
dual containment. The scholarly literature on international politics has identified
structural patterns of warring or conflicting dyads through such concepts as pro-
tracted conflict, intractable conflicts, andFmore analytically definedFthe concept
of enduring rivalries (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Maoz and Mor 2002).
How scientifically sound are such labels? More importantly, are such labels help-
ful in understanding the causes, courses, and consequences of international con-
flicts? In other areas of human and social inquiry, structural characterization of
units is of immense importance. Genetic research clearly indicates that certain
people are far more prone to some diseases than others. Research on addiction
attempts to identify structural propensities of drug or alcohol abuse. Research on
recidivism in criminology is intent on identifying structural propensities for crime.
Research on poverty systematically identifies structural characteristics including
individual, family, and even national correlates of poverty.
This study is motivated by the following empirical observation about international
conflict: the distribution of national and dyadic conflict involvement during the last two
centuries reveals extreme inequalities. A substantial number of states have engaged in
little or no conflict with other states, while a small group of states has participated in a
disproportionately high fraction of all conflicts. Likewise, a substantial number of po-
litically relevant dyadsFdyads that are expected by virtue of their geographic prox-
imity or span of strategic interests to be highly conflict proneFturn out to have little or
no conflict experience over their joint history. On the other hand, a handful of dyads
are responsible for most of the conflict activity in the international system.
This observation runs contrary to both explicit and implicit notions about inter-
national conflict in the literature. Studies influenced by realist conceptions assert that
conflict is an endemic feature of international anarchy. Hence, it follows that every
stateFif it survives long enoughFis bound to get involved in militarized interstate
r 2004 International Studies Review.
PublishedbyBlackwell Publishing, 350MainStreet, Malden, MA02148, USA, and9600GarsingtonRoad, OxfordOX42DQ, UK.
International Studies Review (2004) 6, 107–133
disputes and wars. Likewise, if two states have the opportunity (Most and Starr 1989)
by virtue of their geographical or strategic contact and if both share a sufficiently long
stretch of history, they are bound to fight each other at some point (Waltz 1979:113).
The assumption that there is basic equality (or ‘‘normalcy’’) in conflict-involve-
ment patterns is implicit in most of the quantitative analyses of international con-
flict, which assumes a normal, log-normal, or Poisson distribution of the dependent
variable. Nathaniel Beck, Gary King, and Langche Zeng (2000) point out that these
assumptions are tenuous and that significant bias in the findings may result from
relying upon them.
The fundamental inequality in national and dyadic patterns of conflict involve-
ment may require us to redefine our approach to the study of conflict. Instead of
examining why states fight in general, we need to explore what makes some states
fundamentally pacifist in their international relations while others tend to be sub-
stantially conflict prone. Likewise, we need to investigate why some dyads fight
repeatedly while others do not fight at all.
Perhaps one of the most important implications of an ‘‘unnatural’’ distribution of
conflicts over states and dyads is that we must deal with structural characteristics of
specific groups of states rather than treat all states alike. For example, if there are
identifiable groups of states or dyads that are pacifist, it would be improper to ex-
amine them in the same terms that we study conflict-prone states or dyads. However,
identifying some states (or some dyads) as pacifist and other states (or dyads) as
conflict prone does not mean much unless we can systematically differentiate them in
terms of other properties that are related to their conflict proneness or pacifism.
Accordingly, the underlying aims of the present study are fourfold:
1. To explore long-term patterns of national and dyadic conflict involvement.
2. To classify states and dyads into distinct ‘‘risk’’ groups in terms of their
dispute and war-involvement patterns.
3. To identify the principal characteristics of states and dyads making up each
of the risk groups in terms of their conflict involvement.
4. To identify some preliminary correlates of the structural conflict propen-
sity of states and dyads.
This study focuses on the conceptualization and identification of structural pat-
terns of conflict, not on a theory thereof. In subsequent studies I will explore the
factors that account for the location of states or dyads in each of these risk groups,
or their move across the various groups over time.
The present study is designed as follows. Section two describes the distribution of
militarized interstate disputes and wars over the entire history of nations and dyads
and discusses the implications of these patterns. Section three defines the concepts of
pacifism, conflict proneness, and conflict-related addiction (or fightaholism) in the
context of other types of compulsive-obsessive behaviors, such as substance abuse,
recidivism, and behavioral addictions. Section four offers an empirical description of
these structural patterns of conflict and some of the typical correlates of these risk
groups. Section five discusses the implications of these issues for theories of inter-
national politics and conflict theory. (The research design is given in the appendix.)
The Inequality of Conflict: National and Dyadic Patterns
Some Observations about Units of Analysis in Conflict Research
Many studies of conflict employ the unit-year as their principal unit of observation.
The typical unit of observation is the nation-year (e.g., Maoz 1993, 2001),
1
or the
1
Other investigators (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 1996, 1997; Henderson 1998) hsve used the nation-
decade or the nation-half-decade as their unit of observation.
Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics 108
dyad-year (e.g., Bremer 1992, 1993; Maoz and Russett 1993; Thompson and
Tucker 1997; Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Russett and Oneal 2001). The unit-year
scheme is designed to deal with the questions of ‘‘who gets involved in conflict
when’’ or ‘‘who fights whom when.’’ This approach has yielded important insights
(e.g., Bremer 2000). However, this scheme prevents detection of structural patterns
of conflict that can be conceptualized only within a temporal framework covering
the entire history of the unit. Testing for structural patterns of national and dyadic
conflict involvement requires long-term observation.
Studies on conflict-related structural properties of states or dyads are quite rare.
Quincy Wright (1944) briefly discussed the war-proneness of states. J. David Singer
and Melvin Small (1972; see also Small and Singer 1982), Charles Gochman and
Zeev Maoz (1984), and Maoz (1993) provide descriptive statistics of national war
and dispute proneness. More recently, the enduring rivalry literature (Goertz and
Diehl 1992, 1993; Diehl and Goertz 2000; Maoz and Mor 2002) has provided
structural information on the more dispute-prone dyads. Other studies have at-
tempted to identify potentially addictive patterns (e.g., Bremer 1980; Most and
Starr 1980). However, we still lack a good understanding of these tendencies as well
as of some of their causes and correlates. Thus, a study of these issues appears
timely.
National Conflict Involvement Patterns
The extent of inequality in the conflict involvement of states and dyads is analogous
to income inequality in societies. If all states were equally conflict prone, then the
least conflict-prone states would account for a similar proportion of systemic conflict
as the most conflict-prone states. If the distribution of conflicts over states were
normal, the cumulative distribution would provide us some approximation to the
line of perfect equality. Figure 1 presents empirical patterns of national conflict
involvement over the 1816–1992 period.
This figure suggests a fundamental inequality in the structure of national conflict
patterns: a small number of states accounts for a disproportionate amount of con-
flict in the system while a large number of states evidence very little conflict.
2
Nearly
11 percent of all states with twenty or more years of independence were not in-
volved in any Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) at all. Nearly 57 percent of all
states were not involved in any war. At the other end of the scale, the top 10 percent
of the states accounted for 49.7 percent of all MIDs, and for 56.8 percent of all wars
in the system.
3
Dyadic Conflict Involvement Patterns
Inferences from the analyses conducted at the national level may be highly mis-
leading. States that are peace-prone are benign with respect to all other states; if
one avoids fights, one avoids fights with everybody equally. However, at the dyadic
level, states may not distribute their conflict activity uniformly over partners. If each
of two states is conflict prone, it does not follow that the dyad made up of these two
states would also be conflict prone. If state A fights with states C, D, E, F. . . and state
B fights states Q, R, S, T. . . , then both states may be individually conflict prone
while the dyad itself is pacific. Thus, the distribution of conflicts over dyads may
2
Normalized figures for the distribution control for the length of a state’s national history. The unnormalized
distributions of conflicts yield huge inequalities with Gini coefficients of 0.74 for MIDs and 0.85 for Wars. Similar
analyses were conducted for shorter stretches of time such as half-decades with nearly identical results. See ap-
pendix for details.
3
Matching the distributions of national MID and war involvement patterns with a Poisson distribution yields
extremely high chi-square values (for MIDs, the chi-square is over 63,000 with 9 DF and for war the chi-square is
889), suggesting strong evidence for addiction.
ZEEV MAOZ 109
be significantly different from the distribution of conflicts over individual states.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of MIDs and wars over politically relevant dyads.
This figure suggests that states tend to be extremely ‘‘selective’’ in their choices of
enemies. A majority of all politically relevant dyads (57 percent) never have ex-
ercised threats, displays, or uses of force. Almost 87 percent of all politically relevant
dyads never fought a war. On the other hand, the upper centile of the dyads
accounted for 34 percent of all MIDs and for over 95 percent of all interstate wars for
this population.
Implications
So what if the national and dyadic distributions of conflict are not normally or
Poisson distributed? Many social phenomena are not normally distributed. The use
of international flights, the amount of money invested in stock exchanges by people
or firms, the ownership of golf clubs, and many other trivial patterns of behavior
display highly similar distributions to the ones discussed above. The fact that the
distribution of national and dyadic patterns of conflict involvement is highly un-
equal may be neither surprising nor of significant import.
−20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Cumulative Pct. of States
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

P
c
t
.

C
o
n
f
l
i
c
t

I
n
v
o
l
v
e
m
e
n
t
MID/ Year War/Year Equality Normal Dist.
Gini(MIDs) = 0.59
Gini(wars) = 0.81
Line of Perfect Equality
Cumulative Normal (Poisson)
Distribution
FIG. 1. Lorenz Curve of National Conflict Involvement, 1816–1992 (normalized by length of national
history).
−20%
−10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Dyadic MID/Yr Dyadic War/Yr Perfect Equality Normal Dist.
Gini(MIDs) = 0.819
Gini(Wars) = 0.934
Line of Perfect Equality
Cumulative Normal (Poisson)
Distribution
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

P
c
t
.

o
f

C
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
Cumulative Pct. of Dyads
FIG. 2. Lorenz Curve of Dyadic Conflict Involvement, 1816–1992 (normalized by year of joint dyadic
history).
Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics 110
While it is true that a great deal of trivial social and natural phenomena exhibit
substantial inequalities among units, it is also true of other, possibly less trivial,
patterns of deviant social behavior, such as the use of drugs and alcohol, the in-
volvement in criminal behavior, overeating, and obsessive overuse of certain habits
during leisure time (e.g., computers, television). One of the potential implications
of such skewed distributions of deviant behavior is that they are harmful not only to
the person engaged in them, but also to his/her environment.
The significance of the structural distributions of conflict involvement lies prin-
cipally in the following argument: our treatment of all states or dyads as if they were
a priori equally conflict prone is tenuous and making this assumptionFimplicitly
or explicitlyFin our studies may yield biased inferences. More generally, if we view
conflict involvement as self- and environmentally harmful, then the fundamental
inequality in the distribution of conflict carries important implications for the study
and prevention of conflict. Since conflict is a deviant behavior, the fact that a sub-
stantial proportion of all states and dyads systematically abstains from conflict sug-
gests a substantial lacuna in our knowledge. Specifically, we have a substantial
phenomenon of pacifism in world politics, but we do not know what the characteristics of
pacifist states and pacifist dyads are. The classification of states and dyads into low-
and high-conflict risk-groups may enrich our understanding both of the causes and
the consequences of conflict behavior.
Pacifism, Conflict Proneness, and Fightaholism: A Conceptual Exploration
I now turn to a discussion of three basic concepts that guide this study. These
concepts are interrelated, but each possesses distinctive features. The concepts of
pacifism and conflict proneness are self-explanatory. The concept of conflict-related
addiction or fightaholism is used as a metaphor for a structural pattern of behavior
not tapped by the other concepts. I discuss these concepts in this section.
Pacifism is an absolute concept. It refers to the absolute lack of conflict involvement
given sufficient opportunity. At the national level, an opportunity for conflict exists if a
state has a minimal number of immediate neighbors and if it has existed as an
independent system member for a sufficient amount of time. At the dyadic level,
opportunity is defined by the notion of political relevance (Maoz and Russett 1993;
Maoz 1996) and by a minimum amount of time of common history, that is, by a
sufficient number of years of joint national existence.
4
If a state was involved in a
single dispute or war over its entire history, it can no longer be branded as pacifist.
A national commitment to avoid conflict is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for pacifism. Other states must also avoid conflict with the focal state. Switzerland,
Holland, and Belgium wanted to avoid war in World War I and World War II, thus
declaring neutrality. Yet Germany respected the neutrality of the former, but not of the
latter two states. Dyadic pacifism is perhaps more meaningful. A pacifist dyad is one
wherein both states systematically avoid militarized conflicts with one another. I dis-
tinguish between dispute pacifism and war pacifism. A dispute pacifist is a state/dyad
that has experienced no militarized disputes during its entire history. A war pacifist is a
state/dyad that has never engaged in an interstate war during its entire history.
Conflict proneness refers to the number of conflict involvements per year of na-
tional or dyadic existence. This concept distinguishes between states that have been
involved in a large number of conflicts and those that have been involved in few
conflicts. Dividing by the number of years of existence normalizes for the temporal
opportunity for conflict. By definition, the conflict involvement score of dispute or
war pacifists is zero.
4
The notion of ‘‘opportunity’’ in terms of geographical proximity may be problematic. Nevertheless, it is fre-
quently used in the literature (e.g., Most and Starr 1989; Holsti 1991; Vasquez 1993).
ZEEV MAOZ 111
The concept conflict-related addiction (fightaholism) reflects the evolution of conflict
involvement over time. Two states may have identical conflict-proneness scores but
their patterns of involvement may take on dramatically different forms over time.
For example, only about 18 percent of US militarized interstate disputes and 10.7
percent of its wars were fought in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, 59
percent of Mexico’s MIDs and all of its wars were in the nineteenth century.
Moreover, all except one of the 25 MIDs between the US and Mexico took place
before 1920. More generally, one state may have distributed its conflicts uniformly
over time, whereas another may have experienced a short and extremely intense
period of conflict while the rest of its history may have been relatively pacific.
To capture conflict proneness over distinct phases of states’ or dyads’ histories, I
have developed the notion of conflict-related addiction, or fightaholism. As noted, this
concept is based on a metaphor derived from other types of deviant behaviors.
Clearly, the metaphoric representation of any concept is necessarily imperfect. I do
not mean to suggest that certain states or dyads are addicted to conflict in the exact
same manner that some people are addicted to drugs, alcohol, or tobacco. Nor do I
mean to imply that conflict creates chemical reactions and feelings of craving and
psychological dependence as do certain substances. Rather, the behavioral impli-
cations of addiction or other kinds of obsessive-compulsive disorders are similar or
analogous to the behavioral patterns of conflict involvement of some states and
dyads over time.
In order to explore this metaphor, we must define different types of obsessive-
compulsive disorders and examine how they are diagnosed. These disorders
include various types of substance (drug, alcohol, tobacco) abuse that involve
chemical as well as psychological dependence. But they also include food addiction,
sexual addiction, compulsory gambling, workaholism, and addiction to television or
computers, as well as obsessive criminal behavior. The latter denote behaviors that
are based primarily on psychological dependence. Clearly, these types of addiction
are extremely diverse. However, they share a number of traits that are included in
the general definition of obsessive-compulsive behavior that places most of them
under the label of addiction.
Addiction is a dependence, on a behavior or substance, that a person is powerless
to stop . . . Addiction has been extended, however, to include mood-altering be-
haviors or activities. Some researchers speak of two types of addictions: substance
addictions (for example, alcoholism, drug abuse, and smoking); and process ad-
dictions (for example, gambling, spending, shopping, eating, and sexual activity).
There is a growing recognition that many addicts, such as polydrug abusers, are
addicted to more than one substance or process. (Fray 2001:50)
It is commonly noted that ‘‘the main characteristic of addictive behavior is the
compelling need to engage in a particular activity or to use the addictive substance
without deriving pleasure of it, and despite awareness of the damage caused by this activity to
oneself and to his or her family, friends, or co-workers’’ (Larson 1996:1129, emphasis added).
The elements of this general definition are visible in definitions of specific types
of addiction. Substance addiction is defined as excessive use of a certain substance
over a relatively long period of time. What excessive is depends on the nature of the
substance. With regard to some substances, for example, alcohol, nicotine, or cer-
tain ‘‘softer’’ drugs, addiction severity is a function of three factors: social norms,
the extent of deviation from the norm, and the period of use.
5
5
The measurement of addiction in relation to a certain ‘‘norm’’ is very problematic. First, the ‘‘norm’’ itself might
vary across socieities. For example, the ‘‘norm’’ of alcohol use in Russia, France, and Italy is different from Iran and
Saudi Arabia. (See the figures on the cross-national differences in alcohol use in Clarke and Weisburd 1990:11.)
Second, the norm may change over time. This, for example, was the case with nicotine and drug abuse in most
Western societiess over the last three decades (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990:40).
Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics 112
These definitions of addictive behavior identify five common traits that can be
compared to the notion of fightaholism discussed below:
1. Excessive and repetitive engagement in a given activity.
2. The activity may cause some sort of immediate gratification, but it pos-
sesses some elements that are harmful to oneself as well as to one’s en-
vironment.
3. Awareness that this behavior is self-damaging does not inhibit continuous
engagement in it.
4. Addiction is a self-reinforcing behavior. It may be induced by
chemical craving, by psychological dispositions, or even by rational rea-
soning.
6
5. Efforts to discontinue this activity or to reduce the level of engagement in it
are brief and unsuccessful.
Addictive behavior is typically deviant. The number of people diagnosed as drug,
alcohol, nicotine, or food addicts or as compulsive gamblers (and even recidivists) is
generally small in the entire population, but their rates of consumption of sub-
stances or practice of the activities is disproportionately high. Thus, the study of
addiction focuses on a small number of individuals rather than on general char-
acteristics of a population due to the unequal distribution of deviance in the general
population.
Analogously, fightaholism is defined as excessive and repetitive engagement in milita-
rized disputes and wars over a long period of time with occasionally harmful consequences. At
the dyadic level, we define dyadic fightaholism as repeated and excessive engagement in
militarized disputes and war with the same partner over a long period of time, again with
harmful consequences that accrue to both members of the dyad. This behavior is accompanied
by policies that facilitate the conduct of conflict, such as militarization or alliance formation.
The definitions of these concepts allow us to classify states or dyads into four risk
groups regarding their conflict-related propensity:
1. Pacifists. Those states or dyads that did not engage in any conflict
throughout their history.
2. Normal. States or dyads that have engaged in relatively little sporadic
conflict during their history and whose rate of conflict involvement over
time has been sporadic.
7
3. Conflict prone. States or dyads that have engaged in relatively high
amounts of conflict during their history but whose conflict history is spo-
radic rather than sustained.
4. Fightaholics. States or dyads that have engaged in excessively high
amounts of conflict in a sustained manner over their history.
The first three groups are mutually exclusive. The final group largelyFbut not
completelyFoverlaps with the conflict-prone group. All fightaholics are conflict
prone, but not all conflict-prone states or dyads are fightaholics. In the next section,
we discuss the empirical properties of these four groups.
6
Some theories of gambling and recedivism facilitate the application of rational decision or game theoretic
concepts to such processes. For example, sunk cost paradoxes in the Dollar Auction game and cost benefit cal-
culations in criminal behavior (where the probability of capture is discounted in the planning of later crimes than in
early ones due to experience and learning) suggest that even people who perform rational-like calculations can
become addicted to self-damaging behavior (see Maltz 1984 on recidivism, Brockner and Rubin 1985 on social
entrapment in a wide array of situations, and Maoz 1990 on sunk-cost paradoxes in war).
7
The notion of ‘‘normal dyads’’ is equivalent to what Diehl and Goertz (2000) and Maoz and Mor (2002) call
‘‘proto rivalries.’’
ZEEV MAOZ 113
Identifying Pacifism, Conflict Proneness, and Fightaholism
General Empirical Properties of Structural Conflict Behavior
Pacifism. As noted above, the empirical identification of pacifism is relatively
straightforward. However, the probability of national and dyadic pacifism is re-
lated to the length of a state’s/dyad’s history; the longer the existence of states/
dyads as independent system members, the less likely they are to stay pacifist.
Figure 3 provides some sense of the distribution of national and dyadic pacifism
patterns by years of independence.
Figure 3 suggests that about 9 percent of all states with at least 20 to 50 years of
system membership were MID pacifist. However, none of the states with 50 or
more years of system membership absolutely avoided MID involvement. If states
live long enough, they end up getting involved in MIDs of one form or another.
War-related pacifism, however, is observed at some level even for states with
varying lengths of national histories. More than 55 percent of the states with
histories extending for at least 40 years completely abstained from war. For
‘‘older’’ states, this proportion levels off at an average of 15 percent regardless of
the length of national history.
About 58 percent of the politically relevant dyads with 20 or more years of joint
history are pacifists. This proportion drops to a rate of 32 percent MID-pacifism
for dyads with 50 to 80 years of joint history. It levels off at an average rate of 20
percent for dyads with 80 or more years of joint history. More significantly,
regardless of the length of joint history, 71 percent of all politically relevant dyads never
fought each other in an interstate war.
Thus, in contrast to the realist notion that conflict is a pervasive phenomenon
in world politics, pacifism turns out to be a significant phenomenon in an an-
archic world, and it calls for explanation.
Conflict Proneness. On the national level, there is no discernable increase in
conflict proneness over time. While a regression of MID and war proneness on
length of history yielded statistically significant effects, the coefficients were fairly
low for both measures of conflict (b ¼.004, R
2
¼0.056 for MID proneness, and
b ¼.0008, R
2
¼0.026 for warsFN¼180). This suggests only a small effect of
duration in the system on the increase in rate of conflict proneness for individual
states.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170
No. of Years in System
P
r
o
p
o
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n

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S
t
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National MID Pacifism Dyadic MID Pacifism
National War Pacifism Dyadic War Pacifism
FIG. 3. National and Dyadic Pacifism: Proportion of all states with zero conflict involvement by
number of years of national independence.
Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics 114
A similar finding can be reported for the effect of the length of dyadic his-
tory on the conflict proneness of the dyad. In the case of MID-proneness, the
effect of the length of dyadic history is statistically significant, but the slope is
very low (b ¼.0002, R
2
¼0.003). For wars this effect is not even statistically
significant.
Fightaholism. How do we know that a state or a dyad is fightaholic? In the
appendix, I develop a number of measures of conflict-related addiction that build
on those bodies of literature. Here, I explore the empirical properties of these
measures. A first-cut identification and analysis of conflict-related addiction
requires us to examine time-dependence at various levels of conflict involvement.
TABLE 1. Cross-Time Conflict Levels
1.1 A Hypothetical Addiction Table
Level of Conflict involvement
Current Period Level of Conflict Involvement
Low Medium High
Past Period Low Nonadicted Nonadicted Possibly Addicted
Medium Rehabilitated Possibly addicted Addicted
High Rehabilitated Possibly addicted Addicted
Note: In cells denoted as possibly addicted and addicted, observed frequencies must be higher than expected fre-
quencies. If that is the case in a given contingency table, the cell is designated as consistent. If the reverse is true, the
cell is designated as inconsistent. In cells denoted as rehabilitated, observed frequencies must be smaller than expected
frequencies to be designated as consistent.
1.2. Examples: National Level Cross TIME RELATIONS
Level of MID Involvement
in Present Decade
Row Total
Low Medium High
Level of MID involvement in previous decade Low 470
n
116
þ
70
n
656
(356.95) (139.41) (159.64)
Medium 109
þ
72
þ
69
þ
250
(136.03) (53.13) (60.84)
High 56
þ
60
þ
145
þ
261
(142.02) (55.47) (63.52)
Column Total 635 248 284 1,167
w
2
(4)
¼260.244; po0.001; m
b
¼0.425
Level of MID Involvement
in Present Decade
Row Total
Low Medium High
Level of MID Involvement Two Decades Ago Low 369
n
100
þ
83
n
552
(294.48) (117.57) (139.96)
Medium 105
þ
50
þ
58
þ
213
(113.63) (43.37) (54.01)
High 56
þ
60
þ
109
þ
221
(117.90) (47.07) (56.03)
Column Total 526 210 250 986
w
2
(4)
¼136.539; po0.001; m
b
¼0.544
Note: entries in parentheses are expected frequencies.
n
Inconsistent cell.
þ
Consistent cell.
ZEEV MAOZ 115
Such time dependence could be prespecified so that any relationship between
conflict-involvement levels at one period and conflict involvement at another
period would correspond to the characteristics of addictive behavior discussed
above. Table 1 shows how an interpretation of addictive behavior would appear
in a contingency table that relates these two periods.
In the top part of this table, we designate the cells that are consistent with the
addiction specifications. The presence of addiction in the actual population of
states and dyads is based on the extent to which the difference between the
observed and expected frequencies in the cells that are designated as possibly
addictive or addictive contributes to the overall chi-square of the frequency ta-
ble.
8
The m
b
statistic denotes the proportion of the chi-square accounted for by
the addiction hypothesis (Maoz 1996: 130–132). In the example given in part 1.2
of the table, we see that in most of the cells suggesting patterns of addiction,
observed frequencies are significantly higher than expected frequencies and in
most cells suggesting rehabilitation, observed frequencies are substantially lower
than the expected ones, consistent with the hypothesis of addiction-like behavior.
Table 2 provides the cross-time correlations for both national and dyadic ad-
diction levels over a variety of measures.
The results of Table 2 suggest evidence of addiction-like patterns of warfare
over time. States and dyads that exhibit disproportionately high levels of conflict
involvement during one period tend to be high in conflict in subsequent periods.
This trend extends over relatively long time-spans, implying that a state that
started its national history as a highly conflict-prone state will maintain its status
of addition-like conflict involvement over time.
9
The measures of fightaholism offered herein apply the five characteristics of
addictive behavior to the extent of a state’s involvement in MIDs and wars over
time. A state/dyad is designated as fightaholic if its involvement in MIDs or wars
was far above the national/dyadic average for a given period and if this excessive
involvement lasted over a number of periods consistently. Based on this defi-
nition we can discuss the relationship between conflict-proneness, fightaholism,
and length of tenure in the club of nations.
Similar to conflict proneness, national fightaholism suggests an increasing
trend as a function of the length of the state’s national history. Less than 30
percent of all states with 40 or less years of history can be labeled fightaholics.
However, the 50-year history mark indicates a steep jump in fightaholism.
This rate increases gradually to the point where about 58 percent of the
states with histories of over 170 years were dispute-related fightaholics, and 50
percent of such states were war-related fightaholics. The rate of dyadic fighta-
holism increases gradually up to a peak of 35 percent for all dyads with 130 years
or less of national independence and declines thereafter. The ‘‘old’’ dyads
(with 160 years or more of joint history) exhibit a fightaholism rate of around
30 percent.
Placing States and Dyads in Risk Groups
Having described patterns of pacifism, conflict proneness, and fightaholism, we can
now identify the states and dyads that belong to each of these groups. Table 3 shows
the major pacifist and the major fightaholic states.
8
A similar procedure was developed by Most and Starr (1980). The measures below are a more accurate
representation of the relationship between conflict measures over time based on an a priori designation of specific
cells in the frequency table.
9
A similar analysis was performed for a five-year period split of national and dyadic history. The associations
between rates of conflict involvement over time for that analysis were even higher than those reported here.
Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics 116
From the list in Table 3, it can be said, though with some caution, that most war
pacifists are smaller, less-developed states, while MID and War fightaholics seem to
be composed of two distinct groups. The first is a group of relatively ‘‘young’’ states
(less than 70 years in the system) in the Middle East and East Asia; the second group
is made up of major powers. We turn now to identification of pacifist and fight-
aholic dyads.
The list of pacifist dyads is large and cannot be displayed here. The dyads given
here are the ones with the longest history of dyadic pacifism that are also directly
contiguous. The geographic content of this list of pacifist dyads is interesting: it
consists of Western European and Latin American dyads only. We could not find
significant pacifist dyads in Africa, the Middle East, or Asia.
Turning to the list of conflict-prone and fightaholic dyads, we observe a
general resemblance in the members of the two lists, but they are not in
the same order. We will see below that the correlation between conflict
proneness and fightaholism is not as high as could be expected. Here again, the
members of the two lists are composed of the same groups of states. It is
TABLE 2. Addiction Levels in MID and War Involvement Rates of States and Dyads, 1816–1992
Variable MID/War
1-Decade
Lag
2-Decades
Lag
3-Decades
Lag
First
Decade
/
1. National MID/War Involvement per Decade
>No. of Conflicts per Decade MID 0.425
nn
0.544
nn
0.442
nn
F
War 0.657
nn
0.636
nn
0.605
nn
N¼1,167
þ
N¼986 N¼810
1-Decade Lag of No. Conflicts/Decade MID 0.411
nn
0.482
nn
F
War 0.434
nn
0.673
nn
2-Decade Lag of No. Conflicts/Decade MID 0.485
nn
War 0.668
nn
F
No. Conflicts/Year Next-to-Last Decade MID 0.459
nn
War 0.662
nn
N¼161
Pearson Correlations, Next-to-Last
Decade, Relative Conflict Rates
(see appendix)
MID
/
0.905
nn
War
/
0.647
nn
N¼161
Variable MID/War
1-Decade
Lag
2-Decades
Lag
3-Decades
Lag
First
Decade
/
1. Dyadic MID/War Involvement per Decade
No. of Conflicts per decade MID 0.619
nn
0.604
nn
0.588
nn
F
War 0.617
nn
0.589
nn
0.656
nn
N¼5,443
þ
N¼4,436 N¼3,429
1-Decade Lag of No. conflicts/Decade MID 0.651
nn
0.627
nn
F
War 0.645
nn
0.673
nn
2-Decade Lag of No. conflicts/Decade MID 0.485
nn
F
War 0.620
nn
No. Conflicts/Year Next-to-Last Decade MID 0.640
nn
War 0.657
nn
N¼1,246
Pearson correlations, Next-to-Last
Decade, relative conflict rates
(see appendix)
MID
/
0.273
nn
War
/
0.088
n
N¼546
þ
Entries in each cell are m
b
statistics.
/
Pearson product moment correlation.
n
po.01;
nn
po.001.
ZEEV MAOZ 117
instructive to note, however, that the conflict-proneness and fightaholism
lists do not consist of all the typical dyads that are placed in the ‘‘enduring rival-
ries’’ lists, such as France–Germany, US–USSR, Greece–Turkey, and so forth
(e.g., Diehl and Goertz 2000; Thompson 2001; Maoz and Mor 2002). Fightaholism
and conflict proneness at the dyadic level are not one and the same as enduring
rivalries.
Table 5 provides intercorrelations between these structural patterns of conflict
involvement at the national and dyadic level of analysis.
The correlations between the measures of pacifism, conflict proneness, and
fightaholism are all statistically significant and generally high on both the national
and the dyadic levels of analysis. The correlations between different structural
patterns of conflict involvement are not as high as one might expect, given the
seemingly similar conceptions of conflict proneness and fightaholism. This suggests
that fightaholismFas a structural propensity for excessive involvement in con-
flictFoffers a distinctive characterization of states and dyads. This is notable in
addition to the lack of one-to-one empirical correspondence between such concepts
as enduring rivalries and dyadic fightaholics.
Correlates of Pacifism, Conflict Proneness, and Fightaholism
Despite the wide array of theories and empirical studies on the correlates
of addiction, the literature on substance and behavioral addiction and on chronic
TABLE 3. ‘‘Oldest’’ Pacifist States and Most Fightaholic States
Pacifists
1
MID Fightaholism War Fightaholism
State
No.
Years in
System State
No.
Years in
System
Proportion
of Decades
Fightaholic State
No.
Years in
System
Proportion
of Decades
Fightaholic
Sweden 177 Israel 45 1.000 Israel 45 0.800
Switzerland 177 Pakistan 46 1.000 Australia 72 0.625
Venezuela 152 India 46 1.000 Syria 47 0.600
Haiti 116 Jordan 47 1.000 Jordan 47 0.600
Uruguay 111 Syria 47 1.000 South Korea 44 0.600
Tunisia 100 India 46 1.000 Turkey 177 0.444
Dom. Repub. 92 United States 177 0.833 Iraq 61 0.429
Albania 75 (North)
Vietnam
39 0.800 China 133 0.429
Liberia 73 South Korea 45 0.800 Ethiopia 91 0.400
Afghanistan
2
73 North Korea 46 0.786 India 46 0.400
Nepal 73 China 133 0.778 Pakistan 46 0.400
Costa Rica 73 Russia/Sov. Un. 177 0.722 Cambodia 40 0.400
Panama 73 France 174 0.722 (North)
Vietnam
39 0.400
Ireland 71 Japan 129 0.714 France 174 0.389
Luxemburg 70 Iraq 61 0.714 United States 177 0.333
Iceland 49 Utd. Kingdom 177 0.667 Bulgaria 85 0.333
Burma (Myn) 45 Zaire 43 0.600 Egypt 84 0.333
Sri Lanka 45 Cambodia 40 0.600 Japan 129 0.286
Indonesia 44 Saudi Arabia 66 0.571 Utd.
Kingdom
177 0.278
Taiwan 44 Turkey 177 0.500 Russia/SU 177 0.278
1
Only war pacifism. Recall that no state with a history of 50 years or more was a MID Pacifist.
2
Not a pacifist after 2001.
Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics 118
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ZEEV MAOZ 119
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Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics 120
criminal behavior has identified two basic clusters of correlates of these behaviors:
(1) Intrinsic correlates are factors associated with the individual’s physiology, psy-
chology, or history (both personal and family) and (2) extrinsic correlates refer to
factors in the individual’s social and physical environment that affect the individ-
ual’s behavior. (See Fray 2001 on the general correlates of a wide variety of drug
and behavioral addictions, Teichman 2001 on alcoholism, and Maltz 1984 on re-
cidivism.)
Typical ‘‘correlates’’ of international conflict fit well into this classification. Intrinsic
correlates of conflict at the national level include national characteristics such as
level of power, the (major-regional-minor power) status of the state, its economic
development, regime type, political stability, lateral pressure, and so forth (Rosenau
1966; Choucri and North 1975; Bremer 1982; Maoz 1993, 1996, 1997, 2001).
Intrinsic correlates of dyadic conflict refer to the characteristics of the dyad: its
power ratio, its power-related status, its alliance ties, contiguity, economic devel-
opment, regime type, level of trade, and so forth (Bremer 1982, 1993; Maoz and
Russett 1993; Oneal et al. 1996; Russett and Oneal 2001).
Extrinsic determinants of conflict focus on the politically relevant international
environment (PRIE) in which the state resides: the number of states in its PRIE,
their relative power, number of alliances, level of in the state’s environment, the
level of stability of the state’s environment, and so forth (Maoz 1996, 2001; Ward
and Gleditsch 2000). Studies of dyadic conflict have not generally explored ex-
trinsic correlates of conflict. The few exceptions that discuss such correlates focus
on factors that are similar to those identified at the monadic level (Bennett 1998;
Maoz 2000, 2001).
As noted, this is a preliminary investigation of the correlates of structural location
of states and dyads in different risk groups. A more theoretically informed discus-
sion will be presented and tested in a subsequent study. The purpose of the fol-
lowing analysis is to provide some basic indication of potential ‘‘causes’’ of national
or dyadic conflict patterns. These causes are derived from the quantitative liter-
ature on international conflict that repeatedly uses several basic variables in em-
pirical analysis.
10
Table 6 includes a selected list of potential correlates that are frequently men-
tioned in the conflict literature. Since there are some cross-level differences in the
measurement of the variables, we can expect cross-level differences in the results.
In general, however, the relationship between each of the independent variables
and the risk group is expected to be the same across levels of analysis except for
the alliance variable. For this variable two different measures are employed at the
dyadic level. The first is the number of allies of the state with the fewest allies in the
dyad (Maoz 2000; 2001). The second measure denotes whether or not the dyad was
alliedFas used in most dyadic analyses of conflict.
Because this is an analysis of long-term structural traits of states/dyads, I average
most independent variables over time for any given state or dyad. The problem
with this procedure is that it may generate biased inferences, because the temporal
relationship between the dependent and independent variable is not clear. There
are several reasons for justifying this kind of measurement process, however. First,
pacifism as an absolute characteristic of a state can only be observed on a long-term
basis. Thus, uncovering the correlates of pacifism requires averaging potential fac-
tors over long stretches of time. Second, because certain measures (e.g., regime
scores, number of states in PRIE) are measured both at the point of the state’s/
dyad’s origin and over its entire history, it is possible to compare the results ob-
tained from the averaged measures to the same variables which are unaveraged. If
10
Discussions can be found in the literature on national and dyadic conflict involvement (e.g., Bremer 1992,
1993; Maoz 1993, 1996, 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993,and chapters in the handbook edited by Midlarsky 2000).
ZEEV MAOZ 121
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Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics 122
results are similar, then we can infer that averaging does not lead to substantial
inferential bias.
It is important for the reader to remember that this empirical analysis
of ‘‘correlates’’ of risk groups is exploratory and is not intended to uncover
‘‘causes’’ of either pacifism or fightaholism. This type of analysis is equivalent to
similar analyses conducted in the study of drug and alcohol abuse as well
as in studies of behavioral addictions (Teichman 1989). With these caveats in mind,
Table 7 presents the results of the analysis linking potential correlates to risk
groups.
National Correlates of Pacifism. The results in Table 7 make several inter-
esting points. First, because there exist no states with more than 46 years of
independence that fit the definition of MID pacifism (that is, avoided MID par-
ticipation over their entire history), I focus the discussion on war-pacifism.
Out of 182 states with 20 or more years of independence, 103 states (over 56.5
percent) did not participate in a war. All of these states were minor powers; none
was a regional power or a major power. Thus, it appears that ‘‘minor power-
hood’’ is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for war-related pacifism. Being
a regional or major power, even for a short period, is a sufficient condition for
nonpacifism.
The most potent intrinsic correlates of war pacifism appear to be military
capability, power-related status, economic wealth, type of acquisition of inde-
pendence, and regime type of origin. Thus, it appears thatFbeyond the capa-
bility/status attributes of statesFthe basic circumstances in which the state
entered the system appear to determine to a significant degree whether or not
the state will be a pacifist. States that emerge into the system as a result of an
evolutionary process (Maoz 1989, 1996) are far more likely to end up as pacifists
than states that enter into the system through a revolutionary political process.
On a more general level, pacifist states tend to be militarily weak, less-developed
economically, have emerged into the system through an evolutionary process,
and were democratic at their origin.
Turning to the extrinsic correlates of pacifism, we note that the politically rel-
evant environment of pacifist states is composed of relatively few other states. Other
extrinsic factors do not appear to be correlated with their pacifist tendency.
TABLE 7. Correlates of Risk Groups (National Level): Pacifism, Conflict Proneness, Fightaholism
Independent Variable
MIDs War
Pacifism
þ
Proneness Fightaholism
þ þ
Pacifism Proneness Fightaholism
Mil. Capability À0.280
nn
0.572
nn
0.888
nn
À0.463
nn
0.453
nn
0.762
nn
Power Status À0.254
nn
0.527
nn
0.871
nn
À0.442
nn
0.418
nn
0.801
nn
Economic Wealth À0.198
nn
0.422
nn
0.775
nn
À0.343
nn
0.312
nn
0.641
nn
Regime Score 0.193
nn
À0.090 À0.024 0.043 À0.060 À0.028
Reg. Score at Origin 0.150
n
À0.251
nn
À0.286
nn
0.298
nn
À0.234
nn
À0.296
nn
Type of Independence 0.455
nn
À0.321
nn
À0.245
nn
0.347
nn
À0.216
nn
À0.114
Political Instability À0.314
nn
À0.003 0.298
nn
0.023 À0.164
n
0.214
nn
No. States in PRIE À0.406
nn
0.572
nn
0.854
nn
À0.508
nn
0.417
nn
0.739
nn
No. of Alliances À0.248
nn
À0.005 À0.062 0.075 À0.141
n
À0.108
Conflict in PRIE À0.114 À0.017 À0.314
nn
0.065 À0.014 À0.275
nn
Regime in PRIE À0.005 À0.126
n
À0.170
n
0.117 À0.122 À0.183
nn
N 180 180 180 176 180 180
þ
Results reported here are based on measurement of pacifism as the average number of years without any dispute
over the state’s history.
þ þ
Results reported here are based on relative fightaholism (see appendix).
n
po.05;
nn
po.01.
ZEEV MAOZ 123
National Correlates of Conflict Proneness and Fightaholism. Generally speaking, the
correlates of conflict proneness and fightaholism are the same as those of pac-
ifism, but in the opposite direction. The strength of associations, however, differs
somewhat across measures. Military capability, power status, and economic
wealth are significantly correlated with both conflict proneness and fightaholism
at medium levels. Here, too, the political circumstances of the state’s origin de-
termine its future course. States that came about through evolutionary processes
and whose regime at origin was increasingly democratic are less likely to be
conflict prone and fightaholics than states that have emerged through revolu-
tionary processes and were nondemocratic. Again, the only meaningful extrinsic
correlate of conflict proneness and of fightaholism is the number of states in the
focal state’s politically relevant environment.
These results highlight the predicament of the international ‘‘Gullivers.’’ The
rich and powerful find it difficult to escape war involvement. It is the poor, weak,
and relatively isolated states that inherit the peace.
Dyadic Correlates of Pacifism. The analysis of dyadic pacifism suggests that nearly
57 percent of the politically relevant dyads with at least 20 years of joint history
did not engage in an MID. War-related pacifism amounts to 86.5 percent. Table 8
examines dyadic MID- and war-related pacifism.
The results of this table suggest that pacifist dyads display high levels of ca-
pability disparity, they tend to consist of at least one minor power, they tend to be
jointly democratic, and they tend to emerge through evolutionary rather than
revolutionary political processes. The correlates of dyadic pacifism suggest sev-
eral things. First, with two notable exceptions, all pacifist dyads are composed of
no more than one major power. The only major power dyads that avoided war
were US–UK and US–Russia/Soviet Union.
11
All MID pacifist dyads were com-
posed of strictly minor powers; all dyads involving at least one major power
experienced at least one MID in their lifetime.
A similar observation applies to dyads composed of regional powers. All pacifist
dyads have no more than one regional power. With one exception (the Israel-
Iran dyad in the Middle East over the 1975–1992 period), all dyads composed of
regional powers experienced both MIDs and wars. It appears that major and
regional power dyads are a sufficient condition for nonpacifism.
And in line with the paradoxical results on the alliance status of dyad members
found in previous studies (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bremer 1992), we find
that the higher the alliance-related affinity of dyad members, the more likely they
are to remain pacifists and the lower their dispute proneness score, but the
higher their likelihood of becoming fightaholics. This suggests that common
interests do not necessarily override conflicting interests. This paradoxical find-
ing seems to contradict realist notions that strategic interests dampen the prob-
ability of conflict (e.g., Farber and Gowa 1995; Gowa 1999). However, this
relationship between alliances, or strategic affinity, and nonpacifism may be al-
tered in a multivariate context as was the case in other studies.
The length of the jointly democratic history of the dyad seems to be correlated
with the likelihood of MID and war pacifism. However, this correlation is an
understatement of the relationship between democracy and pacifism. It turns out
that no two politically relevant states that had been jointly democratic for 70 percent or more
of their common history engaged in war. It also turns out that only 5 out of 101 dyads
that had been jointly democratic for more than half of their common history (US–France,
UK–France, US–Italy, Japan–Australia, and Japan–New Zealand) engaged in interstate
wars. Of course, all these wars occurred when one state was nondemocratic.
This is extremely powerful evidence in support of the democratic peace
11
The start of the temporal domain at 1816 ‘‘misses’’ the Anglo-American war of 1812.
Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics 124
proposition. Long periods of joint democracy tend to spill over into pacifism even when at
least one member of the dyad is not a democracy. In addition, dyads in which both
members emerge through evolutionary processes are more likely to end up as
pacifist and less likely to end up as conflict prone or fightaholics. This corrob-
orates Maoz’s (1996) findings about the relationship between state-making proc-
esses and conflict propensity.
Among the extrinsic factors, the most potent correlate of the structural
characteristic of the dyad is the number of states in the dyad members’ res-
pective PRIEs. In addition, the larger the number of allies each member of the
dyad has, the less likely it is to be a MID pacifist but the more likely it is to be war
pacifist.
The level of conflict in dyad members’ PRIEs is inversely related to their
pacifist tendencies and positively related to their level of fightaholism. Other
variables do not exhibit significant relationships with the dependent variables.
The structural position of a state in terms of the various risk groups discussed
here appears, therefore, to have some rather distinct correlates. These correlates
are both intrinsicFbasic national or dyadic attributesFand extrinsic, referring
to the characteristics of states’ or dyads’ environments.
Conclusion
This survey of national and dyadic conflict-involvement patterns over long histor-
ical periods suggests the following observations:
1. National and dyadic patterns of conflict involvement are characterized by extreme
levels of inequality. A considerable number of states engaged in relatively few
MIDs and wars, while a small number of states accounted for a high pro-
portion of all MIDs and wars over the last two centuries. Likewise, a small
proportion of the politically relevant dyads accounted for most dyadic
conflicts.
TABLE 8. Correlates of Risk Groups (Dyadic Level): Pacifism, Conflict Proneness, Fightaholism
Independent Variable
MIDs War
Pacifism
þ
Proneness Fightaholism
þ þ
Pacifism Proneness Fightaholism
Capability Ratio À0.119
nn
À0.066
n
À0.088
nn
À0.145
nn
À0.041 À0.052
n
Power Status 0.225
nn
À0.104
nn
À0.143
nn
0.222
nn
0.027 0.041
Economic Wealth 0.106
nn
À0.026 À0.027 0.115
nn
0.043 0.050
Regime Score 0.210
nn
À0.108
nn
À0.123
nn
0.174
nn
À0.050 À0.075
n
Reg. Score at Origin À0.054 À0.058
n
À0.091
nn
0.090
n
À0.108
nn
À0.106
nn
Type of Independence 0.202
nn
À0.209
nn
À0.227
nn
0.143
nn
À0.115
nn
À0.114
nn
Alliance Affinity 0.116
nn
À0.321
nn
0.183
nn
0.050
n
0.031 0.056
n
Regime Persistence 0.078
n
À0.003 À0.077
n
0.041 0.031 À0.021
No. States in PRIE À0.071
n
0.572
nn
0.133
nn
0.068
n
0.083
n
0.128
nn
No. of Alliances À0.125
nn
À0.005 À0.165
nn
0.083
nn
À0.083
n
À0.091
nn
Conflict in PRIE À0.123
nn
0.233
nn
0.218
nn
0.044 0.220
nn
0.271
nn
Regime in PRIE 0.034 À0.126
n
0.100
nn
0.079 0.026 0.021
N 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172
þ
Results reported here are based on measurement of pacifism as the average number of years without any dispute
over the state’s history
þ þ
Results reported here are based on measurement of fightaholism as the proportion of the state’ s decades in
which it was coded as fightaholic.
n
po.05;
nn
po.01.
ZEEV MAOZ 125
2. There is consistent evidence of national and dyadic conflict-related addiction,
or fightaholism. Specifically, some, but hardly all, of the most conflict-
prone states engaged consistently in a pattern of excessive involvement in
conflict over a large portion of their national histories. These states tend to
form dyads that are engaged in repeated conflict, thus accounting for a
disproportionately high fraction of all dyadic MIDs and wars over the
1816–1992 era. The evidence for national and dyadic fightaholism is fairly
robust.
3. Empirical evidence establishes substantial rates of pacifism at the national and
dyadic level. Side-by-side the evidence of fightaholism, there is substantial
abstinence from conflict involvement at the national and dyadic levels.
Most states and most dyads are neither extreme users of conflict nor are
they complete pacifists. Nevertheless, just as a significant minority of fight-
aholic states and dyads exist, there are a substantial number of states and
dyads that do not fight at all. Just as we spend considerable effort trying to
account for conflict proneness and conflict addiction, it is time we started
studying pacifism systematically.
The preliminary analysis of the correlates of a state’s position within a given risk
group suggests the following conclusions:
4. Pacifism has distinct characteristics. Being a minor power is a neces-
saryFthough not a sufficientFcondition of pacifism. In addition, pacifist
states tend to be militarily and economically weak and tend to have rel-
atively few immediate neighbors.
5. By and large, the correlates of conflict proneness and conflict addiction are the flip
side of the correlates of pacifism; however, there are important exceptions. In gen-
eral, factors that correlate positively with conflict proneness tend to cor-
relate positively with conflict addiction and negatively with absolute or
relative pacifism, and vice versa.
6. It is possible and even important to understand national and dyadic patterns over
long periods of time. This is the key conclusion of this study. The analysis of
national and dyadic patterns over long historical stretches produces some
important insights into issues of conflict and peace. First, evidence about
pacifism, conflict proneness, and addiction may be a useful source for
theorizing about structural patterns of relations at various levels of analysis.
Second, comparing empirical findings from studies focusing on the tra-
ditional unit-by-year observation with studies focusing on the long-term
tendencies of states and dyads may corroborate existing evidence on the
correlates of conflict and warFas many of the findings of this study do.
Alternatively, this comparison may reveal important gaps in our knowledge
as we address different units of analysis. For years, cross-level paradoxes
have perplexed students of war and peaceFthe level-of-analysis puzzle in
alliance and democratic peace studies being only two notable examples
(Maoz 2000, 2001).
This study did not attempt to develop a theory of conflict or peace but rather to
document some basic patterns of conflict and peace across states and dyads. Gen-
eralizing from these patterns into coherent explanations of conflict is left for future
studies.
Methodological Appendix
This appendix discusses all the issues related to the research design of this study.
Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics 126
Data Sources
The principal sources of data for this study include the following:
Variable/s Dataset Source
MIDs/Wars Dyadic MID Dataset Maoz (1999)
Regime/Polity Formation Polity II–IV Jaggers and Gurr (1995)
Mil. Capability COW National Capabilities http://cow2.la.psu.edu/
Alliances COW Alliance Dataset Bennett and Stam (2000)
Spatial-Temporal Domain and Units of Analysis
The temporal domain covers the 1816–1992 period. The spatial domain consists of
all states with twenty or more years of national independence over this period
(N¼182). The twenty-year threshold is due to definitions of units of analysis below.
Two units of analysis are employed. The national-history observation tracks each
state over its entire history, fromthe point it acquired independence to the end of the
period (or to the point the state lost its independence for those states that have not
persisted to the present). States that were independent prior to 1816 were treated as
if they acquired independence in 1815. With regard to measures of MID and war
addiction, state-histories required division of the temporal domain into decades (or
half-decades for validity tests of these measures), starting the counters with the first
year of independence and onwards. Thus, a state that acquired independence in
1838 ended its first decade in 1847, its second decade in 1857, and so forth.
The second unit is the politically relevant dyad history. A politically relevant dyad
is made up of contiguous states, a dyad where one of its members is a major power
with global reach capacity, or a dyad with a regional power that has regional reach
capacity (Maoz and Russett 1993; Maoz 1996, 2001). Each such dyad makes for a
single observation, measured over the entire joint history of the dyad. This history
is defined from the point when the ‘‘youngest’’ member of the dyad acquired
independence to the point where one member ceased to be an independent state,
or through 1992. Dyadic addiction measures entailed dividing dyadic histories into
decades (or half-decades). Dyads with less than twenty years of joint history were
deleted. The grand total for the dyadic analyses is N¼1,172.
12
Measurement of Variables
Dependent Variables: Measures of Conflict and Peace:
General Definitions of Conflict: All of the dependent variables are based on the
standard definition of MID involvement (Gochman and Maoz 1984:596) and of
war involvement (Small and Singer 1982).
Pacifism: I use two definitions of pacifismFabsolute and relative pacifism. Ab-
solute Pacifism is defined as the absence of conflict (MID/War) given sufficient
opportunity. Thus, a state/dyad is considered MID pacifist if it did not participate
in any MID (either as initiator, target, or joiner) during its entire (joint)
history. A state/dyad is considered a war pacifist if it did not participate in an
interstate war during its entire history. Relative Pacifism is measured as the average
number of years of peace (absent any MID/war involvement) of a state/dyad.
12
Analyses were performed also for the population of states/dyads with a minimum of 30 years of history. Results
were largely robust over these breakdowns.
ZEEV MAOZ 127
Conflict Proneness: Conflict proneness is the number of dyadic MIDs/war in-
volvements of a state/dyad per year. Note that each dyadic MID underway in a
given year gets a score of one. Thus, if a state is involved in five MIDs (or in one
MID involving five actual opponents) during a given year, it gets a score of 5 for
that year. Likewise, if a state started a MID during one year and this MID ex-
tended over a period of four subsequent years, the state gets a score of one for
each year this MID was in progress.
13
Measures of MID and War Fightaholism: Following the definitions of fightaholism
in section three of this study, the procedure for developing measures of addiction
was as follows. First, there are no strict benchmarks for defining ‘‘normal’’ in-
volvement in conflict and no strict benchmarks for defining ‘‘periods’’ pertaining
to intervals during which exposure to conflict is measured. Hence, I use two
alternative intervals of exposure to conflict. Also, due to the complexity of this
concept, I develop two alternative sets of measures. Both are used in the analyses
presented herein.
To start with, I take the date of a state’s entry into the system as the baseline for
measuring its conflict involvement. From this point of system entry, I break the
state’s history into two sets of alternative intervals, half-decades and decades.
Then I assess its relative addiction severity and cumulative addiction.
Relative Addiction Severity (RELADCT) is developed in several steps. First, each
nation’s history is divided into decades starting with its year of acquisition of in-
dependence and forward. Thus, for a state that became independent in 1951,
the first decade covers the years 1951 to 1960, the second decade covers the years
1961 to 1970, and so forth. Second, for each decade interval, and considering
all independent states during that interval, the average number of disputes or wars
per state is computed. This establishes the ‘‘normal level of conflict involvement.’’
Thus, over the decade 1951 to 1960, the ‘‘normal level of MID involvement’’ is
given by:
NORMID
1951À1960
¼
¸
1960
t¼1951
¸
nt
i¼1
DYDMID
it
¸
1960
t¼1951
NOSTATES
t
; ð1Þ
Where DYDMID
it
is the number of dyadic MID involvements of state i in year t,
and NOSTATES
t
is the number of states in the system in year t. Next, for each
state, the relative level of conflict involvement is computed in the following
manner.
MIDADCT
i;1951À1960
¼
¸
1960
t¼1951
DYDMID
it
NORMID
1951À1960
if NORMID > 0
0:1 if NORMID ¼ 0
or MIDADCT ¼ 0

; ð2Þ
A score of 0.1 is assigned to MIDADCT when it assumes the value of zero in
order to avoid multiplication by zero in the subsequent stage. Thus, a state that
experiences above average levels of MID involvement over a decade gets a score
larger than one, while a state that experiences below-average involvement over a
decade receives a score between 0.1 and 1. This establishes the state’s rate of
13
See Maoz (1998) for a justification for focusing on disputes underway rather than dispute outbreak in studies
of international conflict.
Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics 128
conflict involvement over a decade relative to the ‘‘normal’’ or average level of
involvement over that decade.
14
Recall that by addiction to conflict, or fightaholism, we refer to excessive con-
flict involvement over long periods of time. Thus, fightaholism increases with the
length of time (number of decades) a state is excessively involved in conflict.
Accordingly, I measure the relative fightaholism of a state over its entire history
using the formula:
RELADCT
i
¼ P
k
d¼1
MIDADCT
id

1=k
; ð3Þ
In the formula, d indexes the nation-decade starting with the first decade of
independence and going to the last (or last decade prior to 1992). This last decade
is indexed by k. Thus, RELADCT is the geometric mean of the decade-rate of
addiction scores at the end of the period of observation. The same logic was applied
to time units of five years and to dyadic addiction. In the latter case, the i index in
Equations (1)–(3) refers to politically relevant dyads rather than to individual states.
Cumulative Addiction reflects the pro portion of a state’s duration in the system
during which it was characterized as addicted. First, I generate a relative posi-
tioning of the state in terms of its MID/war involvement during a given decade by:
TFMID
it
¼
1 if MID
it
> 75 pctile MID
t
0 if MID
it
75 pctile MID
t

ð4Þ
In this formula, TFMID
it
is the relative positioning score of MID involvement.
Thus, a state whose conflict involvement rate during a given decade was higher
than the conflict involvement of 75 percent of all states existing during this decade
gets a high addiction severity score for the decade. States whose MID involvement
rates were equal to or lower than the 75 percent most dispute-prone states re-
ceived got a score of zero.
Next, I cumulated across all consecutive ten-year periods where a state received
a TFMID score of 1, such that the first period gets a score of 1, the second 2, and so
forth. This variable is labeled CUMIDAD. The counter is set to zero whenever a
decade exists that a state gets a score of zero (that is, it drops out of the 25th upper
percentile of MID-prone states). The relative cumulative MID addiction score is
then computed by:
RELCUMID
i
¼
MaxðCUMIDADÞ
i
MAXDECAD
i
ð5Þ
MAXDECAD
i
here is the number of decades during which the state was an
independent system member.
15
Risk Groups: As is customary in research on obsessive behavior in the behavioral
or psychiatric sciences, subjects are placed into risk groups in order to uncover
correlates of addiction or other chronic obsessive behaviors. Risk groups are de-
fined as follows:
Risk Group ¼
0 if state=dyad is paifist
2 if state=dyad fightaholic for more thanhalf its history
1 otherwise

ð6Þ
14
I use this measure rather than normal scores (Z-scores), because of the highly skewed distributions of conflict
and war involvement.
15
The same operations with appropriate adjustments are conducted for war-related fightaholism and for MID
and war fightaholism at the dyadic level.
ZEEV MAOZ 129
Independent Variables:
National Attributes
(1) Military Capability: The average fraction of a state’s military expendi-
tures and military personnel of the system’s total.
(2) Economic Capability: Measured as the average fraction of a state’s iron
and steel production and its energy consumption.
(3) Power Status: The proportion of the state’s history during which it qual-
ified as a major or regional power (Maoz 1996:139; 2001).
(4) Regime Score: From Maoz and Russett (1993), the regime score is de-
fined as: REGIME¼(DEMOC–AUTOC) Â CONCEN, where DEMOC is a
state’s democracy score, AUTOC is its autocracy score and CONCEN is its
power concentration score.
(5) Type of National Origin: Following Maoz (1989, 1996), this concept is
measured as 0 if the emergence of the state into the system was done in
an evolutionary fashion, and 1 if it entered the system through a rev-
olutionary/violent process.
(6) Regime Score at Origin: The regime score of the state at the year it
entered the system.
(7) Regime Stability: Number of regime changes divided by the length of the
state’s history.
(8) Number of States in PRIE: The average number of states in a given
nation’s PRIE.
(9) Number of Allies: Average number of states having alliance ties with the
focal state (Maoz 1996:169–170; 2000:140).
(10) Number of MIDs/Wars in PRIE: Number of dyadic MIDs/Wars in the
PRIE of the focal state, excluding MIDs/Wars involving the focal state.
(11) Average Regime Score in PRIE: Average regime score in the focal state’s
PRIE. (Also measured in some analyses as the proportion of states in
one’s PRIE that are democratic; see Maoz 1996: 171; 2001).
(12) Instability in PRIE: Average number of regime changes in the state’s
PRIE
Dyadic Attributes
(1) Capability Ratio: Average ratio of military capabilities of strongest to
weakest state in dyad. (Bremer 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993).
(2) Power Status (PS) of Dyad: Average (arithmetic mean) score of dyad on
the following scale:
PS ¼
0 Minor ÀMinor
1 Minor ÀRe gional
2 Minor ÀMajor
3 Re gional ÀRe gional
4 Re gional ÀMajor
5 Major ÀMajor

(3) Alliance Status: Proportion of years during which dyad members were
allied.
(4) Similarity of Interests: Bueno de Mesquita’s (1981) tau-b measure of
similarity of interests based on similarity of alliance portfolios of mem-
bers of dyads. I also use Signorino and Ritter (1999) measures, labeled as
S and the weighted version of S labeled as W
s
.
Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics 130
(5) Regime Stability: Average number of (violent or nonviolent) regime
changes as defined by Maoz (1996:128, 219–220).
(6) Type of Dyad Origin: This variable is coded as two if both dyad members
entered the system through a revolutionary process, one if one entered
the system in a revolutionary fashion and one entered through an ev-
olutionary process, and zero if neither member of the dyad entered the
system through revolutionary processes.
(7) Minimum Regime Score of Dyad: Smallest of average regime scores of
members of dyad.
(8) Minimum Regime Score at Dyad’s origin: Smallest of the regime scores
of dyad members at the year the ‘‘youngest’’ member entered the sys-
tem.
(9) Number of MIDs/Wars in Dyad’s PRIEs: Minimum average number of
MIDs/wars in the PRIEs of dyad members.
(10) Average Regime Score in Dyad’s PRIEs: Smallest of average regime
score in states’ PRIE.
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Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics

disputes and wars. Likewise, if two states have the opportunity (Most and Starr 1989) by virtue of their geographical or strategic contact and if both share a sufficiently long stretch of history, they are bound to fight each other at some point (Waltz 1979:113). The assumption that there is basic equality (or ‘‘normalcy’’) in conflict-involvement patterns is implicit in most of the quantitative analyses of international conflict, which assumes a normal, log-normal, or Poisson distribution of the dependent variable. Nathaniel Beck, Gary King, and Langche Zeng (2000) point out that these assumptions are tenuous and that significant bias in the findings may result from relying upon them. The fundamental inequality in national and dyadic patterns of conflict involvement may require us to redefine our approach to the study of conflict. Instead of examining why states fight in general, we need to explore what makes some states fundamentally pacifist in their international relations while others tend to be substantially conflict prone. Likewise, we need to investigate why some dyads fight repeatedly while others do not fight at all. Perhaps one of the most important implications of an ‘‘unnatural’’ distribution of conflicts over states and dyads is that we must deal with structural characteristics of specific groups of states rather than treat all states alike. For example, if there are identifiable groups of states or dyads that are pacifist, it would be improper to examine them in the same terms that we study conflict-prone states or dyads. However, identifying some states (or some dyads) as pacifist and other states (or dyads) as conflict prone does not mean much unless we can systematically differentiate them in terms of other properties that are related to their conflict proneness or pacifism. Accordingly, the underlying aims of the present study are fourfold: 1. To explore long-term patterns of national and dyadic conflict involvement. 2. To classify states and dyads into distinct ‘‘risk’’ groups in terms of their dispute and war-involvement patterns. 3. To identify the principal characteristics of states and dyads making up each of the risk groups in terms of their conflict involvement. 4. To identify some preliminary correlates of the structural conflict propensity of states and dyads. This study focuses on the conceptualization and identification of structural patterns of conflict, not on a theory thereof. In subsequent studies I will explore the factors that account for the location of states or dyads in each of these risk groups, or their move across the various groups over time. The present study is designed as follows. Section two describes the distribution of militarized interstate disputes and wars over the entire history of nations and dyads and discusses the implications of these patterns. Section three defines the concepts of pacifism, conflict proneness, and conflict-related addiction (or fightaholism) in the context of other types of compulsive-obsessive behaviors, such as substance abuse, recidivism, and behavioral addictions. Section four offers an empirical description of these structural patterns of conflict and some of the typical correlates of these risk groups. Section five discusses the implications of these issues for theories of international politics and conflict theory. (The research design is given in the appendix.)

The Inequality of Conflict: National and Dyadic Patterns Some Observations about Units of Analysis in Conflict Research
Many studies of conflict employ the unit-year as their principal unit of observation. The typical unit of observation is the nation-year (e.g., Maoz 1993, 2001),1 or the
1 Other investigators (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 1996, 1997; Henderson 1998) hsve used the nationdecade or the nation-half-decade as their unit of observation.

If the distribution of conflicts over states were normal. Studies on conflict-related structural properties of states or dyads are quite rare.85 for Wars. Similar analyses were conducted for shorter stretches of time such as half-decades with nearly identical results.g.2 Nearly 11 percent of all states with twenty or more years of independence were not involved in any Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) at all.8 percent of all wars in the system.ZEEV MAOZ 109 dyad-year (e. Thus. If all states were equally conflict prone. Bremer 2000). .3 Dyadic Conflict Involvement Patterns Inferences from the analyses conducted at the national level may be highly misleading. 1993. we still lack a good understanding of these tendencies as well as of some of their causes and correlates. F . this scheme prevents detection of structural patterns of conflict that can be conceptualized only within a temporal framework covering the entire history of the unit. . at the dyadic level.’’ This approach has yielded important insights (e. More recently.000 with 9 DF and for war the chi-square is 889). .g. the distribution of conflicts over dyads may 2 Normalized figures for the distribution control for the length of a state’s national history. Bremer 1992. states may not distribute their conflict activity uniformly over partners. Nearly 57 percent of all states were not involved in any war. Russett and Oneal 2001). If state A fights with states C.. D. Thus. and state B fights states Q. J. the enduring rivalry literature (Goertz and Diehl 1992.. However. 1993.. 3 Matching the distributions of national MID and war involvement patterns with a Poisson distribution yields extremely high chi-square values (for MIDs. The unit-year scheme is designed to deal with the questions of ‘‘who gets involved in conflict when’’ or ‘‘who fights whom when. Maoz and Mor 2002) has provided structural information on the more dispute-prone dyads. T . Figure 1 presents empirical patterns of national conflict involvement over the 1816–1992 period.g. if one avoids fights. Thompson and Tucker 1997. one avoids fights with everybody equally. Maoz and Russett 1993. Most and Starr 1980). and Maoz (1993) provide descriptive statistics of national war and dispute proneness. the cumulative distribution would provide us some approximation to the line of perfect equality. However. At the other end of the scale. E. Testing for structural patterns of national and dyadic conflict involvement requires long-term observation. the top 10 percent of the states accounted for 49. then both states may be individually conflict prone while the dyad itself is pacific. Charles Gochman and Zeev Maoz (1984). Other studies have attempted to identify potentially addictive patterns (e. The unnormalized distributions of conflicts yield huge inequalities with Gini coefficients of 0. Katz. Quincy Wright (1944) briefly discussed the war-proneness of states.74 for MIDs and 0. then the least conflict-prone states would account for a similar proportion of systemic conflict as the most conflict-prone states. . Diehl and Goertz 2000. David Singer and Melvin Small (1972. suggesting strong evidence for addiction. States that are peace-prone are benign with respect to all other states. it does not follow that the dyad made up of these two states would also be conflict prone. If each of two states is conflict prone. R.7 percent of all MIDs. and for 56. . the chi-square is over 63. Beck. see also Small and Singer 1982). a study of these issues appears timely. See appendix for details. Bremer 1980. . However. S. and Tucker 1998. This figure suggests a fundamental inequality in the structure of national conflict patterns: a small number of states accounts for a disproportionate amount of conflict in the system while a large number of states evidence very little conflict. National Conflict Involvement Patterns The extent of inequality in the conflict involvement of states and dyads is analogous to income inequality in societies.

the ownership of golf clubs. Lorenz Curve of Dyadic Conflict Involvement. of Dyads Dyadic MID/Yr Dyadic War/Yr Perfect Equality Normal Dist.819 Gini(Wars) = 0. 2. Almost 87 percent of all politically relevant dyads never fought a war. be significantly different from the distribution of conflicts over individual states. Implications So what if the national and dyadic distributions of conflict are not normally or Poisson distributed? Many social phenomena are not normally distributed.59 Line of Perfect Equality 20% Gini(wars) = 0. On the other hand. 1816–1992 (normalized by year of joint dyadic history).110 100% Cumulative Pct. FIG. displays. Lorenz Curve of National Conflict Involvement.934 Cumulative Pct. of States MID/Year War/Year Equality Normal Dist.81 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% −20% Cumulative Pct. the amount of money invested in stock exchanges by people or firms. 100% 90% Cumulative Pct. Conflict Involvement 80% 60% 40% Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics Cumulative Normal (Poisson) Distribution Gini(MIDs) = 0. The fact that the distribution of national and dyadic patterns of conflict involvement is highly unequal may be neither surprising nor of significant import. . Figure 2 shows the distribution of MIDs and wars over politically relevant dyads. A majority of all politically relevant dyads (57 percent) never have exercised threats. the upper centile of the dyads accounted for 34 percent of all MIDs and for over 95 percent of all interstate wars for this population. The use of international flights. 1816–1992 (normalized by length of national history). FIG. of Conflict Cumulative Normal (Poisson) Distribution 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% Line of Perfect Equality 20% 10% 0% −10% −20% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Gini(MIDs) = 0. or uses of force. 1. and many other trivial patterns of behavior display highly similar distributions to the ones discussed above. This figure suggests that states tend to be extremely ‘‘selective’’ in their choices of enemies.

but each possesses distinctive features. 4 The notion of ‘‘opportunity’’ in terms of geographical proximity may be problematic.g. I discuss these concepts in this section. Dyadic pacifism is perhaps more meaningful. the conflict involvement score of dispute or war pacifists is zero.ZEEV MAOZ 111 While it is true that a great deal of trivial social and natural phenomena exhibit substantial inequalities among units.. A dispute pacifist is a state/dyad that has experienced no militarized disputes during its entire history. the fact that a substantial proportion of all states and dyads systematically abstains from conflict suggests a substantial lacuna in our knowledge. Dividing by the number of years of existence normalizes for the temporal opportunity for conflict. but not of the latter two states. television). One of the potential implications of such skewed distributions of deviant behavior is that they are harmful not only to the person engaged in them. such as the use of drugs and alcohol. but we do not know what the characteristics of pacifist states and pacifist dyads are. it is frequently used in the literature (e. it is also true of other. Since conflict is a deviant behavior. Yet Germany respected the neutrality of the former. Pacifism. and obsessive overuse of certain habits during leisure time (e. At the national level. Conflict proneness refers to the number of conflict involvements per year of national or dyadic existence. then the fundamental inequality in the distribution of conflict carries important implications for the study and prevention of conflict. opportunity is defined by the notion of political relevance (Maoz and Russett 1993. A pacifist dyad is one wherein both states systematically avoid militarized conflicts with one another. by a sufficient number of years of joint national existence. Pacifism is an absolute concept. A war pacifist is a state/dyad that has never engaged in an interstate war during its entire history. if we view conflict involvement as self. By definition. More generally.and environmentally harmful. It refers to the absolute lack of conflict involvement given sufficient opportunity. Conflict Proneness. Specifically. thus declaring neutrality. I distinguish between dispute pacifism and war pacifism. the involvement in criminal behavior. At the dyadic level. The classification of states and dyads into lowand high-conflict risk-groups may enrich our understanding both of the causes and the consequences of conflict behavior. possibly less trivial. and Belgium wanted to avoid war in World War I and World War II. The concept of conflict-related addiction or fightaholism is used as a metaphor for a structural pattern of behavior not tapped by the other concepts. Most and Starr 1989. patterns of deviant social behavior. This concept distinguishes between states that have been involved in a large number of conflicts and those that have been involved in few conflicts. These concepts are interrelated. an opportunity for conflict exists if a state has a minimal number of immediate neighbors and if it has existed as an independent system member for a sufficient amount of time.g. . and Fightaholism: A Conceptual Exploration I now turn to a discussion of three basic concepts that guide this study. A national commitment to avoid conflict is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for pacifism. computers. Maoz 1996) and by a minimum amount of time of common history.. it can no longer be branded as pacifist. we have a substantial phenomenon of pacifism in world politics. Holland.4 If a state was involved in a single dispute or war over its entire history. Switzerland. overeating. The significance of the structural distributions of conflict involvement lies principally in the following argument: our treatment of all states or dyads as if they were a priori equally conflict prone is tenuous and making this assumptionFimplicitly or explicitlyFin our studies may yield biased inferences. Other states must also avoid conflict with the focal state. Nevertheless. Holsti 1991. that is. but also to his/her environment. The concepts of pacifism and conflict proneness are self-explanatory. Vasquez 1993).

. and Italy is different from Iran and Saudi Arabia. this concept is based on a metaphor derived from other types of deviant behaviors. only about 18 percent of US militarized interstate disputes and 10. On the other hand. or tobacco. alcohol. alcohol. and despite awareness of the damage caused by this activity to oneself and to his or her family. First. alcoholism. the norm may change over time. that a person is powerless to stop . The elements of this general definition are visible in definitions of specific types of addiction. As noted. the metaphoric representation of any concept is necessarily imperfect. These disorders include various types of substance (drug. More generally. the ‘‘norm’’ itself might vary across socieities. But they also include food addiction. To capture conflict proneness over distinct phases of states’ or dyads’ histories. I do not mean to suggest that certain states or dyads are addicted to conflict in the exact same manner that some people are addicted to drugs.112 Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics The concept conflict-related addiction (fightaholism) reflects the evolution of conflict involvement over time. and smoking). Clearly. This. tobacco) abuse that involve chemical as well as psychological dependence. we must define different types of obsessivecompulsive disorders and examine how they are diagnosed. or co-workers’’ (Larson 1996:1129. . the extent of deviation from the norm.) Second. to include mood-altering behaviors or activities. gambling. friends. eating. whereas another may have experienced a short and extremely intense period of conflict while the rest of its history may have been relatively pacific. France. Nor do I mean to imply that conflict creates chemical reactions and feelings of craving and psychological dependence as do certain substances. nicotine. The latter denote behaviors that are based primarily on psychological dependence.7 percent of its wars were fought in the nineteenth century. or certain ‘‘softer’’ drugs. 59 percent of Mexico’s MIDs and all of its wars were in the nineteenth century. (See the figures on the cross-national differences in alcohol use in Clarke and Weisburd 1990:11. There is a growing recognition that many addicts. For example. and the period of use. alcohol. (Fray 2001:50) It is commonly noted that ‘‘the main characteristic of addictive behavior is the compelling need to engage in a particular activity or to use the addictive substance without deriving pleasure of it. However. drug abuse. for example. was the case with nicotine and drug abuse in most Western societiess over the last three decades (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990:40). on a behavior or substance. or fightaholism. spending. and process addictions (for example. shopping. however. and addiction to television or computers. for example. . With regard to some substances. Clearly. Rather. addiction severity is a function of three factors: social norms.5 5 The measurement of addiction in relation to a certain ‘‘norm’’ is very problematic. Two states may have identical conflict-proneness scores but their patterns of involvement may take on dramatically different forms over time. such as polydrug abusers. one state may have distributed its conflicts uniformly over time. emphasis added). What excessive is depends on the nature of the substance. Substance addiction is defined as excessive use of a certain substance over a relatively long period of time. the behavioral implications of addiction or other kinds of obsessive-compulsive disorders are similar or analogous to the behavioral patterns of conflict involvement of some states and dyads over time. and sexual activity). are addicted to more than one substance or process. Addiction is a dependence. Some researchers speak of two types of addictions: substance addictions (for example. the ‘‘norm’’ of alcohol use in Russia. compulsory gambling. I have developed the notion of conflict-related addiction. all except one of the 25 MIDs between the US and Mexico took place before 1920. In order to explore this metaphor. Moreover. For example. sexual addiction. Addiction has been extended. as well as obsessive criminal behavior. workaholism. they share a number of traits that are included in the general definition of obsessive-compulsive behavior that places most of them under the label of addiction. these types of addiction are extremely diverse.

The number of people diagnosed as drug. by psychological dispositions. the study of addiction focuses on a small number of individuals rather than on general characteristics of a population due to the unequal distribution of deviance in the general population. At the dyadic level. but it possesses some elements that are harmful to oneself as well as to one’s environment. 4.7 3. The definitions of these concepts allow us to classify states or dyads into four risk groups regarding their conflict-related propensity: 1. alcohol. nicotine. Thus. This behavior is accompanied by policies that facilitate the conduct of conflict. but not all conflict-prone states or dyads are fightaholics. 6 Some theories of gambling and recedivism facilitate the application of rational decision or game theoretic concepts to such processes. Normal. Efforts to discontinue this activity or to reduce the level of engagement in it are brief and unsuccessful. All fightaholics are conflict prone. or food addicts or as compulsive gamblers (and even recidivists) is generally small in the entire population. Excessive and repetitive engagement in a given activity. States or dyads that have engaged in relatively high amounts of conflict during their history but whose conflict history is sporadic rather than sustained. such as militarization or alliance formation.ZEEV MAOZ 113 These definitions of addictive behavior identify five common traits that can be compared to the notion of fightaholism discussed below: 1. The activity may cause some sort of immediate gratification. Addictive behavior is typically deviant. Those states or dyads that did not engage in any conflict throughout their history. and Maoz 1990 on sunk-cost paradoxes in war). The first three groups are mutually exclusive. 4. States or dyads that have engaged in excessively high amounts of conflict in a sustained manner over their history. Fightaholics. In the next section. The final group largelyFbut not completelyFoverlaps with the conflict-prone group. States or dyads that have engaged in relatively little sporadic conflict during their history and whose rate of conflict involvement over time has been sporadic. sunk cost paradoxes in the Dollar Auction game and cost benefit calculations in criminal behavior (where the probability of capture is discounted in the planning of later crimes than in early ones due to experience and learning) suggest that even people who perform rational-like calculations can become addicted to self-damaging behavior (see Maltz 1984 on recidivism. 7 The notion of ‘‘normal dyads’’ is equivalent to what Diehl and Goertz (2000) and Maoz and Mor (2002) call ‘‘proto rivalries.’’ . or even by rational reasoning. 2. Awareness that this behavior is self-damaging does not inhibit continuous engagement in it. we define dyadic fightaholism as repeated and excessive engagement in militarized disputes and war with the same partner over a long period of time.6 5. again with harmful consequences that accrue to both members of the dyad. 3. we discuss the empirical properties of these four groups. It may be induced by chemical craving. For example. fightaholism is defined as excessive and repetitive engagement in militarized disputes and wars over a long period of time with occasionally harmful consequences. Brockner and Rubin 1985 on social entrapment in a wide array of situations. Conflict prone. 2. Addiction is a self-reinforcing behavior. but their rates of consumption of substances or practice of the activities is disproportionately high. Pacifists. Analogously.

and Fightaholism General Empirical Properties of Structural Conflict Behavior Pacifism. Conflict Proneness. More than 55 percent of the states with histories extending for at least 40 years completely abstained from war. It levels off at an average rate of 20 percent for dyads with 80 or more years of joint history. While a regression of MID and war proneness on length of history yielded statistically significant effects. National and Dyadic Pacifism: Proportion of all states with zero conflict involvement by number of years of national independence. none of the states with 50 or more years of system membership absolutely avoided MID involvement. the longer the existence of states/ dyads as independent system members. is observed at some level even for states with varying lengths of national histories.004. this proportion levels off at an average of 15 percent regardless of the length of national history. This proportion drops to a rate of 32 percent MID-pacifism for dyads with 50 to 80 years of joint history. 3.6 0.8 0.114 Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics Identifying Pacifism.5 0. and b ¼ . On the national level. Conflict Proneness.2 0.0008. More significantly. regardless of the length of joint history.056 for MID proneness. However. If states live long enough.7 0. . pacifism turns out to be a significant phenomenon in an anarchic world. however. in contrast to the realist notion that conflict is a pervasive phenomenon in world politics. However. the coefficients were fairly low for both measures of conflict (b ¼ . R2 ¼ 0.3 0. there is no discernable increase in conflict proneness over time. they end up getting involved in MIDs of one form or another.1 0 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 No.4 0. Thus. R2 ¼ 0. As noted above. War-related pacifism. the empirical identification of pacifism is relatively straightforward. This suggests only a small effect of duration in the system on the increase in rate of conflict proneness for individual states. For ‘‘older’’ states. 71 percent of all politically relevant dyads never fought each other in an interstate war. and it calls for explanation. About 58 percent of the politically relevant dyads with 20 or more years of joint history are pacifists. of Years in System 130 140 150 160 170 National MID Pacifism National War Pacifism Dyadic MID Pacifism Dyadic War Pacifism FIG. Figure 3 provides some sense of the distribution of national and dyadic pacifism patterns by years of independence.9 0. the probability of national and dyadic pacifism is related to the length of a state’s/dyad’s history. the less likely they are to stay pacifist. Figure 3 suggests that about 9 percent of all states with at least 20 to 50 years of system membership were MID pacifist.026 for warsFN ¼ 180). Proportion of Pacifist States 1 0.

In the case of MID-proneness. If the reverse is true. þ Consistent cell. Here. I explore the empirical properties of these measures.01) 109 þ (56.02) 635 w2(4) ¼ 260. the cell is designated as inconsistent.244.48) (117.539. In cells denoted as rehabilitated. Fightaholism. I develop a number of measures of conflict-related addiction that build on those bodies of literature.13) 60 þ (55.544 Note: entries in parentheses are expected frequencies.001. R2 ¼ 0.57) Medium 105 þ 50 þ (113. A first-cut identification and analysis of conflict-related addiction requires us to examine time-dependence at various levels of conflict involvement. po0.63) (43. mb ¼ 0.001.90) (47.64) 69 þ (60. n Inconsistent cell.167 Column Total Level of MID Involvement in Present Decade Low Level of MID Involvement Two Decades Ago Low n Medium þ High 83 (139.41) 72 þ (53.1 A Hypothetical Addiction Table 115 Current Period Level of Conflict Involvement Level of Conflict involvement Past Period Low Medium High Low Nonadicted Rehabilitated Rehabilitated Medium Nonadicted Possibly addicted Possibly addicted High Possibly Addicted Addicted Addicted Note: In cells denoted as possibly addicted and addicted.07) 526 210 w2(4) ¼ 136. 1.95) Medium 109 þ (136. Examples: National Level Cross TIME RELATIONS Level of MID Involvement in Present Decade Low Level of MID involvement in previous decade Low 470 (356. If that is the case in a given contingency table.03) 250 n Row Total 552 213 221 986 Column Total 100 369 (294.003).96) 58 þ (54.52) 284 n Row Total 656 250 261 1. .47) 248 þ High 70 (159. observed frequencies must be smaller than expected frequencies to be designated as consistent. the cell is designated as consistent.03) High 56 þ (142. For wars this effect is not even statistically significant.ZEEV MAOZ TABLE 1.37) High 56 þ 60 þ (117.425 n Medium 116 (139. observed frequencies must be higher than expected frequencies. Cross-Time Conflict Levels 1. the effect of the length of dyadic history is statistically significant.0002.84) 145 þ (63. po0. A similar finding can be reported for the effect of the length of dyadic history on the conflict proneness of the dyad. How do we know that a state or a dyad is fightaholic? In the appendix. mb ¼ 0.2. but the slope is very low (b ¼ .

The ‘‘old’’ dyads (with 160 years or more of joint history) exhibit a fightaholism rate of around 30 percent. observed frequencies are substantially lower than the expected ones. national fightaholism suggests an increasing trend as a function of the length of the state’s national history. 9 A similar analysis was performed for a five-year period split of national and dyadic history. implying that a state that started its national history as a highly conflict-prone state will maintain its status of addition-like conflict involvement over time. 8 A similar procedure was developed by Most and Starr (1980). Based on this definition we can discuss the relationship between conflict-proneness.9 The measures of fightaholism offered herein apply the five characteristics of addictive behavior to the extent of a state’s involvement in MIDs and wars over time. Table 1 shows how an interpretation of addictive behavior would appear in a contingency table that relates these two periods. The rate of dyadic fightaholism increases gradually up to a peak of 35 percent for all dyads with 130 years or less of national independence and declines thereafter. Placing States and Dyads in Risk Groups Having described patterns of pacifism. This trend extends over relatively long time-spans.2 of the table. observed frequencies are significantly higher than expected frequencies and in most cells suggesting rehabilitation. we see that in most of the cells suggesting patterns of addiction. The presence of addiction in the actual population of states and dyads is based on the extent to which the difference between the observed and expected frequencies in the cells that are designated as possibly addictive or addictive contributes to the overall chi-square of the frequency table. fightaholism. Table 3 shows the major pacifist and the major fightaholic states. Less than 30 percent of all states with 40 or less years of history can be labeled fightaholics. the 50-year history mark indicates a steep jump in fightaholism. . we designate the cells that are consistent with the addiction specifications. Table 2 provides the cross-time correlations for both national and dyadic addiction levels over a variety of measures. consistent with the hypothesis of addiction-like behavior. In the example given in part 1.116 Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics Such time dependence could be prespecified so that any relationship between conflict-involvement levels at one period and conflict involvement at another period would correspond to the characteristics of addictive behavior discussed above. Similar to conflict proneness. and length of tenure in the club of nations. we can now identify the states and dyads that belong to each of these groups. and 50 percent of such states were war-related fightaholics. However. A state/dyad is designated as fightaholic if its involvement in MIDs or wars was far above the national/dyadic average for a given period and if this excessive involvement lasted over a number of periods consistently. In the top part of this table. The associations between rates of conflict involvement over time for that analysis were even higher than those reported here. conflict proneness. The results of Table 2 suggest evidence of addiction-like patterns of warfare over time.8 The mb statistic denotes the proportion of the chi-square accounted for by the addiction hypothesis (Maoz 1996: 130–132). and fightaholism. States and dyads that exhibit disproportionately high levels of conflict involvement during one period tend to be high in conflict in subsequent periods. This rate increases gradually to the point where about 58 percent of the states with histories of over 170 years were dispute-related fightaholics. The measures below are a more accurate representation of the relationship between conflict measures over time based on an a priori designation of specific cells in the frequency table.

though with some caution. of Conflicts per decade MID 0. Pearson product moment correlation.436 1-Decade Lag of No.617nn 0.459nn 0. National MID/War Involvement per >No. that most war pacifists are smaller.443 þ N ¼ 4. n po.636nn N ¼ 986 0. we observe a general resemblance in the members of the two lists.905nn 0. the second group is made up of major powers. nnpo. but they are not in the same order.588nn 0. We will see below that the correlation between conflict proneness and fightaholism is not as high as could be expected. The geographic content of this list of pacifist dyads is interesting: it consists of Western European and Latin American dyads only. Next-to-Last Decade. the members of the two lists are composed of the same groups of states. Turning to the list of conflict-prone and fightaholic dyads.001. relative conflict rates (see appendix) Entries in each cell are mb statistics.442nn 0. of Conflicts per Decade MID 0. / þ 0.167 þ 1-Decade Lag of No. less-developed states.651nn War 0. conflicts/Decade MID War No. We turn now to identification of pacifist and fightaholic dyads.640nn 0.657nn N ¼ 1.662nn N ¼ 161 0. Addiction Levels in MID and War Involvement Rates of States and Dyads.088n N ¼ 546 / Variable MID/War 1. Relative Conflict Rates (see appendix) Variable MID / War / MID/War 1.620nn MID / War / From the list in Table 3. Dyadic MID/War Involvement per Decade No.425nn War 0.246 0.673nn 0.434nn F F F 0.482nn 0.645nn 2-Decade Lag of No.673nn 0. The dyads given here are the ones with the longest history of dyadic pacifism that are also directly contiguous. We could not find significant pacifist dyads in Africa.485nn 0. Conflicts/Year Next-to-Last Decade MID War Pearson correlations. the Middle East. It is .657nn N ¼ 1.544nn 0. Conflicts/Decade MID War 2-Decade Lag of No.485nn 0. 1816–1992 1-Decade Lag 2-Decades 3-Decades First Lag Lag Decade Decade 0. Conflicts/Year Next-to-Last Decade MID War 0. The first is a group of relatively ‘‘young’’ states (less than 70 years in the system) in the Middle East and East Asia.656nn N ¼ 3. The list of pacifist dyads is large and cannot be displayed here.627nn 0.604nn War 0. Next-to-Last Decade.01. it can be said.429 0.668nn Pearson Correlations. Conflicts/Decade MID War No.605nn N ¼ 810 0.273nn 0.411nn 0.619nn 0. while MID and War fightaholics seem to be composed of two distinct groups. Here again.647nn N ¼ 161 1-Decade Lag 2-Decades 3-Decades First Lag Lag Decade / F F F 0.ZEEV MAOZ 117 TABLE 2. conflicts/Decade MID 0. or Asia.589nn N ¼ 5.

833 0.000 1.400 0.600 0.444 0. Fightaholism and conflict proneness at the dyadic level are not one and the same as enduring rivalries. ‘‘Oldest’’ Pacifist States and Most Fightaholic States Pacifists1 No.800 0.000 0. Kingdom Russia/SU Only war pacifism. conflict proneness.333 0.400 0.625 0.571 0.333 0. and Fightaholism Despite the wide array of theories and empirical studies on the correlates of addiction. Greece–Turkey. Correlates of Pacifism.400 0. Kingdom Zaire Cambodia Saudi Arabia Turkey State Israel Australia Syria Jordan South Korea Turkey Iraq China Ethiopia India Pakistan Cambodia (North) Vietnam France United States Bulgaria Egypt Japan Utd. Table 5 provides intercorrelations between these structural patterns of conflict involvement at the national and dyadic level of analysis.800 0. Albania Liberia Afghanistan2 Nepal Costa Rica Panama Ireland Luxemburg Iceland Burma (Myn) Sri Lanka Indonesia Taiwan 1 2 State Israel Pakistan India Jordan Syria India United States (North) Vietnam South Korea North Korea China Russia/Sov. instructive to note. Un. US–USSR.600 0. and so forth (e.g. France Japan Iraq Utd. The correlations between different structural patterns of conflict involvement are not as high as one might expect. such as France–Germany.714 0. Proportion Years in of Decades System Fightaholic 45 46 46 47 47 46 177 39 45 46 133 177 174 129 61 177 43 40 66 177 1.429 0.000 1. This suggests that fightaholismFas a structural propensity for excessive involvement in conflictFoffers a distinctive characterization of states and dyads. given the seemingly similar conceptions of conflict proneness and fightaholism.000 1.800 0.778 0. The correlations between the measures of pacifism.278 0.400 0. Proportion Years in of Decades System Fightaholic 45 72 47 47 44 177 61 133 91 46 46 40 39 174 177 85 84 129 177 177 0. Conflict Proneness.000 1.000 1.600 0.. Recall that no state with a history of 50 years or more was a MID Pacifist.600 0.600 0.286 0.667 0.278 State Sweden Switzerland Venezuela Haiti Uruguay Tunisia Dom. Thompson 2001.722 0.389 0.500 War Fightaholism No.333 0. the literature on substance and behavioral addiction and on chronic .722 0. Repub.714 0. and fightaholism are all statistically significant and generally high on both the national and the dyadic levels of analysis. however. This is notable in addition to the lack of one-to-one empirical correspondence between such concepts as enduring rivalries and dyadic fightaholics.429 0. that the conflict-proneness and fightaholism lists do not consist of all the typical dyads that are placed in the ‘‘enduring rivalries’’ lists.786 0. Not a pacifist after 2001.118 Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics TABLE 3.400 0. Diehl and Goertz 2000. Years in System 177 177 152 116 111 100 92 75 73 73 73 73 73 71 70 49 45 45 44 44 MID Fightaholism No. Maoz and Mor 2002).

600 0.396 0.327 0.347 0.600 0.500 0. Selected Pacifist.800 0.583 0.500 0. Average of MID and war Figthaholism (average proportion of decades of joint history with high MID and War fightaholism scores). of MIDs and wars for year of joint history).479 0. Years ZEEV MAOZ Switzerland-Italy Sweden-Denmark France-Switzerland UK-Belgium Belgium-France Venezuela-Brazil Brazil-Uruguay Portugal-Morocco US-Argentina Sweden-Norway Finland-Sweden Ecuador-Brazil Costa Rica-Colombia 177 175 174 166 162 155 114 105 97 86 79 68 68 Syria-Israel Egypt-Israel North-South Vietnam India-Pakistan Jordan-Israel North-South Korea Cambodia-Vietnam US-North Korea Thailand-Cambodia Somalia-Ethiopia Iran-Iraq China-India Russia-Japan 45 45 22 46 45 44 21 45 40 33 61 46 129 1.500 0.541 0. and Fightaholic Dyads Pacifist Dyads Dyad No. War Prone. Years MDs/Year Dyad Dispute Prone Dyads1 War Fightaholic Dyads2 No. 119 .315 Egypt-Israel Jordan-Israel Syria-Israel North-South Korea China-India India-Pakistan Iran-Iraq Russia-Japan North-South Vietnam US-North Korea China-(North) Vietnam Iraq-Kuwait Iraq-Israel 45 45 45 44 46 46 61 131 22 45 39 32 45 0.568 0.444 0.813 0.538 0. Years Fightaholism Score Dyad No.457 0.600 0.500 1 2 Average of MID and war proneness (average no.500 0.372 0.344 0.011 0.700 0.TABLE 4.600 0.

MIDs/Year of Independence No.200 0.743 0.182 0.544 À0.759 0.882 0.748 Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics Prop.516 F À0.648 0.506 F À0.420 0.392 0.0001 level.657 F 0.884 0.120 TABLE 5.866 0.351 À0.359 À0. Peace Years in History No.374 F À0.882 F 0.810 0.736 0.427 0.877 0.466 0. Decades MID Fightaholic Relative War Fightaholic Prop.959 F Note: All correlations are significant at the po. Wars/Year of Independence Relative MID Fightaholism Prop.452 0.508 0. Decades MID Fightaholic Relative War Fightaholic Dyadic Patterns (N ¼ 1.697 À0.518 0.382 0.541 0. Decades War Fightaholic Prop.585 0. Intercorrelations between Structural Attributes of Conflict Behavior Variable MIDs/Year of Independence Wars/Year of Independence Relative MID Fightaholic Prop.605 0. Decades MID Fightaholic Relative War Fightholic À0.541 F National Patterns (N ¼ 180) À0.438 0.578 0. Peace Years MIDs/Year of Independence Wars/Year of Independence Relative MID Fightaholic Prop.441 0.716 F À0.475 À0.662 0. .591 0.844 0.172) À0.

A more theoretically informed discussion will be presented and tested in a subsequent study. In general. psychology. Maoz 2000. The purpose of the following analysis is to provide some basic indication of potential ‘‘causes’’ of national or dyadic conflict patterns.g. 1996. number of alliances. the (major-regional-minor power) status of the state.g. Bremer 1992.10 Table 6 includes a selected list of potential correlates that are frequently mentioned in the conflict literature. because the temporal relationship between the dependent and independent variable is not clear. There are several reasons for justifying this kind of measurement process. Studies of dyadic conflict have not generally explored extrinsic correlates of conflict. and so forth (Maoz 1996. 1996. 2001). Second. regime type. 1993. 1997. I average most independent variables over time for any given state or dyad. economic development. we can expect cross-level differences in the results. The first is the number of allies of the state with the fewest allies in the dyad (Maoz 2000. Maoz and Russett 1993. level of in the state’s environment. Russett and Oneal 2001). Oneal et al. Because this is an analysis of long-term structural traits of states/dyads. the relationship between each of the independent variables and the risk group is expected to be the same across levels of analysis except for the alliance variable.) Typical ‘‘correlates’’ of international conflict fit well into this classification.. number of states in PRIE) are measured both at the point of the state’s/ dyad’s origin and over its entire history. level of trade. Ward and Gleditsch 2000). Intrinsic correlates of dyadic conflict refer to the characteristics of the dyad: its power ratio. Choucri and North 1975. 2001. Maoz 1993. uncovering the correlates of pacifism requires averaging potential factors over long stretches of time.ZEEV MAOZ 121 criminal behavior has identified two basic clusters of correlates of these behaviors: (1) Intrinsic correlates are factors associated with the individual’s physiology. and Maltz 1984 on recidivism. lateral pressure. Intrinsic correlates of conflict at the national level include national characteristics such as level of power. regime type. The few exceptions that discuss such correlates focus on factors that are similar to those identified at the monadic level (Bennett 1998. 1996. and so forth (Bremer 1982. . its power-related status. Since there are some cross-level differences in the measurement of the variables. The problem with this procedure is that it may generate biased inferences. These causes are derived from the quantitative literature on international conflict that repeatedly uses several basic variables in empirical analysis. The second measure denotes whether or not the dyad was alliedFas used in most dyadic analyses of conflict. this is a preliminary investigation of the correlates of structural location of states and dyads in different risk groups. their relative power. First. 2001). (See Fray 2001 on the general correlates of a wide variety of drug and behavioral addictions. however.and chapters in the handbook edited by Midlarsky 2000). or history (both personal and family) and (2) extrinsic correlates refer to factors in the individual’s social and physical environment that affect the individual’s behavior. As noted. Maoz 1993. 1997. Thus. and so forth (Rosenau 1966. contiguity. its alliance ties. because certain measures (e. it is possible to compare the results obtained from the averaged measures to the same variables which are unaveraged. pacifism as an absolute characteristic of a state can only be observed on a long-term basis. the level of stability of the state’s environment. 2001). Extrinsic determinants of conflict focus on the politically relevant international environment (PRIE) in which the state resides: the number of states in its PRIE. regime scores. Maoz and Russett 1993. its economic development. Teichman 2001 on alcoholism. 1993. If 10 Discussions can be found in the literature on national and dyadic conflict involvement (e. however.. political stability. Bremer 1982. For this variable two different measures are employed at the dyadic level.

Maoz (2001). Bremer (1992) Rosenau (1966) Maoz and Abdolali (1989). No. À þ À À Bremer (1992). Dyadic: weak link no. No. Dyadic: Capability Ratio (strong/weak) Power Status Intrinsic National: Major/Minor Power status. State/PRIE. Maoz (2000). Cap. mixed. 2001). Walt (1996). Dyadic: Weak link No. Dyadic: Weak link democ. Signorino and Ritter (1998) Conflict in PRIE Extrinsic National: No. Dyadic. Maoz (1996). score. Democracy score. 1996). 2001). both minors. Geller and Singer (1998: 27). Potential Correlates of Pacifism. of conflicts in PRIEs Regime in PRIE Extrinsic National: Average Regime score of PRIE Dyadic: Weak link avg. and Fightaholism Expected Correlation Definition À À À þ À þ þ À À þ þ þ þ þ þ Pacifism Proneness Fightaholism Sources Maoz (1996). Dyadic: Weak link regime changes Levy (1988). 2001) Bueno de Mesquita (1981). (1996). Geller and Singer (1998: 27). Maoz (1996. states À þ À À No. Number of allies. of allies. 2000. Geller and Singer (1998) Maoz (1996. of States in PRIE Extrinsic National. Type of Acquisition of National Independence À À þ Æ À þ þ þ þ þ þ Intrinsic National. Rousseau et al. of Alliances Extrinsic Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics National. Dyadic: Type of dyadic acquisition of inde. Number of contiguous states. of conflicts in PRIE. Maoz (1989. regime of PRIEs Dyadic Affinity Extrinsic Dyadic: Tau-b (S) score of alliance affinity .122 TABLE 6. Maoz (1996. presence/absence of alliance in dyad. Variable Type of Factor Military Capability Intrinsic National: Relative mil. Economic Development Intrinsic National: Level of economic wealth Dyadic: Weak link level of wealth. Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997) Singer and Geller (1998: 27). Conflict Proneness. of violent regime changes. Political Instability Intrinsic National. Weak link no. Geller and Singer (1998). Dyadic: Both majors. Ray (1995).1 Regime Type at Origin Intrinsic National. Revolutionary/ Evolutionary emergence as state.

254nn 0. First. With these caveats in mind.280nn 0.024 À0. .5 percent) did not participate in a war.286nn À0. All of these states were minor powers.170n 180 À0.455nn À0. because there exist no states with more than 46 years of independence that fit the definition of MID pacifism (that is.234nn À0.014 À0.216nn À0.739nn À0. Other extrinsic factors do not appear to be correlated with their pacifist tendency. and were democratic at their origin.417nn À0.126n 180 180 0.01.043 0. States in PRIE No.060 À0.028 À0. Out of 182 states with 20 or more years of independence. Thus. economic wealth. Being a regional or major power. type of acquisition of independence.193nn À0. Correlates of Risk Groups (National Level): Pacifism. even for a short period. avoided MID participation over their entire history).801nn 0.453nn 0.343nn 0.527nn À0.641nn À0.296nn À0. less-developed economically.775nn À0.298nn 0.888nn 0. of Alliances Conflict in PRIE Regime in PRIE N À0.406nn 0.572nn À0.122 180 0.245nn 0.075 0. I focus the discussion on war-pacifism.248nn À0.854nn À0. On a more general level.062 À0.005 À0.275nn À0. n po.005 À0. Score at Origin Type of Independence Political Instability No.347nn 0.141n À0. pacifist states tend to be militarily weak. 103 states (over 56.183nn 180 þ Results reported here are based on measurement of pacifism as the average number of years without any dispute over the state’s history. Turning to the extrinsic correlates of pacifism. nnpo.442nn À0.017 À0.065 0. 1996) are far more likely to end up as pacifists than states that enter into the system through a revolutionary political process. is a sufficient condition for nonpacifism. have emerged into the system through an evolutionary process. National Correlates of Pacifism. we note that the politically relevant environment of pacifist states is composed of relatively few other states.251nn 0. Conflict Proneness. The results in Table 7 make several interesting points.108 À0. States that emerge into the system as a result of an evolutionary process (Maoz 1989.090 0.214nn 0. it appears that ‘‘minor powerhood’’ is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for war-related pacifism. it appears thatFbeyond the capability/status attributes of statesFthe basic circumstances in which the state entered the system appear to determine to a significant degree whether or not the state will be a pacifist.314nn À0.312nn À0.298nn 0. Capability Power Status Economic Wealth Regime Score Reg. and regime type of origin.572nn À0.321nn À0. It is important for the reader to remember that this empirical analysis of ‘‘correlates’’ of risk groups is exploratory and is not intended to uncover ‘‘causes’’ of either pacifism or fightaholism.ZEEV MAOZ 123 TABLE 7.164n 0. This type of analysis is equivalent to similar analyses conducted in the study of drug and alcohol abuse as well as in studies of behavioral addictions (Teichman 1989).422nn 0.05. Fightaholism MIDs War þ þþ Pacifism Proneness Fightaholism Independent Variable Pacifism Proneness Fightaholism Mil.508nn 0.871nn 0.117 176 0.314nn À0.023 À0.150n À0.003 À0. Table 7 presents the results of the analysis linking potential correlates to risk groups.463nn À0.114 0. Thus.762nn 0. power-related status.198nn 0. results are similar. then we can infer that averaging does not lead to substantial inferential bias.418nn 0. none was a regional power or a major power. þþ Results reported here are based on relative fightaholism (see appendix).114 À0. The most potent intrinsic correlates of war pacifism appear to be military capability.

Military capability. It turns out that no two politically relevant states that had been jointly democratic for 70 percent or more of their common history engaged in war. The length of the jointly democratic history of the dyad seems to be correlated with the likelihood of MID and war pacifism. These results highlight the predicament of the international ‘‘Gullivers. UK–France. all pacifist dyads are composed of no more than one major power. and Japan–New Zealand) engaged in interstate wars. However. However. this relationship between alliances.11 All MID pacifist dyads were composed of strictly minor powers. the only meaningful extrinsic correlate of conflict proneness and of fightaholism is the number of states in the focal state’s politically relevant environment.g. Generally speaking. This paradoxical finding seems to contradict realist notions that strategic interests dampen the probability of conflict (e. all dyads involving at least one major power experienced at least one MID in their lifetime.g. War-related pacifism amounts to 86. and nonpacifism may be altered in a multivariate context as was the case in other studies. the political circumstances of the state’s origin determine its future course. The only major power dyads that avoided war were US–UK and US–Russia/Soviet Union. The strength of associations. and relatively isolated states that inherit the peace.124 Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics National Correlates of Conflict Proneness and Fightaholism. US–Italy. This is extremely powerful evidence in support of the democratic peace 11 The start of the temporal domain at 1816 ‘‘misses’’ the Anglo-American war of 1812. This suggests that common interests do not necessarily override conflicting interests. The analysis of dyadic pacifism suggests that nearly 57 percent of the politically relevant dyads with at least 20 years of joint history did not engage in an MID.’’ The rich and powerful find it difficult to escape war involvement. Here. they tend to consist of at least one minor power. the more likely they are to remain pacifists and the lower their dispute proneness score. Farber and Gowa 1995.. power status. differs somewhat across measures. Japan–Australia. all these wars occurred when one state was nondemocratic. and economic wealth are significantly correlated with both conflict proneness and fightaholism at medium levels. they tend to be jointly democratic. however. weak. A similar observation applies to dyads composed of regional powers. It is the poor. we find that the higher the alliance-related affinity of dyad members. this correlation is an understatement of the relationship between democracy and pacifism. Bremer 1992). with two notable exceptions. and they tend to emerge through evolutionary rather than revolutionary political processes. Dyadic Correlates of Pacifism. all dyads composed of regional powers experienced both MIDs and wars. It also turns out that only 5 out of 101 dyads that had been jointly democratic for more than half of their common history (US–France. Bueno de Mesquita 1981. It appears that major and regional power dyads are a sufficient condition for nonpacifism. Of course. too. the correlates of conflict proneness and fightaholism are the same as those of pacifism. States that came about through evolutionary processes and whose regime at origin was increasingly democratic are less likely to be conflict prone and fightaholics than states that have emerged through revolutionary processes and were nondemocratic. Table 8 examines dyadic MID.and war-related pacifism. First. The results of this table suggest that pacifist dyads display high levels of capability disparity.5 percent. And in line with the paradoxical results on the alliance status of dyad members found in previous studies (e. Again.. The correlates of dyadic pacifism suggest several things. . but the higher their likelihood of becoming fightaholics. All pacifist dyads have no more than one regional power. but in the opposite direction. Gowa 1999). or strategic affinity. With one exception (the IsraelIran dyad in the Middle East over the 1975–1992 period).

126n N 1.078n À0.209nn Alliance Affinity 0. In addition.071n 0.119nn À0.106nn 0.058n Type of Independence 0.143nn À0.125nn À0.050n 0.106nn À0.572nn No.271nn 0.031 À0.083n 0. the less likely it is to be a MID pacifist but the more likely it is to be war pacifist.026 0. Conflict Proneness.066n Power Status 0.027 À0.115nn 0.172 þ Results reported here are based on measurement of pacifism as the average number of years without any dispute over the state’s history þþ Results reported here are based on measurement of fightaholism as the proportion of the state’ s decades in which it was coded as fightaholic.088nn À0.321nn Regime Persistence 0.172 1.172 À0. National and dyadic patterns of conflict involvement are characterized by extreme levels of inequality.091nn À0. Other variables do not exhibit significant relationships with the dependent variables. This corroborates Maoz’s (1996) findings about the relationship between state-making processes and conflict propensity.174nn À0.227nn 0.128nn 0.021 1.116nn À0.218nn 0. In addition.165nn 0.225nn À0.043 0.054 À0.123nn 0.104nn Economic Wealth 0.115nn À0.100nn 1.041 À0. The structural position of a state in terms of the various risk groups discussed here appears.220nn 0.075n 0.056n 0.083nn À0.026 Regime Score 0.027 0.123nn À0. Conclusion This survey of national and dyadic conflict-involvement patterns over long historical periods suggests the following observations: 1.091nn 0. Among the extrinsic factors. Fightaholism MIDs War þ þþ Pacifism Proneness Fightaholism Independent Variable Pacifism Proneness Fightaholism Capability Ratio À0.077n 0.143nn À0.01.183nn À0.145nn À0.031 0. of Alliances À0. while a small number of states accounted for a high proportion of all MIDs and wars over the last two centuries. States in PRIE À0.052n 0.233nn Regime in PRIE 0.202nn À0.114nn 0.ZEEV MAOZ 125 TABLE 8. a small proportion of the politically relevant dyads accounted for most dyadic conflicts.041 0. A considerable number of states engaged in relatively few MIDs and wars. referring to the characteristics of states’ or dyads’ environments. nnpo. These correlates are both intrinsicFbasic national or dyadic attributesFand extrinsic. therefore.005 Conflict in PRIE À0.083n À0. Correlates of Risk Groups (Dyadic Level): Pacifism. the most potent correlate of the structural characteristic of the dyad is the number of states in the dyad members’ respective PRIEs. Long periods of joint democracy tend to spill over into pacifism even when at least one member of the dyad is not a democracy.108nn Reg.044 0.210nn À0.090n À0. Likewise.05.050 À0.133nn À0.172 1.172 À0.034 À0. the larger the number of allies each member of the dyad has. The level of conflict in dyad members’ PRIEs is inversely related to their pacifist tendencies and positively related to their level of fightaholism. proposition.222nn 0.050 0. to have some rather distinct correlates.003 No.108nn À0. Score at Origin À0.172 1.079 0.041 0.068n 0. n po.021 0. . dyads in which both members emerge through evolutionary processes are more likely to end up as pacifist and less likely to end up as conflict prone or fightaholics.

The analysis of national and dyadic patterns over long historical stretches produces some important insights into issues of conflict and peace. 2001). Methodological Appendix This appendix discusses all the issues related to the research design of this study. By and large. of the most conflictprone states engaged consistently in a pattern of excessive involvement in conflict over a large portion of their national histories. In addition. In general. there are a substantial number of states and dyads that do not fight at all. Just as we spend considerable effort trying to account for conflict proneness and conflict addiction. 6. evidence about pacifism. Specifically. Pacifism has distinct characteristics. Generalizing from these patterns into coherent explanations of conflict is left for future studies. 3. there are important exceptions. pacifist states tend to be militarily and economically weak and tend to have relatively few immediate neighbors. just as a significant minority of fightaholic states and dyads exist. Second. or fightaholism. This study did not attempt to develop a theory of conflict or peace but rather to document some basic patterns of conflict and peace across states and dyads.126 Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics 2. it is time we started studying pacifism systematically. and vice versa. For years. and addiction may be a useful source for theorizing about structural patterns of relations at various levels of analysis. however. some. Empirical evidence establishes substantial rates of pacifism at the national and dyadic level. . there is substantial abstinence from conflict involvement at the national and dyadic levels. 5. Most states and most dyads are neither extreme users of conflict nor are they complete pacifists. This is the key conclusion of this study. conflict proneness. Being a minor power is a necessaryFthough not a sufficientFcondition of pacifism. Side-by-side the evidence of fightaholism. but hardly all. Alternatively. The preliminary analysis of the correlates of a state’s position within a given risk group suggests the following conclusions: 4. There is consistent evidence of national and dyadic conflict-related addiction. comparing empirical findings from studies focusing on the traditional unit-by-year observation with studies focusing on the long-term tendencies of states and dyads may corroborate existing evidence on the correlates of conflict and warFas many of the findings of this study do. The evidence for national and dyadic fightaholism is fairly robust. factors that correlate positively with conflict proneness tend to correlate positively with conflict addiction and negatively with absolute or relative pacifism. Nevertheless. this comparison may reveal important gaps in our knowledge as we address different units of analysis. First. These states tend to form dyads that are engaged in repeated conflict. thus accounting for a disproportionately high fraction of all dyadic MIDs and wars over the 1816–1992 era. cross-level paradoxes have perplexed students of war and peaceFthe level-of-analysis puzzle in alliance and democratic peace studies being only two notable examples (Maoz 2000. the correlates of conflict proneness and conflict addiction are the flip side of the correlates of pacifism. It is possible and even important to understand national and dyadic patterns over long periods of time.

Dyadic addiction measures entailed dividing dyadic histories into decades (or half-decades). a state that acquired independence in 1838 ended its first decade in 1847. a dyad where one of its members is a major power with global reach capacity. The national-history observation tracks each state over its entire history. The spatial domain consists of all states with twenty or more years of national independence over this period (N ¼ 182). or through 1992. Dyads with less than twenty years of joint history were deleted.172. Pacifism: I use two definitions of pacifismFabsolute and relative pacifism. Thus. A politically relevant dyad is made up of contiguous states. its second decade in 1857. A state/dyad is considered a war pacifist if it did not participate in an interstate war during its entire history. and so forth. . 2001).12 Measurement of Variables Dependent Variables: Measures of Conflict and Peace: General Definitions of Conflict: All of the dependent variables are based on the standard definition of MID involvement (Gochman and Maoz 1984:596) and of war involvement (Small and Singer 1982). Each such dyad makes for a single observation. 12 Analyses were performed also for the population of states/dyads with a minimum of 30 years of history. measured over the entire joint history of the dyad. This history is defined from the point when the ‘‘youngest’’ member of the dyad acquired independence to the point where one member ceased to be an independent state. The grand total for the dyadic analyses is N ¼ 1. The second unit is the politically relevant dyad history. or joiner) during its entire (joint) history. Thus. The twenty-year threshold is due to definitions of units of analysis below. from the point it acquired independence to the end of the period (or to the point the state lost its independence for those states that have not persisted to the present). target. Absolute Pacifism is defined as the absence of conflict (MID/War) given sufficient opportunity.psu. Maoz 1996. Capability Alliances Dataset Dyadic MID Dataset Polity II–IV COW National Capabilities COW Alliance Dataset Source Maoz (1999) Jaggers and Gurr (1995) http://cow2. starting the counters with the first year of independence and onwards. state-histories required division of the temporal domain into decades (or half-decades for validity tests of these measures). With regard to measures of MID and war addiction. or a dyad with a regional power that has regional reach capacity (Maoz and Russett 1993.ZEEV MAOZ 127 Data Sources The principal sources of data for this study include the following: Variable/s MIDs/Wars Regime/Polity Formation Mil. Relative Pacifism is measured as the average number of years of peace (absent any MID/war involvement) of a state/dyad. a state/dyad is considered MID pacifist if it did not participate in any MID (either as initiator. Two units of analysis are employed. States that were independent prior to 1816 were treated as if they acquired independence in 1815.la. Results were largely robust over these breakdowns.edu/ Bennett and Stam (2000) Spatial-Temporal Domain and Units of Analysis The temporal domain covers the 1816–1992 period.

Thus. To start with. and NOSTATESt is the number of states in the system in year t. I use two alternative intervals of exposure to conflict. the first decade covers the years 1951 to 1960. Hence. if a state started a MID during one year and this MID extended over a period of four subsequent years. if a state is involved in five MIDs (or in one MID involving five actual opponents) during a given year. there are no strict benchmarks for defining ‘‘normal’’ involvement in conflict and no strict benchmarks for defining ‘‘periods’’ pertaining to intervals during which exposure to conflict is measured. Next. I take the date of a state’s entry into the system as the baseline for measuring its conflict involvement. due to the complexity of this concept. and considering all independent states during that interval. for each state. 9 8 1960 > > P DYDMID > > it > > > > t¼1951 > = < NORMID if NORMID > 0 > 1951À1960 . the average number of disputes or wars per state is computed. First. Both are used in the analyses presented herein. and so forth. From this point of system entry. it gets a score of 5 for that year. I develop two alternative sets of measures. ð2Þ MIDADCTi. Also. the second decade covers the years 1961 to 1970. ð1Þ NORMID1951À1960 ¼ t¼1951 1960 P NOSTATESt t¼1951 Where DYDMIDit is the number of dyadic MID involvements of state i in year t. I break the state’s history into two sets of alternative intervals. over the decade 1951 to 1960. half-decades and decades. a state that experiences above average levels of MID involvement over a decade gets a score larger than one.13 Measures of MID and War Fightaholism: Following the definitions of fightaholism in section three of this study. the ‘‘normal level of MID involvement’’ is given by: 1960 P P nt DYDMIDit i¼1 . the procedure for developing measures of addiction was as follows.128 Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics Conflict Proneness: Conflict proneness is the number of dyadic MIDs/war involvements of a state/dyad per year. for each decade interval. the state gets a score of one for each year this MID was in progress. Thus. This establishes the ‘‘normal level of conflict involvement.1 is assigned to MIDADCT when it assumes the value of zero in order to avoid multiplication by zero in the subsequent stage. each nation’s history is divided into decades starting with its year of acquisition of independence and forward. the relative level of conflict involvement is computed in the following manner. : or MIDADCT ¼ 0 A score of 0. while a state that experiences below-average involvement over a decade receives a score between 0. Second. First. Then I assess its relative addiction severity and cumulative addiction.1 and 1. for a state that became independent in 1951. Relative Addiction Severity (RELADCT) is developed in several steps.’’ Thus.1951À1960 ¼ > > > 0:1 if NORMID ¼ 0 > > > > > > > . Likewise. . Note that each dyadic MID underway in a given year gets a score of one. Thus. This establishes the state’s rate of 13 See Maoz (1998) for a justification for focusing on disputes underway rather than dispute outbreak in studies of international conflict.

it drops out of the 25th upper percentile of MID-prone states). This last decade is indexed by k. d indexes the nation-decade starting with the first decade of independence and going to the last (or last decade prior to 1992). States whose MID involvement rates were equal to or lower than the 75 percent most dispute-prone states received got a score of zero. The counter is set to zero whenever a decade exists that a state gets a score of zero (that is.14 Recall that by addiction to conflict. the second 2. I generate a relative positioning of the state in terms of its MID/war involvement during a given decade by:   1 if MIDit > 75 pctile MIDt ð4Þ TFMIDit ¼ 0 if MIDit 75 pctile MIDt In this formula. Risk groups are defined as follows: 8 < 0 if state=dyad is paifist Risk Group ¼ 2 if state=dyad fightaholic for more than half its history ð6Þ : 1 otherwise 14 I use this measure rather than normal scores (Z-scores). because of the highly skewed distributions of conflict and war involvement. The relative cumulative MID addiction score is then computed by: RELCUMIDi ¼ MaxðCUMIDADÞi MAXDECADi ð5Þ MAXDECADi here is the number of decades during which the state was an independent system member. First. I measure the relative fightaholism of a state over its entire history using the formula:  1=k k . RELADCT is the geometric mean of the decade-rate of addiction scores at the end of the period of observation.15 Risk Groups: As is customary in research on obsessive behavior in the behavioral or psychiatric sciences. Next. and so forth. such that the first period gets a score of 1. Accordingly. or fightaholism. fightaholism increases with the length of time (number of decades) a state is excessively involved in conflict. subjects are placed into risk groups in order to uncover correlates of addiction or other chronic obsessive behaviors.ZEEV MAOZ 129 conflict involvement over a decade relative to the ‘‘normal’’ or average level of involvement over that decade. Thus. ð3Þ RELADCTi ¼ P MIDADCTid d¼1 In the formula. a state whose conflict involvement rate during a given decade was higher than the conflict involvement of 75 percent of all states existing during this decade gets a high addiction severity score for the decade. The same logic was applied to time units of five years and to dyadic addiction. Thus. I cumulated across all consecutive ten-year periods where a state received a TFMID score of 1. This variable is labeled CUMIDAD. TFMIDit is the relative positioning score of MID involvement. In the latter case. 15 The same operations with appropriate adjustments are conducted for war-related fightaholism and for MID and war fightaholism at the dyadic level. . we refer to excessive conflict involvement over long periods of time. the i index in Equations (1)–(3) refers to politically relevant dyads rather than to individual states. Cumulative Addiction reflects the pro portion of a state’s duration in the system during which it was characterized as addicted. Thus.

the regime score is defined as: REGIME ¼ (DEMOC–AUTOC) Â CONCEN. where DEMOC is a state’s democracy score. (2) Economic Capability: Measured as the average fraction of a state’s iron and steel production and its energy consumption. see Maoz 1996: 171. (3) Power Status: The proportion of the state’s history during which it qualified as a major or regional power (Maoz 1996:139. (10) Number of MIDs/Wars in PRIE: Number of dyadic MIDs/Wars in the PRIE of the focal state. (9) Number of Allies: Average number of states having alliance ties with the focal state (Maoz 1996:169–170. excluding MIDs/Wars involving the focal state. 2001). 2001). (4) Similarity of Interests: Bueno de Mesquita’s (1981) tau-b measure of similarity of interests based on similarity of alliance portfolios of members of dyads. . (Also measured in some analyses as the proportion of states in one’s PRIE that are democratic. (Bremer 1992. (4) Regime Score: From Maoz and Russett (1993). AUTOC is its autocracy score and CONCEN is its power concentration score. : 5 Major À Major (3) Alliance Status: Proportion of years during which dyad members were allied. and 1 if it entered the system through a revolutionary/violent process. labeled as S and the weighted version of S labeled as Ws. (6) Regime Score at Origin: The regime score of the state at the year it entered the system. 1996). (7) Regime Stability: Number of regime changes divided by the length of the state’s history. (12) Instability in PRIE: Average number of regime changes in the state’s PRIE Dyadic Attributes (1) Capability Ratio: Average ratio of military capabilities of strongest to weakest state in dyad. I also use Signorino and Ritter (1999) measures. 2000:140). Maoz and Russett 1993). (2) Power Status (PS) of Dyad: Average (arithmetic mean) score of dyad on the following scale: 9 8 > > 0 Minor À Minor > > > 1 Minor À Re gional > > > > > > > = < 2 Minor À Major PS ¼ > 3 Re gional À Re gional > > > > > > > 4 Re gional À Major > > > > . (8) Number of States in PRIE: The average number of states in a given nation’s PRIE. (11) Average Regime Score in PRIE: Average regime score in the focal state’s PRIE. (5) Type of National Origin: Following Maoz (1989. this concept is measured as 0 if the emergence of the state into the system was done in an evolutionary fashion.130 Pacifism and Fightaholism in International Politics Independent Variables: National Attributes (1) Military Capability: The average fraction of a state’s military expenditures and military personnel of the system’s total.

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