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A.dy 2005
3d edition

Published by
Energy Institute, London
The Energy Institute is a professional membership body incorporaid by Royal Charter 2003
Registered charity number 1097899
Thc Energy Idlnstiblte lgatefully acknowfedges the financial rnnibtrtions towards tbe scientific and
technical programme from the following companies:

BG Gmup Km-McGee North Sea (UK) Ltd

BHP Billiton Limited Kuwait Petroleum International Ltd
RP Exploration Opmting Co X*d Murw Petroleum ZRd
BP Oil UK Ltd Si&llUX:Oil Products Limited
Chevron Shell U.K. Explocation and Production Ltd
ConocoPhiilips Ltd Sratoit (U.K.) Limited
Nexen Talisman EnergyCUK) Ltd
ma Total E&P UK plc
ExxonMobil intemationaiUd Total UK Limited

Copyright 0 2005 by tho Energy lustifute, London:

The Energy Institute is a professiorud membership body u~corporatedby Royal Charter 2003.
Registeredcharity number I097899,England

No part of &is book may be reproduced by any meam, or traasmittedoctraoslatod into a machine Imppagewithout the
writtar permission of the publisher.

The infonnafionoontaincdin thispublication isprovidedasguidancconly and whileeveryreasonablccarehas bear t a k ~

to ensure the accuracy of its contents, the Enetgy institute cannot accept any responsibility for any action taben, or not
taker~,onthcbasisof this information.TheEnergylnstmde shall notbefiable to any periodforany loss or damage which
may arise fromthe use of any of the information containad in any of its publications.

Theabovedisctaiis not iatended torcscn'ctorexclude liability fbrdeBfhorpersond injury causedby own ncgligencc.

ISBN 0 85293 418 1

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Whitehall Xndustriai Estate, Co~chesterC028HP, UK.Tek +(0) + I 7% 351
reword ...........................-.................................................. k

eytechnicalchanges .................................................................... x

AcknowI&gements ...................................................................... xii

Overview .............................................................................. ...


1 Xntroducbion ......................L ...............;................. .................. i

1.1 Swpe ......................................................................... *I
1.2 Lirnitsofapplicability ............................................................ 1
1.3 Application o f this Code ........................................................... 2
1.4 Fundamental safety principles ...................................................... 2
1.5 Hazardous area classificationmanagement. ............................................ 4
1.6 Keyterms ...................................................................... 4
1.7 Ventilation ..................................................................... 6
1.8 Buoyancyofrdease .............................................................. 6

2 The technique of hazardous area classification ............................................. 9

.. . 2.1 Introduction ..................................................................... 9
2.2 Data required for the assessment ................................................... ; 9
2.3 Application ..................................................................... 10
2.4 Hazardous area classificationapproaches ............................................ 10
2.5 Apparatus sub-group and temperatureclass ............................................ 11
2.6 The hazardous area classificationdrawing ........................ ;................... II

3 The direct example approach for claSsificationof common facilities in open areas .............. 13
3.1 Scope ........................................................................ 13
3.2 Storagetanks ................................................................... 14
3.3 Road.tankerloaag ............................................................. 18
3.4 Mad tmke~unl~adhg........................................................... 27
3.5 Rail car loading and unloading - Cla+es I,II and III .................................... 32 . .
3.6 -
Marine kilities andjetties Classes I, If and IKI ........................................ 38 . .
3.7 Drum filling and storage .Classes X, II and III ......................................... 42
3.8 Intermediate bulk containers (EBCs), other transportable containers and packaged units ........ 43
3.9 illi in^ stations and fuel dispensing ficiliti& .......................................... 43
3.10 Vehicle repair, servicing areas and inspection pits .................................... . 48 .
Contents Cont .. Page

4 The hazardous area classi

. equipment aad well operalions ............... 49
Iat~aduction ................................................................... 49
4.2 Area classifrcatiort for driltling. workover and wirehe operations in open areas ............... 50
4.3 Surface mud systems ............................................................. 54
4.4 MiscelIaneous sources of release ................................................... 56
4.5 Otherspaces ................................................................... 57
4.6 Well test systems ................................................... :........... 57
4.7 Emergencysystems ............................................................. 57
4.8 Nonelectrical sources of ignition ................................................... 57

oink source approach for classification of indi@dualsources of release ................... 59

5.1 Scope ........................................................................ 59
5.2 Explanation of the 'point source' concept as used in this Code ............................. 59
5.3 Methodology .................................................................. 59
5.4 Pointsources .................................................................. 61
5.5 Shape factors and hazard radii fbr pressurised releases .................................. 72

...................."..............5 .. 75
6.1 introduction ................................................................... 75
6.2 Opeaareas .................................................................... 77
6.3 Sheltered or obstrucM areas ...................................................... 78
6.4 Enclosedareas ................................................................. 79
6.5 Effect of ventilation on zone classifreation of enclosed areas ............................. 82
6.6 Effect of loss of ventilation on hazardous arm classitication of an encfosed area .............. 82

7 Selection. installation. maintenance and use of equipment La hazardous areas .................. 85

7.1 Introduction ................................................................... 85
7.2 Standards ..................................................................... 85
7.3 Selection of Group 11apparatus equipment ........................................... 86
7.4 Type of protection .............................................................. 87
7.5 Selection according to zone classification ............................................. 87
7.6 Apparatussub-groups ............................................................ 87
7.7 Temperature class and gas ignition temperature ........................................ 88
7.8 Enclosure ingress protection ....................................................... 89
7.9 Other requirements .............................................................. 90
7.10 Documentation ................................................................. g0
7.1 1 Marking of apparatm ............................................................ 90
7.12 Installation .................................................................... 90
7.13 Protection of electrical apparatus and cables h r n physical damage ........................ 90
7.14 Mdrnlenance and inspection ....................................................... 91
7.15 Mobile. portable and &ansporMk electrical apparatus and its connections .................. 91
7.16 Personal apparatus .............................................................. 92.
7.17 Batteryrooms .................................................................. 92
7.18 Cathodic protection. earlking and bondi ............................................ 92

Nan-electrical sources o ignitien ....................................................... 93

8.1 introduction ................................................................... 93
8.2 Souscesofignition .............................................................. 93
8.3 gas detectors in I~azazdousarcas ......... ...:.............................. 98
8.4 ous area classificatiou during naahLenance w ................................ 100
Contents Conk.- Page

~ n n e xA Classification and categorisation of petroleum and flammable fluids ................... 103
Annex B Hazardous area classification for hydrogen ........................................ 107
AnnexC Calculationofhazardradii ..................................................... 109
Annex C Part X: Procedure for establishment of appropriate release frequency level ............... 111
Annex C Part 2: Background to risk-based approach ....................................... 117
Annex C Part 3: Background to the calculation of hazard radii in Chapter 5 ..................... 123
Annex D Releases with'm buiidings and associated external hazardous areas .................... 127
Annex E Small-scale operations (iaboratories and piiot plants) ............................... 131
Annex F Types of protection and electrical. apparatus that may have an internal source of release . . 133
Annex C Safeguards on fired process heaters .............................................. 137
Annex H Glossary ..................................................................... 139
Annex1 References ................................................................... 143
Part 15of the IP Model Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum lndustry ('IP 15') is a well-established, internationally
accepted Code for the classification of hazardous areas in the petroleum industry. The second edition introduced an
updated, demonstrable methodology for determining hazard radii, which broadened the applicability of the Code
to all installations handling flammable fluids.

The tiiiid edition provides, primarily, both technical and editorial clarification on issues that have been raised by
users of the second edition since its publication in 2002. In addition, hrther technical and editorial changes have
been made. A summary of them is provided in Key Technical Changes. It is not anticipated that those changes will
result in increased hazardous areas.

The Code applies dispersion modelling to the calculation of hazard radii, taking into account variables such as
pressure of release and the effect of mist or spray formation. The former approach made a distinction between
heavier and lighter-than-air matttrials but this is no bnger valid. The current methodologytakes account of both the
cornposition of the material released and its release conditions including the release pressure.

The Code also provides a risk-based approach for specifying hamdous areas from secondary grade sources of
release, allowing further flexibility in specifying hazard radii. Whilst the Code includes the basis of the risk-hsed
approach, the full methodology is provided in a separate publication: IP A risk-baredapproach fo hazardour area

The i n f o d o n contained in this publication is provided for information only and while every reasonable care has
been t a k a to ensure the accuracyof its contents, the EI cannot accept any responsibilityfor any action taken, or not
taken, on the basis ofthis information. The EI shall not be liable to any person for any loss or damage which may
arise fromthe use of the information contained in any of its publications.

The above disclaimer is not intended to restrict or exclude liability for death or personal injury caused by own

Suggested revisions are invited and sholild be submitted to the Technical Department, Energy Institute, 61,New
Givendish Street, LONDON W 1G 7AR. I,
The key technical changes are to:

- Clarify the t h e e complimentary approaches for carrying out hazardow area classification.
- Clarify that the point source approach can also be used for facilities of c o m o n tVpetVpe
-- Clarify that an optional risk-based approach can be used in conjunction with the point source approach for .
hcilities when the r e l e e rate is unknowa. Provide new guidance on c i m m t a e Mapplyinglhe risk-based

- ClariQ the technical basis for the lower bound of 1 hrfyr.

--- Clarify the limitations of Class of p e t r o l m and introduce the eoncepr of fluid
---- Provide additional guidance on assigning nominal h u x d radii for very Low vapo rates aad clarify the
significanceof the outer boundary of the trazafd radius.
--- Clarify thai hazardous area ~Iassificationmust be carried out before choosing appropriate equipment
- Provide additional guidance on enclosure o f a source of ijpition when sufficient 'sh-di&t tine' separatiou
distances carmot be achieved.

materials into road tankers.

-- Provide additional guidance and direct exampfehazardous area classifiatjon di

storage tank arrangements. Includes requbi for unloading, pertinent

vapour connmtion points) and consequent

--- Clarify hazardous iura cEassificati


- Provide additional guidance on hazardous area classification of gas vents in mud degassing equipment.
- Clarify when risk-based approach should be used for hazardous area classification of point sources.
-.Clarifjrwhy a different procedure is required for determininghazard radii for differentgrades of release in the
point source approach.
- ClarifLthe procedure for determining hazard radii with secondary grade releases in the point source approach
where the hole size is known or unknown
- Clarify seal leakage rates from various pump types in the point source approach.
- Clarib guidance for determining hazard radii for pumps using data tables in the point source approach.
- Provide new guidance regarding the implications on hazardous area classification of the design 1iRing of
pressure retief valves, which can be considered as vents.
- Provide revised guidance on the need not to apply the risk-based approach to flanges and valves when there are
few rebase sources and operations are not under extreme conditions.
- Provide additional hazardous area classification guidance, including the implications of hot materials or
category A or B fluids entering open surface drain cbannels.
- Provide modified flowchart for assessingtype and degree of ventilation, which includesan additional outcome
'over pressurised area'.
--Provide additional guidance on positioning of fixed non-electrical sources of ignition and implications where
located just outside of a hazardous area.
- Provide additional guidance on use of oil mist detectorsincircumstaqces where there is a high risk ofhydraulic
oil release.
- ClaxiSy limitationsof Class of peb-ofeum for more extremeconditions and provide guidance on the concept of
fluid category, which enables the p i n t source method or risk-based approach to be applied.
- Provide additional guidance for secondarygrade releases regarding the relationship between release frequency
LEVEh and individual risk, and calculation ofthe probabilities ofoccupancy and probability when using the
risk-based approach.
- Provide new guidanceon the relevance of the individual risk criterion on LEVELSwith regard to determining
hob sizes when using the risk-based approach.
- Provide new guidancethat sets out the basis for the lower bound hquency of secondary grade releases in terns
of Ule number of flanges,duration of releases, and probabilities of ignition and occupancy and referenced to
the individual risk criterion.
- Provide additionalterms and definitionsfor: 'equivalent diameter'; 'hazardous aea classification'; and 'nominal
hazard radius'.
- Update references.
Thc Institub wishes to m o r d its appreciation of the work carried out by the Wllowing individuals:
# "

Alia Alavi Energy Institute

Howard Growther BP Chemicals Led./ Consultant
Phil Cleaver Advantia Technology Ltd
Paul Evans ChevronTexaco
Kieran GIym BP
Peter NichoIs KCA-Deutag Ltd
.- ..
-. .. .
Colin Pinder BP
Stan Stephen KCA-Deutag Ltd
Andrew Sangster Formerly Institute of Petroleum
Derek Stirling Marathon Oil U.K Ltd
Alau TyldesIey Health and Safkty Executive
Mick Wansborough Shell U.K. Oil Products Ltd

11d s o wishes b recognise the contribution made by those individuals, companies and orgarlisations that provided
comnents since publication of the 2& edition which have resulted in this revised edition.
GENE- This Code presents three cornpIemerttaryapproaches to be used in hazardous area classification.These
are: the & i t example approach, which is lirnitwl to comnion facilities, the point source approach, where release
rates are dependent on process conditions, and the risk-based approach. The point source approach can be used for
all situations; the risk-based approach is an optional methodology for secondary grade releases which may reduce
the extent of the hazardous area determined by the point source approach.

CHAPTER 1:Establishesthe scope of the Code and d e f i key t e r n . It indicates a means of defining flammable
fluids for hazardous area classification puxposes by their flash points and, where extremes of volatility, temperature
and pressure occur, by fluid category. Figure 1.1 provides a guide to applying the Code and selectingthe appropriate
approach to be used.

CHAJPTER 2: Identifies the information required to classify a hazamlous area and explains the technique of
hazardous area classification by use of either the direct example or point s o m e approaches. It describes the
hazardous area classification drawing.

CHAPTER 3: Provides examples, with diagrams, which can be used to classiEy common facilities; distances are
valid forthe conditions given. However, the chapter also refers to the point sourceapproach inchapter 5 for variable
releases such as tank vents.

CUPTEIZ.4: Provides guidance for the classification of drilling rigs, both onshore and offshore with the aid of
diagrams, although distances are derived with greater derence to the point source approach in Chapkr 5.

C E Am I 5: Describes the point source approach and provides the basis for the hazard radii specified throughout
the Code. These are based on the results of dispersion modelliig published in TP Calmlatwns in support ofn315,
which allows for variations in r e l y e rates and operational pressures. A risk-based approach is also provided for
determining the extent of Zone 2 hazardous areas where release hole sizes are not specified a prwri.

CHMTIEIR 6: Provides guidance on the effect of ventilation on hazard radii and zone classification in non-open
areas.The different degrees of ventilation are described and Figure 6.1 provides a procedure for o~ssessingthe type
and degree of ventilation for given situations. Open areas, sheltered areas and enclosed areas are defined and the
application of hazardous area cfassificationto each situation is described. Methods of artificial ventilation and the
effect of loss of ventilation on h e hazardm kea classification are discussed.

CaAlPTER 7: Gives guidance on selection of elactrid equipment acmrcling'to zone classification, type of
protection, temperature class, apparatus group and enclosure ingress protection

FR 8: Legislation requires users to carry out a hazardous area classification, to use &is ar a basis far
seiecting equipment, and to consider all sources of ignition Thii chapter considers the ignition risks associated wi&
non-elecccical equipment.

1.1 SCOPE Commission (XK)and in Europe by the European
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
This Code gives &dance on the classification of areas (CENELBC), followed nationally by bodies such as, in
around equipment handlingor storing flammablefluids, the United Kingdom, the British Standards Institution
and provides a basis for both the correct selection of (BSI). References to standards and guidance issued by
fixed electrical equipment and the location of other these bodies are provided throughout this Code where
fixed sources of ignition in those areas. An 'area' in this appropriate (summarked in Annex I). However, the
context is always taken to be threedimensional. reader is recommended to use the most up-to-date
Hazardousarea classification zoning restrictionsshould version of any referenced standard
be considered when introducing and using any
temporary electrical equipment or mobile equipment
capable of generating a source of ignition. 1.2 LIMITS OF APPLaZCARILWY
It is intended that the guidance given in this Code
is applicable internationally to instailations in Hazardous area classification shouid not be used as a
processing, distribution, production and retail sectors. prime tool in determining layout However, aspects of
The application of this Code is limited to flammable area classification may be considered in determining
fluids similar in physical characteristics to those separation distances. Guidance as to the recommended
occurring in the petroleum, petrochemical and allied safety spacings between equipment and public
iadusrries. Xt does not cover ignitable dusts or the boundaries and to other hcilities, including sources of
assessment of health risks due to the handli of ignition, will be found in other LP Codes referend in
fla m b l e fluids. Also, it does not address the releases Annex I.
of flammable refrigerated or cryogenic liquids, for Note: U a resultinghazard radius is greater than
which the dispersion charac&ristics are markedly 30 m then the slze of the release hi generally larger
different fi-orn those of ffuids at higher temperatures. It than that considered for hazardous area ,

can,however, be used for situations whom vented boil- classiticatlon purposes and consideration should be
off vapour is released at around ambient temperatures. given to m o w n g the facility to minimise the size of
If it is desired to consider hazardous area classification the release,
for the liquids themselves, it will be neoessary to carry
out specific calculations wing suitable dispersion t2.1 Small scale operations
models, e.g. those applied m the caiculation of radii
provided in Annex C Part 3, published in XP Cextain locatians handling only small quantities of
Calculations in suppod of P I S . flammable fluids can, in the context of hazardous area
General guidance as to the main principles, chsification, be classified as 'non-hazardouse.Thii may
definitions and explanations of terms relating to apply to laboratories for testing small petroleum fluid
hazardous area classification has dso been set out samples, for example. It is not possible to set a cut-off
internationally by the International B1ectrotechnical point as tbi must be judged according to the

cixcumstances. For instance, the hazards of draining there are extremes in temperature and pressure, as in
gasoline &om a vehicle fuel tank in an enclosed garage processing plant, a more rigorous calculation
space or a below-ground inspection pit necessitate strict methodology is used, referred to as the 'point source
avoidancl: of all sources of ignition and only Zone 1 approacht.This methodology is presented in Chapter 5.
electrical equipment should be permitted In such cases An optional risk-based approach, covered in Annex C,
due precautions must be taken ta prevent ignition may be used in conjunction with the point source
possibilities from any type o f ignition source (see approach when b e release rate (hole size, pressure) is
Chapter 8). In making such a judgment, the risk to an unknown. ?'his approach may also reduce the extent of
individual should be assessed. the hazard radius.
In certain circumstances, ignition of quite small.
quantities of flammable gashapour mixed with air can
cause danger to anyone in the immediate vicinity.
Where this is the ease, as in a relatively confined Flatnmable atmospheres may also be formed where
location fiom which rapid es flammable fluids handled below their flash points are
hazardous area classification mieased in the form of a mist or spray. Such materials,
quite small quantities of fluid. normally regarded as non-hazardous, should be treated
Each vessel containing flammable fluids should be as hazardous when they are pumped or under pressure
considered individually, with and are capable of producing a mist or spray due to the
surroundings and where people possibility of a release from a small hole dr flange Ieak
a rough guide, hwardous area classification may not be They should be regarded as a category C fluid (s
needed if the maximum amounts of material that could Table 1.2) generating a hazardous area as appropriate.
be released are below the quantitiesgiven in Table 1.1.
Fuaher informationon the applicationofhazardous
area ciassification to smlli-scalc facilities is given in AMENTAX, SAF
Annex E.
1.4.1 Avoidance of fire and explosion

1 3 APPLICATION OF TIXIS The aim of hazardous area classification is to avoid

ignition of those releases that may occur from time to
The application of this Code and the relevance of each time in the operation of facilities handling flammable
chapter are shown in Figure t .l which summarises the liquids and vapour. The approach is to reduce to an
hazardous area classification procedure. acceptable minimum level the probability of
coincidence of a flarrunable atmosphere and an
acifidly of common type ele~tricdor other source ofignition.
As prescribed by IEC (see E C 60079-lo), i t is not
ilities of standard layout and design, the aim of hazardous area classificationto guard against
handling flammable fl the ignition of major releases of flammable materials
h m typical examples. under catastrophic f5ilure ofplant, e.g. the rupture of a
example approach' a sure vessel or pipeline, or the col
These facilities m y , in properly run &ciIities,
source approach, see 13.2. probability of occrrmce. The incidence of sucb
le limitsby wcorrect
32 Other facili~es and operation of

Betails of
process sections

Boiling point
Ffash point
Ambient temperature
prmss conditions:
be assigned to the
(1.6.6, Annex A
Table A l )
1 No

- Premure
- Release a s mist?

L 4
Assign petmfeum Assign non
dass: flammaMe
A, 6. C. GO or cgi)
Material rdeased
(1.6.7 and Tabla 1.2) below its Rash
point, not capable
of fomdng a misf cf
spray, or of
vapmising on a hot
(Classes ll(l),
I W ' 'J(1))

DBtormine Ment of Determine extent of

hazardous area and hazardow area and
zone dassiflcation zone dassifrmtion
us?ng: usktg:
Direct example
{Chapter 3 and 4) (Chapter 5) (Chapter 5 and
Annex c)
raking into m u n t
6 )t e r

. .
.Figure1.1 Application of Code

Good standard of desbn an classification has been carried out on installations

handling flammable fluids.This is, within the European
The harardous area dassification technique described Union, a specific legal requirement under the ATEX
here assumes that the facilities to which it is applied are directive (1999/92EC). Where a facility has been
designed, constructed, maintained and operated in designed and built on a turnkey basis, the plant
accordance with good industry practice so as to reduce designers should have carried out such a study, and
releases to a minimum Equipment and piping should be should have passed it over with other documentation to
designed to international standards or national the owners at the end of commissioning.
equivalents. The recommendations of the IP
publications (Annex I)or their equivalents, regarding
good operational and inaintenancepractice should also
be followed.
These terms are consistent with the usage and principles
in IEC 60079-10. They shouldbe considered equivalent
to definitions in ATEX 99192EC and in the Dangerous
and Explosive ~ t m s ~ h e r eRegulations
2002 (USEAR).
N[a~adousarea classificaLion should be incorporal --
inlo a company's Healttr, Safety and Enviromend
Manageme& System.The person respns'ible for the co-
ordination of the hazacdousmeaclassificationshouldbe A flrunmable atmosphere is defined as a mixtufe of
identified and be competent in this field. The work, flammable gases or vapour with air in such proportion
which requires an interdisciplinaryapproach, should be that, without any further admixwe, it will burn when
carried out by persons who have full knowledge ofthe ignited.
process system and equipment, in consultation with An explosive atmosphere is a mixture with air,
safety, ioss prevention and electrical engineering under atmosphericconditions, of flammablesubstances
personnel, as appropriate. Agreements reached on the in the form of gases, vapour, mists or dusts, in which,
hamdous area classification should be formally after ignition has occurred, combustion rapidly spreads
recorded, continuaity reviewed and h p t u p l a b i fathe entire unburned mixture.
Records, such as drawings andfortabutateddata sheets, The term 'flammable' atmosphere is preferable and
should include details as to the type of protection should be used because the term 'expiosive' is a special
selected to mmt the zone requkements and rhs: case of ' 8 a m b i e ' where either congestion or
apparatussub-groupand ternparapureclass as coveredin confinement leads to the generation of over-pressure
Chapter 7. when the cloud is ignited.
In principie, the classification of an area entails
consideration of ail the actual s o m and potential
sources of release of flammable fluid prasen&. lo
in Chapter 2, the procedurc EIamrdous area classificationi s the assessed division of
ng a standardised hazardous a Faciiity into hazardous areas aud non-hazardous areas,
area classification diagram (Chapters 3 and 4). In other and the subdivision of the hazardous areas into zones.
cases, the procedure of considering individual point
s o w will be n and this approach is detailed and zone ~Iassification

fore the design and ]layout

At this stage, it

somces. All other

contexf though they m y , inpart or whole, form part of
a wider. Astricted at-= witbin the ifacility in which all
id controls. Examphs
T b ~ompanyopemhg a installations (see also
respoll~ibility to ensure section 8.4 and n" tnrcrion and operation
ofdisfribtriion installatiom) and offshore production To assist understanding of the boundaries of the
installatiom (see IS0 13702).Areas are subdivided into definitions of the different grades of release, the
mnes based on the likelihood of occurrence and following quantities are suggested. A release should be
duration ofa flammable atmosphere, as follows: regarded as continuous grade if it is likely to be present
for more than 1000 hours per year and primary grade if
&fie 0: That part of a hazardous area in which a it is likely to be present for between 10 and 1 000 hours -
flammable atmosphere is continuously present or per year. A reiease likely to be present for 1 to 10hours
present for long periods. per year and for short periods only should be regarded
as secondary grade- This assessment should take
Zone 1: That part of a hairardous area in which a account of any fkelihood of leaks remaining
flammable atmosphere is likely to occur in normal undetected. Where releases are likely to be present for
operation. 1 to 10 h o w per year but arc anticipakd in nonnal
operation ( e . routine
~ sampling points) they should be
n n e 2: That part of a hazardous area in which a regarded as primary grade releases unless carried out
flammable atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal under permit-to-work circumstances.
if it occurs, will exist only for a short Details regarding the justification fbr the lower
bound of 1 houtfyear are provided in Annex C section
62.5. 1Even.with an operator present at all times, the
ous areas: Areas that do not fall into any of probability of ignition and the vulnerability likely to
the above. occur fram an ignited reiease of Rammable materiafs an:
such that the target risk within this Code of I E-Slyear is
1.&4 Source and grade of release met without fkther precautions. Note that, as stated in
section 1.2, hazard radii of greater than 30 mare outside
For the purpose of hazardous area classification a therange for which normal hazardousarea classification
source of release i s defined as a point f?om which a techniques can be applied. This should not exclude
B a m b I e gas, vapour or liquid may be released into these events being considered for major hazards studies,
the ahnosphere. Three grades of release are defined in The allocation of the grade of release should be
terms oftheir likely frequency and duration: reviewed in the course of the design stages to deternine
if practicable and ecoaornicai design or engineering
Continuous grade release: A release that is continuow improvements can be made to xeduce the number of
or nearfy so, or that occurs frequentIy and for short continuous and primary
periods. Assessment of the grade of release is not always
obvious and will require experienced eugineering and
Primary grade release: A release that is likely to occur operational judgement Examples wbere continuous,
periodically or occasionally in normal operation i-e. a primary and secondary grade sources normally occur on
release which, in operating procedures, is anticipated to typical equipment may be found in Chapters 3 and 4. It
OCCUT. should be noted that the respective grades of release,
aad hereby zorlaf ide~~tification, have already been
M e reiease: A release that is unlikely to taken into account.
occwin normal operation and,in any event, will do so
only idequently an rl: periods ie. a release
which, in operating , is not anticipated to mne classificaUon
mvs. Such releases m y be of known size e.g. fracture
i.aor unknown size e.g corrosion hole. There is, in most cases, under 'open air'
conditions a direct relationship grade of
e gr-ade of release i s dgendent solely on release and the zone classification to which it gives rise;
fkquency and duration of the reiease. It is completely i.e.
independmt ofthe rate and quantity of the reiease, Ihe
degree of ventilation, or the characteristics ofthe fluid, -- Continuous grade normally
although these factors determine Lhe extent of vapour
nsequence, the dimensional limits of the


Tabb 1.2 Fluid categories

A flammableliquid that, on release, would vapor& rapidly and substandally. This category includes:
(a) Any liquefied petroleum gas or lighter flammabte liquid.

Refinery hydrogeu.

However, it should be noted that the terms of

release' and '7ane' are not s y n o n p u s . &h
continuous, primary and secondary grade releases will Xn other situations, in which variations of fluid
n m a l l y result in Zones 0, 1 and 2 respectively, this volatility, cemperalureand pressure occur under typical
may not always be true. For exaxn~fe,poar ventilation processing conditions, the above classification based
may result in a more stringent zone while, wiah high solely on closed-cup flash points is inadequate and the
ventilation provision, the converse wifi be true (see direct exampb approach in Chapter3 cannot be applied.
Chapter 6). Also some sources m y be considaed to Tbe point source approach in Chapter 5 is then required
have a dual grade of release with a small continuous or and, for this, five categories of fluids, supplemental to
primary grade and a larger secondary grade(see section petroleum fluids by flash pGinl,
5.4.4). Examples of this are a vent with dual-purpose These fluid categories are defined
process requirements or a pump seal. in Table 1.2, and their applidion is described in section
It should also be noted that, whilst a Zone 1 area 5.32.
will often be surrounded by a larger Zone 2 area, there
ific requirement for this. Whem a Zone 1 area
is not part of a larger Zone 2 area then the possibility of
any large bur infxequent release, In addition to the standard terminoIogy used throughout
larger Zone 2 atea, should be co this Code, presentation of many cases of point source
release covered in Chapter 5 uses a base parameter
-6.6 Classificaliou of petroburn

liquid, its volatility is a

ninethe extent of rapid
vapour formation from any reIease.
In many of the commonly encou
facilities, such as those referred to in
elassifrcation of the fl
or evapora(ion of liquids &om

the end of this

1.7 VENTILATION owing to obstructions, natural ventilation may be Iess
&an in a true open area. For example, below-grade
Ventilation comprises the movement of air within and areas such as pits and trenches, areas within tank bunds,
througha volume to achieve the introductionof freshair and congested plant struchlres may be subject to
into, and removal of contaminated air fiom, the volume restricted ventilation and therefore fall. into this
and the mixing of air and contaminants within the category. The extent or severity of the zone
voluine. classificationof the hazardous area may be increased as
The opemess of a region is an important factor in a result
determining the effectiveness of ventilation and the Where the obstructions are such that natural
extent and severity of a hazardous area Two boundary ventitation is severely restricted, it should be classified
cases (open area, enclosed area) and an intermediate as an enclosed area (see 1.7.5).
case (sheltered or obstructed area) are defined in 1.7.3-
1.7.5. These relate to two main types of ventilation, 1.7.5 Enclosed area
natural in the case of an open area and artificial in the
case of an enciosed area, also defined below. Any building, room or enciosed space e.g. cabinet,
The degree of ventilation (unrestricted, restricted, within which, in the absenceof artificial ventilation, the
adequate or inadequate) is a key factor in determining air movement will be limited and any f l m b l e
the zone classification of an area. atmosphere will not be dispersed naturally.
In encIosed areas, different artificiag ventilation
options (geneml or local exhaust, dilution and over-
pressure) may be used to provide adequate ventilation.
Chapter 6 provides guidance on how, in
conjunction with Chapter 5, ventilation type and Previous editions of this and other hazardous area
adequacy should be assessed Figure: 6.1 provides a c!assification codes have made a distinction between
summary of the inter-relationship of the type and degree heavier-than-air and lighter-than-air gases and vapour in
of ventilation. determining the shape profile of a hazardous region in
open areas. However, recent work fll> Calculations in
1.7.1 Natural ventilation support of PZ5) has shown that, for the majority of
releases Erom pressurised sources, the shape of the
Ventilation caused by wind or convectioneffects, due to hazardous region is not related to the relative density of
solar or hot equipment it applies to open and the fluid. The shapesof these zones depend primarily on
sheltered/obstructedareas. Efffectivenatural ventilation the angle of the release and how close the release point
is typically achieved when the wind speed is greater is to the ground. This is because a turbulent jet
than 0,s m/s. dispersion mechanism prevails and the angle of release
and the jet momentum determine the initial direction of
1.7.2 Artificial ventilation the flammabie cloud. Further, the dilutingmixture in air
attains a density very similar to that of air within a very
Ventilation caused by air purge or by assisted short distance of the release point, so that buoyancy
mecha&aI meaw (such as f a or extractors) that may effects are not a significant factor. Similar
be applied generally (throughout the whole of an considerationsapplyto fluids which are released at high
enclosure), or localIy (to deal with a local release or a temperatures and would be buoyant by virtue of their
stagnant region). It applies to enclosed arms only. conesponding low densities. Where areas are sheltered
or enclosed, special reference should be made to the
1.73 Open area conditions in Chapter 6 since lighter-than-air releases
m y accumulate at high level.
An area thatis outdoorswithout stagnant regions, where Somecommon situationswhere the releases are not
vapour is rapidly dispersed by wind and natural pressurised are given in the direct examples in
~mvectioni.e. by nahval ventecti&tion. Typidly, air Chapter 3, but these are ail where heavier-&air
velocities wiH rarely be less than 03 d s and will vapour exists (e.g. open road-tanker fill covers, sumps
frequently be above 2 d s . and pols etc.) If a light&-thawair gas such as
hydrogenormethane were released as a wn-presswised
1.7.4 Sheltered or obstructed area cloud or 'bubble', its dispersion would need to be
specificallyassessed.fn additioa, special considerations
An area within or adjoining an open area (which may apply to hydrogen because of its low minimum ignition
include a partially open building or stnrctwe) where, energy and these are discussed in Annex B.
The object ofthe hazardous area classification approach Infoormation must first be assembled which, according
is to reduce, to an acceptable level, the probability of ta the complexity of the installation, can include:
coincidence of a f l m a b l e atmosphere and an ignition
source. (a) A process flow diagram showing flows,
It requires delineation of the hciiity into hazaniaus temperatures and pressures.
areas and non-hazardous areas. XIazardous areas are
further divided into mnes which are graded according (b) Flash puinrs or, where more complex conditions
to the e s probability
~ of ~the presence of a requiring a point-source release approachapply,the
flammable atmosphere. There are restrictions within boiiing ranges or other relevant physical
these areas and zones on the use of equipment with the characteristicsof the fluids handled that willenable
potential to w s e ignition. Guidauce as to the corrcct the fluid category, as defined in section 1.6.7 and
selection of electrical equipment is provided in mined. These will also be
Chapter 7 and in hllerdetail by the ine the apparatus sub-group and
class (see 2.5 ma Chapter 7).

relevane, a piping and insmenbtion

(for example for processing plant).
is also of value when cousidering the focation arid
control of mn-electrical soufces o with mica1plans and eievati~rms

addition this should show principal saurces of

ignition d

(e) Knowledgeof the equipment featuresand the mode open area, to denote small pockets of non-
of operation. . hazardous areas within a generai hazardous area
unless these are a special feature of the design, e.g.
(f) Consideration of ventilation, whether open area, a ventilation protected enclosure. Likewise, it is
restricted (sheltered) or enclosed (see normally not necessary to determine the hazardous
For sheltered or enclosed situationsthe positions of area that would arise Erom each individual source
openings such as doors, windows and inletsloutlets of release when this woutd not influence the overall
will be needed. The location of below-grade areas, zone boitnday-
such as pits and pipe-trenches, should also be
specified. The basic guidance set out in Chapters 3,4 and 5,
except where otherwise stated, relates to open area
(g) Identify material (e.g. diesel) and process conditions with good ventilation that ensures
{temperatureand pressure). natural dispersionof releases to atmosphelae.These
correspond to typical onshore facilities consisting
It is then nccewuy using the procedures that follow to of structures located in the open, and where such
stemins tbe resulting Zone 0 and Zone 1 hazardous conditions may apply offshore.
areas and the secondary grade releases which define fhe
hux.rdaxies, together with the extent of thew re iess well ventilated or enchsed situations
areas. occur, typically in offshore installations and In
certainonshoresituations,guidanceon the relevant
ventilation condition should be obtained &om
Chapter 6.
A good principle is b consider whether it is
In carrying out such an assessment, by either the direct possible to avoid cbntinuous or primary grade
example approach (2.4.1) or point sowce approach releases in reduced ventilation Iocatiom such as
(2.4.2), the following basic principles should be sheltered or encloscd areas. Likewise, ,&e
considered: hazardous area ciassificationwillbe simpiified if it
is possible to avoid a layout thak by obstruction,
(a) W e n classifying a new ficility or modifying an would create a sheltered area within a nominal
existing one, the hazardous area classification open hazardous area
shauld be Garrid out befare the design and tayout
of equipment are finalised,as at this stage it may be (f) In some cases where a sufficient 'straight line'
possible to make considemble improvements at separationdistancecannot be achieved between the
tittle cost and even some saving. The hazardous potential sources of releaseand ignition source, the
area classification should be reviewed, and inter-positioning of a suitably dimensioned
modified if necessary, on completion of design or imperforate firewall may be practical (see section
before any significantchange is madeto anexisting 6.2.3).Alternatively, it may be possible to enclose
or to the miego that are the potential sources of release andor igaition
handfed. Vents vassels sources. However, the effects of r e d w d
and instrumen&can influence the boundary of tlhe ventilation on the zone classiftcatioa will n
be considered (see section 6.5).

ce of the risk-based a p p a ~ when


roach, which is limited to

k t source approach, w
t on process mndiths,

the risk-based approach. The point source approach can 2.5 APPARATUS SUB-GROUP AND
be used for all situations; the risk-based approach is an TEMPERATURE CLASS
optional methodology for secondary grade releases
which may reduce the extent of the hazardous area To select electrical equipment appropriate to the zone
determined by the point source approach. Figure 1.1 classification, the apparatussub-groupand temperature
illustsatt~how to select the appropriate approach to be class should be determined during the hazardous area
used. ctassification, based on the flammable substances that
can be released, and this information added to the
2.4.1 Direct example approach drawing andfor records. Further guidance given in
Chapter 7 should be followed.
Some arrangements of generic industriat equipment When applying this, the effect of abnormal
handling common flammable materials may be operations, for example startup andshutdown,should be
classified directly from typical examples. Such considered, since such operations may affect the
arrangements include drilling, workover and wellhead composition of any substancesreleased and hence their
sites, tank storage (both upstream and downstream), flash points andlor auto-ignition temperatures.
road and rail car loading and unloading, container However, it may be reasonable to ignore any such
filing, filling station forecourts. Typical classification abnormal composition if it is expected to exist within
should follow the approach in 2.2. Direct examples for the plant for less than 1% of the time, say 100hours per
these arrangements are presented in Chapters 3 and 4. year, and provided that there is no continuous or
However, this approach should only be applied when pr-~marygrade release duting this period. Secondary
the facility under considektion does not differ grade sources are not likely to release during such a
significantly firom the direct example in terms of layout, period See also Annex F, section F2 for situations
type of equipment, class of flammable fluid or the where internal release within apparatus may occur.
pertinent temperature, pressure or ventilation state.
The apparatus sub-group and temperature class
Individual anciliary items (e.g. pump sets, vents,
appropriateto flammable fluids are Iisted in Table 7.2.
sampling and drainage points, pig launchers and traps, When a release is a mixture of substances, the most
sumps, interceptors and separatorsand surfacedrainage)
restrictive apparatus sub-group and temperature class
associated with generic facilities covered b Chapters 3
and 4, but not shown in the diagrammatic exam@x, should be specified. If gases belonging to more than one
should be assessed according to the point source electricalapparatussub-gmupand temperatumcIassare
approach, see 2.4.2. present in non-overlapping areas then it is acceptableto
show different groups and classes.
2.4.2 Point source approach In considering wide boiling range mixtures or
mixtares of gas and liquid, the apparatus sub-group
or installations or processes where the standard should be based on the properties ofthe gas or vapour
that would be released. For example, in the case of a gas
conditions assumed for the direct exampies in Chapters
3 and 4 do notapply (due to viuiabilities of temperature, oil hydro-tmting process unit in a refinery, it should be
pressure, equipment and the degree and type of based on the hydrogen-rich recycle gas. In areas where
ventilation) the extent of vaporisation that would take hydrogeu may be present, such as battery rooms, the
place on release may v w greatly making individual classification should be IIC and Tl (see Table 7.2). See
assessment necessary. This is known as the boint Annex B for a discussion of hydrogencontaining
source approach'. The release rate of a flammable fiuid releases.
is required in order to apply this methodology. A s t e p
by-sbp procedure is provided in Chapter 5.
2.6 THE HAZAFtbOUS A W A . . '

2.43 Risk-based approach CLASSXRCATION DRAWING

For system where the release rate is of an unknown, H w d o u s area classification records can comprise
unspecified and variable quantity, the risk-based detailed drawings with notes and/or can be in the form
approach is proposed to determine the hole size to be of tabulations. The hazdous area classification
used for a secondary grade release. A secondary grade drawings should be in sufficient scale to show all the
release, as defined in section 1.6.4, is oue which would main items of equipment and all the buildings in both
not be anticipated to occur during normal operation. plan and elevation. The positions of all opnidgssuch as
Examples include f d w of pump/coqressor seals, doors, windows and ventilation inlets and outlets, and
leaks h r n valves and flanges, or operafional enor. utility entries if not sealed vapour-tight should be . ,

included as the careful positioning of these openings The drawings andfor notes should indicate whe
can affect the sizingof related externai l~azardousareas, the classification depends on the correct operation of
Records should be marked up to show the special ventilation arrangement. It should consider ar
boundaries of alI hazardous areas and zones present indicatethe effect of faitureof such an arrangement (81
using the shading convention adopted in IlEC 60079-10, sections 6.5 and 6.6).
shown in Figure 2.1. It is acceptable to indicate any The preparationof the hazardous areac~assificatic
requirement for small local zonesfareas, e.g. around drawing provides an opportunity to verify that tl
pumps and control valves, in a noie on the drawing. The coverage of all saurces of release has b~
finall hazardous area classification should include a comprehensive. It also provides an opportunity fi
record of all additioilal supporting details as outlined in smoothing zone boundaries to remove umanagedb
2.2. detail. For example, it is not good practice to deno
Note: it is n-sary to clearly distinguish small pockeis o f non-hazardous area. within a gener
on the drawing where different gas properties hazardous area. It may be desirable to adopt physic
(e-g. hydrogen with a Gas Group IIC on part of a plant features, e.g. roads or m s s ways, for a readi:
where mainly hydrecarbons are present). This definedzone boundary line, provided the zone boundat
illusmied using halfwidth hatching for the h r n any source is within ehese limits.
'hydrogen' region. T f ~ edrawings should be kept I
account of:

- Changes in installation protectiona

Zone O Zone 1 Zone 2 - Expedence in operation of the installation.
- Changes in method or frequency of operations.
Figure 2.1 fiazardous area classification - Reetassificationas a result oErneasu~t:mentsin an
shading conventhn around hazardous areas.

3.1 SCOPE (e) Retail dispensing on filling station forecourts.
(fj Tankage for high volatility/vapour pressure stocks,
The procedure in this chapter is for classification of e.g. Class 0 (LPG), requiring pressure storage.
those industry operations that are carried out in an open
area in facilities so similar in layout and the material The followingsections give guidance on the hazardous
handled that they can be classified directly from typical area classification applicable to such typical facilities.
examples. For facilities in sheltered or enclosed areas When using thiiapproach,the site being assessed must
guidance is given in Chapter 6. not differ appreciably &om the example in layout,
The diagmms in this section are based iargely on equipmentsizeor degree ofventiIation. Wherethere are
experience but the distances given have been shown to diKerencesthey should be accounted for by considering
be broadly consistent with those derived from more the individual sources of release and superimposingon
analytical studies covered in Chapter 5. However, the the standard drawing as applicable.
notes associated with the diagrams should always be
reviewed and, where necessary, consideration given to 3.1.1 Classification of an 'open area'
any circumstances departing from these general design
criteria. The distances shown may be modified if This is the fully open-air situation without stagnant
justified by specific release and dispersioncalculations. ateas where, through naaual ventilation, vapour is
Whilst every effort bas beem made to keep hazard readily dispersed by wind. This is recognised by the
radii in proportion it shoold be noted that the figures IEC as typical in the chemical and petroieum industries
are NOT drawn to scale. onshore where most crude oii and gas processing,
refining, storage and distribution plants arq open-type
Examples include: structures. Typical air velocities found onshore under
these conditions are rarely less than 03 d s and are
(a) Floating roof and fixed. wne or dome roof type -frequentlyabove 2 mls.
tanks (including those which have an internal For this reason, exeeptwhere otherwise q+ifiedas
floatingcover), buried or mounded tanks and filling in the roofed area of ioadiagfacilies or in enclosed or
station tankage. partially enclosed noiseproofed or weather-proofed ,
(b) Road aad rail ioading rind discharge facilities. drilling rigs or mud tank systems, the direct examp1es
(c) Marine ioading and discharge facilities. given in Chapters 3 and 4 are based upon such open
(d) Drum filling. area conditions.
AREA CLASSIFICATION CODE FOR YNSTAI;LATlONS HANDLING FWLh4MABL.E FLUIDS Abnormai topographical or mfeoroiogieal UncIassified flammable nuids

In all the assessments outiined above the degree of F l m a b i e fluids fklling into the 'Unclassified' Class,
openness of the surrounding topography of the site i.e. Rash point >1W0C, may, according to the
should also be considered, to ensure that thm are no temperature of handling, either be considered as non-
major unevenness a r hollows where heavier-than-air hazardous or, at temperatures in excess of the flash
vapour might collect, nor sloping ground down which point, be considered as Class 1[1[1(2) liquids.
suck vapour might flow to lower levels of tlre However, when unclassified products such as
installation. bitumens and heavy residual and bunker fuels are stored
Where severe limitations of apographical or under confined heated conditions in fixed roof tank
meteorological features occur, in what would otherwise (i-e. unventilated uliage space), the flash point of the
be an open area (or in sheltered areas, section 6.3), roduct is not a reliable guide to the presence 0%
pneral artificial ventilation may be appli absence of a flammableatmospl~ere that rnay have built
provision of suitably located fans to improve the general up in the tank vapour space. For this reason it is
ventilation of the area. ent, in common with the ullage space of road or rail
vehicies containingall classes of flamPilablefluids,
to classiEy the ullage space of all
with a 1,s m Z ~ n 1 e hazardous a
With the exception of (E) in 3.1 above, the products and other openings. Reference may also be made to the
associated with these dim& examples will XP Bitumen safely code.
classified as Class I, I1 or llI petroleum or Buid category
6 , and the guidanceof Annex A should be applied. This
includes the distinction between Classes II(l), IX(2),
Irx(1) and III(2).
The following direct examples apply to tankage ac
3.13 variations defined in 34a). The examples apply directly to the
storage oEClass I liquids, for which there should always
For the purposes of this Code, a maximum mbient be such a zoning. This guidance rnay be applied, where
te~wratureof 30°C has been assumed. The h m d such conditions arise, to the storage of Ciass 11(2) and
zone dimensions in the following diagmm are therefore HK(2) liquids (see 3.1.2).
on this condition unless stated otherwise. As indicated in Chapter 2, Table A3 and Ai.3.
For products handledabovea temperatureof30°C, liquids that are stored under Class II(1) or EI(1;
the extent of the hazardous area m y be greater than the conditions will not nomalty require external hazardow
recommendations given ia this chap&. In more area classification.
pronounced cases, e-g. high vapour pressure It is good practice lo restrict electrical. apparatw
condensa~,very light hydrocarbon petrochemical within bunds to the minimum necessary but pumps and
I"eedstock, or bXsnding mrnpents, the appropriate fluid their drives should not be sited within fa& bun&
category should be used and the point source approach The zoning in 3.2.1 and 3.22 wilt normally be
outlined in Chapter 5 should be f o l b w d for the fittings on the tank shell, but it should
%e division between the Class confirmed that &ere is no equipment or release
subdivisions(I) and (2) will also hich would extend thehamdo%
tentperature and, ia arm outside the United Kiigdom, confitmed, Chapter 5 should bc
it will be n i m m r y ta determine the m d u m ambicnt applied
kmperature level$ and the
- Glas X(2) and

regarded as a category
These &qW Iirnits are unlikely lobe eacounbed

this chapter.

the bund wall will contain the spread of vapout due to The area within the tank bund up to a height equal
venting. The area extending 3 rnupwards at right angles to the top of the bund or up to 1 m, whichever is the
to the roof surface, 3 m horizontally from the roof edge greater, should be classified as Zone 2, and any pits or
and 2 m verticaily down the shell from the roof edge depressions Zone 1, because of the greater tendency of
should therefore be classified as Zone 1. heavier-than-air vapour to persist.

' .
, --- -.

-.-Pit or depression

. I. Due to the possibility of misf spray formation, the ullage space of Class U(1) and IU(1) tanks should aIso be regattied as
Zone 0. It is recommended that the area surroundingany vents or openingson the roof of such a tank be regarded as Zone
. .
to a radius determined using section at the vent tip.
, . 2. See 3.1.4 for heated residual fuel and bitumen tanks.
3. In the event of a large loss of containment which fillsthc bund, the hazardous area would extend beyond the bund wall.
See Table 5.7. Any sources of ignition located close to the:bund wall should be isolated in this event

Figure 3.1(a) Bunded tanks cone or dome

I. This clsssification is based on the practice that the roofwill not be grounded on its legs during theoperational cycle, since . .
the spare spaceso created below the roofwould draw in air and create the possibility of ignition caused by Gction. Roofs
shouldonlybe landed for inspection,cteaningandmaintenanceundercarehlfy supervisedwork permitmtrol. Any vapour
space below the roof or between the pn'unary and sebndary seals should be treated as Zone 0.
2. See note 3 of Figure 3.1(a).

Figure 3.1@) -
Bunded tanks floating roof
At a distance of 3 m &om the shell, the Zone 2 3.2.3 Tankage with auter con
should be extended upwards to meet the T h e 1 area.
This is shown in Figure 3.1(a). ff the bund wall is Less On any fixed or floating rooftanks with in-built outer
than 3 m from the tank she& it may containment, the annular space between should be
adjust the mned distance accordingly. These hazard classified as Zone 1, whatever Class of fluid is stored.
distances apply to filling rates ofup to 250 m3k. The remaining area around the containment should be
Additional information and for filling rates greater classified in accordance with 3.2.1 or 3.2.2. See
than 250 m3hcan be found'in section Figure 3.2.

The hazardous area classificationaro

tank should be drawn as in Figure
within the tank shell abo
as Zone I.
area above and

should extend, at the height of the bund, to the bund

wall. Any pits or depressions within this Zone 2 should artificial ventilation sys
be classified as Zone 1.

(a) Cone roof tank



.3 M A D TANKER providing the design of road tankers is in ascordance

with relevant national and international statutory
requirements (guidance is given in XP Petroleum road
, suitable safety and
tanker design a n d c o n s t ~ i o n )and
This section covers both bottom and top loading of operating procedures are foIlowed (see IP Design,
petroleum Qasses 1, IT, [If and similar ff ammable fluids constpuction andoperation of disrvibution~tailatwm).
in the normal case where such facilities are locatedin an Unless these conditions are met, the movemeat 06
open area, under conditions defined in 3.1.1. Class 0 vehicles to and from a loading position, (which must
(i.e.LPG-type materials) loadingshould be classifiedby take place with the loading island, bay area and vehicle
referring to 33.6. in a flammable hazard-& state) and the occupation of
It should be noted that under normal ambient a loading position adjacent to a road tanker
conditions, materials below their flash points such as filling, may be unsafe. Loss of containment on one
kerosine and gas oil, i.e. Classes Kyl) and XII(X), m y loading island which spreads to an adjacent vacant
give rise to hazardous areas around equipmentin which loading island, e.g. vapour spread, spillage during
ihey are handled under pressure, due t~ the possibility filling, breaking of flanges or leakage h m
of mist or spray formation on release. Also, if these maintenance, renders the entry or departwe of vehicles
materials are loaded into a vehicle compartment which unsafe. It should be noted that certain hazardous areas
has previouslycontained a highvapour pressureproduct are transient and only exist whilst I&admg is being
such as gasoline, i.e. switch-loaded, they may displace carried out.
any Barnable atmosphere that remains in &e vapour
space. In such cases the loading facility should be
classified as in 3.3.3 for a C k s I, H(2)or 111(2) product.
However, switch-loadingof cargoes should be avoided The hamdous areas arouad all possible sources of
wherever possible. release which could arise from the installed loading
equipment and slop facilities, in the absence of a tank
3.3. pen air facilities witltr weather roofing vehicle, should be assessed and a practicat envelope
devised. This should include b d o u s areas arising
As depicted in the direct examples that follow, loading from routine operations such as filter cleaning.
Eacilities should normally be located in the open air (see The additional hazardous areas which arise whilst
IP Design,const~uch'anand operation of distribution vehicles are being Elled should be determined. These
installatiom). A roof for weather protection is hazardous areas are transient and will notexist when the
acceptable but any sides should not unduly restrict fill covers are closed and the loading a r m have been
natural ventilation. Also, the space betow the roof returned to the parked positiort Spillagesarising during
should be regarded as a sheltered area, and classified as tank vehicle fiiling should, however, be considered.
Zone 2 as depicted in Figw 3.4. Turbulent airflow Foilawing the steps in 3.3.3 the analysis should be
above a ventilated roofmakes it impossible to calculate carried out in stages as follows:
a specific hazardous area around roofvenls, Therefore,
it is recommnded that electrical equipent should not Glassificutwnof loading island
no vehiclepresent
For the purposes of this guidance, it is assumed that the
ipped with self-sealing
ncy with which the
The approach to the classification for both bottom and n, =wing a smaU
b p goading of road &Amshould take: accowt of the refease of liquid or vapom to occur, they should be
foflowiag sihrations: mleasc s o ~ e sgivingrise
, ta
around the wuptings itr the
loarIing island and bay
present. level- For mleases of up
loading i s h d and
pmenl, iociuding during mling*
(3) Any spillage of fiamnablc materials.

direct exany71e in this chapter are


End &vation

I I I Sz note 3
e I

Plan -with or withwt roofing Closs~$catwnof loading islandand bay orea gives rise to a Zone 1 area of radius i m (see
during loading vehicleprereiu Figure 3.5). This distam assumes h t the s e l f - d i g
The v&~eIecab should always be tfeated as a Zone 2 couplings normally used for bottom loading lirmt the
within the Zone 2 classified area in accordance with IP normal release on d i i o n n d o n to less than 10 ml.
P e t m h mad tankerdesign andcomnvclion. Since there is no bee venting, the only
Vapow is piped from the colldon manifold on the c-kamstance in which d i i to the open air can
vehicle top to a low-level connection on the loading occur IS where failure of the overfill prevention system
island, through a self-sealing coupling. From this leads to the emergency venting of a compartment. This
connection, the vapanr is routed to a vapour colledion possibility is remote since IP Pemlewn road frmRer
unit or, when this is n ~ provided,
. to a vent direct to design and comhuctwn requires the design of the
atmosphere (see There is, t h d o r e , no free overfill prevention systemto bebotb selfchad6ng and
venting in the loading area &om compartment fiU fail-&. Accordingly it can be designated a secondary
covers. However, asmall leakage could result b m the grade release, resulting in a Zone 2 area of
hoseconnectionpoint on the tankesdtuing coupling and 1 m radius around each relief valve, as shown UI
uncoupling. Due to the 6quency of operation, this Figure 3.5.

Vehide dwiw losbing side e k v a h End elwa6on

1. Ernpty bay with w spillageprsent is in safeanditionfar vehicle entry/- wim ventsand ail UHfneCtim closed
2 Whenbottomloadingrank~anbeingfiU8d~thopm60coverj~bazard0lt~areaduetovap,wcmis4ionfmmvents
during loading at a fitling rate of 2,3 m3/mine x t d s in all d i i o n s €omeachopen fill cave^ for Less +lm1m radiw.
Thisd@ances$dd+,~aeasnito I.5m toallowfor~possiblereleaseofprodadhdraw~ffval~ wimusedfor
3. 7ki ullage space m &gok &odd be da9ified as one 0.
Bigare 35 Road tanker eqnipped for battom loading with vaponr c o W o n , during loading Provisionforspillage ducts and channels) will determine the size of pool
Ifi addition to the aggregated Zone 1 areas of likely to be formed for a given combinationof spillage
sgures 3.4 and 3.5 during the loading o p t i o n , rate and duration.
transient h e 2 hazardous areas apply where pillages The sljillage is assumed to be of a category C fluid
of C h I, II(2) or III(2) materials could ouw. and the size of the hKardous area (Zone 2) frmthese
Spillages in the loading area should be coosidered secondary grade release sources is based on the means
secondary grade release% Spillages can occur from of spillage containment as recommended in section
filters during routine servicing, from the failure of 5.4.7. The height of the Zone 2 area should therefore be
pipewnrksystemwmponentsand,despite the provision 1 m. Where there is a drainage channel, ke& or other
of overfill prevention devices, from overiilling of means of containment aronud the loadiig area, then no
vehicle compaNnents at flow rates up to the maximuin flow of spillageoutside the channelor containmentarea
loading rate. The extent of a spillageshould be assessed need be considered, but the further extent of vapour
according to the expected duration of release and with travel should be taken into account Tbe total hazardous
dae regard to snrface grading and draiige systems. area will therefore nonnally he greater than that within
Overfilliig a vehicle is likely to result in the formation thecontainmentarea (seeFigure 3.6 for typical zoning).
of the largest wetted area or pool If a means of contaiuaeut is not provided around the
Details ofthe surfacearea drainage (i.e. the grading loading facility the likely extent of a spillage must be
of the p a d area and positions of cotlecting points, assessed by cpnsidering the sx&x grading.

2. ~dimensionsof~sle~bythe~of~~a~ecootai~entsuchaspliodcontom,kah~~eg~rieys
or cllt-offdraios (as shown). 'L'shown a h is not necessarilv the same dimension iu tmth M o w .
3. ~fweaiim mofini is p&d, the space above tlac ~ o a 1e a& will be Zone 2 up to the roof

P i e 3.6 Area clarsificatianin event of spillage

. .
Side elevatim


3.7 Composite area elpgsltieation drawing for bottom teading road -daring
loadingin the event efa spiaage
:.. ,.
.. . .
4 he composiie darsification drawing practical envelope devised. This shwld include
e detailed analysis carried out above it is hazardous areas arising from other routine oper&mS
to assemble a composite of Figures 3.4 to 3.6, such as filter cleaning.
g in a fml drawing illustrated in Figure 3.7. Additimal hazardous areas which aFise whilst
whole anangement should pennit the vehicles are being filled should then be determined
ofvehiclesto and from theloadingpositions, These hazardous areas are trausienr and will not exist
loading island, bay area and vehicle in a when the fill covers are closed and the loading arms
le hazard-free state. This is ensured by have been returned to the parked position Spiliages,
erence to the operational controls prescribed in IP which could arise during mad taaker I o a d i i should
co~~trucfian and operation of distribution also be considered.
Following the principles established in 3.33 the
analysis should be carried out in stages as follows:
.4.5 W~therprotectwn - bottom loading
the case of bodom loading, overhead protection Chs~1catwn ofloadingisImdandbayarea -
inst weather can bedispensed with, as fillkvers are no vehiclepresent
open for loading purposes. Where, however, Forthis condition the loading island shouldbe classiied
&es of climate make weather roofmg desirable, with the Ioading anns in the parked position to @t
pecfve of whether o r not pipework is installed in movement of a vehicle toand &om the loadingposition
wfspace, it is recommended that the whole ofthe which must take place with the loading island, bay area
. . ,. . , . f wace..other than that whichmav alreadv he withim
and vehicle in a flammable hazard-he state. The lower
. . ".,--i' ' the abovedefined Zone I are& shoild be classified as part ofthe annsafter use will have internal and external
ne 2 (see Figure 3.4). wetted areas and evaporation and diadramage can take
place. Therefore a wminal 1,5m a n e 1 areashould be
4.6 &fe disposal of vented "pour assigned around the end of each loading ann. If
ere the vapour cmitted from vehicle loadii is detachment is via a 'drybreak' coupling, a typical
wllection system, the latter will be release of up to 10 ml may result aod the nominal
loading areas. With the collection hazard radius may be reduced to 1 m for a closed
on, any emissions should be lean in system. Due to the frequency of operation they should
els. However, to allow for process be regarded as primary grade release sources. The
malfunction thevent should be regarded as a m n d a r y Zone 1 area should be extended vertically down to
grade source of release, and its hazardous area sbould ground 1eveL However, it is mommended that the
be assessed in aceordance with section 5.4.4. entire Ioadimg island is classified as a Zone I area to
Where a vapour collection system is not provided, ensureequipmeatlocatedonitisspeci6edaccordiogty,
fieilitiesshould be availableto enable the road tanker's as shown in Figure 3.8.
pour collection manifold to be connected to a
discharge system which will emme that vapour ClaFs@mfwnof Iwdingiskmd and bay meo
aisplaceddming loading is vented &ely away from the -
&ring loading vehicle present
immediate loading area @! Petrolarm road fanker Whenall ffietank wmpartments of a vehicleirreclosed,
~ i g n a d w m f r u c t i o n )The
. hazardousarea fromsuch the uwccupied space of an empty bay hemeen thc
a vent should be as& in aceordance with section Zone 1 areasofadjacentloadingisIandspermits the safe
5.4.4. Given the fkqnency of most loading opecations, entry of the mad tanker and its depaaure when loaded,
the classiication should be Zone 1. subject in both cases to there being 00 spillage and
loading arms being in the parlced position.
335 -
Top loading of road tankers C l a s s I, U When a road tanker is at the loading position, a
and Ill iirrther Zone I area is g e n d when vents and fill
covers are opcncd, or filling wnneaions are made w
A detailed analysis, analogom to that of 33.4 for diimected
bottom loading, should be canied out to produce a Whilst the hazardws area due to vapour emission
composite classiication d i i from vents dudng l d m g at a fiLliig rate of 2 m'lmin
Asin3.3.4,thehazardow areasamundallpossible cxtends in all M o m to less than 1 m for Class I
SOW& of release, which wuld arise &omthe installed peholeum, it has been shown as 1s mu, allow for the
loadiogequ~ntandpr~dddisposal facilitiesin the possible release of product &om draw off valves Vmea
abmce of a mad tanker, shonhi be assessed and a used for adjustment of load

The extent of the Zone I area to be assumed is ~ossibleto asskble acornposite ofFigures 3.8 to 3.10,
shown in Figure 3.9. resulhg in the final drawing illustrated in Figure 3.1 1.
The whole arrangement should permit the Provisionfor spillage movement o f vehicies to and from fkloading positions,
This will apply only for Class I, B(2) and LII(2) with the loading island, bay area and vehicle in a
materials. See and Figure 3.10. flammable hazard-free state. This is ensured by
adherence to the operational controlls prescribed in IP The composite clussz$cation drawing Design, con.struction and operation of distribution
From the detailed analysis carried out above it is then installations.

Note: Tbt above zoning appliesto all fixed equipment. Zhe bay areas betweenloading islands can be considexed non-hazarb
in t&eabsence of spiilage and with loading arms in the parked position in m d i for the entry or depariureof the roadranker
with i(s fill covers closed.

Figure 3.8 Top loading island and bay area - no vehicle present
Side elevation End elevation

Note: Zone 0 inside cornpatmen& applies for all classes of flammable fluids.

Figure 3.9 Top loading of road tanker through open or vent fill covers

Elevation i

Chainage channel

1. For determination ofthe Zone 2 hazardous ma resulting from spillage,for Class I, TI@) and iII(2) materials, see
and section 5.4.7.
2. The dimensions of L and R, are controlIed by means of spillage containment such as ground contours, k- drainage
gulleys and cutdff drams (as shown). L ahown above is not necessarily the same dimension in both d i m
i: . .
Figure 3-10 Typical Zone 2 provision for spillage area with draloage

Zoning when badingtaking plaoe -
spillage areas see note 2

Simple aggregation of Figures 3.8,3.9 and 3.10. For treatment of unoccupied bay on right hand side in condition
to receive a road tanker, see note 2

1. if weather roofing is pmvided, alf space above the Zwe 1 area will be Zone 2 up to the roof.
2 Transient hazantous areas normally fiw &om flammable hazard when no spillage present, or for Class H(l) and wl)
3. Areas filled-in, as shown.

F i r e 3.11 Composite area classification drawing for top loading road tankers during loading, in the
event of aspillage GLasses I, fC and lOIi
g$ -*-
hading of Class 0 it?.
LPG and similar Connection, unloading and disconneciion of
s&. >
materials dclivety hosesforflarnrnabie materials
&,pA . The hazardous areas shown in Figure 3.12 are based on:
~ Q ~ ~ ; i z a r darea ~ u sclass5cation around an LPG tanker
.-"t;; 6'- . '
loading should be camed out in accordance with - A road tanker being parked in a designated location
1, Figure 3.15 with the exception that loading as close as reasonably practicable to the tank fill
.-# &&,<
points, wbich are instalied in adequately ventilated
gss~&&b~!.k storage will be carried out using an external
@&p'umP connected to the mad tanker via flexible hoses up positions in open areas; and
.Z?g&@80 mm diameter. Loss of LPG on disconnectionwill - Hose mns being confined to a designated 'corridor',
sggs ;-
pZn&emte a Zone I of nomima1hazard radius 3 tn around with the minimum number of hoses used, to reduce
&sZ ~ e s hose
,Zt&<A. r r
e connectionpoints. This compares to a loss of the couplings required.
FC?"-.~G at 10 bar(a) through a 1 mm hole giving a hazard
m ~ s d2,S ~ & ~ C9a). If smaller hoses are used,
m (Table The zeleases outlined below may occur during
$&i$hiich lmit the loss of LPG on disconnection to less connection, unloading and disconnection.
%2xa$an 100 ml, the hazard radius may be reduced to 1,s in. Connection of dry hose couplings to road tanker is
b > e hazardous areas around the relief valve and level
not anticipated to give rise to any flammable releases;
& '.-
,Jc~-~dicators will be as shown in Figure 3.15. the only anticipated release will take piace on
in+,., . i
disconnection of a we&d hose.
z$':.-<q - ,+

.-t 'i'
Disconnection of the hose from the road tanker,
3.4 ROAD TANKER UNLOADING which shouId precede disconnection from the receiving
tank, will expose internal wetted areas of both the hose
General coupling and vehicle bottom loading adaptor, and drips
may also occur. As the hose is lifted and product is
drained $ the receiving tank,the hose may be moved
conditions, materials handled sideways and/or towards the tank These sources of
release, which are likely to occur during normal
operation,give rise to the following hazardous areas, as
shown in Figure 3.12:
f o d o n At filling stations, members of the
should be kept outside the classified area during - Zone 1 of nominal 1 m radius around the road
unloading warning signs andlor barriers may be tanker bottom loading adaptm, which extends
down to ground level.
. ' -- Zone I of nominal 1 m height above ground and
3.4.2 Unloading of gasotine- Classes S 11,III and 1m radius either sideof the hose 'corridor' required
similar flammable fluids from the tanker udoading position to the storage
, Entry mrd departure ofroad tankers - Zone 2 of 4 m radius from the tanker unloading
The area may be considered safe for entry and exit of connections, to a height of I rn to cover any small
tankers as long as fill point sealing caps are in positioa, spillages of up to &a 2,5 litres that may occur
the manhole covers are ctosed (for underground fill during the disconnection of hoses.
points) and providing no spillage has occurred. In the
event that any spillage has occurred, this will create a Note: These htrzardous areas are considered to be
transient hazardous area and the road tanker should not transient in the sense that they only exist during and
enter the area until the spillage has been cleaned up. If shortly after the unloading process.
the spillage occurs while the road tanker is parked for
unloading, it should remain isolated and not depart until Where v r y ~ wcollection
r between She udoading tanker
the spillage has been cleaned up. The extent of the and storage tank is used, external breathing of the road
hazardous area due to a spillage will be determined by tanker should not occur. However, under certain
the area of cuntainment and should be classified in conditions e.g, leaving the vehicle standing boxed-in
~ccordancewith section 5.4.7. under strong sunlight,'this could cause the tanker to
emit vapour through its PN breather vent. At: lhe
frequency that this is likely to occur, this may be Uidergroundstorage tanksandfillpoints
considered to have a Zone 2 hazardous area of 1 m Removal of the sealing cap from the tank fill pipe prior !j
radius. to hose connection may give rise to a small release of $
In the event of manual measurement of the road flammable vapour around the filI point. , ::

tankercompartmentcontents (e-g.dipping or sampling), Unless leakage occurs from the hbse couplings or
there should be a Zone 1 area of radius t m in all connection points, the completed hose connection $
directions from the centre of any tank top opening,
extending 2 m above the tank shell. Where hatches are
between the delivery vehicle and receiving tank
comprises a closed system, so that during the period of
open but no manual measurement is taking place, this delivery there is no source of release.
vertical extent can be reduced to I m. When the hose is disconnected, the wetted surface 1
Note that for substaoces handled below their flash area of the tank fill pipe will be exposed until the 1
points such as diesel, the generation of hazardous areas sealing cap is replaced, hence there will be a small
by the formation of mists or sprays from leaks is release of flammable vapour for a very short duration. 2
unlikely, so with these substances,the above areas may h addition, there will be some drainage on $
be treated as non-hazardous. disconnection of the hose.
- i





Note: Ullage space in the road tadex

Figure 3.112 Typical hazardous area eiassification of a road tanker during unloading
. .. ,.
:-.,;.y .
, . .' Fk@:3.13
. .. .. ..,... Typical hazardous a m classification for underground g a s o m storage tanks and fapints
during road tanker connection., unloading and disconnection
.. .._... :...
. .

The above sources of release will give rise to the tanker has to be unloaded into an above ground tank,
folbwing hazardous areas, shown in Figure 3.X3: and a pump is necessary to provide the required
pressure. The hazardous area classification is
- Zone 0 within the tank itself and within any determined by the location of the unloading point and
manhole or pit in which there are tanker delivery whether the pump is provided on the vehicle or at the
hose connection points. installation.
- Zone 1 of nominal t m radius ftom the tank fill
point. Where the fill point is located in a pit or (i) The preferred method of unioading is by using a
manhole, the radius should be extended from the fixed pump on the installation, fed by gravity from
edge of the sump as shown in Figures 3.I3(a) and the road tanker. This has the advantages that the
(b). Note, the above ground hazardous area for equipment on the vehicle is de-energised during
below ground cotmkction points is determined by unloading and the vehicle hoses and couplings are
the dimensions of the sump containing the not subject to pump discharge pressures. In this
cannection points. case, the hazardous area classification should be
- Zone 2 with a horizontal radius of4 m ['I from any prepared for the coupling points and hose draining
abovegroundo%et tank fill points where spillages as above. There-will be an additional Zone 2
will not be caught in an enclosure, 1 m above around the pump, the radius of which will depend
forecourt:level, as shown in Figure 3.13(c). on the type of pump installed: for a pump of a high
integrity type this will be 4 m. Further guidance on
Additionally, covered tank access chambers not the hazardous area classificationof pumps may be
containing tanker delivery hose connection points used found in m i o n 5.4.1. Entry and departure of the
in normal operation should be classified as Zone 1 due vehicle should be controlled by specific site
to the possibility of leakage from fittings within the procedures.
Note that for diesel fbels, under these low pressure (ii) Where a static pump is not available and a vehicle-
conditions the generation of hazardous regions by the mounted cargo pump is to be used (requiring the
formation of mists or sprays from leaks is unlikely, so engine to be run in order to power the pump and
the hazardous areas shown around the fill points and in therefore with the road tanker's electrical system
the pits or manholes would not appIy. The delivery live) hazardous area classification will be
point area may also be a&ed as non-hazardous. The necessary, for both gasoline and diesel (due to the
Zone 0 regions shown inside the tanks should, however, possibility of mist or spray formation from leakage
be retained. However where diesel tanks are manifolded points). The operation itself will give rise to a Zone
withgasolinetanks,or fiIld6ommuki-compartmented 2 hazardous area, with the radius depending on the
tankers containing gasoline, there may be vapour cany- type o f pump used. However, again, if the pump is
over. In these cases, diesel fill points should be of a high integrity type it will be 4 m ['I. For the
classified as if they contain gasoline. hazardous area around any coupling point, see
Figure 3.12. V q o u r connectionpoinr
Pressure build-up in the vapour collection system can Ventingfi.amstorage lanks
by-pass the poppet valve and cause small releases of Care should be taken to ensure that the hose connection
vapour when the dust cap is removed prior to point fcom the tank vent@) remains securely closed in
connecting the hose. Small releases may aIso occur the event that vapow coilection is not practised for any
during hose disconnection proccdwes. These releases reason. Failure to observe this precaution will lead to
will giverise to a Zone 2 hazardousarea ofnominal 1m the discharge of flammable vapour at low level,
radius around the vapour connection point. Part of this bypassing the normal tank vent outlets.
area m y already be covered by the Zone I area relating IIazardous area classi.f7cation around vents from
to the fill point. underground storagetanks will depend on whether t b e ~
is a vapour collection system in place or whether tanks Unlorrdingto above groundstorage tankr are vented directiy to atmosphem.
A different situationto that in 3.4.23 ariseswhen a road System with vapourcollection fittedwill give rise

' Radius of 4 m is suitable for spills of up to 2 3 l i o n unrestrided level surfacessurfaces

Valid for a high integriq pump with an outletpressure of up to 5 bar(a).

(a) With vapour cotlection (b) Without vapour collection

Figure 3.14 Typical hazardous area classification around a storage tank vent pipe

hazardous area of radius 2 m around the top Delivery of LPG is typicalIy from a rigid tanket
b m the system, extending down to ground with an onboarddischargepump. Providing the pump is
ent pipes venting directly to atmosphere will of a high intqgity type, this will give rise to a &ne 2
e rise to a Zone 1 of radius 2 m around the top of the hazardous area of radius 4 m afound the pump. In cases
extending down to ground level, classified as whete an external pump is used for delivery, a 1.5 m
2. See Figure 3.14. Zone 2 hazardous area will be present around any hose
Note, the above hazard radii are applicable for dl connection points around the tanker and the pump will
vent pipes up to 80 mm in diameter and tanker require classifmtion at its fixed location. Further detaiis
unloading rates up to 250 000 liEres/hr. For larger vent of pump classification can be found in section 5.4.1.
pipes and k t e r filling rates, see section 5.4.4. Road tankers fitted with relief valves having a soft
seat wilt give rise to a Zone 2 hazardous area of radius
3.4.3 Unloading of Class 0 i.e. LPG and similar 0,s m For other types of relief valve, this radius should
flammable flutds PI be increased to 2,s tn.
An ullage level indicator is shown with a Zone 1 Road t a n k classijcation hazardous area of radius 1,5 sn. However, it is
Road &rs delivering LPG should be assessed for anticipated that this will not be used during the
hazardous area classification in accordance with uabading operation.
Figure 3.1 5 together with the provisions of safe entry of
vehicles covered in in the event of a spillage Unloading to underground storage tanks
of flammable materials at the site. LPG storage is typically in buried storage tanks as
Whilst road tankers delivering liquid fiels are shown in Figure 3.1qa) and (b). Buried storage tanks
discharged under gravity at ambient conditions, WC wiU have tank access chambers which should be
wiI1 be at its vapow pressure at aqbient temperature classified. as Zone 1 hazardous areas. Where
. will therefore have to be pumped into the storage
"d connections are made, e.g. fill point or ullage level
tank but without the: need for vapour collection and indicator operation, this will create a transient Zone 2
without creating vapour discharges to atmosphere.

ih7~dradiidue to smeU losses havebeen derivedusing~erophrrnedi~pmioa

mode1, inconjunctionw
ith LP Cias Association.
Figure 3.15 Typical composire hazardous area classification around an LPG road tanker during unloadin

hazardous areaof 1,s m above ground around the access 3.5 RAILCAR LOADING AND U N L O A D ~ G
chamber during the unloading operation. Where fill CLASSES I, 11:AND XI1
points and ullage level indicators are offset (above
ground), these will give rise to Zone 2 and Zone 1 3.5.1 General
hazardous areas respectively of X,5 m radius, see
Figure 3.16(b). Rail car loading facilities vary in design. They ma
Relief valves with a soft seat, which are regularly consist of a loading siding provided with a number c
maintained and tested, & not considered under the loading points spaced at intemals to suit rail cr
design relief condition for area classificationpurposes. dimensions. An alternative to this multi-point system i
However, to allow for small, infrequent leakages they a single-point installation in which the loading arms ar
should be classified with a Zone 2 hazardous area of grouped in one position and the train of rail cars i
0,5 m radius. Where other rypes of reIief valves are moved so that each car is brought into the loadin*
fitted, this hazard radius should be increased to 2,s m. position successively. h either case the installations ar
The ullage space within the tank &odd be fundamentally similar to the road tanker loadin:
classified as Zone 0 unless the storage facilities are f$cilities considered in 3.3 and should be analysed in thb
purged with nitrogen prior to filling and emptying to same way.
ensure the tadk ullage never contains a flammable Rail car loading rates and therefore the rate o
atmospheredue to air. In this case, the ~Uagespacemay vapour displacementcan be higher than that considem
be considered as non-hazardous. for road vehicles. The sizeof the hazardous area shoulc
Unless there are 10or more flanges all within a 2 m be increased at these higher loading rates witl
radius, a hazardous area need not be assigned to a single alfowance for greater width of rail cars and large
flange. However, where it is necessary to classify Ioading arms.
flanges they should each have a Zone 2 hazardous area The hazardous area classification guidance given ir
of 2 rn radius. 3.5.3 to 3.5.5 for the loading and discharge of rail tank
cars is in accordancewith the more general guidance fol Unloading io above ground storage tanks such installations, as given in JP Design, cowtnrctio~
Where the tanker is unloaded to above ground storage and operation of dkrribution installatons.
tanks, these should be classified in accordance with

'Valid for losses o f up to 100 mi.

Ullage level indicator

vlcpour collection conneclions, there should be no d e a s e of

leads to emergency
it. Accordingly, this is
Loading of rail cars with vapour collection should de release allowing
eliminate routine emissions of flammable m a ~ a i s in Figure 3.17 lo
&om the fill. covers. However, where loading Eacilities downgraded to a Zone 2 clamification
require removal of the fill covers prior to loading and The possible losses of vapour h m the loadkg
c h w e on completion of loading, this will allow a itself will generate a nominal 1,5 m radius fnrm
felease of vapour which could extend over the full the outlets of the loading a m . Due to the variable
len& of the loading gantry (i.e. while the rail car i s location of the loading ann,the Z m e 1 area s h ~ l d
moved along the track). Due to the frequency of extended 3 m above the working Ievel of the
QWration this is designated a primary p d e release The interior of the rail car will, as in the
creating a 2 m radius Zone I area around the fill cover road car, be Zone 0 at all limes. Figure 3.17 shows the
extending to ground level (see Figure3.17). Where rail individuai aspects which should be combined to
ca*s are fitted with permanent filling and vapow produce the overall hazardous area classifisation.

Extent of Zone 2 hazardous area Extent of spillage area (see note 2)


Old elevatkxl wSth weather roofing

I. llle Zwe I a m shmld be eaut&d to cover ule total length of the ganUy to allow f adiffmnt positions of the mil car
either in the case of a muWpoint system or in the ease of a single rail car moving nloog the track whilst the fill m a is
2. fie &
extent of the spillagearea for classI, iI(2)and 11~2)
(see 3.3-43). To detenniae the extent of the Zoue 2 area,see section 5.4.7.
3. For mil cars with pennaneatloading and npour mlleetion wnnecti~ns,the Zmc I hazacdous srea above the fiU c w a ~
may be downgradedto a Zooe 2.
4- Without weather roofa$ the 'fill-inrZone 2 a m up to the roof, above m c 2 w e 2 gennstsd by pa(entids p w e and the
Zone 1 area generated by the rail cars will not exist

Q u r e 3.17 Top loadhg of nil can, single or multipoint, with sapour mllectioo

3.5.3 Top lloacling of rail cars without vapour (e) The combination of the above factors is shown in
collection Figure 3.17.
ft should be noted that the whole of the area
(a) A primary gmde release occurs whilst the rail car is below any weather roofing should be classified as
being loaded due to vapour emission from the open Zone 2 down to the Zone 1 area.
or venting fill covers. Primary and secondarygmde
releases occur from loading arms when being 354 Bottom loading of rail cats
removed &om the rail car and returned to the
parked position, tiom spillages due to overfilling, Bottom loading of pi1 cars is a less common practice.
and from maintenance of filters and other However, where it is carried out a similar analysis
associated equipment. should be followed as in 3.5.3 for top loading, bearing
For loading rates up to and including in mind that bottom loading is carried out at ground
2,5 m3/min, it is recommended that an area bvel. Consideration should be given to the following:
extending in all directions to a distance of 1 m
around each fill cover, with a vertical drop to (a) Sealed coupiings are normally used &om which a
ground level, be classified as Zone I and that this secondarygrade release may oecux due to leakage.
be extended to cover the total length of the gantry Secondary grade releases can arise due to
to allow for different positions of the rail caror cars ovwfiiting or accidental spiilage when couplings
in the case of a multi-point system. For rates above are broken, and &om filters and associated
2,5 m3/min, the area should be extended to 2 m. equipmt.
The 2 m horizontal extent will cover the greater
width of the rail car (see Figure 3.17). (b) For bottom loading at rates up to and including
2,5 m3/minthe area of the loading stand should be
b) The Zone I area for the g m t y should extend fiorn classified as Zone 1 up to a height of I m above
ground level to a height of 3 m above the working any vent level. For rates above 2,s m3/min the
level of the gantty, as in 3.5.2. height should be increased to 2 m.

c) The interior of the rail car will, as in the case of a (c) The classification of the rail tanker will be as in
road tanker, bc Zone 0 at all times that the vehicle 3.5.3(c). The envelope of the Zone 1 area
is in service. However, when all fill coven and associated with the fll covers and their vents
outlets are closed, as for the running condition and extends, during filling operations, as described in
for entry and departureafker loading, the exterior of 3.5.3(a) for top loading down to ground level.
the rail car can be classified as non-hazardous.
(The control conditions for the safe entry and (d) The 7 ~ n2ehazardous area that is required to allow
depaiture are dealt with in 3.5.6). forthevarioussecondarygrade releases arising due
to spillages should be derived as detailed in
d) Normally, impertneable catchment trays will be 3.5.3(d).
provided to contain spillages, in which case the
Zone 2 should be assessed as detailed in The composite area classification drawing is shown in
Otherwise, wetted areas from spillage will be Figure 3.18, both with and without overhead weather
restricted by the ballast on the b c k ; in this case, it roofulg.
is recommended that, &or Class 1, H(2) and IJI(2) Note the in-fill in this composite of the vertical
materials, a Zone 2 area should extend 3 rn heights of the Zone 1 areas in (b) and (c) above.
horizontally in all directions 6-omthe extremities of
the gantry structure, with a height of 1 m in
accordance witb Table 5.7.

,i: ....
,.: ,
. '..'
Zbne 1 filled-ln to uniform height

End elevationwithout weather roofing

Figure 3.18 Bottom loading of rail cam, single or multipint, with yapour collection
3. a hose canaeeaoon - a result of hose breakage, or during coupling or
Where the unloading area is paved or concreted
ardous area classifiation for the discharge of a over, the extent of the spillage anxishould be defined as
train of rail cars will follow the general principles for shown in Figure 3.18. In such a case, the procednre in
the discharge of road tanker vehicles in 3.4, though the should be applied with due consideration of
boundaries such as spillage chame1s or drains.
However, in the ease of rail cars, it is recommended
that, because of the degree of manual participation and
the multiple nmbm of cars, spillage arm should be
dassified as Zone 1. When ballasted track underlies the
mil car discharge losation, e spillage area will
horizontdly 3 m in af 1 directionsfiom
e and coupling positions and for a
allow for raised connections) should
specified. Thisappliesonly to Class I, II(2) and IXX(2)

Sdeeievalim ,


3.5.6 Conditions for safe eeiry and departure of within IS m of a point where Class I, U(2) or IEL(2)
rail tank car trains to and from material is being loaded or discharged.
unloading facilities Classes 1,

The fotlowing points provide an impoitant part of the

general analysis of the installation:

(a) The movement of vehicles to and from the loading

position must take place with the loading gantry
and- vehicle in a flammable hazard-free state. This section considers the hazardous area on jetty and
Certain mnes .are transient and only exist whilst marine facilities arising from the loading or unloading
loading is being carried ott; safety is assured by of a tanker. It includes the hazardous area arising h m
adhering to prescribed safety and operating the cargo hoses and From vents on the tanker. The
procedures (bbr details see IP Design, constmction hazardous area &om othm equipment on the jetty should
and operalion of distribution insiallalions). be estimated using the appropriate sections of Chapter
5. Hazardous areaclassificaiion onjetties should always
(b) 'f'racks serving loading or discharge facilities be based on the most volatile product handled.
should wherever possible be resewed specificalIy This section does not apply to the vesstSl itself for
for that purpose. They should be sited at least 15 m which guidance should be sought in the appropriate
from the nearest maritime code of regulation, i.e. IEC 60092-502,
roadway. Tankers - Spechi f d u r e s . Furlher guidance on the
precautions to be taken during handling on tankers and
(c) Loading and unloading facilities should be at terminals for crude oil and petroleum products is
electrically continuous and earihed with means of given in the International Safety Guidefor Oil lirnkei-s
bonding vehicles to the fixed facility. The and Terminals (ISGOTT).
installation of earth interlock systems is Where jetties are used for both loading (or
recommended to prevent product movements ballasting of tanks containing vapour) and discharge, a
unless proper earthing and bonding connections composite hazardous area for the facility should be
have been made. obtained by combining the hazardous areas for h e
Rails should be bonded at all other joints in the separak operations.
loading and unloading: area and bonded to the main
earthing system of the unloading equipment. The Jetlies - loading facilities
track of the rail sidiutg should also be independently
eartfied. (a) The hazardous areas should be e&ablished for each
Rail sidings for loading and unloading of rail possible primary and secondary grade so
tank cars should be provided with insulatingjoints retease associated with the jetty equipment.
to isolate the track of the siding &om the main line
and to prevent contact with stray c m n t s from (b) Primary grade releases occur during lanker loading
electrified lines or railway signalling due to vapour vented from tanker compaments or
during gas freeing of tanker compartments, should
(d) UnprotecLed electric locomotives or dieset the latter take place whilst the tanker is alongside
locomotives, unless conforming with or adjacent to the jetty.
107Recommendationsfor fhe protection @diesel For jetties with facilities for loading (including
engines operating hazardous areas (see nker vents will create a pri
Chapter 8), should a allowed within 9 rn of a to the varying sizes of ships an
point w h m Class S E(2) or EI(2) material is Wig tidal movements, it is m n u n e n d e d that an
extending 20 m in
around the hull ofthe
and vertically to a
oach level, should be classified as Zone 1.
ull locations shou

extreme berthing locations (see Figure 3.20). For tankers with loading rates of 10 m31rnin or less, the
this purpose the hull of the tanker should be horizontal distance in (b) may .be reduced to 15 m and
assumed to be in contact witti the jetty; i.e. all the vertical to 15 m.
shore side distances should be measured from the
fixed water-side of the jetty. 3.6.3 Jetties - unioading facilities

(c) Primary and secondary grade releases can occur For jetties where unloading operations are camed out,
from fixed and portable equipment such as filters, the marine arms, hoses, etc., constitute a closed system,
sample points, slop tanks, loading marine arms and and only secondary grade releas= are likely to occur. It
hoses, drainage and drip trays, pump glands and is recommended that an area extending from the
seals, valves, meters and flanges. coupling points, a distance of 20 m horizontally, up to
The hazardous areas arising b m the jetty a height of 20 m above the coupling points and down to
equipment can be assessed by considering each water level should be classified as Zone 2 (see
possible s o w of release in accordance with Figure 3.21).
Chapter 5. The hazardous area created by the I-iamdous areas shouid be established for each
tanker can then be superimposed on the hazardous individual source of release from the jetty equipment
area determined for the jetty alone. The since some may necessitate locaiized Zone I areas
loadinglualoading equipment, when not in use and within the above overall Zone 2 area.
in the parked position may create a source of Zf ballasting is carried out during unloading into
release whilst draining. However, the Zone 2 unsegregated ship's Qnks which could contain vapour,
hazardous areas arising around the coupling points or if gas W i g of tanks is carried out whilst alongside
are enveloped by the existing Zone 1 classification the jetty, then the jetty should be classified in
for the loading operation shown in Figure3.20. accordance with 3.6.2.
For classification onboard the tanker vessel,
(d) For jetties berthing only barges, coasters or other see 3.6.1.

(See note 2) (Seenote 2)

20 rn

1. The Zone 1, area is additional to any hazardous area assessed in consequenceof all other equipment on the jetty.
2. Distance may be reduced to I5 m for vessels with loading or unloading rates of 10m31miaor less.
3. The hazardous area should extend 20 m above the coupling points. This may be reduced to 15 m for loading rates of
10 m3/min or less.
4- For category A fluids, reference shonld be made to the methodology given in Chapter 5.
5. lkse distances may be conservative. However, they cover a great variety and size of ships which may be berthed for
loading. If the size of the vents and loading ratcs are well-defined, section 5.4 may be used to determine more specific
hazard radii.

Figure 3.20 Jetties loading facilities onfy

a. Jetty approach

W d o u s area should be 20 m above the coupling point. For a category C matda], this is equivafeat to
bole in the coupling. If larger bola sizes are psible'refmnce should be made'toTable C9@) for the


storage areas -Classes

Where reasonably practicable, such containers should

This section applies to the filling of storage d m s of a he stored at ground level (singly or in stacks of no more
nominal capacity of 205 l i t e s or less. than four high) and in the open air. This will enable
leaks to be more readily detected, and any vapour
3.7.1 General arising to be dissipated. Such stacks for Class I or II(2)
materials should be placed in one, or several compounds
Drum filling should normally be carried out in an open if the total volume of packed product exceeds 200 m3,
or sheltered area. If not, this section does not apply and with small walls or silk, e.g. of 150 mm height, to
the drum filling area should be regarded as an enclosed prevent uncontrolled leakage.
area with a primary grade release source, and local The storage and handling of sealed containers will
exhaust ventilation should be provided (see secrion not normally give rise hazardous reieses, but the area within the walls or sills should he classified as
The drum should be regarded as a primary grade Zone 2 to a height of at least i nn above the highest
source of release. The hazardous area should be conbiner.
classified as Zone I. Kt should extend 1 m in all Fork IilR trucks or other materials kaudling
directions from the edges of the filling or venting equip men^ if used within &e h
openings (see Figure 3.22)- The spillage area should be in Figure 32%and 3.7.3, shouId be protected to Zone 2
determined according to section 5.4.7. standards. New equipment should be buiit to
The filling line outlet is also a primary grade source BS EN 1755.
of release. The hazadous area should extend 1,5 m in Where the recommended zone distances cannot be
all directions &omthe filling line outlet. achieved, consideration may be given to the provision
When filling containers with Class II(1) and KKt(1) of a fixed water spray systetnor an appropriate fwewall,
materials, section A1.3 (formation of mists and sprays) as in section 6.2.3. Such a firewall should be at least as
will apply. Therefore the 1,s m hazardous area in all high as the top of the container stack, and be sited
directions from the end of the filling h e outlet should 1-3 m from the stack. The firewail may form part of a
also apply. Gaee should be taken to avoid soutves of bund, unpierced building wall, or boundarywall and to
ignition tbac could give rise to a Aazard in the event of ensure adequate ventitation normally be on one side
a ground spill. only of the stack

ent suchasgroundcontours, kerbs, and drains(asshown).

3-72 Drum storage in buildings - Classes I and 3.9 FILLING STATIONS AND FUEL

When it is not practicable to store containers in the 3.9.1 Introduction

open, they may be stored in suitable storage buildings,
hich should not be used for other purposes. Such 'This section covers the equipment and layout to be
uiidings should, as in the case of storage in the open found on the forecourt under the normal open area
ir, have means of containing spillage e.g. by sills or condition It should be applied also to non-retail
ramps 150 mm high across doorways. The flooring gasoline dispensing sites and to dispensing to boats,
should be impermeable to liquid spills. light aircraft and into portable containers. As applied
Storage buildings should be well ventilated, below, the Zone 2 areas indicated cover the possibility
rovided openings do not conflict with the need for a of localised flammable atmospheres being present for
all to be fire resisting, and be classified as Zone 2 up short periods, with such areas being weft ventilated
a height of 2 rn above the highest container. If under open area conditions.
eating is provided it should not be a source of ignition. The classified areas indicated relate to the
For details of package filling and storage building installation of fixed electricalequipmen4 and should not
stiuction, see IP Design, construction andoperation be considered as extending beyond an unpierced wall,
tribution installatiom. roof or other vapour barrier or solid partition (see
Where artificial ventilation is to be provided the section 6.2.3).
idance given in Chapter 6 should be followed, with The n o m l prohibition of smoking, nonelectrical
sources of ignition, and the running of engines, during
both the fuelling of vehicles and the delivery of fuels
from road tankers, should also be vigorously enforced
(see Chapter 8).

3.9.2 Gasoline dispensers and other Class I, II(2)

n, thii should be located at least 15 m from any and LXI(2) fluids
area, tankage or storage area where Class I or
petroleum is stored or handfed. Reference should be made to the dispenser
Where used drums are to be reconditioned or manufacturer to determit~e the Likely sources of release
red, cleaning and gas-freeing should be carried out from a dispenser, based on the relevant standard to
e open air a well-ventilated building, and which it was designed and constructed. Por new
ropriate precautions taken against any source of dispensers the manu-factureror supplier should provide
a diagram with the unit showing the zones in and
around the unit. The zoning within and immediately
above the housing of dispensers (both gasoline and
LPG) will depend on their internal consttuction (e-g.
employing vapour barriers). Details of the dispenser
internal zoning and its vapour barriem are necessary
when more accuratedetermination ofthe externalzones
around the dispenser is required, as opposed to the
generic examples given in this scction (or other user
Figures 3.23 to 3.27 arc intended to assist in the
selection of electrical and other equipment suitable for
.8 INTERiMEDUTE BUEK CONTAINERS operation in the vicinity of gasoline dispensers.Figures
(IBCS),OTHER TRANSPORTABLE 3.23 to 3.26 summarise the hazardous areas arising
CONTAIIWHS AND PACKAGED UNITS around specific equipment; Figure 3.27 shows how
these separate areas are aggregated together and
contain flammable fluids on a site, indicates the extent of the transient hazardow areas that
should be given to the hazardous area occur during dispensing which are not applicablewhen
vehicles enter or leave the site. The f imcan be used
to assess the risks of other potentiai ignition sources in
. .

the area. They should not, however, be used to When the nozzles are not withdrawn for re%elling,
determine construction requirements of dispensers as the limited hazardous area amund the dispenserenables
these will have been designed and assessed against vehicles to enter the filling station witbout passing
relevant national, European or lntemational Standards. through any hazardous arm. Dispenser housing Hmrdous area crroundexfwnaldispenser air

Figure 3.23 shows the extent of hazardous areas around separator vent
a dispenser housing, which applies to gasoline Figure 3.24 illustrates the extent of the hazardous area
dispensers either with or without. Stage 2 vapour around an air separator vent on the outside of a gasoline
collection installed. Figure 3.23(a) shows the extent of dispenser (either with or without Stage 2 vapour
colIection instalIed). The Zone 1hazardous area extends
hazardous areas withoutavapourbarrier; Figure3.23(b)
250 rnm I~orizontally,down to ground level, and
shows the reduction in the area when there is a vapour
100 rnm verticalIy above the vent.
m 2 hazardous area may vary between
0 - 200 mdepending on the standard of construction
of the dispenser housing. Where necessary, reference
should be made to infomation h m the dispenser

(a) Wittiout a vapour b a n k

Typicall Lazardoas area elassifieation

around an external dispenser air separator vent Hazardow area m u n d a vehicle Jili pipe

&ring refuellatg
When a nozzle is ins& into the vehicle fill pipe and
the nozzle trigger is operated, flow of gasoline begins
and vapour is displaced fiom the vehicle's tank.
Where the dispellserffrlling station is fitted wiih
Stage2 vapour wlitxtion, dispiaced vapour is recovered
@) With a vapour barrier
by the nozzle and very little is displaced to atmosphere.
The hazardous area in this case will be Zone 2 as shown
in Figwe 3.25(a).
Where Stage 2 vapour collection is not in
nLem the vehicle tank, vap
here and, because it is heavier than
air, it rolls down the side of the vehicle and. slumps
I I tha v s p y barrier. towards the ground The hazardous area in this case will
be Zone 1 as shown in

leak under these


1- -

(a) Nozzle fitted with Stage 2 vapour collection (b) Nozzle without Stage 2'vapour collection

ate: 1,2 rn allows for those cases where the h w is lifted over the vehicle on its return to the nozzle housing and for vehicles
ith a high fuel tank opening.

Figure 3.25 Typical hazardous area classification around a nozzle during vehicle refueUing

around a dispenser with two side mounted hoses. It is

tion of vehicle refuelling, liquid andlor based on:
1 be present in the nozzle when it is
awn, This gives rise to a small Zone 1 hazardous - A dispenser without a vapour barrier, with rtn
around the n&zle until it is returned to the nozzle external air separator vent.
sing on the dispenser. Up until 100 mtn from the - A standard dispenser hose length of 3,6 m.
le housing this may be considered a Zone 2 due to The vehicle refbelling location is not the same for
ikelihood of it existing at any number of points every refuelling operation, but is restricted by the
locus of the hose length. As the nozzle will distance to which the nozzle may be extended.
ays be returned to the same position, a Zone 1 Since a vehicle may park. in various positions the
rdous area will arise within a 100 m radius hazardous area created by the refuelling operation
dispenser nozzle housing. The area within shown in Figure 3.25 will occur wherever the
housing classified ai Zone 0. vehicle is parked. This results in a composite
ese are only normally relevant for the design of hazardous area which extends &om the maximum
he dispenser, but should be considered if electronic length of the hose all the way back to the dispenser.
isplays are mounted on the nozzle. - A small hazardous area around the nozzle after
.- refielling, as described in
Again, since the vehicle may park in various
housing positions, the hazardous area created by the nozzle
will occur wherever the vehicle is parked all the
way back to the dispenser as it is being returned to
the housing. In addition, since the release volume is
rdatively small, this, together with the variety of
parking positions, significantly reduces the
fkquency of the release occurring in the same
position every time and allows the Zone 1 which
would otherwise occur all the way back to the
dispenser, to be downgraded to a Zone 2, except
where the nozzle nearsthe dispenser housing, as the
:Any unciassifiedelectricalequipment shouldbe located n o d e will always be returned to the same position.
a safe distance above the n&zle housinp. Note, the Zone hazardous 2 aiea created by the
nozzle is enveloped by the hazardous area created
by the refuelling operation.

Note: Where a dispenser is fitted with a vapous barrier,

consideration' should be given to the hazardous area
associated with the nozzlea&r vehicle r&elling as it is
rebmed from the vehicle tank fill point to the dispenser
nozzle housing.
Extent of Zone 2 from vehicle

I- 4

igure 3.27 Typical composite hazar

2. Suitable far dispensers using hose lenglfis of up to 4 m.

$ A s described in.

g-&+G "-


&&zFr,:-. pica1 hazardous area dassification for an oiVwaler separator

.9.4 Prevention of spillage due to mechanical

damage and protection of buiidinp with
access to the forecourt

(a) Pumps and dispensitig units should be protected to

prevent damage by collision that could result in
releases of a scale that would invalidate the
foregoing classification.
onnection to I0 ml. However, this can %cur at any
ser and the full extent of the @) Neverheless, access to buildings within a classified
area shouId be provided with a sill or step not less
equivalent to the length of the hose, to a height of than X 50 mm in height
height to which the hose
the refirelling operation). Adequately ventilated kiosks and any other small
with relief valves with set buildings with openings in a h a d o w area should
t-off b a d of the filling apply the appropriate zone lhroughout the building,
infrequent releases of including to its hll height, as vapour in a confined space
is unlikely to remain at low level.

d any casing vents will be limited to a Zone 2 of

radius a m d the apertures. SurlFace run-ofF fr as where spillage of oily
materials is p s s i b be routed via an o i h t e r
should be cIwified as Zone 1
when these are seafed ( i s . gas tight). If the chamber is
covered but not &as tight, this will give rise to an
a above the cover of

radius 2 m from the edge to a height of I m, in IeveL However, in large service amas the Zone 2 need
accordance with Table 5.7. not be extended to the entire workshop provided
Where oily materiak are not removed directly adequateventilation is provided toprevent the spread of
fotlowingspillage, the ullage space in theseparator wiB any flammable material to parts of the f'lity which
be classified as Zone 0 givingrireto aZone 1 hamdous have been deemed to be non-hazardous areas.
area of 1 m radius around the top ofthe separator vent. It is rewgnised that blaoket hazardous area
See F i e 3.29. classificationwould prevent somemaintenanceactivities
Where oily materials are emptieddirectlyfollowing which create sources of ignition being caried out
spillage, the ullage space in the separator may be Inspedion pits, for the purpose of fxed swrces of
classified as a Zone 1 giving rise to a Zone 2 bazanfous ignition, should be classifiedas Zone 1 areasand whwe
area of radius I rn around the top of the separator vent maintenance activitiesmay result in a source ofignitioq
management symms should be in place to halt and
prevent such activities once a spill of flammable
3.10 YEIi[mE REPALR, SERVICING AREAS materials has occmed. Further activities should not be
AND INSPECTIONPITS restarred until the pit has been deemed gas-'ee and safe.
Note, inspection-typepitsfor motor vehicles cannot
The danger of releases of petmlenrn fuels. whether bc consideredasfreely ventilatedspaces, irrespectiveof
accidental or intentianat, such as by drainage of location Forced ventilation to purge v+ur from pits
equipment and fuel tanks in such areas, should be cannot be taken into amount when classifying such
emphasised to alt staff.Thenecessityof either excludiig areas, since it cannot be guaranteed to sweep the area
or strictly motmlling both electrical and non-eledcicat under all conditions, besdng in mind obmuctions that
sources of ignition should always be observed. can occur and ventilation failure.
Consideration should be given to segregating hot work This +dance is applicable to repair and semicing
from areas where flammable spillage could occur. areas in refining and pdmchemical facilities; guidance
Where releases of flammable materials could occur for local garages and repair shops should be obtained
in above ground repair and servicingarea$ theseshould from the Local regulatory inspector.
be treated as a Zone 2 up to a heigh[ of 1 m above floor
41 INTRODUCTION outlined in Chapter 7, it atso gives guidance on the safe
operation of non-elecnical sources of ignition, such as
gives guidance on the application of area fixedwmbustionenginesandgasturbmeequlpmentand
on to drilling rigs, workover rigs, coiled on hot surface protedion (see Chapter 8).
unitr, sonbbimg units and well servicing
ipmenf, which are operabxt 41.1 Use of the chapter

Despite a number of d i h n c e s . there are suficient

on fixed offshore installations; common faaors in drilling and well servicing practices,
- on mobile ofEhore instaflations. wbetha on land or oahore, on f w d piatforms pr
mobile mitt of all types, to allow t
his chapter to be set
It is not applicable to production wellheads and out in the formofdirect examples.
folds, nor to production operations downmeam of In applying the examples, users should check that
e wellhead, e.g. oil/gas separation, &watering, or there are not signiticant differewes behvm the
pumpingorcompressorunits,whichshouldbeclassiied examples v t e d hereand the layout proposed which
in aemnlance wifh Chapter 5. The storage and loading wouldnecessitatctheindividnaiwrsiderationofspecial
of aude oil aftes stabilisation to Wid category C features, induding the application of the point source
condition, as d e h e d in Table 12, should follow the approach in Chapter 5. Hszardous areas should be
puidaace for C h I petroleum g i w in Chapter 3. The definedamsideringall well opcrafons for which the rig
guidance in this chapter, which adopts a risk-based might beused
apPmach allied to practical experience, follows the The guidance applies both to drillingrigs located in
principles of IEC (61892 saies) and applies only to the un+&ed open a w conditions as defined in section
smallreleasesofgasandoilthatcanacarrintheabove 1.7aadtofaeilitieslacatedinsheltaed,enclosedor
Opaatious. Guidance is provided on the installation of partially enclosed situatiws. In the latter cases, the
equipment for the contml of gas kicks using n o d ventilationaiditionsbouldbeconsidexedin~~~~rdance
qpaaGng pmcedures. However, well hlowauts giving wifh Chapm 6.
rise to large releases are otrtsidethe smpe ofhazardous Althonph many Mobiie OBhore Drilling Uaits
area classification and should he a matter for standii (MODUs) operating iotanationally will he oeaified in
Operational pmdica. acoordan~= with the N O Codefor the conslnrcfion ond
Whilst the Code is principally wncemed with the equipmenlofmb2eo~horedrilIingw2icr(eithct 1979
s e b i o u and installation of electtical equipment as or 1989 edition), the guidance of this Cede has been

widened to include semi-submersibles, jack-ups and Releases h m ( c ) are likely to be insignificant in an
drill-ships open demck or mast, but may be. considered as
secondary grade releases man enclosed denick
4.12 Sources of flammable release Releases from (d) may be significant in carain
types of operation.
During normal dcillii and well servicing operatiom. Releases fmm (e) are not normally significant,
hydrocamOn release to the surf&% can occur in the except in the ose of inadvertent releases fium high-
following ways: pmsure p i p o r k .
Seeoodary grade releases h m (g) may oaw at
(a) Dissolved gas which comes out of sollaion under sumps or drainage tanks and be eonveyed by vents or
rcducedprtssuresat the sluface, often w h i l e d r g drains to areas where potential sounes of ignition are
at nearbalanceoruMLrr-balancedhydrdcaUy, or present. Outlets or entries to vent and drain systems
as hip gas during a round hip to pull the drillstring should be considered awordiogly.
eom the hole.
@) As a 'kjck'wikhoccm when downholeformation 4.13 Groupings for area chifieation
pressure unexpectedlyexceeds thehydrostatichead
of the circulatingmud column The reunnmauled procedure for hazdous area
(c) F m residual mud on the surface of dnipipe beiig classifmtion is to omsider Ihe elements of any drilling
racked in the dmick during a lound-trp, or on or well servicing facility under the followinggroupings:
production or coiled adi~ngbeing wimmaWn from
the hole, or h m core samples laid out for (a) The rig substructure - the space between the rig
inspect&. floor and main platform deck (offshore) or ground
(d) Gas escape ftom the sluffing box on a wireline level on a land rig, and in which the bell-nipple,
lnbricato~, the injectorof a wiledtubmg unitor the diverta and blow-out preventen are located
stripperbowl of a snnbbii unit @) The wellhead area down to the cellar deck o f f h
(e) Smatl hydrocabon releases from rotating or wellhead cellar on land-bmd rigs.
e q u i p m f pumps and pipework, omning in (c) The upper works of the rig, above the rig floor.
normal 0per;ltions and maintenance. (d) Thecirculating nuhemudsystem, includingshale
(t) ShaUowgac biow-out shaker, mud pikz or tanks &.
Lg) Vapours present in oily d r a i i system$ vents or (e) Other spaces adjoining mcSe anm subject to
duaiog. miscellaneous small releases fmm tanks, flanges,
vents w drains.
For hazardous area c l d c a t i o o purposes thmvghout (f) Gas vents fmm any of the above, includingmud de-
the drilling ktallation, (a) is tbe major consideration, gasser and W A C vents
with potential sources of ~~~IMIYgrade release at the
bell-nipple and around the mud return flowline outlet, These subsections differentiateas appropriate between
shale shakers and ~ v mud-pits.
e These points h i d open area and enclosed or sheltered conditions. Other
be considered as similar to sumps or vents as desaibed enclosures not covered by these examples should be
in Chapter 5. dealt with by reference to Chapters 5 and 6.
Gas release in the event of a kick, (5). is dealt with
by operating praclices which establish conbolted
conditions for rpsparses wing equipment provided on 4 2 AREA CLASSILlCATION FOR DRILLING,
the rig.Significantreleases can o c a u h m t h e vent lines WORKOVER AND WIRELINE OPERATIONS
of the d m seoaratwdownstream of the choke and IN OPEN AREAS
fmm the divert& line and should be crmsidaul in
hazdous ~ e classication.
a Many drilling rigs onshore and some drilling and
Liquid hy- entering the cim&ion wellhead areas offshore may be emsideredopen areas,
system downholeundernormaldrcumstanoesareliiely although &e-y may indude sow small, I&
to be very much diluted by the mud system. However, sheltered areas. When the rig substtuuure and any
under conditim of underbalanced drilling, the mmbined wellhead area can be considered opes, as
proportion of hydiocarbons in mud Ktrons may be definedin5ectinm 1.73 and62,hazard&a~easshould
significant, with apotential for contmuous release, and be assigned in accordance with 42.1 to 4.2.5 below.
shouldbe considered in hazardous area classification.
opmtion Ifharea~dapotentialsourceofrele~se
is open, it should be treated as a Zone 2 hazardous area,
For ddlling and workover installations where a bell- and if enclosed, as Zone I.
nipple is used at the top of the riser, it should be
re&edas asomofprimrygrade releaseandmted 43.2 Rig upperworks
as a sump. In an open area, the Zone 1 hazardous area
should extend vaticaUy and horizontally eom t h bell- ~ For an open design denick (ie. non-enclosed) a Zone 2
nipple and down to ground or sea level to limits hazardous area due to spillage on the rig floor should
calculated in accordance with section 5.4.8. W e a extend a distance equal to R, calculated as in section
divetter is installed, hazardous areas will exist at the 5.4.7 above the rig floor. Where rig floor wiod-walls are
bell-nipple and at the diverter line outlets. Where the fitted, the Zone 2 hazardous area shwld extend to at
return mud is mmted through a gas-tight flow tine, the least the top of the wind-wail.
Blowout Preventer(B0P) and riser assembly should be Some drillstring companents when ntcked in ihe
mnsidered as a potential so- of secondary grade derrick can bc coated with residual mud or solids and
release fram flanges or drain points and the Zone 2 produce a small hazardous release, hut in the open this
areashouldextendhorizontallyand above the will rapidly disperse due to natural ventilation Coring
and below the well casing flange to limits samples laid out on the drill floor or elsewhere may also
section 5.4.5.Any trough- be a source of hydrocarbon release and give rise to
e flow-line, open-top tanks or equipment connected spillage potential areas and should be classified
stem that is not gas-tight should be accordingly.
as potential sourcesofprimary The hazardous area created by a mudgas separator
ng a Zone 1 hamdous area. vent should be defined in accordance with section
It~sgoodpracticeforhhazardousareaoriginating as described in 4.3.3.
the bell-nipple or wellhead to inch& the hazardous Hoists on wiled tubing and snubbing units should
any other adjacent sources, e.g. vent$ and be treated in the same way as drilling derricks.
the BOP riser system and diverter, including However, consideration should also be given to the
vah.esandaccessories.Whereoperationdareas hazards of residual mud or fluid inside and on the
ove the weather deck are enclosed, ihe extent of the exterior of coiled tubing or production tubing.
area is defmed by the enclosure. Any releases
6om the bell-nipple and therefore the 4.23 Cellar decks and well cellars
ons area should be exteoded vertically w the
of the bell-nipple. In certain circumstance^, i.e. Unless artiiicially ventilated, the space around the
ersecirculaiiug', an area around the path of the wellhead in an onshore cellar shonld be regarded as
or Kelly Swivel should also be regarded as inadequately ventilated and classified as a sump in
.U'bere arig is fittedwithcoutainmentaround accordance with section 5.4.8 as shown in Figure 42.
e BOP, the extent of the hazardous area is defined by The ventilation in any spaces adjoining well cellan or
e dimensions of the containment wellhead areas and moonpools on offshoreinstallations
Where there is w wntainment of spillages on the shwld be assessed and the zone classificalion and
Eather deck, the extent ofthe hazardous area below the boundaries established
Eather deck will be calculated as per section 54.8. For spillages in a sheltered area, as defined in
For fixed and d i e offshore installations, similar section 63, the hazardous area should extend 3 m
ciples should be applied; the full extent of the BOP outside any opening in the shelter o r a distance equal to
risw assembly down to tbe wellhead flange of the R, calculated as in section 5.4.8 h n the belI-nipple,
I w i n g should, due to potential leakage, be whichever is the greater.
tiai sources of secondaryreleaseand Spillages in open welkead areas ou fixed offshore
defined according to &on 5.4.5. installationsshonldbetreated inaccordancewith section
ese secondary releases are genetally 5.4.7. Where one or more wellheads are enclosed in
corporated in the Zone 1 arras for normal rig 'cells', they should not be regarded as 'open'.

Figure 4.1 Drilling and workover

Gmund level

Note: only part of ~nstallation

shown: for parts of the installation
above the ground level, see
corresponding part of F~gure4.1
above weather deck.
Well casing /
Figure 4.2 Typical well cellar (land rig)

- hillfkm

Weatller deck

Wellhead deck

Ground or ~e'alevel

Figure 4.3 freestanding wireline operation (open areas)

- 4.2.4 Workover, snubbing, coiled tubing and Where these operations are canied out using the
wirelining operations main drilling rig, these areas are generally incorporated
in the Zone I areas defined for normal rig operations.
The classification derived in 4.2.1 should he applied to Where they are canied out without the drilling rig, the
work-over, snubbing, coiled tubing and wireline hazardous areas are considered equivalent and are
operations. Fortheseoperations, themostprobablepoint represented by the wireline operation in Figure 4.3.
ofhydrocarbonrelease is the strippingunit, injector head
. or stuffingbox. The extent of the hazardous area should 4.2.5 Operations where rig or wellhead areas are
' .. he assessed from the configuration of the equipment to not 'open'

be installed. W e r e the area surrounding the drilling

riser and BOP assembly is enclosed, the hazardous area Where any part of a rig drill-floor, sub-structure or
should be defined as in 4.2.5. Potential leakage rates upper-works is enclosed (see section 6.4.1), all apertures
should be obtained from equipment ~ u ~ l i eand r s the fromthe enclosed area containing a source or sources of
hazard radius determined by reference to Annex C release should be regarded as secondary grade release
Part 3 or by a similar calculation methodology. In the sources and a hazardous area extending 3 m from each
absence of supplier leakage rate information, hole sizes aperture should be specified.
should he estimated by reference to Table C6 and the If the dernck is partially or totally enclosed for
hazard radius should be determined using Table C9(a). weather or other protection, the ~ntemalspace should be
classified as Zone 1 with a Zone 2 area extending atomisation, causing a mist to form. Geological advice
outside apertures in the enclosure to limits determined in may be required to estimate the maximum operating
accordance with guidance in section 6.4. Where a vent temperature ofthe mud. The effect of hazardous drilling
line is fitted on the derrick, the radius (R,) of the mud is considered in 4.3.6.
hazardous area should be calculated in accordance with
Table 5.5. .3.1 High pressure mud pumps and manifolds
If the sub-structure is totally enclosed, the bell-
nipple should be treated as a sump in accordance with High pressure mud pumps and manifolds in the surface
section 5.4.8 and the internal space should be c1assifiei.I mud system may normally be excluded as sources of
as Zone 1 with a Zone 2 area extending 3 m outside any release because any leakage would be small with a low
aperture in the enclosure (see also section 6.4). Enclosed hydrocarbon contcnt. Thus the area surrounding a mud
onshore well cellars and other non-open areas are pump may be unclassified unless it is located in an area
covered in 4.2.2. that is classified because of some other facility or mud

areas Shale-shakers and solidsre

Figure 4.1 shows the extent of hazardous areas in the A shale-shaker located in an open area should be treated
drill floor, subst~uctureand upper-works of 'open area' as a sump (see section 5.4.8), with a horizontal Zone 1
(offshore and land) drilling rigs. Figure 4.2 shows area of 3 m, extending 3 m above the top of the shale-
hazardous areas for a well cellar. Figure 4.3 shows shaker, as shown in Figure 4.4. These dimensions are
hazardous areas associated with wireline operations suitable for shale-shakers of less than 5 m length.
offkhore. When a shale-shaker is located in an enclosure with
In these drawings the hazardous area arising from adequate artificial ventilation, the enclosure should also
the surface mud circulation system is excluded since this be classified as Zone I , with an additional Zone I area
is dealt with in 4.3. However, if the mud itself is extending from any opening to no more than 3 m.
regarded as hazardous, as in 4.3, or the return flow-line
is open, then the effect of any sources relevant to Figures 4.323 Mud degassing cqniprnent
4.1 anti 4.3 should be considered, as in 4.2.1.
All parts of the surface mud system excluding the
reserve pits and transfer pumps should generally be
considered to be active, with the potential to contain oil
or flammabk gas, both lighter and heavier than air. The
The surface mud system includes: sections of tank below the shale-shakers and mud
treatment equipment are the most likely to contain
-- high pressure mud pumps and manifolds; hydrocarbons in the form of dissolved gas and traces of
shale-shakers and other solids removal equipment; crude oil. Gas should be removcd by circulation through
- mud degassing equipment; a mud de-gasser. Any traces of crude oil will usually be
-- mud pits (settling tanks) and active tanks; heavily diluted by drilling mud, but can be removed by
- - liquid mud mixing, storage and transfer system; skimming.
- cuttings treatment and re-injection system. When mud from the active system is transferred to
the reserve pits, it may still contam &aces of
Drilling fluids may be water-based or oil-bayed. Oil- hydrocarbons. However, rhe quantity of hydrocarbon
based drilling fluids may be mineral, vegetable ox circulating will normally be small and thus the extent of
synthetic. Either type may contain a wide variety of the hazardous area from any secondary grade releases
chemicals. The possibility of the mud being hazardous will be correspondingly small.
should bc considered. Drilling mud should be considered The extent of the hazardous area arising from
hazardous when its temperahire can be raised to its sources on mud degasser systems (active system and
flash-point or auto-ignition temperature during use, choke) should be assessed as a main process vent in
storage or on release. High temperatures may occur as a accordance with section 'I'he main mud system
result of high downhole temperatures, high subsurface gas vent may be located at the top of the derrick or it can
temperature andlor dilution by pick-up of formation be remote from the drilli~lgarea.
hydrocarbons. On release, fluids may be affected by the When geological or other knowledge allows the
heat of the sun, contact with hot objects or spray xnaxi'murn likely vent rate to Ire estimated, the extent of


the hazardous area should be based on section 5.4.4. produce a significant release, in which case the tank
When this information is not available, the hazardous concerned should be regarded as a primary grade source
area should extend at least 15 m in a11 directions from of release. In an open area with adequate ventilation, the
the vent or down to ground level if the vent is less than hazardous area should be as defined by Figure 4.5. The
15 m from the ground. space within the tank walls should be classified as
With a vent at the derrick top, any area within the Zone 1, with a Zone 2 area outside in accordance with
derrick less than 15 m from the vent tip should be section 5.4.8.
considered hazardous. It is the preferred practice for mud tanks to be sited
The gas vent should normally be considered a in an open area. Where this is not practicable and there
secondary grade release. is not adequate artificial ventilation, the area around a
mud tank located in an enclosure should be classified as
4.3.4 Mud pits and active tanks Zone 1 to the extent of the enclosure, with an additional
Zone 2 area extending 3 m &om any openings in the
The active mud tanks should be regarded as secondary enclosure, For artificial ventilation see 4.3.5 and
grade sources of release, except when there is a Chapter 6.
probability that gas-cut mud could enter the tank to

Ground or dec

Note: R = 3 m, h = 3 m based on a sump o f less than 5 m in length (see 4.3.2).

Figure 4.4 Hazardous area around a shale-shaker in an open area


Pigure 4.5 Hazardous area around mud tanks


4.3. mixing, storage and depending on their composition, it is beneficial to treat

ation of enclosed systems the well rehlrns in a closed-loop system prior to
conditioning the drilling fluid. Separation of water, oil
Xn respect of 4.3.2 and 4.3.4, i t should be noted that and gas can be achieved by use of h k or cyclone
ventilation in areas of significant hydrocarbon release separators rather tham by conventional shale-shakers.
can be set by the requirement for air change to meet Thus, the fimt stage of the process should be the
environmentd and health exposure criteria, rather than separation of hydrocarbons fiom the fluid stream. 'Ibe
consideration of flammability. In sheltered or enclosed process design shouId be amngedso as to avoid the use
areas, Iocal air velocities can be made sufficiently high of electrical or moving rnechanicd equipment in places
with the aid of focal artificial ventilation to avoid where there may be acontinuous or significant releaseof
classi@ing all of the sheitered or enclosed area as hydrocarbons. SuitablearrangemefilsshouId be made for
Zone 1 (see sections 6.3 and 6.4). sampling and the removal of accmuiated solids.
Generally, mud-room air changes of 12 per hour The separation system should be treated as a
may be sufficien&but higher rates may often be required pokential source of primary grade release and be
for specific equipmen< e.g, shale-shakers or to ensure designed accordingly. If &ere is a significant risk of
removal ofvapour from partially cIosexl mu hydrocarbon release downstream of the separation
process, the compt& system should be designed as a
amordance with the relevant parts of sections 5.4.7 and
hen drilling mud itself is cansidered to be 5.4.8.
in eonsequence of factors explained in 4.3, ffle extent of Thereafter, trea-nt of the drilling fluid to
the hazardous areas should be estimated Ibr the remove any residual solids should be designed to
equipment in the mud system, with any open tanks being minirnise the potential for further hydrocarbon refease.
considered as sumps (see section 5.4.8). The larger of When the shale-shaker is located in au enclosure
the estimated distances based upon Chapter 5 or without artificial ventitation, the enclosure should be
calculated as in 4.3.2 to 4.3.4 should be wed to define classified as Zone X, with an additional Zone 2 area
the hazard areas. extending fram any opening calculated in accordance
Mud pumps and associated pipework, valves and with section 5.4.8. W e r e adequate ventilation is
fittings should be considered sourcesof release when provided (see 4.3.5), the Zone 2 area nay be reduced as
the mud is itself hazardous, and the extents of the in 43.2.
hazardous areas should be based upon the relevant Other solids ipment should be
sections oEChapter 5. considered as a so grade release and a
Zone 1 hazardous area established, as described b4.3.2.
-7 CuMnp tr-eatmen4storage an8 re-Iujection Other process equipment in the separation train should
systems be treated in accordance with relevant sections of
Chapter 5.
Untreated cuttings may be contamhtd with liquid
hydrocarbons or potentially hmdou9 drilling mud.
dous fluids may a
re-injection. Any
secondarygrade and small. Open f i d syste e extent of the hazardous area from other
stage processingequipmentshould be regarded as s u p s miscellaneow sources?
will n a t I y lie within

,423. Washed cuttings and

drillingoperations, the retwniag nuid

will contain dritling , bydr-11s (02
gas) and ~ i i d s .In majority of am,

4.5 OTHER SPACES temporary installation should be determined from

Chapter 5. When permanent facilities are provided to
The ventilation in any other spaces on a drilling facility Iocate temporary well test equipment in specific
not specifically covered in this chapter should be locations, hazardous areas should be defined as though
assessed as outlined in Chapter 6 and the zone the temporary equipment was permanently installed
and area boundaries for non-open areas
in accordance with Chapters 5 and 6. This
should include: 4.7 EMERGENCY SYSTEMS

(a) Any enclosures which do not themselves contain a Aiarm and shutdown systems embodying gas detection
source of release, but which fall within and have and other sensors, with redundancy to avoid false
openings to, an external llazardous area. The operation, are covered in the examples inchapters 6 and
internal space should be classified as having the 8. In considering zone classification in 4.2 and 4.5, it is
same zone number as the external area, unless recommended that ekcaical apparatus required to
protected by artificial ventilation as prescribed in operate under conditions of breakdown should be of a
Chapter 6. There need be no hazardow area drawn type suitable for Zone 1 opexation (see Chapter 7).
from apertures in the enclosures beyond that Where such systems are instaIled, there should aiso
covered by the:area within which the enclosures lie. be independent means o f providing essential services
such as emergency lighting, escape route lighting, voice
(b) Areas on an offshore installation where space does and radio communications, with appropriateprotection,
hot permit utility process areas, electricalequipment that will remain in operation in the zone in question
rooms, control rooms and accomodation or office under the most adverse conditions. Normally the
areas to be located in a non-hazardous area which it protection required will be of a type suitable for a
is proposed to protect by pressurisation/over- flammable atmosphere. In addition, such apparatus
pressure. should not be de-energised or shut off as part of any
Battery rooms sited in a non-hazardous area shutdown procedure and should be provided with an
which, because of their release of electrolytic gas independent, protected power supply such as a batiery
containing hydrogen and oxygen, require specific backup.
area classification See section 7.17.

Note: in some cases the provision of an appropriately 4.8 NON-ELECTRTC& SOURCES OF

rated fire wall between the ignition and release sources I[GNLTKON
can reduce the extent of the hazardous area so as to
provide adequate separafion (see section 6.2.3). Although area classification is intended primarily for the
seledtim and location of electrical equipment, as
described in Chapter 7, area classification should also
4.6 WELL TEST SYSTEMS take into account non-electrical sources of ignition.
These are described in Chapter 8.
Equipment to test wells is often installed on a temporary
basis. The extents of hazardous areas associated with a . .
This chapter covers all facilities that fall outside the
direct examples of Chapters 3 and 4. Typical hazad Release sat.irces evaluated under this category are
radii are provided, using the res;ults of dispersion refenrd to as'point souses'. Some are true point sources
modelling published in IP Calcu2afiom ia supporf of as with vents, drains and samplepoints; other equipment
IPIS. items, such as pump units, are composed oofan assembly
The hazardous area classification of point sources is of several individual point sources. Dekminatioo of
determined using calculated hazard radii together with azard radii using the 'point source' approach entaits
either the physical geometry ( e g . a pit) or the shape consideration of each identifiable piiential &ease.
Cactoir;shown in Figure 5.6 to €om a Ehree-dimasional
envelope of the hazardous area. The b d radii in
Chapter 5 are for the condition of open area naturai
veatilation and are valid within the process conditions
givea The &tars deknninmg the extent of the hazardous area
Where a release rate (hole size and presswe) is from a point source include the vaporising potential of
the fluid release, the degree of ventilaiion and the rate or
votume of lhe release.
means of adjusting release ?'be hazard radii (R,) given in 5.4 are
nditions Eall outside of the range of the tabula
scenarios. ng pressure, q u i p m n t size ek.,
re appropriate, RJ may

--- identi& point sources;

e of release and nuid
--- establish zone classification;
releast?, ---. deternine hazard radii;
- deternine hazardous a r k


53.1 tdentify point souroes the ratehrolume of the release, or any other physical
The Tist stage in the hazardous area classification of a In assessing the grade of a release the following
points are pertinent:
plant or facility is the identification ofthe p i n t sources,
usually small, that are possible from the associated
equipment which typically includes valves, flanges, (a) In the case ofoperationallycontrolled releases e.g.
vents, sampling and drainage points, instrument sampling and drain points, most (if not all) vents,
connections, releases from rotating machinery such as filter cleaning and pig receiving operations, no one
pumps and compressors, and any areas where spillage grade of release is applicable since the operational
from these sources could collect. frequency chosen will determine whether the
In well designed, operatedandmaintained facilities, equipment release should be graded as primary,
such point sourceswill usually resuit in secondary gmde secondary or continuous. Such a decision can
releases with a limited number of primary and usually be made at the planning stage (see section
continuous grade releases. Subject to any restrictions 1.6.4).
caused by reduced ventilation withinenclosedareas (see
Chapter 6), the hazardous area will mainly therefore be (b) For releases that are uncontrolled (e.g. leakage from
Zone 2 with several smdler Zone I areas. Zone 0 arcas pump seals, glands and pipe flangeQa secondary
will normally be restricted to the interior of cone roof grade of release is applicable. Genemlised
tanks, or other equipment containing both flammbie assessments of hole sizes fiom experience of the
fluids and air, e.g. vapour collection lines, open sumps equipment type in question, {e.g. pump and
and any substantially continuous vents. compressor seals and glands, flanged joints etc.)
have been compiled (see the risk-based approach
5.36 Determine grade of release and fluid Annex C Part 2 ) and incorporated in specific
category subsections of 5.4 and may be used accordingly -or
until either manufacturers' release rates or
In principle, the classification procedure entails the measured release rates are available, or individual
consideration of ail actual and potential sources of failure ratesbecome apparent through observation,
flammable release. A11 continuous and primary grade e.g. where service conditionsare untypical, such as
sources of release shouM be identified and assessed to where fluids handled are corrosive or abrasive.
determine the extent of the resulting Zone 0 and Zone 1 Correct choice of materials for gaskets, glands,
hazardous areas; wherever possible by design, they seals etc. is important
should be reduced both in number and extent. However,
for secondary grade sources of release, it is often only Determination of fhefluid category
necessary to consider those sources located towards the The fluid category for each point source may be
periphery of a plant that may a f f i the outer boundary determined using Tables 1.2 (Chapter 1) and A3
of a Zone 2 area since many plant areas constitute a (Annex A). Note, the fluid condition of a release under
general Zone 2 area based on boundary features, as shutdown conditions may vary and be of a different
outlined below. This consideration shouId include any vapour- producing potential thanundernormal operating
areas where spillagecould collect. Should the equipment conditions. An example would be the fluids in a
layout be such that it is not possible to assign a general fractionating column or receiver which at shutdown
Zone 2 area, then the hazardous area provided by each might be less well separated k r n lighter fractions.
secondary grade release s o w or group of release Guidance for this type of activity falls into the cleaning
sources should be determined. and gas-freeing sections of cbdes such as IP Design,
The extent of vapour travel, and hence the hazard consmction undoperation of dktribution instalIatim.
radii for each point source to be assessed, will be a 1P Tank cleaning code and the HSE Cleaning andgas-
function of the fluid characteristics and vapour-forming fieeing ofranks containing$ammable residues.
conditions during release, including mass or mass rate
and the rate ofvaporisation. 533 Establish zone classification Determination of the grade of reiease The zone classification (ie. Zone 0, 1 or 2), which is a
The grade of a release is an expression of frequency and fimction of the grade of release, tbe duration of a
duration, in accordancewith the international definitions flammable atmosphere and the degree of ventilation
of continuous, primary or secondary as stated in section should be determined accordingto sections I .6.3 to I .6.5
1.6. It is independent of the degree of ventilation or the and Chapter 6.
nature and volatiiity (vaporising potentiat) of the fluid,

radii in.5.3.4, thy are

-dimensioaal form and

. .

to use to obtain hazard radii. Tables C9(a) and C9(b) respectivelyof Annex C Part 3.
Shape factors for the hazardous areas axe determined

Does the fluid fall into one

of the tolpwing categories:
A, B,C , G(i), or OQI)?


Are the hale size and

process conditions for
the equipment considwed
covered in secllon 5.4
or in Tables C9(a) and (b)?

Cany out dispersion

Readoff&a hazard radius modelling using specific
(R,) from the appropciate chamctedstics of the fluM and
(able in section 5.4 w from elease rate (hole stre,
: Tables CS(a) and {b) pressure)ht establish ttws
(R,and R2respectively). extent of the hazardous area.
considered covered in

Carry out specific

assessment to detormirm
leak hde size lrom

Does Re fluid Wl into one

of the following
A, a; c. ~ f ior) G(ii)?

Read-off the hazaM Carry out dii

mdlus (R,) from ling using spec if^:
appropriate tab46 in c h a e & W of the fluid
section 5.4 or From dbakwsireto
Tables C9(a) and (b) determine the extent of
(R, and & respcWeiy) the hazardous area

* Optional, Im d to determine
fmquency of leak
'. 5.4.1 ]Pumps that an equivalent release hokdiameterof 0,lSD tnay be
used for standard pumps with throttle bushes and
that 'standard pumps' (i-e. hose fitted 0,23SD for standard pumps without throttie bushes,
ingle mechanical seals) should have an externaI where SD is the pump shaft diameter in mm. Seal
manufacturers may have more precise leak sizes for their
seals which, if used, will give considerably reduced
hazard radii.
Seal leakage rates from standard pumps are
generally greater than from those pumps fitted with
throttle bushes or from high integrity type pumps. A
nominal hole size of 2 nun diameter (IP A risk-based
approach) can be taken to represent the leak from a high
integrity pump.
At LEVELS II: and KIi, the ieakage rate is
packed glands for independent of the seal type and is controlled by other
chanicd seals for features such as discharge pipe connections or casing
failures. Since the hazard radii are dominated by leak
sources other thanbsealfailure the hole size is expressed
in terms of the diameter of the pipe discharge line. ExampIe hazard radii (RJ for pumps

The following examples (Tables 5. i(a) to (cf) are for a
pump located at a height greater than 1 m above ground
with a discharge pressure 10 bar(a), a shaft diameter of
25 m and a discharge pipe diameter of LOO mm,
assuming that mawfacturers' data for a sial failure rate
release rate are not available. Where a pump is at a
height less than or equal to 1 m above ground, the
ground effect hazard radius R, may be determined using
Point sources andgrades of release Table C9(b). Hole sizes are determined from Table C6
(Annex C Part 2). Hazard radii are based on the
dispersion distances given in Annex C Part 3.

5.4.2 Equipment drains and liquid sample points:

id is also unlikely. Should any The hazard caused by equipment drains and sarnpk
points depends upon design, which can include, for

. . -- open valve draining to the ground;

- open valve draining to tundish and drain system;
- valve draining to closed cabinet and drain system.

Gaseous samplepoints or drain points l?om gas systems

should be considered as vents. Good practice is to allow
for abnormal release if a sample valve were to be
wnditions) supplied by the pump vendor. In the absence jammed open, for example by double valving. For other
of .&inuf~tu~ers' data, hazaxd radii may be calculated release points not individually covered (e.g. cleaning or
u ~ i %the equivalent leak bole diameters given in filter changing openings), the classification approach
Table C6 (Annex C). These values are based on should follow the principles outlined, noting the
Ang C l a s s ~ t o~f n comparability of the release quantity and fiuid category
on seal leaks and are likely to over with those of ofher listed examples and whether the
seal EiiIure holes. The data suggest equipment is be drained to an open or closed system.


Table 5.X(a) Hazard radii (R,) for standard pumps without throttle bushes


SD = shaft diameter (mm)

DP = diameter of discharge pipe (mm)
t For this release, the hazard radius exceeds 30 m. The release is greater than that normally considered for hazardous
area ciassification and should be avoided.

Table 5.X@) Hazard radii (R,) for standard pumps with throttle bushes

SD = shaft diameter (mm)

DP = diameter of dischargepipe (nun)
j- For this release, the hazard radius exceeds 30 m. The release is greater than that normally considered for hazardous
area classification and shoutd be avoided.

Table 5.l(c) Hazard radii @

for high
I, integrity
) pumps

Note: High integrity pumps arc taken as pump fitted with double seals and throttle bush, or better.
DP = diameter of dischargepipe (mm)
t For this release, the hazard radius exceeds 30 m. The release is greater than that normally considered for hazardous
area ctassificationand should be avoided.

Systems should be desighed to avoid draining or may be determined using dispersion models which
smpling of category A or B liquids direct to into account the actual characterjsti~sof process fluid,
ahosphere. Where possible, such liquids should be and the physical characteristics of the dmidsample
before draining or sampling to avoid the release point.
of vapour. Where this is not feasible (e.g. with LPG), : Table 5.2 shows the maximum hazard radius (R,)
equipment driins should be connected to a closed for fluid categories A, B and C for the 'worst case'
system. Samples should be taken in a closed container discharge pressure given in Annex
such as a sample bomb. When the lines and bomb are categories A anand B the m i m m d
not purged to a closed system there should be aa propo~tionalto the pressure.)

.drains the fluid normally drained

but flanmable aiaterjal could Piping on compressor systems may be subje~tto
vibration. The distances recommended in this section
assume that failure ofjoints and nozzlesdue to vibration
considemd separately.
precauhons are taken to ensure that
flammable liquid is improbabte. Suibble 5.4.3.I Poinl sources andgrnde ofrelease
which would reduce the process drain to a sewn Point sources on'compressors include seals, &landsand
de source. of releare include: joints. However, for the purposes of hazardous
classification the compressor should be regarded as a
draining into an intermediate drain pot; secondary m e point source.
the use of multiple valves on the drain including at
least one valve which springs closed unless held Estimation of leak hole size and determination
of hazard radii
It is recommended that the manufacturers' data for seal
Point sources fsilure leak rates are used to establish the hazard radii
equivalent to a LEVEL 1 release. In the absence of
vendor data, Cox, Lees and Ang Classij?cution of
hazardous areas suggests an equivalent release hole
diameter of 0,12SD for a purged labyrinth seal and
2.2 Grarle of release 0,053SD for a floating ring seal, where SSD is the shafk
diameter in m (see Table C6, Annex C). LEVEL 11 and
IIE hole sizes are provided based on E&P F o m data,
These hole sizes are independent of seal type, and are
considered to be larger failure cases than normally
When classifying a b i n p i n t used only at considered for hazardous area classification purposes,
down, the fluid category should be based on the Having determined the hole size, the hazard radius
ined using Table C9(a) in
Part 3, and C9(b) where R, is required. Table 5.3 gives
dii dctcrinined by this process for an
of a compressor with a sea1 pressure of
100 bar(a) with a shaR diameter of 100 mm for typical
gases described by categories G(i) and G(ii)*

.3 Example calculation for co hole size and hazard radius

N/A Not applicable since hole size is independent of seal type.

J. These hole sizes are considered greater than should be used for hazardous area classification purposes. This Code
does nor therefore give hazard radii for these hole sizes. The user may detormine the hazard radii by mlculatioa.

Any vents or relief valves on flammabie material duty, lower fiamability limit to
including vents from the seal and lube oil system, shouid induced Bow.
discharge to a closed system or to atmosphere at a non-
hazardous location. The hazardous area around the vent Tank vents
should be based on 5.4.4. Similarly, liquid &om knock- Fredy vented tanks will allow vapourfair m&Wa to
out drums or pulsation dampers should preferably drain released in normal operation. Vze pressure wiihh, the
through a vented degassing pot to a closed drain system. @nkrises very little above atmospheric. High level vents
The hazard radii for drains and vents shouid be from tankage should be regarded as primary grade
determined independently of the compressor, based on sources of release with the extent of the h e I
5.4.2 and 5.4.4. hazardous area dependent on the vapour emission rate
(or filling rate). For low venting rates under very low or
-4.4 Vents to atmosphere zero wind conditions material may flow down the
outside of the vent pipe. It is therefore appropriate to
X 4.4.I Detemtinafion of hazardous area exte~idthe hazardous area beneath the Zone 1 area down
It is recommended that specific dispersion modelling of to ground level. However, due to the low frequency o f
actual process fluids and venting conditions is used to such conditionsoccurringthis need only be classified as
determine Lhe veaicai and horizontal extent of the Zone 2. Pigum 5.3 together with Table 5.4 give the
rdous area. hazardous area around (he vent from the storage of a
For some vents there may be a continuous or typical category C fluid.
rimary grade release during nonnat operation with a
lager, secondary grade release during abnormal or 5.4.4-3 Process ven@
emergency operations. The hazardous area for such a Process vents may release mixtures of hydrocarbons
vent is defined by a Zone 0 or 1 hazardous area undiluted with air, or gaslvapour mixlures with air of
~espondhgto the continuous or prim e pressure driving the release will
release, smomded by a larger Zone 2 i~azai-dousarea han atmospheric. The hazard radii
m e s p o n d h g to the secondary grade release. The been calculated for a matrix of
foilowing sections give the hazad radii for unimrpeded venting rates and v a t diamet%mfor both a lighter and a
vents for specific conditions based on the results of heavier-than-air release and are given in Table 5.
dispersion modelling published in TP Calnrlatwy~sirn
support of l P l S (see also Annex C Pad 3). Where any
innpedance to venting exists (e.g. weather plates) Ihe
hazard radius is likely ta be greater. If the calnrl
hazard radius is greater thm 30 m, then the size of
is greater than that nomdly mnsidered for
uii area classificationpurposes.
umed &at tbe vents provided are =mote may either be cafcuiated or, for a conservative hazard
from aay s t m c W and, if attached, are elevated radius far ithe next
sufficientlyfor the lei ion of gases and vapour to the


-Working level
(a) Primarygrade release @) Secondary grade reIease (c) Vent with dual requiremenls

1. Vent pipe opening should have at least R, metres of free space arwnd it in a11 dirb.ctionsto allow dispersal of vapour, and
be away from open windows, doors etc.
2. For mad tanker delivery systemsthe height of a vent above the working level shouId be greater &an the possibleliquid level
in the road tanker to prevent overspill, and in no case less than 5 m above working level.
3. To avoid piacing a working platform in a Zone 1 area, h shouid be measured from any working level within R, metres of
the vent stack.
4. in (c), R, for Zone I should be for the primary grade release and R,for Zone 2 should be for the secondary grade release.

Figure 5.3 Typical hazardous areas around tank vents

Table 5.4 H ~ r radius

d (RI) from tank vent for category C fluid

I- Vent rate (Ptm3/hr.)

(Based on Table lo@)of LP Culculatio~lin mppotf of iPI.5) Imhumenr vents not covered under hazardous area cfassification.

The diameter of the smallest item on the vent line (e,.g. However, the design of relief valve vents should m u r e
the h e , vent or resttjction orifice) should be used to they are discharged to a safe locatioa To cover any
d e W e the hazard radius. small leakages that may occur,a Zone 2 of nomiual 1 rn
Gaseous sample points should be designed so that radius shouid be placed anymd the end of the discharge
the flow ra~r:i s less than 10 m3/hr under ambient point.
conditions. It may benecessaryto fit a flow restrictor on
high pressutu: systrms. 5.4.5 Piping systems
H d radii may be determi'nsd using data given in
Table C9(a), Annex C Part 3. Piping system .designed and constructed to
ANSVASMF, 1831.3 (XSO 15019) or equivalent and Pressure relief valves withoutvalves,iastnunents or significant flangesshould
l'remm reliefvalvesliKing at their design condition are not be considered as sourcar of release.
The importance of choosing the correct accordance with UKWAnP Guidelines for the
constructional materials i s paramount. In addition, management ofthe intee*@of bolzedpipejoints.
materials for gaskets, jointing compounds, gland
. should be sele&& installed and 5.4.5.I poi^ sources andgrades ofrejease
maintained in accordance with the piping material The majority of flangejoints are rarely broken, e.g. only
during major maintenatrcework, LypicaIIy at intclrvals of
piping systems are particularly prone to abour two years or more. Therefore flanges should
accidenbf damage and possible release to atmosphere. considered as sourc m n d a r y grade rel
Support imd bracing of small bore connections used for However, flanges sho regarded as primary
pq$ng, draining, venting, sampling, pmssure gauge releases when they are broken during n d operation
connectkms, injection points, etc., should be considered (e-g. for spade changi
in accordance with IPWKOOA Guidelina /or the occur or where factors
management, design, installofion and mainfeplculceof shock, mechaaical
s d bore tubing systems. risk of leak. As a guide, a flange should be considered as
Pipes smaller than 15 m diamew should be a primary grade release it is broken with a
avoided. Where this is not possible, e.g. on inshument frequency greater than once aek. When: flanges are
s y s t m , tubingwith an upstream isolating valve close to broken under normal operation, there should be valves
the vessel or main tine shoijld be provided. adjacent to the flange to rninimise any release. Also, if
Flanges should be designed and constructed in there are a large number of potential leak sources (as a of release
Pig receivers and launchers are iikely to be opened
fxequently and should normally be regarded as sources
of primary grade release. The hazardous area should be
classified as Zone I.

5-4.6.2 Determination ofhazavd radii

With an ineerIock system as rmmmended above, the
openings on the receiver and launcher shoufd be
regarded as minor release sources and it is suggested that
radius of 3 mis assigned. This distance
1,s rn ifthe equipmeit is p
nitrogen or water washed though before opening.
On pig receivers and launcherswithout an interlock
system on drains, vents and the door, the probability of
lease is increased and

additional Zone 2 area Ikom the equipment door. 'The

hazard radii should be determined, Tables C9(a) (and (b)
where appropriate) may be referred to as a guide to the:
hazard radii depending on ihe possible release size,
process conditions and release height. However, note
that for equipment on large and/or high pressure lines the
resulting hazad radius may well be much larger than
that generally considered for hazardous area
classification. Other precautions such as re-designing
the system or strictly controlled work permit p r o c d ~ ~ c : s
Table C6 in Annex C Part 2 for the appropriateLEVEL are necessary.
ofrelease frequency. Table 5.6 gives typical hazard radii
(K,) based on the upper bound hole sizes at a pressure of 4.7 Liquid p o l s due to spillage
1 0 bar(a), based on the hazard radii in Table C9(a),
Amex C Part 3. Actual hamrd radii rnay be determined Plant design should minimisc liquid spills by providing
using the l~olesizes in Table C6 lor specific system tundishes or other suitable collecting points for sample
pres,mray. points, drains and liquid overflows. However,
inadvertent spills can occur, and this rnay influence the
size and area of an overall Zone 2 boundary.
On each facility the positions at which spillage is
Operating procedures should ensure that pig receivers credible should be identified. If they cannot
and launchers are isolated from the line and vented down eliminated by economicallypracticablechanges to plant
to atmospheric pressure and drained before they design, then the size and position of the iifceiy poof
opened. Thus the design of the pig receiver and launcher estimated. This requires information on the
closure should be such.that it cannot be opened while grading of the site, the Iacation of collecting points for
under pressure; this may be achieved by an interlock drains and the position of bunds or caliecting walls.
with the vent and drain system, and the provision of a In an openarea tke resultinp, hazardous Gea should
properly maintained pressure gauge. Doors on traps and cfassified as z o n e 2
launchexsxquire a stringent inspixtion and mainterlance should prevent spillage in normal ope ratio^.
regime to ensure they remain leak-tight under pressure. The size ofthe hazardous area should be d e t e d n d
Vents and drains should discharge to a safe tocation from Table 5.7 and Figure 5.4. These distances a
and the hazard radii from e v e n t s , equipment drains or supported by calculations in i P Calculationsin suppoH
open sumps should be estimated using the appropriate of IP1.5 and are applicable to category C liquids for
section of this chapter. tempefatures up to 50°C.For gases or category A and B
! .


liquids the size of the hazardous area will often be Any resultant liquid pool should be corlsidered as r
determinedby the initial flash vapour release rather than category C liquid. This is because any vapour wit
the evaporation &omthe on-ground accumulation.The already have been released and therefore the liquid poo
exact extent should be determined by calculation. cannot be boiling.

R, is the extent of the hazard radius from the edge o f the pool in the same direction.
L is the equivalent diameter oftbe pool.
h depends on the temperature of release and the volatility of the xnateriai released For category C fluids up to 50°C, h
nominally 1 m;for volatile fluids or at elevated temperatures, a nominal height, 4 of at least 3 rn should be apptie
However, it is recowtended that this height is verified by calculation.

The possibility of more kequent, unplanned maintenance

should always be considered.
of this Code a sump means a vessel, Where there is a possibility that, in normal
bpen or vented to atmosphere, used to collect flammable operation, apprecjable quantities of flammable gas or
liquid usually as a result of deliberate draining. Other materials in fluid categories A or B can enter, a degasser
r, may enter the sump but the installed upstream of the sump or a sealed but vented
normally an appreciable part of the sump is recomended. Otherwise the system should be
. A sump is usually below ground designed so that normalfy only oit in category C below
50°C can enter,
rceptors and separators should De[erminafionof hazardous area
ical layout of sumps, interceptors and separatgrs
5.5. The space wit-h.frthe walls of an
based on the expected Bow-rate. open sump or to ground level, whichever is higher,
covered with e.g. ventilated should be regarded as an enclosed area. For a primary
classified as Zone 0

In contrast, interceptors and sepamtors arc: vessels

, open or vented to afmosphere, used to separate
," flammable liquids &om other non-flammnable liquids
(typically water) in which the flammable liquids are not radius R, obtained h m Table 5.7 for the sump
-' present in appreciablequantity. Typically they are found equivalent diameter where it can be assumed that entry
on the main oilhater effluent system from a facility. of category C fluids only (below 50°C) can occur-
Generally Ntis assumption can be made ouly in the case Grade of release of installations such as storage and tankage areas. This
Where sumps, interceptorsor separators are intended to area should be classified as Zone 1 or Zone 2 depending
contain flammable liquids they should be ccmsidered as an whether the source is primary or secondary grade.
continuous or primary grade sources depending on the Where there is a possibility that a hot material (e.g.
fequeacy with which flammable material is expected to category C fluid above SOY! or steam condensate) could
enter. enter the sump in sufficient quantity to produce an
They may be regarded as a secondary grade source. appreciabie flammable vapour, or that Gategory A or B
when &amable material enters infrequentlye.g. during material could inadvertently enter, a hazard radius R,of
major niaintenance at intervals of about two years or at least IS rn should be used with an increased verlicai
longer, or as a result of equipment fai6ailure e.g. tube
fallure in a cooling water system or in a major spillage.


2. Dimensions from Table 5.7.

< .

5.4.9 Pits or depressions The possibility of vapour release should atways be

considered when manhole covers are Iifted or
Where a pit or depression exists in a hazardous area, temporarily removed.
without itself containing a source of release, it should be Note: Drainage systems should be designed with
regarded as inadequately ventilated and therefore consideration given to the principles detailed in
classified as Zone 1. IP Environmental guidelinesfor petroleum dbfributwn
imiallations. In the case of filling stations, the design
5-4-10 Surface water drainage systems should be in accordance with APEA4P Design,
construction, modification, maintenance and
Oily water and chemical sewers can become decomml;rssioningofjiling stations.
contaminated with flammable fluids during normal
operations, and openings to atmosphereshould therefon:
be regarded as sources of primary grade retease. 5.5 SHAPE: FACTORS AND HAZARD RADII
Normai open surface liquid drain channels, typically FOR PRESSUMSED RELEASES
not more than0,S m wide, handling flammable materials
should have a nominal hazardous area of 1 rn horizontal The relationship between the hazard radius K, (as
radius each side and 1 m radius vertically above them. determined in the preceding section) and the full three-
Where there is a possibility that a hot'material (e-g. dimensional envelope of the hazardous area is
category C fluid above 50°C or steam condensate)could determined using Figure 5.6. The shape factor depends
enter the drain in sufficient quantities to produce an upon the height and orientation of the release and the
appreciable flammable vapour, or that category A or B hazard radius. The key features are:
materiab could inadvertently enter, these distances
should be extended to 3 in. - Releases below a height (H) of 1 rn are influenced
The vaporisation rate kom any vents on drain by the ground and have a hazard radius RZ.
systemsshould normally be low and a Zone 1hazardous .- Releases above I m,but at heights below the hazard
area should be drawn in aceordance with Table 5.5 radius R,+ I m are influenced by the ground if the
assuming a vent rate of not more than 10 m3/hr at release is directed downward and passes below L m.
ambient conditions. - Releases at a height above the hazard radius R, -e
The possibility of abnormalreleases (e.g. hot water) I rn are independent of the ground.
entering the drains and the vaporisation of volatile
liquids should be considered. Based on this it may be The ground effect radius R, can be determined using
appropriate to define a larger Zone 2 area using Table C9@) (Annex C). The ratio It&, decreases as
dimensions given in Table 5.5 consistent with the higher release pressure increases due to improved mixing.
vapour emission rate.

(a) Releases where Eli > R,-+- 1 m


(b) Releases where I m < H > R,+I rn

(c) Releases where H s 1. rn



6.1 INTRODUCnON 'displacement ventilation'. By inference, high

concentfatiom of contaminant m y existwithim the
ntilation comprises the movement of air within and volume and be emitted fmm iL
- Gradual displacement with good mixing. Here any
, and removal of contaminated air from the contaminant is well-mixed through the volume. A
large part or all of the volume on become
contaminated, while displacement removes the
Gas or vapow released to the airnosphere will mixture of air and contaminant. A special case of
diluted by dispersion in h air until its thisis sometimesreferred toas'dilution ventilation'.
is at a safe limit (below LFL). The time
Whatever the situation, the v d l a t i o n of a confined
the gas cloud depends upon the nature ofthe release., the. spa= is typically quantified by a single panuaeter - the
vapour properties such as density relative to air, the number of air volume changes per hour. Ventilation is a
movement of the air and the presence of turbulence to complex subject and in carrying out an assessment it is
promote mixing. Where the release is not into necessary to consider both the type (natural or artificial)
completely free air (i.e. not into an open area) then the ofventilationand, within thetype.thcdegree (resoicted.
airflow, orventilation,is also afactorin detemnining the adequateor inadequate)of ventilation to be provided, its
mte of gas or vapour dispersion. However, it is reliability and the consequents of its faihue. These
important .toafso consider, in a sheltered or obstruded con side ratio^ need totake account ofthe potential s i z ,
open area or enclosed area, whether any recirculating of release and the affected volume which may be a
motions may Iead to a gradual accumulation of gas or subdivision of a larger volume, for example a bay in a
vapour over time. large warehouse.
The processes of movement of air and removal of The different types and degrees of ventilation are
contaminated air occur, to differing degrees, in any described below under the sections Open Areas,
ventilation process. The limiting cases are: Enclosed Areas and Sheltered or Obsmrcled Areas
. . which cover the subdivisions of 'outdoor' and 'indooi'
. ..,
.. ..
- Efficient displacement withbut mixing. Here a ventilation used in other Codes. Figure 6.1 may be used
,. w determine how to assess the degree of ventilation for
.', .: contaminant is swept out of avolume without much

mixing. This is sometimes referred to as any given situation.


' 'Frcshrcsh
implies Gce fromflammablecontaminants.
. ................ --
Determine openness of region to be classifiedby Inspsiion dimtallation layout

Figwe 6.1 Procedure for assessing type and degree of ventitation


6.2 OPEN AREAS (a) Open air situations typical ofthose in the chemical
and petroleum industries which comprise open
structures, pipe racks, pump bays etc.

openings in the walls andlor roof so dimensioned

and located that the ventilation inside the building
iffs or other buildings preclude an area being for the purpose of hazardous area classification can

e hazardous area classification exercise is

ed ifali continuous and primary gradesourn of Where a facility is classified as an 'open ad i.e. with
can be located within open arcas. However, natural ventilation, the hazardous area classification

of plant design are covered in section 1.5.

IEC 60079-10 recognises that obstacles way impede
Natural ventilation naturalventilation, and this may enlarge theextentofthe

In respect of'natural'natural ventilation', E C 60079-10 obstacles such as dykes, walls and ceilings may Emit the
movement of a gaseous release, reducing the extent of
the hazardous area Examples of this use of a 'deflection
wall' are provided in 6.2.3.

/ ---.
. \

Plan view

's the hazard radius obtained from Chapter 5.

Wall sbould extend to 81 l e a i the full vertical height of the hazaniw area if it is to be uscd as a defleeiion will.
the &ortest disance %om the source to the edge of the retaining walL

Figure 6.2 Ehtent of hazardous area around wall producing sheltered area


6.2.3 Effectof a fire or deflection wall on release can be located withm open areas. There
bazardons area however, a variety of nahlrally venrilated si-
where the assumptionof minimum wind speeds give
Where limitation of space will not allow a mum of IEC 60079-10 f a an open area (ie. wind speed w
ignjtioa (electrical or o t h w i i ) to be located outside a less than 0.5 m/s and fiesuently above 2 d s ) may
hazardous area,the alternative may be to segarate them apply, but air change rates will be much greater f
with an impdorate Grewall. Thiswould be sized so that those foundinside enclosed areas orevenwell-ventilr
the equivalent v a p r travel diianw amund ihe ends of buildings. It should be noted that air movement ma)
or above thewall will be at least equal to the sfnightline funnelled selectively in particular directions due to
distances derived h m the standard BSSeSSment of the layout of a facility. Typical examples include: clow
hazardnus area 'mensioes. This widely used rule of spaced pipe racks within open air planr. structr
thumb is illustrated in Figure 62. It has m, formal hannga roofbut only partial wallsfcompressorhow
technical basis, and its adoption Kflccts an engineering road tanker loading anas); open air plant where
judgement a assessment movement is obstructed by large tanks or walls; t;
Such a deflection wall should be conshuctedto an bunds and below-grade areas such as pits and p
adequate fire mistance standard and be located so as to trenches In such locations, neither the classification
minimisetbe flame engulfment of facilities wntaininga direct example (Chapters 3 and 4). northe classificat
significant quantity of flammable material, and may by point source method (Chapters)-may be appropri
form part of the site bouodaty or the wall of a building. (although some of the direct examples do inch
The wall should be on one side only of the facilities sheltmd anas). With partial buildings, wind-flows F
containing the souroe(?.) of release, allowing fiee the building will create areas of high tuttulencc :
ventilation in all other d i i t i o m . rapid dispersion of releases, panicularly around
Examples of rhis application include the band wall edges ofthe building and ahove mof level. A judgem
a d a tank compwnd (as in Figures 3.1 and 32), the will have to be made, based on the pam.atlar situati
feduction ofseparation distances as in LPG facilities, the but generally such an area with restricted natc
separation between power-driven equipmentand process ventilation should be assigned a zone classification c
equipment by a gastight wall wifh a drive shaft seal severity of one step higher than if it were a filly o&
(Chapter 8) and numerous cases in the compaci area e.g. a below-grade pit in a Zone 2 area wo!
circnmstancesof an oBhore platfwu become Zone 1. The extent of any classified area beyc
the openings in a building containing release source:
6-2.4 Buildings adjacent to open harardous areas effectively afunction of the dilutimofthereIeasewill
the building. With no dilntion, the extent of i
A building may contain no internal sources of release, classified area beyond the building need not be grea
but have openings directly into an adjacent open than the hazard radius equivalent to the release in OF
ctassifd area The building should be assigned a zone air as cafcnlated using the methodology in Chaptcr 5.
classification o f a higher severity than the adjacent area reduction in the hazard radius may be estimated ba.
if B is possible for any leakage to m i s t in the building on the anticipated level of dilution of the release witl
(see Table 6.2). Ifthe openings are not too Luge, over- the building.
pressurisation ventilation may be a feasible option, The extent ofthe hazardous areas around sources
allowing the building to remain unclassified (see gas at high pressure in the open air is not so affected
6.433). wind speed because releases at high pressure indr
their own mixing. The exrent of the hazardous a~
around a release in a sheltered area will be of a simi
6 3 S H n T E R E D OR OBSTRUCneD AREAS size to that in me free atmosphere provided that thee
a sufficientsupply of air to remove the diluted m&
A sheltered or obstructed area is defmed as an area fmm the neighbourhood of the release and there are
within or adjoining an open area (which may include a directiy enclosing surfaces Lo encourage reciwlati
pa1tidly open building or shucture) where, owing to motions or retain the diluted mixture. Provided t
0bstructio~naturalventilationisrEstricred and less than sunoundingatmospheredoesnoccontainconcentratio
in stnre open area Where theobsPudon is such that ahove 20% of the loww flammable limit, the bazardo
nahlralvenblation is severely rrstricted, it should be area around high pressure gaseous releases will not
classified as an endosed area (see 6.4). pates than twice the hazardous area in free air. If a
The hazardous area classification exercise is mixture accumulation does occur, however, then t
simplified if all cnntiau~lsand primary grade s ~ ~ c e s o hf a d o u s area may be increased through the I
with no stagnant area'. As such it will usually have air
velocities lower than in an open area. A ventilationrate
of 12 air cbangedln is likely to be snfticienz, if therearc
nci stapmt regions, to ensure that flammable
atmospheres arising from an improbable short tam
release of gas or vapocn will n n ~ ~ e r s ifor
s i longer than
aboot ten minutes. The extent of the flammable
ahnosphere that will exist dnring the release fiom a low
momentum source can be stimattdusing the equations
of a wall torestrict the extent of a given in IEC 60079-10or by specialist calculations, as
The objective of adequate ventilation is to ensure
gnition is covered in 623. &at a b u i l d b eontalning secondary grade release
sources can be properly classified as Zone 2. in large
buildings it may be possible to classify some parts as
6.4 ENCLOSED AREAS non-hazardons, while other parts are Zane 2.
Continuous or primary grade releases should not be
disc6arged internally, but should be piped d i m l y to an
external safe loation thmugh ducting. Wi suitable
movement will be limited a d any ventilation design, any Zone 1 areas should be of veiy
limited extent
Although adequate ventilation is defmed by the
12 airchangeslhr criterion it must be remembered that
the hazardous area that will be formed is also dependent
on the size of tbe release and the bnilding volume
dhctlyaffected by therelease. Insmall buildings, 12air
changes/hr can often be achieved simply by providing
sufficiint ventilation openings, at high and low levels,
and in more than one wall of the building. With larget
buildings or stluctwzs artificial ventilation is often
needed to achieve 12 air chang&, and where this is
provided, careful design and balancing of air inlet or
extraction points is needed to ensure no stagnant areas
It is generally easier to ensure that flammable gases exist Measurements made after the ventilationsystem is
installed may beneededto check for stagnantareas,and
the tests may need to be carried out bath on an empty
building, and aAer large items of plant, or stocks of
products have been introduced. With very large
buildings it may become impracticable to pmvide
artificial ventilation to achieve 12 air cbaogeslbr, it is
e.g: all unsuitably ceztilied elect~icai certainly inefficient to blow very large amounts of air
y be automatically isolated (sei'6.6). around constantly, simply tudeal witha small secondary
grade release that may occur quitc inbquently. An
alternaiiveapproachis needed, and the best solution wil2
rtber discussion oftheeffects ofventilation in depend on the number and location of the secondary
areas containing sources of release, see grade releases occurring.
Zacatisedexhaustventilatiw(LEVsa, 6.43.1),gas
detection or other me- of prompt identification of
6.43 . Adequate ventilation releases of flammable matetials should he considered
No general guidance can be given about the size of
Adequate ventilation is a reference condition used buildimgs orsbuctnres that wit these options, as other
extensively, defined in a number of Codes worldwide factors such as the prevailing wind conditions at the site
a d particnlarly offshore as 'the achievement of a and whether the building is heated also need to be
uniform ventilation rate of at least 12 air changedhr, ccnsidered.

If hazardous concentrations are created within a fluid is a 5 mm diameter hole in a line at 50 bar@
building then there is the potential to produce a Leaks of this size should be detected pmmptl~
hazardous area outside the budding. An exfxeme worst Category C fluids will generate localilsed Zone I area
casescenario is forthe whole building contents to reach around open liquid surfaces, and a larger Zone 2 is ofte
a hazardous concentration. There may then be the assigned as well but it may not be necessary to class$
potential for ignition to ouw exteroally to the building, the whole building as Zone 2, especially if there are n
prodncing a flame that bums back into the building sources of release present in the upper parts of th
creating a wnf~nedexplosion within the building It is enclosure.
therefore essential that the potential for gas build-up to
concen~r~tions above 20% of LFL be avoided within the 6.4.2 Inadequate ventilation
bulk atmosphere in the building.
In a building with a well-mixed atmosphere into Where an enclosed area is not provided with artificia
which a wnstant flow of flammable gas is released, a ventilatiofi,air movement is likely to vary substantially
simplecalculation~allows the steady stateconcentration and w general assumptions can be made about tb,
of gas to be calculated lfthe release is intermittent, or mixing of a release. Continuous and primary grad<
wntmlled before the steady state concentration is sources of release should bc avoided in such an area
reached, the maximum gas concenbation will be less. inadequately ventilared areas should be classified a.
The minimum ventilation flow rate required to ensure Zone I since a sew,ndary grade source may form ;
that concentrations of above 20% of the LFL are not tocaiised flammable atmosphere and'pemist for long
produced can also be estimated by sirniiar methods tiom periods.
the size of the release and the LFL of the gas. The Inadequately ventilated areas should be avoided
recommended design target is to eosunthat the average particularly where personnel access is nquittd, ~ b j e u
concentration of flammable atmosphere within the to the ConfrnedSpacesReguLrfio1997.Theserequire
building doesnot exceed20% of the LFL in the event o f in addition to the controls on entry, the provisian ot
a prolonged release from a secondarygrade souroc. The arrangements for dealing with emergencies including
zoning external to the building should take account of rescue from a confined space and equipment to enable
the location ofrelease points relative to openings. Where resuscitation. Lf ventilation cannot be improved, the use
it is possible for a release to be directed thmugh an of flammable gas detectors should be considered (see
opeaing the-hazard radius should be at least R, as d o n 8.3). When these are &stalled it should not be
determined by.Tabfc C9(a) and may extend to R, in the possible for any smkantial volume of flammable
eventofinteraction with the p u n d . Iocases where the atmosphere to form and paspm& undeteaed, allowing
release;mp'mgesinternallywithin the building, specialist safety measures to be taken, as ignition would be veq
advice sbould be sought because the ooutcome may bc hazardous. If fwed gas detectors are not povided, accesr
building, r d e a s e a n d r n a t e r i a l ~ cIt. is possible that, should be controlled, and testing of the heatmwpbere
in certain cireumstanees, then is no need to assign a before entry should be required.
hazardous area beyond my openings in the building,
uniess the opening is witbin the local zone immediately 6.43 Arttlicial veutiiatioo types
sunounding the release location. However, it is
reoommendedthat specialistadviceis soughtto chofvm The assumption of good mixing is likely to be
this is the ease. reasonable for releases fiom pressnrised sources,which
Vaailation cates greatly above t h target 12 air entrain air into a jet For releases with low momentum,
chang& are likely to cause discomforkto openrton vcry careful design of the air extm points may be
dressedforindoorcooditioos. A building sized i 000 rn3 neededto eusure good m i x i i is achieved Measurement
and having a ventilation design that encouraged mixing of locatised air movement within tht:building after all
of the release, rafher than displacement, would equipment is installed may be needed.
expe.riewe a problem in that signiti-t regions of Artificial ventilation may be applied to part of an
5nJmable. mixture may arise for releases of about area i.e. local artificial veatiladon. or to tbe whole area
O,03 Lg/s and larger for category A, B and G(i) fluids ie. g e n d attificial ventilation Ow-pressurisationfor
and abmt 0.01 kgls and hgex for categny G@) fluids. example may be applied either locatty or generally.
ifforeseeablesecondarygradesounes ofreleaseexceed If artraftive ventiktion is used, the outlet should
these value?, thedesign ofthe.whole insfaBation should nonually be at high level and in particular it is important
be reviewed F o r . a G(i) fluid this release rate that it is sited so that w i m h t i o n of flammable gases
unraponds a&roximarely to a 5 mm diamder hole in back into any other building or structure is notpossible,
a line at 10 bar(a); the axresponding figurefor a Kii) evenunderveiystill airconditions Whereventilationis

area, may be nsed to dilute and remove much larger

releases than thosecontrolled by LEV. A forceddraught
likely to be influenced by wind and convective fan may be used in c o n j u d o n with an extractor fan.
In any case, provided the atmosphere inside the This arrangement has been used inside the acoustic
hoods for gas t d i e s , where the complex pipework
provides many potential sources of release, but the
source of ignition created by the hot surface of the
turbine cannot be prevented. The objective is to dilute
evenquite large releases very close to the source, so that
ere category B or C fluidscan be released, these ignition cannot occur. The maximum size of release to
could flow in liquid form towards any openings out of be controlled needs to be carefully assessed and each
the enclosed area Suitablcdrains and sills are needed to installation will be different, so generalised advice on
prevent the flow into non-hazardous areas. Normal ventilation rates cannot be given. See section 82.5 for
&am including fire doors are not l i l y to prevent such f i e r information on gas turbine k v s . Owr-prerswisation
6.4.3. I Local exhaust venfi[olion This term is nsed to d-be a system of ventilation for
a mom or other enclosed area, and also a protective
method for a single item of e l d c a l equipment
.deutihble primary or m u d a r y grade release Where it is applied to a room it may allow a room
that contains no sounes of release to be classedas no*
hazardous although it is connected to another mom
classified as Zone 1 or Zone 2 or, in conjunction with
adequate ventilation, allow a mom surrounded by a
Zone 1 to be classified as Zone 2 if it contains only
gases and vapour over quite short distances, determined secondary grade sources of release. Where it is applied
by the inlet velocity and correct design of the inlet. to a single item of equipmcnk or a group of equipment
Factors that need to be amsidered &en the system is items inside a single well-scaled cabinet, it is designed
designed include: the rate of release; the momentum of to prevent ingress of flammable gas, and heme prevent
the gas flow; any air movement due to general the formation of a flammable atmosphere inside. This
ventilation nearby; and thc position of the operator. kdmique may allow electrical equipment that is
Capture velocit-ns in the range 0,5-1,O mls are typically unobtainable inanignition-protectcdfmtobe installed
used for refeases at low velocity inlo moderately still air. in a hazardous area
The concept of air change rates does not apply to the Applied to an enclosed area it is a form of adficial
ventilation and should be designed so that a pressure
W& a suitable design, LEV should prevent any differential ofat I& 50 N/mz(5 mm WG) is maintained
flammableatmosphere forming except in the immediate &tween the enclosed area m d any hazardous area.
vici*of therelease source. An mclosed area may then Warning, preferably audible and visuaI, should be
remainunclassified, even though p h a r y grade releases provided for loss oEpressure differential. If d i r e access
are present More commonly it will be Zooe 2, to allow is provided b e e n the pressurised area and a Zone 1
for various p i b l e secondary grade releases. Where area,air lock doors should be installed betweentheareas
primary grade release m c e s are present, an audible w and the space W e e n them classified as a Zone 1
sual warning should be provided if the LEV system is harardousa~8
not functioning correctly. . .. Seaion 6.6.3 gives advice on other actions that
LEV may also be provided to control secondary should follow any failure of the ventilation system As
gradereleases that are generated by operator action, eg. air locks may allow pressure differentials to be briefly
le pointr In thiicase, the extraction may only need lost, some delay on the activarion of any shut down of
operate during the sampling operation. Some means elechical equipment may be considered. Such a delay
to ensure the.LEV is always operating when it is needed following an audible alarm should not normally exceed
30 seconds.
Detailed mpkements for the application of Diizdion w d a t i o n pressorisatiha to electrical apparah~~ are M b e d in
In some restricted ckum%&mces, a very high flow ofair BS EN 50016. This distinguishs between static
applied to a space, perhaps within some larger enclosed pressmisation, where the inside of the apparatus is held


above the pressure of the suuoundings, prssmistion local artificial or dilufion ventilation, and primary gr
with leakage compensation, and pRssurisation with releases should be avoided as far as is pmcticablt
continuous flow of the protectivegas Itrequim the use madeas small as possible. This zoning wouldbe app
of an inert gas for staticpressurisation The standardsets to the whole of the enclosure, with the exception of
requirements for equipment to be used in Zone 1. A situation in note 5, in which the zone createdby a rek
variation of this, .which will specifi less rigaous is small in relation to the size of the building,
requirements for equipment that will only be used in sufficientventilation is preseut to prevent accumulal
Zone 2, is under active development by the international above 20% of the LFL of the bulk atmosphere. Un
standards bodies. these conditions, local hazardous arm classificationr
be allowed. The situation when there are no inta Air infokesand a h d s sources is specified in Table 6.2. The notes to Table
The locationofair intakes (including intakes to: heating explain the reasoning for the different u
and ventilating systems; combustion plant air classifications.
compressors for instrument, process or breathing air; gas
turbines) should be chosen to avoid transfer of a
flammable atmosphere to a source of ignition Air 6.6 EFFECT OF LOSS OF VENTILATION 0
intakes should be located as far as is reasonably HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION OF f
practicable Iium the boundary of any l m d o u s area ENCLOSED A R M
The location should be selected a& considering the
effects ok In enclosed areas with artificial ventilation,
classification guidance given in Tables 6.1 and 6.:
- Air contamination with flammable matexiaL based on the specified ventilation operating effeaivt
- ADYadditional safely systems, e.g. equipment trips Ifthis ventilation were to fail the classification situat
on detecrion of flammable material in the air would revert to tbat of 'inadequate' ventilation in th
intakes. tables, hence it is necessary to consider what measu
should be taken to prevent this occurring, or w
The exhaust outlets of heating or ventilation systems additional back-up systems are needed. The ventilat
saving installations classified as hazardous should system should be designed to be reliable, with,
t h e n d v e s be classified appropriately. example, automatic stait-up ofastandby fan in the ev
of primary fan failure. Power for the main and stanc
fans should not be fmm a common supply. Howe\
6 5 EFFECT OF VENTILATION ON UlNC whilst total ventilation failure is unlikely, it
CLASSIFICATION OF ENCLOSED AREAS foreseeable and the actions r e q u i d are consida
Section 6.43 considaed the objeaive of providing
artificial ventilationtoenclosedanas is. thohecoafimd 6.6.1 Provisions for loss of adequate ventilatio
volumes in which nahual ventilation p r i d e s less than
12 air changes per hour throughout the whole volume. An enclosed area classified as Zone 2 by virtue
The consequences of releases in these enclosures were adequate ventilation normally contains only second;
briefly discussed. Thepurposc ofthis sectionis to define grade sources of release andlor openings into Zont
the wneclassificationthat shouldbeappliedwithinsuch areas. It may sometimes contain small primary gra
enclosed areas.The classification depends on the degree nleasc sourus On loss of adequate ventilation th,
of ventilation and the grade and location of the release. will not necessarily be an immediate development o
Table 6.1 considers the 7me classification within flammable atmosphere and it may be consida
enclosures containing sources of release within the acceptable, subject to monitoring of the ahnosphere a
volume, whilst Table 6 2 considers the zone of plant conditions. to cwtinue for a shon period
classification within enclosuresthatdo not have internal operate equipment only suitable for Zone
sources of release but that are adjacent to other Nevertheless, there should be an audio-visual alarm
hazardous inear, arising fmm external s o w . indicateventilationlossand a written procedure to wr
Figure 6.1 provides a flow chart mat defines when the both the d c p of monitoring necessary and the a d
different types of ventilation apply. to be taken if mechanical ventilatiatiwr fails. Fixed g
Attention is drawn to the notes to Table 6.1, in detecton should normally be provided. Equipment r
panicular to note I. Continuous grade releases in suitable for Zone I should be electrically isolat
enclosu~sare not acceptable practice unless small with immediately if gas is deteczed, or the source o f t

enclosed area

continuous grade of release.

but may be applicable in

of mnliauous or primary grade swces within an enclosed srea is not acceptable practice and should be

.3::,<; '.'
effect of ventilation on mue dassificaiion within endosed area

Grade of Veutilation
release source inadequate I Adequate Dilution Over-pressnre")
i.e. Zone o
I MO(" / ZoneO(') I Not applicable
I Non-hazardous with source
%maw2 Zone 0"' Zone I"' Not applicable outside enclosed area, but see
i.e. Zone I failwe mode (6.6.3)
I Now:
i.e. Zone 2
Not applicable
I. Locatimofan mclowd area without o v e y - p ~ c ~ pratmtion
su~ in a Zone 0 or I is not aweptablc practice and should be
2. An inadequately ventilated enclosed ama within an cxcrnal Zonc 2 and not cwtaining a m i c e of rdease may
sometimes be classifiedas Zom 2 when the only apcrhrn is a selfclosing vapour-tirght door.The ?i"Xpencyof door
o p i n g and the ventilatiw level must be considered Lo assess the risk.

release stopped if more practicable. A rnasta switch is equipment not of a type of protection suitable fix use i
normdly pmvided to facilitate the elecfrical isolation the adjacent hazardous area Ficd gas detecton shoul
when necessary. nomaliy be provided. Eguipment not suitable foruse i
a Zone 1 areashouldbeelectricallyisolatedimmediarel
6.6.2 Provisions for loss of dilutinn ventilation if gas is detected.

An enclosed area cl&ified as non-hazardous by v h e 6.6.4 Reliability, location and choice of tixed ga
of dilution ventilation normally wntains primary grade detectors
sources of release and may contain small continuous
grade release sources. tf dilution ventilation is the basis The need for f i e d gas detection to monitor, alann and
of safety, an automatic ticitch-aver to a back-up power as appropriate, initiate shutdown has been stated in tho
supply must be provided. The back-up supply musf as preceding measures for protection w.nst loss o
a minimum operate for sufficient time to enable the artifiial ventilation by dilution ventilation o
plant to be shut down. An audio-visual alarm should be pressurisation Thc comments in section 8.3 an
provided. pertinent fn view of the difficulties with regard to fhc
accuracy of some gas detector types,specialistguidanu
6.63 Provision for loss of overpressure should be sought in r a p of their selection anr
ventilation location, and also the cholce of alarm Settings (m som
cases these may be as low a s 10% LFL for audible
An enclosed area with over-pressure ventilatim is alarm, with a second trigger, say, at 50%for shutdown).
separated by vapow-tight barrim born adjacent It may well be ngssary, to avoid false indications and
hazardous areas and contains no cmtinuous or primary possible inadvertent sbtdowq to apply wincidem
gmde sources of release. On loss of over-pressure voting arrangements where monitoring is carried out,
ventilation, therefore, the development of fiammable employing three detecton in wbich operation of any
atmospheres within the area is likely to be slow and it is detector at low level will sound an alarm and where
not WrmaIIyne~g~ry i&iteIy to isolate electrical coincidence operation of two out of the thKe at high
equipment Nevertheless, t h ~shouldbeanandio-visual
, level will activate the shutdown It should be ootedtbat
alarm to indicate ventilation loss andamiacn pmcedure gas detecfors are not inbinsically safe and must be
to wvet the electrical isolation that would be rcquiredif certified for the groups of gases in which they will
the ventilation loss persisted. A maser switch is operate. B& gas gmup and ternperahrre class m a be
nonnally provided to facilitate the electtical isolation specitied (see Chapter 7).
when necessary.In general this should beappliedto any

7.1 INTRODUCTION increasingly these standards have been agreed at
European or international ieveL in various countries,
nce the hazardous area classification of a piant is such protected electrical equipment bas been tested and
determined, it should be used as the basis for selecting certif~edby independent tesr houses, although different
suitable equipment. To reach the intended le& of countries had slightly different tests. A driving force
d & y , equipment must then be installed correctly, behind the standardisatiun work has beeu a d e s k by
oDerated w&in its desien envelooe and maintained rnanufaciurersto have equipmeut testified and ceititied
a&uately. Further i n f o - d o n these aspects is only once to a common basis. Mob hazardous
contained in this chapter. Elechicaf equipment specially installations will contain older elechical equipment
constntcted to prevent it igniting a flammable designedand constructed to earlier standards which can
atmosphere is referred to as protected equipment remain in operationproviding it is properlyoperated and
throughout the rest of this chapter. maiutained and test certificates remain valid
Traditionally,hazardousareaclassification has been
used 8s a tool to specify what types of tixed electrical 7.2.1 Internationat standards on selection and
equipment may be used at different locations within a maintenance
hazardous installation As a simple extension to this,
hazardous area classification has sometimes been used In addition to standards on the design of protected
as a guide to specifying locations where special control equipment there are also standards on the seledion of
is needed over tcansient activities which create an equipment (BS EN 60079-14). inspection and
ignition hazard, such as themaintenanceor movement of maintenance (BS EN 60079-17) and the repair and
vehicles (see Chapter 8). overhaul of protected equipment (BS IEC 60079-19).
As ageneral policy, electricalequipmentshould not This chapter doer not attempt to repeat thecontent of ail
be located in a hazardous area if it is possible to place it thesestandards,huttooutiiethe principles, and to draw
in a non-bazardous arm nor should it be placed in aaention to aspesfs which relate particufarly to
Zone 1 if it can be placed in Zooe 2. hazardous installations. See Table 7.1 and Annex F.


Over many years standards for electrical equipment for

use inhazardous 2lras have beendevelopedand refined.



Table 7.1 Standarh relevant to electrical equipment categories for use in hazardous areas

Current British Current IEC Earlier standards

Type proteetion and Intended for use
standard and standard and approximately
marking letter in zones
date BS EN date equivalent E S
Used in
General requirements 6007910 2004 6007910 2000 mbination with 50014 & 550111

Pressurid 'p' 60079/2 2004 60079/2 2001 I 50016 & 550113

Powder fiUed 'q' 50017 1998 6007915 1997 1 5501/4
50018 & 550115
F~ameprwf'8 60079/1 2004 6007911 2003 1
50019 & 550116
Imeased safety 'e' 6007917 2003 60079l7 1990 1 AfilLllA

.- I
. .
60079114 1996
Non inmdive 'd 60079'15 2 50021
60079115 2005
Encapsulated 'm' 60079118 2004 60079/18 1992 1 50028 & 550118
50014, PD IEC

tlammable gases
flammable gases
and vapours

3. Dates re& to the 1st full idition. In many cask amendments have been issued subwqumtly. For mae details see
Annex F.

7.23 The type and grouping of equipment 7 3 SELECTION OF GROUP 11 APPARATUS

European requirements(ATEXDirectives) fbrelecnical
apparatus for hazardous areas distinguish between: Correct selection of equipment requires three factors tc
be taken into account These are:
Group 1 Elecbical equipment fbrmines susceptible
to firedamp (methane). - Zone in which the equipment will be used.
- Sensitivityto ignition of the gascs or vapour likeb
Group !I Electrical equipment forplam other than to be present, expressed as a gas group.
mines. Group I1 is subdivided into JIG for - Sensitivityofthegases orvapourpresent toig
use where gaws orvapour may be prseat by hot surfaces, expressed as a temperahue
and !.ID for use where dusts may be classification.
There is no simple link between ignition sensitivity end
Some types ofnon-elecaicalequipment may also create ignition trolperature. As an example., hydrogen is
an ignition hazard and EU legislation (the ATEX extremely sensitive to ignition by sparks, but has a bigh
Direclives) establishes very simihr requirements on ignition temperature.
eleceicai and non-electrical equipments d d specifically Some types of non-electricalequipment may also
as suitable for nse in hazardous wutf Group I and create an ignition hazard, and the ATEX Directives
Group I Dapparatus are not considered in this Code. establish very similar requirements on electrical and

mu-electrical equipment soldspecificallyas suitable for 7.6 APPARATUS SUBGROUPS

urs; in hazardous areas.
The ATEX Directives establish a fiumework of Not all flammable fluids are equally easy to iguite, and
essential safety requirements, and the existing eleclrical the diffexent properties are usually measured as
standards are being adjusted to comply with these. In minimum ignition tempemaae, and minimum ignition
addition there will be mutual recognition of test energy. Electrical equipment standards rewgnise these
certificates and mmpulsory standard markings, so that diierences by subdividingthe equipment categoriesiloto
a certificate issued by one test house under the ATEX subgmups,andternperatureclassesThethree subgroups
procedures will be valid anywbere within the European reflect & i t minimum ignition energies. Only
Union. Users should be able to establish fiom the hydrogen and acetylene appear in subgroup lIC as the
madcing where any item of equipment may be safely gases most sensitive to ignition. Table 7.2 l i tht
installed. subgroup applicable to common petroleum products.
These subgroups apply only to equipment made to
protection concepts 'i:'d', 's' and 'p'.
7.4 TYPE OF PROTECTION This sub-gronpiug is detamind by celttfying test
bodies in accordance with the grouping of gases and
Various concepts are used to build protected electrical vapour as prescribed in IEC 60079-12.
equipment and these are set out in different standards. Reference may also be made to IEC 6W9-0,
As asimpfeexample, oil-filled apparatusp e n i s sparks E C 60079-10 and BS EN 50014.
igniting a flammable atmosphere by submerging
contacton in oil, wbilc intrinsically safe apparatus is (a) For other types of proteetion than.'5' 'd', 's and
designed to Emit the enefgy within the system so that above, thepmteuivetechniques apply equally toall
even under fault conditions a spark cannot o m r (see gases and vapour, subject only to the &her aspect
Table 7.1). of temperature classification as in 7.7. Apparatus
sub-grouping for thex other types of protection is
not therefore applicable. 'Il~ereshould, however, be
7 5 SELECTION ACCORDING TO ZONE awareness that these are 'multiple' [ypes of
CLASS1[FICATION protation in which, increasingly, eleclrical
apparatus may incorporate mom than one typt of
~uipmentbnilttodifferentprotection wnceptstandards protection
may not offer the same degree of safety. This is
mmgnised in the older standards by specifying that (b) The apparatus sul+groups for a large number of
some protected equipment is suitable only for use in gases and vapours have brzn listed in E C 60079-
Zone 2, while othertypes may be used in Zones i and 2, 20. A shorter list for those most wminody handlal
and equipment offering the highest degnz of protection in the petmleum, petrochemical and gas sectors.
may be used in Zones 0, 1 or 2. Under the ATEX including methane in surface handling and
Directives, these differences are m g n i s e d by hydrogen, is given in Table 7.2 Thc rewmmeod-
descniing three categories'of equipment: ations in section 25 where mbmues of gases are
involved should be consulted
Category 1: equigmentprovidiigthe most secure level
of protection and suitable for use in Zones Note: Apparatus certified in the UK to the d i e r
o,i or2 flameproof BS 229 and BS 4683-2 standards and to
Category 2: equipment suitable for use in Zones 1 or 2 BS 1259(intrinsicsafety) are also grouped according to
Category 3: equipment suitable for use in h e 2 the experimental data for limiting safe gaps or ignitiqg
surfa~e~(see IEC 60079-14) and they remain
A parallel series of standards for non-electrical optionally acceptable.
equipmentarebeingpreparedbytheEumpean standards
organisation CEN, as EN 13463. These will address the (c) Tbe effects of an intanal release, if diiuing in
risks associated with possibilities such as overheating, composition from the external flammable
e.g. fddional heating, and impact sparks arising h m atmosphere, should be taken into account when
rotating equipment, and descni diffexent protection selecting the apparatus grouping (see also 7.10 and
concepts. h e x F).

Table 7.2 Recommended apparatus subgroup and temperatureclass far some

flammable fluids

Apparatus Temperature (T) class*

Flammable fluid
sub-group of suitable equipment
Hybgen IM: TI
Methane IIA TI
Ethane ILA TI
Propane IIA TI
LPG* IIAt 3-2
Uhylene UB T7.

KIA fl
Toluene IL4 T1
llA T3

Kerosine* IIA n
Gas oil* IIA T2
Residual productsf IIA T2
* Where the fiamdk fluid is a mixture, the appmms sub-group and tcmpadture clas
nlate to the most onerous umstiluent of the mixture. The apparahs subgmup and
temperamre class are thedore only typical im there csses aod should be VRitied far
individual mixtuns uGng Iaboratory dtecks
+ Baral on ignition temperamre of the substaace in amonkace with EC 60079-14 and IEC 6W794.
t If LPG contains significantquantities of 2-butene then the eppqriate apparatus group is

A fuller tist of materials and equipment sub-pups may ignition temperature of the gases and vapour to which it
be found in IEC 60079-0. may become exposed,
This is achieved by considemion of the following
(d) As !he e u p i u g bgomes more severe in going two factors:
&om ILA to 103 to LIC, subgroup B apparatus may
bc used in place of sub-group A apparatus and sub- 7-7.1 Themadmumsurfacetemperature rntingof
group C can be used in place of apparatus for both the apparatus

apparaIus,which wouldbeabletopduce an ignitionof

7.7 TEMPERATURE CLASS A M ) GAS the sunounding atmosphere'.
IGNlTION TEMPERATURE Note: The most adverse conditions include
recognised overloads and any fault c o n d i m s
SinceWkgarorvapourcanbeignitalbycoutact mgnised in the specific standard for me type of
with a hot surface,for all type.of protection appambs it proteetion.
is necessary to specify an appropriate Tanperablre 0 The test resuits are corrected to allow for a
class, such that the maximum accessible surface maximum ambient tempsahtre of40nC. Equipment that
temperature intemaily or externally will not exceed the may be w s e d to surmundingtempanbcesabove this


special consideration The tests measure the 7.7.3 Selection of T class

m i m n m surface temperature of any unprotected
internal or external surface (i.e. casing) due to self- Table 7.3 lists the appropriate T class of equipment for
heating from eiechical energy within the apparatus. common petroleum products.
Fmm such testin& the testing authority will assign
the apparatus to one of the six recognized international Notes:
Temperatnre class ratings TI to T6 in accordance with (a) Apparatus having a Lower maximum surface
IEC 60079- 14and BS EN 50014. ThesesixT classes are temperature, i.e. higher temperature class may he
shown in Table 7.3. used in place of that having a higher maximum
surfice temperature (lower T class), but not
7.72 The ignition temperature of the gas or conversely.
(b) As with apparatus sub-pup the effects of both
Ignition temperatures are measured in a standard intanalandextemal releaseshould beconsideredin
apparatus, and results are tabulated for many materials. the selection of temperature class. The temperature
Apparahls is then simply selected by matching the classes indicated in Table 7.2 relate to the exteaat
ignition temperature Lo lhe temperablre class of the hazards. Apparatus with an internal and possibly
equipment Very small h d surfaces do not ignite gases different release may require a different T class, in
and lEC 60079-0 and BS EN 50014 allow a relaxation which case the more severe of the two should be
of the temperature limits for equipment with a surface seleaed See also Annex F.
area of less than 10 sq cm. Note that the relaxation is
25 OC for temperatures T4 to T6 and 50 OC ForTl to T3 (c) An ambient temperature other than 40 OC may also
classes. The margins for small components used in i be adopted as in the case ofcold climate conditions
circuits arc given in lEC 6W79-11. as encountered in lhe Arctic or northernNoah Sea,
Note: Ignition temperature, formerly iknown as the for which Wrewise this procedure will apply.
'auto- or spontaneous ignition temperature' is not the
same as the flash point of the material (see section (d) Ignition temperames are not inherent properties of
82.6.1). It is the temperatureatwhich, whenmixed with a substance, but depend also on the method o f t g t
air at normal pressure and as a consequence of chemical The selection of apparatus based on Tables 7.2 and
readions initiated on acuulnt solely of t e m p e m , the 7.3 is conservativeand no additional safety fador is
substance will ignite and bum m the absence of any needed.
initiating source ofspark or flame.
A tablegivingthedetermined ignition temperatures (e) When mixtures of substances can bc released the
of a large number of gases and vapours may be found in most restrictive temperature class should bc
IEC 60079-20. specified (see section 25).

(f) For ignition temperalllres of mists, see Amex k .

Table 7.3 Relationship between temperature cfass
and maxhumsurfacetemperatureoftheapparatus*
Maximum surface,
Temperature class Other non-electrical factors specified in the selection of
temperahire ("Q
the electrical apparatus are measures required to be
TI I 450
applied to the enclosure to provide a chosen degree of
protection to:

(a) Pasonsagainst contact with intcmnl liveorrotating

parts inside the enclosure, and to the apparahrs
against ingress of solid objects, dusts, etc.
* In accordance with IEC 60079-0. The assumed
@) l%e apparatus against the in- of water, spray,
maximum ambient temperahue related to me above
values is 40% If required to be designed for odm jeg heavy seas and even total immersion
indicated 00 the appararus &g (see 7.1 1) Fuller.details on the degrees. of protection and their . .

ciassification are provided in IP ElecbicnIsafe@ code. 7-11MARKING OF APPARATUS

The various standards for equipment spec@ markin

7.9 OTKER REQUIREMENTS requirements in considerable detail. Equipment shod
be installed so its marking plate on beseen The ATE
All elechical apparatus should be installed, used and Directive 9419IEC extends the marking requirement
maintained for use within their e l e m d ratings for making it a legal requirement for new expiosia
power, voltage, currenf frequency, etc., and such other protectedeqnipmentmbemarkedwitht h e m e tE
general, e.g. earthing, factors that might affect the safety symbol of explosion protection, @, the year c
ofthe installationM c a l protection standards@st construction,themanufacturer's name and other detail
such factors asoverload or overcurrent are outside the Individualtesting laboratories also specify ma& t
scope of &is Code, or of hazardous area classification. show where equipment has been catified.
Other publications of a requisite general nanne and aU
s t a m requirements should be followed, such as
IEC 60364, BS 7671 in Me UK (commonly known as 7.12 INSTALLATION
the IEE wiring regulations), the Elechi@ at Work
Reguloions 1989 and the associated memorandum of To achieve the intended level of safety, explosio~
guidance., where they apply. protected equipment needs to be i6sta!kd c o w
lustallation practices are given in IEC 60079-14. Thm
involved in this work need to be trained in the specif
requirements for @pment made to the differel
protection concepts. The requirements for inbinsicall
To help future maintenance, and to help demonstratethat safe circnii are particularly detailed and important.
the ignition hazards have been properly addressed, an
inventory of equipment installed in a hazardous nrea
should be maintained. This will include the type of
proteaion, tempemme class, and where relevant the APPARATUS AND CABLES FROM
subgroup of the apparatus as well as its focation. PWSICAL DAMAGE
The hazardous area classification documentation
should also include detaiIs of the prop- of Protected electrical equipment is designed to be robu
flammablefluids expected to bepresent in different parts enough to withstand o o d industrial condition
of the instaltation Relevant details include: the boiling without failing in a way that would create a spar:
point, or vapour pressure at ambient temperatures; IEC 60079-0 specifies impact and mechanical streng
ienition ternmature; flash point flammable limits and tests forequipmeat. There are also tests for resistauce I
some che&i&, but these cannot cover all the possib
reIative density of the gas or vapour.
AU the above selection advice applies to typical types of corrosive chemicals that may be present in r
atmospheric conditions including normal variations in industrial installation.
taapewbss and pressure. Where these cannot be Despite these requirements, installers sboufd mi
assumed, or where a raised oxygen emtent is possible, care to locate equipment and cablmg where it is n.
specialist advice should be sought vulnerable to obvious damage, e.g. careless movenm
Some types of protected apparatus, pahcularly of a vehicle or the operation of a mne.
analytical equipment, umiain flammable fluids within In particular cables sbould be provided wii
the enclosure, and may have the potential for an internal adequate protection, and be adequately suppoitf
unintended source of release. This should have been throughout theirlength.e.g. on suppotis or cable trays I
considered when the equipment was certified. Once through protective troughs or tubes, and be protectf
equipment scleaion has been futalised. the hazardous against corrosive fluids or organic chemicals that am.
area classification should be recheckmi, in case the weakmplasticshothing Thevulnerabilityofcablem
intanal m c e of release can locally affect the zoning to fire should also be considered
around the equipment

7.14 MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION need to be taken to ensure that the. apparatus, or any
apparatus associated with it, is not opened until the
m e lie outside the scope of hazardous area rotating plant is stationary. Most power capacitoIS are
and of this Code, and detailed advice is fiWwith dischargeresistors and it shouldbe wted that
contained in the IF' EIecirical suf* code and these take a finite time to bring the terminal voilage to a
EC fjOO79-17. Requirements vary according to the hamlless value.
type of pmteciica selected. The following,
however, should be stressed.
(a) All electrical circuits should be provided with an TRANSPORTABLE ELECTFUCAL
effective means ofisolation Where equipmentmay APPARATUS AND lTS CONNECTIONS
be located in h+ousareas it is importantthatthe
neutral is also isolated. It is equally important that (a) Some types ofpottable equipment are des~gnedand
these are provided with adequatelabelimgto ensure consttucted to explosi~tpmtedcd standards.
foolproofandrapididentification.A master isolator Generally it will not be suitable for all zones and
w isolators may be pmvided that will pamit large every possible type of explosive aimosphere. It is
areas of plant to be disconnected in the event of generally advised that equipment should be suitable
severe emergency. for use in Zwt 1, as the boundary behueen Zone 1
and 2 is usually not evident on an aduaf plant The
@) The inspection, testing, maintenance, repiacement boundaty of Zme 0 is usually easier to define, and
and repair of cettified equipment should be h & n s should then make clear whether a
entrusted only to persons qualified in the special partiwlar item of equipment is suitable for use in
techiques involved. Zone 0. For example instructions with a protected
torch may staic 'do not use inside storagetanks and
(c) For appat-atus other thao type of proteaion 'i' and process vessels (Zone 0)'.
for low-power non-incendive apparatus t y p N,no If flammable materials requiring qupment to
apparatus should be opened in a hazardous area sub gmnps IIB or UC are pmcnt, to avoid
nntii it bas been isolated from its source of supply confusion,wherepossiblepoaabIeapparatusshouId
and e f f e h e measures, such as the locking of the be built to the most onerous requirement
isolating switch in the opcn position or fuse Alternatively, instructions should ens= that
removal, have been taken to prevent its being made equipment certified to IIA standards is not used
live before reassembly. See Eleciricip ui Work inappropriately. For example, instiuaions with a
Regulations. regulations 14 and 16. LIA torch might say 'do not use on the hydrogen
(d) No flameproof apparatus should be serviced in a
Zone 1areauntil it has been isolated from its source @) Account should be taken of the e l h c shock risk
of p w e r and stringent measures have been taken to with mains supplied portable or tmnsportablc
prevent it being rculmected before it is apparaius, which may require double insolation,
reassembled earth leakage protection, eic.

When, for the purpose of electrical testjng, it is (c) Plugs and sockets to be used in a hazardous area
essential to reconnect to the source ofpower before during normal operationshouldbk ceiritiedasbeing
the apparatus is reassembled, the substance giving suitable for use in the paaicnlar zone and should
rise to the risk should be removed and appropriate have mechanical and/or e l h c a l interlocking to
tests made by a gas detedw at suEcient intcrvak prevent danger during insertion or removal of the
while the app- is live in a partially dismantled plug-
condition See Electniiity UI Work Regulkzionr,
regulations 14 and 16. P o ~ l equipment
e is often exposed to:

Particular attention should be paid in the case of (a) increasedriskofmechanicatdamage;

apparaius that may be live even after it has been (b) the effects of the weather, nahlral hazards.
disconnected 5om a s ~ l n ofe supply. Where haw temperature or pressure;
rotating machinery is involved, the back em-f. of such (c) the effects of wet, dirty, dusty or corrosive
plant should be considered and precautions will usually conditions, as well as potentially explosive
atmospheres. Regular maintenance is particularly 7.17 BATTERY ROOMS
A battery room contab electrical cells or batteris
Mobile apparatus includes both electricallypropelled or which may be on charge or discharge. Most types of
electrically powered apparatus and also mobile batteries will create spa& or overheat to a dangerous
equipment which itself generates electricity. In the latter degree if the terminals are shorted out It is not possible
case due regard must be paid to the mode of use and type to build powpxful bbaaeries to prevent this risk
of protection adopted for the primary power source as Lead acid batteries unit hydrogen during charging,
well as for the electrical genexator. and can cream a hazardous area above banks of cells.
Battery rooms should be adequai4y ventilated in order
(d) If standard industrial portable w transpoltable to assist in the &ispasion of the hydmgea This may
apparatus is to be used ina hazardous area, itshould entail the use of artificialventilation
only be used under the clearly prescribed and Electrical apparatusthus may need to besuitable for
closely controlled conditions, including a gasfree use in Zone I hazardous areas with apparatus of sub-
check, outlined in Chapter 8. group IIC TI class suitability for hydrogen as in
Table 7.2 unless there is dilution by LEV, as provided
for in Chapter 6.
7.16 PERSONAL APPARATUS Further guidancc is given in BS 6132, B$ 6133,
IEC 60896 and 1EC 60623.Similar precautions should
Hsnd torches and mobile telephotm are wamplcs of be applied to non-open buildings etc where electrical
personal apparatus that should not he taken into a vehicles are recharged
hazardous area unless they are built m an appropriate
standard o r a gds-6ee certificatehas been issued for the
periodofuse. Someuncertified apparatus suchas battery 7.18 CATHODIC PROTECTION, EARTKTNG
openled watches 'md hearing aids may be appmved by AND BONDING
the facility rhanagement due to the very low power
requirement since the main risk is tbe shortingof battery Guidance is g i m in the IP Elechhdsafeery cade.

. .

8.1 INTRODUCTION temperature class and other derails to show where i t ~ a n

. .
he used safely.
The wncept of hazardous area classification was An alternative method i f control is the use of gas
originally developed for the selection and location of detectors. These may be potiable, and used 'when
fixedelectricalequipmentforusenearflammahle fluids. maintenance work creating a risk of ignition has to
However, it is not only incorrectly-selected electrical carded out in an area m d l y classified as hszardous
equipment thatcan bea source ofignition butalso items Fixed gas detection .cystems are sometimes used where
suchas naked flames in directly-firedfumaces, vehicles, it is more practical to shut a system dawnin the event of
hot surfaces on wmpressors or any equipment which a gas leak, than to fit ignition-pmcectad e q u i p m o f an
may cause friction sparks. AU souncs of ignition need appropriate standard These alternatives are considered
to be controlled where flammable atmospheres may below.
fom~,and hazardons area classificatiou is a gwd basis
for deciding what equipment may be used at any
particutar location. 8.2 SOURCES OF IGNITION
While the principal objective of this Code remains
the class'ication of areas for the selection of the Non-electrical equipment may create an ignition risk if
appropriate type of protection for electrical apparatus, parts become hot in n o d operation or as a resuit of
this chap& provides additional guidance for the use of mechanical failure, such as a iXed bearing. The hot
the hazardous area classification approach to aid the surface may be inside equipment or outside. Faulty
locatiouandcootmlofnon-electricalsourcesofignition. mechanical equipment may cause showers of hot metal
This is in accordance with the ATEX Diiectives, which sparks to he thrown &om ~ b b i n gsurfaces, or a few
apply equally to electricaland non-electrical equipment sparks from single impacts. Both types of fault createan
capable of causing an ignition of a flammable ignitionrisk
atmosphere.The tenn'contml should, in this context, be Most cqnipmentdesigned for controlledcombustion
regarded as extending to the training of personnel for is inevitably hot, and hazardous area ctassification
safe working in such areas, including work permit cannotbesensiblyappliedcloheto it. Examples are fired
heaten, flares, gar t u r b i i and internal combustion
European standards are currently heiig written for engines. The approach should then be to minimise the
nonelectrical equipment for use iu flammable risk of leaks, and to ensure that any that do occur are
atmospheres drawing on the principtes adopted for quickIy diluted betow the 5mmahle range. Thc
electrical equipment New equipment that creates a particular precautions that apply to sfarting up fired
potmtial ignition hazard shouM nowbemarked with the heaten are covered in Annex G.
CE mark and @ mark an equipmcnt oiegory and Other potential ignition sources such as lightning,



static electricity and pyrophoric scale are not primarily distribution of the aidlow, it is possiblefw adangem
controlted by equipment selection and hazardous area accumulation of gas in one part of the room O I coex
cfassificatio% and are wnsidaed briefly in 82.8. with a very low gas concentration in the airflowleayi.
The location of fzed sounes of ignition should be the room A high air speed may a h reduce f
determined during plant layout work Note, a situation sensitivityof the detcdor.
where a fixed source of ignition is located just outside a
hazardous area leads to a much higher probabiity of 8.22 Flares
ignition than suitably classified equipmm located just
inside. It is good practice therefore to locate fuced Flares should be sited as far away as possible from
sources of ignition as Eu as practical oufside the hazardous area. In selecting the location the possibik
hazardous area that bummg liquid or hot carboo particles could i
ejected from the flare should be considered For deta&
8.2-1 Fired heaters and furnaces guidance on the design of flares,see AH RP 521.

Fired heaters and furnaces are a s w c e of ignition 8-23 Vehicles -road and rail traffic
because of the naked flame, and in some casescan also
have surfam hot enough to cause ignition. Open ports Normal vehicles contain many so- of ignitio~
on combustion chambers, in principle, create arisktbat including electricat circuits, hot paas on the en&
the flames h i d e the furnace could directly ignite a overheating brakes, andstaticdisd,arges.The impacta
flammable atmosphere on the m k i d e This is vehicles with process plant is also liable to create
parlicularfy likely if fluctuations in the fuel and aiz release of gas or liquid, and many accidents ha".
pressures cause Qames to emerge from the port it is occurred where a vehide bas both caused a leak ant
preferable to design furnaces to avoid tke need for ports ignited it. Therefore the coobul of vehicle movema
to be opened they are operating. around hazardous areas requires c o n s i d d o n .
Fired heaters, h a e m and other combustion Road tMi and rail locomotivesshould he regard@
&ipment should be located as far as is practicable as a source of ignition unless specially p m t d is
outside any hazardous area, preferably at the edge of accordance with 8.2.4. For mobile equipmentdriven
process blocks. There remains thc risk that fuel lines or diesel or elcL.tric engines, various methods of pmsection
process lines to and from the equipment may teak and have been devised for operation in Zone I or Zone 2.11
ignite on hot surfaces or eleclrical equipment Hot is not practical to build a spa& ignition engine suitable
surfaces associatad with fsed eqnipment cannot be for use in a haradous area Forthe design and operation
completely avoided and industry expimce suggests ofexpkvsion-protected lifttmcks, seeBS EN 18341and
that they are one ofthemost common causes ofignition 2. and BS EN 1755. lhereare also trucks 6tWlwith gas
offshore, though they can of course be minimised by detection systems that can automatically sbut down the
pmperlappingand insulationwhich isanywayaecessary vehicle, and when properly designed, these can achieve
for reducing energy losses. The risk o f ignition by the the same standard of safety. Where such equipment has
electrical equipment can be reduced by hazardous area no such protection, its inhvduction should be based on
ciassificafion around the potential leakage points in the work permit conbd, as for hot work.
fuel process lines. If the Iatter nm at rempaahues The use of mads within hazardous areas should
above auto ignition temperature of the process therefore be restricted. Thisshwldnormally beachieved
materiai, however, then harardous area classification by physicd bmriers, which are controlled by a person
may be judged to be unnecessary for than The responsible f o ~ p m ~ o n o f thazardous
he area but may
maintenance of flanges, valves and h e r potential be achieved by other meam, e.g. warning beacons.
sourcesof release in the immediate vicinity of the heater Special conkd must be exercised over mad tanker
should receive@~cularatlention. Following any work vehicles at Class I paroleurn loading and discharge
on fuel lines, so igr-asis practicable, lbey should be areas, and it should be ensured that unprotected mil
pressure tested before the fired equipment is re- locomotives, including conventional electric powered
commissiooed. units, do not enter beyond the permitted safe distance,
Flarmoablegasdet&torsaresometimesp~videain Recommended basic standards and practice for the
buildmgs containing gas fired heaters. If forced, operation of road and rail vehides is provided in IP
ventilation is also provided to the build% particuiar Design. cotashucfwn and operasion of distribution
care is needed when selecting the location for gas instdaiionr.
detec(wS, if they are lo detect all gas escapes prompa. Fire fighting and other emergency service vehicles
Depending on the location of the I&, and the of standard typeand design cau also present a source of
(g) Flammable gas or smoke detection equipment may
be used, either for aIam only or for a l m and

(b) Where posslbte, the air intake should be drawn iiam

outside any hazardous area, and the exhaust should
terminate outside the hazardous area. If this is not
possible, the precautions used on the inlet and
exhaust from vehicles should be used. See 82.3.
. ~

(i) Elearic stalters will usually be inappropriate, and

alfematives that create no ignition risk should be
used e.g. hand cranking, or a compressed air drivc.

(j) Water-cooling may be used on the exhaust

manifold, w other particularly hot parts.

(k) In the case of exhaust gas temperature wnbnl it

should be noted that air-cooled or turbcharged
diesels on have exhaud'temperatures higher than
watwc00Ied machines,and heat exchangeor fmed
coolers may be desirable on the exbanst manifold

(I)Ovdeating due to failure of cooling water nipply

or loss of lube oil pressure, and the provision of an
alarm a; in the case of a permanently installed
machine, an automatic shutdown device may be

(m) An effective spark arrestor on the exhaust system

(n) A quick closing valve in the air intake manifold

which can be used m stop the engine promptly in
case of emergency.
ca) No spark ignition engine should be installed or
operated in a hazardous area. Note: On some plants such engines and especially
diesels arc insfallcd to d i v e emergency power
@) Eagmes should be mounted above grade to prevent generatorsor firepumps. They are then required lo work
a c m u l a t i o n of flammable vapour. ina general emergency condition and should be located
as far as is reaonabiy practicable outside a hazardous
(c) Internal combustion engines should not be area. (For fire figbiing and other emergency service
permanently installed within tank compounds vehicles see 8.2.3.)
In the case of permanent, mobile or temporary
(d) If weather protection is required the shelter should equipment, it should be stnxed thattheeffcctiveneis of
preferably be open-sided. protective systems is dependent upon a high standard of
maintenance and inspection of the equipment by
(e) Emergency stop facilities should be installed both s EEMUA 107).
properly q u a l i f i e d p e ~ n (see
local to and remote from the engine. Road tanker vehicles are excluded fmm the above
( f ) Consideration should be given to the provision of a may cnterand load or unload atdistribution installations
separating vapow-tight wall between the engines are controlIed by the operational pmcedKes of IP
a d the driven equipment, containing sealed sleeves Design. coizsImcfion and opmorion of dirtributwn
t h g h which piston rods or shafts pass. instolloliom and equivalent codes (see also 82.3).
: .

AREACLASSIFICATIONWOE FORINSTALLATIONSHANOUNC FUMNABLE FLUIDS infernal combuslion enginerfor &uIing rigs often have many flexible connections and joints, mn at
When i n t e n d combustion engines are required to high pressures, and should be considered as pobtial
provide power for drilling/well servicing rigs, only sources of release. The engine surface temperatures are
diesel engines should be used in a hazardous axa The often well above the auto-ignition temperahue of the
followingprotectionandquickshutdownsystemsshould fuel, particularly for a m e n g i n e derived units.
be fitted to engines that areinstalled witbin areas ofa rig Hazardous area ciass~fcationis inappropriate in
which may become hazardous areas in the event of the circumstances and safety can only be achieved by a
accidental escape of hydrocarbons from the well bore: combinationof factors including adequatemaintenance,
suitable ventilation, gas detection sys[ems, andlor
(a) Flameproof electrical equipment and flameproof explcsion venting. Further lnfoonation is provided i n b e
electrical or non-electrical starter system HSE Confrol of safely risks at gar hrrbines used for
power generation.
(b) An effective spark arrestor on the exhaust system
8.2.5. I Fuel lypes
(c) A quick closing valve in the air intake manifold Gas Nrbines may be driven by liquid or gaseous fuels.
which can be used to stop thc engine promptly in Gaseous fuels are often suppliedat vety high pressures,
case of emergency. and any release from the fuel lines will emerge as a
supenonio jet, which will entrain Zir into itself
When used on rig draw works and hoists, diesel e n & s irrespective of any forced ventilation in the enclosure.
must be huther equipped with the following systemS to Liquid fuels are usually supplied at lowerpressutcs, but
provide exaa protection: may still be released as a stream which atomises itself,
o r which can spread a considerable distance before
(d) An effedive flame arrestor in the air intake impacting on the mmmdings and breaking up.
manifold. Forced venlilnrion
(e) A system for quick shut-off of fueL F o d ventilation is normally provided to control the
~. temperature of the unit A high flow rate does not
(9 Protection systems controk located so they are necessarily ensure effective mixing of the atmosphere
easily opewed from the driller's positionon therig. throughout an enclosure, and studies in some
installationshaveshown thatgas leaks can buildupuntil
(g) Exhaust ducts to discharge to a safe area a d a r r g e w volume of explosive mixture is formed
S i l y inmeasing the flow rate may not prevent this
(h) Antistatic and fxe-resistant driving belts with non- pmblun, and redesigning the ventilation inlets and
metallic fan blades on the cwling systems. outlets €vm the enclosure is more effective.
ComputationalFluid Dynamics (CFD) modeiling of the
(i) Automatic shutdown system in the event of engine airflows has been found helpful when designing new
overspeed. system. With exisling plant, on-site measurements
within the cnclmre are needed to assen the desiga If
8.2.5 Gas turbioe drives problems are evident CFD modelling may help in the
selection of methods to improve the air mixing.
Gas turbines are employed in many major inSaW%ons,
including offshore platform, as drives for lmrmps and Gas detection
compressors. Sometimes the gas turbii cau be Gas detection is important otherwise leaking systems
separated from the pmcess equipmentby agas-tight wall may goundetectedfw an extended p e r i d Careful siting
with a driveshaff seal, in which case it can be installed of the detector heads is essential. One head should be
outside any hazardous area created by proms plant it is sited in the ventilation outlet, but this alone may not be
driv'i ifit bas N l y open area ventilation and tbe seal adequate. A high ovabll airflow may dilute a modest
is well-maintained Any weather p r o t e c t i ~provided leak below the detedion limit, while allowing a gas
should comprise only a roof and partial walling. build-up in paas ofthe enclosuxe wheze the air change
Many gas twbiines are provided for el& power rates are less
generafion?hese are normally installed in an enclosed
area (the ' M i n e room or enclosure^, o h with an Clacsifi-on within the turbine e n d o w e
additional amst& enclosure that !as . a separate WhcK gas detection and well &gaed ventilation are
venfiiationsystem [neither case& fuel supply systems provided, protested elecuicai equipment selected on the

of harardous area classification is no longer the likely to be spilt on it to above the ignition temperature
ary means of ensuring safcty. Nevertheless, it is should not be located in a Zone 0 or Zone 1 area
ended as a secondary protective measure that the The ignition tempemhue or auto-ignition
e turbine enclosure is Zane 2 and eiectrical temperature (ACT) OF a substance is not an absolute
s chosen accordingly. If there is equipment property of that substance, but will depend upon Facba
fore thc ventilation is established, this such as:
"Id be certified for Zone 1 operation
- How near a vapourlair concentration is to the
.6 IIoC surfaces stoichiometric concentration.
- The temperature of surfaces in contact with the
chanical equipment may become hot under normal mixture.
ion, or under fault conditions e.g. excessive - The contact time between the mixhue and the
n behveen moving parts. If it is to be installed in surface.
dous area, this risk should be considered. The - Whether the surface is'active' or inert (see
t part of the equipment may be on the inside or - The area of the hotssurrace.
de. Appropriate selection of equipment depends
on the zone, and ignition temperature of the nuids Under open-air ventilation conditions it is generally
resent The latier is a particular concern as fluids hated m o n dificult to raise the temperalure of agas or vapour
above a specific temperature can ignite on mixing release to above the ignition temperature, with lhe result
ith air in the abscnce of any source of ignition. that N T s measured in small contined volume tests are
very wnsemtive in relationship to the maximum safe
2.6.1 Ignition temperatures ondfinrh poinu temperature of a hot surface in the open an.
ition temperatme are two entirely Nevertheless, it is good practice tn avoid very hot
properties of a substance. The tlash poiot of a surfaces, e.g. w ~ t han internal fluid tempexamre above
the minimum temperature at which it is deemed 650 "C, in process plant in hazardous areas even with
flammable atmosphere in air under open-air ventilation In areas with less ventilation it is
ewnditions ofthe testprocedure, in whicha small test easier for a hot surface to heat agas or vapour release to
is repeatedly Lowered to the liquid surface as its above the NT, and equipment surfaces should not
rature is raised until a flammable condition is first e x 4 the AIT of any likely release For conditions
served. Ignition does not occur a t thistlash point where a general exposure to a range of flammable
unless there is a source of ignition (see also Amex A). vapourand gases may be encountered, a limit of200 "C
If the sample is heated Further, atsomc point il wiil is recommended.
ignite without the application ofan external flame at the
ignition temperature. This may be considerably higher Cnrillylicallyucfiwsufuces -Auf~ignilionof
than the flash point The ignition mechanism involves oil impregnated maleriak
decomposition of the compound by heal to give active Surfacesthat arecatalytically active can ignitevapouror
radicals, which result in pmpagaiion and branching as liquid at temperatures lower than the normal ignition
these radiealsreact withmore molecules or withoxygen. temperawes referred lo above. Auto-ignition ofbitumen
The ignition tempsrature (ako referred to or heavy oils can occur at temperatures which,
synonymously as the autuignition temperature or depending upon grade, can be as low as 240 T; self-
spontaneous ignition tempmture) is the iowest heating leading to auto-ignition of porous or fibmus
temperature at which a flammable gds or vapour igniks materials impregnated withoils or bitumens canoccur at
under test conditions. These vary wiiicly even for icmpeia(ures as low as 100 "C. Oil and bitumen
hydmcxhons, from 5 3 7 . Tfor methane, downto 201 OC contamination of thermal insulating maierials and the
fordcrane. Valuerfortpicai flammable fluids aregiven accumulation of oily rags or similar material near hot
in IEC 60079-20. surfaces should therefore be avoided, especially in areas
ciassifed as hazardous. Conditions for do-ignition
Ignition from a hot surface can occur either when a gas- H i g h - p r e s s w e ~ b I e ~ ( ~oil
~ l&ge
air mixture comes in contact with the surface or when a HydranIicoiisystems canbeused fortransmimngpower
liquid leak falls onto that surface. Such leak; should be or motion, and inter o1ia ax so used on o&;hore
avoided Sources that could release a fluid above the platforms and drilling iigs. The fluids in these system
ignition temperatun (eg. a pump on hot oil duty) and are normally mineral oils having closed cup flash points
any equipment that could raise the tempnature of liquid in the range 150-250 OC and AITs in the range



315-425 *C. They are often used under very high create a flammable atmosphere, and the formation of
pressures (several hundred bar) and all hydraulic glowing coke deposits.
systems are prone to leak. Although the temperature of Guidance on static and the control of ignition
the oil in a correctlyoperating system is usually less than hazards may be found in 1P Guidelinesfor [he c o n h l of
65°C at the pump inlet, i.e. considerably lower than its hazards arisingfiom static electricity, BS 5958- 1and -2,
flash point, there is always a risk of fire if a leak occurs, and BS PD CLC/fR 50404.
due to atomisation of the o i l the reasons for some
ignitions being imperfectly understood (see HSE Thefie
and explosion hozarak of hydraulic accumuiators).
Where it is impossible to remove dl ignition The impact of a light metal (aluminium, titanium,
sources, the use of more 'fm-resistant' hydraulic fluids zirconium) object with a rusty surface may cause a
should be considered. Flexible hoses. should be used reaction known as the themite reaction. This produces
only where absolutely necessary and should be covered hot metal sparks that are particularly incendive.
in braiding. Kigid pipes with swivel joints should be Standards for eIectrical and non-ekcrrical equipment for
used instead of flexible pipes, wherever possible, use in hazardous areas place restrictions on the use of
adequately supported to protect against vibration and light metals on the outside of equipment to prevent this
mechanical damage. risk. For the same reason, the use of aluminium ladders
An automatic excess flow valve is desirable and a or scaffolding may create an ignition Gsk, and this
quick operating valve provided so that the flow of oil should be considered before they are used in a Zone I
can be stopped in the event of serious leakage or a fire. area.
Oil mist detectors may be usefbl in circumstances where
there is a high risk. 8.2-10 Radio frequency electromagnetic radiation

8.2.7 Gas detectors -inherent risks Radio-frequency electromagnetic radiation can be a

potential ignition source even at an appreciable distance
Some types of gas detedor wntain a hot element, on from the transmitting equipment. This radiation can
which controlled combustion of a flammable mixhtre induce electric currents in any metal structure on which
takes pJace. These are prevented from igniting a it impinges. Advice on whether specific equipment can
surrounding flammable atmosphere by flame traps on the cause a hazard is given in BS 6656. See also IP
inlet and outlet. BS EN 61779-4 and BS EN 61779-5 Recommendationfor radio tdephone equQment and its
describe requirements for instnunents for different ins~aNationin petroleum road tankers.
purposes. Not all instruments will be suitable where
hydmgen or acetylene may be present, and users should
check that any instrument provided is safe for use 8 3 USE OF GAS DE'mCTOKS IN
wherever it is used on the plant. HAZARDOUS AREAS

8.2.8 Electrostatic and pyropboric ignition 83.1 Use of gas detectors during maintenance
The use of gas detectors as a pre-condition to hot work
In process plant and tank vapour spaces likely to contain and as a check during the course of this activity is
pyrophoric deposits, special care is necessary to avoid essential. Flammable gas detectors may be calibratedfor
the simultaneous occurrence of flarnmabfe atmospheres a particular gas, o r mixture of gases and vapour, and
and the conditions necessary for self-heating of the may not accurately respond to other gases. They should
deposits. The grades of bitumen with which there is a be recalibrated if required to monitor for different gases
probability of these two circumstances becoming from those for which the calibration has been carried
coincident, witb the consequence of fire or explosion, out.
should be considered. IP Bitumen safe@ code provides The most commonly used portable gas detector is of
f U r k guidance on precautions against the formation of the catalytic filament type and the manufacturer should
pyrophoric scale in heated bitumen'tanks resulting from be consulted for information on their operation,
high temperature. Tanks may be self-inerting because of calibration and maintenance. W y t i c detectors can give
gradual oxidation of the bitumen, and accumulation of false results on an atmosphere that is oxygen deficient,
carbon dioxide, as well as flammable vapour formed either because inerf gas is present, or because the
from the bitumen. Operating procedures need to a s u r e flammable gas concentration is above the UFL. For this
that the intduction of fiesh air does not simultaneously reason instruments may be made to different standards.

4 describes instruments designed to - To safeguard automatic ventilation against &lure

100 % LFL, while BS EN 61779-5 and the development of unsafe flammable
ments designed for reading up to 100% concentrations in control rooms and similar
ere an inert gas may be present inside protected enclosures such as analyser houses,
ent designed to read up to 100%gas turbine hoods, etc.
the oxygen content of the vessel
- 'I'o provide automatic alarm and initiate shutdown
ffer 'poisoning' of the of process or other equipment.
a falsely low reading if
- To assist safe evacuation from such situations.

compounds, which form - Alerting of and triggering offire protection systems.

ial instruments should be
heres have to be tested, 8-3.2.1 Selection of locution and vtumber of such
or high-temperature sensors
gainst such poisoning is One, or a combination, of the folIowing two alternative
reference sample gas approaches may be used according to the cifcumstances:
ent recdibration
(a) Source detection, in which the sensors are located
adjacent to the likely sources of hazardws release.

(b) Perimeter detection, in which the detectors are .

tubes ares possible solution. located to surround the whole area or plant fiom
A11 certification is carried out for gas rnixtures with which the hazard may arise, i-e. adjacent to the
air only, and is not valid for oxygcn-rich atmospheres; possible sources of ignition.
specialist advice from the suppliers is necessary for such
a case. Method (a) is applicable for small enclosed situations,
The operator must be trained .in their use and the such as gas turbine enclosures and hoods (see 8 2 5 ) and
above limitations, and always follow the manufacturer's presswised control rooms (sections 6.5 and 6.6).Thus
instructions. Regular maintenance of the instrument is such non-hazardous areas within Zone 1 or 2 areas
necessary, and written records shouId be kept. The should be safeguarded by gas detectors at the inlets to
instrument itself may develop internal faults and regular the ventilation system- Enclo.sures with an internal gas
checks on its calibration are necessary. source such as gas turbine assernbties should have gas
Ilf any doubt arises from the response of the detection within the enclosure, preferably on the
instrument,the atmosphere undertest should be regarded ventilation outlet. Detection of gas within or at the inlet
as hazardous. . to an enclosed space should have an alarm and initiate
appropriate action such as shutdown of unprotected
8.3.2 Use of gas detectors for work otber than equipment
maintenance For detecfion of large gas accumulations in open
areas, source detection may provide an early warning of
Gas detectors may be an appropriate method of control a gas cloud in stilI air, but provides no warning if the
where the n o m l hazardous area classification is not wind is in an adverse direction. On the other hand,
adequate or as a means to activate additional safeguards. perimeter protection alone would have to be extensive if
Examples are: a delayed warning were not to result in a still air
situation. Thus a combination of (a) and @) is most
- The safeguarding of non-hazardous areas such as effective for large outdoor sites.
public places when unusual activities take place, The objective is to detect only large abnormal gas
such as the gas-freeing of tankage with the releases; the spacing can be proportionately Large. The
evolution of Iarge quantities of vapour, the basic principles thereforeare that gas detectors should be
tmasfer/off-loading of large volumes of very located as near as possible to gas leak sources rather than
volatile materials, and the carrying out of complex to sources of ignition, and close enough to each other to
hot work repairs, in locations in proximity to detect significant gas accumulation while being far
processes that cannot readily be shut down enough away h m known gadvapour sources of release
temporarily. such as pump glands, vaive stems etc., to avoid false

alantdshutdown initiation action. such equipment over the long-tern1 cycle o f operation
The positioning of serisors should also take into during which the dependability of it to perfonn ib
account whether the releases are likely to be lighter or expected function will IE crucial.
heavier than air, i.e. above or below the level of the The need for ensuring adequate resistance to the
release respectively. They should also be protected anticipated environmental stresses under which it will be
against physical damage and undue vibration. required to iirnction and the inherent limitations of ail
types of sensor as outlined above (together with the
8.33 Knfra-red and other interfering effects of certain gases, water vapour etc.)
must be taken into account in the scrupulous observance
Though more expensive, infix-red detectors are reliable of regular inspection and recheck with the reference test
and stable and can have a fast response, an important gas reconmended by the supplier.
requisite for gas detection systems required to initiate an Where this involves removal of the equipment and
alarm or shutdown of equipment In general thcy are the related section of plant cannot be shut down, care
unaffected by poisons and the presence of inert gases must be taken to provide a suitable replacement such as
and can measure gas concentratious up to 100%. The a tsanspo&able unit.
principle employed is dependentupon the comparison of Where onstream equipment cannot be accessed, the
the absorption of an inh-red beam by the gas being principle of multiple gas detection systems with
with that of a similar beam, or the same beam, coincidence voting may necessary. Arri example is
in a prescribed reference gas. Such sensors should be given in section 6.6.4.
used only for detection of gas mixtures for which they
have bcen calibrated, since other gases may be
undetected if their absorption band lies outside that of
the calibration band-width (see also below)-
Otlw types of gas detection include thernxil
conductivity sensors and semiconductor sensors, which Kfazardous area classification is primarily a means of
depend upan changes in the electrical conductivity of a determining what equipment may be used in a particular
semiconductor due to chemisorption at its snrface on location during norma1 operation. It is not intended to
contact with the gas. The former are suitable mostly at apply during repair or maintenance. Many installations
relatively high concentratioas, usually above the LFL, have s i t e rules which restrict maintenance operations in
and should not be used for measurement below the LFL a wider general area than the hazardous areas determin
except in the case of gd'ies such as hydrogen for which using this Code. This is necessary because maintenance
they are exceptionally sensitive. The semiconductor activities can release flammable fluids in quantities not
sensor type can be used for Ihc dete&on of gases in any considered as part of the hazardous area classification
concentmtiwr~,but is sensitive to inhibition by certain study, and because hot work can vaporise heavy
substances, on which manufacturer's guidanceshould be products, to form flammable atmospheres where none
given. would normally exist (see EISE Nor work). Note in
Note: N l three abovc types cannot be:relied uporr to particubr that gas-freeing of process plant by forced
discriminate between combustible and non-combustibtc ventilation can crea r clouds that spread Ear
gases - or beween gases and water vapour or producfs beyond the normal zone. Within the wider
of combustion - except where these are predeteminsd restricted area, tec h as work permits, and
Water removal conditioning is desirable. gas-free testing will often be needed, and local site rules
should Iw: followed. Xn particular, it is essential
before heat is applied to the outside of process plant,
regardless of the mne, full precautions including
'The reliabiliq of a detection system b only as good as effective isolation, removal of residual product and gas-
its installation, s u b s q u e ~maintenanm m d regular free checks are carried out- When hot work is to
and test chwk routine. undertaken in a ka
thal, whereas portable classificaiion should
apparatus IS in frequent use and lends The conditions and supervision that ar
intenance and calibration, irt the case of a should, infer ulia, include die following u
fixed derection sensor it may go for Xongpeniods wi permit:
e n m n k r i n g a positive atmasphere by which it wi
activated. (a) Reduce temporarily for the duration of the aclivity
~ g reliability of
ses the problem of e r m r i ~ the the extent of the hazardous areas and zones in the

vicinity by arrangements, which eliminate primary Preparation for work under permit will l~oweverneed to
grade t.eleases and detect rapidly and reliably any consider inferali' bI&ing or spading ofl'connections
secondary grade releases. to ensure positive isolation, elechical drsconnection, gas-
freeing, and arrangements for continuous checks to
(6) Avoid any unnecessary sources of ignition and my ensure that heat generated as a result of the work itself
transmission of fire or sparks from the work into thc d m not prodrrce localised vaporisation of residues on
adjoining harardous areas. walls etc, with a risk of explosion.
Xn respect oflot work tci be carried out on or around
(c) Stop the wo& ifparticular releascs are detccted that b&s and their vents and other openings, atiention
may aftect the area of the work should be drawn to section 3.1.4. This states that where
healed products that contain residual kactions, such as
It is not the place of this Code to deal with the details of fuel oils and bitumens, are srored in confined situations,
work permit control for which fiirthcr deta~lsmay be such as tankage with an ullage space with open vents,
hund elscwherc (e.g. B E Guidance otzperrnit-fa-work the flash point as sampled of the bulk liquid is no
systems, HSE Scge isolation ofplant uPld c?quipmc?rzf,IP indicator of the presence or absence of a
Design, consfruction and operation oj' ci~sfribution ilammablelexplosiveatmosphere in the head space. This
rnstaffations, APEAJIP D e s i p , construc2ion, can only be ascertained by gas testing checks prior to the
rnodi/cation, mainiennnce and decommirsioning of iuitiatiori and in the cxJursc of hot work.
Jilfitzg.slationsar~dIP Roadlank vehicle workvhop code).


A1 J

The 1P c h s e s of petroleum conform to the most It should, however, be m g n i s e d that there is an

frequently used flash point divisions in European upper temperature limit, though unlikely to be
Directivesand UKReguhtions, and with the subdivision encountered, in the Class I, 1&2)and UI(2) ~Iassification
of Classes I1 and Dir have been standardised by the applications in Chapter 3, above which they should not
Energy Institute in its various 1P publications to govern be extended; this upper Iirnit is the temperatureat which
the handling of petroleum materials throughout the the liquid would boil.
sectors of bulk storage, loading, conveyance, discharge
and distribution (see TabIe Al).

Table dkl Petroleum Classes

Class 0 Liquefied petroleum gases (LPG)

Class 1 Liquids that have flash points below 2 1OC
Class II(1) Liquids tkat have flash points from 21°C up to and inchding 55OC, handled below flash point
Liquids that have flash points from 2I0C up to and including 5SUC,handled at or above flash
Class U(2)
Liquids that have flash points above 55°C up to and including 100°C, handled below flash
Class III(L)
Liquids that have flash points above 55°C up to and including 100UC,handled at or above
flash mint

Liquids that have flash points above 100°C

Typical examples of petroleum fluids are shown in Table A2.

! .


'Table A2 Typical commoiliy encountered petroleum n~aterials

etroleum Class
and Dash poi~rt ypical examples
--- -
Propane - 42
I,PGs, ethylene, propylenes Not applicable 1 Butane -1
Gasoline (petrol) ca. 20-205
Stabilised crude oil
Avtage wide cut jet fuel (JP4;
jet B)
Naphtha -2 to 10
Methanol - 11 -
Avtur/Jet A/Turbo&eI 38 minimum
Kerosine (a) premium grade 43 minimum
(b) regular 38 minimum
Gas oilidistillate heating oil 55 +
Automotive diesel &el 55 Jr
Unclassified Atmosphere residues
>IO°C Heavy
- - fuel oils

addressed in the paper Presmrised atornkdon of high

$mh point liqui& - lmplicarions Jbr hcwmdous area
The defmitlon of flash point as given in the G1.0ssary classification,by P.J. B ~ w m and LC. Shirvill.
(Annex H) is taken as .the indicator of the lowest This p p e r concludes that pressure differentials o f
temperature at which, in the presence of air at only a few bars are sufficient to mrnise co~nrnonly
atmospheric pressure, a flammable liquid will give off a encountered liquids. Generation of mists created by the
suff~cientlyrich vapour for ignition to occur in the impact of liquid streams on a surface close to the point
presence ofa source of ignition. The difference between ofrelense also to be possible. However, it does
flash point and ignition temperature is explained in not make any recommndatiaas for the extents of
section flammable mists and sprays. Further research is needed.
The XP classification system, as in Al, aud its It does suggest that porous spray guards can be used
subdivision of Classes U and 111 according to whether around flanges and h o r n poteatid leakage points,
the condition of handling Is at a lernperamre cawing the material to coalesce back to a liquid below
above the flash poinL is in accord with the its flash point, rendering it n o u - i d o w . But this is
in IEC 60079-10 that an explosive gas only practicable in a few specialised applications, and
(vapour) atmosphere generally cannot mist i requires rigorous control ovec mainrc:nance activities to
point Is significtuttly abovc the relevant ensure that the
tcnaperat.1.lue of lfial;fluid However, where
released under pfessure which cannot be heated to within 5°C of its flash point
f l m & l e liquid can be can be regarded as non-hazarhus.
b l o w the flash point. To ctarify the position pending further r-esearcb,it is
There is little h o w l suggested that, where a fluid is more &an 5°C below its
mists and the appropriate flash poirrt, and mt atmospheric pressure or u
mas. Some oftbe issu
the f o d o n and the hazard of flammable mists are

it should be regard& as a category C fluid (see A2), Because of the greater variability in temperahrre
generating a ha~ardousarea appropriate to the type of Class II liquids should, however, be regarded as
equipment given in Chapter 5 of this Code, because of harardous, i.e. Class II(2), in processing areas and
the possibility of ntisl or spray formation from a small should be individualiy assessed in climatic regions other
hole or a flange leak. tlxm the UK (see section 3.1 -3).
In applying the IP flash point classification in When petroleum materials are to be stored or
Chapter 3, and in those cases where it is used with the handled that are in the Class 11(2) or 111(2) condition, or
procedure of Chapter 5, the two principles outlined are likely to be exposed to conditions of teqemture
above will takc effcct. above the flash point, the fdciiities should be classified
as laid down for Class I. It will be seen that this is the
A1.2 GIass 1 fluids procedure that has been applied in Chapter 3. For the
alternative cases the procedure oC tire point source
A Class I pclralet~rnsuch as gasoline, or agwoline type rrxethod of Chapter 5 is to be applied to facilities in the
component or a shbiiised crude oil, with an extremely Class I1(2) or XIZ(2) condition.
law flash point, will always produce a vapour in the
flarrrmable range in air even at temperatures f x below
the ambient Facilities handling Class 1 petroleum will
always require to be area classified. Petroleum materials having a Qastt po~rrtabavc 100 OC
cat), be given the subdivision accorded to Class III
kX,S oieurn and the petroleum and should be regarded as Glass W(2) when
handIed or above their flash points.
A distinction, however, should be made between
In the cascof materials whose flash point places them in dktiliaks in this unclassified range and products such a5
Class 11 or 111 these will oRen be stored or handled at bitumens. When such materials are s u r d in heated
temperatures below the flash point - i.e. at temperatures fixed roof tankage (wherein the ullage space is
which give rise lo insufficient vapour for ignition. essentlatly unventilated), the flash point as sampled or
When a Class I[ or Ill pfoduct cannot be raised to recorded will not be indicative of the presence or
absence of a flatnrmble ahnosphere that may have
the flash point (i.e. Class IT(1.) or III(l)), nor its releasc
be in the form of a flammable mist or spcay, then for the accumulated in the ullage space. In common with tlze
purposes of ltazardous area classification such a Liquid ullage space of tixed roof truiks or road or rail fank
m y be considered not to give rise to a h m d o u s a m , vehicles c o n t a i n i all classes of pt~oleum,the ullage
SQ that hazard zoning i s not necessary firr the space sltould be cliassified Zone 0, with a 1,5 rn Z ~ n Ie
surrounding plant. I-Iowever, where a materiai is held surrounding vents andother roof openings (see note 2 to
under pressure and there is a poss1bi1it-yof mist or spray Figure 3. I).
Eonnation on release, that material tnay produce a It should also be recognised in h d
flammable atmosphere regardless of the storage petroleum of high flash p i n t that a1 h point
conditions and Bashpoint. In such, circumstances, and AIT are different characteristics, at very high
therefore, those materials class~fiedas Class II(1) or temperatures dre effcts can converge, i.e. axe high
iIT(1) (is. non-halardaus) should be classed rrs Ir(2) or tcmpratures, for example, of a hot surface can create a
111(2) respectively. h m a b l e condition locally which may be ignited by
111 such a casc it must be confirmed that the liquid auto-ignition by that hot suxhce, as well as by an
rnperahire cannot be raised by any means in the event
of release, e.g. by corrtact witha hot surface or proxirniky
to an adjacent non-electrical source of ignition (see
Chapter 8).
As a typicat example, within the UK mainIanrf a g level. For these
maximum ambient temperature of JO°C ctrn be assumed,
while typicaliy ofi'shore in the N o h Sea a maximun~
wouldbe 24OC. Aviation fuels of the kerosine type (flash class) for use with the point source classification
point 38OC minimum) may therefore, under these 5 should be applied and the
conditions, be classed as non-hazardous when stored ory A, B, C or C (gas) selected
away fxom processing areas and hat lines and vessels. (see below).

A2 RELArrONSXmP BETWEEN PET]ROLEUIW[ A2.1 Simple relationship between petroleum class

CLASS AND FLUfD CATEGORY and fluid category

Where flammablefluids are handledunder more e m m e For simple situations Table A3 may be used to convert
conditions of temperature, pressure, composition and classification to fluid category.
volatility, the simple classification by means of the . It will be noted that the degree of vaporisation that
above IP system for petroleum fluids is inadequate and will occur on release to atmosphere reduces in going
the concept of 'fluid category' bas been introduced (see from category A to category C, i.e. category C is Ieast
section 1.6.7). This enables the determination of volatile.
hazardous areas by use ofthe point source (Chapter 5) or From the definitionsit will be clear that forthe same
risk-based (Chapter 5 and Amex C) approaches. . flammable fluid, at various stages of its processing or
handling, there can be a different fluid category
depending upon temperature and pressure at the specific
points of release. Each situation at a point of reicase
should be separately evaluated.

Table A3 Relationship betweea 1P petroleum Class and fluid category

IP petroleum Class, based (except for LPG) on closed cup

flash points I Fiuld category

above flash
Handled Can be
below boilin!
point and
cannot be

I point point mist

released as

Note I Not applicable (MA) because liquids not handled above their flash point cannot be above thejr boiling point
Note 2 Cryogenic fluids need special consideratioo.
Hydrogen and hydrogen-containing streams occur energy andquenching disfumesforC H f 1 2undC,H$H,
widely in refin&es and chemical plants e.g. in mixlures with air. This work was commissioned to
platformers, hydrotreaters, refinery fitel gas, synthesis determine at what hydrogen content a gas mixture'
gas units (which produce a mixture of hydrogen and containing hydrogen should be designated as hydrogen.
carbon monoxide). Hydrogen may also be present in This work has shown that mixtures containing hydrogen
battery rooms and analyser houses- Such situations in excess of 30 % volume should be regarded as
present special problems for hazardous area hydrogen.
classificationand electrical equipment selection because Annex C Part 3 gives the composition used to
of their gas group categorisation a$ KC,related to the represent a typical refinery hydrogen stream (i.e. G(ii))
very low ignition energy of hydrogen. together with hazard radii over a range of process
Further guidance on mixtures containing hydtogen conditions.
is given in IP Predictions of minimum spark ignition
, .


Part 2: Describes the background to the risk-based
approach and how risk tolerability criteria art
Secondary grade releases am accidental in nature and related to release frequency LEVELS and
therefore the extent of the flammable atmosphere will corresponding release hole sizes.
vary depending on the size ofthe leak. Where leak ratcs
are unknown, this Annex provides a procedure for Part 3: Presents the background to the dculation of
determining an appropriate leak Me. This Annex is split hazard radii for given release rates used in
into Ibrex: partr;: Chapter 5 and is based on IP Chlculations in
sqport of IPIS.
Part 1: Describes tfic procedure for determining
appropriate release frequency %EVE%' to be
used in conjunction with section 5.4 and is
based on IP A ri~k-bused approach to
hazardous area classificafion.


- Plot plan (Exp) within process
area using Table C2.

Values within LEVEL

U s e LfWZL 1 hazard

-- Determine hazard radii using Fgm 5.2, Chap& 5.

Figure C1 Risk-based procedure for calculation of bazard radii for secondary grade releases
for seeonclary grade refeascs.
This Code sugests three LEVELS of release
frequency (LEVELS I, 11 and EX) which are based on
A secondary grade release, as defined in section 1.6.4, is achieving an overall value of individual risk of less than
one which would not be anticipated to occur during I ,OE-5/yr. Hence, as the combination of occupncy and
n o m f o w t i o n . Examples include failure of pump/ the probability of ignition inc~ases,the corresponding
compressor seals, leaks &om corrosion holes and release frequency LEVEL will increase, which will
tlangcs, or operational error. result in larger failure sccnarios.
Since for these situations the release rate may Note that frequency LEVEL is inverse to release
an unknown, unspecified and variable quantity, a Er~quency:LEVEL 1 is highest frequency (1,052) and
methodology is proposed to detcnnine the bole size to be LEVEL 3 i s lowest frequency (I,OE-4).
used for svch a secondary grade release. l l i s Figure CX describes the procedure for determining
methodology is described in P A Risk-based approach the appropriaterelease frequency LEVEL (I, II or XU) to
to h u m d m a r m clnssz~rationand i s based on a be rlsed when dekimining h a m d radii iar section 5.4.
concept of 'release frequency LEVEL'. The objective of For the purpose of this Code, tlxe relase Grequency
CIlc methoclology is to ensure the 'individual risk" (IIi) to LEVEL is based on personnel risk only. The
the most exposed worker on the plant does not exceed metlodology does rlot preclude any company including
1,OE-Yyr. other risk criteria or including other aspects e.g. business
Eili.storiw1 failure d a b e.g. Cox, Lees and Ang or economic risk. For further details see C2.2. It should
CIa~r.r$ccrtionof hmurdous areas indicate that, for a be noted that even when the occupancy of an area is
given item of equipment, small release holes occur more 7~x0,the user will still be directed to release
freque~ltlythan larger release holes. a minimum requirement.
These dafa have h e n assessed to determine the hole general i n h t to assign
size that correspor~dsto a particular release fi-equency Enstallation as a whok rather tha
LEVEL for each type of equipment considered (see individual point source.
Table CG).
The release fi-equency LEVEL to be used on a
specific piant is based on the exposure of the most
exposed individual to flammable reteascs and the
probability of ignition of those releases. The release Workers within Zone 2 hazardous areas are exposed to
frequency LEVEL is then used to determine hole s i x s xnulbiple sources of release. In order to take multiple

sowces into account a parameter called Exposure (Exp) C1.2.2 Calculation of number of secondary grade !

is used as follows: release sources within range (N


Exp = P*, NrW Plant workers will be exposed to a wide variety of

where potential secondary grade release sources depending on
P, Probability the worker is on site within the the type of plant and their working schedule. At one
hazardous area. extreme there may be workers who spend very short
N The time weighted average number of release periods of time near hazardous release sources (e.g.
sources which can affect the individual during engineering/planning/1aboratory staff who make
their time within the hazardous area. occasional visits to process units) and at the other
extreme there will be workers permanently stationed
These parameters are described as follows: within the hazard ranges of multiple r e i e a s e s o m (e.g.
workers in an LPG bottling plant., or compressor house).
C1.2.1 Probability of occupancy (P,J To take account of these situations it is necessary to
calcuIate the average number of release sources which
P, is calculated by estimating the proportion of time the could affect the individual (taken as the average number
individual spends on site exposed to at least one of Zone 2 radii which the individual is within:during
potential telease source (i.e. within a hazardous area). their time in the hazardous area). 'The following values
This is simply thenumber of hoursthe individual spends for the average number of release sources are proposed
in the hazardous area per year divided by the number of for variousprocess plants activities based on observation
hours in a year. A rnaximum number of working hours of typical onshore process units. For operators who
of 1920 hdyr (i.e. 40 hours * 48 weeks) is taken This spend all of their working time in a single location (e.g.
conrespnds to a maximum P,, oP0,22 i.e. 1920/8760. d r i l h g operators) an exact count of the number of
release sources may be made. Table C1 presents
Four values of P, are selected f o ~ Z o n e2: suggested values-for .'
average number of release s o u ~ ~ s I" C.
-- 100 % oKZSme ori an s h i h in a-himdous-am- Gitbin range.-=- -*.-- ' '
- = 0,22)
- An average of approximately five hrlday in a Ct.2.3 Calculation of Expvsure (Exp)
hazardous area P
(, = 0.13)
- An avemge of two hr/day in a hazardous awt Table C2 gives various input values of,P and,
,N for
(P, = 0,055) determining exposure in the expression:
- An average of one hr/day in a hazardous area
P(, = 0,028) Exp = P*, N,,,
These vaiues are presented in Table C2

Table C1 Avaage number of release sources in range

General patrol in 'open' plant

General patrol in 'congested'


tnspection of areas with many

release sources


Table C3 Probability of ignition (P+) for varying sources of ignition strengths

1 Probability of ignition
given release
Where control of sources of ignition extends beyond Zone 2
(e.g. on offshore facilities where ignition sources are linked to
fire and gas detection systems).

C 1 3 PROBABILITY OF IGNITION ( P d AT therefore, be taken as 0,01 (ignitiondrelease into a

THE UlNE 2 OUTER BOUNDARY Zone 2 a m ) . E&P Forum Hydroarbon ,I@k and
ignition database contains a similar ignition model for
Sources of ignition are controUcd within Zone 2 releases on offshore platforms.
ha~ardonsareas. However on the Zone 2funclassified Outside hazardous areas there is no control over
boundary it is acceptable to locate any sources of sources of ignition and continuous sources of ignition
ignition. may be present at the Zone 2 outer boundary. Where
The probability of ignition for a given releaserate is there is a strong and continuous source of ignition (e.g.
plotted graphicallyin Cox, Lees and Ang, Clussifkation flare, hot exhaust etc.) at a Zone 2 outer boundary, an
of hazardom areas, and contained in Annex B of IP A ignition probability of 1,O may be taken for the portion
risR-based approach io hazardous area classifcation. of the Zone 2 outer boundary which is adjacent to the
Releases with low release rates (i.e- less than 1 W s ) will source of ignition For less strong or intermittent sources
typically have dispersion distances within the of ignition a probability of ignition of 0,l is taken which
Zone 2 boundary and a probability of ignition given corresponds to the average ignition probability for
reIease of 0,01 is quoted in Cox, IRCS and Ang, mediudarge releases quoted in Cox, Lees and Ang,
Classi$cution of hazardous areas. The probability of CIass~~curion of hazardous areas. These values are
ignition (from all causes) given release in Zone 2 may, summarised in Table C3.

Table C4 Calculation of P

Percenbge of time worker spends in areas with following ignition sources at the plant* 1 1
I boundaw 1 . 1

0 100 1 0,003 _)
* Note, the 'plant is the potentid Zone 2 area
A m c - PART 1

For a given secondary grade reiease source, strong, LEVEL Frequency o f release per leak source-yr
medium and weak sources of ignition may be located on LEVEL I Greater than 1,OE-2 /release source-yr
the Zone 2 boundary. The appropriate value of Pi, to use LEVEL, II 1 ,OE-2 to 1,O%3 /release source-yr
in calcdating the individual risk (1R) of the most LEVEL 111 1,OE-3 to 1,OE-41release source-yr
exposed worker is a h c t i o n of the proportion of time
the worker spends in areas of various ignition source These release levels are plotted on Figure C2 against
strengths. If, for example, the most exposed worker various values of Exp and Pi,
spends 100% of time in areas of strong ignition (e.g. Figure C2 may therefore be used to select the
operating a fired heater) then a value of 1,O should be appropriaterelease f?equency (LEVEL I, iI or IU) to use
taken for Pi,. For situations where the work pattern is for a given Pi, at the Zone 2 boundary and a givai
relatively random within the process area, Pi, may be exposure (Exp) of an individual to secondary grade
calculated by estimating the proportion of the Zone 2 release sources.
boundary which contains controlled, weak, medium and
strong sourccs.of ignition. The following observations may be made about Figure
Typical cases are given in 'Table C4. C2:
The maximum value of Pip-is 1,O. However this - In general the release which &curs at a fkequency
would only be achieved if the Zone 2 hazardous area of LEVEL i (1,OE-Zrelease source-yr) may be used
were surrounded by strong continuous sources of to establish the Zone 2 boundary; however, if the
ignition. Values of Pi, which do not contain 'strong' exposure as defined in C 1.2 is high, a hquency of
and/or 'mediumk components are mainly applicable to LEVEL I1 (1 ,OE-3 /release source-yr) should be
offshore facilities. used.
- A frequency of LEVEL D(l,OE-3 frelea~esource-
yr) should also be used in situations where there is
average occupancy and a concentration of strong
ignition sources, giving a valueof pi, in excess of
As described in Annex C Part 2, releaqe frequencies are 0,1.
banded into three levels as follows (shown graphically - In the extreme case of high exposure and a
on Figure C2): concentration of stxong ignition sources, a
frequency of LEVEL, 111(1 ,OE-4/release source-yr)
should b u s e d . However it may be preferable to
carry out measures to reduce the risk.

Exposure (Exp.1 ID z M)
Frequency of release of 1
-- Freouenw of release of 1

Figure C2 Release frequency LEVEL to achieve IR criterion of 1,OE5 (or lower) given Pi, and Exp


in the UK, onfy individual risk (XU)has quoted
acceptability criteria. fXSE The tolerability of risk@orn
Part 2 provides extracts from IP A risk-bared approach nuclear power stations, suggests that "a risk of death of
lo hazardous area classificationas background to the around one in 1000 per m u m is the most that is
determination of release frequency LEVELS and hole ordinarily accepted by a substantial group of workers in
sizes for secondary grade releases quoted in Chapter 5. any industry in the UK and therefore it seems reasonable
to adopt this as the dividing line of what is just about
tolerable as a risk and what is una~~eptable". Fatalities
C2.1 SELECTION OF due to accidental ignited releases represent only one
lRXSK ACCEPTABILITY CIUTEREA contribution to IR and therefore the acceptability
criterion for this contributor should be set at a lower
In order to use a risk-based approach, the units in which level.
risk is measured and criteria deemed to he acceptable
must be established. The measures of risk contained in
Table CS were considered.

'Table CS Suggested risk criteria

Measure of risk (units) 1 Criteria 1

Numerical criteria available in the UK which could be

Societal risk
(Frequency of number of simultaneous No hard numerical criterion available in the UK.

Enviroruneutal risk
Fire risk ( f ~ e s h r . )

No criteria available.
As low as reasonably practicable (ALARI') principle



The XR for a typical (onshore) petrochemical plant (2.2 EFFECT OF INDIMDUAL, RISK
worker in the UK is of the order of I,0E-4fyrfyr (BMA CRITERION ON DlETERMDNING BOLE SEES
Living with risk) and is built up Erom a number of
contributions. The two principal categories are: This Code bases the hazard radii derived using the risk-
based approach on an indivicbal risk of 1,OE-5/yr as
- Major hazard risk from hydrocarbon processing justified in C2.1. Whilst there is no intention that this
activities. should be changed, it is not the purpose of this Code to
- Non-hydrocarbon processing related risk such as impose 1R criteria on individual companies. The use of
occupational risk (trips, falls etc.) and, especially a higher or lower level of IR impacts on the derived
for offshore workers, transportation risks (e.g. refease frequency LEWL and hence the actual s u e of
helicopter, 'ship etc.). the hazard radius.
For a given set of mitigating probabilities for
The major hazard hydrocarbon processing risk is ignition, occupancy and vulnerability of say 1,OE-2, at
generally due to release of hydrocarbons. The the standard KR of 1,OE-Yyr the event fi-eguency would
mechanisms of release fall into four categhes: be 1,OE-3/yr and therefore LEWEL U release sizes would
be used. However, if the IR was based on I,OEIUyf, for
Generic (leaks from pipework, vessels and 'point the same set of mitigating probabilities, ihe: event
sources' such as pumps, compressors, valves, frequency is increased to I ,OE-Uyr and hence LEVEL. I
flanges etc.)- release frequencies will be specified, giving smaller
-- Process specific events (sampling, draining etc.). hazard radii. If an 1R 1,OE-3/yrwas the chosen criteria,
- External events (extreme weather, seismic, the event frequency would be fbrthex reduced to
vehicle/ship/aircraft impact). 1,OE-llyr which, using historic data for release
- Escalation and knock on. fi-equencies would result in hole sizes even smaller than
those set at the 1,EVEL 1event fkquency, reducing still
The consequences of a hydrocarbon release will depend further the hazard radii.
on the process fluid, processing conditions and release
rate. Consequences which have the potential to cause a
Fatality include explodons, fires, toxic releases, missiles C23 IRELATIONSHW OF MDMDUAL RISK
This Code's zoning guidance for secondary grade
releases is intended to manage the risk associated with Individual risk (/yr) from a single ignited secondary
accidental ignition of hydrocarbon releases. Fatalities grade release source is defined as:
due to ignited releases component of one
category of major hazard hydrocarbon processing risk. IR*lrd (/release source-yr) =
To establish a robust criterion for this contniutor it is F,,-(/reIease source-yr)*P+*P,*V
proposed to sct the 1R acceptability level f w fktality due
to accidental ignited releases to 1W of the total 1R for Within a Zone 2 boundary, there will usual& be a
a typical onshore plant worker (i.e. 0,1x 1 , O M = 1,OE- multiplicity of release sources, so that as one moves
5/yr). further away from one particular release source otber
The value of 1,OE-S/yr compares well with work release sources will come within range. The fkquency
carried out by the HSE, (internal report, unpublished) of a flammable atmosphere within a Zone 2 area will
which calculates the actual Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) therefore vary fi-om location to Iocation within the
of O,56 fatalitiedl , O M exposure hours due to accidental Zone 2 depending on how many secondary grade release
ignition of flammable substances. This is equivalent to sources are within range of the individual. This effect is
an IR of 1,07E-5lyr. quantified by the term N- described below.
An upper bound IR acceptability criterion of Individual Risk (iyr) fiom a number of ignited
1,OE-S/yrdue to accidental ignition of flammabie secondary grade release sources is defined as:
substances is therefore adopted.
where: examining failure data for various items of equipment
F, Frequency of a flammtble atmosphere at the considered to be point retease sources in this Code. The iI i
Zone 2 boundary from each release source. extent of the flammable atmosphere depends on the size
,, Probability of ignition at the Zone 2 outer (diameter) of the hole in the equipment and the
boundary. characteristics of the process fluid-
, Occupancy: probability that the individual is 1P A risk-based approach to hazardom urea
within the effect distance (hazardous area). classification contains a detailed description of how the
V Vulnerabifiiy: probability of fatality per leak hquency lcvel vs. hole size relationshii was
exposure to an ignited release. determined for items of equipment considered to be
IP A rir;k-based approach to hmardous area release point sources. This is sumarised In Annex G
ciassrjication describes two approaches, (a) P a t 1. Kt also provides a methodology which allows
analysis of historical data, and (b) synthesis harard radii to be calculated givcn a hole size and
using conditional probabilities. Both p r o m s conditions.
approaches give broadly similas results, and a Table C6 sumrnar ises the hole size dis(fibution for
vt~lnembiiityvalue (V) of 0,01 fatallties per saondary grade releases at various hquencies from the
accidental ignited release within tbe Zone 2 items of equipment covered in section 5.4.
area is uscd in the calculations.
N,, Number of release sources within range of the
individual, C2.
IR,,,, ,
b, Maximum acceptable 1R due to ignited
releases. As described in C2-1, this is GRADE RELEASES
taken to be I,OE-51yr.
'The previous edition of this Code stated that secondary
'This equation may be further simplified by: grade releases were those present for less than 10 hours
per year wifh a lower bound duration of 0 hours (i.e. no
--Substituting tlte valnes of 0,0i for V, and I,OE-Yyr lower bound). KIowever, in section 5.4 on flanges, the
for tbe maximum value of IR. conccpt pf a minimum number of flanges (i.e- 10 or
- Combining , N and P, a s one variable mllcd more) was introduced. Ten or more flanges were
Exposure (Exp). Exp = 1'- * N ,, required within close proximity to create sufficient

Fh(/release source-yr) -
(I ,OB-S/yr)/(Pw * 0,Ol * Bxp)
likelihood of release to justify classification as a
secondary grade release. In section 1.6 of this edition a
secondary grade release is defined as one which is
present for between 1 and 10 hdyr i.e. introducing a
Figures C3 and C4 show the ~lationshipoCIR , lower bound of 1 haur duration.
(lrelmc source--yr)vs. exposure with fixed values for I hour per year is equivalent to an approximate
Fh, and V = 0,01, and for various values of Pi,. frequency of 1E-4lyr and therefore, to meet a e XK
criterion of LOE-51yr only requires the combined
For simplicity, the frequency of flammabk releases are mitigating probabiliiies fbr ignition and occupancy lo be
banded into t h e e LEVELS which are shown graphically less than or equal to O,I which, Ibr a maximum
on Figure C2. pmbabiiity of occupancy of 0,22, will bc met in all
circumstances except where &ere are strong continuous
sources of ignition.

7'he fPequcncy of a flammable release due to secondary

y a d e release point sources may be estimated by

Table C6 Equivalent hole sizes for a range of r e k

-I---- Release freuuencv level
Greater than 1,OE-2 - I,OE-
e source-yr
Single seal throttle bush 0,LSD 0,OIA or O,1SD or D"
Single seal no throttle bush 0,23SLZ 0,OIA or 0,23SD or D*
Double seal throttle
- NIA ---
Purged labyrinth
22 m 70 inn1
2,O m 6,0 nun
Chnprcssed asbestos fibre 1 NIA 0,5 nun I 2,3 rnm
Spimt wound joint 1 I I 0,s ~ n m
Ring type joint 1,O mm ----
Valves 0,IDP
using historical leak
----- data if available, or suitable synthesis technique e.g.

* = Select largest hole size

N/A = Data not available; use a nominal hole sizc of 2 mm diameter
D = Equivalea diameter (mm)of seal leak from pumtt/~mpressorvendor
SD -= Shaft diameter (m)for pumps and compressors
A =Area of pipeline connected to equipment (mm2) w h a 0,0 ~ I A and 0,1A are equivalent to 0,lDP and 0,3DP
rcspecrively and DP is the diameter of the pipeline wunwted to the equipment
DP = Pipeline diameter (mm) for valves

Note that for pumps and Gompressors i t is recommended ttmt the actual size of the hofe which would result from seal failure
is established using mufact~uers'data. In lhe ahseace of such data the values given above may he use&



This h e x provides extracts fiom XP Calcufationrin Dispersionmodellin$ was carried out for representative
suppori of IP15 as background to the calculation of fluids for eategorim A, B, C, G(i) and G(ii). The
hazard radii based on dispersion modelling. Dispersion compositions used are shown in Table C7. In addition,
modelling was used to determine the hazard radius, R,, the physical parameters used during modelling are
for each release source quoted in section 5.4. The tables shown in Table C8. If actual compositions of flammable
it1 this Annex use the same approach and process fluids. fluids or dispersion p.arameters vary widely 6-om those
However, they cover a much wider range of process used here, specific dispersion modelling should be
conditions and may therefore be used to obtain a more carried out to verify safe hazard radii.
accurate estimate of hazard radii if required.

Table C7 Fluid cornoositions and LFLs .

1 LFL (kglm3) 1 0,039 1 0,042 1 0,043 1 0,034 1 0,011 ]

(Table 2 of IF' Calculntions in support oflPI.5)
Dispersion modelling was canied out using Shell Global Solutions' HGSYSTEM package, which is freely available on the
internet at httpY/www.bgsyst~n.comto users for determining hazard radii for other conditions if required.

C3.2 HAZGRD RADIUS 'LOOK-UP' TABLES Table C8 Physical parameters used in dispersion

Hazard radii appropriate to the release hole sizes quoted

for items of equipment in section 5.4 may be directly
read off Tables C9(a) and (b). Where the equipment is
not covered by section 5.4, hole sizes may be determined
by historical data or synthesis techniques.
'fie numerical values given in Tables C9(a) and (b)
are specific to the example fluids. The reIease rate for
these fluids is only weakly dependent upon small
variations in the storage temperature of about 20°C,
which is chosen to reflect a daily average UK summer
temperature. Other fluids may be more sensitive to
temperature changes.
' f i e ground effect radius, R,, should be used in Rclease orientation
conjunction wirh section 5.5 and Figure 5.6 to determine
the shape of a hazardous area.
Typical hazard tadii fiom Tables C9(a) and (b) are
presented in tabular form in the relevant sections of
Chapter 5.

Table C9(a) Hazard radius (R,)


Table a@)
Hazard radius at ground level CR,)

0,003 0,02 0,07 <1 1 2,5 5

0,02 0, 1 054 1 2 6 11
0,03 0,2 0,7 2 3 ' 8 14
* At the fluid storage temperature of 20°C the nominal discharge pressure of 5 bar(a) is below the saturated vapour pressure of
Fluid category k Ihe saturated vapour pressure ( 4 8 bar(a)) was used to calcu1atc the discharge rate and dispersion.
release behaviour in enclosures The material is based on
XP Caiculatinnr in support of IPI5 (item 6 ) .
In the t h t edition of IP 15 Area classijication codefor
pefroleum imtallationf, guidance was supplied on the
zoning to be applied within buildings and their D2 TYPES OF VENTILATION
associatede x t m l areas. It is bclievd that this guidance
was a practical assessment, based largely on engineering A release of flammable material into a confined space,
judgement, of what is in reality a complex situation. The such as a building, is poteutialIy an extremely hazardous
behaviour in any situation will depend on thc release event. ljpitiou may lead to the development of over-
location, direction, momenhlm and buoyancy and the pressure causing structuraldamage to the enclosure and
particular size and nature of the internal obstructions n e i $ b d n g buildings. Consequently, there is a need to
within the enclosure and the location and size of its distinguish between &leases that can be controlled by
openings, both in relation to the prevailing windor other suitable ventilaLior~hazardous area classification and
forced ventilation flows and the release itself. correct control of equipment, and events that could
Experience in the use of the guidance suggests that it release so muchrnaterialthat a more fundamental design
provided a pragmatic *approach in the absence of any review is needed. Events leacling to a sustained release
more detailed analysis. Nevertheless, the scientificbasis of significant quantities of flammable enaterial should
for titis guidance is not clear and, unlike the situation in not be considered as normal operation but be subject to
Chapter 5, where specific consequence models can be a detailed risk analysis.
used witbin their limits of applicability in order to A krther concern related to releases inside
produce tables of recommended dispersion distances for mclosures is how to assess the conditions under which
individual p i n t s o ~ r c c sfor r-eIeascs in open areas, no a release might escape the endosure at a flammable
such generally applicable analysis can be produced for conce~~tratiou and require external ignition prevention
releases inside enclosures. The guidance contained in p~ecautions.Tbi will depend on the degree to which the
Chapter 6 reflects this position and provides criteria that release is diluted within the encIoswe by any ventilating
can be applied, based on operaling experience, and flows. General guidance for the safe ventilation of
engineeringjudgement, to tbe determination of the type building enclormres is given in Chapter 6 by dividing
of ventilation (Figure 6.1)and the effect of the d e w of activities ahat rnay lead ta releases into categories
ventilation on the zone classification (Tables 6.1 and requiring different grades of ventilation. Cirades of
6.2). Tbe purpose of this Annex is to provide furtfier ventilation are then parameterised by the air change rate,
explanation and background information relating to a,expressed as the number of times per hour hat the air
in the building is changed. Four categoriesare identified: D3.1 For a heavier-than-air gas

Adequate ventilation: In round figures, if the gas is we11 mixed, a release of

To quickly redreduce possibly flammable concentrations to 0,l kg/s could give rise to potentially flammable
safe concentrations in the event of a teak or spillage. conditions through an adequateIy ventiiated building
Based on engineering experience, 12 air changes/hr is (12 air changes per hour), of volume 1 000 m3,on a time
recommended where action is taken to stop the fluid scale of -700 s. This would be an extremely hazardous
source as quickly as possible. condition. Larger releases might lead to potential
flammable regions outside of the building because t&
Dilution ventilation: material leaving would be above the lower flammability
Forced ventilation at sufficient rate to limit tbe formation limit for the gas within the building. Certainly a reiease
of a gas volume at a concentration of 20 % of the LFL is as large as about 1kg/s, capable of filling the building to
recommended. Typically dilution ventilation will be the UFL should not be tolerated.
vigorous (30 - 90 air changedir) and the output diverted For pressurised releases a release rate of = O,! kg/s
to vents. for a category A or B fluid could arise for a h o h size as
small as 2 mm for pressures below 50 bar. The hazard
Local exhaust ventilation: radius for an unconfined release of this magnitude is
The use of either small scale dilution ventilation (use of 5 m which is half the characteristic length scale of the
extractors etc.) or an enhancement of flow in obstructed example building and the order ofmagnitude of the free
areas to attain adequate ventilation is recommended. path of a centralIy placed release. The hazard radius is
also the distance over which the unconfined jet entrains
Overpressure ventilation: enough air to dilute the mass flow to the LFL. This
Prevention of the ingress of flammable material to a entrainment is comparable to the circulation in the
confined area by maintaining an over-pressure within it building and it is thus reasonable to propose that the
is recommended For cases where buildings are close to volume of air passing through the building can be well
potential sources but do not contam sources themselves. mixed by a pressurised release, in the absence of
impaction on surrounding surfaces or obstructions. If
Ofthe above categories, only adequate ventilation need significant impaction occurs, it may be that buoyancy
be quantified since it applies generally to small spills. effsts will be morc significant, leading to preferential
The dilution ventilation rate needs to be specially mixture accumulation.
designed for each application. It usually requires fresh
air to be forced into an encIosure; forced extraction may D33 For a lighter-thawair gas
be needed as weil. I a a l exhaust ventilation is
essentially the same as adequate ventilation for small The analysis above can be reworked for category G(i)
enclosures within a larger confined workplace. Its and G(ii) gases and it can be deduced that quite small
effectivenessdepends on eRective capture of the release presswised releases of the type used to underpin the
by ensuring an adequate flow velocity as well as hazard radius recomme~ldationsfor unconfined releases
adequate volume flow of air. in the norn?ai case the and of size of about 0,l kgls could result in the
emuent is ducted to a vent. Overpressure ventilation establishment of a f l a m a b l e mixture within a 1 000 m3
requires a minimum pressure differential to be building having a ventilation rate of 12 air changes per
maintained during all normal operations. hour for category A and G(i) fluids, and a somewhat
lower value of = 0,04 kg/s for category G(ii) fluid.

Assuming for the purposes of illustration that the
gaseous flammable material that it; released mixes Flow and dispersion are strongly influenced by the
unifomiy with the ventilating flow within a building or building shape and orientation to the wind. Buildings are
enclosure, it is possible to calculate the timedependent classified as bluffrather than streamlinedbodies and tbis
ammulation of gas concentrationwithin the enclosure. greatly complicates the description of the flow.
Further details are provided in 1P CnlcltIations in Consequently,%ere is a large body of work reporting the
suppori ofIPI5, item 6. The results of these caIculations study of flow and dispersion in building wakes,
indicate the folIowing for different density gases: referenced in IP Calculations in support of IPlS.
The main feature of a bluff rather than a streamlined
body is that the wind flow cannot pass smoothly around
the body but instead separates &om the upwind edges of The implication of section D3 is that there may be
the body. This forms a region along the sides and behind situations in which flammable malerial is emitted from
the body in which pressure is r e d u d The pressure a building as a result of an internal release. The fate of
dZference across this region causes the separated flow this material needs to be assessed The following general
from each edge and side of the body to curve towards comments can be made regarding an external hazardous
each other and eventually intercept to form a area:
recirculation region behind the body in which the mean
flow is actually reversing as fluid is returned towards the' (i) Unless a release is directed towards a particular
low pressure regions. Depending on the shape of the opening within an enclosure or building, an external
body this region can extend back up the building sides to hazardous area will only exist if the release is
the building fxont. The flow within the recirculation sufficiently large to raise concentrations within the
region is highly time varying and unsteady. It was building above the LFL. For a building of size
originally thought that the recirculation region was a - 1 000 m3this implies pressurised releases have to
closed 'bubble' bounded by a separation streamline and
that material was transported in and out of the region by
exceed 0,l k d s and assumes that the releases take
place within the body of the building.
turbulent mixing across this boundary. This remains a
usehl sunplification of the flow but it is now known that (ii) The efflux &om the building will comprise a flow of
transfer ofmaterial in and out of the recirculation region approximately 3,33 m31s for a building of size
is not limited to hlrbulent transport across the boundary. - 1 000 m3with adequate vcntilation and will take
Material is also advected into the region along entering place through thc normal ventilation openings in the
mean streamlines and advected out via verticd spiral building fabric.
vortices or through entrainment by horseshoe vortices.
The entire recirculation region may even collapse
(iii) The efflux is a relatively srnail flow and will be
iutemittently causing all the contents to be flushed
mixed into the recirculation behind the
building in the presence of wind. This mixing
There is no simple aid accurate way of assessing
process is a resutt of highly unsteady flow and is
the fate of material released into the wake of a building.
wind speed and wind direction dependent but is
Dispersion models in regulatory use (AI)MS, ISC,
AERMOD) recognise that significant mixing takes place highly effective.
in a building wake and this can reduce concentrations
downwind of the building by up to an order of (iv) Iience, the hazardous areas will be restricted to the
magnitude compared with an unconfined release. The immediate vicinity of vent openings and the
models do not attempt to describe events in the near building fabric.
wake and treat this as a wefl-stirred region of constant
concentration i-e. any material leaving the building is If releases are larger than 0,l kg/s then a greater ha7.d
predicted to undergo a step change in concentration. will exist
Such models should not bc used closer to the For slightly higher flow rates, iftheefflu buoyancy
building than 3-5 times the extent of the recirculation (positive or negative) is not negligibly small it will
zone. Typically the extent of the recirculation 7 ~ n fore influence the dynamics of the ventilation flow.
squat shaped buildings scales as the building height and Specificallyit will preferentiallydirect ha~afdstoroof or
for tail thin buildings it scatts as the building width For floor and enhance ventilation, and if the buoyancy driven
a building of characteristic dimension 10m this imposes outflow exceeds tile vcntilation flow a counter flow
a region of modelling uncertainty of 30-50m This is of (additional ventilation) will be induced
greater extent than the prescnt code for the cxternal For much larger flow rates specific cases need to be
hazard radii. considered. Containment and building effects will keep
Aa alternative to regulatory models is to use external concentrations low but events that create an
experimentation or CFD to explore some release opening in the fabric of the building, such as opening a
scenarios. The disadvantage, in addition to that of cost, door, that make greater ventilation possible would lead
is that generafisation of the results is difficult. This to the outflow of flammable material presenting a
particular problem is also difficult to solve with Iocaiised hazard.
computational methods because of the physical
complexity of the probIem and the requirement for
El GENERAL It should be rscognised that many item of
laboratory equipment are not available in a form that is
Research and development installations have special protected against the risk of igniting flamtnable
featwas which need to be considered in assessing the atmospheres; hot plates, heating mantles and ovens are
fire and explosio~lrisks, and the approach to hazardous ail likely to have surfaces hot enough to be capable of
area classification for laboratories and pilot plants. The igniting some materials that may be u s d Small motors
starting point is as usual, the identif~cationof sources of and instrumentation are oRen potential sources of
release, both from normal operations, and as a result of ignition. Consequently lnbomtories are not usually
failure of equipment or poor handling. At laboratpry -zoned, and the risk of fm or explosion has to be
scale, primary grade sources of release of flammable controlled in other ways.
vapour and gases should be small. Some may be
controlled simply by good ventilation of the room. ?'his 'These may include:
is likely to be needed in any case to control the health - Training in techniques to reduce (he frequency and
risks &om substances released. si7x of sources of release e.g. handling techniques
Many operations involve manipulation of that minimise the risk of iiquid spiils.
flammable liquids. The release of vapour as a primary - Appropriate use of fume cupboards, to control
grade source is Likely to be very small. Where normal prinlary or larger secondary @ sources.
operationsare likely to release more vapour, for example -- A high standard of awareness of the fin:risk, and
where solvents are to be evaporated or liquids are G o i n g in the actions to be taken in the event of
sprayed, they should be carried out in fume cupboards, spillage, or leaks.
to control personal exposure, but these also have the - Means to isola,te from a safe place any electrical
effect of minimising the riskof an explosive atmosphere. equipment that is live, in the event of a spillage or
Consideration should be given to the possibility that. the leak.
external fume cupboard vents could generate hazardous - Suitable equipment and hdining for dealing with
areas in the event of a release within the cupboards. small fixes.
Possible secondary grade sources of release in many - 6 1 0supervision
~ of laboratory work wilere prompt
circumstances are numerous and include breakage of action may be n d e d to deal with rclcases of any
giassware, loss of cooling to a condenser, mains gas taps sort
on an open bench, tenlporaty pipe work b e e n a gas - Good ventilation.
bottle and other apparatus, boil over of reaction
mixtures, spillage &om poor handling techniques, If precautions of this type are provided, and the risk
storage containers left open, unsuitable disposal of assessment shows that foreseeable fies are Wrely to be
contaminated rags. The size and possible duration ofany controlled safely by laboratory staff, e.g. using a single
of these possibilities should be considered. fire extinguisheror fire blanket, relaxation from the need

for hazardous area classification may be justified. should be kept to a minimum, and effective low level
Precautions to Iimit the risk of escalationof any incident ventilation is needed
are also needed, for example limiting the quantitiesof all
combustible materials stored within the labratory and
protection fiom fire of any highly toxic products. E3 PILOT PLANTS AND U R G E SCALE

E2 HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH There is no s h q dividing line between larger scale

PARTICULAR CLASSFS OF MATEEUAL laboratories and pilot plants, and each situation should
be considered individually. Local ventilation may be
This section is not intended to be comprehensive purposedesigned for a specific rig, or it may be installed
guidance on safe laboratory practice, but is xestricted to in a large &me cupboard. In either case, adequate
advice on storage. ventilation may limit the extent of any flammable
Limits should be set on the amount of flammable atmosphere that could be f m e d so it is of negligible
liquids that are stored within a laboratory. In most cases extent Hazardous area classificntim is then not needed.
a maximum of 50 litres, stored in a purpose-designed ORen apparatus will be floor mounted, in which case
cupboard should be allowed. Larger quantitiesshould be individual facilities should be surrounded by z~sballow
stored in a room designed for the purpose, or in the open sill to prevent t l a t i o n by any liquid spill flowing fi-om
air. AAez use, storage vessels should be returned to the one unit to another. Where general ventilation only is
cupboard prompt&, and not left in fume cupboards or on provided, or where there is the possibility of escalation
open benches. to involve rapidly mom than one rig, a full hazardous
Compressedor Iiquefied flammablegases should be area classification is more likely to be needed. In any
either stored outside the building, or in a specially case where flammable liquids or heavy flammable
ventilated area. SmalI numbers of cylinders in regular vapour may be released at low momentum and collect at
use may be kept within the laboratory, but the main floor level, tbe lowest levels of the room should be
cylinder vaive should be closed at all times when the designated Zone 2. Where hazardous area classification
cylinder is not in use. Proper controi of pressures and is needed, the facility should not be located in the same
piping of sufficient strength are needed to minimise the room as an unclassified small scale taboratory because
risk of leaks, or hcturing glassware. Permanent of the dificulty of defining and maintaining a boundary
pipework for gases should be made out of metal, and between the classified and unclassified areas. Even if
operate at as low a pressure as practicable. Liquefied hazardous area classification is not considered essential,
flammable gases are a particular hazard, espccialIy if it should be possible to isolate heat and power sources
they arc provided for laboratory purposes in an Gorn a safe place, and to raise the alarm without causing
unstenched form. Quantities kept in the laboratory an ignition risk
E'1 DESCKLPTXON OF THE RECOGNEED For details see IEC 60079-2 or BS EN 50016. In
TYPES OF PROTIECflON protection of large enclosures such as control rooms, see
LISTED LN TABLE 7.1 also sections 6.43.3. Suitable for Zone 1.

A brief description of the internationally standardised Powder-fiUed protedion (Ex q)

types of protection listed inTab1e 7.1 follows for ease of
reference. Achieved by filling the enclosure with finely granulated
material (usually quartz) so that in the intended service
Oil immersed protedion (Ex o ) any arc occurringwithin the enclosure will not ignite any
external atmosphm. Suitable for Zone 2 only. See
A type of protection in which the electrical apparatus or IEC 60079-5, BS EN 500 17.
parts thereof are immersed in non-volatile oil such that
an explosive atmosphere which may occur above the oil It;lame-proof enclosure (Ex d)
level or outside of the enclosure cannot be ignited e.g.
switch gear. See IBC 60079-6, BS EN 50015. An enclosure that will withstand an internal expiosion of
Acceptable for Zone 2. an explosive mixture without suffering damage or
propagating the infernal flammation, tluough any joints
Pressurisation o r continuolls diIu(ioa (Ex p) or structural openings in the enclosure, to an exlernal
explosive mixture for which it is designed. A flame-
A method of protection using the pressurisation of an proof enclosure may be used for apparatus containing an
enclosure of a protective gas to prevent the ingress of an i n m a l source of release. However, see F2 note (1)
external flammable atmosphere. Where there is no regarding the need for release of any i n t d pressure
internal release, the protective gas may be air, where that could rise above atmospheric. For details see
there is an internai release then pressurisation with an references in Table 7.1 and the note to section 7.6(b).
inert gas is applied, or cor~tinuousdilution with air at a Note that a flarne-proof enclosure is usually
rate that will dilute and prevent the release from certified with the protected electrical apparatus in place.
reaching the LEIJ. This type of protection is permitted in all zones except
Zone 0.

Xncrwed safety (Ex e) Non-iclcendive (Ex n)

A type of protection giving an increased security against A typeofprotectionsuch that in normaloperation within
the possibitity of excessive tcmperames and of the its rated duty it wi1I not ignite a surrounding flammable
occurrence of arcs and sparks. See BS EN 50019. atmosphere, and a fault capable of ignition is unlikely to
E C 60079-7 gives requirements For construction and occur. See BS EN 50021. It includes equipment which
tests. is hermetical4y sealed.
This type of protection is permimd in all zones Included in this category is a range of types of
except Zone 0. (In some countries authorities may protection, such as:
restrict its use to Zone 2.)
(a) Energy limited.
Intrinsic safety (Ex ia and Ex ib) (b) Non-sparking.
(c) Restricted breathing.
Intrinsic safety applies to electrical apparatus, or part of
such apparatus, intended for use in a l~azardousarea, in This type of protection is permitted in Zone 2. Further
which the electrical circuits themselves are incapable of details on sub-designations of Ex n are provided in
causing ignition. Furthermore, it applies to associated XEC 60079-15.
apparatus and to any parts located outside the hazardous
area, fmm where the intrinsic safety of the eIsGtrical Encapsulation type of protection (Ex m)
circuits may be influenced by the design, construction
and use of such apparatus or parts. Electrical equipment is described as encapsulated when
An intrinsically-safe circuit is one in which any it is embedded into a mass of fire-resistant solid
s p a . or thermal effect, produced either when it insulating materiat Detailed requirements for electrical
conforms electrically and mechanically with its design and mechanical properties are set out in BS EN 50028.
specificationorinspecifiedEauItconditions,is incapable Equipment of this type is suitable for use in Zones '1
of causing ignition of a given explosive mixture. A fault and 2.
is defined as a defect or electrical breakdown of any
fdlible component or connection between cornponem, Specfat protection (Ex s)
upon which the intrinsic safety of the circuit depends.
Typical t& conditions are prescribed in XFX: 60079-11. This category is no longer appiicable; however, ATEX
An intrinsically-safe ap- is one in which all equipment category II t G is appropriate, ie. meeting
electricalcircuits are intrinsically safe. Tt is placed in one the requirements of lEC 60079-26 or EN 50284.
of two categories:


Apparatus in this category is incapable of cawing LNTERNAL SOURCE OF RELIEASK
ignition in normal operation, or with a single fault, or
with any combination of two fault3 applied, with a It is important to note in selecting explosion-protected
specified safety &tor for c u m t and/or voltage. apparatus that, as indicated in sections 7 4 c ) and 7.7.3
When the appamus has unprotected sparking note @), consideration should be given to whether there
contacts in any part of the apparatus likely to be exposed may be a possible internal release offlammablc material
conf.inuousIyor for long periods to an explosive mixture, within the equipment itsel£, which could require a
such contacts require the application of s u p p t e m t a q different allocation of what zone may be applicable for
protective measures. this selection, aud, if SO, whether a difference in
Apparatus in this category offers the highest degree composition as cornparod to the external atmosphere
of protection and is permitted in aU zones. could affect the selection of apparatus sub-group and T
-r class.
Catcgo'y Ex ib: While not exhaustive, and the advice of the
Apparatrrs in this category is incapable of causing manufacturer or mpplier should always be ascertained,
ignition in normal operation, or with any single fault the following notas may be of assistance:
applied with a specified safety factor for c m n t andlor
voltage. This type of protection is permitted in all zones (a) An i n W source of release in any category of
except Zone 0. explosion-protected electrical apparatus is defined
as a device(s) in the apparatus from which (1) A 'restricted release' is one in which any release of i
flammable gas or vapour is released in the course of flammable material within the apparatus is limited
normal operation or may be released in abnormal to an extent within the containment or diluent
circumstances, e.g. due to failure of the containment capacity of a protective gas system.
system. An 'unrestricted release' is one in which the
Thus sometimes a flammable substance is of above can be exceeded. As outlined later, it is not
necessity introduced into the enclosure of an just the performance of equipment when new; the
electricd apparatus, in particular in the case of a effect of long-term ageing and deterioration must
process analyserand in certain instruments used for also be considered.
measurement and control where there is connection (Where release internally could be significant,
with the process £ I
uid. there will be need for adequate and safe means of
For some types of instrument, protection by relieving this to the exterior by special breather or
pressurisation or continuous diiution by either air or similar provision, which will not affect the type of
inert gas such as nitrogen may be provided, as in protection. W ~ t ha flammable release, such devices
type of protection 'p' in accordance with should include flame arrestor provision, as in the
IEC 60079-2. case of the flame-proof enclosure of Ex d
(b) It should be noted that an 'enclosure' may he of any
size and may range from a small instrument case to (2) Assessment of an internal release. The assessment
a structure such as an analyser house or control should recogtiise that the consequences of an
room containing multiple apparatus. The enclosure internal release of flammable gas or vapour within
may serve solely as a mechanical protection or may an apparatus may be more severe than a release
constitute an integral part of the type of explosion externally, since in the former, in the absence of a
protection, and for the variant cases section 6.4 dilution protective system, ir can remain and
should be consulted. The followi~~g notes apply to accumulate. Thus a release that could be
the release that may occur within a single apparatus undetectablein the open due to diffusion can slowly
enclosure, but it should be borne in mind that there raise the level within such a n enclosure to a point
may be 'nested enclosures' when one or more that comes within the flammable range.
enclosures are placed one within another. In such a White individualjudgementmust always apply,
case it is necessary to assess the probability of a the broad types of release potential that can arise
flammable substance of potentially explosive force with various foms ofequipment can be considered
being present betwwn each successive enclosure as follows.
boundary before proceeding to determine the type Evaluation of internai release hazard relative to
of prokction for apparatus inside cach. Xn placing the external hazard zoning. It will be seen from the
one or more enclosures within one another the foregoing generaiised review that the internal
atmosphere of the inner enclosures may prove more hazard assessment will iu some cases override the
significant indetermining the types ofprotection for external classification and be the factor that
apparatus inside than the hazardous area determines the type of protection. In other cases,
classification in the rane of application* when the same equipment is to be installed in a
more severc cxternal hayard zoning, it will be these
(c) The nature of an internal hazard within the external hazards that will determine the actual
enclosure (casing) of a single apparatus will depend, hazard type of protection to be applied.
as in general classification, upon a number of
circu~nsZancessuch as the integrity of construction (3) Wo normal release'. This term recognises that for
and in-service maintenance, whether an internal certain equipment there is minimal risk of a release
release occurs in normal or abnormal conditions as within its enclosure throughout its in-service
defined below, and whether when, for example, the duration between inspection and maintenance
protection of the apparatus is prcssurisation or intervals.
dilution with air, the release is 'restricted' or While it is not possible to be absolutely
'unreslricted'. specific, it i s normally assigned to equipment in
which there is enclosure in metallic piping, tubing
The following comments are made on the a.sumption and elements such as Bowdon gauges,bellows or
that such equipment is correctly installed, tested and spiralsoperated within their established ratings, and
maintainecl: with joints with threads, welding, metallic

compression fittings, etc., which could simiiarly be (b) Ipressurisation with inert gas such as nitrogen can
considered as having no noma? release. also be applied, since the internal releases cannot
Such a criterion entails materials and create a flammab1e atmosphere in the absence of
construction that withstand time and service, and do oxygen-
not q e or degrade, which normaUy would militate With type of protection 'p', the requirements of
against window assemblies in casings, moving protection against loss of protective gas input by
seals, elastomerio seal materials and non-metallic a i m or shutdown should be observed.
flexible tubing, unless experiencedemonstrates the
contrary. (c) Where dilution with air is applied in the case of a
Since seals, rotating or sliding, flanged joints 'restricted normal release', the internal hazards are
and flexible non-metallic tubing can be assumed reduced to a level comparable to those in an
often to leak minutdy after a period in service, the external non-hazardous zone. This applies also in
lower categorisationof'limited normalrebse' may the event of abnormal reIease which would be in the
be considered, against the possibility that 'restricted' category. Were the abnormaI release to
degradation with age could give rise to release be in the 'unrestricted' category as defined in note
above that expected for new equipment. (I), this would not be applicable and the internal
hazard would become comparable to th,$ of an
(4) 'No abnormal release'. Electrical apparatus may be external Zone 1.
considered in this category ifunder any foreseeable
abnormal conditions there is no possibility that an (d) When protective gases are used, as in the above
intemal release could occur. examples, pta-purging by the passage of such gas
An example that can be quoted would be a through the d o s u r e and its associated ductings
Bourdon tube with a mechanic$ strength such that should be carried out prior to the energisationof the
my foreseeable overprmsure would not cause system, so that flammable gas is first cleared from
failure ofthe tube. the enclosure.
Conversely, when under foreseeable abnormal
conditions an internal reIease could occur, e.g. tt (e) In all other types of protection, provided there is na
thin-walled metal diphragm or bellows, which normal release and that an abnormal release would
could rnechanicafly fail due to repeated flexing or be only very infrequent and of relatively short
application outside the intended range of operation, duration, the intemal hazards are comparable to
the apparatus should be considered as having an those of an external Zone 2 release.
abnormal release potential. Thus if such apparatus is installed in an
external non-hazardous or Zone 2 area,the internal
hazards are the determining factor calling for
It73 SELECTION OF ZONE CXSSLFICATION Zone 2 type protection.

The following generalid examples may be illustrative (f) However, where the same apparatus as in (e) is
of the approach that may be taken, ushg more detailed installed in an external Zone 1 or Zone 0,it is the
guidance than is possible bere. The effect ofthe internal latter external classification that will determine the
release composition on apparatus sub-group and type ofprotection level, not the intemal conditions.
temperature class should always be considered. Again, with an apparatus in which thc internal
release hazards are assessed as comparable to that
(a) When there is normal internal release, the internal of a r ~extend Zane 1, installation of that apparatus
hazards are comparableto the hazards of an external in a Zone 0 external zone will result in the latter
Zone 0, and comparable type of protection determining that the type of protection should also
limitations should be assumed, with consideration be that for Zone 0.
of type ofprotection 'p' to protect against the xtfease
by continuous dilution with air to circa 25 % of the
G1.0 MTRODUCTION GX.1 Flame failure safeguards

It is not appropriate to classify the inside of a plant These are required on all burners operating below
designed for controlled combustion as a hazardous area, 750°C, and higher temperdture burners that operate
although if &el js supplied to a combustion chamber intrmittcntly. Ionising detectors (particularly flame
when there is no flame or other form o f ignition, a rectification) or radiation detectors are preferred.
flammable atmosphere can quickly form. With fired Burners operating for long periods above 750°C
h e a m , dangerous conditions can occur. may not be fitted with flame failure proteciion, and may
have manual operatcvl valves in the fuel supply to
- While the plant is shut down, if fuel can leak past a individual burners or a group of burners. Where this is
controi valve or valves. the case, control systems are required to prevent h e 1
-- During .start up if too much he1 is supplied before supply to a burner whelk no pilot flame or other source of
source of ignition is provided. ignition is present.
- During normal running if h e flame fails for any
reason, c.g. brief intcrrnption to the fuel supply, or 61.2 Safety shut nff valves
sudden surge of combustion air or at shut down if
the combustion air supply Is shut before tbc fuel Recommendations on types and monitoring systems are
WP~Y. given in BS EN 161, US EN 676, BS EN I643 and
BS 5885.
Detailed technical specificzkons for burner control
systems have been developed for many applications, and G1.3 Ignition sequences
the requirements depend mainly on the designed heat
input, and whether the plant tuns for long continuous These should preferdbly be fully automatic with timed
periods, or intermittently. Fircd process heaters should sequences, incorporating the following:
normally follow the requiremeats for similar heaters in
other applications and the general guidance given in - Prepare checks on safkty .system.
HSC Safe operafion ofceramic kilns can be applied. - Pre-ignition purge, typically 5 times combustion
Precautions can be grouped under the headings of chamber volume o f air.
flame failure safeguards, safety shut off valves for fuel - Ignition, with he1 supply before ignition controIled
lines, ignition sequences, operating procedures, shut so that the maximum energy release is limited to
down sequences, additional safety monitors and 53 KJm3 of combustion chamber volume.
explosion relief - Flame proving, with post purge if ignition is not

G1.4 Operating procedures G1.6 Additional safety monitors

These should be available in clear, unambiguous form, These may be appropriate, e.g. flow and pressure sensors
with concise instsuctions for emergency shut down. on fuel and air supplies or eA~austand recirculation fans.

421.5 Shut down sequences C1.7 Explosion relief

Air supplies should be maintained until all pilot/maio The design should consider the possible risk of
he1 valves have been closed, and continue for a period explosions, and ifnecessary incorporateexplosionrelief.
to purge residual combustion products. The safety shut See BS EN 746-2.
down system should be in the closed position when the
plant is shut down. .

Adequate ventilation: This is ventilation, natural, Auto-ignition temperature (MT): see ignition
artificial or a combination of both, sufficient to avoid temperature; also synonymouswith spontaneous ignition
persistence of flammable atmospheres within sheltered temperature (SIT).
or enclosed areas but insufficient to avoid their initial
formation and spread throughout the area This will Black heat type heating: Black heat type heating
nonnally be achieved by a uniform ventilation rate of a equipment is that in which the external radiant or
minimum of 12 air changesh with no stagnant areas convection heating surface operates at a temperature not
(see section 6.4.1 and Annex D). exceeding 200°C and which has no internal source of
Apparatus group (or sub-group): Certain electrical
apparatus for use in a hazardous area is allocated to a Boudhg: Provision of a low-resistance electricaI
group or sub-group depending on its suitability for use conductor between sections of plant, equipment or
with specific gases (see section 7.6). . IP Electrical safety code.
s t r u ~ t m sSee

Area classification: see hazardous area classification. Buoyancy of release: A gas or vapour should be
considered a s buoyant and lighter than air if its density
ATEX: This acronym is short for Atmosphcrc Explosiv, ou release to atmosphere from a non-pressurised source
and is used in relation to directives 94/9/L3C and would be less than 0,75relative to the ambient air (see
1999/92/EC (known as ATEX 95 and ATEX 137 section 1.8).
respectively). Directive 9419 concam the establishment
of a single market for equipment to he used in Certification: Procedure by which a third party givw
potentially explosive atmospheres. Further details are written assurance that a product, process or service
given in Chapter 7. Directive 1999/92concerns common conforms to specified requirements. (Thrd paxty -
health and safety standards at places where explosive Person or body that is recognised as independent of the
airnospheres may form. It establishes n h i i u m parties involved, as concerns the issue in question). The
requirements for the protection of workers, specifically ATEX Directive 94/9/EC requires electrical equipment
requires areas to be classified where explosive of categories i and 2 to be subject to a process of
atmospheres may form, and provides a legal definition certification, before the CE mark can be affxed, and the
of the zones. It is implemented into U K law as part of product sold within the EU. The certific~tionmay be
the Dangerous Subsfanem and ExpIosive Atmospheres carried out by any of the notified bodies (government:
Regulationsthat also transcribe the requirements ofother appointed test houses) within the EU. Category 3
European legislation. equipment does not have to be certified, instead the
manufacturermay issue a self~eclarationof conformity.


class of pefroieum: System of IP classification of fire resistant: A term used to denote a defined standard
petroleum liquids including crude oil and its products of resistance to fix exposure.
into CIasses 0, 1, Ilt(l), II(2), III(I), EI(2) and
UncIassified based upon their flash points, see Annex A. Flame arrestor: A device to prevent the back
propagation of flame. It can take the form of perforated
Cold work: The out of any task, or the use of plates, fine slots in metal blocks, wire mesh gauzes, ,

any tool or equipment that will not produce a source of crimped metal or bunches of narrow metal tubes.
ignition (see also Hot work). It includes the use of tools
for erection, dismantling and cIeaning, which are not Mammabk (synonymow with 'inflammable'): Refers
liable to produce incendive sparks, and operations such to any substance, solid, liquid, gas or vapour that is
as drilling, tapping and cutting carried out in such a way easily ignited- The addition of the prefix 'noneindicates
as to limit the heat produced and keep the temperature of that the substances are not readiiy ignited but does not
the tools and work below 100 "C. necessarily indicak that they are non-combustible. A
petroleum liquid is classified as flammable if it has a
Combushile gas indicator: see Gas detector. flash point up to and including 55°C. See Flash point
and Annex A,
Continuous grade release: A release that is continuous
or nearly so (see section 1.6.4). Flammable atmosphere: A mixture of OammaHegases
or v a p m with air insuch a proportion that, without any
Dilution ventilation: Artificial ventilation sufficient to further admixture, it will burn when ignited (see section
maintain generally as non-hazardous an enclosed area 1.6.1).
containing a source of release or an aperture into a
hazardous area (see section and Annex D). Flammable limits (or range): The limits of
combustibility of flammable gases or vapour when
Dry break coupking: A hose coupling designed to mixed with air (see Upper flammable limit and ]Lower
minimise the leakage of Iiquid when the hose is flammablelimit)-note these terms are synonymous with
disconnectedEach half ofthe wupling contains a valve explosive limits (or range).
which cIoses when the latchs holding the halves
together are released. Flash p i n k The lowest temperature, corrected to a
barometric pressure of 101,3 kPa, at which tfie
Earthing: The provision of a safe path of electrical application of a source ofignition causes the vapour of
current to ground, in order to protect stmctures, plant the test portion to ignite and the flame propagate across
and equipment fram the effeds of stray electrical the s u h c e of the Iiquid under the specified conditionsof
currents and electrostatic discharge. See 1P Electrical test
s u m code. Flash point values are dependent on the test method
used, the apparatus design, thecondition of the apparatus
Enclosed area: Any building, room or encbsed space used, the vaporisation characteristics of mixed and
within which, in the absence or failure of artificial contaminated samples, and the operator procedure
ventilation, the ventilation does not meet the carried out. Flash point can therefore only be defined in
requirements for adequateventilation(see section6.4.1). terms of a standard test rnetbod and no genmlly
applicable valid corretation can be guaranteed between
Equivalent diameter: 'Che diameter of tbe circle of values obtained by different test methods or where
equivalent area to the rectangle. different test apparatus is specified. i
For the purposes of this Code, when nrference is
Equivalent leak hole diameter: Dispersion distances made to flash point it will be to a closed cup non-
quoted in Annex C (Part 3) are based on releases from equiiibrium test method. For liquids having flash points
circular release holes. Leak holes which are not typically below 40°C the test method to be used to determine the
circular in cross-section (e.g. leaks through the annula; flash point should be IP 170Deienninarion offlashpoint
space ofa pumpfcompressorsea1or leaks through cracks - Abel closed cup method. For Iiquids having flash
in gasket joints) are expressed as a circular leak hole points above 40°C the method used to determine the
diameter with an equivalent dispenion range to the non- Rash point should be IP 34 Determination ofJashpoint
circular leak hole. -Pensky-Martens closed cup method.
&hid: A gas, liquid or vapour. operation, unless it is carried out in sucb a way as to
keep the temperature below the level at which ignition of
Fluid categories: A categorisation for the purposes of a flammable atmosphere could occur. (See also Cold
hazardous area classification of flammable petroleum w o k )
fluids by the point source method of Chapter 5 according
to their potential for rapid production of flammable Ignition temperature (synonymous with 'auto-'.and
vapour on release to the environment Four fluid 'spontaneous-@ition temperatures'): The temperature
categories are defined: A, B, C and G (see Table 12, .at which a substance will begin to burn without
Chapter 1). application of any source of ignition (see sections
8:2.6.1, and 7.7.2). ..
Gas detector: An instrument, fixed or portable,
designed to detect and measure the presence and Inadequate ventilation: Ventilation, natural or
concentration of flammable gas in an area (see section artificial, which is insufficient to avoid persistence of a
8.3). flammable atmosphere within shekered or enclosed
akas (see sections 6.4.2 and 6.6).
Gasfree: A tank is considered to be gas-Gee when the
concentration of flammable gases or vapour is within Ineendive spark: A spark of sufficient temperatureand
safe prescribed Iirnits. The term gas-free does not imply energy to ighite a flammable gas.
absence of toxic gases or sufEciency of oxygen for
vessel entry. Inflammable: see flammable.

Hazardous area classification: The notional division of Internal release (internal source o f release): see
a facility into hazardous areas and non-hazardous areas, Annex F.
and the subdivision of hazardous areas into zones (see
section 1-6-21. Intrinsically safe: An intrinsically safe electrical circuit
is one in which any sparking that may occur, under the
Hazardous area and zone: A three-dimensional space conditions specified by the certifying authority and with
in which a flammable atmosphere is or may be expected the prescribed components, is incapable of causing
to be present in such frequencies as to, require special ignition of the prescribed flammable gas or vapour (see
precautions for the construction and use of eIectria1 section 7.4 and the description in the list of F1 in
apparatus. All other arcas are referred to as non- Amex F).
hazardons in this context. In a hazardous area three types
of zone are recognized (see section 1.63). Local artificial ventilation: Air movement and
replacement with Eresh air by artificial means applied to
Eazardous atmosphere: An atmosphere containing a particular source of release or locat area within a more
flammable gas or vapour in a concentration capable of generd area (see Chapter 6 and Annex D).
ignition. (Tile term is synonymous with flammable
akuospkre and refm exclusively to hazards arising Lower explosive limit @,EL): Synonymous with lower
from ignition. Where there is hazard from other muses flammable limit
such as toxicity, asphyxiation or radioactivity, this is
specifically mentioned.) Lower flammabte limit (K,FL): The lowest
concentration of a flammable gas or vapour in air at
Ilaaard radius: TfK: largest horizontat extent of the atmospheric pressure capable of being ignited. The
hnzardous area, independent of ground effects, that is figure is expressed as percentage by volume.
generated by the source when situated in an open area
under u d c t e d natural ventilation (see section 1A.8). Mobile equipment: Equipment mounted on its own
This is the distance at which the concentration of wheels or tracks or having some other facility for
flammable vapour in air has fallen to the lower mobility.
flammable limit.
Nominal hw;trd radius: For very low vapour release ,
Hot work: This includes welding or the use of any rates, e.g. the breathing from open road tanker hatches
flame or electric arc or the use of any equipment IiieIy due vnly to ambient temperature variations or i
to cause heat, flame or spark. It also includes caulking, evaporation of liquids &om small drain channels, the rate i
chipping, drilling, riveting and any other heat-producing ofvapour flow is too small for dispersion modelling to
\' '

predict the hazard radius acczlrately. In such cases, a

nominal value, based on experience and engineering
judgement is suggested.
Static electricity: The build-up of an electrical i
Noa-hazardous area: Ax1 a m in which flamniable difference of potential or charge tfvough fr-iction of
atmospheres are not expected to be present so that dissimilar materials or substances.
special precautions For the construction and use of
electrical apparatus or for the control of non-electricat Temperature class (T class): One of six values of ,
sources of ignition are not required. Note: Such an area temperature allocated to electrial apparatus derived ,'
may still be part of a greater restricted area. from a system of classification according to the '
maximum surface temperature of the apparatus (see
Offset fill pipe: A filling pipe, e.g. on a filling station section 7.7).
tank, on which comtection for the hose of the delivery
vehicte is at some distance from the bnk. rotection: Measures appiied ia the
construction of electrical apparatus to prevent l:~e
: An area in an open air situation where ignition ofa surrouadiug B a m a b l c retease.. See section
vapour is readily dispersed by wind. Typically air 7.4 and the descriptive list in F2 in Anncx F. (See also
velocities will rarely tw3 less than 0,5 d s and will Internal release.)
frequently be above 2 mds (see sections 3.1.. 1 and 6.2).
Upper explosive %itnit(UEL): Synonymom with upper
venallation: Artificial ventilation of an flammable limit.
enclosed area to maintain Ule area at R conlralled
pra$sure above the ambient pressure {set: section Upper flammable limit ( FL): The concentration of flammable gas or vapour in air at atmospheric pressure
above which combustion will not occur. The figure is
rimary grade release: A releaye tirat is l'iely to occur expressed as a percentage by volume.
in normal operation {see section 1.6-4).
Ventitstion: A general fmm to indicate air movement
rophoric scale or depasits: Usually fme1y divided and replacement. by fie& air- Nahual ventilation refers
ferrous sulphide formed inside a tank, pipeline or to ventilation caused by wixtd or convection effects.
equipment, in the presence of rnercaptaos or hydrogen Mificial ventilation refers to ventilation caused by air
sulphide. It is capable of such rapid oxidation on purges or mechanical means such as fans (see section
exposure to air that heating to incandescence crrn occur. 1.7).

S w i r d a r y grade release: A release that is unlikely to ork perruit: A document issued by an authorised
occur in n o m l operation and, in any event, will be of person to pennit work to be carried out safely in a
short duration (see seciion l.6.4). defined area under specified conditions (see section 8.4).

r An area within an open area when; of a hazardous area in which a

be less than in a taue open area but is flammable atmosphere is con~~uously present or present
adequatr: ventilation as defined in section 6 3 . for long periods (see su;lioa 1.6.3).

ade of @few: For the pupose of ne 1: 'That part of a rdous area irr which a
classificaiion, a pvint from which a flammable atmospkm is iikeiy occur in norm1
c gas,vapour or liquid may be released into the operalion (see section 1.6.3).
re. Three grades of release are defined inf ~ m s
of" their likely frequency and duration: continuous; dous in which a
and secondary (see section 1.6-4). le almosphere is not likely to w r in nonnal
operation and, if it occurs, will exist only fbr a shod
n: Naked lights, Eres,.cerr;lin eiec.bricaI period (see section 1.6.3).
s above ignition tern
d by any other meals (see
Chapters 7 and 8).
The foilowing publications arc referred to in this Code: burners and gas appliances
IZS EN 676:2003 Automatic forced draught burners for
American Petroieum Institute (APII) gaseous fuels
API Recommended Practice 521 Guide for Pressure- RS EN 746-2:1997 Industrial thermoprocessing
Relieving and Depmsuring Systems: 1997 equipment. Safety rcquircmcntsfor combustion and he1
handling systems
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) BS EN 1643:2000 Valve proving systems for automatic
ANSUMME B3 1.3 Process piping 2002 shut-off valves h r gas burners and gas appliances. See
British Standards Institution @ST) BS EN 1755t2000Safety of industrial trucks. Opetation
BS 229:1957 Specification. P h e p r o o f enclosure of in potentially explosive atmospheres. Use in flammable
electrical apparatus gas, vapour, mist and dust
BS 1259:1958 Intrinsically safe electrical apparatus and BS EN 1834-1:2000 Reciprocating internal combustion
circuits for use in explosive atmospheres engines.Safety requirements for design and construction
BS 4683-2:1971 Specification for electrical apparatus of engines for use in potentially explosive atmospheres.
for explosive atmospheres. The cor~structionand testing Group I1 engines for use in flammable gas and vapour
of flameproof enclosures of electrical apparatus atmospfieres
BS 4683-4:1973 Specification for electrical apparatus BS EN 1834-2:2000 Reciprocating internal combustion
for expiosive atmospheres. Type of protection 'e' eogines. Safety requirements for design and construction
ES 5501 series Electrical appaxatus for potentially of engines for use in ptentially explosive aimospheres.
expiosive atmospheres Group I engines for use in undergmmd workings
BS 588585i998 Automatic gas burners suxeptible to fire damp and/or combustible dust
BS 5958:1991 Code of practice for control of RS EN 13463 series Non-electrical equipment for
undesirable static electricity ptentia1Iy explosive atmospheres
BS 61321983 Code of pt-accice for safe operation of BS EN 50014:1998 EIectrical app& for pohtialIy
&line s m d a r y cells and batteries explosive atmospheres. General requirements
BS 6133:1995 Code of practice for safe opefation of RS EN 50015:1998 EIectrical apparatus for potentialfy
leadacid stationary batteries explosive ahnospheres Oil immersion '0'
BS 66%:2002 Guide ta prevention of inadvertent BS EN 50016:1996 Electrical apparatus for potentially
ignition of flammable atmospheres by radio-frequency explosive atmospheres. Pressurized apparatus 'p'
radiation B S EN 50017:2998 EIectrical apparatus for potentially
BS 7671:2001 Requirements for electrical installations. explosive atmospheres. Powder fiIling 'q'
DeE Wiring Regulations. Sixteenth edition BS EN 50019:2000 Electrical app- f a pokntiaIly
BS EN 161:2002 Automatic shutaff valves for gas explosive a t m o s p h m . Increased safety *e4


BS EN 50021:1999 Etectrical apparatus for potentially accnmlators, May 1988

explosive atmospheres. Type of protection "n" HSE The tolerability of risk fhm nuclearpowerstations,
BS EN 50028:1987 Electrical apparatus for potential& 1992
explosive atmospheres. Encapsulation 'm'
BS EN 617794.2000 EIectrical apparatus for the RS(G)5 Hot Work: Welding and cutting on plant
detection and measurement of combustible gases. containing flammable materials
Pefformance requirements for Group n apparatus PM&1 Control of safety risks at gas turbines used for
indicating up to 100% lower explosive limit power generation, 2003
BS EN 61779-5:2000 Electrical apparatus for the
detection and measurement of combustible gases. Institution of Chemical Engineers
Performance requirements for Group II apparatus Cox, Lees and Ang Classification of hazardous areas
indicating up to 100% (VN) gas
BS EN 60079-14:2003 Electrical apparatus for Institution of Electrical Engineers GEE)
explosive gas atmospheres - Part 14: Electrical Recommendations for the Electrical and Electronic
installations in hazardous areas (other than mines) Installations of Mobile and Fixed Offshore Installations
BS EN 60079-17:2003 Efectricai apparatus for 1992
explosive gas atmospheres - Part 17: inspection and
maintenanceofelectrical instalhtions in hazardous areas International Association of Oil and Gas Producers
(other than mines) (OGP) (formerly E&P Forum)
BS TIEC 60079-19:1993 Electrical apparatus for Hydrocarbon leak and ignition database, Pubiication
explosive gas atmospheres. Repair and overhaul for 180, 1992
apparatus used in explosive atmospheres (other than
mines) lnternational Chamber of Shippingloll Companiest
ES PD CLCITR 50404:2003 Electrostatics. Code of International Marine Forumflnternational
practice for the avoidance of hazards ctue to static Association of Ports and Harbours
electricity International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and
EN 50284 Special requirements for construction, test Terminals (ISGOTI*)
and marking of electrical apparatus of equipment group
11, category 1 C lnternational Elecfrotechnieai Commission (IEC)
FlEC 60079-0 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas
Engineering Equipment and Materials Users' atmospheres - Part 0:General requirements
Association (EEMUA) XEC 60079-1 Electricat apparatus for explosive gas
Publication 107 Recommendafions for the protection of atmospheres - Part 1 : Flameproof enclosures 'd
diesel engines operating in hazardous areas XEC 60079-2 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas
atmospheres - Part 2: Pressurized encioswes 'p'
European Directives E C 60079-4 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas
1994/9/EC Approximation of the laws of member states -
atmospheres Part 4: Method of test for ignition
concerning equipment and protective systems intended tempaahu;e
for use in potentially explosive atmospheres XEC 600795 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas
199/92/1EC Minimum requirements for improving the atmospheres - Part 5: Powder filIing 'q'
heaith and safety of workers at risk from explosive LEC 600796 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas
atmosphenx atmaspheres - Part 6: Oil-immersion '0'
IEC 60079-7 Eldcal apparatus for exp!osive gas
Health and Safety Executive @lSE) and Health and atmosphem - Part 7: Xncreascd safety 'e'
Safety Commission, published by HSE Books E C 60079-10 Electrid apparatus for explosive gas
IISC Safe isolation of plant and equipment, 1997 a m s p h e m - Part 10: CIassificationof hazardous areas
JiSC Safe operation of ceramic kilns, 1993 IEC 60U79-11 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas
RSE CS 15: Cleaningand gas-fr-ee'mgof tank,^, containing atmospheres - Part I 1: Intrinsic safety 'i'
flammable residues, 1997 IEC 60079-12 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas
I-ISEHS(G)250 Guidance on permit-to-work systems: A atmospheres - Part 12: Classification of nzixtures of
guide for the petroleum, chemical and allied industn'es, gases of v a p w with air according to their maximum
2005 experimental safe gaps and minimum igniting currents
HSE Technology Division Specialist Inspector Report UEC 60079-14 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas
No.9, 'fie fire and explosion hazards of hydraulic atmospheres - Part 14: Electrical installations in
hazardous areas (other than mines) Part 1: Electrical safety code
LEC 60079-15 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas Part 2: Design, construction and operation of distrib-
atmospheres - Part 15: Type of protection 'n' ution installations
IEC 60079-17 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas Part 11: Bitumen safety code
atmospheres - Part 17: Inspection and maintenance of Part 16: Tank cleaning code
electrical installations in hazardous areas (other than Part 21: Guidelines for the control of hazards arising
mines) from static electricity ,

IEC 60079-18 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas

atmospheres - Part 18: Construction, test and marking of Other publications:
type of protection encapsulation'm' electrical apparatus - Road tank vehicle workshop code
IEC 60079-19 Electrical apparatus for.explosive gas - A risk-based approach to hazardous area
atmospheres- Part 19:Repair and overhaul for apparatus classification
used in explosive atmospheres (other than mines or --- Predictions of minimum spark ignitim energy and
explosives) quenching distances for C&/K, and C-,H,JH2
IEC 60079-20 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas lnixtures with air
atmospheres - Part 20: Data for flammable gases and - Calcdations in support of IP15: The area
vapours, relating to the use of electrical apparatus classification code for petroieurn installations
XEC 60079-26 Electrical apparatus for explosive gas - Envimhmental guidelinesforpetroleumdistribution
atmospheres- Part 26: Constraction, test and marking of insdlations
Group I1 Zone 0 electrical apparatus - Recommendation for radio telephone equipment
UEC 60092-502 Electrical installations in ships - Part and its installation in petroleum road tankers
502: Tankers - Special features --- Standard Test Methods for anaiysis and testing of
XEC 60364 Electrical installations of buildings petroleum and related products, and British
IEC 60896 Stationary lead-acid batteries Standard 2000 Parts, 2005 (includes P 34
IEC 60623 Secondary cells and batteries containing Determination of flash point. - Pensky-Martens
alkaJine or other non-acid electrolytes - Vented nickel- closed cup method and. IP 170 Determination of
cadmium prismatic re-chargeable single cells flash point - Abel closed cup method)
IEC 61892-1: 2001 Mobile and fuced ofihore units - - Petmleurn road tanker design and construction
Electrical installations - Part 1: General requirements
and conditions APEAfIP, published by Energy Institute and T h e
IEC 618923: 1999 Mobile and fixed offshore units - Association for Petroteurn and Explosives
Electrical installations - Part 3: Equipment Administration
IEC 61892-5: 2000 Mobile and fixed offshore units - - Design, construction, modification, maintenance
Electrical Installations- Part 5: Mobile units and dewmmissioning of filling seations
IEC 61892-6: 1999 Mobile and Gxed offshore units -
Electrical installations - Part 6: Installation IPTCTr(OOA, published by Energy Institute and
IEC 61892-7: 1W7 Mobile and fixed offshore units - United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association
Electrical installntions - Part 7: I-Iazardous a ~ e a - Guidelinesfor the management, design, installation
and maintenance of small bore tubing systems
lnterr~ationalMaritime Organization @MO)
Code for the construction and equipment of mobile Technical Papers
offshore driIIing units Bowen, P. J. and Shirvill, L. C. 'Presswised
atomisation of high flash point liquids - Implications for
Pnterna~onalStandardisation Organisation (XSO) hazardous area classification', Symposium on European
IS0 13702:1999 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Advances in Process Safety, UMIST, Manchester 19-21
Control and mitigation of fires and explosions on April 1994.
offshore production installations - Requirement and Gale, W. E. 'Module ventilation rates quantified', Oil
guidelines and Gas Journal, 23 December 1985, pp.39-42
IS0 15649: 2001 Petroleum and Natural Gas Lndustries Marshall, M. R The eff& of ventilation on the
- Piping accumulation and dispersal of flammable gases',
LChemE. 4* XntemationalSymposium, Harrogate, 1983
IP, pubiiihed by Energy Institute
Model Codes of Safe Practice in the Petroleum Industry: The British Medical Association, Ziving with rislr'
UK Reguiations United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association
1989 UK Electricity at Work Regulations (UKOOA)
1995 510743 Ofihore Installations(Prevention of Fire UKOQA/IIP, published by UKOOA
and Explosion, and Emergency Response) Regulations Guidelines for the management of the integrity of bolted
' 1996 SI 192 Equipmentand Protective Systems Intended pipe joints
for Use in Potentially Explosive Atmospheres
Regulations (As amended S I 200113766).
1997 SI 1713 Confined Spaces Regulations
1998 SI 2306 Provision and Use o f Work Equipment
2002 SI 2776 Dangerous Substances and Explosive
Atmospheres Regulations '

2004SI 568 The Caniage of Dangernus Goods and Use

o f Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations