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DISTINCTION FOUR

TEXT OF PETER LOMBARD


Chapter One

HIC QUAERITUR UTRUM CONCEDENDUM SIT, 1. HERE IT IS ASKED WHETHER IT IS TO BE GRANTED


QUOD DEUS SE GENUERIT. Hic oritur quaestio satis THAT GOD GENERATED HIMSELF. Here arises a very
necessaria. Constat et irrefragabiliter verum est necessary question. It is certain and is inviolably
quod Deus Pater genuit Filium. Ideo quaeritur, true that God the Father generated the Son. So it is
utrum concedendum sit quod Deus genuit Deum. Si asked whether it is to be granted that God generated
enim Deus genuit Deum, videtur quod aut se Deum, God. For if God generated God, it seems that either
aut alium genuerit. Si vero alium Deum genuit, non God generated God himself, or generated another.
est tantum unus Deus. Si autem se ipsum Deum But if he generated another God, then there is not
genuit, aliqua res se ipsam genuit. Ad quod only one God. But if God generated himself, then a
respondentes dicimus, sane et catholice concedi, thing has generated itself. Responding to this, we
quod unus unum genuit, et quod Deus Deum say that it may well be granted, as in accordance
genuit, quia Deus Pater Deum Filium genuit. In with the Catholic faith, that one generated the one,
symbolo quoque scriptum est: Lumen de lumine, and that God generated God, because God the
Deum verum de Deo vero. Quod vero additur: ergo Father generated God the Son. In the Symbol, too, it
genuit se Deum, vel alium Deum, neutrum is written: Light from light, true God from true God.
concedendum esse dicimus. Quod alium Deum non But as to that which is added, therefore he generated
genuit, manifestum est, quia unus tantum Deus est. God himself or another God, we say that neither is to
Quod autem seipsum non genuit, ostendit be granted. That he did not generate another God is
Augustinus in 1 libro De Trinitate dicens: Qui putant manifest because there is only one God. That he did
eius potentiae esse Deum ut seipsum ipse genuerit, eo not generate himself, Augustine shows this in On
plus errant, quod non solum Deus ita non est, sed nec the Trinity, Book One, saying: As for those who think
spiritualis, neque corporalis creatura. Nulla enim res that it is in God’s power to generate himself, they err
est quae seipsam gignat ut sit. Et ideo non est the more because not only is it not so in the case of
credendum vel dicendum, quod Deus genuit se. God, but it is not so even in the case of a spiritual or
bodily creature. For there is not a thing which
generates itself so that it be. And therefore it is not
to be believed or said that God generated himself.
ALIA QUAESTIO DE EODEM. Sed adhuc opponunt 2. ANOTHER QUESTION ON THE SAME SUBJECT. But
garruli ratiocinatores, dicentes: Si Deus Pater genuit some garrulous rationalizers object, saying: If God
Deum, aut genuit Deum qui est deus Pater, aut the Father generated God, either he generated God
Deum qui non est Deus Pater. Si genuit Deum qui who is God the Father, or God who is not God the
non est Deus Pater, ergo Deus est qui non est Deus Father. If he generated God who is not God the
Pater; non ergo tantum unus Deus est. Si vero Father, then there is a God who is not God the
genuit Deum qui est Deus Pater; ergo genuit se Father; and so there is only one God. But if he
ipsum. Ad quod respondemus determinantes illam generated God who is God the Father, then he
propositionem, qua sic proponunt: Si Deus Pater generated himself. To this we respond by
genuit Deum, aut Deum qui est Deus Pater, aut determining the proposition in which they put this
Deum qui non est Deus Pater; hoc enim sane et forth: If God the Father generated God, [then he
prave intelligi potest: et ideo respondendum est ita: generated] either God who is God the Father, or
Deus Pater genuit Deum qui est ipse Pater: hoc God who is not God the Father. For this can be
dicimus esse falsum; et concedimus alteram, scilicet, understood either correctly or wrongly; and so a
genuit Deum qui non est Pater. Nec tamen genuit response is to be made in these terms: ‘God the
alterum Deum, nec ille qui genitus est, alius Deus Father generated God who is the Father himself,’
est quam Pater, sed unus Deus cum Patre. this we say to be false; and we grant the other,
namely ‘he generated God who is not the Father.’
But he did not ‘generate another God,’ nor is the one
who was generated another God than the Father,
but one God with the Father.
Si vero additur: Genuit Deum qui non est Deus But if it is added: ‘He generated God who is not
Pater, hoc distinguimus: quia dupliciter potest God the Father;’ this we distinguish, because it can
intelligi: Genuit Deum, qui non est Deus Pater, be understood in two ways: ‘he generated God, who
scilicet Deum Filium, qui Filius non est Pater, qui is not God the Father,’ namely God the Son, and the
Deus est, hic sensus verus est. Si vero intelligatur sic: Son is not the Father, who is God’; this sense is true.
Genuit Deum qui non est Deus Pater, idest qui non But if it is understood in this way: ‘he generated
est Deus qui est pater, hic sensus falsus est. Unus God, who is not God the Father,’ that is, who is not
enim et idem Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus that God who is the Father, then this sense is false.
Sanctus; et e converso Pater et Filius et Spiritus For one and the same God is Father and Son and
Sanctus est unus Deus. Holy Spirit; and conversely, Father and Son and
Holy Spirit is one God.

Chapter Two

OPINIO QUORUNDAM DICENTIUM, TRES PERSONA THE OPINION OF SOME WHO SAY THAT THE THREE
ESSE UNUM DEUM, UNAM SUBSTANTIAM, SED NON E PERSONS ARE ONE GOD, ONE SUBSTANCE, BUT NOT
CONVERSO, SCILICET UNUM DEUM VEL UNAM CONVERSELY, THAT ONE GOD OR ONE SUBSTANCE IS
SUBSTANTIAM ESSE TRES PERSONAS. Quidem tamen THREE PERSONS. But some adversaries of the truth
adversarii veritatis concedunt, Patrem, Filium et grant that Father and Son and Holy Spirit, or the
Spiritum sanctum, sive tres personas, esse unum three persons, are one God and one substance, but
Deum, unam substantiam, sed nolunt concedere yet they refuse to concede that the one God or one
unum Deum, sive unam substantiam, esse tres substance is three persons. They say that the divine
personas: dicentes, substantiam divinam praedicari substance is predicated of the three persons, not the
de tribus personis, non tres personas de substantia three persons of the divine substance.
divina.
Fides autem catholica tenet ac praedicat, et tres But the Catholic faith holds and preaches both
personas esse unum Deum, unam substantiam, sive that the three persons are one God, one substance,
essentiam sive divinam naturam; et unum Deum, or essence or divine nature, and that the one God or
sive essentiam divinam, esse tres personas. Unde divine essence is three persons. And so Augustine,
Augustinus in 1 libro De Trinitate ita ait: Recte ipse in On the Trinity, book 1, says as follows: “Rightly is
Deus Trinitas intelligitur beatus, et solus potens. God himself, the Trinity, understood to be blessed
Ecce quam expresse dixit: Ipse Deus Trinitas, ut and alone in dominion.” See how he expressly says
ostenderet, et ipsum Deum esse Trinitatem, et ‘God himself, the Trinity’ in order to show that God
Trinitatem esse ipsum Deum. Item in eodem: In himself is the Trinity, and the Trinity is God himself.
verbis illis, inquit, Apostoli, quibus de adventu Christi – Also, in the same place, he says: “In those words of
agens dicit: - Quem ostendet beatus et solus potens, the Apostle,” in which, speaking of the coming of
Rex regum, et Dominus dominantium, qui solus Christ, Paul says, Whom he will show to be blessed
habet immortalitatem – nec Pater proprie nominatus and alone in dominion, the King of kings and Lord of
est, nec Filius, nec Spiritus Sanctus; sed solus et lords, who alone has immortality, etc., “neither is the
beatus potens, idest unus et solus Deus verus, qui est Father specifically named, nor the Son, nor the Holy
ipsa Trinitas. Ecce et hic aperte dicit unum solum Spirit, but the blessed and alone in dominion, that is,
verum Deum esse ipsam Trinitatem: et si unus Deus the one and only true God, who is the Trinity itself.”
Trinitas est, ergo unus Deus est tres personae. And so he here expressly states that the one and
only true God is the Trinity itself; and if the one God
is the Trinity, then the one God is three persons.
Idem in libro 5 De Trinitate: Non tres Deos, sed Also, in book 5, On the Trinity: “We say that the
unum Deum dicimus esse ipsam praestantissimam same most high Trinity is not three gods, but one
Trinitatem. Idem in libro De fide ad Petrum, in God.” Also in the book On Faith to Peter, in
expositione symboli: Satis est Christiano rerum expounding the Creed: “It suffices for the Christian
creaturum causam, visibilium, sive invisibilium, non to believe the cause of all created things, visible and
nisi bonitatem credere Creatoris, qui est Deus unus et invisible, to be none other than the goodness of the
verus; nullamque esse naturam quae non aut ipse sit, Creator, who is the one and true God. There is no
aut ab ipso; eumque esse Trinitatem, Patrem scilicet nature which is not God or from God, and he is the
et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum. Item Augustinus in Trinity, namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit.”
sermone De fide: Credimus unum Deum, unam esse Also, Augustine in the sermon On Faith: “We believe
divini nominis Trinitatem. Idem in 6 libro De in one God, and that there is one Trinity of the
Trinitate: Dicimus Deum solum esse ipsam divine name.” The same [Augustine], in On the
Trinitatem. Ecce his et aliis pluribus auctoritatibus Trinity, book 6: “We say that the only God is the
evidenter ostendit, dicendum esse et concedendum, Trinity itself.” And so by these and many other
quod unus Deus est Trinitas, et una substantia tres authorities, it is clearly shown that we must say and
personae, sicut e converso Trinitas dicitur esse unus grant that the one God is Trinity, and the one
Deus, et tres personae dicuntur una substantia. substance three persons; and conversely, the Trinity
is said to be the one God, and the three persons are
said to be one substance.
REDIT AD PRAEMISSAM QUAESTIONEM, SCILICET AN HE RETURNS TO THE EARLIER QUESTION, NAMELY
DEUS PATER SE DEUM, AN ALIUM GENUIT DEUM. Nunc WHETHER GOD THE FATHER GENERATED THE GOD
ad praemissam quaestionem revertamur, ubi [THAT IS] HIMSELF OR ANOTHER GOD. Now let us
quaerebatur an Deus Pater genuerit se Deum, an return to the earlier question, where it was asked
alium Deum. Ad quod dicimus, neutrum fore whether God the Father generated the God [that is]
concedendum. Dicit tamen Augustinus in Epistola himself, or another God. To which we say that
ad Maximum, quod Deus Pater alterum se genuit, neither of these is to be granted. But Augustine says,
his verbis: Pater, ut haberet Filium de se ipso, non in his Epistola ad Maximum, that God the Father
minuit seipsum; sed ita genuit de se alterum se, ut generated himself as another; these are his words:
totus maneret in se, et esset in Filio tantus quantus et “The Father, in order to have the Son from himself,
solus. Quod ita intelligi potest, idest, de se alterum a did not diminish himself, but so generated another
se genuit, non utique alterum Deum, sed alteram self from himself that he remained entirely in
personam; vel genuit se alterum, idest genuit himself, and yet was as great in the Son as he is
alterum, qui est hoc quod ipse. Nam etsi alius sit alone.” This may be understood as follows: that is,
Pater quam Filius; non est tamen aliud, sed unum. he generated another from himself, and not at all
another God, but another person; or he generated
another self, that is, he generated another, who is
also what he himself is. Indeed, although the Father
is other [alius] than the Son, yet he is not another
thing [aliud], but one.

COMMENTARY OF SAINT THOMAS

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Postquam probavit Trinitatem personarum in After having proved the Trinity of persons in the
unitate essentiae, auctoritatibus, rationibus et unity of essence by authorities, reasons, and
similitudinibus, hic incipit determinare quaestiones likenesses, here he begins to deal with the questions
incidentes circa praedeterminata. Dividitur autem in about the predetermined arguments. Now, it is
partes duas. Cum enim personarum Trinitas divided into two parts. For, since the persons of the
distinguatur per processionem unius personae ab Trinity are distinguished one person from another
alia, in prima movet quaestiones circa hanc by procession, in the first he brings up questions
processionem quantum ad suppositum et terminum; about this procession as regards the supposit and
in secunda quantum ad principium, 6 distinct., ibi: the terminus; in the second, questions about the
quaeri solet, utrum Pater genuerit Filium voluntate, principle, in Dist. VI, where it says: “It is usual to ask
an necessitate. if the Father has generated the Son by will or by
necessity”.
Sciendum est autem, quod licet Magister Now, one should know that even though the
moveat has quaestiones de generatione Filii a Patre, Master brings up these questions about the
tamen eaedem quaestiones possunt fieri de generation of the Son from the Father, one can still
processione Spiritus sancti, et similiter bring out the same questions about the procession
determinantur. of the Holy Spirit, and they are resolved in a similar
way.
Prima autem pars dividitur in duas: in prima Now, the first part is divided into two: in the
inquirit utrum nomina essentialia concreta possint first, he inquires whether the essential concrete
significari ut suppositum actus generationis, vel ut names can signify as supposit of the act of
terminus; in secunda inquirit de nominibus generation, or as terminus; in the second, he asks
essentialibus in abstractione significantibus, 5 about the essential names that signify in abstraction,
distinct., ibi: post hoc quaeritur, utrum concedendum in Distinction Five, where it says: “After these
sit, quod pater genuit divinam essentiam. De matters, it is asked whether it is to be granted that
personalibus enim non est dubium, supposita the Father generated a divine essence.” Regarding
distinctione personarum per actus notionales. the personal [names] there can be no doubt,
supposing the distinction of persons by notional
acts.
Prima in duas: in prima determinat The first part [is divided] into two: in the first he
quaestionem; in secunda objicit contra determinata, determines the question; in the second, he objects
ibi, nunc ad praemissam quaestionem revertamur. against the determinations made, where it says:
Circa primum inquirit, utrum haec sit vera, Deus “Now let us return to the earlier question.”
genuit Deum: et dividitur in partes duas, secundum Concerning the first he asks whether this is true,
quod duabus viis ex ista propositione procedit. “God generated God”, and it is divided into two
Secunda incipit ibi: sed adhuc opponunt; quae parts, as it proceeds from this proposition according
dividitur in duas: in prima ponit processum ex dicta to two ways. The second begins where it says: “But
propositione ad impossibile, et solvit: et quia in sua some object”; and it is divided into two parts: in the
solutione supponit quod nomen personale possit first he brings the process to the impossible based
praedicari de essentiali, ut dicatur, Deus est Pater, on the aforesaid proposition, and resolves it; and
ideo in secunda excludit errorem contradicentium since in its solution it supposes that the personal
per multas auctoritates, ibi: quidam tamen veritatis name can be predicated of the essential, by way of
adversarii concedunt, patrem et filium et spiritum saying that God is the Father, so in the second he
sanctum, sive tres personas, esse unum Deum, unam excludes the error of those who oppose it by many
substantiam; sed tamen nolunt concedere, unum authorities, where it says: “But some adversaries of
Deum, sive unam substantiam, esse tres personas. the truth grant that Father and Son and Holy Spirit,
or the three persons, are one God and one
substance, and yet they refuse to concede that the
one God or one substance is three persons.”

QUESTION ONE

Ad intellectum hujus partis de duobus To understand this part, two things are
quaeritur: primo de divina generatione; secundo de examined: first, what concerns divine generation;
divina praedicatione. second, what concerns divine predication.
Circa primum tria quaeruntur: 1. an in divinis sit Concerning the first, three things are examined:
generatio; 2. supposito quod sic, an haec sit vera: 1. If in the divine there is generation; 2. Supposing
Deus genuit Deum; 3. de aliis locutionibus quae ex that there is, whether the proposition “God has
ista littera concluduntur. generated God” is true; 3. The other phrases that are
drawn from this text are studied.
ARTICLE ONE
Utrum generatio sit in Deo?
Whether there is a generation in God?

Ad primum sic proceditur. Proceeding to the first.


1. Videtur quod in Deo non sit generatio. 1. It seems that in God there is not a generation.
Generatio enim est species mutationis, secundum For generation is of the species of change, according
Philosophum, V Phys., text. 4. Sed a Deo removetur to the Philosopher, in V Phys. But change is to be
mutatio, Jac. 1, 17: apud quem non est transmutatio, removed from God, [according to] James 1:17, “For
nec vicissitudinis obumbratio. Ergo nec generatio. whom there is not transmutation, nor shadow due
to change”. Therefore, there is no generation [in
God].
2. Praeterea, quanto creaturae sunt nobiliores, 2. Furthermore, insofar as creatures are nobler,
magis accedunt ad divinam similitudinem. Sed in more greatly do they approach to the divine
creaturis nobilioribus non invenitur generatio, sicut likeness. But in the more noble creatures generation
in Angelis et in corporibus caelestibus, sed tantum is not found, as in the Angels and in heavenly
in inferioribus. Ergo videtur quod nec in deo bodies, but the same in inferior things. Therefore, it
inveniatur. seems that neither in God is it found.
3. Item, ubicumque est generatio, oportet quod 3. Also, wherever there is generation, it is
sit aliquid in genito communicatum a generante. necessary that there be something in the generated
Sed per illud quod sibi a generante communicatur communicated by the generator. But based on that
non distinguitur a generante. Ergo oportet ibi esse which is communicated from the generator, [the
aliquid aliud per quod ab ipso distinguatur, cum generated] is not distinguished from the generator.
omne genitum a generante distinctum sit. Ergo Therefore, it is necessary that there be something
omne quod generatur, est compositum, cum sit ibi else by which [the generated] is distinguished from
aliquid et aliquid. Sed in Deo non est compositio. the generator, as everything generated is distinct
Ergo nec generatio. from their generator. Therefore all that is generated
is composite, since there is something and
something else. But in God there is no composition.
Therefore, neither is there generation [in God].
Contra, Isa. ult., 9: Ego qui generationem tribuo On the contrary, in Isaiah 66:9 it is written: “I
sterilis ero? who bring to generation, shall I be sterile?”
Item, omne quod communicat se, communicat As well, all that communicates himself,
se ratione actus qui est in ipso; quia potentia non communicates himself by reason of the act which in
agit nec communicat se. Sed divina essentia est in himself; since the potency does not act nor
primus et purus actus. Ergo videtur quod summe communicate itself. But the divine essence is the
communicet se. Sed non communicat se summe in first and pure act. Therefore, it seems that it
creaturis, cum non terminetur in eamdem naturam supremely communicates itself. But it does not
talis communicatio. Ergo videtur quod communicet communicate itself supremely in creatures, since
se per generationem in Filio; haec enim est maxima such communication does not terminate in the
communicatio. same nature. Therefore, it seems that it
communicates itself by generation in the Son; for
this is the maximum communication.

SOLUTIO. Respondeo dicendum, quod SOLUTION. I respond saying that reason cannot
generationem esse in divinis, ratione efficaciter effectively confirm that generation is in the divine,
confirmari non potest, sicut supra dictum est, dist. 3, as was said above in Dist. 3, q. 1, a. 4, but it is held by
quaest. 1, art. 4, sed auctoritate et fide tenetur: unde authority and by faith: hence, it must simply be
simpliciter concedendum est, generationem esse in conceded that there is a generation in the divine.
divinis.
Sciendum tamen est, quod, cum omnis perfectio However it should be understood that since
sit in Deo et nulla imperfectio, quidquid perfectionis every perfection is in God and there is no
invenitur in creatura, de Deo dici potest quantum ad imperfection, whatever is of perfection that is found
id quod est perfectionis in ipsa, omni remota in creatures, can be said of God as regards what is of
imperfectione. Si autem nomen imponitur ab eo perfection in it, with every imperfection removed.
quod imperfectionis est, sicut lapis, vel leo, tunc Now if the name is imposed from that which is of
dicitur de Deo symbolice vel metaphorice. Si autem imperfection, like stone, or lion, then, it is said of
imponitur ab eo quod est perfectionis, dicitur God symbolically or metaphorically. However, if it is
proprie, quamvis secundum modum eminentiorem. imposed by that which is of perfection, it is said
properly, although in a more eminent way.
Dicitur autem nomen imponi ab eo quod est Now, one says that the name is imposed from
quasi differentia constitutiva et non ex ratione that which is like a constitutive difference and not
generis; et ideo quandocumque aliquid secundum from the notion of the genus; and therefore every
suum genus dicit imperfectionem, et secundum time that something according to its genus means
differentiam, perfectionem, invenitur in Deo imperfection, and according to its difference means
quantum ad rationem differentiae, et non quantum perfection, it is found in God according to the
ad rationem generis: sicut scientia non est in Deo notion of the difference and not according to the
quantum ad rationem habitus vel qualitatis, quia sic notion of the genus: as science is not in God
habet rationem accidentis; sed solum secundum id according to the notion of habit or quality, because
quod complet rationem scientiae, scilicet this has the notion of accident; but only according
cognoscitivum certitudinaliter aliquorum. to that which constitutes the notion of science,
namely, knowing something with certainty.
Similiter dico, quod si accipiamus genus Likewise, I say that if we take the genus of
generationis, secundum quod invenitur in generation, as it is found in inferior beings, it is of
inferioribus, imperfectionis est: mutatio enim, quae imperfection: for change, which is the genus of
est genus ipsius, ponit exitum de potentia ad actum, generation, presents an exiting from potency to act,
et per consequens ponit materialitatem in genito, et and consequently presents materiality in the
per consequens divisionem essentiae: quae omnia generated, and consequently the division of the
divinae generationi non competunt. Si autem essence: all things that do not belong to divine
consideretur secundum differentiam suam, per generation. Now if generation is considered
quam completur ratio generationis, sic dicit aliquam according to its difference, that by which the notion
perfectionem: passive enim accepta dicit of generation is constituted, then is means a
acceptationem essentiae in perfecta similitudine; perfection: for generation taken passively means the
cujus communicationem dicit, si sumatur active: acceptance of the essence in perfect likeness; and, if
quorum neutrum imperfectionem dicit: taken actively, means the communication of the
communicatio enim consequitur rationem actus: essence. Now neither of these two things means
unde omnis forma, quantum est de se, imperfection. For communication follows the notion
communicabilis est; et ideo communicatio pertinet of act; hence every form, to the degree that it is of
ad nobilitatem. Et hoc modo accepta generatione est itself, is communicable; and therefore
per prius in Deo, et omnis generatio in creaturis communication belongs to nobility. And taken in
descendit ab illa, et imitatur eam quantum potest, this way, generation is primarily in God, and every
quamvis deficiat. Unde ad Ephes. III, 15: Ex quo generation in creatures descends from this, and
omnis paternitas in caelis et in terra nominatur. Si imitates it to the degree that it can, although in a
autem accipiatur secundum rationem usitatam in deficient way. Hence, in Ephesians 3:15 it is written:
nomine, secundum quam dicimus generationem in “From which every paternity in heaven and on earth
creaturis, sic non convenit Deo nisi transumptive, is named.” If, however, it is taken according to the
sicut et alia corporalia. usual meaning of the name, according to which we
mean generation in creatures, then it does not
belong to God, unless by transposition, as also in
other corporeal realities.

Et per hoc jam patet solutio ad primum: quia And for this reason the solution to the first is
generatio, secundum suum genus, quod est mutatio, already clear: since generation, according to its
in divinis non invenitur; unde in Deo non est genus, which is change, is not found in the divine;
mutatio, sed operatio divinae naturae, secundum hence in God there is not change, but rather the
Damascenum, lib. I Fid. Orth., cap. VIII. Differt operation of the divine nature, according to
autem operatio a motu, secundum Philosophum, Damascene. Now operation differs from motion,
Ethic., V, cap. IV, V et VI, quia operatio est actus according to the Philosopher, in V Ethics, chs. IV, V
perfecti, sed motus est actus imperfecti, quia and VI, for operation is the act of what is perfect,
existentis in potentia. but motion is the act of the imperfect, since it is of
the existent in potency.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod nulla creatura To the second it should be said, that no creature
susceptibilis est generationis sine eo quod est is susceptible to generation without that which is of
imperfectionis in ipsa: cum enim in omni creatura imperfection in it: for, in fact, in every creature that
differat essentia et esse, non potest essentia essence and being differ, the essence cannot be
communicari alteri supposito, nisi secundum aliud communicated to another supposit, if not according
esse, quod est actus essentiae <in qua est>; et ideo to another being, which is the act of the essence <in
oportet essentiam creatam communicatione dividi, which it is>; and therefore, it is necessary that the
quod imperfectionis est; et ideo in perfectissimis created essence in communication is divided, which
creaturis non invenitur, sed in his quae magis is of imperfection; and therefore, in the most perfect
removentur a divina similitudine. creatures it is not found, but only in those that more
greatly are removed from divine likeness.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod in divina To the third it should be said that in divine
generatione non est aliquid additum essentiae in generation there is not something added to the
genito, per quod differat a generante; sed ex hoc essence in the generated, by which it differs from
ipso quod accipit essentiam a generante, the generator; but from the very fact that [the
distinguitur ab eo relatione dantis et accipientis: generated] receives the essence from the generator,
quae relationes non differunt ab essentia realiter, it is distinguished from the latter by the relation of
sed tantum ratione, ut prius dictum est. Et ideo non the giver and the receiver: and these relations do not
sequitur ibi compositio: quod in aliis esse non differ from the essence really, but only by reason, as
potest, quia nulla relatio est substantia secundum previously said. And therefore [in God] it does not
rem in creaturis. Unde oportet quod omne follow a composition: this cannot occur in other
generatum sit compositum, et sic iterum patet quod things, because no relation is really the substance in
generatio in creaturis sine imperfectione esse non a creature. Hence it is necessary that everything that
potest. is generated be a composite; and thus it is clear that
generation in creatures cannot be without
imperfection.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod generatio realiter To the fourth it should be said that generation is
non est aliquid medium inter Patrem et Filium, cum not really some medium between Father and Son,
generatio secundum rem passive accepta, sit ipsa since generation really taken passively, it filiation
filiatio, quae est proprietas Filii, et est in Filio; et itself, which is a property of the Son and is in the
cum in Patre accipitur active, est ipsa paternitas Son; and since in the Father it is taken actively, it is
quae est in patre, et est ipse pater: tamen significat paternity itself which is in the Father and it the
proprietatem per modum actus, et ista significatio Father himself: nevertheless it means the property
fundatur aliquo modo supra rem in acceptione by way of act, and this meaning is founded in some
unius ab altero. way upon reality in the reception of one by the
other.

ARTICLE TWO
Utrum ista propositio, Deus genuit Deum, sit falsa
Whether this proposition, “God generated God”, is false?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Proceeding to the second. 1. It seems that this
haec sit falsa, Deus genuit Deum. Generatio enim [proposition] is false, “God generated God.” For
importat relationem distinguentem personas, ut generation implies the distinguishing relation of
dictum est, art. praeced.. Si igitur conceditur, quod person, as was said in the previous article. If,
Deus genuit Deum, oportet quod concedatur quod therefore, it is granted, that God generated God, it
Deus distinguitur a deo, et quod Deus est alius a would be necessary that it be granted that God is
deo, quod non conceditur. distinct from God, and that God is other than God,
which it not to be granted.
2. Praeterea, terminus in praedicato positus non 2. Furthermore, the term posited in the
trahit terminum in subjecto positum extra suam predicate does not bring the term posited in the
significationem, sed tantum restringit ipsum ratione subject outside of its meaning, but only restricts it
consignificationis temporis, ut stet pro praesentibus, by reason of the consignification of time, so that it
praeteritis, et futuris: quin potius est e converso, stands for things present, past and future; moreover,
secundum Boetium, quod talia sunt praedicata, it is rather the opposite that is the case, according to
qualia permiserint subjecta. Sed hoc nomen Deus Boethius, that the predicates are those that the
significat essentiam. Ergo per verbum quod subjects permit. Now, the name “God” means the
praedicatur, non trahitur ad standum pro persona, essence. Therefore, from the verb which is
sed supponit essentiam. Haec autem est falsa, predicated, it is not brought to mean the person, but
essentia genuit essentiam, ut infra dicetur, dist. 5, supposes the essence. Now this is false, “the essence
quaest. 1, art. 1. Ergo et haec, Deus genuit Deum. generated the essence” as will be said further on, in
Dist. V, q. 1, a. 1. Therefore this is also false: “God
generated God.”
3. Item, si Deus genuit Deum, ergo Deus est 3. Also, if God generated God, then God is
generans, et Deus est genitus. Sed quidquid dicitur generating, and God is generated. But what is said of
de singulis personis, potest dici de deo. Sed de patre a singular person can be said of God. But of the
dicitur quod est generans et de filio quod non est Father it is said that he is generating and of the Son
generans. Ergo potest dici quod Deus generat et that he is not generating. Therefore, it can be said
Deus non generat: quod falsum Est. Ergo et prima that God generates and God does not generate:
est falsa, Deus genuit Deum. which is false. And therefore the first proposition
“God generates God” is false.
Contra, in symbolo dicitur: Deum de Deo On the contrary, it is said in the Symbol: God
genitum. Sed non generatur de deo, nisi sicut de from God is generated. But one is not generated
generante. Ergo Deus generat Deum. from God, unless as from a generator. Therefore
God generates God.
Praeterea, Deus dicit habentem deitatem. Ergo Furthermore, God is said to have deity.
quidquid dicitur de habente deitatem, potest dici de Therefore, what is said to have deity, can be said of
Deo. Sed potest dici: habens deitatem generat God. But it can be said: the one having deity
habentem deitatem. Ergo potest dici: Deus generat generated the one having deity. Therefore, it can be
Deum. said, “God generated God.”

SOLUTIO. Respondeo dicendum, quod ista est SOLUTION. I respond saying that this
simpliciter vera et concedenda, Deus generat Deum. [proposition] is absolutely true and should be
Sed circa veritatem ejus est duplex opinio. Quidam granted, “God generates God.” But about its truth
enim dicunt, quod hoc nomen “Deus” significat there are two opinions. For some say that this name
essentiam et supponit essentiam quantum est de se, “God” means the essence and denotes the essence
sed propter indifferentiam essentiae ad personas in with regard to what it is in itself, but on account of
divinis, ex adjuncto notionali trahitur ad the indifference of the essence to the persons in the
supponendum pro persona. Alii dicunt quod hoc divine, with an added notional is brought to denote
nomen “Deus” significat essentiam, et supponit, the person. Others say that this name “God” means
quantum est de se, personam, tamen indistincte: the essence and denotes, with regard to what it is in
unde potest supponere unam tantum vel plures itself, the person, although indistinctly: hence it can
personas: unam cum dicitur, Deus generat: plures, denote only one person or many persons: for one
ut cum dicitur Deus est Trinitas. Et haec opinio [person] it means, God generated; for many
videtur verior esse. Quamvis enim, ut dicitur Lib. De [persons] it mean God is Trinity. And this is the
causis, prop. 6, omne nomen deficiat a significatione opinion that seems to be more true. Yet, although as
divini esse, propter hoc quod nullum nomen it is said in the De causis, prop. 6, every name is
significat simul aliquid perfectum et simpliciter lacking in signifying the divine, on account of the
(quia abstracta non significant ens per se subsistens, fact that no name means simultaneously something
et concreta significant ens compositum), perfect and simple (since abstract names cannot
nihilominus tamen abjicientes id quod signify subsistent being per se, and concrete names
imperfectionis est, utimur utrisque nominibus in signify composite being), nevertheless, eliminating
divinis, abstractis propter simplicitatem, concretis that which is of imperfection, we use both names for
propter perfectionem. Unde hoc nomen Deus the divine, abstract names for simplicity, concrete
significat per modum perfecti et per se subsistentis, names for perfection. Hence, this name “God”
sicut et hoc nomen homo: unde, sicut et hoc nomen signifies by way of the perfect and subsistent per se,
homo in se importat non tantum essentiam, sed as also the name “man”, by which, just as the name
etiam suppositum, sed indistincte (alias non “man” in itself implies not only the essence, but also
praedicaretur de individuis), ita et hoc nomen Deus. the supposit, yet indistinctly (otherwise it would not
Et ideo de se habet quod possit supponere pro be predicated of individuals), so also the name
persona, et non habet quod supponat pro essentia ex “God.” And therefore of itself it can denote the
modo significandi nominis, sed tantum ex ratione person, and not the essence with regard to the mode
divinae simplicitatis, in qua idem est re essentia et of signifying of the name, but only by reason of
suppositum. divine simplicity, in which the essence and the
supposit are the identical thing.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod generari To the first, therefore, it should be said that to
significat proprietatem per modum actus; actus generate signifies the property by way of act; now,
autem est suppositorum tantum: humanitas enim the act is only of the supposits: for humanity does
non generat, sed homo: et ideo cum dicitur, Deus not generate, but man does: and therefore when it is
generat Deum, locutio simpliciter est vera, quia said that “God generates God,” the phrase is true
actus non potest referri nisi ad suppositum. Sed simply, because the act can only refer to the
referri et distingui non significant actus nisi supposit. However, to refer and to distinguish do
grammatice loquendo; et ideo possunt referri ad not signify to act if not grammatically speaking. And
essentiam et ad suppositum: et ideo non simpliciter therefore they can refer to the essence and to the
conceditur, Deus distinguitur a Deo, ne distinctio supposit, and therefore it is not simply granted that
referatur ad essentiam; et praecipue cum hoc nomen God is distinguished from God, nor is distinction
Deus importet suppositum indistinctum, quod non referred to the essence: and principally when this
distinguitur nisi personali proprietate adjuncta, ut name “God” implies the indistinct supposit, which is
paternitate vel filiatione. not distinguished unless by an added personal
property, such as paternity or filiation.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod, quamvis hoc To the second it should be said that even
nomen “Deus” significet essentiam, tamen, quantum though the name “God” signifies the essence, still,
est de se, supponit habentem essentiam, et rem with regard to what it is in itself, it denotes that
naturae, etiam non intellectis personis, quas fides which has the essence and the thing of nature, even
distinguit. Unde potest supponere pro persona, without understanding the persons, which faith
etiamsi ab alio non restringatur. Et quia supponit distinguishes. Hence, it can denote the person even
personam indistincte, ideo potest stare in locutione if it is not restricted by the other. And since it
pro quacumque persona: et sic reddit locutionem denotes the person indistinctly, it can therefore
veram. Unde in hac propositione, Deus generat stand in a phrase for any person. And this makes the
Deum, in supposito stat pro Patre, in apposito pro phrase true. Hence in this proposition, “God
Filio. generates God”, in the subject [God] stands for the
Father and in the predicate [God] stands for the Son.
Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc nomen “Deus,” To the third it should be said that the name
proprie loquendo, nec est universale nec singulare; “God,” properly speaking is neither universal nor
sed habet aliquid de ratione universalis, scilicet singular, but has something of the universal notion,
quod praedicatur essentialiter de pluribus namely, the fact that it is predicated essentially of
suppositis; et inde habet quod ea quae praedicantur many supposits; and therefore that which is
de singulis suppositis, praedicantur de ipso: habet predicated of the singular supposits is predicated of
autem de ratione singularis hoc quod non this; it also has the notion of singular by the fact
multiplicatur ad multitudinem suppositorum: that it is not multiplied to many supposits: for we
dicimus enim, quod Pater et Filius sunt unus Deus, say that the Father and the Son are one God, but
sed Socrates et Plato sunt plures homines: et ex Socrates and Plato are many men: and from this part
parte ista habet hoc nomen “Deus” quod negatio et the name “God” has the characteristic that negation
affirmatio opponuntur contradictorie: unde sicut and affirmation oppose each other in a
istae non possunt simul esse verae, socrates currit et contradictory way: hence, just as this cannot be
non currit; ita nec istae, Deus generat et non simultaneously true, “Socrates runs and does not
generat. run;” so also neither can this, “God generates and
does not generate.”

ARTICLE THREE
Utrum Deus genuit se Deum vel alium Deum.
Whether God generates God himself or another God.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Proceeding to the third. 1. It seems that either
genuit vel se Deum, vel alium Deum. Idem enim et God generates God himself or another God. For
diversum universaliter dividunt ens. Sed “se” est “same” and “diverse” universally divide being. But
relativum identitatis, “alius” autem importat “himself” is a relation of identity and another
diversitatem. Ergo oportet dicere, quod genuit vel se implies diversity. Therefore it is necessary to say
Deum vel alium Deum. that God generates God himself or another God.
2. Item, ut supra dictum est, hoc nomen “Deus” 2. Also, as was said above, this name “God” is
trahitur ad standum pro persona ex notionali taken to stand for the person from the notional
adjuncto. Sed “alius” importat distinctionem addition. But “another” implies a notional
notionalem. Ergo ly “alius” hoc nomen “Deus” facit distinction. Therefore, “another” makes this name
stare pro persona. Sed haec est vera: Deus genuit “God” stand for the person. But this is true: God
aliam personam divinam. Ergo et haec: Deus genuit generates another divine person. And, therefore,
alium Deum. this is also true: God generates another God.
3. Item, videtur quod haec sit vera, Deus genuit 3. Also, it seems that this is true: that God
se Deum. Idem enim, ut dicit Philosophus, V generates the God [that is] himself. For identical, as
Metaphys., cap. XV, vel in ant. exemp., cap. XVII est the Philosopher says, in V Metaphys, ch. 15, or later
unum in substantia, sicut aequale unum in on in ch. 17, is one in substance, just as equal is one
quantitate. Sed sicut una magnitudo est Patris et in quantity. But just as the magnitude of Father and
Filii, sic et una substantia. Ergo sicut conceditur ista, Son is one, so also the substance is one. Therefore,
Deus genuit aequalem Deum; ita debet concedi ista, just as this is granted: God has generated an equal
Deus genuit eumdem Deum. Unde similiter et haec, God, so also the other is granted, God has generated
Deus genuit se Deum, cum “se” sit relativum the same God. Therefore, similarly also this, that
identitatis. God generates the God [that is] himself, when
“himself” is [taken as] a relation of identity.
Item, quaeritur de aliis duabus propositionibus, 4. Also, two other propositions are inquired
scilicet, genuit Deum, qui est Deus Pater, vel Deum about, namely, [God] generated the God who is God
qui non est Deus Pater. Videtur enim quod haec sit the Father or [God generated] the God who is not
falsa: genuit Deum qui est Deus Pater. “Qui” enim God the Father. For it seems that the following
cum sit relativum, facit secundam notitiam [proposition] is false: [God] generated the God who
suppositorum. Sed iste terminus Deus, ad quem is God the Father. “Who”, since it is a relative
refertur, stabat pro persona Filii. Ergo et relativum [term], provides a second knowledge of the
supponet personam Filii. Sed haec est falsa: Filius est supposits. But this term God, to which it is referred,
Deus Pater. Ergo et haec, Deus genuit Deum, qui est stands for the person of the Son. Therefore, the
Deus Pater. relative also denotes the person of the Son. But the
following [proposition] is false: the Son is God the
Father. Therefore, this [proposition] is also false,
God generated the God who is God the Father.
Item, videtur quod etiam negativa sit falsa. 5. Also, it seems that the negative is also false.
Negatio enim respicit terminum sequentem For the negation regards the following formal
formalem. Ergo cum dicit, Deus genuit Deum qui terminus. Therefore when one says, God generated
non est Deus Pater, a Filio, quem refert relativum, the God who is not God the Father, by negation one
per negationem removetur ly Deus, qui in removes from the Son, to which the relative refers,
praedicato ponitur, non tantum quantum ad the term God, which is in the predicate, not only
suppositum, sed quantum ad formam; et ita divina with regard to the supposit, but also with regard to
essentia removebitur a Ffilio, quod falsum est. the form; and thus the divine essence is removed
from the Son, which is false.

SOLUTIO. Respondeo dicendum, quod magister SOLUTION. I respond saying that, in the text, the
in littera negat utramque praemissarum; eo quod Master denies both premises; since “another”, since
alius, cum notet diversitatem, ponit formam suam it denotes diversity, posits its form concerning the
circa terminum cui adjungitur, cum sit adjectivum, term to which it is added, since it is an adjective,
et ita designabitur diversitas in forma divinitatis. Ly and thus designates diversity in the form of the
se autem cum sit relativum identitatis, refert idem divinity. “Himself”, on the other hand, since it is a
suppositum; et ita cum dico: genuit se Deum, relation of identify, refers to the same supposit; and
ponitur indistinctio suppositi inter patrem et filium; thus when I say: generated God himself, it posits an
et cum dicitur, genuit alium Deum, ponitur indistinction of supposits between Father and Son;
diversitas naturae; et ideo utraque neganda est. and when it is said: “has generated another God” it
posits a diversity of nature; and therefore both are to
be denied.
Sed sunt aliqui qui distinguunt istam, genuit However, there are some who distinguish this
alium Deum; quia ly alium potest teneri substantive [proposition] “generated another God,” since the
vel adjective. Si adjective, tunc erit locutio falsa, quia term another can be taken as a substantive or as an
ponet diversitatem circa hunc terminum Deus; si adjective. If it is taken as an adjective, then the
substantive, tunc erit constructio appositiva, et phrase will be false, since it posits a diversity
locutio erit vera, et erit sensus, genuit alium Deum, concerning the term God; if it is taken as a
qui est Deus. Sed, quia non invenitur quod substantive, then it will be an apposite construction,
adjectivum in masculino genere substantivetur, et and the phrase will be true, and the sense will be,
maxime cum adjungitur sibi substantivum, ideo generated another God who is God. But, since one
haec distinctio non videtur multum valere; nisi forte does not find that the adjective of the masculine
subintelligatur hoc participium “ens” ut dicatur gender be substantive, and above all when it is
alium entem Deum. Sed hoc erit nimis extortum; et added to a substantive, so this distinction does not
ideo dicendum cum Magistro quod utraque falsa est. seem to have much value; if not perhaps
understanding the participle “being” [ens] so that it
means another God-being. But this will be too
forced; and therefore one should say with the
Master that both are false.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod idem et To the first, therefore, it should be said that
diversum sufficienter dividunt ens creatum, propter “same” and “diverse” sufficiently divide created
hoc quod ubicumque in creaturis est diversitas being, on account of the fact that each time there is
suppositorum, est diversitas essentiae; sed in Deo in a diversity of supposits in creatures, there is a
diversis suppositis est una essentia: et ideo nec diversity of essence; but in God, in the diverse
identitas competit propter diversitatem supposits there is one essence: and therefore,
suppositorum nec diversitas propter identitatem neither identity belongs [to God] on account of the
essentiae; sed tantum unitas. diversity of supposits, nor diversity on account of
the identity of essence, but only unity.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod alius importat To the second it should be said that “another”
distinctionem in communi, non magis personalem implies a distinction in common, which is not more
quam essentialem: et ideo quando adjungitur personal than essential: and therefore when it is
termino personali, importat distinctionem added to a personal term it implies a personal
personalem; quando autem adjungitur termino distinction; but when it is added to an essential
essentiali, importat diversitatem essentiae, term, it implies a diversity of essence, according to
secundum exigentiam formae illius termini; cum the requirement of the form of that term; in fact, the
termini, praecipue substantiales, recipiant terms, above all the substantial terms, receive
diversitatem et pluralitatem ex parte suae formae. diversity and plurality on behalf of their forms.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod idem significat To the third it should be said that “same”
unitatem in substantia; et praeter hoc, quia signifies unity in substance; and for this, because it
relativum est et habet articulationem implicitam, is relative and has an implicit articulation, it implies
importat unitatem suppositi, et multo plus hoc the unity of the supposit; and much more so the
pronomen “se,” quod est etiam relativum pronoun “himself,” which is also a reciprocal
reciprocum, quod non est reperire in hoc nomine relative; something that is not found in the word
“aequale:” et ideo non est simile quod pro simili “equal,” and therefore it is not similar to that which
inducitur. is presented as such.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod Magister To the fourth it should be said that the Master
distinguit utramque illarum propositionum. Si enim distinguishes both propositions. For if when it is
cum dicitur, Deus genuit Deum, qui est Deus Pater, said that God generates the God who is God the
ly Pater construitur appositive ad ly Deus, locutio Father, there Father is presented appositively to the
falsa est: quia tunc ly Deus restringetur ad standum term “God,” then the phrase is false: because God is
pro persona Patris; et sic erit sensus: genuit Deum, restricted to stand for the person of the Father; and
qui est ipse Pater: et sic affirmativa falsa est, et this will be the sense: [God] generated God, who is
negativa vera. Si autem intelligantur non per the Father himself. [In this case,] the affirmative is
appositionem, sed mediate conjungi illi duo termini, false and the negative is true. Now if they are not
scilicet Deus, et Pater; ut sit sensus: genuit Deum understood by apposition, but by means of the
qui est Deus et Deus est Pater; tunc affirmativa vera conjunction of the two terms, namely, God and
est, et negativa falsa. Praepositivus tamen dixit, Father, so that this is the sense: [God] generated
quod utraque falsa est, nec sunt contradictoriae God who is God and God is Father, then the
propter diversam suppositionem hujus relativi qui: affirmation is true and the negative false. Still
in affirmativis enim refert tantum suppositum Praepositivus [the Chancellor] says that both
antecedentis, et cum antecedens supponat pro [propositions] are false, and that they are not
persona Filii, referret personam Filii, de qua non est contradictory on account of the diverse denotation
verum dicere, quod sit Deus pater. In negativa vero of the relative [term] “who:” in the affirmation it
relativum refert non tantum suppositum, sed etiam refers only to the supposit of the antecedent, and
essentiam. Unde oporteret quod hoc praedicatum since the antecedent denotes the person of the Son,
Deus Pater removeretur non tantum a supposito it will refer to the person of the Son, of which it is
Filii, sed etiam ab essentia: et ita falsa est. Sed quia not true to say that he is God the Father. In the
hac distinctione facta, adhuc habet locum distinctio negative, however, the relative [term “who”] refers
Magistri, et praecipue in affirmativa; et iterum quia not only to the supposit, but also to the essence.
non videtur necessarium esse quod in negativis Hence it would be necessary that the predicate God
relativum referat aliter quam in affirmativis, nisi the Father be removed not only from the supposit of
forte propter negationem, cujus est confundere the Son, but also from the essence, and this is false.
terminum et facere eum teneri simpliciter (quod But because this distinction that is made still has a
tamen non habet respectu praecedentis, sed tantum place in the Master’s distinction, and above all in
respectu sequentis): ideo videtur efficacior via the affirmative, unless perhaps on account of the
magistri, et secundum ipsum concedendum est, negation, to which it belongs to confuse the term
quod utraque potest esse vera et falsa; secundum and make this to be taken simply (which, however,
cujus distinctionem patet solutio ad quartum is not had with respect to what precedes, but only
argumentum. with respect to what follows): so the way of the
Master seems more effective, and according to this,
it should be granted that both [propositions] can be
true and false. And according to this distinction, the
solution to the fourth argument is clear.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod quando duo To the fifth it should be said that when two
termini contrahuntur per appositionem, terminus terms are contracted by apposition, the apposite
appositus efficitur quasi forma ei cui apponitur. term becomes the form of that to which it is
Unde si intelligatur appositive: genuit Deum qui apposited. For this reason, if the following is
non est Deus Pater, negatio non removebit formam understood appositively, generates God who is not
divinitatis sed paternitatis a Filio. God the Father, the negation does not remove the
form of divinity, but rather paternity from the Son.

QUESTION TWO

Deinde quaeritur de divina praedicatione. Et Then, divine predication is examined. And


circa hoc duo quaeruntur: 1. utrum possit fieri about this two things are asked: 1. whether one can
praedicatio in divinis per propositionem aliquam; 2. make a predication about God by means of some
utrum possit persona praedicari de essentia. proposition; 2. whether person can be predicated of
the essence.

ARTICLE ONE
Utrum de divinis possit formari propositio
Whether one can form a proposition about the Divine

Ad primum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod in Proceeding to the first. 1. It seems that in the
divinis non possit aliqua formari propositio, in qua divine one cannot form some proposition, in which
aliquid de ipso praedicetur. Veritas enim signi something is predicated of him. For the truth of the
consistit in conformitate signi ad signatum. Sed sign consists in the conformity of the sign to the
omnis praedicatio fit per aliquam compositionem. signed. But every predication is made by some
Cum igitur in Deo nulla sit compositio, videtur quod composition. Since, therefore, nothing is composite
de ipso nulla possit formari vera praedicatio. in God, it seems that no true predication can be
form about him.
2. Item Dionysius, cap. II Caelest. Hierar.: In Deo 2. Also, Dionysius says in II Caelest. Hierar.:
negationes sunt verae affirmationes incompactae. “With respect to God negations are true, and
Appellatur autem incompactum illud quod non est affirmations are inadequate.” And that which is not
debito modo ordinatum, nec est competens. Sed ordered in a proper way is called inadequate and is
talis inordinatio inducit falsitatem in does not belong. But such disorder introduces falsity
propositionibus. Ergo videtur idem quod prius. in propositions. Therefore, it seems [to conclude]
the same as before.
Contra: fidei non potest subesse falsum. Sed On the contrary, there can be nothing false
multae propositiones affirmativae enunciantur a contained in the faith. Now, many affirmative
nobis de Deo secundum fidem nostram, scilicet propositions are enunciated by us about God
quod Deus est trinus et unus. Ergo videtur quod de according to our faith, namely, that God is triune
Deo possit formari vera propositio. and one. Therefore, it seems that concerning God a
true proposition can be formed.
Item, secundum Boetium, nulla propositio est Also, according to Boethius, no proposition is
verior illa in qua idem de se praedicatur. Sed truer than that in which a thing is predicated of
quidquid est in divinis, est idem re, cum in Deo sit itself. But what is in the divine is the same thing,
idem habens et habitum, et quod est et quo est, since in God having and habit are the same, and also
excepto quod una persona non est alia. Ergo videtur that which is and that by which it is, except that one
quod de Deo possint formari verissimae locutiones. person is not the other. Therefore, it seems that
concerning God most true phrases can be formed.

SOLUTIO. Respondeo dicendum, quod SOLUTION. I respond saying that the enunciation
enuntiatio sequitur apprehensionem. Unde follows upon apprehension. Hence, insofar as we
secundum quod intelligimus aliqua, oportet quod understand something, it is necessary that we
enuntiemus illa. Apprehensio autem fit secundum enunciate it. For apprehension is done according to
potestatem apprehendentis; et ideo ea quae sunt the power of the apprehender; and, therefore, our
simplicia intellectus noster enuntiat per modum intellect enunciates those things that are simple by
cujusdam compositionis; sicut e contrario Deus way of some composition. God, on the contrary
intelligit res compositas modo simplici: et inde est understands a composite thing in a simple way: and
quod intellectus noster de Deo format propositiones hence our intellect forms propositions about God by
ad modum rerum compositarum, a quibus way of composite things, from which it naturally
naturaliter cognitionem accipit. receives knowledge.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intellectus To the first, therefore, it should be said that our
noster deficit a cognitione divinae majestatis, intellect is lacking with regard to the knowledge of
similiter etiam et enuntiatio deficit a significatione divine majesty, and likewise, the enunciation is
perfecta; nihilominus tamen est veritas, inquantum lacking with regard to perfect signification;
intellectus formans enuntiationem accipit duo quae nevertheless there is truth, insofar as the intellect
sunt diversa secundum modum et idem secundum that forms enunciations takes two things which are
rem. Unde secundum diversitatem rationum format diverse according to mode and identical according
praedicatum et subjectum, et secundum identitatem to the thing. Hence, according to the diversity of
componit. notions it forms the predicate and subject, and
according to identity it combines them.
Ad secundum dicendum, quod affirmativae To the second it should be said that affirmative
propositiones pro tanto dicuntur incompactae in propositions are inadequate with respect to the
divinis, quia nihil eorum quae praedicantur de ipso divine, since nothing of which is predicated of it
significant ipsum per modum quo ipse est, sed per signifies according to the mode in which he is, but
modum quo intellectus noster accipit ex rebus according to the way in which our intellect receives
creatis informatus. Unde oportet quod nomina illa [having been] informed by created things. Hence, it
praedicata de Deo intelligantur praedicari remotis is necessary that those names predicated about God
illis modis quibus de creaturis praedicantur. Unde are understood to be predicated having removed
Dionysius omnes divinas praedicationes ita docet those modes with which they are predicated of
exponere: Deus est sapiens, et non sapiens, scilicet creatures. Hence, Dionysius teaches that every
sicut alia, ut differat in eo sapientia a sapiente; sed divine predication is to be expounded as follows:
est supersapiens, inquantum est in ipso nobiliori God is wise, and not wise, namely, as others [are
modo sapientia quam significetur per nomen. wise], such that there is a difference in him between
wisdom and the wise; however, he is super-wise,
insofar as there is wisdom in him in a more noble
manner than is signified by the name.

ARTICLE TWO
Utrum persona possit praedicari de essentia
Whether person can be predicated of the essence?

Ad secundum sic proceditur. 1. Videtur quod Proceeding to the second. 1. It seems that
persona non possit praedicari de essentia. person cannot be predicated of the essence. For,
Praedicatum enim habet rationem formae. Sed predicate has the ratio of form. But person is the
persona est suppositum formae, vel naturae. Ergo supposit of the form or the nature. Therefore,
persona non habet rationem quod praedicetur de person does not have the ratio which is predicated
natura vel essentia. of the nature or essence.
2. Item, praedicatum semper significatur inesse 2. Also, predicate always means to inhere in a
subjecto. Persona autem non significatur ut subject. Now the person is not signified as inherent
inhaerens essentiae, sed e converso. Ergo persona in the essence, rather the opposite is the case.
non potest praedicari de essentia. Therefore, person cannot be predicated of the
essence.
3. Item, superius per se praedicatur de suo 3. Also, the superior is predicated per se of its
inferiori, sicut homo de Socrate; sed Socrates inferior, as man of Socrates; but Socrates is
accidentali praedicatione praedicatur de homine; predicated of man with an accidental predication; it
accidit enim homini esse Socratem. Sed sicut happens in fact to man to be Socrates. But just as
Socrates est suppositum humanae naturae, ita Pater Socrates is a supposit of human nature, so also the
est suppositum naturae divinae. Ergo videtur quod Pater is a supposit of divine nature. Therefore, it
haec non sit vera, Deus est pater, nisi forte per seems that this is not true, that “God is Father,”
accidens. unless perhaps accidentally.
4. Item, sicut dictum est, Sup., qu. 1, art. 2, hoc 4. Also, as was said above in q. 1, a. 2, this name
nomen Deus, quantum est de se, supponit God, with regard to what it is in itself, denotes the
personam. Sed haec est falsa: una persona est Fater person. But this is false: a person is Father and Son
et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Ergo haec etiam: unus and Holy Spirit. Therefore this is also false: One God
Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. is Father and Son and Holy Spirit.
5. Item videtur quod haec etiam sit falsa, Deus 5. Also, it seems that this is also false: God is
est Trinitas. Nihil enim praedicatur de homine quod Trinity. For nothing is predicated about man that is
non praedicetur de aliquo supposito hominis. Sed not predicated of some supposit of man. But Trinity
Trinitas neque praedicatur de patre neque de filio is not predicated of the Father, nor of the Son, nor
neque de spiritu sancto. Ergo per eamdem rationem of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, for the same reason, it
non potest dici quod Deus sit trinitas. cannot be said that God is Trinity.

SOLUTIO. Respondeo dicendum, quod in divinis SOLUTION. I respond saying that, in the divine,
est omnino indifferentia naturae ad suppositum; et nature is completely undifferentiated with respect to
ideo nec est ibi universale neque particulare: et ideo supposit; and therefore there is no universal nor
sicut vere praedicatur essentia de persona, ita et e particular; and thus as one truly predicates the
converso. Sed verum est quod quantum ad modum essence of the person, so also the converse. But it is
significandi plus habet de proprietate propositio in true that according to the mode of signifying the
qua praedicatur essentia, quam in qua praedicatur proposition in which the essence is predicated is
persona, cum praedicatum se habeat loco formae. more proper than that in which one predicates the
person, since the predicate occupies the place of the
form.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod quamvis To the first, therefore, it should be said that
persona sit suppositum, nihilominus tamen propter even though the person is the supposit, nevertheless
indifferentiam suppositi ad naturam persona est on account of the undifferentiation of the supposit
aequalis simplicitatis cum natura; et ideo de se with respect to the nature, the person is simply
conversim praedicantur. equal to the nature; and therefore they are
predicated conversely of each other.
Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum: quia in And for this reason the solution to the second is
Geo habens et habitum sunt idem re. clear: because in God having and habit are the same
thing.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod in divinis non est To the third it should be said that in the divine
aliquid accidentale, nec est ibi universale et there is nothing accidental, nor is there universal
particulare; et ideo nihil dicitur ibi per accidens, and particular; and therefore, nothing is said there
neque per consequens, sicut in creaturis; sed tantum accidentally, nor consequentially, as in creatures;
attenditur ibi alius et alius modus significandi. but there one looks only to one and the other way of
signifying.
Ad quartum dicendum, quod hoc nomen Deus, To the fourth it should be said that this name
quantum est de se, quamvis supponat pro persona, “God,” with regard to what it is in itself, although it
nihilominus tamen non supponit pro aliqua persona stands for the person, nevertheless does not denote
distincte, immo indeterminate; nec forma significata some person in a distinct way, but rather in an
per nomen “Deus,” a qua nomen imponitur, est indeterminate way; neither is the form signified by
proprietas personalis, sed natura communis: et ideo the name “God,” from which the name is imposed, a
unitas significata per hoc adjectivum “unus,” personal property, but a common nature. And
refertur ad formam divinitatis, et non ad therefore, the unity signified by the adjective “one,”
suppositum. Sed hoc nomen “persona” imponitur a is referred to the form of the divinity, and not to the
personali proprietate, quae est forma significata per supposit. But the name "person” is imposed from a
terminum; et ideo haec est falsa: una persona est personal property, which is the form signified by the
Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus; quia significaretur terminus. And therefore this is false, “one person is
una personalitas trium personarum. Father and Son and Holy Spirit since it would signify
one personality of the three persons.
Ad quintum dicendum, quod Pater supponit To the fifth it should be said that Father denotes
personam distinctam, similiter et Filius et Spiritus a distinct person and similarly Son and Holy Spirit;
sanctus; sed hoc nomen Deus supponit personam instead the name “God” denotes the person in an
indeterminate; et ideo ratione indeterminationis indeterminate way: and thus by reason of the
aliquid potest praedicari de Deo quod de nulla indetermination one can predicate of God that
distinctarum personarum praedicatur: sicut etiam which is not predicated of any of the distinct
de homine dicitur, quod nulli singularium convenit persons; as also in man one says that to none of the
esse commune vel speciem vel aliquid hujusmodi. singulars belongs common being, or the species, or
Quod autem plures personae hominum non possunt something similar. Now, the reason that many
simul praedicari de hoc nomine “homo,” ratio est human persons cannot be predicated
quia plures personae non sunt unus homo sicut simultaneously with regard to the name “man,” is
plures personae sunt unus Deus et trinitas; et ideo because many persons are not one man as [instead]
convenienter dicitur: Deus est tres personae vel many persons are one God and Trinity; and
Trinitas.” therefore it is correct to say: “God is three persons or
Trinity.”

EXPOSITION OF THE TEXT

“Deus Pater alterum se genuit.” Hoc dupliciter “God the Father generates another himself.”
solvit Magister. Quia ly “se” potest esse ablativi This is resolved in two ways by the Master. The term
casus, et tunc simpliciter vera est: et est sensus: “himself” can be in the ablative case, and then the
Genuit alterum se, idest alterum a se. Vel potest esse proposition is simply true, and the sense is
accusativi casus; et tunc vel facit simplicem Generated another himself, i.e., another from
relationem; et sic iterum vera est, refert enim himself. Or it can be in the accusative case; and then
identitatem naturae; tamen erit impropria: vel faciet either it establishes a simple relation, and thus it is
relationem personalem et sic est falsa, quia refert still true, since it refers to the identity of nature; still
idem suppositum. it will be improper: or it establishes a personal
relation, and then it is false, since it refers to the
same supposit.
Potest tamen dici, quod etiam si referat idem One can still say that even if it refers to the
suppositum, quodammodo erit vera, sed erit same supposit, it is true in a certain sense, but it will
emphatica locutio, ut sit sensus: Genuit alterum se, be an emphatic phrase, with this meaning: “he
idest similem sibi; sicut dicit poeta: “di faciant sine generated another himself, i.e. similar to himself; as
me ne moriatur ego.” the Poet says: “the gods accomplish without me that
my I does not die”.