You are on page 1of 11

Mohd Irwan Arifin v.

[2017] 1 ILR Aluminium Company Of Malaysia Berhad 397

A MOHD IRWAN ARIFIN v.


ALUMINIUM COMPANY OF MALAYSIA BERHAD
INDUSTRIAL COURT, KUALA LUMPUR
ANDERSEN ONG WAI LEONG
AWARD NO. 168 OF 2017 [CASE NO: 19/4-96/15]
B
23 JANUARY 2017
DISMISSAL: Insubordination – Whether the claimant had acted in an
insubordinate way towards his superior – Factors to consider – Evidence adduced
– Effect of – Whether it had been an isolated incident – Whether he had been
provoked – Whether insubordination had been successfully proven against him –
C
Evidence adduced – Evaluation of – Whether his dismissal had been justified
under the circumstances – Whether dismissal without just cause and excuse
DISMISSAL: Misconduct – Claimant rude and discourteous to his superior –
Whether it had constituted serious misconduct – Factors to consider – Company
D failing to consider mitigating circumstances before dismissing him – What it
should have done – Whether his misconduct had justified his dismissal
EVIDENCE: Adverse inference – Non-production of material witnesses –
Whether Normimi and Teh had been material witnesses in this matter –
Whether they would have given evidence differing from that given in the DI if
E called to testify at the hearing – Factors to consider – Effect of – Whether an
adverse inference ought to be drawn against the company
The claimant had been employed by the company as a Senior Facilities
Services Co-Ordinator under the General Services Department.
Approximately six months into his employment with it, he was informed
F that his department was being absorbed by the Human Resources
Department and that his reporting line would change. The claimant was
unhappy with the restructuring and a series of e-mails and words ensued
between him and the company. He was subsequently issued a show cause
letter for charges of being insubordinate. The claimant responded to it, but
G the company was not satisfied with his responses and proceeded to
convene a Domestic Inquiry (‘DI’). At the conclusion of the DI, he was
found guilty of all the charges preferred against him and discharged from
service. The claimant now contends that his dismissal had been without
just cause and excuse. The sole issue that arose for determination was
H whether his dismissal had been carried out with just cause and excuse.
Held for the claimant: dismissal without just cause and excuse
(1) Having considered all the evidence adduced, the claimant, on a
balance of probabilities, had committed the misconduct in four of the
charges brought against him. He had been a senior management staff
I
of the company and such behaviour had been unbecoming of him. He
had acted aggressively and inappropriately towards Normimi who
had been his superior, in terms of ranking in the company’s hierarchy
(para 25).
398 Industrial Law Reports [2017] 1 ILR

(2) On the drawing of an adverse inference against the company for its A
failure to call Normimi and Teh as a witness, even if these two
witnesses had been called, it had been unlikely that they would have
given any new evidence and they would probably have given the
same evidence as they had given in the DI, which had not been
disputed by the claimant. Thus, no adverse inference would be drawn B
in this case (para 26).
(3) Not all misconduct deserves the punishment of dismissal. Dismissal
is only warranted if the employee has committed serious misconduct.
The misconduct complained of in this case had not been serious
misconduct which had justified the claimant’s dismissal. The e-mails C
sent by the claimant to Normimi and his utterances to her, could not
be said to constitute insubordination, although they had been rude and
discourteous. The e-mails had arisen due to the claimant’s
unhappiness with the manner in which the restructuring had been
conveyed to him, which the evidence had suggested had been abrupt D
and hasty. It could have been an isolated incident and there had not
been any evidence to indicate that it had happened before. Further,
the probability was that he had been provoked in his meeting with
Normimi when he had been confronted and reprimanded. Also, there
had been no evidence to suggest that the company had taken into E
account mitigating factors before dismissing him, which it should
have done. The exchange of words and fracas in this case seemed to
have arisen due to a lack of communication and/or miscommunication
between the parties (paras 28 & 29).
[Dismissal without just cause or excuse - Claimant awarded backwages and F
compensation in lieu of reinstatement in the sum of RM46,800.]
Award(s) referred to:
DTS Trading Sdn Bhd v. Wong Weng Kit [2008] 1 ILR 548 (Award No. 222 of 2008)
Goodyear Malaysia Bhd v. National Union of Employees in Companies Manufacturing
Rubber Products [1986] 1 ILR 522 (Award No. 88 of 1986) G
Holiday Inn, Kuching, Sarawak v. Puan Elizabeth Lee Chai Siok, Sarawak [1990] 2 ILR
262 (Award No. 255 of 1990)

Case(s) referred to:


Bax Global (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. Sukhdev Singh Pritam Singh & Anor [2011] 2 CLJ
534 H
Jupiter General Insurance Co, Ltd v. Ardeshir Bomanji Shroff (1937) 3 All ER 67
Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v. Wong Seh Yen [1995] 4 CLJ 449
Telekom Malaysia Kawasan Utara v. Krishnan Kutty Sanguni Nair & Anor [2002] 3 CLJ
314
Wong Yuen Hock v. Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [1995]
3 CLJ 344 I
Mohd Irwan Arifin v.
[2017] 1 ILR Aluminium Company Of Malaysia Berhad 399

A Legislation referred to:


Employment Act 1955, s. 14
Evidence Act 1950, s. 114(g)
Industrial Relations Act 1967, ss. 20, 20(3), 23(6) & 30(5)
For the claimant - Tengku Saiful Hisham; M/s Apandi Ali & Co
B For the company - Abdullah Abd Karim; Malaysian Employers Federation
Reported by Sharmini Pillai

AWARD
(NO. 168 of 2017)
C Andersen Ong Wai Leong:
Reference
[1] This is a reference from The Honourable Minister of Human
Resources, Malaysia to the Industrial Court of Malaysia under s. 20(3) of
D the Industrial Relations Act 1967 in respect of the dismissal of Mohd
Irwan Bin Arifin (“the claimant”) by his employer, Aluminium Company
of Malaysia Berhad (“the company”) on 16 January 2014.
[2] The case was previously tried and concluded by the former
Chairman, Yang Arif Puan Hapipah Binti Monel who had retired from the
E Industrial Court. I have since taken over the conduct of this matter as the
new Chairman of this court. I have been requested to deliver and prepare
the Award for this matter. Parties have on 20 October 2016 given their
consent for me to deliver and prepare the Award without the need for the
case to be heard de novo. I further rely on the authority of Bax Global
F (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd v. Sukhdev Singh Pritam Singh & Anor [2011] 2 CLJ 534
where the court held that s. 23(6) of Industrial Relations Act 1967
(“IRA”) allows another chairman to continue hearing a part-heard case
and the new Chairman can hand down the Award in such cases.
[3] Therefore, this Award is written based on my reading, perusal and
G evaluation of the facts and evidence contained in the notes of proceedings
prepared by the former Chairman, Yang Arif Puan Hapipah Binti Monel
and gleaned from the documents made available to me.
Facts

H [4] Pursuant to the company’s letter of offer dated 25 April 2013, the
claimant commenced employment on probation with the company on
2 May 2013 as Senior Human Resources Specialist.
[5] The claimant via the company’s letter dated 1 September 2013 was
re-designated as Senior Facilities Services Co-ordinator with the company
I effective from 1 September 2013 and was placed under the General
Services Department / Section of the company, in charge of general
services and maintenance works.
400 Industrial Law Reports [2017] 1 ILR

[6] On 16 December 2013, the claimant received an email from the A


then Human Resources Manager, Puan Normimi Mansor (“Puan
Normimi”) informing the claimant that the General Services Department
/ Section of the company would be absorbed under the Human Resources
Department (“the Restructuring”) and he is required to report to the
Admin Manager, Ms. Angeline Tan. B

[7] The claimant was unhappy with this new arrangement and the
manner Puan Normimi has handled the Restructuring which to him was
not professionally done. He complained that inter alia there was no general
announcement or prior discussion with him on the matter and he did not
receive any official letter informing him of such arrangement. C
Subsequently, exchange of emails and words ensued between the claimant
and Puan Normimi.
[8] On 19 December 2013, during a meeting attended by the claimant
and Puan Normimi, angry arguments and quarrels broke out between
D
them. This was witnessed by several of their colleagues who were also
present at the meeting.
[9] The company issued a show cause letter dated 23 December 2013
to the claimant for the incident that took place on 19 December 2013 and
the emails sent by the claimant to Puan Normimi prior to that.
E
Accordingly, the claimant via letter dated 25 December 2013 replied to
the allegations raised in the company’s show cause letter.
[10] Dissatisfied with the claimant’s reply, the company convened a
domestic inquiry on matter on 13 January 2014. The company leveled 6
charges against the claimant, to which the claimant pleaded not guilty to F
all of them. The charges made against the claimant are now produced here
as follows:
Charge 1
That on 19.12.2013 between 3.35 p.m. until 5.30 p.m. while attending the
meeting pertaining to your reporting line at Alcom Meeting Room 1 you G
had behave in a bad manner by raising you voice and at the same time
accusing of non-professionalism to Puan Normimi Binti Mansor, the
Company’s Human Resources Manager over her email sent to you on
16.12.2013 @ 5.44 p.m.
Charge 2 H

That on 19 December 2013 between 3.35 p.m. until 5.30 p.m. while
attending the meeting pertaining to your reporting line at Alcom Meeting
Room 1, you had challenged to fight with Puan Normimi Binti Mansor, by
shouting “you bawa you punya lawyer here and saya bawa Jabatan Buruh”
whilst refusing to accept Puan Normimi’s explanation on the content of her I
email dated on 16 December 2013 @ 6.08 p.m. to you was purely to advise
you to work together with Miss Angeline Tan ...
Mohd Irwan Arifin v.
[2017] 1 ILR Aluminium Company Of Malaysia Berhad 401

A Charge 3
That on 19 December 2013 between 3.35 p.m. until 5.30 p.m while
attending the meeting pertaining to your reporting line at Alcom Meeting
Room 1, you had acted in ill mannered, violently by shouting the words
“you shut up” and at the same time pointing your right hand’s index finger
B straight to Puan Normimi’s face when she asked if you understood the
content of her email to you dated 16 December 2013 @ 5.44 p.m …
Charge 4
That on 19 December 2013 between 3.35 p.m. until 5.30 p.m while
attending the meeting pertaining to your reporting line at Alcom Meeting
C Room 1, you have insulted Puan Normimi, the Company’s Human
Resources Manager by uttering the words “you ingat you besar ke?” when
she said - “You cannot talk to me like that, I am the Company’s officer and
we are currently in formal discussion.”
Charge 5
D That you had insulted Puan Normimi Binti Mansor, the Company’s Human
Resources Manager through claims of cronyism/hidden agenda via your
email dated 18 December 2013 @ 10.11 a.m. item no 2 which spelled as
follows:
… I was arranging with Angie over the telephone issue which
E suddenly you interrupted and mention the reporting line. Are you
and Angie (sctraching each other back?)
Charge 6
That you had insulted and rudely accused Puan Normimi Binti Mansor, the
Company’s Human Resources Manager involved in office politics through
F the last sentence of your email to her 18 December 2013 @ 10.11 a.m.
which read as follows:
…What I need is your professional action over these issues and not
on the office politics being played.
[11] The company found the claimant guilty of all 6 charges leveled
G
against him and the claimant was informed by the company of their
decision to dismiss the claimant via the company’s letter dated 16 January
2014 on the ground of serious misconduct. The claimant contended that
his dismissal from employment was without just cause and excuse.

H Evaluation And Findings Of The Court


[12] On the facts of this case, the factum of dismissal is not in dispute.
The question that this court is required to consider is whether the claimant
was dismissed with just cause and excuse. In the case of Milan Auto Sdn
Bhd v. Wong Seh Yen [1995] 4 CLJ 449, Federal Court, Mohd Azmi bin
I Kamaruddin, FCJ, in making reference to Wong Yuen Hock v. Syarikat
Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [1995] 3 CLJ 344, held
that the function of the Industrial Court in dismissal cases on a reference
under s. 20 is two-fold. Firstly, to determine whether the misconduct
402 Industrial Law Reports [2017] 1 ILR

complained of by the employer has been established, and secondly A


whether the proven misconduct constitutes just cause or excuse for the
dismissal.
[13] On the present facts, the misconducts complained of are in relation
to the email sent by the claimant to Puan Normimi on 18 December 2013
B
@ 10.11 am. (as referred to in the company’s Charge Nos. 5 and 6) and
the incident that took place during the meeting on 19 December 2013.
[14] The word “misconduct” in the context of industrial relation is not
defined by the statutes although the Employment Act 1955 (“EA”) did
provide that an employer may, on the grounds of misconduct inconsistent
C
with the fulfillment of the express or implied conditions of his service
dismiss the employee (see s. 14 of EA). It is generally accepted in
industrial jurisprudence that every employer has the right to establish rules
and regulations governing the conduct of his employees at the workplace
and during work time and every employee owes certain duties to his
D
employer. Some of these duties and obligations arise from the contract of
employment while others can be implied from the employer-employee
relationship.
[15] In Holiday Inn, Kuching, Sarawak v. Puan Elizabeth Lee Chai Siok,
Sarawak [1990] 2 ILR 262 (Award No. 255 of 1990), the court held that
E
any conduct inconsistent with the faithful discharge of his duties, or any
breach of the express or implied duties of an employee towards his
employer, unless it be of trifling nature, would constitute an act of
misconduct.
[16] The claimant in our present case has never denied sending the email F
in question to Puan Normimi, whether during the domestic inquiry session
held on 13 January 2014 or cross examination by the company’s counsel.
However, the claimant did attempt to justify the contents of his email
during the Domestic Inquiry. On his remark “Are you and Angie
(sctraching each other back?)”, the claimant’s explanation was “It’s a
G
spontaneous word. I’m not accusing her la”. The claimant also denied
accusing Puan Normimi of playing office politics notwithstanding his
email. The claimant explained in his own words, “… ok I not accusing her
of office politic but the words it say that. Maybe I tak pandai cakap BI
English or what ...”
H
[17] The claimant’s accusations against Puan Normimi in his email are
unwarranted and uncalled for as Puan Normini at that time was just
informing the claimant of the Restructuring. The claimant’s response, to
my mind was an attempt to undermine the authority of Puan Normimi
who was the Human Resources Manager at that time and constitute
I
misconduct.
Mohd Irwan Arifin v.
[2017] 1 ILR Aluminium Company Of Malaysia Berhad 403

A [18] With regards to the incident that took place in the meeting on
19 December 2013, the claimant when asked by the company’s counsel
during cross examination on the company’s Charge Nos. 1 to 4, disagrees
with the charges leveled against him. The claimant insisted that he did not
raise his voice or shout at Puan Normimi and ask her to “shut up”. He
B maintains that he was just being vocal and it was his character and manner
of speaking. He also denied making any challenge to Puan Normimi.
According to his reply in the Domestic Inquiry, he did not mean to
challenge Puan Normimi. He was just joking with Puan Normimi.
[19] The company’s witness, Che Jah Khairuddin (“COW3”) who was
C present at the meeting on 19 December 2013 together with the claimant
and Puan Normimi, confirmed in her Witness Statement that the claimant
was quarreling with Puan Normimi in the meeting. According to COW3,
the claimant raised his voice toward Puan Normimi and accused her of
being unprofessional. The claimant also pointed his finger at Puan
D Normimi and asked her to shut up.
[20] COW3’s evidence on the incident that took place during the
meeting on 19 December 2013 is consistent with the testimonies of Puan
Normimi and Mr. Teh Chin Hwee at the domestic inquiry. Mr. Teh Chin
Hwee (Mr. Teh) was the claimant’s immediate superior and was present
E in the meeting on 19 December 2013 together with Puan Normimi and
COW3.
[21] The company did not call Puan Normimi or Mr. Teh to give
evidence during the trial. The claimant’s counsel in his written
submissions argued that the company has failed to prove on the balance of
F
probabilities that the claimant has committed the alleged wrongdoings
during the meeting on 19 December 2013. The claimant’s counsel invites
this court to invoke the adverse inference under s. 114(g) of the Evidence
Act 1950 against the company for their failure to produce Puan Normimi
and Mr. Teh as witness to give evidence during trial.
G
[22] It is trite law that for dismissal cases the quantum of proof is on the
balance of probabilities even if the misconduct complained of is of
criminal in nature [see the case of Telekom Malaysia Kawasan Utara v.
Krishnan Kutty Sanguni Nair & Anor [2002] 3 CLJ 314].

H [23] Whilst, it is reckoned that Puan Normimi and Mr. Teh are relevant
witnesses for the company, failure by the company to call them to give
evidence during trial is not fatal on the facts. The claimant has never
denied the emails sent to Puan Normimi and he admitted to the notes of
proceedings of the Domestic Inquiry at pp. 28 to 59 of COB1 during cross
examination by the company’s counsel. The claimant’s counsel also did
I
not object or challenge the said notes of proceedings during trial. COW3
has also confirmed the incident that took place in the meeting room on
19 December 2013 and her testimony corroborates the evidence given by
Puan Normimi and Mr. Teh in the Domestic Inquiry.
404 Industrial Law Reports [2017] 1 ILR

[24] The company through COW3 has given evidence that Puan A
Normimi and Mr. Teh have resigned from the company. The company’s
counsel has informed this court that they have attempted to serve the
subpoena on Puan Normimi to secure her attendance in court and to be a
witness for the company. According to the counsel for the company, Puan
Normimi refused to accept the subpoena and their process server has left B
the subpoena in her mail box. No further explanation was given by the
company’s counsel with regards to the subpoena issued against Puan
Normimi. The company also did not provide any explanation as to why
Mr. Teh was not called as a witness.
[25] Having considered all the evidence put before this court, I am C
satisfied that on a balance of probabilities the claimant would have
committed the act complained of in the company’s Charge Nos. 1 to 4,
thereby misconducted himself. The claimant was a senior management
staff of the company and such behavior was unbecoming of one. The
claimant has acted aggressively and inappropriately toward Puan D
Normimi who was his superior in term of ranking in the company’s
hierarchy.
[26] It is the considered view of this court that had the company called
Puan Normimi and Mr. Teh as witness, likelihood they would have given
the same evidence as what they had given in the Domestic Inquiry. It is E
not likely that there will be any new evidence which would be adverse to
the company if Mr. Teh or Puan Normimi was called as a witness. As said
earlier, the alleged wrongdoings or act of misconducts are clear on the
facts and can be gleaned from the documents put before this court, which
were not disputed by the claimant. Therefore, no adverse inference will be F
drawn against the company for not calling Puan Normimi and Mr. Teh as
witnesses.
[27] In any event, it is an established principle that Industrial Court is
not bound strictly by the rule of evidence or the Evidence Act 1950.
Section 30(5) of the IRA requires that the court shall act according to G
equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities and legal form. In Telekom Malaysia Kawasan Utara
v. Krishnan Kutty Sanguni Nair & Anor, Justice Abdul Hamid, delivering
the judgment of the Court of Appeal stated as follows:
... the Industrial Court should not be burdened with the H
technicalities regarding the standard of proof, the rules of evidence
and procedure that applied in a court of law. The Industrial Court
should be allowed to conduct its proceedings as a “court of
arbitration”, and be more flexible in arriving at its decision, so long
as it gives special regard to substantial merits and decides a case in
I
accordance with equity and good conscience.
[28] Having established the misconduct committed by the claimant, we
must now consider whether the proven misconduct constitutes just cause
or excuse for the dismissal. Not all misconduct deserves the punishment
Mohd Irwan Arifin v.
[2017] 1 ILR Aluminium Company Of Malaysia Berhad 405

A of dismissal. The punishment of dismissal is only warranted if the


employee has committed serious misconduct. In my view, the
misconducts complained of here are not serious misconduct justifying
dismissal. I do not think that the emails sent by the claimant to Puan
Normimi and the utterances of the claimant could be said to constitute
B insubordination. No doubt, they were rude and discourteous but they are
not act of insubordination. Although the emails were sent a day before the
incident on 19 December 2013, they emanated from the same cause and
can be regarded as a single outbreak due to the claimant’s unhappiness
with the manner the Restructuring was conveyed to him. This could be an
C
isolated incident and certainly there is no evidence that such an incident
had happened before. Further, in all probability, the claimant would have
been provoked when confronted or reprimanded on 19 December 2013
during the meeting. In this context, I refer and adopt the words of Lord
Maugham in Jupiter General Insurance Co Ltd v. Ardeshir Bomanji Shroff
(1973) 3 All ER 67 (PC) where he said:
D
Their lordships would be loathe to assent to the view that a single
outbreak of bad temper, accompanied it may be with regrettable
language, is a sufficient ground for dismissal.
In such cases, one must apply the standards of men and not those
E
of angels, and remember that men are apt to show temper when
reprimanded.
[29] Also, on the facts, there is no evidence that the company has taken
into consideration of the relevant mitigating factors before dismissing the
claimant. The exchange of words and fracas in this case seem to have
F arisen due to lack of communication or miscommunication. This, to me is
relevant mitigating factor that the company ought to have taken into
consideration before deciding to dismiss the claimant. The evidence here
suggests that the Restructuring was communicated to the claimant, rather
abruptly and in a hastily manner.
G [30] In the case of Goodyear Malaysia Bhd and National Union of Employees
in Companies Manufacturing Rubber Products [1986] 1 ILR 522 (Award
No. 88 of 1986) it was said:
Important circumstances which mitigate the offence of the workman
should be taken into account by the employer before he can be said
H to have made a fair and reasonable decision to dismiss. For example,
a workman’s past record of good service, or the management’s own
actions or omissions which contributed to the misconduct, are
mitigating factors which any reasonable company would take into
account of before dismissing.

I [31] In the circumstances, this court having considered all the facts and
evaluated the totality of the evidence, both oral and documentary and
going by equity, good conscience and substantial merits of the case
406 Industrial Law Reports [2017] 1 ILR

without regard to technicalities and legal form, finds on the balance of A


probabilities that the claimant had been dismissed without just cause or
excuse.
Relief
[32] As for the relief sought, it may be undesirable to order reinstatement B
of the claimant to his former employment or position given the
circumstances the claimant was dismissed from his employment.
Therefore, this court will award him compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
[33] On the backwages, from the evidence presented to this court, the
claimant at the time of dismissal was drawing a salary of RM4,500. It is C
unfortunate that no or very little evidence being adduced on post dismissal
earning by the claimant. The claimant in his Witness Statement merely
said that he was not working at the time of hearing. No evidence being led
on whether the claimant has worked before between the period
immediately after dismissal until the date of conclusion of hearing or D
whether he has attempted to secure any similar employment. At this
juncture, I would like to refer to the case of DTS Trading Sdn Bhd v. Wong
Weng Kit [2008] 1 ILR 548 (Award No. 222 of 2008) where the learned
Chairman commented as follow:
In a society such as ours where a person would invariably have to E
work in order to sustain day to day living, the court is of the view
that even if no evidence is adduced as regards to post dismissal
earnings, the court is entitled nevertheless to make a deduction for
post dismissal earning. As such, a claimant who has not been
gainfully employed since his dismissal or who has been gainfully
employed but on a woefully small salary should clearly say so to the F
court. To remain silent is to risk the court making a deduction
deemed reasonable by the court.
[34] On the facts, hearing of this matter was concluded on 24 March
2016, after more than 2 years have lapsed from the time the claimant was
dismissed, namely on 13 January 2014. Taking the cue from the case of G
DTS Trading Sdn Bhd v. Wong Weng Kit, one could not help but to infer that
the claimant during aforesaid period of exceeding 2 years would have been
gainfully employed or receiving some forms of earning from his
employment after the dismissal and prior to the hearing date. Therefore,
this court is inclined to make reasonable deduction on the backwages H
accordingly for post dismissal earning.
[35] This court is also mindful of para. 5 of the Second Schedule of the
Industrial Relations Act 1967, which provides:
Any relief given shall take into account contributory misconduct of
I
the workman.
Mohd Irwan Arifin v.
[2017] 1 ILR Aluminium Company Of Malaysia Berhad 407

A [36] This is a clear case where reasonable deduction has to be made for
contributory misconduct of the claimant. The dismissal was clearly
attributable to claimant’s own indiscretion. Also nowhere suggest that the
claimant has even made any attempt to apologize to Puan Normimi
immediately after the incident. Perhaps an earnest apology from the
B claimant could have done the trick and save the claimant from the
predicament he is in now.
[37] Accordingly, this court makes the following orders:
(a) Compensation in lieu of reinstatement
C RM4,500 x 2 months = RM9,000
(b) Backwages
RM4,500 x 24 months = RM108,000
Less 40% for contributory misconduct = (RM43,200)
D
Less 25% for post dismissal earning = (RM27,000)

Total = RM37,800
[38] The court orders that the company pays the claimant the sum of
E
RM46,800 less any statutory deductions, if any, to the claimant vide his
Solicitors, Messrs. Apandi Ali & Co within 30 days from the date hereof.