98 1 A. Correct. 2 Q. In tidying up the drafts. 3 A.
It came through, as I recall, very quickly and had to be 4 turned round very quickly. Mark saw it, I saw it, but 5 it was a very rapid revision/review of the work that we 6 had, in effect, completed a month and a half earlier, 7 around about 20th June. 8 Q. Perhaps after lunch I can come back to what you drafted 9 and what Dr Kelly drafted in May and June, and then the 10 detail of what you had in September. 11 A. Certainly. 12 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much. 13 (1.00 pm) 14 (The short adjournment) 15 (2.00 pm) 16 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Lamb, I was asking you some questions 17 about the dossier. Can you look at CAB/3/82 which is 18 going to come up on your screen. This is the earliest 19 version of the dossier we have been given. It is dated 20 20th June 2002. If you look at the top, it says: 21 "1 document version, 20th June 2002." 22 A. Correct. 23 Q. That talks about the history of UN weapons inspections 24 in Iraq. Is that the document to which you referred 25 earlier this morning? 99 1 A. Correct. 2 Q. And that is the document that you had had input into and 3 you had reviewed with Dr Kelly? 4 A. Correct, yes. 5 Q. And if one goes, then, to the contents of the dossier as 6 published, which is DOS/1/56, it rather looks as if that 7 has become chapter 2, is that right? 8 A. Or part 2, yes. 9 Q. Sorry, part 2. You then did not draft anything further 10 of the dossier? 11 A. After the 20th June version you just put on the screen? 12 Q. Yes. 13 A. No, that was the end of my personal involvement, direct 14 personal involvement with the dossier, correct. 15 Q. We have been given another dossier dated 16 5th September 2002; and that is CAB/3/7. Did you see 17 this document at all? If it scrolls right down so you 18 can see the top of the page, you can see someone has 19 written in handwriting, I do not know who, 20 "5th September 2002"; have you seen that document 21 before? 22 A. I honestly cannot recall whether I saw that specific 23 document. 24 Q. Right. So did you review any dossiers in September?
25 A. I personally simply oversaw or was made aware, excuse 100 1 me, of our revision, that is to say the revision made by 2 my department to the historical element that referred to 3 the UNSCOM inspections. That was the part that came 4 back to the Counter Proliferation Department for 5 revision as necessary on 9th September and which was 6 dealt with by my colleague, Mr Peters. 7 Q. When you were giving evidence earlier this morning you 8 also said you had had some earlier involvement in 9 chapter 3 of the dossier. Can we bring up DOS/1/56 10 which was the current position, I think you said? 11 A. Correct, yes. 12 Q. That is chapter 3 of part 1. The current position, 1998 13 to 2002. You had some involvement in drafting that? 14 A. Not in drafting it, but in some of the meetings in the 15 Cabinet Office at which that particular element of the 16 briefing papers were being discussed. 17 Q. Right. Do you know when those meetings were? Were 18 those before June 2002 or in September 2002? 19 A. No, those were much earlier. So they took place in, 20 I believe, February/March 2002. 21 Q. Right. Did Dr Kelly attend any of those meetings? 22 A. Dr Kelly attended no meetings in the Cabinet Office 23 relevant to this dossier. 24 Q. Right. Did you discuss what became chapter 3 with 25 Dr Kelly? 101 1 A. Most certainly. Our relationship with Dr Kelly was 2 a very easy one, a very relaxed one; and when he came 3 into the department we would, as a matter of course, 4 show him and tell him where we were up to. We would 5 show him drafts if drafts were available and we would 6 discuss them with him. This was, as I say, on an 7 informal basis. He was keen to find out from us where 8 we were, and we were keen obviously to put things back 9 to him to use him as a sounding board and a source if 10 need be of information and confirmation of any facts. 11 Q. Looking at the contents page, those bits of the chapter 12 that you, in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, would 13 have discussed, if I can use that term, I hope fairly, 14 with Dr Kelly would be part 2, History of UN Weapons 15 Inspection and chapter 3, The Current Position; is that 16 right? 17 A. That would be correct. I would add, however, there is 18 also part 3, Iraq Under Saddam Hussein, which became 19 known, informally at least, to those of us involved in 20 the Cabinet Office meetings, as the human rights element 21 of the dossier. There we would have discussed that also 22 with Dr Kelly. He had an extremely close knowledge of
23 Iraq and a very close knowledge of the nature of the 24 regime. I am sure that we discussed that with him 25 informally. I believe also that he would have discussed 102 1 that with the relevant department in the Foreign Office 2 which took responsibility for drafting that particular 3 section, which was -4 Q. Who is that department -5 A. Excuse me, which was our Middle Eastern department. 6 Q. So he would have had direct discussions with them as 7 well? 8 A. He would have had discussions with them. We were a very 9 close-knit group of people who had all worked on this 10 issue for some time. He knew us all well. Indeed, the 11 colleague in the Middle Eastern Department who was 12 responsible and oversaw the human rights element, had 13 previously been in the Counter Proliferation Department 14 and therefore was very well known too. 15 Q. Are you able to share his name with us? 16 A. That is Dr Amanda Tanfield(?). 17 Q. Right. So we have looked at Iraq Under Saddam Hussein, 18 if one is looking at the contents page, part 3; History 19 of UN Weapons Inspections, part 2; part 1, chapter 3, 20 Current Position. Did you have anything to do with 21 either chapter 1, the Role of Intelligence, or chapter 22 2, Iraq's Programmes? 23 A. Not as I recall, no. 24 Q. Can I take you to some documents where he describes his 25 role in the programme? The first document is MoD/1/19. 103 1 That is a letter of 30th June 2003. He describes, in 2 the third paragraph: 3 "As you know I have been involved in writing three 4 'dossiers' concerning Iraq -- the 1999 UNSCOM/Butler 5 Status of Verification Report... " 6 Do you know anything about that? 7 A. I know it historically as a document, sir, and that 8 obviously marks a stage in the UNSCOM assessment of the 9 situation in Iraq; but I would be unable to go into any 10 detail as to its contents. 11 Q. You did not know about his own involvement in that? 12 A. Not personally, no. 13 Q. Then he talks about the September 2002 International 14 Institute of Strategic Studies report which was the IISS 15 one. You no doubt have seen that document? 16 A. I have seen that document, yes. 17 Q. Then he talks about the UK Government's Iraq's weapons 18 of mass destruction report. 19 A. Correct. 20 Q. He says:
21 "My contributions to the latter [the UK 22 Government's] were in part 2", which I think accords 23 with your evidence. He talks about history of UN 24 inspections and part 1, chapter 2, Iraq's programmes 25 1971 to 1998 at the behest of the Foreign and 104 1 Commonwealth Office, which I think you were saying he 2 was really dealing with in part 1, chapter 3. Perhaps 3 he dealt with other people? 4 A. No, in theory he would have dealt with my department in 5 that respect. Clearly, he would have had expertise in 6 that area and covering that length of time because of 7 his time spent in Iraq and the inspections he had 8 conducted there. I think it is fair to say that the way 9 in which the dossier came into being does not 10 necessarily reflect the earlier component parts of the 11 dossier. 12 Q. Right. 13 A. And, therefore, when I said that my involvement and the 14 involvement of my department was essentially on the 15 programmes 1998 to 2002, and the historical element, 16 that was, I believe, accurate. I can understand that 17 Dr Kelly may have felt and may have believed that to 18 some extent his contribution extended and to some extent 19 it did -- if that is to be fair. In the course of our 20 discussions clearly he would provide us with very, very 21 detailed historical background and information on -22 Q. Which would have gone back before 1998? 23 A. Which would have gone back before 1998. But I am not 24 aware personally of any discussions with him on issues 25 prior to the 1990s. 105 1 Q. Can you look at a document CAB/1/74 which was, in fact, 2 written by Michael Jay who is the Permanent Under 3 Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth 4 Department. 5 A. Correct. 6 Q. In the penultimate paragraph. This is referring to 7 David Kelly: 8 "I should add that the person concerned did have 9 a hand in producing Part 2 of the September dossier 10 [which I think accords with what you said] on the 11 history of UNSCOM inspections. Because of his 12 first-hand experience, he was invited to comment on the 13 first draft of that chapter. For the same reason he was 14 also asked to produce the first draft of the box on 15 page 38, entitled 'Inspection of Iraq's biological 16 weapons programme'." 17 That accords with your understanding as well, is 18 that correct?
19 A. Correct, yes. 20 LORD HUTTON: Can I just ask you Mr Lamb: on part 2 of 21 the September dossier Dr Kelly would have commented on 22 that, he did not actually write it, he commented on it, 23 but he actually wrote, did he, the first draft of the 24 box on page 38? 25 A. He would have written what eventually became the first 106 1 draft in the box on page 38, because when we prepared 2 our first draft in April 2002, we felt that it would be 3 helpful and indeed very instructive to set out some 4 background on the specific instances relating to Iraq's 5 biological weapons programme which was obviously 6 Dr Kelly's very particular area of expertise. 7 Therefore, he contributed that particular element. He 8 also contributed and helped with other elements that 9 figure now elsewhere in the document, in particular on 10 pages 11 and 12, that relate to the chemical weapons and 11 biological weapons agents developed by Iraq, their 12 lethality and so on; and obviously he acted as technical 13 adviser in that respect. 14 LORD HUTTON: Yes; but when you say "contributed", do you 15 mean that he made comments on a draft that you or 16 someone else had written or that he wrote it himself? 17 A. With respect to Iraq's biological weapons programme, he 18 wrote that himself. 19 LORD HUTTON: I see, yes. Thank you very much. 20 MR DINGEMANS: Do you know how many drafts of the dossier 21 were produced? 22 A. No is the quick answer to that. I think the best way of 23 describing the process that I was involved in was very 24 much something that I would call a rolling text, that is 25 to say it is a text that is constantly under revision 107 1 and under review; and therefore although versions of it 2 would be printed and possibly circulated, it was always 3 understood that it was a work in progress. And I think 4 that the document on the 20th June, dated 20th June, 5 which you showed me was, as I say, as far as we were 6 concerned in the Counter Proliferation Department, the 7 conclusion of our direct and immediate input to the 8 dossier. 9 Q. So you finish on 20th June with that document signed off 10 that I have shown you at least the first page on. And 11 then you have nothing really further to do with it until 12 September; is that right? 13 A. That would be right, yes, indeed. 14 Q. Do you know what version of the dossier you saw and were 15 asked to comment on in September and when you commented 16 on it?
17 A. Yes, I do. As I think I said earlier, it was the 18 historical element. It was essentially part 2. 19 Q. Right. 20 A. That came back to us for possible revision. It was seen 21 by my colleague, Mr Peters, and dealt with by Mr Peters. 22 That was all that Dr Kelly saw in the Foreign Office of 23 that particular 9th September document. 24 Q. 9th September. So that must have been the dossier which 25 we have dated 5th September, is that a fair inference? 108 1 A. I think it is a fair inference, sir, yes. 2 Q. But you would not be able, without seeing the documents, 3 no doubt, to be able to compare them? 4 A. I think even if I saw the documents I might have 5 difficulty at this distance in retracing the steps. But 6 I think it is a fair inference that they are very 7 comparable. 8 Q. And that was a draft he commented on, on 9th September, 9 in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office? 10 A. He was shown it by my colleague Mr Peters -11 Q. Yes. 12 A. -- on 9th September. So he saw that element which was, 13 in actual fact, very faithful to the element that we had 14 concluded with on 20th June, and very faithful to what 15 eventually appeared in the dossier. 16 Q. Right. Do you know what he said in relation to that 17 part of it on 9th September? 18 A. I do not directly; but I know of his comments and 19 attitude throughout the period of the drafting of that 20 section, which was that he was very supportive of it, as 21 were we all. He felt that this was something that 22 needed to be set out. It needed to be set in context, 23 the nature of both the Iraqi programme and how the 24 Iraqis had gone to some considerable length to conceal 25 their programmes and also to deter and dissuade the 109 1 earlier UNSCOM inspections. And so, for him, it was 2 very much something that was going to -- as we all hoped 3 at that time, indeed as came to actual fruition -4 ensure that UN inspectors went back into Iraq, as indeed 5 they did. 6 Q. Do you know anything about his e-mailed comment which we 7 can see at CAB/3/21? We are in the documents that came 8 to the Inquiry this weekend, where part of it has been 9 redacted for security purposes, but it says this: 10 "10th September 2002", it is sent to someone whose 11 name is blanked out. 12 "I have just spoken to David Kelly (ex UNSCOM BW and 13 cleared) about the growth media amount page 8 top para 14 line 2. It states that UN inspectors could not account
15 for up to 20 tonnes of growth media..." 16 Pausing there. Growth media is what you grow the 17 biological weapons with; is that right? 18 A. Correct, yes, sir. 19 Q. So if you want lots of anthrax, you buy lots of growth 20 media? 21 A. Absolutely; and they did, indeed, purchase very large 22 quantities. 23 Q. Yes: 24 "In fact 2.456 tonnes was missing. UNSCOM could not 25 account for a further 15.457 tonnes which Iraq claimed 110 1 it used in BW [biological weapons] work. But Iraq has 2 not revealed its production documents therefore this 3 amount is unaccounted for. The existing wording is not 4 wrong -- but it has a [then it is a] lost of spin on 5 it", that may be a typo for "lots of spin on it". 6 First of all, have you seen this e-mail before? 7 A. I did not see it contemporaneously, sir, however I did 8 see it at the latter end of last week, yes, before it 9 was provided to the Tribunal. 10 Q. Do you know whether it means -- whether it is a typo or 11 not -- whether it means lots of spin on it or a loss of 12 spin on it? 13 A. I really cannot comment. I am afraid I do not know. 14 LORD HUTTON: Or a lot of spin on it. 15 MR DINGEMANS: Yes. And do you know whether that reflected 16 Dr Kelly's views of the dossier at the time, that there 17 was lots of spin on it? 18 A. No, sir, I do not believe it did reflect his views. 19 I can obviously only speak for my contacts with him, 20 which were extensive, right up through a large part of 21 the drafting into September and beyond; and as he said 22 to the Foreign Affairs Committee on 15th July, he was 23 very supportive of the dossier and very supportive of 24 the analysis put forward in the dossier. 25 So I do not believe, and I have asked my colleagues 111 1 on this particular point because, clearly, it has become 2 a matter of very real interest and concern to us; but 3 none of them recall any occasion in the Foreign Office 4 in which he indicated he had any concern or questions or 5 scepticism about any element of the dossier. 6 Q. Right. Do you know when the -- can I call it this the 7 45 minute claim; if I say the 45 minute claim, would you 8 know what I was talking about? All right. 9 Do you know when the 45 minute claim was first 10 inserted into the dossier? 11 A. I do not, sir, in a way that would be accurate enough to 12 answer your question. I think, however, that colleagues
13 who are due to follow me will be able and be in a much 14 better position to answer that question. 15 Q. Because your involvement was really June and then this 16 review in September? 17 A. Correct. 18 Q. And were you aware of any unhappiness in defence 19 intelligence staff, DIS, at the time? 20 A. I was unaware of any unhappiness. 21 Q. Right. Do you know, apart from your chapter, which 22 I think you have said remained broadly consistent 23 throughout -- and we have your chapter, the 24 United Nations history and then we have the final 25 version so we will be able to make a textural 112 1 analysis -- do you know whether any changes or other 2 transformations took place in the dossier in the weeks 3 leading up to publication or you simply were not shown 4 those? 5 A. I was not involved with that process. By that stage it 6 was being handled by my senior officials. I was not 7 involved. I was, in fact, on leave throughout much of 8 the month of August. But I was not at all closely 9 involved in any work on the dossier in September. 10 Q. Right. And I think you are very kindly going to come 11 back and assist us with other aspects of the story later 12 on; but is that all that you can help with on the 13 drafting of the dossier, from your point of view? 14 A. I believe that it is, sir, yes. As I say, if I could 15 make one simple comment: we worked extremely well in 16 a very relaxed manner, a very happy manner in many 17 respects. It was not a labour of love, it was something 18 we thought was extremely important, continue to believe 19 to be extremely important. I am only very saddened that 20 that happy atmosphere has the shadow of Dr Kelly's death 21 hanging over it. 22 LORD HUTTON: Mr Lamb, you have said that there was 23 a decision by the Prime Minister on 3rd September to 24 publish the dossier; but do I take it that it had always 25 been contemplated from an earlier part of the year that 113 1 the dossier might be published? 2 A. My Lord, I think that we had a working assumption that 3 we were preparing a document that would be published. 4 LORD HUTTON: Yes. 5 A. And in all the work that we did, that was very much the 6 focus and the criteria on which we based our work. 7 LORD HUTTON: Yes I see. Thank you very much. 8 A. I do not believe that was formally confirmed until the 9 Prime Minister's statement on the 3rd but I think we 10 took that as a working assumption.
11 LORD HUTTON: Now you referred to meetings in the Cabinet 12 Office and you said that Dr Kelly did not attend any of 13 them. Were those meetings of a particular committee? 14 Were they just a group of officials or was there a name 15 given to that committee? 16 A. I do not recall the specific name that was given to it 17 but it was a group of officials who met to discuss this 18 text, to keep it under review. It was very much as 19 I said a rolling process and a rolling text, whereby 20 a meeting would take place, my contribution would have 21 been submitted, it would be criticised by that 22 committee, suggestions made, drafting suggestions 23 proposed, and as necessary, if the group felt that there 24 were other elements that were required, a letter would 25 follow to me instructing me to provide additional 114 1 elements. 2 LORD HUTTON: Yes. 3 A. That is the manner in which we worked. 4 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Were the members of that group 5 officials, what, from the Foreign and Commonwealth 6 Office, from the Ministry of Defence, from the Cabinet 7 Office? 8 A. There were officials taken from all the relevant 9 departments, certainly the Foreign Office, the Ministry 10 of Defence, I believe defence and intelligence staff and 11 possibly from the agencies but I do not specifically 12 recall that. 13 LORD HUTTON: Yes. When would have been the last of those 14 meetings which you would have attended? 15 A. I have documents that commissioned work for me in the 16 course of May and I obviously responded to those in the 17 course of May. The final text, as I saw it on 20th June 18 I would imagine that the last meeting must have taken 19 place in June of 2002. 20 LORD HUTTON: Yes. 21 A. However, the Cabinet Office can obviously confirm that. 22 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. There is a reference to I think 23 the assessment committee that advises the JIC. Were any 24 members of the assessment committee in the group that 25 met? 115 1 A. The assessment staff, sorry, I omitted that. The 2 assessment staff would be present at all of these 3 meetings. 4 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed Mr Lamb. 5 I understand you are going to be good enough to come 6 back at a later stage. Thank you very much for helping 7 us today. I am most grateful. 8 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Howard, please.
9 MR MARTIN HOWARD (called) 10 Examined by MR DINGEMANS 11 Q. Mr Howard, can you give his Lordship your full name? 12 A. My name is Martin Lloyd Howard, my Lord. I am Deputy 13 Chief of Defence Intelligence in the Ministry of 14 Defence. 15 Q. Can I just confirm this: at the material time you were 16 not deputy chief of defence intelligence, is that right, 17 for the drafting of the dossier? 18 A. That is right. 19 Q. So the evidence that you are going to give is based on 20 discussions that you have managed to have with other 21 people -22 A. That is right. 23 Q. -- relating to the dossier. Can I ask you, do you know 24 whether Dr Kelly, from those discussions, was involved 25 in drafting the dossier? 116 1 A. I was aware that he was involved in providing some 2 contributions to the historical part of the dossier as 3 set out in his letter of 30th June, but that as I say is 4 second-hand knowledge. His involvement in other parts 5 of the dossier was as far as I can see he had contacts 6 with some members of defence and intelligence staff and 7 I believe attended one meeting. I think in your 8 previous session we referred to an e-mail in which he 9 passed views on to one of my staff, which was then 10 passed on to the assessment staff. 11 Q. Can I help you with a bit more of his evidence about 12 what he did in ISC/1/8. This is an extract from his 13 evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee. 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. What he said in paragraph 4 on that page is this: 16 "I was aware of the general debate that was going on 17 between those who were supporting the war and those who 18 were against the war and the justification for war and 19 I saw this as being part of that debate. The reference 20 was to a senior intelligence officer who had been 21 involved, primarily in drafting the dossier, that didn't 22 match me, I'm not an intelligence officer, I was not 23 involved, I mean I was involved in aspects of drafting 24 the dossier but in the non-intelligence dimension but I 25 certainly wasn't responsible for the final content of 117 1 that dossier, so the alarm bells didn't start ringing. 2 A friend of mine at RUSI... " 3 Can you help us with what that is? 4 A. That is the Royal United Services Institute. 5 Q. "... suggested, and I don't think she suggested because 6 she identified me, but she said I should read that, and
7 when I read it there was one phrase in there that I read 8 as being a 'Kelly' statement..." 9 He talks about that. He also dealt with his 10 involvement in the dossier at MoD/1/47, at paragraph 5 11 at the top, you can see this. This is an interview that 12 is being conducted that we will come back to and look at 13 in sequence. Just so that you know, it is on 7th July: 14 "Hatfield asked Kelly to describe in detail his 15 involvement in the Government's dossier of September 16 2002. Kelly said that to his recollection the idea of 17 a dossier arose in April 2002. He had drafted his 18 contributions during May and June. He then recalled 19 that the subject went into limbo. He was on leave for 20 two weeks in August and then on duty in New York and 21 consequently was not involved in any work during that 22 month. His only subsequent involvement was when he was 23 asked by DIS (in September) to look at the passages on 24 biological weapons and consider whether anything extra 25 could be added. He had suggested including a discussion 118 1 of Smallpox, but that was subsequently rejected on the 2 grounds of there being inadequate intelligence. That 3 was the sum of his involvement. Howard asked if he had 4 contacted in order to check textural amendments". 5 That is you asking the question? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. "Kelly replied that he had not. Howard also asked if 8 Kelly had discussed the dossier with DIS staff. Kelly 9 replied that he could not recall any in depth 10 discussion. He recalled that there had not in any case 11 been much discussion of the dossier at the time." 12 Does that accord with what you have been able to 13 discover about Dr Kelly's involvement? 14 A. I think it is consistent with what I have been able to 15 discover. What we discovered was that aside from the 16 e-mail which we referred to or which you referred to in 17 the previous session, there was a meeting -- well, 18 meeting is probably too strong a word. There was an 19 informal discussion in the DIS we think held on 20 19th September at which Dr Kelly was present, and this 21 was a hurriedly convened meeting just to sort of go over 22 the then latest draft of the dossier which I think is 23 the draft of 19th September. 24 Dr Kelly, at that meeting, according to those 25 present who I have been able to consult, confined his 119 1 comments to the historical part of the dossier. There 2 is no recollection on any of their parts about whether 3 or not he raised smallpox or not but it is possible he 4 could have raised it at that meeting.
5 Q. At this stage you obviously were not involved? 6 A. No. 7 Q. Can I just pick up two further references to what he was 8 doing on official documentation? These were his staff 9 assessment to March 2003, it is MoD/3/16 at paragraph 2. 10 This is April 2002 to March 2003. This was a document 11 that we just got. But at paragraph 2 it says this: 12 "Objective: Support to Non Proliferation 13 Department/Middle East Department, Foreign and 14 Commonwealth Office. 15 "To continue to provide advice on Iraq and its WMD 16 capability based on knowledge and experience. 17 "Comment: David has provided excellent authoritative 18 and timely advice to the FCO on all aspects of Iraqi 19 WMD, he is recognised internationally as an expert." 20 That obviously picks up Mr Lamb's involvement? 21 A. Yes. Hmm, hmm. 22 Q. At 18, MoD/3/18, in part C, I suspect this is Dr Wells' 23 assessment in the second paragraph: 24 "David Kelly is a recognised authority on all 25 aspects of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. As such 120 1 his advice and input have been in high demand across 2 various Government departments during the last year. 3 David's advice has helped formulate UK policy with 4 respect to Iraqi WMD. David couples a deep technical 5 knowledge with political awareness which enables him to 6 operate in what is a high profile and politically 7 sensitive area." 8 That is all that there is in the staff review, but 9 it is certainly suggesting, so far as the Ministry of 10 Defence were concerned, that he was still providing 11 advice on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. 12 A. That is right, yes. 13 Q. Do you know how many drafts of the dossier were 14 produced? 15 A. No, I am afraid I do not. I was not directly involved 16 at the time. There were several. It was an iterative 17 process. I believe there was contact between the 18 Cabinet Office, who were in overall charge of the 19 drafting, and organisations such as the DIS and others 20 almost on a daily basis. So I cannot precisely say how 21 many drafts there were. 22 Q. Because we have a number of drafts that appear to have 23 been circulated. First of all, can I take you to the 24 document which was produced on 20th June 2002. That is 25 CAB/3/82. Just to the first page of that. 121 1 This is the one document version, 20th June 2002. 2 Did you see this document at all? What were you doing
3 at the time before you became DCDI? 4 A. I was the director general of corporate communications 5 in the MoD. 6 Q. So did you, in that capacity, have any involvement in 7 the dossier? 8 A. Very little. I think I recall having seen a draft of 9 part of a possible dossier, possibly at around about 10 that time or maybe earlier, but I really cannot recall 11 in any detail. I was not directly involved. 12 Q. The next draft that we have been provided with is dated 13 5th September 2002. That is CAB/3/7. We only have, as 14 it were, the little manuscript writing at the top 15 right-hand corner which gives us the date of 16 5th September 2002. 17 The final draft we have is at CAB/3/22. That 18 appears to be dated 19th September 2002. Do you know 19 whether or not those represent all the drafts that were 20 produced? 21 A. I am sure they do not represent all the drafts. There 22 were certainly others produced. I believe one, for 23 example, was produced on 15th September. And there will 24 probably have been others as well. That is only what 25 I have been able to discover since I have been in this 122 1 job. 2 Q. Right. And there is going to be no reason why we cannot 3 look at those drafts? 4 A. Well, that is not my responsibility. 5 Q. No. Do you know when -- if I say the 45 minute claim, 6 to use shorthand, you do not need me to show you where 7 it is made in the original dossier, you know what I am 8 talking about? 9 A. I know what you mean, yes. 10 Q. Do you know when the 45 minute claim was first made in 11 any draft dossiers? 12 A. I do not know when it appeared in a draft dossier. 13 I know that the date of the intelligence was 14 30th August 2003. 15 Q. You said 2003. 16 A. Sorry, 2002, I apologise. And I know that it was 17 reflected in a JIC assessment on 9th September but -18 Q. Can I stop you there, because you may be able to explain 19 a reference. MoD/4/9, this is a document that we will 20 come back to, if I may, but do you see "45 minutes"? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Is this a document that you produced? 23 A. No, that was produced by the Cabinet Office assessment 24 staff. 25 Q. Right. Do you know when that was produced? It appears 123
1 on the bottom to be 17th July 2003. 2 A. Certainly at around about that time, yes. 3 Q. And what it says in relation to 45 minutes is this: 4 "Concerns related to the level of certainty 5 expressed in the foreword and executive summary. By 6 this stage in the drafting process, following 7 consultation with the DIS, the main text said: 8 'intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able 9 to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 10 45 minutes of an order to do so'. This reflected the 11 language in the 9th September JIC paper. The executive 12 summary expressed the point differently, as a judgement. 13 The personnel concerned did not share this judgement. 14 But it was agreed by the JIC." 15 The 9th September JIC paper is the document you have 16 just referred to, is that right? 17 A. Yes, that is right. 18 Q. So that was picking up the intelligence you say was 19 dated 30th August? 20 A. That is right. 21 Q. And it gets into the 9th September JIC paper? 22 A. That is right. 23 Q. But the 9th September JIC paper is not a draft of the 24 dossier? 25 A. That is right. 124 1 Q. Because the 5th September draft of the dossier, that 2 does not appear to have anything relating to the 3 45 minutes in, but the 9th September does? 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. That is your understanding, that the first reference to 6 45 minutes is in the 9th September JIC paper? 7 A. As I understand it, in terms of a completed intelligence 8 assessment, it would have been in that one, as 9 I understand it. 10 Q. Can I also just confirm this: as far as Dr Kelly's 11 security clearance, we heard this morning that that was 12 at the highest level, subject to a need to know basis. 13 But anything involving the dossier and its relationship 14 with Iraqi weapons of mass destruction he would have 15 been cleared to see; is that right? 16 A. Almost certainly. I think that there was some 17 intelligence which was finally reflected in the dossier 18 which was compartmented and restricted to a very few 19 individuals, and that would not have included Dr Kelly; 20 but the majority of material which was reflected in the 21 dossier, he would have been cleared to see. He may not 22 necessarily have seen it but he would have had the -23 Q. But he would have been cleared to see it? 24 A. That is right. 25 Q. It has been said, on various broadcasts and
125 1 publications, that Dr Kelly told journalists that the 2 45 minute claim was added in the week before publication 3 and that it was single sourced where most other material 4 was double sourced. Can you first of all confirm with 5 me whether or not the material was single sourced rather 6 than double sourced? 7 A. It came from a single source, a well established and 8 reliable source we have reported before on other issues. 9 Q. I think there have been various Government notices about 10 that and those Government notices have disclosed to the 11 public that he is said to have been an Iraqi military 12 officer; is that right? 13 A. As I understand it. 14 Q. So it was single source. The other claim it is said 15 that Dr Kelly made was that the 45 minute claim was 16 added in the week before publication. I have shown you 17 the 5th September dossier, not the whole of it, and 18 I have shown you the 19th September dossier. Do you 19 know whether or not that claim, if it was made, was 20 true? 21 A. I cannot say for certain. As you say, it was not in the 22 5th September dossier. That does not surprise me if the 23 intelligence was only dated 30th August. It would have 24 taken some analysis to decide how it fitted and what 25 else we ought to include. I think that it would 126 1 probably have appeared in a version of the dossier which 2 preceded the 19th. As I recall -- again I have not been 3 able to check this -- as I recall, it probably appeared 4 in a version dated 15th September but others will be 5 better placed to give you a more authoritative answer on 6 that. 7 Q. It has been said in broadcasts that Dr Kelly suggested 8 to journalists that Downing Street knew that the claim 9 was wrong before it was broadcast. If he said that, was 10 that right? 11 A. No. 12 Q. It has been said that Dr Kelly told journalists that the 13 transformation in the week before publication came about 14 because of Mr Campbell. If he said that, was that 15 right? 16 A. To the best of my knowledge, no. 17 Q. Can you help us with what meetings took place in 18 September? As I understand it, there was quite a lot of 19 activity running up to June 2002. In fact, we have seen 20 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office production in 21 June 2002. It seems that not much drafting went on over 22 the summer months; is that right? 23 A. I do not have first hand knowledge of that; but that
24 certainly accords with the account that other people 25 have given me. 127 1 Q. Right. Then things seem to have started up again in 2 September. As far as you were concerned, do you know 3 what involvement, if any, Mr Campbell had in relation to 4 the dossier? 5 A. I have no detailed knowledge. Mr Campbell chaired the 6 Iraq Communications Group which -7 Q. Can you just stop there and tell me what the Iraq 8 Communications Group is? 9 A. That was an interdepartmental group of mainly directors 10 of communication, essentially to look at how the 11 Government's policy on Iraq as a whole should be 12 communicated through the media to the public. 13 Q. Where did that take place? That took place in No. 10, 14 did it? 15 A. Yes, it did. 16 Q. In fact, you, at the time, I think you have told us were 17 Ministry of Defence Communications -18 A. That is right. 19 Q. So you were on the -20 A. I attended some of those meetings, yes. 21 Q. But some of them you managed to avoid and sent a deputy? 22 A. Indeed. 23 LORD HUTTON: Who chaired those meetings? 24 A. Alastair Campbell. 25 MR DINGEMANS: And did you attend the meetings that he 128 1 chaired in September 2002? 2 A. I am almost certain on 5th and 9th September I did not. 3 I checked on my diary for my previous job and there is 4 no record of my having attended them and I do not recall 5 having attended them. 6 Q. So you do not know what discussions would have taken 7 place at that group, relating to the dossier? 8 A. No, I am afraid not. 9 Q. There is reference to other meetings which took place, 10 and we are going to hear about this from Mr Miller, on 11 9th and 17th September 2002; but you would not have 12 known about those either, is that right? Or you knew 13 about them? 14 A. I think these were the meetings that were held in the 15 assessment staff where members of the DIS attended. 16 I certainly would not have known about them at the time; 17 I am obviously aware of them now. 18 Q. Right. So at the time you did not know in relation to 19 that? 20 A. No. 21 Q. Do you know or have you been able to find out what
22 Dr Kelly's involvement was in September 2002 with the 23 DIS? 24 A. I have only been able to identify two occasions. One 25 was when his views on growth media were recorded in an 129 1 e-mail sent -2 Q. Can I take you to that e-mail? 3 A. Certainly. 4 Q. It may help. CAB/3/21. This is the e-mail to which you 5 refer, is it? 6 A. That is right, yes. 7 Q. And I read it out before. Do you know how Dr Kelly came 8 to be making this comment? Someone must have shown him 9 a draft of the dossier. 10 A. I think that is very probable. I have actually spoken 11 to the individual concerned and I think on this 12 particular instance it sounds like the individual rang 13 Dr Kelly up with this line and just asked for a view. 14 But I do not know -- it is very possible he was shown 15 a copy of the dossier at that time, and the presumption 16 is that it was the dossier dated 5th September or that 17 draft that he saw. 18 Q. You spoke to the person who sent the e-mail or produced 19 the e-mail? 20 A. Produced the e-mail. 21 Q. Can you help us with the bottom lines? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Do you know what he intended to type? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Because as it is typed, it obviously makes no sense. 130 1 A. I am sure what he meant to type was "it had a lot of 2 spin on it". 3 Q. And the "s" just got in it? 4 A. Yes, I believe so. 5 Q. Was that a view that was held by members of the DIS at 6 the time? 7 A. Perhaps I could just say something about this. 8 Q. Yes, of course. 9 A. Because I did speak to the individual concerned and~-10 Q. I understand you have redacted his details? 11 A. Indeed, yes. What he told me was this was an area where 12 you are trying to account for something that has not 13 been found. Where lots of different figures are around, 14 all of them in different ways are correct and it was 15 that where he meant to use the phrase "a lot of spin on 16 it". I think it is important, he also wanted to make 17 the point to me, and he explicitly did this unprompted, 18 that this was his view, not David Kelly's view. 19 Q. So this was the person who sent the e-mail's view that
20 there was spin on it? 21 A. He used a phrase -22 Q. Which has all sorts of dreadful connotations? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. That was his phrase rather than Dr Kelly's phrase? 25 A. Yes, that is what he told me. 131 1 Q. I had asked you also whether or not there were persons 2 in the DIS who were, broadly speaking, unhappy with the 3 direction of the dossier. 4 A. Hmm. 5 Q. Can you assist me at all in relation to that? 6 A. Yes. Again, this is not first hand knowledge but what 7 I have discovered since I have been in this post. At 8 the time the dossier was produced there was a very wide 9 variety of views on different parts of the dossier and 10 the language that was used in it. They were not 11 differences of view about whether intelligence should be 12 included or not, it was more about how the intelligence 13 was described or how it should be interpreted. It was, 14 for example, the difference between saying "intelligence 15 suggests, "intelligence shows, "intelligence indicates". 16 These meanings have quite a lot of -- you know, to 17 intelligence analysts they are quite important 18 distinctions. 19 Q. Yes. 20 A. I should say this sort of debate is quite normal and is 21 the sort of debate that we encourage all the time in the 22 intelligence world. The process of intelligence 23 assessment, to be valuable, is something where different 24 viewpoints have to be reconciled and an element of 25 judgment applied. That is certainly what happened here. 132 1 At the end, towards the end of that process, two 2 individuals expressed concerns about some specific 3 language in the dossier to their line manager. That was 4 fully aired within the DIS; and those views were taken 5 into account before the Joint Intelligence Committee 6 finally met to review the final text and approve it. 7 The Joint Intelligence Committee includes both the Chief 8 of Defence Intelligence and his deputy. 9 LORD HUTTON: Can I ask you: the views had been expressed in 10 the DIS but those views were then actually passed on to 11 the JIC; is that right? 12 A. I think that they were certainly passed on to the Chief 13 of Defence Intelligence and his deputy, who sit on the 14 JIC. 15 LORD HUTTON: Yes. 16 A. Whether every single view of every single DIS analyst 17 was passed on I think that is unlikely, my Lord.
18 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. 19 MR DINGEMANS: Can we go back to MoD/4/9 where I think in 20 the document produced on 17th July 2003 it was said that 21 concerns fell into three groups. 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. First of all can you help me with this document? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. I have it as Annex A. 133 1 A. Yes. 2 Q. I think you told us this was a briefing note, is that 3 right? 4 A. It is Annex A to a briefing note, it is attached to 5 a briefing note. 6 Q. Who produced Annex A? 7 A. The Cabinet Office assessment staff. 8 Q. Is that the JIC? 9 A. They service the JIC, they support the Joint 10 Intelligence Committee. 11 Q. It was said that concerns fell into three areas: 12 "Recent production of CBW agent." 13 As I think you indicated there was a concern about: 14 "...language in the dossier was too strong on the 15 continued production of chemical and biological agents. 16 These concerns related to the foreword, executive 17 summary and main text. 18 "The language in the dossier was stronger on this 19 issue than it had been in the 9th September JIC 20 assessment. This reflected the arrival of further, 21 corroborative intelligence on 11th (and 23rd) September. 22 Because of its sensitivity, this had not been seen by 23 the personnel concerned (as they acknowledged)." 24 The 45 minutes I have read. 25 "Saddam and the importance of CBW. 134 1 "The DIS personnel did not agree that intelligence 2 'shows' Saddam attached great importance to possessing 3 weapons of mass destruction. They judged it only 4 'indicated' this." 5 A. Hmm, hmm. 6 Q. That is because, I think you have told us, that persons 7 involved with intelligence are very careful with their 8 use of language? 9 A. That is right. 10 LORD HUTTON: To quite a lot of lay persons the distinction 11 between "shows" and "indicates" is an extremely fine 12 one. 13 A. Well, it is relatively fine; but it is important to 14 intelligence analysts. 15 LORD HUTTON: In intelligence matters, yes.
16 MR DINGEMANS: In the same way sometimes for lawyers use of 17 words can be quite important. 18 A. I am sure that is right. 19 Q. Would Dr Kelly have been aware of these concerns? 20 A. I have no evidence that he was specifically; but he knew 21 a lot of people in DIS, and they consulted him on 22 a reasonably regular basis and rightly so. You know, he 23 was a leading expert in his field. And it seems to me 24 it is possible if not probable that he might have been 25 aware of the views of some analysts but I have no 135 1 certain knowledge that that is the case. 2 Q. In relation to the unhappiness that was expressed 3 contemporaneously, can I take you to MoD/4/11, a letter 4 where various details have been again redacted to 5 protect identities. It starts off: 6 "Dear DCDI", that is you, is it not? 7 A. It is, yes. 8 Q. "Having scanned the Foreign Affairs Committee report of 9 its 'Inquiry into the Decision to Go to War with Iraq' 10 I have some concerns." 11 He was effectively coming to you because he did not 12 know whether he had to report them or not? 13 A. That is right. 14 Q. He says: 15 "Your records will show that as [there are a whole 16 series of letters I do not think we need] and probably 17 the most senior and experience intelligence community 18 official working on 'WMD', I was so concerned about the 19 manner in which intelligence assessments for which I had 20 some responsibility were being presented in the dossier 21 of 24th September 2002, that I was moved to write 22 formally to your predecessor ... recording and 23 explaining my reservations." 24 Then he goes on to comment on what the Foreign 25 Affairs Committee have said and dealt with it; and he 136 1 seeks your advice. Before we turn to your response, is 2 this a man -- I do not, I think, need the identity -3 a man or woman whose identity would have been known to 4 Dr Kelly? 5 A. Yes. 6 Q. So if this man or woman had those concerns sufficient to 7 cause him to write, then Dr Kelly, as a matter of 8 inference, is likely to have known of those concerns? 9 A. I think that is possible, yes. 10 Q. You know the personnel better than I do so you are 11 likely to know whether or not those concerns are likely 12 to have been shared with them. 13 A. This individual has actually retired, so I do not know
14 him personally. 15 Q. And just for the sake of completeness, and so that it is 16 clear what your response was, can we turn to MoD/4/12, 17 where -- I hope I summarise this accurately -- you are 18 entirely happy that he has written, entirely happy that 19 he has done the right thing, but there was no question 20 of any wrongful conduct? 21 A. Absolutely. 22 Q. Right. Mr Howard, I understand that you are also very 23 kindly going to come back and assist us with matters 24 later on in the chronology; but is that all that you can 25 help us with on the chronology? 137 1 A. On the involvement of Dr Kelly in -2 Q. Sorry, yes, in the dossier. 3 A. I believe that is, yes. 4 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Mr Howard, at the meeting on 5 19th September that Dr Kelly attended, would there have 6 been a discussion of the entire dossier as it then stood 7 at that meeting? I mean the whole dossier would have 8 been there to be discussed? 9 A. Yes. 10 LORD HUTTON: And would it have been a fairly lengthy 11 discussion? Might it have gone on for an hour or 12 longer? I appreciate it is hard for you to say. 13 A. It is very hard to say. I would guess that sort of time 14 would be right. I have looked at the comments that were 15 sent by the DIS to the Cabinet Office assessment staff 16 on the 19th which I think reflect that meeting, and 17 there are I think three or four pages of comments. That 18 implies a reasonably lengthy meeting. So I think an 19 hour would be a reasonable guess, my Lord. 20 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Now, on a more general point, when the 21 dossier refers to weapons of mass destruction, would 22 that include artillery shells that might have been 23 loaded with gas? When one thinks of weapons of mass 24 destruction one tends to think of missiles that have 25 a range of 200 or 300 miles. But the term includes 138 1 artillery shells? 2 A. It certainly does, yes, that are filled with chemical 3 weapons or biological weapons. 4 LORD HUTTON: But with some sort of chemical or biological 5 factors; yes? 6 A. Yes, my Lord. 7 LORD HUTTON: When the dossier refers -- I think there are 8 four references. In the foreword by the Prime Minister 9 there is a reference to "military planning allows for 10 some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an 11 order to use them"; but then the other three references
12 in the dossier refer to these weapons being "deployable 13 within 45 minutes". To your mind what does the word 14 "deployable" convey? 15 A. It conveys to me movement from fort storage areas to 16 units so that they could be used. There are various 17 ways of interpreting it. That is my interpretation. 18 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Your interpretation would not 19 necessarily include their actual firing, then? 20 A. Well, having been deployed with the units, they would be 21 ready for firing straight away, as soon as the order 22 came. I think that would be the distinction. 23 LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes. Yes. Thank you very much 24 Mr Howard. Your assistance has been helpful. I am 25 grateful. 139 1 A. Thank you. 2 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, if you were intending to have 3 a short break, before the next witness may be a good 4 time. 5 LORD HUTTON: Yes indeed. 6 (3.00 pm) 7 (Short Break) 8 (3.05 pm) 9 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Miller, please. 10 MR JULIAN MILLER (called) 11 Examined by MR DINGEMANS 12 Q. Could you give his Lordship your full name. 13 A. Julian Alexander Miller. 14 Q. What is your occupation? 15 A. I am the chief of the assessment staff in Cabinet 16 Office. 17 Q. What does the assessment staff do? 18 A. It is a body responsible to the chairman of the Joint 19 Intelligence Committee. It provides principally 20 classified assessments for the Joint Intelligence 21 Committee and senior Whitehall customers. In doing its 22 business it draws on classified material from the 23 intelligence agencies as well as diplomatic and open 24 source reporting. 25 Q. So you report up to the Joint Intelligence Committee? 140 1 A. That is right. 2 Q. Perhaps you can just help us with a brief description of 3 what that body does. 4 A. It is a body which brings together the chiefs of the 5 intelligence and security agencies with senior policy 6 makers in Whitehall, particularly from the Foreign 7 Office, Ministry of Defence, other interested 8 departments. It is a Cabinet Office committee chaired 9 by John Scarlett, it meets once a week and provides
10 papers, assessments for officers and senior policy 11 makers in Whitehall dealing with a full range of foreign 12 security policy issues. 13 Q. You have told us often they meet, the JIC. How often do 14 you meet? 15 A. I do not have a body of my own that meets. I have 16 a staff of about 30 people that sits in the Cabinet 17 Office and provides intelligence assessments, which are 18 then either issued in their own right or put to the 19 Joint Intelligence Committee for approval. 20 Q. And were you in your current position at the time that 21 the dossier was being produced last year? 22 A. Yes I was. 23 Q. Do you know how many drafts of the dossier were 24 produced? 25 A. The drafting process was a little complicated. As we 141 1 have heard, there was some work initiated in February 2 and March which had in mind the possibility of 3 publication. Towards the end of March, we reached 4 a stage where the element of that which I was working 5 on, which was to do with Iraq's weapons of mass 6 destruction, was potentially ready for publication. The 7 decision was taken not to go ahead and publish it. That 8 piece of work was then kept on the stocks if you like 9 and updated over the spring and summer. 10 Q. Why was it not published then? 11 A. I am not sure what the reason was. 12 Q. Not your decision? 13 A. Not our decision. 14 Q. There were other documents which were being produced 15 which subsequently got tied up in the dossier? 16 A. Yes, there were -17 Q. I think we have heard of the history of United Nations 18 inspections. 19 A. There was work on that. There was also a paper produced 20 on Saddam's regime, if you like, and the human rights 21 efforts. You have talked in earlier sessions about the 22 document on weapons inspections, dated 20th June; and, 23 by that stage, there were three separate papers: that 24 one, a paper on human rights and a paper on weapons of 25 mass destruction. So those sat, if you like, as three 142 1 separate elements which could have been considered 2 a dossier which could have been handled individually. 3 Q. Can I just ask for DOS/1/56 which I hope is the contents 4 page of the dossier as published -- a sad life one 5 leads. If you look at part 1, part 2 and part 3. So 6 part 3 you say was the human rights, I think it had the 7 shorthand?
8 A. Yes, that is right. 9 Q. Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Then history of weapons 10 inspection under part 2, we know where that came from 11 because Mr Lamb has helped us with that. 12 A. Correct. 13 Q. What were you doing? You were doing part 1, generally, 14 were you? 15 A. Yes, by June we had produced text which, I suppose, 16 broadly covered chapters 2 and 3 of part 1. 17 Q. We know that chapter 3 had at least been seen in draft 18 by Dr Kelly at about June time. I think that was 19 Mr Lamb's~-20 A. I had understood he had seen part 2, I was not clear 21 whether he had seen part 3. 22 Q. Maybe I have misrecollected his evidence, but he had 23 seen part of your production? 24 A. Yes, that is my understanding. I have no direct 25 knowledge of that. 143 1 Q. You have no direct knowledge of what Dr Kelly had or had 2 not seen; is that right? 3 A. That is correct. 4 Q. Did you know of Dr Kelly at this stage? 5 A. No, I did not. 6 Q. And where was the part 1 being produced, the weapons of 7 mass destruction chapter, as it were? 8 A. That was being produced in the assessment staff, my unit 9 in the Cabinet Office -10 Q. Yes. 11 A. -- in cooperation with the intelligence agencies and the 12 DIS. 13 Q. So the DIS would have reported up to you and you would 14 then have used some of their material? 15 A. I do not think I characterised it as reporting up. We 16 worked with them and we led the drafting process. 17 Q. Is it a fair impression that by June 2002 you are 18 reasonably well advanced in the sense that you have what 19 looks like part 1, part 2 and part 3 or the beginnings 20 of those and then not really much happens until 21 September again, is that right? You are probably in the 22 best position to help us. 23 A. Well I did not really have much to do with what became 24 part 2 and part 3 at that stage. They were being 25 handled by the authors of those sections. What became 144 1 part 1, we had a text which evolved into part 1. 2 Q. Right. 3 A. Between June and the beginning of September we kept that 4 text updated as new intelligence arrived; and we, if you 5 like, had a rolling version of that text over the summer
6 against the possibility that it might need to be 7 published at a later stage. 8 Q. Right. Then I think, as a matter of chronology, the 9 Prime Minister announced on 3rd September something 10 would be published. 11 A. Correct. 12 Q. So, as a matter of reality, is this right: there was 13 then a lot more work done tidying it up for publication? 14 A. Yes, that is certainly correct. There was also 15 a decision taken to slightly expand the basis of the 16 document to say more about the role of intelligence, to 17 try to be more explicit about what intelligence told us 18 of Saddam's programmes. 19 Q. Do you know who was responsible for thinking that ought 20 to go into the dossier? 21 A. The general handling of the dossier was discussed at the 22 meeting which we have heard about on 5th September and 23 again 9th September. 24 Q. That was, I hope my memory is right, the No. 10 sort of 25 Iraq weapons communication group et cetera, was it? 145 1 A. Yes, that is right. I am not sure if it had a title at 2 that stage but it was a group of people who met in 3 No. 10 and decided how to handle the presentation of the 4 material. 5 Q. That was, I think we have heard from Mr Howard, although 6 he was not present at them, chaired by Mr Campbell? 7 A. Correct. 8 Q. And with the communications officers for the respective 9 departments? 10 A. I am not sure whether it had the communications officers 11 for the respective departments or not. It had 12 representatives of departments and of the Cabinet Office 13 there. 14 LORD HUTTON: Were you present at either of those meetings? 15 A. I was present at the meeting on 5th September, my Lord. 16 MR DINGEMANS: Are you able to tell us what was discussed on 17 5th September? 18 A. My recollection is not very precise but it was to do 19 with the need to look at the material we had, the need 20 to take account of how the public debate had moved on 21 over the summer, the extent to which public knowledge 22 and awareness of Iraq's capabilities had increased, to 23 decide what sort of material we should be covering in 24 terms of human rights and the history, and to talk about 25 how best to brigade the material that was already on the 146 1 stocks. It also started to talk about who should do 2 what and to allocate responsibility. 3 Q. Do you know whether minutes of the 5th September or
4 indeed 9th September meeting are available? 5 A. I am afraid I do not know. 6 Q. But you were there on 5th September. So it was decided 7 at that meeting, I hope I put this fairly, that the 8 dossier was going to be expanded to deal with some areas 9 that the drafts did not deal with? 10 A. It was to be expanded to be more detailed, I think is 11 how I put it. 12 Q. Right; and to have this explicit chapter which if we go 13 back to DOS/1/56 you can see relating to the role of 14 intelligence? 15 A. I do not think the specific decision to have that 16 chapter was taken on 5th September. 17 Q. Right. Now, we have three drafts of the dossier, which 18 I think you have seen on the screen? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. So if it is all right I will not go through the process. 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. 20th June, 5th September, 19th September? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Have you seen any other drafts? 25 A. Yes. 147 1 Q. Right. And I think you said you thought there was one 2 on 15th September, was that you -3 A. That was Martin Howard. 4 Q. Oh, Martin Howard thought there was one? 5 A. Can I say first of all about the draft of 20th June, and 6 indeed 5th September, neither of those were, if you 7 like, complete elements, or complete in themselves. The 8 one on 20th June, if I understood the document you 9 showed us, was the material on the history of WMD 10 inspections. The document you showed us dated 11 5th September was, I think, the document for which my 12 team was responsible, dealing with Iraq's WMD 13 programmes. 14 Q. Right. 15 A. At both stages there was other material also on the 16 stocks, dealing with the other elements that we have 17 discussed. 18 Q. So they were not at that stage complete dossiers, they 19 were only chapters of it, effectively? 20 A. Correct. 21 Q. But if you had the draft or were responsible for the 22 draft dated 5th September, that, when the dossier was 23 finally published, included in that part of the dossier 24 the 45 minute claim? 25 A. Yes, that is right. 148 1 Q. Do you mind me using the shorthand?
2 A. No, no. 3 Q. Right, the 45 minute claim. 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. So it was not in the dossier on 5th September. Do you 6 know when it was added to the dossier? 7 A. Yes. It was added to the dossier immediately after it 8 was included in the JIC assessment which Martin Howard 9 has referred to of 9th September. So it was in 10 a version of the dossier which we produced for working 11 purposes on 10th or 11th September. 12 Q. Right. Would it be possible, perhaps, to have a copy of 13 the first draft which had the 45 minute claim in it? 14 A. I am sure it would. 15 Q. Would Dr Kelly have seen any of these drafts? 16 A. I have no direct knowledge of what Dr Kelly saw beyond 17 the fact that on 10th September my staff received the 18 e-mail which you have shown earlier, which included 19 a comment on a specific point of historical fact from 20 Dr Kelly. 21 Q. Before I ask you a bit about the 45 minute claim, can 22 I just show you what Dr Kelly said to the Intelligence 23 and Security Committee at ISC/1/26. I am afraid we have 24 just got two lines at the bottom of that before we have 25 to go on to ISC/1/27. Mr Arbuthnot: 149 1 "45 minutes then you felt -- it was unwise to put it 2 in, is that right?" 3 Then if we go to 27, Dr Kelly said this: 4 "I mean looking backwards, yes, I wasn't involved in 5 the actual inclusion of it or the information that was 6 there. 7 "Question: Had you seen any" -- now there has been 8 some tidying up of this transcript to ensure that 9 confidences are still proposed -- "intelligence material 10 to back it up? 11 "Answer: I'd seen no intelligence material relevant 12 to that topic whatsoever. 13 "Question: Have you since then seen any 14 intelligence material about that? 15 "Answer: No." 16 Does that accord with your understanding that he had 17 not seen any intelligence material relating to the 18 45 minute claim? 19 A. I do not really have an understanding one way or the 20 other, I am afraid, on what Dr Kelly did or did not see. 21 Q. Were you aware of any unhappiness amongst DIS personnel 22 relating to the dossier at the time in September 2002? 23 A. No, I was not, and we had discussions with all the 24 interested people including the DIS; and they raised 25 a number of points with us. In the way we normally
150 1 work, we hear what people have to say, we try to amend 2 texts in the light of that comments and then give them 3 further opportunities to comment. We adopted this 4 approach in preparing the dossier. 5 Q. For the dossier. 6 A. And we then put it finally to the Joint Intelligence 7 Committee for approval, and my understanding was that 8 that approval reflected the DIS's contentment with the 9 material. 10 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you Mr Miller: when you said 11 you had discussions, you raised points with the DIS, is 12 that with a number of members of the DIS or is it just 13 with one person who represents their view? 14 A. It is usually with one or two people, my Lord, who 15 represent the collective views of the organisation. 16 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. And when you say that different 17 points are discussed, would it sometimes be implicit in 18 that that there were differing views within the DIS, and 19 that would be conveyed to you? 20 A. We might become informally aware that there were 21 differing views but I would not normally expect that to 22 be paraded in front of us. We would expect to see 23 a view from the DIS reflecting the view they had 24 collectively reached following internal discussions. 25 LORD HUTTON: So the person or persons who represented the 151 1 DIS would state a view to you which you would understand 2 to represent the views of the DIS; but at the same time 3 you would assume that the person or persons who gave you 4 the views of the DIS would have reflected the differing 5 opinions in the opinion expressed to you? 6 A. Correct. 7 LORD HUTTON: Yes. 8 MR DINGEMANS: Can I ask you to look at a document numbered 9 MoD/4/6? This appears to be the briefing note which we 10 have heard about from Mr Howard. 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. It appears to be a recommendation for the Secretary of 13 State's appearance before the ISC. There are a number 14 of recommendations that are made, 2(a), (b), (c). 15 Can I take you to page 7, MoD/4/7, and take you to 16 paragraphs 4 and 5: 17 "During Sir David Omand's evidence session with the 18 ISC on 16 July, he was asked about the processes by 19 which staff in the intelligence agencies can express 20 concerns about the possible misuse of intelligence, and 21 whether those processes had been used in connection with 22 the September dossier on Iraq's WMD. He explained the 23 role that the staff counsellor plays in respect of 24 intelligence agency staff who wish to raise concerns.
25 He was asked a similar question about the DIS and said 152 1 that this was a matter for the defence secretary and 2 that he would pass this point on to MoD." 3 Then you can see from paragraph 5: 4 "At the time of dossier, the DIS, like the rest of 5 the intelligence community, was heavily involved in 6 commenting and contributing to successive drafts of what 7 became the dossier published in September 2002. These 8 discussions were very complex and detailed right up to 9 the last minute. As an example, I attach some 6 pages 10 of working level comments which were passed by the DIS 11 to the assessments staff on 17th September. In the 12 course of this debate two individuals in DIST ..." 13 What is DIST? I know what DIS is. 14 A. I think it is the technical directorate of the DIS but 15 I am not absolutely confident. 16 Q. Thank you. 17 "... (one of whom is still in post and one of whom 18 has retired) raised in writing some specific concerns 19 about the precise wording on issues relevant to their 20 areas of expertise. These did not raise objections to 21 the use of material but were more about the description 22 to be used (intelligence shows, indicates or suggests) 23 [the wording I think everyone has spoken about]. 24 I attach copies of the relevant minutes." 25 Were you aware, for example, of that level of 153 1 concern or comment? 2 A. At the time that we were preparing the dossier, I was 3 not. Perhaps for completeness I should say that in the 4 course of the discussions with the DIS the question was 5 raised about whether the 45 minutes material supported 6 the use of the word "judgment" as against "indication" 7 or "suggestion". Our view was that because it fitted 8 with other intelligence we had about Iraq's existing 9 command and control arrangements that it did support 10 that, the use of that word. 11 Q. Yes. 12 A. That was then included in the draft of the dossier which 13 was circulated on 19th September, which I think you 14 have; and the subsequent comments we had on that draft 15 did not question that language. So we regarded that as 16 a point which had been aired and satisfactorily settled. 17 Q. Resolved, as it were? 18 A. Correct. 19 Q. Can I take you to the points raised on 19th September? 20 This is a document CAB/3/79. Parts of it, again, have 21 been redacted for obvious reasons. This is headed 22 "Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Dossier -- Comments
23 on Revised Draft (15 Sept 2002)" which supports what you 24 were saying about the existence of the 15th September 25 one. 154 1 Was that the one that had the 45 minute claim in for 2 the first time, as far as you recollect it? 3 A. No, I am afraid there is a degree of complication here 4 in that these comments were not on the draft of 5 15th September, they were on the draft of 6 19th September. They have carried through, in the 7 heading of the letter, the reference to an earlier 8 draft. 9 As I said a moment ago, the intelligence on the 10 45 minutes was included first of all in a draft around 11 10th or 11th September. There were then continuing 12 discussions with the DIS and others over the succeeding 13 period. They may well have commented on a working draft 14 on 15th September. On 19th September a draft was 15 circulated more formally after the meeting I had held on 16 17th September, and my understanding is that these 17 comments refer to that draft. 18 Q. So can I just clarify with you: what meetings did you 19 hold relating to the dossier then? 9th and 17th? 20 A. Yes, that is right. 21 Q. But you attended meetings which were related to the 22 communications group which were chaired by Mr Campbell 23 which were the 5th and 9th? 24 A. I attended the meeting on the 5th but not on the one on 25 the 9th to the best of my recollection. 155 1 Q. You know he had one on the 9th? 2 A. Yes he did. Could I just perhaps note at this point 3 that the chairman of the JIC, who had overall 4 responsibility for the process from the beginning of 5 September, attended both those meetings and I know that 6 he would wish to give if you like the authoritative 7 evidence. 8 Q. That is Mr Scarlett who is coming along later? 9 A. That is right, yes. 10 Q. I should ask him about those matters, should I? 11 A. I think he would be best placed to give you an account 12 of those meetings and an overview of the process. 13 Q. And do you know whether or not Mr Campbell's 14 communications group met again after 9th September 15 before the publication of the dossier? 16 A. I am afraid I do not know. 17 Q. No. We are looking at a letter dated 18 19th September 2002. 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Comments on revised draft. Although it says
21 15th September, you have just explained why that means 22 19th September. 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Can I take you to CAB/3/80? If we look at the third 25 paragraph down which has "Page 11, Para 3" first bullet, 156 1 then it is: 2 "Amend to '2,390 litres of aflatoxin'". 3 Then if you look three below that, you have: 4 "Page 16 ... Bullet; 5 "Amend to '4.6 tonnes of growth media'". 6 Then the penultimate entry: 7 "Amend sentence to read 'UNSCOM established that in 8 1987 Iraq considered the use of mobile BW production 9 facilities. In the past ...'" 10 Then the reason for the change, that UNSCOM did not 11 establish that Iraq was planning to conceal from the 12 inspectors the capability to produce agents. 13 Doing the best I could, knowing what has been 14 published against Dr Kelly's background and reading 15 these documents that came in over the weekend, it seems 16 that those are comments that may have been made by 17 Dr Kelly. Are you able to help us with what 18 contributions, if any, he made on 19th September? 19 A. I am afraid I am not. I understand from recent 20 conversations with the DIS that they believe that he 21 did, through discussion with their people, contribute to 22 these comments but I do not know which comments came 23 from him. 24 Q. No. You, I suppose for similar reasons, are unlikely to 25 know whether or not he was aware of any concerns that 157 1 might have been expressed within DIS about drafting of 2 the dossier? 3 A. I am afraid I have no knowledge of that. 4 Q. Do you know of anything else relating to Dr Kelly's 5 involvement in the drafting of the dossier? 6 A. No, I think I have only heard of the three points which 7 we have already discussed: his contribution to the 8 original section on history of inspections, the comment 9 about growth media reported to us on 10th September -10 Q. Yes. 11 A. -- and his possible comment on the later draft which may 12 have been reflected in the comments we were just looking 13 at. 14 Q. Can I just ask you these questions: it has been said 15 that Dr Kelly told journalists that the 45 minute claim 16 was added in the week before publication. Doing the 17 best you can, it looks like it got in on about 18 15th September or --
19 A. Earlier than that. It was 10th or 11th September. 20 Q. 10th or 11th, right. Then it is certainly in on the 21 15th September one? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Do you know whether Dr Kelly commented on the 10th or 24 11th? 25 A. I have no reason to think he did. 158 1 Q. No. He may have done through DIS but nothing that you 2 can help with? 3 A. No. 4 Q. It has also been said that Dr Kelly told journalists 5 that it was added in late and was single sourced. As 6 far as you were aware, this was intelligence which was 7 single sourced, is that right? 8 A. Yes, it was a single source as we have heard, 9 a reliable, established one. 10 Q. If he had said that, he must have heard that from 11 someone? 12 A. It would seem so, yes. 13 LORD HUTTON: But do I understand from what you are saying 14 Mr Miller that there was other intelligence which 15 supported maybe not directly the 45 minute claim? I do 16 not want you to go into details, but did I understand 17 you correctly? 18 A. It did not support the specific timing. 19 LORD HUTTON: Yes. 20 A. But it supported the picture of Iraq having established 21 command and control arrangements for the use of these 22 weapons and having those in place. 23 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Thank you. 24 MR DINGEMANS: It has been said that Dr Kelly told 25 journalists that Downing Street knew that the claim was 159 1 wrong. If he did say that, would that have been true or 2 not? 3 A. It would not have been true. 4 Q. And it has been said that Dr Kelly told journalists that 5 the transformation in the week before publication came 6 about because of Campbell. If he had said that, would 7 that have been true? 8 A. No, it would not have been true in either sense in that 9 I do not think there was a transformation the week 10 before publication. 11 Q. Right. 12 A. And certainly changes such as the inclusion of the 13 reference to 45 minutes were nothing to do with No. 10. 14 Q. Right. That came about because the intelligence had 15 been picked up -- I think you use the mnemonic JIC in 16 the 9th September and then it gets into the draft on
17 about the 10th or 11th? 18 A. That is right. 19 Q. Am I right in saying this: Mr Campbell's involvement 20 appears to relate to chairing meetings on 5th and 21 9th September? 22 A. Yes. I think there were some subsequent exchanges on 23 drafting points and structural points, but informally. 24 Q. He was involved, what, on informal drafting points 25 afterwards? 160 1 A. To the best of my recollection. 2 Q. Right. And you believe there would be minutes relating 3 to the meetings that he chaired on the 5th and 4 9th September? 5 A. I am afraid I cannot help you on whether there are 6 minutes. 7 Q. But there were certainly minutes in relation to the 8 meetings you chaired on 9th and 17th September? 9 A. No, there were not minutes of those meetings. What we 10 did was produce a new draft of the document in the light 11 of discussion at those meetings. 12 Q. And your involvement in giving evidence to his Lordship 13 relates solely to the dossier. So can I just ask you 14 this general question, which I think everyone has been 15 given notice of, which is this: is there anything else 16 which you know of the circumstances surrounding the 17 death of Dr Kelly which you can help Lord Hutton with? 18 A. No, I am afraid there is nothing else I can think of. 19 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed Mr Miller. I am 20 most grateful for your evidence. 21 Mr Dingemans does that bring us to the end of the 22 witnesses today? 23 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord that is today's evidence. 24 LORD HUTTON: As I indicated, one cannot exactly predict the 25 length of witnesses. It is important I think that 161 1 people are not brought and kept waiting, so I think it 2 is better that we rise now and we will sit again 3 tomorrow then at 10.30. Thank you very much. 4 (3.35 pm) 5 (Hearing adjourned until 10.30 am the following day) 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 162 1 INDEX 2 PAGE 3 MR TERENCE THOMAS TAYLOR (called) ................ 3 4 5 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 4 6 7 MR RICHARD PAUL HATFIELD (called) ................ 14 8 9 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 14 10 11 MR PATRICK LAMB (called) ......................... 91 12 13 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 91 14 15 MR MARTIN HOWARD (called) ........................ 116 16 17 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 116 18 19 MR JULIAN MILLER (called) ........................ 140 20 21 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 140 22 23 24 25 163