KATARUNGAN PAMBARANGAY

Heirs of Fernando Vinzons vs. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 541 , September 30, 1999
1. Remedial Law; Ejectment; The rule is that the one-year period provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted
from the last letter of demand to vacate.-

This case being one of unlawful detainer, it must have been filed within one year from the date of
last demand with the Municipal Trial Court, otherwise it is an accion publiciana cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court. The rule is that the one-year period provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from
the last letter of demand to vacate. Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of
possession when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.

2. Remedial Law; Ejectment; It is well-established that what determines the nature of an action and
correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it is the allegation made by the plaintiff in his
complaint.-

The instant Complaint for ejectment filed by petitioner in October 1989, was filed more than one
year from the termination of the month-to-month lease some time before April 1988. It is well-
established that what determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has
jurisdiction over it is the allegation made by the plaintiff in his complaint.

3. Remedial Law; Ejectment; Presidential Decree No. 1508; Non-compliance with the condition
precedent prescribed by Presidential Decree 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause
of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity.-

The challenged decision correctly dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiffs, the petitioners
herein, to avail of the barangay conciliation process under PD 1508, preliminary to judicial recourse.
The Court of Appeals had found that “there is no clear showing that it was brought before the
Barangay Lupon or Pangkat of Barangay 5, Daet, Camarines Norte, where the parties reside and the
property subject of the case is situated, as there is no barangay certification to file action attached
to the complaint. Paraphrasing Peñaflor vs. Panis, “the Lupong Barangay is with jurisdiction under
PD 1508 to pass upon an ejectment controversy where the parties are residents in the same
barangay or in barangays within the same city or in barangays adjoining each other.” It is clearly
averred in the Complaint that herein petitioners, then represented by the widow of the late
Fernando Vinzons, resided in the same barangay, hence, covered by the said law. In Royales vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court ruled that “non-compliance with the condition precedent
prescribed by PD 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action and make his
complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or pre-maturity.”
Defendants, private respondents herein, objected to the failure of the parties to undergo a
confrontation at the barangay level in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo to
no avail as the trial courts merely brushed aside this issue. Hence, the Court of Appeals had to
rectify this error by the trial courts.
4. Remedial Law; Ejectment; Presidential Decree No. 1508; Allegations in petitioners’ complaint that
efforts to settle the controversy at the barangay level had failed in Civil Cases Nos. 1923 and 2061
does not constitute compliance with the requirements of Presidential Decree 1508 for purposes of
filing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 2137.-

In refutation of the said findings of the Court of Appeals, petitioners submit that “it is clear in the
findings of fact of the MTC of Daet, as affirmed by the RTC of Daet that before the filing of Civil
Cases Nos. 1908, 1923 and 2061, demand to vacate had already been made to the defendant after
efforts to settle the controversy at the barangay level had failed.” This is not a factual finding of the
MTC, but an allegation in petitioners’ Complaint. As mentioned earlier, the MTC merely brushed
aside the issue of nonrecourse to barangay conciliation. This allegation in petitioners’ Complaint
that efforts to settle the controversy at the barangay level had failed in Civil Cases Nos. 1908, 1923
and 2061, does not constitute compliance with the requirements of PD 1508 for purposes of filing
the Complaint in Civil Case No. 2137.

5. Remedial Law; Ejectment; Presidential Decree No. 1508; Petitioners cannot rely on the barangay
conciliation proceedings held in the other cases and consider the same as compliance with the law;
Legal action for ejectment is barred when there is non-recourse to barangay court.-

Referral to the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat should be made prior to the filing of the ejectment
case under PD 1508. Legal action for ejectment is barred when there is non-recourse to barangay
court. The Complaint for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 2137, should have been
coursed first to the barangay court. Petitioners cannot rely on the barangay conciliation proceedings
held in the other cases and consider the same as compliance with the law.

6. Remedial Law; Ejectment; Evidence; Almost as well-recognized as the gen-eral rule is the exception
that the factual findings of the trial court may nonetheless be reversed by the Court of Appeals if by
the evidence on record or the lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred.-

Petitioners rely heavily on the general rule that findings of trial courts deserve to be respected and
affirmed by appellate courts. Almost as well-recognized as the general rule is the exception that the
factual findings of the trial court may nonetheless be reversed by the Court of Appeals if by the
evidence on record or the lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred. Considering that the trial
courts and the Court of Appeals arrived at different factual findings, we have reviewed the evidence
on record and have found as aforesaid, the improper assumption by the MTC of the case due to
non-recourse to barangay conciliation and the lapse of the one-year period for bringing the case for
unlawful detainer.

Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 753 , July 23, 1992
1. Unlawful Detainer; Katarungang Pambarangay; Pleadings and Practice; Defendant in the ejectment
case raised the non-recourse to the Barangay in his answer.-

We do not agree with petitioner that the issue of non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508
was raised only for the first time in the Court of Appeals. When private respondent stated that he
was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect, was stating that since
he was never summoned, he could not appear in person for the needed confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable settlement. Without the mandatory
 personal confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the MTC. Private respondent’s allegation in
paragraph 4 of his Answer that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman;
that plaintiff has no cause of action against him as alleged in paragraph 7 of the Answer; and that
the certification to file action was improperly issued in view of the foregoing allegations thereby
resulting in non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508, as stated in
paragraph 8 of the Answer are in substantial compliance with the raising of said issues and/or
objections in the court below.

2. Unlawful Detainer; Katarungang Pambarangay; P.D. 1508 requires the actual, personal appearance
of the parties, not their children.-

Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally appear before the Barangay Chairman was
because of her recurring psychological ailments. But for the entire year of 1988___specifically
September to December 6—there is no indication at all that petitioner went to see her psychiatrist
for consultation. The only conclusion is that 1988 was a lucid interval for petitioner. There was,
therefore, no excuse then for her non-appearance at the Lupon Chairman’s office.

3. Unlawful Detainer; Katarungang Pambarangay; Legal action is barred when there is non-recourse to
barangay court.-

Petitioner’s non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 legally barred her from pursuing the
ejectment case in the MTC of Manila. Having arrived at this conclusion, there is no need for Us to
discuss the other issues involved.

Uy vs. Contretras, 237 SCRA 167 , September 26, 1994

1. Courts; There is a hierarchy of courts determinative of the venue of appeals which should also serve
as a general determinant of the proper forum for the application for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.-

At the outset, it must be stated that were it not for the importance of the issue to be resolved in the
light of the revised law on katarungang pam-barangay provided for in the Local Government Code of
1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which took effect on 1 January 1992, this Court would have declined to accept
the invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ prayed for. We have already
ruled that while it is true that this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
and habeas corpus, such con-currence does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which application therefor may be directed. There is a hierarchy of courts determinative
of the venue of appeals which should also serve as a general determinant of the proper forum for
the application for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for this judicial hierarchy by the
petitioner and her lawyers ought to have led them to file the petition with the proper Regional Trial
Court.

2. Katarungang Pambarangay Law; The Local Government Code of 1991 revised the law on
katarungang pambarangay, and expressly repealed P.D. No. 1508.-
 The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by P.D. No. 1508 which was
enacted on 11 June 1978. However, the Local Government Code of 1991, specifically Chapter 7, Title
I, Book III thereof, revised the law on the katarungang pambarangay. As a consequence of this
revision, P.D. No. 1508 was expressly repealed pursuant to Section 534(b) of the Code.

3. Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Three (3) new significant features of the revised katarungang
pambarangay law.-

It may thus be observed that the revised katarungang pambarangay law has at least three new
significant features, to wit: 1. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in P.D. No.
1508 to those offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding
P5,000.00. 2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the contending
parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought
in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located. 3. It provides for the suspension of
the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the mediation, conciliation, or
arbitration process.

4. Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Venue; Convenience is the raison d’etre of the rule on venue.-

Procedural rules including those relating to venue are designed to insure a fair and convenient
hearing to the parties with complete justice between them as a result. Elsewise stated, convenience
is the raison d’etre of the rule on venue.

5. Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Actions; The jurisprudence built on P.D. 1508 regarding prior
referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable.-

While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence
built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in
court remains applicable because its provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in
the Code.

6. Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Judges; Statutes; Judicial Notice; The trial judge should have taken
judicial notice of the Local Government Code of 1991, specifically on the provisions on the
katarungang pambarangay, and his total unawareness thereof is distressing.-

Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of the Local Government Code of
1991, more specifically on the provisions on the katarungang pambarangay, is distressing. He should
have taken judicial notice thereof, ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court,
courts are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of “the official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines.” We have ruled that a judge is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. He should
have applied the revised katarungang pambarangay law under the Local Government Code of 1991.
Had he done so, this petition would not have reached us and taken valuable attention and time
which could have been devoted to more important cases.

7. Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Absence of prior mediation pursuant to the katarungang

pambarangay law bars the filing of the complaint with the court.-
 In view of the private respondents’ failure to appear at the first scheduled mediation on 28 April
1993 for which the mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight physical injuries
could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of
Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature and,
pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras
should have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking
refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government
Code of 1991) which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to
prescribe. This is because, as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the
prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April
1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati.

8. Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Estoppel; A party’s act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by
unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint
right away with the trial court cannot be countenanced.-

Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private
respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had
sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the
scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot
be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system.

9. Katarungang Pambarangay Law; The Court emphasizes the vital role which the revised katarungang
pambarangay law plays in the delivery of justice at the barangay level, in promoting peace, stability,
and progress therein and in effectively preventing or reducing expensive and wearisome litigation.-

Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to emphasize the vital role which the revised
katarungang pambarangay law plays in the delivery of justice at the barangay level, in promoting
peace, stability, and progress therein, and in effectively preventing or reducing expensive and
wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should, with sincerity, exhaust the
remedies provided by that law, government prosecutors should exercise due diligence in
ascertaining compliance with it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate
sanctions for non-compliance thereof.