IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

No.___, Misc. Docket 2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Plaintiff-Respondent
VS.

ROBERT WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Petitioner

APPLICATION FOR THE EXERCISE OF

KING’S BENCH POWER OR EXTRAORDINARY JURISDICTION

Application for an Exercise of Either King’s Bench or Extraordinary Jurisdiction

Seeking Removal of Trial Court Judge and Vacatur of Probation Violation
Sentence Due To Appearance of Bias in the Criminal Trial Division
of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
at Docket No. CP-51-CR-00011614-2007 (Brinkley, J.)

Kim M. Watterson Peter Goldberger

M. Patrick Yingling LAW OFFICE OF PETER
REED SMITH LLP GOLDBERGER
225 Fifth Ave. 50 Rittenhouse Place
Pittsburgh, PA 15222 Ardmore, PA 19003
412-288-3131 610-649-8200

Joshua M. Peles Brian J. McMonagle

REED SMITH LLP MCMONAGLE, PERRI,
Three Logan Square MCHUGH & MISCHAK
1717 Arch St., Suite 3100 1845 Walnut St., 19th Fl.
Philadelphia, PA 19103 Philadelphia, PA 19103
215-241-7939 215-981-0999
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................... 3

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION ................................................................................. 12

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND RELEVANT TO THE

REQUEST FOR REMOVAL OF THE TRIAL JUDGE ........................................ 15

A. Mr. Williams’ Original Conviction And Sentence .............................15

B. The Trial Judge Twice Extends The Period Of Mr. Williams’

Probation .............................................................................................16

C. The Trial Judge Revokes Mr. Williams’ Probation And

Sentences Him To 2 To 4 Years In Prison Despite The
Probation Office And District Attorney’s “No Incarceration”
Recommendations ...............................................................................16
D. Mr. Williams Moves The Trial Judge For Her Recusal, For
Reconsideration Or Modification Of The Probation Sentence,
And For Bail—And The Commonwealth Takes No Position On
These Requests ....................................................................................20

E. After The Trial Judge Cancels The Bail Hearing The Superior
Court Orders The Trial Judge To Act On The Motion For Bail
Without Further Delay.........................................................................20
F. After Two Years, The Trial Judge Finally Releases A
Transcript Relevant To The Recusal Motion ......................................22

G. The Trial Judge Improperly Comments To The Press On

Matters Relevant To This Case ...........................................................24

H. The Trial Judge Has Yet To Rule On The Recusal Motion Or

Issue A Rule 1925(a) Opinion .............................................................25

ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 26

I. THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER THE TRIAL JUDGE REMOVED

AND THE PROBATION REVOCATION ORDER VACATED ................26

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 A. The Trial Judge Has Stepped Far Outside The Judicial Role
And Engaged In Conduct That, At Minimum, Creates An
Appearance of Impropriety .................................................................27

B. Recusal Is Warranted When The Cumulative Effect Of A

Judge’s Remarks And Conduct Create The Appearance Of Bias
Or Impropriety .....................................................................................40

C. Because The Cumulative Effect Of The Trial Judge’s Remarks

And Conduct In This Case Creates The Appearance Of Bias,
This Court Should Exercise Its King’s Bench Power, Remove
The Trial Judge And Vacate Her November 6, 2017 Order ...............44

II. THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE JURISDICTION WITH

RESPECT TO MR. WILLIAMS’ PCRA PETITION...................................47

A. Mr. Williams Was Convicted Solely Based On The Testimony

Of Officer Graham ..............................................................................48
B. Newly Discovered Evidence Indicates That Officer Graham
Perjured Himself..................................................................................49

C. The Commonwealth Acknowledges The “Strong” Likelihood

That Mr. Williams’ Conviction Will Be Reversed And Does
Not Oppose Bail Pending Consideration Of The PCRA Petition .......56
D. A New Trial Is Required Where A Constitutional Violation
Undermined The Truth-Determining Process Or Where
Exculpatory Evidence Was Unavailable At The Time Of Trial .........57

RELIEF REQUESTED ............................................................................................ 59

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 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page
In re Avellino,
690 A.2d 1138 (Pa. 1997) .......................................................................................
In re Bruno,
101 A.3d 635 (Pa. 2014) .........................................................................................
Commonwealth v. Cottle,
426 A.2d 598 (Pa. 1981) .........................................................................................

Commonwealth v. Darush,
459 A.2d 727 (Pa. 1983) .........................................................................................
Commonwealth v. Goodman,
311 A.2d 652 (Pa. 1973) .........................................................................................
Commonwealth v. Hernandez,
783 A.2d 784 (Pa. Super. 2001) .............................................................................

Commonwealth v. Lemanski,
529 A.2d 1085 (Pa. Super. 1987) ...........................................................................

Commonwealth v. McCracken,
659 A.2d 541 (Pa. 1995) .........................................................................................
Commonwealth v. Perrin,
108 A.3d 50 (Pa. Super. 2015) ...............................................................................

Commonwealth v. Rhodes,
990 A.2d 732 (Pa. Super. 2009) .............................................................................

Commonwealth v. Serrano,
727 A.2d 1168 (Pa. Super. 1999) ...........................................................................
Commonwealth v. White,
910 A.2d 648 (Pa. 2006) .........................................................................................

Commonwealth v. Williams,
129 A.3d 1199 (Pa. 2015) .......................................................................................

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Commonwealth v. Williams,
No. 730 EDA 2016, 2017 WL 3933347 (Pa. Super. Sept. 8, 2017) .......................

Joseph v. Scranton Times L.P.,

987 A.2d 633 (Pa. 2009) ........................................................................................

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,

446 U.S. 238 (1980) ................................................................................................

In Interest of McFall,
617 A.2d 707 (Pa. 1992) .........................................................................................

Mun. Publications, Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia

Cty.,
489 A.2d 1286 (Pa. 1985) .......................................................................................
Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court,
407 U.S. 355 (1972) ................................................................................................
North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969) ................................................................................................

In re President Judge for 30th Judicial Dist.,

216 A.2d 326 (Pa. 1966) .........................................................................................

In re S.A.,
925 A.2d 838 (Pa. Super. 2007) .............................................................................
Williams v. Pennsylvania,
136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) ............................................................................................

Statutes
18 Pa. C.S. § 907 ..........................................................................................................

18 Pa. C.S. § 6106(a)(1)...............................................................................................

18 Pa. C.S. § 6108 ........................................................................................................

35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30) .......................................................................................

42 Pa. C.S. § 502 ..........................................................................................................

42 Pa. C.S. § 726 ..........................................................................................................

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42 Pa. C.S. § 9771(c)(3)...............................................................................................
42 Pa. C.S. § 9543(a)(2)...............................................................................................

Constitional Provision
Pa. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) ............................................................................................

Pa. CONST. art. V, § 2(c) ............................................................................................

Rules
Pa. R. App. P. 1762(a) .................................................................................................
Pa. R. Crim. P. 521(B)(2) ............................................................................................

Pa. R. Crim. P. 708(A) .................................................................................................

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 APPLICATION FOR THE EXERCISE OF KING’S BENCH POWER OR
EXTRAORDINARY JURISDICTION

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA:

Petitioner Robert Williams (“Mr. Williams”) asks this Honorable Court to

intervene in this matter to vindicate his liberty and due process interests, as well as
to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. This case involves a pattern of
judicial (mis)conduct that has prejudiced the rights of a probationer and threatens
to undermine the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judicial system. There
are ample reasons for this Court to act to rectify those wrongs—indeed, it is

imperative that this Court intervene.

Mr. Williams was released from jail in 2009—following a 2008 conviction
for an offense that occurred when he was only 19 years old, and has since been
shown to have been obtained based on perjured testimony. Since then, his
probation has been supervised by Honorable Genece E. Brinkley (the “trial
judge”), who repeatedly has exceeded the judicial role by sometimes essentially
acting as a prosecutor and, at other times, taking an unusual interest in, and trying
to inject herself into, Mr. Williams’ personal and professional life. Making matters
worse (and perhaps because of her preoccupation with this case), the trial judge has
extended the period of Mr. Williams’ probation several times—so far keeping him
under her supervision for almost a decade. Based on the trial judge’s last extension
of the probationary period, Mr. Williams would have been under her supervision
until 2022, when he would be 35 years old. Most recently, the trial judge has

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revoked Mr. Williams’ probation and sentenced him to a period of incarceration to
last for at least 2 years and as many as 4 years.

This Application challenges the fundamental unfairness of allowing a trial

judge laboring under what is, at minimum, an appearance of bias, to continue to
preside over this case. Because this case is infected with that appearance of bias,

Mr. Williams seeks an order removing the trial judge from the case, vacating her
recent order finding a probation violation and imposing the 2 to 4 year prison
sentence, and, if necessary, directing a new probation revocation hearing before a

different judge.
In addition, this Application seeks PCRA relief on Mr. Williams’ original
conviction. Mr. Williams filed a PCRA petition and a motion for bail pending

consideration of the petition in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

a month ago based on newly-discovered evidence that the arresting officer
committed perjury and was included on a “do not testify” list maintained by the
District Attorney’s Office, which was never disclosed to Mr. Williams or his
counsel prior to any of his court proceedings. The Commonwealth has since
acknowledged the “strong” likelihood that Mr. Williams’ conviction will be
reversed and declared its non-opposition to Mr. Williams’ motion for bail pending
consideration of the PCRA petition. Still, Mr. Williams can have no confidence in
the outcome of either his PCRA petition or his request for bail arising out of that
petition, as both requests for relief have been assigned to the trial judge, who has
exhibited bias and an unusual personal interest in this case and also has not

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promptly acted on various matters related to Mr. Williams’ case pending before
her.

Mr. Williams has asked to be released on bail through other petitions, but be
also additionally requests that this Court order his immediate release on bail while
it decides whether to grant this Application. Notably, the Commonwealth did not

oppose Mr. Williams’ motion to recuse filed in the trial court, did not advocate that
Mr. Williams be incarcerated, and did not oppose his requests for bail filed in both
the trial court and Superior Court.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The uncontroverted record demonstrates that the trial judge—in the course
of administering Mr. Williams’ probation—has undertaken a prosecutorial role and
improperly injected herself into Mr. Williams’ personal and professional life far

beyond what is necessary to perform proper judicial functions, thus creating the
appearance of bias and, in turn, undermining the integrity of the judicial system.
Making matters worse, the judge (through her personal attorney) has publically
commented on Mr. Williams’ case and threatened to sue Mr. Williams, his
attorneys, and his professional management.
While on probation, Mr. Williams has become a globally known recording

and performing artist, professionally known as “Meek Mill.” That fact appears to
have caused the trial judge to become preoccupied with this case which, in turn,
has had significant adverse consequences for Mr. Williams. As noted, the trial

judge’s improper and highly unusual approach to this case most recently resulted
in her decision to sentence Mr. Williams to 2 to 4 years in prison (more than

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double the sentence for the 2008 conviction) for minor probation violations—even
though Mr. Williams’ probation officer and the assistant district attorney both

recommended that no prison sentence be imposed. What’s more, the trial judge
recently denied Mr. Williams bail, a request the assistant district attorney did not
oppose—with the trial judge justifying her decision based on her own view of the

facts (which is ill-founded, wrong, and contradicted by the record).

As explained in more detail below, there can be no doubt that the probation
violations were technical and minor. In early 2017, Mr. Williams failed a drug test

as a result of his overuse of pain medication. After that, he rehabbed and

underwent an intensive detox program. When sentenced for the probation
violations, Mr. Williams had been drug-free for over 10 months. He also was

arrested (with charges later dropped) twice in 2017: in March in St. Louis for
coming to the defense of a close family friend (who had recently suffered a
gunshot wound, and who Mr. Williams had been mentoring) when his friend was
sucker-punched by an airport employee; and in August in New York City for
“popping a wheelie” on a motorbike on a city street in a video posted to social
media. Both charges were dismissed after investigation.
Given the nature of these events and Mr. Williams’ overall progress toward
full rehabilitation, Mr. Williams’ probation officer concluded that Mr. Williams
should not be found in violation of his probation and not sentenced to prison. The
probation officer expressly stated: Mr. Williams “has responded well to corrective
measures and actively participated in an effort towards behavioral change.” The

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Office of the District Attorney likewise took the position that the technical
violations did not warrant incarceration.

Nonetheless, the trial judge scheduled a violation of probation hearing, took

the extraordinary step of revising and greatly expanding the probation officer’s
report, and, following a hearing infected with additional irregularities and

deficiencies, found that Mr. Williams had violated his probation apparently (1) by
getting arrested in New York and St. Louis—even though those charges were
dismissed after investigation—and engaging in other conduct, which the trial judge

raised on her own—namely, (2) receiving approved rehabilitation services in

Atlanta instead of California—even though the trial judge was notified by both the
probation officer and Mr. Williams’ management that Mr. Williams was being

rehabbed in Atlanta; (3) requesting permission to travel for work (i.e.,

performances)—even though Mr. Williams never performed unless specifically
permitted; and (4) not traveling to Greece in August 2017 after the trial judge had
permitted him to travel there.1

1
Mr. Williams has been not been able to ascertain precisely what violations he was
charged with committing, or what conditions of his probation were supposedly
violated because no formal “request for revocation” ever was filed. This
contravenes Rule 708(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure—which
implements this Court’s and the U.S. Supreme Court’s procedural due process
precedents. The absence of the required revocation request likely is a consequence
of the manner in which the violation of probation hearing was initiated in the first
place. As explained, the trial judge sua sponte scheduled a “violation” hearing—
and after that, the probation officer submitted a letter-report, which referred to
incidents that might be construed as potential technical violations, but concluded
that Mr. Williams’ conduct while under supervision was “within normal limits.”
Accordingly, the report did not recommend that the trial judge take any action. The
continued on next page

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 During the hearing, the trial judge also raised issues that had no bearing on
the question of whether Mr. Williams had violated probation—specifically, the

trial judge took the time to say that she was personally offended by the type of
community service Mr. Williams had performed. While admonishing
Mr. Williams, the trial judge disclosed for the first time that she had taken the

highly unusual step of visiting Broad Street Ministry to observe him performing
community service and was very upset to find him sorting clothes instead of
feeding the homeless—which is what she apparently wanted him to do (but never

ordered him to do). The trial judge was so angry about this that she interrupted
Mr. Williams’ allocution to declare that this was just another way that he had
disobeyed her.

This was not the first time the trial judge had said and done things that
revealed that she had taken an inordinate—indeed, a peculiar and personal—
interest in Mr. Williams’ case. As explained in more detail below, the trial judge
has stepped outside the judicial role in various ways—sometimes assuming a
prosecutorial role, sometimes inappropriately injecting herself in Mr. Williams’
professional and personal life, and other times focusing on how Mr. Williams’
conduct affects “her” personally.

continued from prior page

trial judge nevertheless issued her own revised probation report with her own
narrative account of Mr. Williams’ conduct while under supervision that she
claimed would “assist both counsel in preparing for the VOP hearing.”

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 The trial judge’s conduct in connection with the violation of probation
proceeding, noted above, is just one example of her taking on the role of the

prosecutor (or the probation officer). On the personal front, when Mr. Williams
pleaded for leniency on a similar technical violation in 2014, the trial judge
admonished him by saying: “You said you didn’t want to disappoint your fans by

going back to jail. Talk about your fans being disappointed, how about me?”
(emphasis added). She also once suggested (outside the presence of Mr. Williams’
counsel) that Mr. Williams record a cover of a Boyz II Men song and dedicate it to

her. As for her unusual and inappropriate preoccupation with Mr. Williams’ career,
the trial judge repeatedly has recommended that he fire his New York management
company and replace it with a local Philadelphia manager. It is no wonder that for

almost two years she denied him the transcript from an in-chambers discussion she
had with him because, as she put it, she did not want her statements “to be taken
out of context by anyone down the road either for appeal purposes or whatever.”2
Given all of this, Mr. Williams moved for the trial judge to recuse herself or
send the recusal motion to the supervising judge for decision. The next day,
Mr. Williams moved to modify his sentence, and the following day, he moved to
be released on bail. The trial judge did not rule on the recusal motion—neither
rendering a decision on it herself nor referring it to the supervising judge. Yet, she

2
As noted, the trial judge recently sua sponte (and for personal reasons) released
the transcript upon the advice of her personal counsel—which only confirms Mr.
Williams’ contentions of improper conduct.

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forged ahead and decided the bail motion, denying it. The trial judge still has not
taken action on the recusal motion.

And, things have only gotten worse in the months since the trial judge
sentenced Mr. Williams. The trial judge finally released the long-withheld
transcript from an in-chambers discussion with Mr. Williams—for, as her personal

attorney has said, strategic reasons. The attorney speaking on the trial judge’s
behalf made statements to the press regarding Mr. Williams’ case, asserting that
Mr. Williams’ allegations of improper judicial conduct were “100 percent false”

and threatening to sue Mr. Williams and/or his attorneys and professional
management if they file a complaint with the Judicial Conduct Board or refuse to
issue an apology.

Judges in this Commonwealth must conduct themselves in a manner that

promotes the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judicial system. That means
that a judge must be, in fact, impartial and avoid even the appearance of bias. The
trial judge’s conduct here has, at the very least, created an appearance of bias
warranting this Court’s immediate review and intervention because
(1) Mr. Williams’ liberty is at stake—he is incarcerated for what amounts to, at
most, technical probation violations for which even the Commonwealth did not
recommend imprisonment; and (2) the appearance of bias in this case compromises
the integrity of the Commonwealth’s judicial system, which is a matter of
substantial public concern in every case.
And, while the consequences that have befallen Mr. Williams as a result of
the trial judge’s unusual approach to her oversight of his probation and the adverse

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impact her conduct has had on the judicial system would be reason enough to
intervene in any case, the stakes are even greater here given the significant public

interest in these proceedings, as evidenced by the numerous national media reports

on the unusual and unjust circumstances of this case. Here are just a few:

 Paul Solotaroff, #Free MeekMill: Brutally beaten by rogue cops, the

jailed rapper has because a cause and, in an exclusive interview from
prison, he speaks out and looks ahead, RollingStone (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.rollingstone.com/music/features/free-meek-mill-prison-
police-brutality-roc-nation-w517712 (last visited Mar. 17, 2018).

 Solomon Jones, Meek Mill and Paul Manafort: How the criminal
justice system treats black men differently than white men, Philly.com
(Dec. 6, 2017),
http://www.philly.com/philly/columnists/solomon_jones/meek-mill-
paul-manafort-court-justice-solomon-jones-20171206.html (last
visited Mar. 17, 2018);

 Ed Pilkington, Jay-Z, Kaepernick and the disturbing story of the

rapper sent back to prison, The Guardian (Nov. 24, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/nov/24/meek-mill-jay-z-
colin-kaepernick-prison-probation-protest (last visited Mar. 17, 2018);

 Jill Filipovic, Meek Mill Is In Jail for a Wheelie While Harvey

Weinstein Roams Free, TIME (Nov. 21, 2017),
http://time.com/5033582/meek-mill-harvey-weinstein/ (last visited
Mar. 17, 2018);

 Rachel Leah, Why you need to care about Meek Mill’s battle with a
judge, Salon (Nov. 18, 2017),
https://www.salon.com/2017/11/18/meek-mill-judge/ (last visited
Mar. 17, 2018);

 Deena Zaru, Outrage mounts over Meek Mill’s prison sentence, CNN
(Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/14/politics/meek-mill-
prison-judge-rally/index.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2018);

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  Sidney Madden, Meek Mill’s Sentencing Generates Protest, Calls for
Probation And Parole Reform, NPR (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/therecord/2017/11/15/564385830/meek-
mill-sentencing-protest-probation-parole-reform (last visited Mar. 17,
2018);

 Hundreds rally in support of imprisoned rapper Meek Mill, Fox 29

(Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.fox29.com/news/local-news/rally-
protesting-meek-mills-prison-sentence-to-be-held-monday (last
visited Mar. 17, 2018);

 Reggie Shuford, Meek Mill’s sentence reveals problems with

Pennsylvania’s extreme use of court supervision, ACLU of
Pennsylvania (Nov. 14, 2017),
https://blog.aclupa.org/2017/11/14/meek-mills-sentence-reveals-
problems-with-pennsylvanias-extreme-use-of-court-supervision/ (last
visited Mar. 17, 2018).
In addition, at the 2018 Super Bowl, the Philadelphia Eagles highlighted
their concerns about this case by using one of Mr. Williams’ best-known songs,
“Dreams and Nightmares,” as the music for their entrance onto the field.

The heightened attention on the judicial system provides an additional

reason for this Court to act.3
Mr. Williams, therefore, requests that this Court (1) exercise its King’s

Bench or Extraordinary Jurisdiction; (2) order Mr. Williams’ immediate release on

3
On December 6, 2017, Mr. Williams filed a notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, docketed at 3880 EDA 2017, which challenges among other things
the trial judge’s revocation of probation and sentencing decision. As for this
Application, Mr. Williams is asking that this Court exercise its King’s Bench
power to remove the trial judge, vacate the sentence tainted by the trial judge’s
appearance of bias, and if necessary, remand for proceedings before a different trial
judge.

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bail while this proceeding is pending; (3) order the trial judge removed from the
case; (4) vacate the trial judge’s probation revocation decision and sentence; and

(5) if necessary, remand for proceedings before a different judge. See Argument
§ I, infra.
* * *

Just recently, facts have come to light that require Mr. Williams to seek
relief from this Court for an independent reason. There is newly discovered
evidence that Mr. Williams’ underlying convictions are based on perjured

testimony, and that he is (as he has always claimed) innocent of all but one of the
charges against him. Based on this, on February 14, 2018, Mr. Williams moved in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for relief under the Post-

Conviction Relief Act and for bail pending consideration of the PCRA petition.
The trial court conducted the required preliminary screening under Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 906(A)–(B), 907(1) and 908(A), and ordered that a
response be filed prior to April 16, 2018, when a hearing is scheduled. On March
14, 2018, the Commonwealth acknowledged the strong likelihood that Mr.
Williams’ conviction would be reversed and declared its non-opposition to Mr.
Williams’ request for bail pending consideration of the PCRA petition. Despite his
having forwarded the Commonwealth’s filing to the trial judge immediately upon
receipt with a request for release on bail, Mr. Williams remains incarcerated.
There is every reason to believe that Mr. Williams request for PCRA relief
will be decided by the trial judge, to whom it currently is assigned. Despite
Mr. Williams’ recusal motion, there is no indication on the docket that the request

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for PCRA relief has been reassigned to a different judge pursuant to Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 903(C)–(D). Given that the trial judge has not taken

action on the recusal motion for four months and has delayed filing her Rule
1925(a) opinion on Mr. Williams’ direct appeal to the Superior Court (which, in
turn, has delayed the appeal itself), there is good reason for Mr. Williams to

believe that his PCRA request will not be ruled upon promptly. Accordingly, Mr.
Williams asks this Court also to exercise its King’s Bench or Extraordinary
Jurisdiction in connection with his PCRA petition and grant the petition or assign it

to a different judge and grant him immediate bail while this Court (or the trial
court) determines whether, and how, to vacate his original conviction.4 See
Argument § II, infra.

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to act on Mr. Williams’ request for removal of
the trial judge and vacatur of her sentencing order on either of two bases—King’s
Bench and Extraordinary Jurisdiction. “It is well-established that ‘[a]ll
Pennsylvania courts derive power or authority, and the attendant jurisdiction over
the subject matter, from the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth.’”
Commonwealth v. Williams, 129 A.3d 1199, 1205-06 (Pa. 2015) (quoting In re

Bruno, 101 A.3d 635, 659 (Pa. 2014)). Article V, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution provides that this Court “shall be the highest court of the

4
Mr. Williams has separately filed in this Court an Application For Exercise Of
Extraordinary Jurisdiction Granting Bail Pending Consideration Of Post-
Conviction Relief Act Petition.

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Commonwealth and in this court shall be reposed the supreme judicial power of
the Commonwealth.” Pa. CONST. art. V, § 2(a). Section 2 further provides that

this Court “shall have such jurisdiction as shall be provided by law.” Id. at 2(c).
This Court may exercise jurisdiction over this case on either of two bases, or both
of them.

King’s Bench: The General Assembly has recognized this Court’s King’s
Bench authority in Section 502 of the Judicial Code (“General powers of Supreme
Court”), which states:
The Supreme Court shall have and exercise the powers vested in it by
the Constitution of Pennsylvania, including the power generally to
minister justice to all persons and to exercise the powers of the court,
as fully and amply, to all intents and purposes, as the justices of the
Court of King’s Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer, at
Westminster, or any of them, could or might do on May 22, 1722. The
Supreme Court shall also have and exercise the following powers:

(1) All powers necessary or appropriate in aid of its

original and appellate jurisdiction which are agreeable to
the usages and principles of law.

(2) The powers vested in it by statute, including the

provisions of this title.

42 Pa. C.S. § 502. Pursuant to the King’s Bench power, “the justices of the
[Supreme] Court have cognizance of all causes statewide, whether civil or
criminal.” In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 670. The King’s Bench power “aids the Court

in its duty to keep all inferior tribunals within the bounds of their own authority.”
Id. In keeping with that duty, this Court’s “principal obligations are to
conscientiously guard the fairness and probity of the judicial process and the

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dignity, integrity, and authority of the judicial system, all for the protection of the
citizens of this Commonwealth.” Id. at 675.

This Court is further empowered to act immediately to fulfill these

obligations, and need not wait for a matter to run the ordinary course of an appeal.
As this Court has explained, “King’s Bench allows the Supreme Court to exercise

authority commensurate with its ‘ultimate responsibility’ for the proper

administration and supervision of the judicial system” and, thus, “[i]n certain
instances, the Court cannot suffer the deleterious effect upon the public interest

caused by delays incident to ordinary processes of law, or deficiencies in the

ordinary processes of law making those avenues inadequate for the exigencies of
the moment.” In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 670-71 (quoting In re Avellino, 690 A.2d

1138, 1144 n.7 (Pa. 1997)). Most simply put, this Court will “employ [its] King’s
Bench authority when the issue requires timely intervention by the court of last
resort of the Commonwealth and is one of public importance.” Id. at 670 (citing
In re President Judge for 30th Judicial Dist., 216 A.2d 326, 326 (Pa. 1966)).
This Court’s King’s Bench powers are broad, and so it may order whatever
relief is needed to prevent injustice. That power extends to vacating orders entered
by a trial court judge whose impartiality can be questioned. See, e.g., Joseph v.
Scranton Times L.P., 987 A.2d 633, 637 (Pa. 2009) (“Because the appearance of
judicial impropriety was established here, no showing of actual prejudice need be
made …. [W]e agree with President Judge Platt’s recommendation that the verdict
and judgment entered in the Joseph case ‘as well as all substantive orders’ entered

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by Conahan and Ciavarella be vacated, and this matter returned to the Court of
Common Pleas of Luzerne County for assignment to a new judge for a new trial.”).

Extraordinary Jurisdiction: This Court “may, … in any matter pending

before any court or magisterial district judge of this Commonwealth involving an
issue of immediate public importance, assume plenary jurisdiction of such matter

at any stage thereof and enter a final order or otherwise cause right and justice to
be done.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 726.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND RELEVANT TO THE

REQUEST FOR REMOVAL OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
A. Mr. Williams’ Original Conviction And Sentence
On August 19, 2008, following a non-jury trial before the trial judge, Mr.
Williams was convicted of carrying a firearm without a license (18 Pa.C.S.
§ 6106(a)(l)), carrying a firearm in public in Philadelphia (id. § 6108), possession
of an instrument of crime (id. § 907), simple assault (id. § 2701(a)), and possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (35 Pa.Stat. § 780-113(a)(30)). He
was convicted at the same time of certain additional lesser-included offenses
(simple possession of drugs, id. § 780-113(a)(16); carrying a loaded weapon in a
vehicle (18 Pa.C.S. § 6106.1)); and acquitted of several other, related charges,
including two counts of aggravated assault (id. § 2702(a)(6)). The charged offenses

occurred on January 24, 2007, more than 11 years ago, when Mr. Williams was
19 years old. At that time, he had no prior criminal convictions. Based on these
convictions, on January 16, 2009, the trial judge sentenced Mr. Williams to serve

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concurrent terms of 11½ to 23 months’ county confinement, to be followed by 10
years’ probation. Mr. Williams was released on parole on December 15, 2009.

B. The Trial Judge Twice Extends The Period Of Mr.

Williams’ Probation
On July 11, 2014, following probation violation hearings, all of which were
based on technical violations (that is, not “direct violations” premised on new

criminal conduct), the trial judge resentenced Mr. Williams to 3-6 months’
confinement plus 5 years’ probation. On February 5, 2016, for other technical
violations, the trial judge sentenced Mr. Williams to an additional 6-12 months’

confinement, with immediate parole to house arrest subject to daily community

service for 90 days, which was subsequently extended by a week (essentially, late
February through early June 2016), followed by 6 years’ probation.

See Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 730 EDA 2016, 2017 WL 3933347

(Pa. Super. Sept. 8, 2017) (not precedential). Based on the 2016 sentence,
Mr. Williams’ probation (for his 2007 crime) would last until 2023, around the
time when Judge Brinkley’s ten year judicial term expires.

C. The Trial Judge Revokes Mr. Williams’ Probation And

Sentences Him To 2 To 4 Years In Prison Despite The
Probation Office And District Attorney’s “No
Incarceration” Recommendations
Most recently, Mr. Williams appeared before the trial judge on technical
probation violations—apparently (1) a failed drug test in early 2017 which resulted
from an overuse of pain medication, after which Mr. Williams rehabbed and has

been clean for over a year; and (2) arrests with charges dismissed after

- 16 -
investigation (one for coming to the aid of a close family friend and another for
“popping a wheelie” on a city street in a video posted to social media).

Mr. Williams’ probation officer issued a report on the technical violations.

Exhibit A, Probation Office Report. The report noted that Mr. Williams had
“responded well” and “actively participated in an effort towards behavioral

change.” Id. The probation officer then went on to say that Mr. Williams’ conduct
while under supervision was “within normal limits.” Id.
Despite these recommendations, the trial judge informed the parties by email

that the “[m]atters discussed” by the probation officer would “be addressed at the
November 6, 2017 hearing as potential technical violations,” and further stated that
additional “incidents and/or facts which occurred during [Mr. Williams’] probation

which are not specifically detailed in [the probation officer’s] summary report”
would also be “reviewed” at the hearing. Exhibit B, October 31, 2017 email. The
next day, the trial judge sent the parties a formal notice of the hearing,
accompanied by her own “more detailed factual summary” (with attachments),
which, according to the judge’s email, was “prepared by the Court in order to assist
Counsel in preparation for the scheduled Violation of Probation Hearing.” Exhibit
C, November 1, 2017 email and attachments. The letter’s narrative exposition,
however, did not set forth particularized allegations that specific conduct
constituted a violation of probation; nor did it identify the conditions of Mr.
Williams’ probation that the conduct allegedly violated.
Several of the trial judge’s added accusations against Mr. Williams appeared
to be based on her own memory or her own investigation on “various social media

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outlets.” Exhibit D, Tr. 11/6/17, part 1, at 100. As explained in more detail below,
at least one of those added accusations—regarding drug treatment in Atlanta,

Georgia—directly contradicted the probation officer’s report (and other record

evidence) insofar as it claimed that the trial judge was not provided with a required
notice of travel. Exhibit A, Probation Office Report.

Then, at the revocation hearing, the trial judge conducted a lengthy

adversarial and accusatory examination of the probation officer. Exhibit D, Tr.
11/6/17, part 1, at 25-44. Despite the trial judge’s cross-examination, the probation

officer held to her view, stating that Montgomery County “would be comfortable
continuing supervising [Mr. Williams], comfortable being his probation officer and
not in prison.” Exhibit D, Tr. 11/6/17, part 1, at 44. For its part, the Office of the

District Attorney took the position that the technical violations did not warrant
incarceration. Exhibit E, Tr. 11/6/17, part 2, at 26-28.
Not surprisingly, the hearing strayed far beyond the probation officer’s
report—with the trial judge making accusations and issuing admonitions relating to
long ago events that were based solely on the judge’s recollections and personal
“investigation.” For example, she visited the community service site where Mr.
Williams was assigned to serve the homeless in early 2016. Exhibit E, Tr. 11/6/17,
part 2, at 67-74. She made this visit surreptitiously and without notice to (or in the
presence of) Mr. Williams’ counsel, either before or after the visit. Indeed, the first
time the trial judge made a record of her visit was during her colloquy with Mr.
Williams at the conclusion of the November 6, 2017 hearing—nearly two years
after the visit:

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 THE COURT: … I sat in the room waiting for you to come out that
day with a tray to serve the homeless people, and you didn’t.

THE DEFENDANT: Can I speak on my behalf?

THE COURT: No. Mr. Williams, I can appreciate that you think that
you have served the homeless, but that was a surprise visit by me.
You remember that?

Exhibit E, Tr. 11/6/17, part 2, at 68. The trial judge apparently was angry that
Mr.Williams was sorting clothes for the homeless instead of serving food to them
(a task which, not surprisingly, was not chosen by him, but rather assigned to him
when he showed up at the designated location to perform community service).
The trial judge then relied on her own version of what she had observed at
the community service site—without providing Mr. Williams any notice or
opportunity to present contrary evidence or argument—as a reason to reject the
recommendations of both the probation office and the District Attorney and impose
a state prison sentence of 2 to 4 years’ confinement. Exhibit E, Tr. 11/6/17, part 2,
at 74.
At the close of the November 6 revocation hearing, the trial judge ordered
that Mr. Williams be taken immediately into state custody—having apparently
asked for guards and transportation to the prison to be at the ready even before the
hearing started. Mr. Williams thus is currently confined at the State Correctional
Institution at Chester, Pennsylvania. As described below, the trial judge further has
denied Mr. Williams’ request for bail pending appeal.

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 D. Mr. Williams Moves The Trial Judge For Her Recusal, For
Reconsideration Or Modification Of The Probation
Sentence, And For Bail—And The Commonwealth Takes
No Position On These Requests
On November 14, 2017, Mr. Williams filed a motion for recusal in the trial
court (based on arguments like the ones made in this Application) 5 and, on
November 15, 2017, for reconsideration and modification of the probation

revocation sentence. Pending determination of those motions, Mr. Williams, on

November 16, 2017, moved the trial court for immediate release.6 The
Commonwealth authorized Mr. Williams’ counsel to advise the trial court that it

was taking no position on these motions.

E. After The Trial Judge Cancels The Bail Hearing The

Superior Court Orders The Trial Judge To Act On The
Motion For Bail Without Further Delay
When, consistent with its routine practice, the clerk of the trial court

scheduled a prompt hearing on Mr. Williams’ bail motion (for November 27,
2017), the trial judge immediately directed that the hearing be cancelled and

5
Mr. Williams supplemented that Motion for Recusal on December 4, 2017 to
address an FBI investigation of the trial judge related to Mr. Williams’ trial court
proceedings, and again on February 12, 2018 to address the trial judge’s improper
comments to the media through her personal counsel.
6
Mr. Williams has no history of flight or attempted escape; no prior or subsequent
criminal record; and no history of using false identification. Because Mr. Williams
is known on sight to hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people, it would be
impossible for him to flee or hide, even if he were inclined to do so (which he is
not). Indeed, the probation officer noted that “there was never a time that
[Mr. Williams] was never available for supervision.” Exhibit D, Tr. 11/6/17, part 1,
at 17.

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removed from the calendar. Because the trial judge gave no indication that she
would act in a timely fashion on the unopposed motion, and in fact cancelled the

bail hearing without scheduling a new hearing date, Mr. Williams, on November
27, 2017, filed an emergency petition for an original writ of habeas corpus in the
Superior Court. The next day, the Superior Court ordered the trial court to address

Mr. Williams’ motion for bail without further delay. Exhibit F, November 28, 2017
Superior Court Order.
In response, on December 1, 2017, the trial judge, without first addressing

the request for her recusal, denied bail pending adjudication of Mr. Williams’
pending motion to modify the sentence and pending any subsequent appeal.
Exhibit G, December 1, 2017 Order and Opinion. The trial judge based her

decision on: (1) her view of Mr. Williams’ probation history (which was at odds
with the probation officer’s conclusion that Mr. Williams “responded well” to
corrective admonitions and “actively participated in an effort towards behavioral
change”); (2) her own accounts of Mr. Williams’ two 2017 arrests, from which she
concluded that he poses “a great risk to the safety of others” (which was at odds
with undisputed evidence showing that Mr. Williams acted lawfully in coming to
the rescue of his friend in St. Louis, and that nothing about the “popping a
wheelie” incident in New York shows that he is a danger to others); (3) her view
that Mr. Williams poses a danger to himself due to his past history of drug use
(which was at odds with the Commonwealth’s confirmation that Mr. Williams has
been clean since January 2017); (4) her skepticism about Mr. Williams’ family
devotion (despite that Mr. Williams unquestionably meets his obligations to his

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son and visits his son and mother frequently, whenever permitted by the court);
and (5) her opinion that Mr. Williams poses a flight risk due to him having

multiple addresses since 2012 (which was at odds with the fact that Mr. Williams
always has appeared for his legal proceedings and most importantly, the fact that
the probation office (not to mention the trial judge) has known his addresses at all

times and his probation officers frequently visited him at home). Id.
On December 8, 2017, after having filed his timely notice of appeal from
violation of probation determination, Mr. Williams filed an Application for Bail

Pending Appeal from Revocation of Probation in the Superior Court—explaining

the foundational flaws and factual errors in the trial judge’s bail opinion. See Pa. R.
App. P. 1762(a); Pa. R. Crim. P. 521(B)(2). That request was denied without

opinion on December 12, 2017. Together with this Application, Mr. Williams is
filing an application for review of that bail denial, invoking this Court’s authority
under Pa.R.App.P. 3315.

F. After Two Years, The Trial Judge Finally Releases A

Transcript Relevant To The Recusal Motion
On January 26, 2018, the trial judge ordered that the notes of a previously
sealed, in-chambers (but not ex parte) portion of a probation violation proceeding

held on February 5, 2016, be unsealed, transcribed, and made available to the

public. Mr. Williams had been seeking a copy of that transcript—but not to have it
unsealed—since shortly after the February 5, 2016 proceeding occurred, but the
trial judge denied his requests. No party ever asked that the transcript be unsealed.

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Yet, the trial judge sua sponte ordered its release—purely for personal reasons
(as discussed below).

The transcript shows that Probation Officer Treas Underwood (whom the
judge—rather than the probation department—had personally selected for
assignment to this case) and ADA Noel DeSantis repeatedly expressed the view

that Mr. Williams’ alleged difficulties as a probationer resulted from the bad
influence and unhelpful involvement of his current professional management.
Exhibit H, Tr. 2/5/16 (in camera), at 27:16; see also at 47:24-25. They also

continually compared that management unfavorably with Mr. Williams’ prior

professional representation by Mr. Charles (“Charlie Mack”) Alston. Id.
This presentation was directed at Mr. Williams personally, in response to his

own, in-chambers statements to the trial judge. ADA DeSantis expressly refers to
herself, the Probation Officer Underwood and the trial judge as “a team,” doing
“[w]ork that the Judge wanted.” Exhibit H, Tr. 2/5/16 (in camera), at 34:6-7.
Indeed, Ms. Underwood calls her supervisory efforts in cooperation with Mr.
Alston “what the Judge wants. The Judge’s mission. What she wants.” Exhibit H,
Tr. 2/5/16 (in camera), at 24:14-15. The ADA prosecutor’s and Probation Officer’s
statements on this subject cover more than 23 pages of the 65-page transcript.
Exhibit H, Tr. 2/5/16 (in camera), at 18:23-34:12; 44:12-25; 49:17-50:10; 54:5-14;
55:15-59:12; 61:12-14 (PO: “I work well with Charlie [Alston]. That is the whole
key.” The Court: “Okay.”); 65:9-66:13. Notably, the trial judge did not express
disagreement with the ADA DeSantis or Probation Officer Underwood’s numerous
statements. At the conclusion of the in-chambers proceeding, the trial judge briefly

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disavowed any authority or intention to control Mr. Williams’ management
decisions, a statement Mr. Williams reasonably understood at the time as being

made simply “for the record,” as the trial judge’s own words suggested (“I don’t
want the record to suggest ….”). Exhibit H, Tr. 2/5/16 (in camera), at 66:19-25.

G. The Trial Judge Improperly Comments To The Press On

Matters Relevant To This Case
Shortly after the transcript was released, on February 1, 2018, local press
outlets reported that the trial judge had retained private counsel, A. Charles Peruto,
Jr., for the purpose of advising her and taking action on her behalf against Mr.

Williams and/or his counsel and professional representatives. Those reports were
published in newspapers dated February 2, 2018.
According to both the Philadelphia Inquirer and Legal Intelligencer reports

(attached hereto as Exhibits I and J), Attorney Peruto asserted, speaking on behalf
of the trial judge, that “all the allegations” made by Mr. Williams about the trial
judge’s comments—all of which Mr. Williams has meticulously cited to the
record—are “100 percent false” (Legal Intelligencer) and “didn’t happen”
(Inquirer). The transcripts, of course, speak for themselves and belie these
statements. In addition, according to both the Philadelphia Inquirer and Legal

Intelligencer reports, the trial judge’s attorney, speaking on her behalf, has
threatened to sue Mr. Williams and/or his attorneys and/or professional
management for defamation (“the target of any litigation would likely be Williams’
management and legal team rather than Williams”; Legal Intelligencer), if they

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either fail to publish an apology (Legal Intelligencer) or if they file a complaint
about the judge with the Judicial Conduct Board (Inquirer).

Further, the trial judge’s attorney, speaking on her behalf, asserted that she
unsealed the long-sealed February 5, 2016 transcript not as an action taken in the
judicial administration of Mr. Williams’ case, but for the purpose of “deflat[ing]

the accusation” against the trial judge herself (Inquirer) and to defend her
reputation (Intelligencer). Further, in a video-recorded interview with TMZ, a
celebrity-and-entertainment-oriented website, published online on February 7,

2018, the trial judge’s attorney, again speaking on her behalf—indeed, referring to
himself and the Judge as “we”—directly and personally attacked Mr. Williams’s
attorneys. (www.tmz.com/2018/02/07/meek-mill-legal-team-liars-judges-lawyer-

charles-peruto-jr).

H. The Trial Judge Has Yet To Rule On The Recusal Motion

Or Issue A Rule 1925(a) Opinion
Mr. Williams filed a timely notice of appeal on December 6, 2017 from the
trial judge’s November 6, 2017 revocation of probation. As this Court knows, the
trial court record typically is not transmitted to the Superior Court—and a briefing
schedule is not issued—until the trial court issues an opinion pursuant to

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a). Yet, the trial judge did not
issue an order under Rule 1925(b) requiring Mr. Williams to prepare a concise
statement of his issues for appeal until January 26, 2018—nearly seven weeks after
Mr. Williams filed his notice of appeal. Mr. Williams filed his rule 1925(b)
statement on February 16, 2018.

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 As of the date of this filing—approximately four months since the
November 14 recusal motion was filed—the trial judge still has not ruled on the

recusal motion or referred it to a different judge for decision. By deciding the bail
motion herself, however, the trial judge has effectively denied the recusal motion
and has given no indication that she ever intends to rule on it. The trial judge also

has not issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion, which has effectively put Mr. Williams’
appeal to the Superior Court on hold.
Mr. Williams now applies to this Court to exercise King’s Bench or

Extraordinary Jurisdiction to order the immediately release of Mr. Williams on bail

while this proceeding is pending, order the trial judge removed from the case,
vacate the trial judge’s November 6, 2017 Order (violation of probation and

sentence), and, if necessary, remand for proceedings before a different judge.7

ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT SHOULD ORDER THE TRIAL JUDGE REMOVED
AND THE PROBATION REVOCATION ORDER VACATED
The uncontroverted record demonstrates that the trial judge—in the course
of administering Mr. Williams’ probation—has undertaken a prosecutorial role and
improperly injected herself into Mr. Williams’ personal and professional life far
beyond what is necessary to perform proper judicial functions. See § I.A, infra.

7
Contemporaneously with this filing, Mr. Williams has filed an application for
review under Rule 3315 of the Superior Court order denying bail pending appeal
and, in the alternative, an application for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction
granting bail pending consideration of Mr. Williams’ Post-Conviction Relief Act
Petition.

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This, in turn, has created the appearance of bias, which has undermined the
integrity of the judicial system. This Court may and should intervene to eliminate

the cloud that hangs over this case.

Controlling law compels removal of the trial judge under these
circumstances and vacatur of the November 6, 2017 Order: as detailed below,

controlling law holds that recusal is warranted when the cumulative effect of a
judge’s remarks and conduct create the appearance of bias or impropriety, see
§ I.B, infra; and because the cumulative effect of the trial judge’s remarks and

conduct in this case create the appearance of bias, this Court should exercise its
King’s Bench power to remove the trial judge, vacate the sentence, and remand for
proceedings before a different judge, see § I.C, infra.

A. The Trial Judge Has Stepped Far Outside The Judicial Role
And Engaged In Conduct That, At Minimum, Creates An
Appearance of Impropriety
Throughout the course of this case, the trial judge repeatedly has stepped
outside of her judicial role in a variety of different ways. She has inappropriately
injected herself into Mr. Williams’ personal and professional life far beyond what
is needed to perform the judicial functions, and has taken on a prosecutorial role.
Making matters even worse, the trial judge has shown a peculiar and inappropriate

interest in Mr. Williams’ case. Indeed, she has made it a personal matter—viewing
Mr. Williams’ alleged conduct as an affront not to the judicial system or the
Commonwealth, but to her personally.

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 1. The Trial Judge Has Offered Mr. Williams Personal And
Professional Advice, Unrelated And Unnecessary To Her
Judicial Supervision Of His Probation
Throughout the course of Mr. Williams’ probation, the trial judge has
repeatedly offered Mr. Williams personal and professional advice—both on and off
the record, but keeping the record secret from Mr. Williams and his counsel (even
when an in-chambers discussion was recorded and could be transcribed). The trial

judge’s injection of her personal views on Mr. Williams’ career evidences her
peculiar personal interest in this matter. Specifically:
The trial judge has suggested that Mr. Williams break his contract with his
present professional management (Roc Nation of New York) and return to the
local manager he had used earlier in his career (Charles Alston, p/k/a Charlie
Mack, of Philadelphia):

 Trial judge stating: “The other manager [Mr. Alston], we didn’t

have no problems; scheduling, and we don’t have no problem
understanding that he was going to come back here in six
months. He understood all of that. I don’t know how or when
you all got involved, but he didn’t have none of these problems.
He didn’t have no problems with the other manager, so you all

let him down this time.” Exhibit K, Tr. 12/17/12, at 125:21-

126:7;
 Trial judge stating: “Well, Charlie Mack was the person that

came up in here during the trial. He came during the trial. He

came and provided this Court with a contract saying that he was

- 28 -
 going to be working under contract with him. I said, Okay.
Let’s see what happens. You can do what y’all need to do under

this contract. It was when the defendant got new management

that apparently there became some miscommunication about
travel and I said that before and I’m saying it again.” Exhibit L,

Tr. 3/15/13, at 53:21-54:6;

 “[ADA] DESANTIS: Your Honor, obviously I don’t disagree
with Charlie Mack when he ran the defendant’s campaign as,

you know, Robert Williams, Meek Mills. There were no

problems. THE COURT: That’s right. DESANTIS: So I
applaud Mr. Mack. THE COURT: When Mr. Mack had him,

there were no problems.” Exhibit M, Tr. 8/18/14, at 62:19-63:2;

 Trial judge recounting matters discussed with Mr. Williams on
February 5, 2016 in chambers: “There was also some
discussion concerning the defendant’s management. ... I don’t
want this to be taken out of context by anyone down the road
either for appeal purposes or whatever, that there was some
discussion because the defendant, prior to Roc Nation, had been
represented by Mr. Alston[,] whose stage name is ‘Charlie
Mack,’ and that there was some discussion about his
involvement in continuing to assist Mr. Williams because it
seemed as if while Mr. Mack was representing him there were
fewer problems with the probation department[,] and I think I

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 said on the record Mr. Williams chooses who he wants for his
management and he’s obviously chosen to have whoever he

wants as his management ....” Exhibit N, Tr. 4/7/16, at 24:13-

25:6.
 After criticizing Mr. Williams’ current management and

comparing it unfavorably to Mr. Alston, the ADA referred to

herself, the judge’s hand-selected probation officer, and the trial
judge as “a team,” doing “[w]ork that the Judge wanted.”

Exhibit H, Tr. 2/5/16 (in camera), at 34:6-7. And, the probation

officer called her work in cooperation with Mr. Alston “what
the Judge wants. The Judge’s mission. What she wants.”

Exhibit H, Tr. 2/5/16 (in camera), at 24:14-15.

There is more. The trial judge also has offered Mr. Williams personal and
professional advice during in-chambers discussions, some without counsel present.
One such conference took place at the conclusion of a February 5, 2016
hearing when the trial judge invited Mr. Williams and his then-girlfriend (Onika
Maraj, p/k/a Nicki Minaj, also a prominent musical performer) into chambers for a
conversation. No counsel was present. Nor was a court reporter present—thus,
there is no transcript of this conference. Exhibit O, Tr. 2/5/16 (sentencing hearing),
at 91:3-8. Mr. Williams and Ms. Maraj can, if necessary, testify that, during the in-
chambers but off-the-record discussion, the trial judge made additional personal
and extrajudicial suggestions concerning Mr. Williams’ professional endeavors.
For instance, the trial judge suggested that Mr. Williams record a version of a song

- 30 -
by the popular group Boyz II Men called “On Bended Knee” and that he mention
the judge in the song. Mr. Williams declined to do so, to which the trial judge

ominously replied, “Suit yourself.”8

Another in-chambers conference took place during that same hearing—with
Mr. Williams, his counsel, the Assistant District Attorney, and the Probation

Officer. A court reporter was present, and Mr. Williams’ counsel ordered a copy of
the transcript. However, the trial judge personally directed the reporter not to
transcribe and produce it. Mr. Williams then moved for access to the transcript of

this in-chambers proceeding—arguing that he had a constitutional right to it so he

could properly and fully defend himself. See Exhibit P, September 8, 2017
Superior Court Decision, at 1.9 The reason the trial judge had directed that the

8
Mr. Williams understands that this Court might see his assertions regarding what
went on in the non-transcribed in-chambers conference as uncorroborated
contentions or possibly as a “he-said, she-said” situation. But the scales should tip
in favor of corroborating Mr. Williams’ story; the trial judge has not been reluctant
to improperly invoke her status as a member of the judiciary or step outside the
proper judicial role to abuse those who dare to clash with her. See Exhibit Q, Letter
from Brinkley to Tenants (filed in Landlord/Tenant action in Philadelphia County
Municipal Court) invoking judicial status when threatening eviction.
9
During the hearing on Mr. Williams’ motion, the trial judge stated that
Mr. Williams could not have access to the transcript unless it was made part of the
public record. See Exhibit P, September 8, 2017 Superior Court Decision at 4. In
response, Mr. Williams explained why his entitlement to access to the transcript
and whether that transcript should be accessible to the public were separate issues.
The trial judge disagreed. Because the trial judge continued to impose a condition
(which Mr. Williams argued was legally improper), Mr. Williams withdrew his
motion. Id. On appeal, Mr. Williams argued that the trial judge’s imposition of this
improper condition effectively denied his motion for access to the transcript. The
continued on next page

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transcript not be made available is evident from the record. As she put it: she does
not want her statements “to be taken out of context by anyone down the road either

for appeal purposes or whatever.” Exhibit N, Tr. 4/7/16, at 24:13-25:6.

As explained, almost two years after the hearing, the trial judge sua sponte
ordered that the transcript be unsealed, transcribed, and made available to the

public. According to the trial judge’s attorney, speaking on her behalf to the press,
the transcript was made available to the public not because it was an appropriate
ruling, but for the purpose of “deflat[ing] the accusation” against the trial judge

herself (Inquirer) and to defend her reputation (Intelligencer). The transcript does
not contradict Mr. Williams’ contentions, but instead confirms that the trial judge’s
hand-selected probation officer and the ADA repeatedly argued for the rehiring of

Mr. Alston. See Relevant Facts and Procedural Background § F, supra.

2. The Trial Judge Has Reacted In Personal And Injudicious

Terms—Often Taking On The Role Of The Prosecutor Or
Probation Officer
On multiple occasions—including, most recently, in revoking Mr. Williams’
probation and sentencing him to a substantial period of incarceration—the trial
judge has made this a personal matter. She has repeatedly accused him of
“thumbing his nose,” not at “the court,” but at her personally. See, e.g., Exhibit K,

Tr. 12/17/12, at 111:19-112:6; Exhibit R, Tr. 7/11/14, at 159:12-160:3; Exhibit M,

continued from prior page

Superior Court disagreed, holding that “a review of the trial court’s docket reflects
that no appealable order was entered on April 7, 2016.” Id. at 5-6.

- 32 -
Tr. 8/18/14, at 85:3-15; Exhibit S, Tr. 12/10/15, at 7:13-8:4, 98:18-99:3; Exhibit E,
Tr. 11/6/17, part 2 at 74. She also has apparently decided that she is the reason for

Mr. Williams’ success—that she identified his talents early and, according to her,
has at “every stage of my dealings with [him], … tried to do whatever [she]
believe[d] he needed to do to pursue his career.” Exhibit O, Tr. 2/5/16 (sentencing

hearing) at 77:25-79:5.
Since she imposed on Mr. Williams a guidelines sentence of 11½ to 23
months in 2008, the trial judge has watched him like a hawk, bringing him in for

quarterly status hearings and forcing him to vet all of his travel (which is required
for his job) through the trial judge personally. And when a travel issue arises, the
trial judge punishes Mr. Williams severely, forcing him to cancel previously

scheduled engagements and even throwing him in prison. And when Mr. Williams’
career does not advance as quickly as she expected it to—which is far from
surprising because many venues may consider him unreliable due to the trial
judge’s unnecessary interference with his ability to perform—the trial judge takes
that personally as well. She has gone so far as to compare Mr. Williams to Jay-Z:

Talk about your fans being disappointed, how about me? How about
me after doing all I’ve done for you over all these years trying to help
you have a career and to move your career forward? Because I said
you know what? He has the ability to be like Jay-Z. He has the ability
to make Jay-Z’s kind of money. He has the ability to move his family
from here to there if he would just acknowledge that he has to do it a
certain way ....

Exhibit R, Tr. 7/11/14, at 200:11-01:2 (emphasis added).

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 Then, in 2015, at another violation of probation hearing regarding primarily
travel-related issues, the trial judge took personal offense to the fact that Mr.

Williams had not become “greater than Jay-Z”:

I then [in 2009] saw that Mr. Williams had the opportunity to be very
big in the music business that I had not seen in anyone before. I saw
it. And because I saw it, I was able to fashion the sentence that will
allow him to be able to pursue that career with just a small amount of
jail time. ... So at every stage of my dealings with this defendant, I
have tried to do whatever I believe he needed to do to pursue his
career with my first belief and my continuing belief was that he could
have a phenomenal career in the music business[,] greater than Jay-Z,
greater than a lot of other people that are out there now. I saw that in
2009. Unfortunately, the defendant has really disappointed this court,
because even though I allowed him to be able to do his craft[,] to go to
studios all over the United States without any restrictions, he still
didn’t do—even today he has not done what I can see that he could do
even to this day.

Exhibit O, Tr. 2/5/16 (sentencing hearing), at 77:25-79:5.

This type of excessive interest or entanglement in a defendant’s personal and

professional life on the part of a judge is highly unusual. Indeed, the trial judge—in
some ways—has functioned as a probation officer. Her visit to the site of Mr.
Williams’ community service is a case in point. At any given point in time, trial
judges are overseeing the probation of hundreds of defendants; they hardly have
the time to personally monitor a defendant’s community service. This monitoring
is done by probation officers—not judges. Yet, the trial judge took the
unprecedented step of visiting the site of Mr. Williams’ community service,
plucking him out the hundreds of probationer defendants under her supervision for
personal observation.

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 What is more, while the trial judge sees herself as taking steps to advance
Mr. Williams’ career—inappropriate in and of itself—nothing could be further

from the truth. The trial judge often has taken on a prosecutorial role. A perfect
illustration of this is the trial judge’s conduct in connection with the violation of
probation proceedings—both before and during the hearing. See pp. 15-18, supra.

And, true to form, the trial judge returned to the “personal” at the end of the
hearing—stating, “You won’t have to report to me ever, and I don’t have to deal
with you ever again.” Exhibit E, Tr. 11/6/17, part 2, at 74:24-75:1. This is not

language used by a neutral arbiter. This is injudicious language that indicates that
Mr. Williams’ case has clearly become personal for the trial judge.

3. The Trial Judge Has Relied On Personal Knowledge And

Knowledge Obtained Ex Parte Of Mr. Williams’ Conduct
On Probation And Her Own Memory Instead Of (And
Sometimes In Disregard Of) The Actual Record
The trial judge’s over-involvement in this case—at times making herself a
central focus—also is reflected in extra-judicial fact-finding and treatment of the
record. As noted, at the November 6, 2017 hearing, the trial judge revealed for the
first time that she visited the community service site where Mr. Williams was
assigned to serve the homeless. Exhibit E, Tr. 11/6/17, part 2, at 67-74. She then

relied on her own version of what she had observed to reject the recommendations
of both the probation officer and the Assistant District Attorney that Mr. Williams

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not be incarcerated and imposed a state prison sentence of 2 to 4 years’
confinement. Exhibit E, Tr. 11/6/17, part 2, at 74.10

The trial judge also based her November 6 ruling, in part, on her (clearly
erroneous) personal recollection that she was not informed that Mr. Williams
would be receiving treatment in Atlanta. Exhibit D, Tr. 11/6/17, part 1, at 36:22-

38:3, 56. Contrary to the trial judge’s recollection, the record reflects that she was
informed via a January 13, 2017 email of Mr. Williams’ upcoming schedule, which
included drug treatment in Atlanta. Exhibit T, 1/13/17 email to trial judge with

January and February schedules (identifying Mr. Williams’ location as Atlanta for
“Medical treatment as discussed with P.O. and Judge Brinkley”). When shown the
email during the hearing, the trial judge’s comments suggested that she believed

Mr. Williams and his team might have manufactured the email—and did not relent
even when the District Attorney’s Office said that it had received the email, which
also listed the judge as a recipient. Id.; Exhibit D, Tr. 11/6/17, part 1 at 56:19-24
(ADA confirming receipt of email). Mr. Williams’ probation officer also
confirmed that she knew of the location where he was undergoing rehab. Exhibit
D, Tr. 11/6/17, part 1, at 16 (testifying that “it was an in-home detoxification
program in Atlanta, Georgia, which we were aware of.”). And yet, in the end, what
actually happened apparently did not matter to the judge. Exhibit E, Tr. 11/6/17,
part 2, at 20 (trial judge ruling (erroneously) that “[t]here’s some issues the Court

10
The trial judge thus made herself a witness on whether Mr. Williams was in
compliance with her instructions regarding community service.

- 36 -
has with the scheduling of the detox in Atlanta, about giving the Court proper
notice of that, because the Court was not given notice”).

4. The Trial Judge Not Only Has Shown An Unwillingness To

Consider Mr. Williams’ Legal Options, But She Has
Prejudged Them And Even Taken Offense To His Legal
Requests
Parties in criminal proceedings should be able to reasonably expect that the

trial judge will act in a neutral manner and will not prejudge a party’s legal
arguments for relief. The trial judge here has fallen far short in that regard. For
instance:

The trial judge actively discouraged Mr. Williams from seeking

modification of, or appealing, the February 2016 resentence. Specifically, she
warned Mr. Williams, “when you file a petition for reconsideration, and then file

notice of appeal, the petition for reconsideration is scheduled[,] I can schedule the
hearing on the petition to reconsideration and reconsider and give out a greater
sentence. So the sentence could go up, not down. But that is your choice. I think it
would be a complete waste of money to pursue. That is your choice.” 11 Exhibit U,
Tr. 2/9/16, at 11:15-25.

11
This warning not only was improper, but also was substantially incorrect, since
with rare exceptions any increase in sentence upon reconsideration would violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 783 A.2d 784, 787-88
(Pa. Super. 2001) (quoting Commonwealth v. Serrano, 727 A.2d 1168, 1170
(Pa. Super. 1999)).

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 The trial judge also prejudged Mr. Williams’ reasonable requests for an
early end to his probation or to transfer his probation to another state where his

work was based. Exhibit L, Tr. 3/15/13, at 52:5-16 (“So no[,] and don’t even ask
me again about early termination[,] because that’s not going to happen.”).
Moreover, the trial judge admonished Mr. Williams’ management just for

asking that he be permitted to perform at previously-scheduled events. In mid-

August 2017, the trial judge emailed Mr. Williams’ management and stated that
Mr. Williams “must return to Philadelphia and remain at home in Montgomery

County until 8-31-17, pending further Order of this court.” Exhibit V, 8/17/17
email (emphasis added). After that, the trial judge sent another email saying that
Mr. Williams may not travel to perform until resolution of other matters. Exhibit

W, 9/5/17 email. Hoping that Mr. Williams would be able to honor commitments
that he previously had made, his management asked that he be permitted to travel
to perform at pre-scheduled events after 8-31-17. Exhibit D, Tr. 11/6/17, part 1, at
80, 102 (“THE COURT: [Mr. Williams’ manager] would say, we know that you
told us that he could not go to these, but can he go because we already scheduled
it.”).12 Mr. Williams did not engage in such travel, but that apparently did not make
a difference to the trial judge, who was upset that a request even was made:

12
All requests made after 8/31/17 asking for permission to meet existing
obligations or book appearances were appropriate and courteous. Exhibit X, email
dated 9/1/17; Exhibit Y, email dated 9/19/17; Exhibit Z, email dated 9/25/17.
Mr. Williams did not perform at any event that was not specifically approved by
the court. Exhibit D, Tr. 11/6/17, part 1, at 89.

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 MR. MCMONAGLE: Judge, I did want to make one point. He did not
go to any of these performances.

THE COURT: I know that. That’s not the issue at this point.

Exhibit D, Tr. 11/6/17, part 1, at 89-90.

5. The Trial Judge, Through Her Personal Counsel, Has Made

Statements About This Case To The Press, Going So Far As
Threatening To Sue Mr. Williams’ Legal and Management
Team
During the pendency of Mr. Williams’ motion to recuse, a private attorney
representing the trial judge commented on this case in the press. The statements
made to the press provide further grounds for her recusal.
Speaking on behalf of the trial judge, her attorney stated that “all the
allegations” made by Mr. Williams about the trial judge’s comments—all of which
Mr. Williams has meticulously cited to the record—are “100 percent false” (Legal
Intelligencer) and “didn’t happen” (Inquirer). Exhibits I and J. The trial judge’s
attorney, speaking on her behalf, also threatened to sue Mr. Williams and/or his
attorneys and/or professional management for defamation (“the target of any
litigation would likely be Williams’ management and legal team rather than
Williams”; Legal Intelligencer), if they either fail to publish an apology (Legal
Intelligencer) or if they file a complaint about the judge with the Judicial Conduct
Board (Inquirer). Clearly, Mr. Williams’ case is a personal matter to the trial

judge.

* * *

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 This undisputed evidence provides ample reason for this Court to intervene.
As shown below, an application of well-settled law to this record compels the

conclusion that the trial judge should be removed from this case and her November
6, 2016 Order should be vacated.

B. Recusal Is Warranted When The Cumulative Effect Of A

Judge’s Remarks And Conduct Create The Appearance Of
Bias Or Impropriety
“‘A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct
[her]self at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.’” In Interest of McFall, 617 A.2d 707, 713
(Pa. 1992) (quoting Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2(A)). In the context of
criminal sentencing, this standard requires that a judge recuse “whenever [s]he
believes [h]er impartiality can be reasonably questioned.” Commonwealth v.

Darush, 459 A.2d 727, 731 (Pa. 1983); see also Commonwealth v. Lemanski,
529 A.2d 1085, 1089 (Pa. Super. 1987) (“We emphasize that a defendant is entitled
to a trial before a judge who is not biased against him at any point of the trial, and
most importantly, at sentencing.”). “Because of the tremendous discretion a judge
has when sentencing, ‘a defendant is entitled to sentencing by a judge whose
impartiality cannot reasonably be questioned.’” Commonwealth v. Rhodes,

990 A.2d 732, 748 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting Darush, 459 A.2d at 732).
Consequently, a party seeking recusal of a trial judge and assignment to a
different judge for sentencing “need not prove that the judge’s ruling actually

prejudiced him; it is enough to prove that the reasonable observer might question

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the judge’s impartiality.” Rhodes, 990 A.2d at 748 (citation omitted); see also
Joseph v. Scranton Times L.P., 987 A.2d 633, 634 (Pa. 2009) (“There is no need to

find actual prejudice, but rather, the appearance of prejudice is sufficient to warrant
the grant of new proceedings.”) (vacatur of judgment entered in civil case due to
appearance of bias) (citation omitted). “‘[T]he appearance of bias or prejudice can

be as damaging to public confidence in the administration of justice as would be

the actual presence of either of these elements.’” Interest of McFall, 617 A.2d at
713 (quoting Commonwealth v. Goodman, 311 A.2d 652, 654 (Pa. 1973)). This

well-settled principle is exemplified by the Court’s landmark opinion in Darush:

Although we find no evidence of bias and are convinced the judge

acted in what he sincerely felt was a proper manner, we nevertheless
believe appellant is entitled to resentencing by another judge because
certain remarks the judge was said to have made about appellant could
raise a reasonable question concerning his impartiality in sentencing.

459 A.2d at 730.

When determining whether removal of a judge is required, this Court may
look at the entire course of the judge’s conduct—there is no need to search for a
single “smoking gun” bad act. As the Superior Court explained: “[A] party’s call
for recusal need not be based only upon discreet incidents, but may also assert the
cumulative effect of a judge’s remarks and conduct even though no single act

creates an appearance of bias or impropriety.” Rhodes, 990 A.2d at 748-49;

see also Commonwealth v. White, 910 A.2d 648, 659-60 (Pa. 2006) (agreeing with
statement that “[w]hile the examples I have reviewed, standing alone, may not

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warrant the conclusion that there existed an appearance of impropriety, I would
find that in the aggregate, such a determination is compelling”).

Under this standard, a judge’s removal may be warranted where, for

example:
 The judge appears to act as both an agent of the judiciary and the

prosecution. See, e.g., Interest of McFall, 617 A.2d at 713 (ordering

new proceedings before a different judge because “[t]he
circumstances under which [the trial judge] participated as an ‘agent’

of both the judiciary and the prosecution created an environment of

partiality which is unacceptable”).
 The judge takes a special interest in the defendant. See, e.g., White,

910 A.2d at 655-56 (remanding for appointment of different judge

where trial judge told defendant that she wanted “to send [her] to
someplace where [she] could grow up to be a beautiful young
woman,” inquired as to the defendant’s eating habits, and shared
information about her own family).
 The judge has personal knowledge of disputed facts. See, e.g.,
Mun. Publications, Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
Cty., 489 A.2d 1286, 1289 (Pa. 1985) (disqualifying judge because he
“not only had personal knowledge of disputed facts but was in a
position to rule on objections to his own testimony and to assess his
own credibility in light of conflicting evidence”).

- 42 -
 The judge’s remarks reflect a disparaging attitude towards the
defendant. See, e.g., Darush, 459 A.2d at 732 (“[C]onsidering all the

circumstances, especially the trial court’s inability to affirmatively

admit or deny making remarks from which a significant minority of
the lay community could reasonably question the court’s impartiality,

we feel the largely unfettered sentencing discretion afforded a judge is

better exercised by one without hint of animosity toward appellant.”).
 The judge declines to use a report in the record and instead relies on

evidence obtained ex parte. See, e.g., Rhodes, 990 A.2d at 750

(ordering re-sentencing before different judge where trial judge
obtained evidence ex parte, which then “served as the primary source

of information on which the court made its determination to impose a

sentence close to the statutory maximum”).
 The judge’s conduct indicates a pre-determined view of the law as
applied to the facts. See, e.g., Lemanski, 529 A.2d at 1089 (remanding
for new trial before different judge where “[t]he record before us
indicates a predetermined policy with respect to sentencing drug
offenders”).
 The judge makes an effort to hide facts from the parties and the public
that might be relevant to a recusal motion. See, e.g., Joseph, 987 A.2d
at 636 (vacating trial court order and remanding for assignment of
different judge where previous judge “ensured that litigants who

- 43 -
 would have had a strong and obvious reason to seek his recusal would
not learn of the facts that would occasion the motion”).

While any one of these circumstances warrants recusal, each one is present
here. Thus, as explained below, the trial judge’s conduct clearly supports Mr.
Williams’ requested relief.

C. Because The Cumulative Effect Of The Trial Judge’s

Remarks And Conduct In This Case Creates The
Appearance Of Bias, This Court Should Exercise Its King’s
Bench Power, Remove The Trial Judge And Vacate Her
November 6, 2017 Order
Here, the trial judge has acted outside the proper judicial role and her

remarks and conduct have created the appearance of bias—and, thus, her
impartiality reasonably can be questioned. See § I.B, supra. Given the appearance
of bias created by this conduct, an order removing the trial judge from the case,

vacating the trial judge’s sentence, and remanding for proceedings before a
different judge is warranted. See Joseph, 987 A.2d at 636; Mun. Publications,
489 A.2d at 1289; Darush, 459 A.2d at 732; Interest of McFall, 617 A.2d at 713;
Rhodes, 990 A.2d at 750; Lemanski, 529 A.2d at 1089.
In particular, vacating the trial judge’s sentence and remanding for
proceedings before a different judge is the relief that is required when a trial

judge’s remarks and conduct create an appearance of bias and impropriety. See
Joseph, 987 A.2d at 637 (ordering the removed judge’s orders “be vacated, and
this matter returned to the [trial court] for assignment to a new judge for a new
trial”); Darush, 459 A.2d at 732 (“[A] different trial judge must be assigned to

- 44 -
resentence appellant. Judgment of sentence vacated and case remanded for
resentencing.”); Rhodes, 990 A.2d at 751 (“In view of the taint that follows such a

determination, we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand this case for re-
sentencing before another judge.”). Only this relief will protect both Mr. Williams’
interests and the integrity of the judicial system.

The King’s Bench power exists so that this Court can “conscientiously guard
the fairness and probity of the judicial process and the dignity, integrity, and
authority of the judicial system, all for the protection of the citizens of this

Commonwealth.” In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 675. When these interests are at stake,
this Court may act immediately and need not “suffer the deleterious effect upon the
public interest caused by delays incident to ordinary processes of law”—indeed,

“King’s Bench allows the Supreme Court to exercise authority commensurate with
its ‘ultimate responsibility’ for the proper administration and supervision of the
judicial system.” Id. at 670-71 (quoting In re Avellino, 690 A.2d at 1144 n.7).
Here, the trial judge’s conduct warrants immediate King’s Bench review and
relief because (1) Mr. Williams’ liberty is at stake—the trial judge had
Mr. Williams taken immediately into state custody following the November 6,
2017 hearing; and (2) the integrity of the Commonwealth’s judicial system is
implicated—a substantial public concern in all instances, but one that is of even
greater concern here since this case is the subject of substantial media coverage
and thus is in the public eye.
First, a defendant’s interest in an unbiased and impartial judge has due
process implications, which are particularly important when a defendant’s liberty is

- 45 -
at stake. Due process entitles a defendant to “‘a proceeding in which he may
present his case with assurance’ that no member of the court is ‘predisposed to find

against him.’” Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2016) (quoting
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)). In the context of a criminal
proceeding, if a defendant is denied due process, then the defendant is at “risk of

losing his most important right—his liberty.” In re S.A., 925 A.2d 838, 847 n.9
(Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal
Court, 407 U.S. 355, 364-65 (1972).

Mr. Williams currently is incarcerated serving a 2 to 4 year sentence the trial

judge imposed based on technical probation violations, overriding the probation
officer and Assistant District Attorney’s recommendation that incarceration was

not warranted. The trial judge’s substantial sentence—a disfavored sanction that
was not essential to vindicate the authority of the court, see Commonwealth v.
Cottle, 426 A.2d 598, 601-02 (Pa. 1981); 42 Pa. C.S. § 9771(c)(3)—is the
culmination of a pattern of conduct in which the trial judge repeatedly stepped
outside the bounds of the judicial role. Under these circumstances, any reasonable
person—and the public at large—would question the trial judge’s impartiality. This
Court has the power to take action now and remedy the situation by ordering a new
hearing before an impartial judge.
Second, the issue here—which directly implicates the integrity of the
Commonwealth’s judicial system—is of great public importance. “A judge should
respect and comply with the law and should conduct [her]self at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the

- 46 -
judiciary.” Interest of McFall, 617 A.2d at 713 (citation omitted). Moreover, “the
appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence in the

administration of justice as would be the actual presence of either of these

elements.” Id. (citation omitted). Even the Commonwealth itself, through the
Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, does not disagree—as it did not oppose

Mr. Williams’ motion to recuse.

The trial judge’s actions would be cause for concern—and would adversely
impact the public’s view of the integrity of the judicial system—in any case. But

that concern is particularly acute here. Given Mr. Williams’ celebrity status, the
Commonwealth’s judicial system now is subject to heightened attention.13
Mr. Williams deserved better—as do all defendants in his situation. The

Commonwealth’s judicial system generally does do better—and this Court can

demand that it always do better by granting relief in this case. Accordingly, in
order to restore confidence in the judicial system, this Court should exercise its
King’s Bench power and remove the trial judge from the case, vacate the trial
judge’s sentence, and remand for proceedings before a different judge.

II. THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE JURISDICTION WITH

RESPECT TO MR. WILLIAMS’ PCRA PETITION
There is newly discovered evidence that Mr. Williams’ underlying
convictions are based on perjured testimony, and that he is (as he has always
claimed) innocent of all but one of the charges against him. Based on this, Mr.

13
See pp. 8-10, supra.

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Williams is entitled to relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act. The PCRA
petition, filed on February 14, 2018, is attached as Exhibit AA. Mr. Williams’

motion for bail pending consideration of the PCRA petition, also filed on February
14, 2018, is attached as Exhibit BB.
Because the PCRA petition has been assigned to the trial judge—who, as

shown, is laboring under an appearance of bias and has not acted promptly on Mr.
Williams’ requests for relief—this Court should act in this regard as well, pursuant
either to King’s Bench or Extraordinary Jurisdiction. As explained supra pp. 12-

14, with King’s Bench jurisdiction, the Court has “cognizance of all causes
statewide, whether civil or criminal.” In re Bruno, 101 A.3d at 670. In addition,
with Extraordinary Jurisdiction, this Court “may, … in any matter pending before

any court … of this Commonwealth involving an issue of immediate public

importance, assume plenary jurisdiction of such matter at any stage thereof and
enter a final order or otherwise cause right and justice to be done.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 726. Accordingly, this Court may assume jurisdiction over the pending PCRA
proceeding in Mr. Williams’ case.

A. Mr. Williams Was Convicted Solely Based On The

Testimony Of Officer Graham
Mr. Williams was convicted on August 19, 2008, following a non-jury trial,
of carrying a firearm without a license (18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(l)), carrying a firearm
in public in Philadelphia (id. § 6108), possession of an instrument of crime (id.
§ 907), simple assault (id. § 2701(a)), and possession of a controlled substance
with intent to deliver (35 Pa.Stat. § 780-113(a)(30)). He was convicted at the same

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time of certain additional lesser-included offenses (simple possession of drugs, id.
§ 780-113(a)(16); carrying a loaded weapon in a vehicle (18 Pa.C.S. § 6106.1));

and acquitted of several other, related charges, including two counts of aggravated
assault (id. § 2702(a)(6)).
Mr. Williams asserted his innocence on all but one of these charges. Two co-

defendants were acquitted of all charges at the same trial. The only witness who
testified for the Commonwealth at trial was Philadelphia Police Officer Reginald
Graham. Officer Graham also was the affiant on the application for the search

warrant that yielded the evidence used to support several charges at trial. The trial
court likewise relied on Graham’s affidavit for the finding of probable cause that
justified its denial of the defendants’ pretrial motion to suppress. The guilty

verdicts were expressly based on the trial court’s crediting Officer Graham’s
testimony over that of Mr. Williams on most points.
The Commonwealth has acknowledged that “Officer Graham was the only
witness called at trial and was the affiant on a search warrant which produced
evidence against [Mr. Williams],” and thus that “his veracity is essential to the
Commonwealth’s prosecution of this matter.” Exhibit CC, Commonwealth PCRA
Bail Response. Moreover, no Brady or Giglio material concerning Officer Graham
was produced by the Commonwealth to the defense prior to or during trial.

B. Newly Discovered Evidence Indicates That Officer Graham

Perjured Himself
Mr. Williams is entitled to a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence.
Neither Mr. Williams nor the trial court could not have known about this

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exculpatory evidence earlier because, as the Commonwealth has acknowledged,
“the prior District Attorney’s Office did not provide it to [Mr. Williams] or to the

Court.” Exhibit CC, Commonwealth PCRA Bail Response ¶ 9. This exculpatory

evidence, which is detailed below, would have changed the outcome of the trial if
it had been introduced.

Gibson Affidavit. On February 6, 2018, former Philadelphia Police Officer

Jerold Gibson provided a sworn affidavit to Licensed Private Investigator Cliff
Goldsmith stating that he (Gibson) was present (with Officer Graham) when Mr.

Williams was arrested on January 24, 2007. Officer Gibson was part of the same
squad as Graham (the Narcotics Field Unit) from 2004 to 2013. Gibson’s affidavit
(attached to the PCRA petition, which is attached here at Exhibit AA)

demonstrates—as Mr. Gibson would testify at a hearing on the PCRA petition—

that Graham lied as to nearly every material fact in his testimony at trial. At the
time of Mr. Williams’ arrest, according to Officer Gibson’s affidavit:
 Contrary to Graham’s trial testimony, Exhibit DD, Tr. 8/19/08, at 45,
but consistent with Mr. Williams’ testimony, id. at 80, Gibson did not
hear Mr. Williams ask, “Who are you?” to approaching police.
Exhibit AA, PCRA petition, Gibson Aff. ¶ 6.
 Contrary to Graham’s trial testimony, Exhibit DD, Tr. 8/19/08, at 45,
but consistent with Mr. Williams’ testimony, id. at 80-81, Mr.
Williams never pointed a gun at Officer Graham or anyone else.
Exhibit AA, PCRA petition, Gibson Aff. ¶¶ 7-8.

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 Contrary to Graham’s trial testimony, Exhibit DD, Tr. 8/19/08, at 45,
but consistent with Mr. Williams’ testimony, id. at 80, Gibson did

observe Mr. Williams take a gun out of his waistband to discard it.
The gun was in fact recovered “a couple feet away” from Mr.
Williams, following his arrest. Exhibit AA, PCRA petition, Gibson

Aff. ¶ 18.
 Contrary to Graham’s trial testimony, Exhibit DD, Tr. 8/19/08, at 45,
but consistent with Mr. Williams’ testimony, id. at 80, approaching

officers did not yell to Mr. Williams to “Drop the gun.” Exhibit AA,
PCRA petition, Gibson Aff. ¶ 10.
 Contrary to Graham’s trial testimony, Exhibit DD, Tr. 8/19/08, at 45,

but consistent with Mr. Williams’ testimony, id. at 80-81, Graham

never took cover behind a green van, but rather remained on the
sidewalk with Mr. Williams. Exhibit AA, PCRA petition, Gibson Aff.
¶ 9.
 Contrary to Graham’s trial testimony, Exhibit DD, Tr. 8/19/08, at 46,
but consistent with Mr. William’ testimony, id. at 80, Mr. Williams
did not stand up from behind a car and take off running. Exhibit AA,
PCRA petition, Gibson Aff. ¶ 11.
 Contrary to Graham’s trial testimony, Exhibit DD, Tr. 8/19/08, at 46,
but consistent with Mr. Williams’ testimony, id. at 80-81, police
officers did not tackle Mr. Williams as he tried to flee. Exhibit AA,
PCRA petition, Gibson Aff. ¶¶ 11-12.

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  Contrary to Graham’s trial testimony, Exhibit DD, Tr. 8/19/08, at 46,
but consistent with Mr. Williams’ testimony, id. at 80-81,14 Williams

did not struggle with officers at the time of his arrest. Exhibit AA,
PCRA petition, Gibson Aff. ¶ 13.
 Finally, according to Gibson, Graham never claimed that Mr.

Williams had pointed a gun at him until after Mr. Williams was in
custody. Exhibit AA, PCRA petition, Gibson Aff. ¶ 19.
Walker Affidavit. On February 7, 2018, former Philadelphia Police Officer

Jeffrey Walker provided a sworn affidavit to an investigator working under

Licensed Private Investigator Cliff Goldsmith stating that he, Walker, was in the
Narcotics Field Unit from 1999 to 2013, and worked with Officer Graham in that

Unit from 2003 to 2005 or 2006 and then again in 2012. (A copy of the affidavit is
attached to the PCRA Petition, which is attached here at Exhibit AA). Walker was
a cooperating witness for the federal government in a prosecution of certain
members of the Unit on criminal charges. Walker’s affidavit strongly corroborates
Gibson’s. Based on his detailed, direct and personal knowledge of the workings of
the Narcotics Field Unit and of Graham's conduct while part of that Unit,
according to Officer Walker’s affidavit, and as Mr. Walker would testify at a
hearing:

14
Mr. Williams lodged a contemporaneous Internal Affairs complaint with the
Philadelphia Police about having been brutalized at the time of his arrest. Exhibit
AA, PCRA petition; Exhibit DD, Tr. 8/19/08, at 87-89.

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  Officer Graham frequently misused confidential informants (“C.I.s”)
and fabricated the alleged probable cause for search warrants. He also

lied about the justification for warrantless searches. Exhibit AA,

PCRA petition, Walker Aff. ¶ 5. Notably, at Mr. Williams’ trial,
Graham testified to recovering two packets of alleged crack cocaine

from a C.I. who allegedly purchased them from Mr. Williams on

January 23, 2007,15 but no property receipt or lab report for those
packets was offered in evidence at trial, much less the alleged packets

themselves (a glaring omission that trial counsel for Mr. Williams

failed to note and did not mention in arguing for a judgment of
acquittal).

 Officer Graham frequently stole and kept money that he recovered

during searches and arrests. Exhibit AA, PCRA petition, Walker Aff.
¶ 6.
 Officer Graham often beat people he considered suspects, as Mr.
Williams testified was done to him by Graham in this case. Exhibit
AA, PCRA petition, Walker Aff. ¶ 3.

15
This alleged sale occurred at a time on January 23, 2007, for which Mr. Williams
had a clear alibi, as he testified at trial. Exhibit DD, Tr. 8/19/08, at 81.
Nevertheless, his attorney did not attempt to corroborate the alibi, and failed to
argue for a judgment of acquittal on the basis that this testimony was truthful.

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  Officer Graham admitted to Walker in 2007 or 2008 that he beat Mr.
Williams during his arrest in this case. Exhibit AA, PCRA petition,

Walker Aff. ¶ 12.

 Based on Walker’s experience as a police officer and in particular his
experience working with Graham in the Narcotics Field Unit, and

further based upon his review of the Preliminary Arrest Report in Mr.
Williams’ case, as prepared and filed by Graham, the Arrest Report
“bears the hallmarks of a fraudulent affidavit, written to manufacture

probable cause for the search warrant.” Exhibit AA, PCRA petition,
Walker Aff. ¶ 13. In support of this conclusion, Walker cites four
specific details that do not ring true to him. Among these is Graham’s

claim that Mr. Williams pointed a gun at the officers who approached
to arrest him (as Graham testified at trial and Mr. Williams denied).
Exhibit AA, PCRA petition, Walker Aff. ¶ 13(c).16
The Investigative Report. On February 13, 2018, the Philadelphia Inquirer
and philly.com published an exclusive investigative report17 from which Mr.
Williams learned for the first time that:

16
Walker’s affidavit is consistent with the FBI Form 302 reports of interviews with
Walker dated from 2013 to 2014, except that Officer Walker did not discuss Mr.
Williams’ case with the FBI, as they did not ask him about that subject.
17
Available at http://www.philly.com/philly/news/philadelphia-police-misconduct-
list-larry-krasner-seth-williams-meek-mill-20180213.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2018). A copy is attached to the PCRA petition, which is attached here at Exhibit
AA.

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  Officer Walker testified in civil depositions in 2016—of which Mr.
Williams does not yet have copies—about Graham’s perjury,

additional acts of dishonesty, and other misconduct. One or more of

these depositions, according to the article, was taken by then-private
attorney Lawrence Krasner, Esq. who is now the elected District

Attorney of Philadelphia County.

 Officer Graham’s name appears on a list, first created in early 2017
according to the article and previously secret and unknown outside the

District Attorney’s Office, of Philadelphia police officers and former

officers who are not to be used as witnesses for the Commonwealth,
as the District Attorney’s Office will not stand behind their credibility.

By letter to co-counsel for Mr. Williams dated March 8, 2018, the

District Attorney’s Office conceded the existence of this “do not call”
list, and in particular that former police officer Graham was included
on that list. Exhibit CC, Commonwealth PCRA Bail Response ¶¶ 7-8.
Investigative Support Services Memorandum and Verdict. On March 16,
2018, pursuant to a subpoena served on the police investigatory unit, counsel for
Mr. Williams received, for the first time, a September 16, 2016 Investigative
Support Services Memorandum (Exhibit EE) and March 8, 2017 Hearing Verdict
Sheet (Exhibit FF) related to Officer Graham. The Investigative Support Services
Memorandum concludes:
 Graham sat for and failed an FBI polygraph examination pertaining to
his conduct as a police officer, Exhibit EE at 8;

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  After the results of the polygraph examination were revealed, Graham
admitted he lied, id.;

 Graham confessed that he had received money recovered during

searches, id.;
The Police Department held a hearing for Graham on March 8, 2017 based

on the Investigative Support Services Memorandum and found Graham guilty of

Conduct Unbecoming for engaging in criminal conduct and lying during an
investigation. Exhibit FF. This is over and above the disclosure in the so-called

“do not call” list, which states that Officer Graham retired before his Police Board
of Inquiry hearing.

C. The Commonwealth Acknowledges The “Strong”

Likelihood That Mr. Williams’ Conviction Will Be
Reversed And Does Not Oppose Bail Pending Consideration
Of The PCRA Petition
On March 14, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a response to Mr. Williams’
motion for bail pending consideration for PCRA relief in which it confirmed the
accuracy of the grounds for Mr. Williams’ motion and stated its non-opposition to
Mr. Williams’ request for bail pending consideration of the PCRA petition. Exhibit
CC, Commonwealth PCRA Bail Response.

As noted above, the Commonwealth acknowledges that “Officer Graham

was the only witness called at trial and was the affiant on a search warrant which
produced evidence against [Mr. Williams],” and thus “his veracity is essential to

the Commonwealth’s prosecution in this matter.” Exhibit CC, Commonwealth

PCRA Bail Response ¶ 5. The Commonwealth also acknowledges that “[t]he

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District Attorney’s Office, prior to 2018, maintained a list of officers whose
credibility was in question” and that “Officer Graham was included in that list.” Id.

¶ 7. Importantly, the Commonwealth takes the position that the trial court “could
not have known [of this information] at trial or at any subsequent violation hearing
because the prior District Attorney’s Office did not provide it to [Mr. Williams] or

to the Court.” Id. ¶ 9.

Finally, the Commonwealth proffers that “the risk of an unjust or
disproportionate sentence … increases as long as [Mr. Williams] remains in

custody” and that “there is a strong showing of likelihood of [Mr. Williams’]

conviction being reversed (in whole or in part).” Exhibit CC, Commonwealth
PCRA Bail Response ¶ 10. The Commonwealth also confirms that it is

“unopposed to [Mr. Williams’] ‘Motion for Stay and for Bail Pending
Consideration of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.’” Id. ¶ 10. Despite the
Commonwealth’s conclusions and non-opposition, the trial court has yet to take
action on Mr. Williams’ PCRA bail request.

D. A New Trial Is Required Where A Constitutional Violation

Undermined The Truth-Determining Process Or Where
Exculpatory Evidence Was Unavailable At The Time Of
Trial
Mr. Williams’ conviction plainly should be vacated. Under the PCRA, a
conviction should be vacated and a new trial granted where, among other things, a
constitutional violation “so undermined the truth-determining process that no

reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place” or “[t]he

unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has subsequently

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become available and would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been
introduced.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i) and (vi). Newly discovered evidence

demonstrating that a conviction was based almost entirely on pervasive perjury of

the Commonwealth’s only witness cannot be dismissed as “merely impeaching” or
as offered “solely for the purpose of impeachment.” See Commonwealth v.

McCracken, 659 A.2d 541 (Pa. 1995) (credible recantation can support a new
trial); Commonwealth v. Perrin, 108 A.3d 50 (Pa. Super. 2015) (affidavit directly
showing key witness lied at defendant’s trial is not mere impeachment and

warrants hearing on motion for new trial); see Commonwealth v. Perrin, 59 A.3d
663, 668 (Pa. Super. 2013) (Wecht, J., concurring, at earlier stage of case;
explaining that “merely impeaching” doctrine is no more than an application of the

rule that newly discovered evidence must be such that it would likely change the
outcome).
While Mr. Williams’ PCRA petition is pending in the trial court, he can have
no confidence that it will be ruled upon fairly or promptly. The trial judge—to
whom Mr. Williams’ petition is assigned—has delayed ruling on or issuing
required orders in various matters pending before her in connection with Mr.
Williams’ case. See Factual and Procedural Background Relevant to Request for
Removal of the Trial Judge § H, supra. Even after the Commonwealth indicated its
non-opposition to Mr. Williams’ bail request pending consideration of the PCRA
petition, the trial judge has not taken action to grant bail. And, in any event, as
explained above, the trial judge—to whom the PCRA petition is assigned—should
be removed from the case. See Argument § I, supra.

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 RELIEF REQUESTED
Mr. Williams respectfully requests that this Court exercise its King’s Bench
or Extraordinary Jurisdiction, immediately release Mr. Williams on bail while this

proceeding is pending, order the trial judge removed from the case, vacate the trial
judge’s November 6, 2017 Order (violation of probation and sentence), and, if
necessary, remand for proceedings before a different judge.

The facts and law set forth in this Application provide ample grounds to
grant the relief Mr. Williams requests, and no discovery is required to ensure a full
and fair adjudication of this Application. If, however, this Court concludes that
discovery is needed to resolve this matter, Mr. Williams requests release on bail
while that discovery is conducted.
Mr. Williams also requests that this Court exercise its King’s Bench or

Extraordinary Jurisdiction in connection with his PCRA petition and grant the
petition or at least assign it to a different judge and to grant him immediate bail
while this Court or the trial court determines whether, and how, to vacate his
original conviction.18

Respectfully submitted,

18
This Court’s King’s Bench jurisdiction is broad enough to support a conclusion
that the original conviction and/or the November 6, 2017 sentence must be
vacated, as well as the conclusion that another sentencing hearing need not be
convened.

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 By: /s/ Kim M. Watterson
Kim M. Watterson
/s/ Peter Goldberger M. Patrick Yingling
Peter Goldberger REED SMITH LLP
LAW OFFICE OF PETER GOLDBERGER 225 Fifth Ave.
50 Rittenhouse Place Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Ardmore, PA 19003 412-288-3131
610-649-8200 kwatterson@reedsmith.com

/s/ Brian J. McMonagle /s/ Joshua M. Peles

Brian J. McMonagle Joshua M. Peles
MCMONAGLE, PERRI, MCHUGH & REED SMITH LLP
MISCHAK, P.C. Three Logan Square
1845 Walnut St., 19th Fl. 1717 Arch St., Suite 3100
Philadelphia, PA 19103 Philadelphia, PA 19103
215-981-0999 215-241-7939

Dated: March 19, 2018 Counsel for Defendant-Petitioner

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH PUBLIC ACCESS POLICY

I certify pursuant to Pa.R.App.P. 127 that this filing (including the attached
exhibits) complies with the provisions of the Public Access Policy of the United

Judicial System of Pennsylvania: Case Records of the Appellate and Trial Courts
(eff. 1/5/2018) that require filing of confidential information and documents
differently than non-confidential information and documents.

/s/ Kim M. Watterson

Kim M. Watterson
REED SMITH LLP
225 Fifth Ave.
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
412-288-3131
kwatterson@reedsmith.com
 PROOF OF SERVICE

On March 19, 2018, I caused a copy of the foregoing to be served on

counsel for the District Attorney’s Office via the electronic filing system,
PACFile.

/s/ Kim M. Watterson

Kim M. Watterson
REED SMITH LLP
225 Fifth Ave.
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
412-288-3131
kwatterson@reedsmith.com