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DISTINCTION THREE

TEXT OF PETER LOMBARD


Chapter One

INCIPIT OSTENDERE QUOMODO PER CREATURAM 1. HERE HE BEGINS TO SHOW HOW THE CREATOR
POTUERIT COGNOSCI CREATOR. Apostolus namque ait COULD BE KNOWN THROUGH CREATURES. For the
(Rom 1, 20) quod invisibilia Dei, a creatura mundi per Apostle says (Rom. 1:20) that the invisible things of
ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, God, as also his eternal power and divinity, are
sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas. Per perceived by a creature of the world, having been
creaturam mundi intelligitur homo, propter understood through the things which are made. By a
excellentiam qua excellit inter alias creaturas, vel creature of the world, man is understood on account
propter convenientiam quam habet cum omni of the excellence by which he excels all other
creatura. Homo igitur invisibilia Dei intellectu creatures, or on account of the accord which he has
mentis conspicere potuit, vel etiam conspexit, per ea with every creature. Therefore, man was able to
quae facta sunt, idest per creaturas visibiles, vel perceive, or even perceived, by the understanding of
invisibiles. A duobus enim iuvabatur, scilicet a his mind, the invisible things of God through the
natura, quae rationalis erat, et ab operibus a Deo things which are made, that is, through visible or
factis ut manifestaretur homini veritas. Ideo invisible creatures. For he was helped by two things,
Apostolous (Rom 1, 19) dicit, quia Deus revelavit illis, namely nature, which was rational, and by the
scilicet dum fecit opera in quibus artificis works which God had done in order that the truth
aliquatenus relucet indicium. should become manifest to man. Hence, the Apostle
says (Rom. 1:9) that God revealed to them, namely
when he made the works in which the mark of the
maker shines forth in some manner.
PRIMA RATIO, VEL MODUS, QUO POTUIT COGNOSCI 2. FIRST REASON OR MODE BY WHICH GOD COULD
DEUS. Nam, sicut ait Ambrosius (potius, BE KNOWN. As Ambrose says (Ambrosiaster on Rom.
Ambrosiaster in Rom 1,19), ut Deus, qui natura 1:19), God, who is invisible by nature, in order to be
invisibilis est, etiam a visibilibus posset sciri, opus knowable to visible creatures, made a work which in
fecit, quod opificem visibilitate sui manifestavit; ut its own visibility revealed its maker. In this way, the
per certum, incertum posset sciri, et ille Deus uncertain could be known through the certain, and he
omnium esse crederetur qui hoc fecit quod ab homine who had done what was impossible for man to do
impossibile est fieri. Potuerunt ergo conoscere, sive should be believed to be God of all. And so they were
cognoverunt, ultra omnem creaturam illum esse qui able to know or did know that, beyond each
ea fecit quae nulla creaturarum facere vel destruere creature, there was the one who had made what no
valet. Accedat quaecumque vis creatura, et faciat creature is able to make or destroy. Let any creature
tale caelum et talem terram, et dicam, quia Deus est. come forth which can make such a heaven or such
Sed quia nulla creatura talia facere valet, constat an earth, and I will say that it is God. But since no
supra omnem creaturam illum esse qui ea fecit ac creature can make such things, it is evident that the
per hoc illum esse deum, humana mens cognoscere one who made them is above all creatures. By this
potuit. means, the human mind was able to know that he is
God.
SECUNDA RATIO QUA POTUIT COGNOSCI, VEL 3. SECOND REASON BY WHICH GOD COULD BE
MODUS QUO NOVERUNT. Alio etiam modo Dei KNOWN, OR MODE IN WHICH THEY DID KNOW HIM.
veritatem ductu rationis cognoscere potuerunt, vel They could also, or did indeed, know God’s truth in
etiam cognoverunt. Ut enim Augustinus ait in libro another way by the guidance of reason. For as
De civitate Dei (8,6), viderunt summi philosophi Augustine says in his book On the City of God (8, 6):
nullum corpus Deum esse; et ideo cuncta corpora the highest philosophers perceived that no body is
transcenderunt, quaerentes Deum. Viderunt etiam God, and so they went beyond all bodies in their
quidquid mutabile est, non esse summum Deum, search for God. They also perceived that whatever is
omniumque principium; et ideo omnem animam, changeable is not the most high God and the principle
mutabilesque spiritus trascenderunt. Deinde of all things, and so they went beyond every soul and
viderunt, omne quod mutabile est, non posse esse changeable spirit. Then they perceived that all which
nisi ab illo qui incommutabiliter et simpliciter est. is changeable cannot be apart from him who
Intellexerunt igitur, eum et omnia ista fecisse et a unchangeably and simply is. And so they understood
nullo fieri potuisse. both that he made all things and could not himself
have been made by anyone.
TERTIA RATIO VEL MODUS. Consideraverunt 4. THIRD REASON OR MODE. They also considered
etiam quidquid est in substantiis, vel corpus esse vel that whatever exists in substances is either a body or
spiritum; meliusque aliquid spiritum esse quam a spirit, that it is better for something to be a spirit
corpus; sed longe meliorem qui spiritum fecit et than a body, but that he is far better who made both
corpus. spirit and body.
QUARTUS MODUS VEL RATIO. Intellexerunt etiam 5. FOURTH MODE OR REASON. They also
corporis [speciem esse sensibilem et spiritus] understood that [the species] of the body [to be
speciem intelligibilem, et intelligibilem speciem sensible] and the species [of the spirit] intelligible,
sensibili praetulerunt. Sensibilia dicimus quae visu and they preferred the intelligible form to the
et tactu corporis sentiri queunt; intelligibilia quae sensible one. We call those things sensible which
conspectu mentis intelligi. Cum ergo in eorum can be sensed with the body’s sight and touch; the
conspectu et corpus et animus magis minusque intelligible things are those which can be
speciosa essent; si autem omni specie carere understood by the mind’s insight. And as by their
possent, omnino nulla essent; viderunt esse aliquid insight they perceived that the body and the spirit
quo illa speciosa facta sunt, ubi est prima et were more or less beautiful in form, and that these
incommutabilis species, ideoque incomparabilis: et would become nothing at all if they were to lack all
illud esse rerum principium rectissime crediderunt form, they saw that there is something by which
quod factum non esset et ex quo cuncta facta essent. these things were given form. That is the first and
unchangeable form, and therefore incomparable,
and so they most rightly believed that this was the
principle of things, which was not itself made and
from which all things were made.
Ecce tot modis potuit cognosci veritas Dei. Cum 6. See how many ways the truth of God could be
ergo Deus una sit et simplex essentia, quae ex nulla known. God is a one and simple essence which does
diversitate partium vel accidentium consistit; not consist in any diversity of parts or accidents. But
pluraliter tamen dicit Apostolus “invisibilia Dei”, the Apostle says in the plural, the invisible things of
quia pluribus modis cognoscitur veritas Dei per ea God, because God’s truth is known in several ways
quae facta sunt. Ex perpetuitate namque through the things which are made (Rom. 1:20).
creaturarum intelligitur conditor aeternus, ex Indeed, from the perpetuity of creatures, the
magnitudine creaturarum omnipotens, ex ordine et Creator is understood to be eternal; from the
dispositione sapiens, ex gubernatione bonus. Omnia magnitude of creatures, omnipotent; from their
autem haec ad unitatem deitatis pertinent order and disposition, wise; from his governance
monstrandum. over them, good. And all these things pertain to
showing the unity of the Godhead.
QUOMODO IN CREATURIS APPARET VESTIGIUM 7. HOW A VESTIGE OF THE TRINITY APPEARS IN
TRINITATIS. Nunc restat ostendere, an per ea quae CREATURES. Now it remains to show whether it may
facta sunt, aliquod Trinitatis <vestigium, vel> have been possible to obtain some <vestige, or>
indicium [, vel] exiguum haberi potuerit. De hoc mark [, or] small trace of the Trinity through those
Augustinus in libro 6 De Trinitate (10,12) [ait]: things which are made. Concerning this, Augustine
Oportet ut Creatorem per ea quae facta sunt, says in On the Trinity, book 6: It is fitting that, when
intellectu conspicientes, Trinitatem intelligamus. we regard the creator by our intellect through those
Huius enim Trinitatis vestigium in creaturis apparet. things which are made, we understand the Trinity.
Haec enim quae arte divina facta sunt et unitatem For a vestige of the Trinity appears in creatures.
quamdam in se ostendunt et speciem et ordinem. Indeed, these things which have been made by divine
Nam quodque horum creatorum et unum aliquid est, art show in themselves a certain unity, a species, and
sicut sunt naturae corporum et animarum; et aliqua an order. For each of these created things is some one
specie formatur, sicut sunt figurae vel qualitates specific thing, as are the natures of bodies and souls
corporum, ac doctrinae vel artes animarum; et and the teachings or skills of souls; and it seeks or
ordinem aliquem petit, aut tenet, sicut sunt pondera preserves a certain order, as are weights and
vel collocationes corporum, et amores vel locations of bodies and loves or delights of souls. And
delectationes animarum. Et ita in creaturis praelucet so a vestige of the Trinity shines forth in creatures.
vestigium Trinitatis. In illa enim Trinitate, summa For in that Trinity is the highest origin of all things,
origo est omnium rerum, et pulchritudo and the most perfect beauty, and the most blessed
perfectissima, et beatissima delectatio”. delight.
Summa autem origo, ut Augstinus ostendit in 8. As Augustine shows in his book On True
libro De vera religione (55,113), intelligitur Deus Religion, the highest origin is understood to be God
Pater, a quo sunt omnia, a quo Filius et Spiritus the Father, from whom are all things and from
Sanctus: perfectissima pulchritudo intelligitur Filius, whom [proceed] the Son and the Holy Spirit. The
scilicet veritas Patris, nulla ex parte ei dissimilis; most perfect beauty is understood to be the Son,
quem cum ipso et in ipso Patre veneramur; quae namely “the truth of the Father, in no part dissimilar
forma est omnium, quae ab uno facta sunt et ad from him, whom we venerate with and in the same
unum referuntur. Quae tamen omnia nec fierent a Father. It is the form of all things which are made by
Patre per Filium, neque suis finibus salva essent, nisi the one and to the one are referred. Yet all these
Deus summe bonus esset, qui et nulli naturae, quae things would not be made by the Father through the
[quod] ab illo bona esset, invidit; et ut in bono ipso Son, nor would they be safe within their bounds, if
maneret, alia quantum vellet, alia quantum posset, God were not most highly good, suffering no envy of
dedit. Quae bonitas, Spiritus Sanctus intelligitur qui any nature which could take goodness from him.
est donum Patris et Filii. Quare ipsum donum Dei And he granted perseverance in that goodness to
cum Patre et Filiio aeque incommutabile colere et one nature as much as it willed, and to another as
tenere nos convenit. much as it was able. This latter goodness is
understood to be the Holy Spirit, who is the gift of
the Father and the Son. Hence, it is fitting for us to
honor and hold this same Gift of God as equally
unchangeable with the Father and the Son.
Per considerationem itaque creaturarum, unius Thus, by our consideration of creatures, we
substantiae Trinitatem intelligimus, scilicet unum perceive the Trinity to be of one substance, namely
Deum Patrem, a quo sumus, et Filium, per quem the one God the Father, from whom we are, and the
sumus; et Spiritum Sanctum, in quo sumus: scilicet Son through whom we are, and the Holy Spirit in
principium ad quo recurrimus, et formam quam whom we are; also, the principle to which we return,
sequimur, et gratiam qua reconciliamur:unum and the form to which we conform, and the grace by
scilicet, quo auctore conditi sumus; et similitudinem which we can become reconciled; also, the one by
eius, per quam ad unitatem reformamur; et pacem, whose act we are created, and his likeness through
qua unitati adhaeremus; scilicet Deum, qui dixit: which we are reformed into unity, and the peace in
Fiat <lux>, et Verbum per quod factum est omne which we cleave to unity; also, God who said Let
quod substantialiter et naturaliter est; et Donum there be <light>, and the Word through whom all
benignitatis eius, qua placuit quod ab eo per that exists substantially and naturally was made, and
Verbum factum est et reconciliatum auctori, ut non the Gift of his benignity by which it pleased him
interiret. that whatever had been made by him through the
Word, and had been reconciled to its maker, should
not perish.
Ecce ostensum est, qualiter in creaturis 9. And so it has been shown how the image of
aliquatenus imago Trinitatis indicatur; non enim per the Trinity in some measure is revealed in creatures.
creaturarum contemplationem sufficiens notitia But a sufficient knowledge of the Trinity cannot and
Trinitatis potest haberi vel potuit sine doctrinae vel could not be had by a contemplation of creatures,
interioris inspirationis revelatione. Unde illi antiqui without the revelation of doctrine or inner
philosophi quasi per umbram et de longinquo inspiration. So it was that those ancient
viderunt veritatem, deficientes in contuitu Trinitas, philosophers saw the truth as if through a shadow
ut magi Pharaonis [Pharaoni] in tertio signo. and from a distance, lacking in insight into the
Adiuvamur tamen in fide invisibilium per ea quae Trinity, as was the case with Pharaoh’s magicians in
facta sunt. the third plague (Ex. 8:18). And yet we are aided in
our faith in invisible things through those things
which were made.

Chapter Two

QUOMODO IN ANIMA SIT IMAGO TRINITATIS. Nunc 1. HOW THERE IS AN IMAGE OF THE TRINITY IN THE
vero ad eam iam perveniamus disputationem, ubi in SOUL. But now we have come to the disputation of
mente humana, quae novit Deum vel potest nosse, where in the human mind, which has known or can
Trinitatis imaginem reperiamus: ut enim [ait] know God, we may find the image of the Trinity. For
Augustinus in 14 libro De Trinitate ait, licet humana as Augustine says in On the Trinity, (Book 14, chap.
mens non sit eius naturae cuius Deus est, imago 8, 11): “although the human mind is not of the same
tamen illius, quo nihil melius est, ibi quaerenda et nature as God, yet his image, ‘than which nothing is
invenienda est, quo natura nostra nihil habet melius, better,’ is to be sought and found in our mind, since
idest in mente. In ipsa enim mente, etiam antequam our nature has nothing better than that. For in the
sit particeps Dei, eius imago reperitur: etsi enim mind itself, even before it becomes a partaker of
amissa Dei participatione deformis sit, imago tamen God, his image is to be found. And even if the mind
Dei permanet. Eo enim ipso imago Dei est mens, should become deformed by the loss of partaking in
quo capax est eius, eiusque esse particeps potest. God, yet the divine image remains in it. For by this
Iam ergo in ea Trinitatem, quae Deus est, very fact is the mind an image of God: that it is
inquiramus. capable of God and can partake of him”. And so let
us now seek in the mind the Trinity which is God.
Ecce enim mens sui meminit, intelligit se, diligit But see, the mind remembers itself, understands
se. Hoc si cernimus, cernimus Trinitatem; nondum itself, and loves itself. If we discern this, we discover a
quidem Deum, sed imaginem Dei. Hic enim quaedam trinity; this is not yet God, but an image of God. For
apparet trinitas memoriae, intelligentiae et amoris. here appears a certain trinity of memory,
Haec ergo tria potissimum tractemus, memoriam, intelligence, and love. And so let us most particularly
intelligentiam, et voluntatem. discuss these three things: memory, intelligence, and
will.
Haec ergo tria, ut ait Augustinus in libro 10 De As Augustine says in On the Trinity, Book 10,
Trinitate, non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita; nec tres “these three are not three lives, but one life; not three
mentes, sed una mens; <nec tres essentiae, sed> una minds, but one mind; <not three essences, but> one
essentia. Memoria vero dicitur ad aliquid; et essence. But memory is said with respect to another;
intelligentia et voluntas, sive dilectio, similiter ad and intelligence and will, or love, are likewise said
aliquid dicitur; vita vero dicitur ad se ipsam, et mens with respect to another. Life, however, is so called in
et essentia. Haec ergo tria eo sunt unum quo una vita, respect to itself, and so also mind and essence. These
una mens et una essentia et quidquid aliud ad seipsa three, then, are one insofar as they are one life, one
singula dicuntur, etiam simul, non pluraliter, sed mind, one essence. And whatever else is said of them
singulariter dicuntur. Eo vero tria sunt quo ad se severally in respect to themselves, even if it is said of
invicem referuntur. all of them, yet it is not said in the plural, but in the
singular. But they are three by that same reason by
which they are referred reciprocally to each other.
QUOMODO AEQUALIA SINT, QUIA CAPIUNTUR A 4. HOW THEY ARE EQUAL BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL
SINGULIS OMNIA ET TOTA. Aequalia etiam sunt, non AND ENTIRELY CONTAINED BY EACH OF THEM. Also,
solum singula singulis, sed etiam singula omnibus; they are equal not only each to each, but also each to
alioquin non se invicem caperent. Se autem invicem all, otherwise they could not contain each other as
capiunt; capiuntur enim et a singulis singula, et a they do. Indeed, each is contained by each and all by
singulis omnia. each.
Memini enim me habere memoriam et For I remember that I have memory and
intelligentiam et voluntatem, et intelligo me intelligence and will; and I understand that I
intelligere et velle atque meminisse; et volo me velle et understand and will and remember; and I will to will
meminisse et intelligere. and to remember and to understand.
QUOMODO ILLA TRIA MEMORIA CAPIAT. Totamque HERE HOW MEMORY ENTIRELY CONTAINS ALL
meam memoriam et intelligentiam et voluntatem THREE. All I remember concurrently my whole
simul memini. Quod enim memoriae meae non memory and intelligence and will. For whatever I do
memini illud non est in memoria mea. Nihil autem not remember of my memory is not in my memory,
tam in memoria est quam ipsa memoria. Totam ergo for nothing is as much in memory as memory itself,
memini. Item quidquid intelligo, intelligere me scio; et and so I remember it all. Also, I know myself to
scio me velle quidquid volo; quidquid autem memini, understand whatever I understand, and I know myself
scio. Totam igitur intelligentiam, totamque to will whatever I will; but I remember whatever I
voluntatem meam memini. know. And so I remember my whole intelligence and
my whole will.
QUOMODO ILLA TRIA TOTA CAPIAT INTELLIGENTIA. HOW INTELLIGENCE ENTIRELY CONTAINS ALL
Similiter cum haec tria intelligo, tota simul intelligo: THREE. Similarly, when I understand these three, I
neque enim quidquam intelligibilium est quod non understand all of them at once. For there is no
intelligam, nisi quod ignoro. Quod autem ignoro, nec intelligible thing which I do not understand, except
memini nec volo. Quidquid autem intelligibilium non for what I do not know; but I neither remember nor
intelligo, consequenter etiam nec memini nec volo; will what I do not know. It follows that I neither
quidquid autem intelligibilium memini et volo, remember nor will whatever intelligible thing I do not
consequenter intelligo. understand. It also follows that I understand
whatever intelligible thing I remember and will.
QUOMODO ILLA TRIA TOTA CAPIAT VOLUNTAS. HOW THE WILL ENTIRELY CONTAINS ALL THREE.
Voluntas mea etiam totam intelligentiam totamque My will also contains my whole intelligence and my
memoriam meam capit, dum utor eo toto ergo whole memory while I make use of all that I
intelligo et memini. Cum itaque invicem a singulis et understand and remember. And so, since all of them
omnia et tota capiantur, aequalia sunt tota singula in their entirety are mutually contained by each, they
totis singulis, et tota singula simul omnibus totis, et are each severally equal to each severally, as also
haec tria unum, una vita, una mens, una essentia. each severally in its entirety to all together in their
entirety; and these three are one, one life, one mind,
one essence.
Ecce illius summae unitatis atque Trinitatis, ubi 5. And so the human mind is an image, if an
una est essentia et tres personae, imago est mens unequal one, of that highest Unity and Trinity in
humana, licet impar. Mens autem hic pro animo which there is one essence and three persons. But
ipso accipitur, ubi est imago illa Trinitatis. Proprie the mind here is taken to stand for the soul itself, in
vero mens dicitur, ut ait ipso accipitur, ubi est imago which there is that image of the Trinity. As
illa Trinitatis. Proprie vero mens dicitur, ut ait Augustine says, properly speaking, the mind itself is
Augustinus, non anima ipsa, sed quod in ea est not the soul, but (as is often said) only its most
excellentius, qualiter saepe accipitur. Illud etiam excellent part. It is also to be noted that memory is
sciendum est, quod memoria non solum absentium not only of absent and past things, but also of
est et praeteritorum, sed etiam praesentium, ut ait present ones, as Augustine says in On the Trinity,
Augustinus in 14 libro De Trinitate, alioquin non se Book 14; otherwise it would not comprehend itself.
caperet.
EX QUO SENSU ILLA TRIA DICANTUR UNUM ESSE ET 6. IT IS ASKED IN WHAT SENSE THOSE THREE ARE
UNA ESSENTIA QUAERITUR. Hic attendendum est SAID TO BE ONE AND ONE ESSENCE. Here is to be
diligenter, ex quo sensu accipiendum sit quod supra diligently examined in what sense is to be taken
dixit, illa tria, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et what was said above, that those three, namely
voluntatem esse unum, unam mentem, unam memory, intelligence, and will, are one, one mind,
essentiam: quod utique non videtur verum esse, one essence. This does not appear to be true
iuxta proprietatem sermonis. Mens enim, idest according to the proper sense of words. For the
spiritus rationalis, essentia spiritualis est et mind, or the rational spirit, is a spiritual and
incorporea. Illa vero tria, naturales proprietates seu incorporeal essence. But those three are natural
vires sunt ipsius mentis, et a se invicem differunt: properties or powers of the mind itself, and differ
quia memoria non est intelligentia vel voluntas; nec among themselves because the memory is neither
intelligentia voluntas sive amor. the intelligence nor the will, and the intelligence is
not the will or love.
QUOD ETIAM AD SE INVICEM DICUNTUR RELATIVE. 7. ALSO, THAT THESE ARE ALSO SPOKEN OF
Et haec tria etiam ad se ipsa referuntur, ut ait RELATIVELY WITH REGARD TO EACH OTHER. And these
Augustinus in 9 libro De Trinitate. Mens enim amare three also refer to themselves, as Augustine says in
seipsam vel meminisse non potest, nisi etiam noverit On the Trinity, Book 9: For the mind cannot love, or
se. Nam quomodo amat vel meminit quod nescit? remember, itself, unless it also knows itself; for how
Miro itaque modo ista tria inseparabilia sunt a can it love, or remember, what it does not know? In a
semetipsis, et tamen eorum singulum et omnia simul marvelous manner, these three things are inseparable
una essentia est, cum et relative dicantur ad invicem. from each other; and each of them severally and all of
them together are one essence, since they are even
spoken of relatively with regard to each other.
HIC APERITUR QUOD SUPRA QUAEREBATUR, 8. HERE THE QUESTION POSED ABOVE IS
SCILICET QUOMODO HAEC TRIA DICANTUR UNUM. Sed RESOLVED, NAMELY HOW THESE THREE CAN BE CALLED
iam videndum est quomodo haec tria dicantur una ONE. But we must now examine how these three can
substantia. Ideo scilicet quia in ipsa anima vel mente be termed one substance. This is so because they
substantialiter exsistunt, non sicut accidentia in exist substantially in the soul or mind itself, and not
subiectis, quae possunt adesse et abesse. Unde as accidents in subjects, which can be present or
Augustinus in libro 9 De Trinitate ait: Admonemur, absent. Hence, as Augustine says in On the Trinity,
si utcumque videre possumus, haec in animo exsistere Book 9. “We become aware, if we are at all able to
substantialiter, non tamquam in subiecto, ut color in perceive, that these exist in the spirit substantially,
corpore: quia etsi relative dicuntur ad invicem not as though in a subject like color in the body
singula, tamen substantialiter sunt in sua substantia. because, even if these are spoken of relatively in
Ecce ex quo sensu illa tria dicantur unum esse, vel regard to each other, yet they exist severally in their
una substantia. own substance.” This is the sense from which those
three are said to be one or one substance.
Quae tria, ut ait Augustinus in libro 15 De 9. As Augustine says in On the Trinity, Book 15:
Trinitate, in mente naturaliter divinitus instituta Anyone with a lively intuition perceives that these
quisquis vivaciter perspicit, et quam magnum sit in three have been divinely and naturally established in
ea, unde potest etiam sempiterna incommutabilisque the mind, and also how great a thing it is in the mind
natura recoli, conspici, concupisci (reminiscitur enim whereby even the eternal and unchangeable nature
per memoriam, intuetur per intelligentiam, can be recalled, gazed upon, and desired: it is
amplectitur per dilectionem) profecto reperit illius remembered through memory, contemplated through
summae Trinitatis imaginem. intelligence, and embraced through love. Assuredly,
one here discovers the image of that most high
Trinity.

Chapter Three

QUOD IN ILLA SIMILITUDINE EST DISSIMILITUDO. 1. THAT THERE IS A DISSIMILITUDE IN THAT


Verumtamen caveat ne hanc imaginem ab eadem SIMILITUDE. And yet let him beware lest he so
Trinitate factam ita ei comparet ut omnino aestimet compare to its maker this image made by the Trinity
similem; sed potius in qualicumque ista similitudine as to believe it to be entirely like it; whatever be the
magnam quoque dissimilitudinem cernat. likeness between the two, let him also discern the
great dissimilitude.
PRIMA DISSIMILITUDO. Quod breviter ostendi FIRST DISSIMILITUDE. This can be briefly shown.
potest. Homo unus per illa tria intelligit, meminit, The same person, through those three things,
diligit: qui nec memoria est, nec intelligentia, nec remembers, understands, loves; the person is neither
dilectio; sed haec habet. Unus ergo homo est qui memory, nor intelligence, nor love, but has all three.
habet haec tria, non tamen ipse est haec tria. In illius It is the one person who has these three things, but he
vero summa [summae] simplicitate naturae quae is not these three. But in the simplicity of that most
Deus est, quamvis unus sit Deus, tres tamen personae high nature which is God, although there is only one
sunt, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et hae tres God, yet there are three persons, Father and Son and
unus Deus. Aliud est itaque Trinitas res ipsa, aliud Holy Spirit,” and these three are one God. “And so the
imago Trinitatis in re alia: propter quam imaginem Trinity itself is one thing, and the Trinity’s image in
etiam illud in quo sunt haec tria imago dicitur, idest something else is another. Because of that image,
homo, sicut imago dicitur et tabula et pictura quae in even that in which these three are found, namely
ea est; sed tabula nomine imaginis appellatur propter man, is called an image. In the same way, both the
picturam quae est in ea. canvas and the picture on it are called an image, but
the canvas is called an image because of the picture
which is on it.
ALIA DISSIMILITUDO. Rursus ista imago quae est ANOTHER DISSIMILITUDE. Moreover, this image,
homo habens illa tria, una persona est; illa vero which is man endowed with those three things, is one
Trinitas non una persona est, sed tres personae, Pater person; that Trinity, on the other hand, is not one
Filii, et Filius Patris, et Spiritus Patris et Filii. Itaque person, but three persons: the Son’s Father, the
in ista imagine Trinitatis non haec tria unus homo, Father’s Son, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son.
sed unius hominis sunt. In illa vero summa Trinitate, And so in this image of the Trinity, these three things
cuius haec imago est, non unius Dei sunt illa tria, sed are not one man, but one man’s; but in that most
unus Deus; et tres sunt illae, non una persona. Illa high Trinity, whose image this is, they are not three
enim tria non homo sunt, sed hominis sunt, vel in things of the one God, but are one God; and they are
homine sunt. Sed numquid possumus dicere, three persons, not one. For those three things are not
Trinitatem sic esse in Deo ut aliquid Dei sit, nec ipsa a man; they are of a man or in a man. But can we say
sit Deus? Absit ut hoc credamus. Dicamus ergo in that the Trinity is in God in such a way that it is
mente nostra imaginem Trinitatis, sed qxiguam et something which belongs to God, but is not itself
qualemcumque esse, quae summae Trinitatis ita gerit God? Far be it from us to believe so! Therefore, let us
similitudinem, ut ex maxima parte sit dissimilis. say that there is an image of the Trinity in our mind,
but that it is flimsy and partial; it bears a likeness to
the most high Trinity only insofar as it is mostly
dissimilar from it.
Sciendum vero est, quod haec Trinitas mentis, 2. As Augustine says in On the Trinity, Book 14,
ut ait Augustinus in 14 libro De Trinitate, non it is to be noted that this trinity of the mind is God’s
propterea tantum imago Dei est, quia sui meminerit image not only because the mind remembers and
mens et intelligit ac diligit se; sed quia potest etiam understands and loves itself, but because it can also
meminisse et intelligere et amare illum a quo facta remember and understand and love him by whom it
est. was made.
ALIA ASSIGNATIO TRINITATIS IN ANIMA, SCILICET 3. ANOTHER MARK OF THE TRINITY IN THE SOUL,
MENS, NOTITIA, AMOR. Potest etiam alio modo NAMELY MIND, KNOWLEDGE, AND LOVE. The trinity in
aliisque nominibus distingui trinitas in anima, quae the soul, which is an image of the most high and
est imago illius summae et ineffabilis Trinitatis. Ut ineffable Trinity, can also be distinguished in
enim ait Augustinus in 9 libro De Trinitate, mens et another way and by other terms. For as Augustine
notitia eius et amor tria quaedam sunt. Mens enim says in On the Trinity, Book 9, the mind and its
novit se et amat se, nec amare se potest nisi etiam knowledge and love are three things. For the mind
noverit se. Due quaedam sunt mens et notita eius. knows and loves itself, nor can it love itself unless it
Item duo quaedam sunt mens et amor eius. Cum ergo has come to know itself. The mind and its knowledge
se novit mens et amat se, manet Trinitas, scilicet are two things; similarly, the mind and its love are
mens, amor, notita. Mens autem hic non accipitur two things. Thus, as the mind knows and loves itself,
pro anima, sed pro eo quod in anima excellentius there is still a trinity, namely of mind, love, and
est. knowledge. And the mind is here understood not as
the soul, but as that which is most excellent in the
soul.
Haec autem tria, cum sint distincta a se invicem, 4. These three things, even though they are
dicuntur tamen esse unum, quia in anima mutually distinct, yet are said to be one because
substantialiter exsistunt. they exist substantially in the soul.
QUOD MENS VICE PATRIS, NOTITIA FILII, AMOR 5. WHY THE MIND IS TAKEN TO STAND FOR THE
SPIRITUS SANCTI ACCIPITUR. Et est ipsa mens quasi FATHER, KNOWLEDGE FOR THE SON, LOVE FOR THE
parens, et notitia eius quasi proles eius. Mens enim HOLY SPIRIT. And the mind is, as it were, the parent,
cum se cognoscit, notitiam sui gignit, et est sola while its knowledge, as it were, its offspring: For the
parens suae notitiae. Tertius est amor, qui de ipsa mind, as it comes to know itself, begets knowledge of
mente et notitia procedit, dum mens cognoscens se itself and is the sole parent of its knowledge. The
diligit se; non enim posset se diligere, nisi third is love, which proceeds from the mind itself
cognosceret se: amat etiam placitam prolem, idest and knowledge, when the mind, coming to know
notitiam suam, et ita amor quidam complexus est itself, loves itself; indeed, it could not love itself, if it
parentis et prolis. did not know itself. It also loves its offspring, which
it finds pleasing, namely its knowledge; and so love
is an embrace of parent and offspring.
QUOD NON EST MINOR MENTE NOTITIA, NEC AMOR 6. THAT KNOWLEDGE IS NOT LESS THAN MIND, NOR
UTROQUE. Nec minor proles parente, dum tantam se LOVE THAN EITHER OF THE OTHERS. Nor is the
novit mens quanta est; nec minor est amor parente et offspring less than the parent, as the mind knows
prole, idest mente et notitia, dum tantum se diligit itself to the measure of its own being; nor is love less
mens quantum se novit et quanta est. than the parent and its offspring, that is, than mind
and knowledge, as the mind loves itself to the
measure of its own knowledge and being.
QUOD HAEC TRIA IN SE IPSIS SUNT. Sunt etiam 7. THAT THESE THREE THINGS ARE IN THEMSELVES.
haec singula in se ipsis: quia et mens amans in These singular things also are in themselves, because
amore est, et amor in amantis notitia, et notitia in the loving mind is in love, and love is in the
mente noscente est. Ecce in his tribus qualecumque knowledge of the lover, and knowledge is in the mind
Trinitas vestigium apparet. that knows. And this is how some vestige of the
Trinity appears in these three things.
QUOMODO MENS PER ISTA PROFICIT AD 8. HOW THE MIND PROGRESSES THROUGH THESE
INTELLIGENDUM DEUM. Mens itaque rationalis THINGS TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD. And so the
considerans haec tria et illam unam essentiam in rational mind, considering these three things and
qua ista sunt, extendit se ad contemplationem the one essence in which they are, extends itself to
Creatoris, et videt Trinitatem in unitate et unitatem the contemplation of the Creator, and sees the unity
in Trinitate. Intelligit enim unum Deum esse unam in Trinity and the Trinity in unity. For it
essentiam, unum principium. Intelligit enim quia si understands that there is one God, one essence, one
duo essent, vel uterque insufficiens esset, vel alter principle. For it understands that, if there were two,
superflueret; quia si aliquid deesset uni quod alter either both would be insufficient, or the second
haberet, non esset ibi summa perfectio; si vero nihil superfluous. This is the case because, if something
uni deesset quod haberet alter, cum in uno essent were to be lacking to the one which the other had,
omnia, alter superflueret. Intellexit ergo unum esse the highest perfection would not be found there; but
Deum, unum omnium auctorem; et vidit quia if nothing were to be lacking to the one which the
absque sapientia non sit, quasi res fatua; et ideo other had, and since all things would already be
intellexit eum habere sapientiam quae ab ipso genita found in the one, the other would be superfluous.
est; et quia sapientiam suam diligit, intellexit etiam Thus, it understood that there is one God, one
ibi esse amorem. maker of all things. And it saw that such a God,
without wisdom, would be as if an empty thing; and
so it understood him to have wisdom, which was
generated from him; and because it loves its own
wisdom, it understood also that love was there.

Chapter Four

HIC DE SUMMA TRINITATIS UNITATE. Quapropter CONCERNING THE UNITY OF THE MOST HIGH
iuxta istam considerationem, ut ait Augustinus in TRINITY. In accordance with this consideration, as
libro 9 De Trinitate (4,1), credamus Patrem et Filium Augustine says in On the Trinity, Book 9, “let us
et Spiritum Sanctum unum esse Deum, universae believe that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one
creaturae conditorem et rectorem; nec Patrem esse God, maker and ruler of all creatures; that the Father
Filium, nec Spiritum Sanctum vel Patrem esse vel is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit the Father or the
Filium, sed Trinitatem relatarum ad invicem Son, but a trinity of mutually related persons.” For as
personarum. Ut enim ipse ait in libro De fide ad he says in the book On Faith to Peter, one is the
Petrum, una est natura, sive essentia Patris et Filii et nature or essence of Father and Son and Holy Spirit,
Spiritus Sancti, non una persona; si enim sic esset but not one person: “For if there were one person, as
una persona, sicut est una substantia Patris et Filii et there is one essence of Father and Son and Holy
Spiritus Sancti, veraciter Trinitas non diceretur. Spirit, it would not truthfully be called a trinity. Or
Rursus quidem Trinitas esset vera, sed unus Deus again, it might indeed be a true trinity, but that
Trinitas ipsa non esset, si quemadmodum Pater et trinity would not be one God, if, just as the Father
Filius et Spiritus Sanctus personarum sunt ab invicem and Son and Holy Spirit are distinguished from each
proprietate distincti, sic fuissent naturam quoque other by a property of their persons, they would also
diversitate discreti. Fides autem Patriarcharum, be divided by a diversity of their natures. But the faith
Prophetarum atque Apostolorum, unum Deum of the Patriarchs, Prophets, and Apostles preaches
praedicat esse Trinitatem. In illa ergo sancta that the one God is a Trinity.” “And in that holy
Trinitate unus Deus est Pater, qui solus essentialiter Trinity there is one God the Father, who alone in his
de seipso unum Filium genuit; et unus Filius, qui de essence begot the one Son from himself; and one Son,
uno Patre solus essentialiter natus est; et unus who alone in his essence is born of the one Father;
Spiritus Sanctus, qui solus essentialiter a Patre and one Holy Spirit, who alone in his essence
Filioque procedit. Hoc autem totum non potest una proceeds from the Father and the Son. One person
persona, idest gignere se et nasci de se et procedere de cannot do all this, namely beget itself, and be born of
se. Ut enim ait Augustinus in 1 libro De Trinitate itself, and proceed from itself.” For as Augustine says
(1,1), nulla res est quae seipsam gignat ut sit. in On the Trinity, Book 1, “there is nothing that
begets itself into being.”

COMMENTARY OF SAINT THOMAS


DIVISION OF THE TEXT
In parte ista ostendit Magister unitatem In this part the Master shows the unity of
essentiae et trinitatem personarum per rationes et essence and Trinity of persons by means of certain
similitudines quasdam, et dividitur in partes duas: in arguments and likenesses, and it is divided into two
prima ostendit unitatem essentiae divinae per parts: in the first he shows the unity of the divine
rationes naturales; in secunda ostendit trinitatem essence by natural arguments; in the second he
personarum per similitudines creaturarum, ibi: nunc shows the Trinity of persons by means of creaturely
restat ostendere utrum per ea quae facta sunt, likenesses, where it says: Now it remains to show
aliquod trinitatis indicium vel exiguum haberi whether it may have been possible to obtain some
potuerit. indication or [trace] of the Trinity through those
things which are made.
Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit per Concerning the first he does three things: first,
auctoritatem Apostoli, probantis unitatis divinae he shows the unity of the divine essence by means
essentiae possibilitatem; secundo inducit of the authority of the Apostle, which proves its
probationem, ibi: nam sicut ait Ambrosius; tertio possibility; second he introduces the proof, where it
excludit quamdam objectionem, ibi: cum ergo Deus says: For, as Ambrose says; third he excludes an
una sit et simplex essentia... Pluraliter tamen dicit objection, where it says: Because, therefore, God is a
Apostolus: invisibilia Dei. one and simple essence… But the Apostle says in the
plural, the invisible things of God.
Secunda autem pars in qua ponit probationem, Now, the second part, in which he presents the
dividitur in quatuor, secundum quatuor rationes proof, is divided into four, according to the four
quas ponit. Harum autem diversitas sumitur arguments that he presents. Now the diversity of
secundum vias deveniendi ex creaturis in Deum, these proofs is based on the ways that Dionysius
quas Dionysius ponit. presents to arrive to God from creatures.
Dicit enim quod ex creaturis tribus modis In fact, he says that from creatures we reach
devenimus in deum: scilicet per causalitatem, per God in three ways: namely, by causality, by
remotionem, per eminentiam. Et ratio hujus est, remotion and by eminence. And the reason for this
quia esse creaturae est ab altero. Unde secundum is that the being of the creature is from another.
hoc ducimur in causam a qua est. Hoc autem potest Hence, according to this we are lead to the cause
esse dupliciter. Aut quantum ad id quod receptum from which it is. Now, this can happen in two ways.
est; et sic ducimur per modum causalitatis: aut Either with regard to what is received; and thus we
quantum ad modum recipiendi, quia imperfecte are led by the way of causality: or with regard to the
recipitur; et sic habemus duos modos, scilicet way of receiving, because it is received imperfectly;
secundum remotionem imperfectionis a Deo et and thus we have two modes, namely, according to
secundum hoc quod illud quod receptum est in the removal of imperfection from God and
creatura, perfectius et nobilius est in creatore; et ita according to the fact that what has been received in
est modus per eminentiam. the creature is more perfectly and nobly in the
Creator; and this is the way of eminence.
Prima ergo ratio sumitur per viam causalitatis, Therefore, the first reason is taken by way of
et formatur sic. Omne quod habet esse ex nihilo, causality and is formulated as follows. All that has
oportet quod sit ab alio, a quo esse suum fluxerit. being from nothing, it is necessary that it is from
Sed omnes creaturae habent esse ex nihilo: quod another, from which its being is derived. Now, every
manifestatur ex earum imperfectione et creature has being from nothing, which is
potentialitate. Ergo oportet quod sint ab aliquo uno manifested by their imperfection and potentiality.
primo, et hoc est Deus. Therefore, it is necessary that they are from one first
thing, and this is God.
Secunda ratio sumitur per viam remotionis, et The second reason is taken by way of remotion,
est talis. Ultra omne imperfectum oportet esse and is as follows. Beyond every imperfection, it is
aliquod perfectum, cui nulla quidem imperfectio necessary that there be something perfect, which
admisceatur. Sed corpus est imperfectum, quia est does not have any admixture of imperfection. Now
terminatum et finitum suis dimensionibus et the body is imperfect, because it is terminated and
mobile. finite in its dimensions and is mobile. Therefore, it
Ergo oportet ultra corpora esse aliquid quod non est is necessary that beyond corporal things there is
corpus. something that is not a body.
Item, omne incorporeum mutabile de sui natura Likewise, everything incorporeal that is able to
est imperfectum. Ergo ultra omnes species change is by nature imperfect. Therefore, beyond
mutabiles, sicut sunt animae et Angeli, oportet esse every species of changeable beings, like souls and
aliquod ens incorporeum et immobile et omnino Angels, it is necessary that there be some
perfectum, et hoc est deus. incorporeal and immobile being that is entirely
perfect, and this is God.
Aliae duae rationes sumuntur per viam The other two reasons are taken by way of
eminentiae. Sed potest dupliciter attendi eminentia, eminence. But one can consider eminence in two
vel quantum ad esse vel quantum ad cognitionem. ways, either in regard to being or in regard to
Tertia ergo sumitur ratio per viam eminentiae in knowledge. Therefore the third reason is taken by
esse, et est talis. Bonum et melius dicuntur per way of eminence in being and is the following. Good
comparationem ad optimum. Sed in substantiis and better are said in comparison to an optimal. But
invenimus corpus bonum et spiritum creatum in substances we find that bodies are good and
melius, in quo tamen bonitas non est a seipso. Ergo created spirits are better, yet in them goodness is
oportet esse aliquod optimum a quo sit bonitas in not from themselves. Therefore it is necessary that
utroque. there be something optimal from which goodness is
in both.
Quarta sumitur per eminentiam in cognitione, The fourth way is by eminence in knowledge
et est talis. In quibuscumque est invenire magis et and is as such. In things, where a greater and lesser
minus speciosum, est invenire aliquod speciositatis comeliness is found, there is found something that
principium, per cujus propinquitatem aliud alio is the principle of comeliness, by whose closeness
dicitur speciosius. Sed invenimus corpora esse the other is said to be more comely. But we find that
speciosa sensibili specie, spiritus autem speciosiores corporeal bodies are comely by a sensible species,
specie intelligibili. Ergo oportet esse aliquid a quo yet the spirit is more comely by the intelligible
utraque speciosa sint, cui spiritus creati magis species. Therefore, it is necessary that there be
appropinquant. something from which both are comely, to which
the created spirits more greatly approach.
Nunc restat ostendere, utrum per ea quae facta Now it remains to show whether it may have been
sunt aliquid trinitatis indicium vel exiguum haberi possible to obtain some indication, if a small one, of
potuerit. Hic ostendit trinitatem personarum per the Trinity through those things which are made.
similitudines in creaturis: et primo per Here he shows the Trinity of persons by means of
similitudinem vestigii; secundo per similitudinem likenesses in creatures: and first by the likeness of
imaginis, ibi: nunc autem ad eam jam perveniamus vestige; second by the likeness of image, where it
disputationem, ubi in mente humana... Trinitatis reads: But now we have come to the debated point of
imaginem reperiamus. Circa primum duo facit: where one may find in the human mind … the image
primo enim ostendit per auctoritatem Augustini of the Trinity. Regarding the first he does two things:
quomodo in vestigio creaturarum repraesentatur first, he shows by the authority of Augustine how
trinitas personarum; secundo ex ipsa similitudine the Trinity of persons may be represented in the
vestigii concludit personarum distinctionem, ibi: per vestige of creatures, then from the very likeness of
considerationem creaturarum, unius substantiae the vestige he concludes to the distinction of
trinitatem intelligimus. Ubi distinguit tres personas: persons, where it reads: by our consideration of
primo quo ad nos, et hoc tripliciter; secundum creatures, we perceive the Trinity to be of one
exitum nostrum a deo, et secundum reditum in substance. There he distinguishes the three persons:
ipsum, ibi, scilicet principium ad quod recurrimus; first, with regard to us, and this in three ways –
et secundum beneficium ipsius Dei, ibi: unum according to our proceeding from God and
scilicet, quo auctore conditi sumus. Secundo according to our return to him, where it says:
concludit per comparationem ad omnia, ibi: scilicet namely, the principle to which we return; and
Deum qui dixit: fiat lux. Ultimo ostendit vestigii according to the benefit of God himself, where it
repraesentationem esse insufficientem, ibi: ecce says, the one by whose act we are created. Second, he
ostensum qualiter in creaturis aliquatenus imago concludes by the comparison to all things, where it
Trinitatis inducatur. says, God who said Let there be light. Finally, he
shows that the representation of the vestige is
insufficient, where it says: And so it has been shown
how the image of the Trinity in some measure is
revealed in creatures.

QUESTION ONE
Quia autem in parte ista ostenditur, qualiter Now, because in this part one shows how one
venitur in cognitionem dei per vestigium arrives to knowledge of God through the vestige of
creaturarum, ideo quaeruntur duo: primo de divina creatures, two questions are asked: first, about
cognitione. Secundo de creaturarum vestigio. divine knowledge; second, about the vestige of
creatures.
Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor: utrum Deus Concerning the first point, four things are
sit cognoscibilis a creaturis; utrum Deum esse sit per asked: 1. Whether God is knowable from creatures.
se notum; utrum possit cognosci per creaturas, et 2. If the existence of God is evident in itself. 3. If he
quorum sit Deum per creaturas cognoscere; quid de can be known by creatures and to whom belongs
Deo philosophi per creaturas cognoscere potuerunt. knowing God by means of creatures. 4. What the
philosophers can know of God by means of
creatures.

ARTICLE ONE
Whether God can be known by a created intellect
Utrum Deus possit cognosci ab intellectu creato

AD PRIMUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod deus PROCEEDING TO THE FIRST. It seems that God is
non sit cognoscibilis a creato intellectu. Dicit enim not knowable by a created intellect. For Dionysius
Dionysius, quod Deum nec dicere nec intelligere says, in De div. nom., ch. 1: “that we can neither
possumus: quod sic probat. Cognitio est tantum speak about nor understand God,” which he proves
existentium. Sed Deus est supra omnia existentia. in this manner. Knowledge pertains only to the
Ergo est supra omnem cognitionem. existing things. But God is above all existing things.
He is, therefore, above knowledge.
ITEM, Deus plus distat a quolibet existentium 2. AGAIN, God is more distant from any existing
intelligibilium notorum nobis, quam distet intelligible things known by us than an intelligible
intelligibile a sensibili. Sed sensus non potest thing is from a sensible thing. But the senses cannot
intelligibile cognoscere. Ergo nec Deus potest a know an intelligible thing. Therefore, neither can
nostro intellectu cognosci. God be known by our intellect.
ITEM, omnis cognitio est per speciem aliquam, 3. AGAIN, all knowledge arises by means of some
per cujus informationem fit assimilatio cognoscentis species through the formation of which an
ad rem cognitam. Sed a Deo non potest abstrahi assimilation of the knower to the thing known is
aliqua species, cum sit simplicissimus. Ergo non est produced. But some species cannot be abstracted
cognoscibilis. from God, since he is most simple. He is, therefore,
not knowable.
ITEM, ut dicit Philosophus, omne infinitum est 4. AGAIN, as the Philosopher says (Physics, III,
ignotum; cuius ratio est, quia de ratione infiniti est, 4), every infinite thing is unknown: and the reason is
ut sit extra accipientem secundum aliquid sui, et this, because it is of the ratio of the infinite to be
tale est ignotum. Sed Deus est infinitus. Ergo est outside the receiving according to something of
ignotus. itself, and such is the unknown. But, God is infinite.
Therefore, he is unknown.
ITEM, Philosophus dicit, quod ita se habent 5. AGAIN, the Philosopher says (De anima, III, 1),
phantasmata ad intellectum, sicut colores ad visum. that the phantasms are to the intellect as colors to
Sed visus corporalis nihil videt sine colore. Ergo sight. Now, the corporeal sight does not see
intellectus noster nihil intelligit sine phantasmate. anything without color. Therefore, our intellect does
Cum igitur de Deo non possit formari aliquod not understand anything without the phantasm.
phantasma, ut dicitur isa. 40, 18, quam imaginem Given, therefore, that of God one cannot form any
ponetis ei? videtur quod non sit cognoscibilis a phantasm, as one reads in Isaiah 40:18: “What image
nostro intellectu. will you compare with him?”, it seems that he is not
knowable from our intellect.
CONTRA, hierem. 9, 24, dicitur: in hoc glorietur ON THE CONTRARY, in Jeremiah 9:24, it is said:
qui gloriatur, scire et nosse me. Sed ista non est “Let him who glories glory in this, that he
vanagloria ad quam Deus hortatur. Ergo videtur understands and knows me”. Now, this is not a
quod possibile sit Deum cognoscere. vainglory, if God exhorts us to it. Therefore, it seems
that it is possible to know God.
ITEM, ut supra dictum est, etiam secundum AGAIN, as is said above, also according to the
Philosophum, ultimus finis humanae vitae est Philosopher the ultimate end of human life is the
contemplatio Dei. Si igitur ad hoc homo non posset contemplation of God. If, therefore, man could not
pertingere, in vanum esset constitutus; quia vanum achieve this, he would have been constituted in
est, secundum Philosophum, quod ad aliquem finem vain; since it is vain, according to the Philosopher,
est, quem non attingit; et hoc est inconveniens, ut that which is for some end that is not reached; and
dicitur in Psal. 88, 48: numquid enim vane this is inconvenient, as it said in Psalm 88:48: “For
constituisti eum? have you constituted him in vain?”
ITEM, ut dicit Philosophus, in hoc differt AGAIN, as the Philosopher says (De Anima 3, 7),
intelligibile a sensibili, quia sensibile excellens the intelligible differs in this from the sensible,
destruit sensum; intelligibile autem maximum non because the excessively sensible destroys the sense,
destruit, sed confortat intellectum. Cum igitur Deus while the maximum intelligible does not destroy,
sit maxime intelligibilis quantum in se est, quia est but rather strengthens the intellect. Therefore, since
primum intelligibile, videtur quod a nostro God is the maximum intelligible insofar as it is in
intellectu possit intelligi: non enim impediretur nisi himself, because he is the first intelligible, it seems
propter suam excellentiam. that he can be understood by our intellect: for it is
not impeded except on account of his excellence.
RESPONDEO dicendum, quod non est hic I RESPOND by saying that here this is not a
quaestio, utrum deus in essentia sua immediate question about whether God can be seen
videri possit, hoc enim alterius intentionis est; sed immediately, since this is another problem, but if he
utrum quocumque modo cognosci possit. Et ideo can be known in any way. And thus we say that God
dicimus quod deus cognoscibilis est; non autem ita is knowable; not, however, knowable to the point
est cognoscibilis, ut essentia sua comprehendatur. that his essence is comprehended. For every knower
Quia omne cognoscens habet cognitionem de re has a knowledge of the known reality not according
cognita, non per modum rei cognitae, sed per to the way of the thing known, but according to the
modum cognoscentis. Modus autem nullius way of the knower. Now, there is no creature whose
creaturae attingit ad altitudinem divinae majestatis. mode reaches the height of the divine majesty.
Unde oportet quod a nullo perfecte cognoscatur, Hence, it is necessary that he is not known perfectly
sicut ipse seipsum perfecte cognoscit. by anyone as he himself perfectly is known.
AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod deus non est TO THE FIRST therefore it should be said that as
hoc modo existens sicut ista existentia, sed in eo est God is not according to this mode of existing, as
natura entitatis eminenter. Unde, sicut non est these existing things, but in him the nature of entity
omnino expers entitatis, ita etiam non omnino est is present eminently. Hence, as he is not completely
expers cognitionis, quin cognoscatur; sed non deprived of entity, thus he is neither completely
cognoscitur per modum aliorum existentium, quae deprived of knowability, to the point of not being
intellectu creato comprehendi possunt. known; but he is not known in the mode of other
existents, that they can be comprehended by the
created intellect.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod quamvis plus TO THE SECOND it should be said that although
distet deus a quolibet intelligibili, secundum God is more distant from any intelligible thing,
naturae proprietatem, quam intelligibile a sensibili, according to the quality of nature, than an
tamen plus convenit in ratione cognoscibilis. Omne intelligible thing is from a sensible, he nonetheless
enim quod est separatum a materia, habet rationem agrees more in the concept of being able to be
ut cognoscatur sicut intelligibile: quod autem known. For every thing that is separate from matter
materiale est cognoscitur ut sensibile. has a concept so that it may be known as an
intelligible thing; every thing that is material,
however, is known as a sensible thing.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod species, per quam TO THE THIRD it should be said that the species
fit cognitio, est in potentia cognoscente secundum by means of which one has knowledge, is in potency
modum ipsius cognoscentis: unde eorum quae sunt in the knower according to the mode of the knower
magis materialia quam intellectus, species est in himself. Hence, a species of the things that are more
intellectu simplicior quam in rebus; et ideo material than the intellect exists in the intellect in a
hujusmodi dicuntur cognosci per modum more simple way than in things, and for this reason,
abstractionis. Deus autem et Angeli sunt things of this sort are said to be known by way of
simpliciores nostro intellectu; et ideo species quae abstraction. God and angels, however, are simpler
in nostro intellectu efficitur, per quam than out intellect, and for this reason, a species that
cognoscuntur, est minus simplex. Unde non dicimur is formed in our intellect by which they are known is
cognoscere ea per abstractionem, sed per less simple. Hence, we are not said to know them by
impressionem ipsorum in intelligentias nostras. abstraction but by an impression of them in our
understandings.
AD QUARTUM dicendum, quod infinitum dicitur TO THE FOURTH it should be said that the
dupliciter, scilicet privative et negative. Infinitum infinite is said in two ways, namely privatively and
privative est quod secundum suum genus est natum negatively. The infinite in a privative sense is that
habere finem, non habens; et tale, cum sit which according to its genus is made to have a
imperfectum, ex sui imperfectione perfecte non terminus, and does not have it; and this, being
cognoscitur, sed secundum quid. Infinitum negative imperfect, by its imperfection is not known
dicitur quod nullo modo finitum est; et hoc est perfectly, but under a certain aspect. The infinite in
quiddam quod se ad omnia extendit, a negative sense is that which in no way is finite;
perfectissimum, non valens ab intellectu creato and this is something that is extended to all things,
comprehendi, sed tantum attingi. most perfect, that cannot be comprehended by the
created intellect, but only touched.
AD QUINTUM dicendum, quod philosophus, TO THE FIFTH it should be said that the
loquitur de cognitione intellectus connaturali nobis Philosopher (De anima, III, 30), speaks about the
secundum statum viae; et hoc modo deus non intellect’s knowledge that is connatural to us
cognoscitur a nobis nisi per phantasmata, non sui according to the condition of this life. And in this
ipsius, sed causati sui per quod in ipsum devenimus. way, God is known by us only through a phantasm,
Sed per hoc non removetur quin cognitio aliqua not a phantasm of himself but of an effect of his by
possit esse intellectus, non per viam naturalem which we reach him. But, as a result of this, the fact
nobis, sed altiorem, scilicet per influentiam divini that there can be some knowledge of God in the
luminis ad quam phantasma non est necessarium. intellect is not withdrawn – knowledge not by the
way natural to us but by a higher way, namely, by
the influence of the divine light for which a
phantasm is not necessary.
ALIA concedimus. Tamen ad ultimum, quia THE OTHER ARGUMENTS we concede.
concludit, quod deus etiam nunc maxime Nonetheless, to the last one, which concludes that
cognoscatur a nobis, respondendum est, quod God also now is known by us maximally, it is
quodammodo est simile in intellectu et sensu, et necessary to respond that the case of the intellect
quodammodo dissimile. In hoc enim simile est quod and of sense is in part similar and in part dissimilar.
sicut sensus non potest in id quod non est It is similar, in fact, since as the sense does not have
proportionatum sibi, ita nec intellectus, cum omnis power over that which is not proportionate to it,
cognitio sit per modum cognoscentis, secundum neither can the intellect, since all knowledge exists
Boetium: in hoc autem dissimile est quod through the mode of the knower, according to
intelligibile excellens non corrumpit, sicut excellens Boethius: There is dissimilarity, however, in the fact
sensibile; unde intellectus non deficit a cognitione that an exceedingly strong intelligible thing does
excellentis intelligibilis quia corrumpatur, sed quia not corrupt the intellect, as an exceedingly strong
non attingit. Et ideo non perfecte Deum videre sensible thing corrupts the senses. Hence, the
potest intellectus creatus. intellect does not fail to attain knowledge of an
exceedingly strong intelligible thing because it is
corrupted, but because it does not reach it.
Therefore, the created intellect cannot see God
perfectly.

ARTICLE TWO
Whether God’s existence is per se notum
Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum

AD SECUNDUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod PROCEEDING TO THE SECOND. 1. It seems that
Deum esse sit per se notum. Illa enim dicuntur per God exists is per se notum. For those things are
se nota quorum cognitio naturaliter est nobis insita, called per se notum the knowledge of which is
ut: omne totum est majus sua parte. Sed cognitio naturally implanted in us, such as every whole is
existendi Deum, secundum Damascenum, greater than its part. But, according to Damascene,
naturaliter est omnibus insita. Ergo Deum esse est the knowledge of God existing is naturally
per se notum. implanted in everyone. Therefore, that God is, is per
se notum.
ITEM, sicut se habet lux sensibilis ad visum, ita 2. ALSO, as sensible light is related to a seen
se habet lux intellectualis ad intellectum. Sed lux thing, intelligible light is related to an understood
visibilis seipsa videtur; immo nihil videtur, nisi thing. But visible light is itself seen, or more
mediante ipsa. Ergo Deus seipso immediate precisely, nothing is seen except by means of it. God
cognoscitur. is known, therefore, immediately in himself.
ITEM, omnis cognitio est per unionem rei 3. ALSO, all knowledge is through the union of
cognitae ad cognoscentem. Sed Deus est per the thing known with the knower. But through
seipsum intrinsecus animae etiam magis quam ipsa himself God is even more internal to the soul than
sibi. Ergo per seipsum cognosci potest. the soul is to itself. He can be known, therefore,
through himself.
PRAETEREA, illud est per se notum quod non 4. FURTHERMORE, that is self-evident which
potest cogitari non esse. Sed deus non potest cannot be thought not to be. But God cannot be
cogitari non esse. Ergo ipsum esse, per se est notum. thought not to be. His existence is, therefore, self-
Probatio mediae est per Anselmum: Deus est quo evident. The proof of the second premise is provided
majus cogitari non potest. Sed illud quod non potest by Anselm, who in Chapter 15 of the Proslogion says
cogitari non esse, est majus eo quod potest cogitari that God is that than which a greater cannot be
non esse. Ergo deus non potest cogitari non esse, thought. But that which cannot be thought not to be
cum sit illud quo nihil majus cogitari potest. Potest is greater than that which can be thought not to be.
aliter probari. Nulla res potest cogitari sine sua God cannot, therefore, be thought not to be. This
quidditate, sicut homo sine eo quod est animal can be proved in another way. No thing can be
rationale mortale. Sed dei quidditas est ipsum suum thought without its quiddity, as for example, man
esse, ut dicit Avicenna. Ergo deus non potest cannot be thought without thinking about a
cogitari non esse. rational, mortal animal. But God’s quiddity is his
being itself, as Avicenna says in Chapter 1 of On the
Intelligences. Therefore, God cannot be thought not
to be.
CONTRA, ea quae per se sunt nota, ut dicit ON THE CONTRARY, those things that are per se
philosophus, etsi exterius negentur ore, nunquam notum, as the Philosopher says in Book 4 of the
interius negari possunt corde. Sed deum esse, potest Metaphysics, can never be denied inwardly by the
negari corde. Psalm. 13, 1: dixit insipiens in corde heart, even if they may be denied outwardly by the
suo: non est deus. Ergo Deum esse non est per se lips. But God’s existence can be denied by the heart:
notum. The fool said in his heart: there is no God (Psalm 13:1).
Therefore, that God is is not per se notum.
ITEM, quidquid est conclusio demonstrationis ALSO, whatever is the conclusion of a
non est per se notum. Sed Deum esse demonstratur demonstration is not per se notum. But that God is is
etiam a philosophis. Ergo Deum esse non est per se indeed demonstrated by philosophers. Therefore,
notum. that God is is not per se notum.

RESPONDEO, quod de cognitione alicujus rei I RESPOND that someone can speak about the
potest aliquis dupliciter loqui: aut secundum ipsam knowledge of any thing in two ways: either
rem, aut quo ad nos. Loquendo igitur de Deo according to the thing itself or with respect to us.
secundum seipsum, esse est per se notum, et ipse est Speaking therefore about God according to himself,
per se intellectus, non per hoc quod faciamus ipsum God’s existence is per se notum, and he is
intelligibile, sicut materialia facimus intelligibilia in understood through himself, not by the fact that we
actu. Loquendo autem de Deo per comparationem make him intelligible as we make material things
ad nos, sic iterum dupliciter potest considerari. Aut intelligible in act. However, speaking of God in
secundum suam similitudinem et participationem; comparison to us, he can still be considered in two
et hoc modo ipsum esse, est per se notum; nihil ways. Either according to his likeness and
enim cognoscitur nisi per veritatem suam, quae est a participation; and in this way his esse is per se
Deo exemplata; veritatem autem esse, est per se notum; for nothing is none except through its truth,
notum. Aut secundum suppositum, idest which is exemplified on God; now, that truth exists,
considerando ipsum Deum, secundum quod est in is per se notum. Or according to the supposit, i.e.,
natura sua quid incorporeum; et hoc modo non est considering God himself, according to what is
per se notum; immo multi inveniuntur negasse something incorporeal in his nature; and this way is
Deum esse, sicut omnes philosophi qui non not per se notum; moreover, many are found that
posuerunt causam agentem, ut Democritus et deny God is, as all the philosophers who did not
quidam alii. posit an agent cause, like Democritus and some
others.
Et hujus ratio est, quia ea quae per se nobis nota And the reason for this is those things that are
sunt, efficiuntur nota statim per sensum; sicut visis per se notum to us are made known immediately by
toto et parte, statim cognoscimus quod omne totum the senses; as when we see the whole and the part,
est majus sua parte sine aliqua inquisitione. Unde we immediately know that every whole is greater
Philosophus: principia cognoscimus dum terminos than its parts without some inquiry. Hence the
cognoscimus. Sed visis sensibilibus, non devenimus Philosopher [says]: we know the principles when we
in Deum nisi procedendo, secundum quod ista know the terms. But seeing sensible things, we do
causata sunt et quod omne causatum est ab aliqua not come to God unless proceeding according to
causa agente et quod primum agens non potest esse which these things are caused and every caused is by
corpus, et ita in Deum non devenimus nisi some agent cause and that the first agent cannot be
arguendo; et nullum tale est per se notum. Et haec a body, and thus we do not come to God if not by
est ratio Avicennae. argumentation; and no such thing is per se notum.
And this is the reason of Avicenna.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod auctoritas TO THE FIRST, therefore, it should be said that
Damasceni intelligenda est de divina cognitione the authoritative text of Damascene should be
nobis insita, secundum ipsius similitudinem et non understood as referring to divine knowledge within
secundum quod est in sua natura; sicut etiam us according to his likeness and not according to
dicitur, quod omnia appetunt deum: non quidem what is in his nature; as well, one says that all things
ipsum prout consideratur in sua natura, sed in sui desire God, not insofar as he is considered in his
similitudine; quia nihil desideratur, nisi inquantum nature, ma in his likeness: since nothing is desired
habet similitudinem ipsius, et etiam nihil and also nothing is known unless insofar as it has a
cognoscitur. likeness to him.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod visus noster est TO THE SECOND it should be said that our vision
proportionatus ad videndum lucem corporalem per is proportionate to seeing corporeal light per se, but
seipsam; sed intellectus noster non est our intellect is not proportionate to knowing
proportionatus ad cognoscendum naturali something with natural knowledge if not by means
cognitione aliquid nisi per sensibilia; et ideo in of sensible realities: therefore, pure intellects may
intelligibilia pura devenire non potest nisi arguendo. not be reached if not by argumentation.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod quamvis deus sit TO THE THIRD it should be said that although
in anima per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam, God is in the soul by essence, presence and power,
non tamen est in ea sicut objectum intellectus; et still he is not in it as object of the intellect; and this
hoc requiritur ad cognitionem. Unde etiam anima is required for knowledge. Hence even the soul is
sibi ipsi praesens est; tamen maxima difficultas est present to itself, and yet in the knowledge of the
in cognitione animae, nec devenitur in ipsam, nisi soul, one has the maximum difficulty, nor is it
ratiocinando ex objectis in actus et ex actibus in arrived to unless by reasoning from objects to the
potentias. acts and from acts to the powers.
AD QUARTUM dicendum, quod ratio Anselmi ita TO THE FOURTH it should be said that Anselm’s
intelligenda Est. Postquam intelligimus deum, non reasoning should be understood in the following
potest intelligi quod sit deus, et possit cogitari non way. As soon as we understand God, it cannot be
esse; sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur quod aliquis thought that God exists and that he can be thought
non possit negare vel cogitare, deum non esse; not to be. And still from this it does not follow that
potest enim cogitare nihil hujusmodi esse quo majus one cannot deny him, or thing that God is not; in
cogitari non possit; et ideo ratio sua procedit ex hac fact, one can think that there is nothing that one
suppositione, quod supponatur aliquid esse quo cannot think of anything greater. Therefore, his
majus cogitari non potest. Et similiter etiam reasoning is based on this supposition, that it is
dicendum ad aliam probationem. supposed that there exists something of which one
cannot think of anything greater. And something
similar can be said for the other proof.

ARTICLE THREE
Whether God can be known by man through creatures
Utrum Deus possit cognosci ab homine per creaturas

AD TERTIUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod Deus Proceeding to the third. It seems that God can
possit cognosci per creaturas ab homine. Rom. 1, 20: be known by man by means of creatures, as one
invisibilia dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta reads in Rom 1:20: The invisible things of God from
sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Creatura autem the creatures of the world are understood and seen by
videtur esse homo, secundum expositionem the things which were made. Now, the creature in
magistri. Ergo per creaturas ab homine potest question seems to be man, according to the
cognosci. exposition of the Master. Therefore, he can be
known by man by means of creatures.
ITEM, videtur quod ab Angelo. Cognitio enim 2. ALSO, it seems that [God can be known] from
dei per creaturas fit per hoc quod videtur divina the Angel. In fact, the knowledge of God by means
bonitas relucens in creatura. Sed Angelus of creatures is had insofar as one sees the divine
cognoscens res in proprio genere, videt divinam goodness resplendent in creatures. Now, the angel,
bonitatem in ipsis. Ergo cognoscit creatorem ex knowing things in their genus, sees divine goodness
creaturis. in these. Therefore it knows the Creator by means of
creatures.
ITEM, videtur quod etiam bruta. Nulli enim fit 3. ALSO, it seems that also brute animals [know
praeceptum nisi ei qui cognoscit praeceptum. Sed him]. In fact, one does establish a precept except for
Jonae 4 dicitur, quod praecepit Dominus vermi, those who know the precept. But in Jonah 4 it says
quod percuteret hederam. Ergo vermis potest that the Lord commands a worm that it attack the
cognoscere divinum praeceptum, et ita potest etiam plant. Therefore, the worm can know the divine
cognoscere praecipientem. precept, and thus it can also know the preceptor.
ITEM, videtur quod etiam a peccatoribus possit 4. ALSO, it seems that it can also be known by
cognosci: dicitur enim Rom. 1, 21: cum Deum sinners: for it is said in Romans 1:21: though they
cognovissent, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt. Tales knew God, they did not glorify [him] as God. Now,
autem peccatores fuerunt. Ergo etc. these were sinners. Therefore, etc.
CONTRA, omnis effectus ducens in cognitionem 5. ON THE CONTRARY, every effect leading to the
suae causae, est aliquo modo proportionatus sibi. knowledge of its cause, is in some way proportionate
Sed creaturae non sunt proportionatae Deo. Ergo ex to it. But creatures are not proportionate to God.
eis non potest homo in suam cognitionem venire. Therefore, from these man is not able to come to
knowledge of him.
ITEM, videtur quod nec Angeli. Quod enim per 6. ALSO, it seems that neither [can] the angels.
se cognoscitur, non cognoscitur per aliquid aliud. For what is known per se, is not known by
Sed Deum cognoscunt Angeli per se, videntes ipsum something else. But God is known per se by the
in sua essentia. Ergo non cognoscunt ipsum per angels, seeing him in his essence. Therefore, they do
creaturas. not know him through creatures.
ITEM, videtur quod nec etiam a brutis. Nulla 7. ALSO, it seems that neither [is he known] by
enim potentia affixa organo habet virtutem ad brute animals. For no power affixed to an organ has
cognoscendum nisi speciem materialem, eo quod the power to know something beyond the material
cognitio sit in cognoscente secundum modum species, given that knowledge is in the knower
ipsius. according to its mode. But brute animals do not
Sed bruta non habent virtutes cognoscitivas, nisi have cognitive, but sensitive powers, which are
sensitivas, quae sunt affixae organo. Ergo nullo affixed to the organ. Therefore, in no way can they
modo possunt cognoscere Deum, qui omnino est know God, who is totally immaterial.
immaterialis.
ITEM, videtur quod nec etiam a peccatoribus. 8. ALSO, it seems that neither [is he known] by
Ambrosius enim dicit super illud, Matth. 5, 8: beati sinners. For Ambrose says about Mt 5:8: “Blessed the
mundo corde quoniam ipsi Deum videbunt. Si qui pure of heart for they shall see God”, if some are
mundo corde sunt, Deum videbunt, ergo alii non pure of heart, they will see God; therefore others will
videbunt; neque enim maligni Deum videbunt, not see; for not even those who are evil see God, nor
neque is qui Deum videre noluerit, potest videre can the one who does not want to see God, see him.
Deum.

RESPONDEO dicendum, quod, cum creatura I RESPOND saying that because the creature
exemplariter procedat a Deo sicut a causa proceeds exemplarily from God as from a cause in
quodammodo simili secundum analogiam, eo some way similar according to analogy, insofar as
scilicet quod quaelibet creatura eum imitatur namely some creature imitates him according to the
secundum possibilitatem naturae suae, ex creaturis possibility of his nature, namely from creatures one
potest in deum deveniri tribus illis modis quibus can arrive to God in the three modes that we have
dictum est, scilicet per causalitatem, remotionem, indicated, namely, by causality, remotion and
eminentiam. eminence.
Ad hoc autem quod aliquis ex creaturis in deum Now, since from creatures one can arrive to
deveniat, duo requiruntur: scilicet quod ipsum God, two things are required: namely, that one can
deum possit aliquo modo capere, et ideo brutis non in some way grasp God himself, and therefore this
convenit talis processus cognitionis; secundo process of knowledge does not belong to brute
requiritur quod cognitio divina in eis incipiat a animals; second, one requires that knowledge of
creaturis et terminetur ad creatorem; et ideo Angelis God in him begins from creature and ends in the
non convenit deum cognoscere per creaturas, neque Creator: and thus to the Angels it does not belong to
beatis hominibus, qui a creatoris cognitione know God through creatures, nor to blessed men,
procedunt in creaturas. Sed convenit iste processus who proceed from knowledge of the Creator to
hominibus, secundum statum viae, bonis et malis. creatures. This process, however, belongs to men
according to the state of via, both good men as well
as evil men.

PRIMUM ergo concedimus. THE FIRST, therefore, we concede.


AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod quamvis TO THE SECOND it should be said that although
Angelus cognoscat divinam bonitatem relucere in the Angel knows that divine goodness shines in the
creatura, non tamen ex creatura venit in creatorem, creature, it still does not come to the Creator from
sed e contrario. creatures, but rather the contrary.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod praeceptum Dei TO THE THIRD it should be said that the precept
non devenit ad vermem, ita quod intentionem of God does not arrive to the worm, such that it
praecepti apprehenderet, sed quia divina virtute apprehends the intention of the precept, but rather
mota est ejus aestimativa naturali motu ad because its estimative power was moved by the
explendum illud quod Deus disponebat. divine power by a natural motion to fulfill what God
disposed.
QUARTUM concedimus. THE FOURTH we concede.
AD QUINTUM dicendum, quod creatura est TO THE FIFTH it should be said that a creature is
effectus non proportionatus creatori; et ideo non an effect that is not proportionate to the Creator;
ducit in perfectam cognitionem ipsius sed in and therefore it does not lead to perfect knowledge
imperfectam. but to imperfect knowledge of him.
SEXTUM ET SEPTIMUM concedimus. THE SIXTH AND SEVENTH we concede.
AD OCTAVUM DICENDUM, quod Ambrosius TO THE EIGHTH it should be said that Ambrose is
loquitur de visione dei per essentiam, quae erit in speaking about the vision of God by essence, which
patria, ad quam nullus malus poterit pervenire. will be in patria, to which no evil-doer is able to
Similiter etiam ad cognitionem fidei nullus venit nisi come. For similarly to the knowledge of faith no one
fidelis. Sed cognitio naturalis de Deo communis est comes except the faithful. But the natural
bonis et malis, fidelibus et infidelibus. knowledge about God is common to good people
and to evil people, to the faithful and to infidels.

ARTICLE FOUR
Utrum philosophi naturali cognitione cognoverint trinitatem ex creaturis
Whether philosophers by natural knowledge knew the Trinity from creatures

AD QUARTUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod PROCEEDING TO THE FOURTH. It seems that by
philosophi naturali cognitione ex creaturis in natural knowledge philosophers have come to the
Trinitatem devenerunt. Dicit enim Aristoteles: et Trinity by means of creatures. For Aristotle said: and
per hunc quidem numerum, scilicet ternarium, by this number, namely three, we have sought to
adhibuimus nos ipsos magnificare Deum unum magnify the one God, superior to all perfections of
eminentem proprietatibus eorum quae creata sunt. created reality. In a similar way, Plato also said
Similiter etiam Plato, loquitur multa de paterno many things about the fatherly intellect and many
intellectu et multi alii philosophi. other philosophers.
PRAETEREA, philosophi potuerunt devenire in 2. FURTHERMORE, the philosophers can come to
cognitionem eorum quae in creaturis relucent. Sed the knowledge of those things that shine in
in anima est expressa similitudo Trinitatis creatures. But in the soul there is the clear likeness
personarum. of the Trinity of persons. Therefore, it seems that
Ergo videtur quod per potentias animae, quas through the powers of the soul, which these
philosophi multum consideraverunt, potuerunt in philosophers considered much, were able to come to
Trinitatem personarum devenire. the Trinity of persons.
ITEM, Richardus de s. Victore, dicit: credo sine 3. AGAIN, Richard of St. Victor says: I believe
dubio quod ad quamcumque explanationem without a doubt that any explanation of truth,
veritatis, quae necesse est esse, non modo which is necessary, may be proved not only by
probabilia, immo et necessaria argumenta non probable arguments, but also by necessary ones. But
desunt. Sed necessarium est cognoscere trinitatem. it is necessary to know the Trinity. Therefore it
Ergo videtur quod ad ipsius cognitionem philosophi seems that the philosophers have been able to have
rationem habere potuerunt. Quod etiam videtur ex arguments for knowledge of this. Also, this seems
probationibus supra inductis, dist. 2, art. 4, quibus to be the case from the proofs used above (D. 2, a.
trinitas probatur. 4), in which the Trinity is proved.
ITEM, dicitur Rom. 1 in Glossa quod philosophi 4. AGAIN, it is said in the Gloss on Romans 1 that
non pervenerunt ad notitiam personae tertiae, the philosophers did not come to the knowledge of
scilicet spiritus sancti, et idem habetur super Exod. the three Persons, namely to the Holy Spirit, and the
8, ubi dicitur, quod magi Pharaonis defecerunt in same is had concerning Exodus 8, where it is said
tertio signo. Ergo videtur ad minus quod ad that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third
notitiam duarum personarum venerunt. sign. Therefore, it seems at least that they came to
knowledge of two persons.

CONTRA, Heb. 11, 1: fides est substantia ON THE CONTRARY, Hebrews 11:1: faith is the
sperandarum rerum, argumentum non substance of things hoped for, the argument of
apparentium. Sed Deum esse trinum et unum, est things not seen. But that God is Triune and One, is
articulus fidei. Ergo non est apparens rationi. an article of the faith. Therefore, it is not apparent
to reason.

RESPONDEO dicendum, quod per naturalem I RESPOND saying that by natural reason one
rationem non potest perveniri in cognitionem cannot come to the knowledge of the Trinity of
Trinitatis personarum; et ideo philosophi nihil de persons; and therefore of this the philosophers did
hoc sciverunt, nisi forte per revelationem vel not know anything, unless perhaps by revelation or
auditum ab aliis. Et hujus ratio est, quia naturalis having heard it from others. And the reason for this
ratio non cognoscit Deum nisi ex creaturis. Omnia is this, that natural reason does not know God
autem quae dicuntur de Deo per respectum ad except from creatures. Now all the things that are
creaturas, pertinent ad essentiam et non ad said of God in relation to creatures, belongs to the
personas. Et ideo ex naturali ratione non venitur nisi essence and not to the Persons. And therefore from
in attributa divinae essentiae. Tamen personas, natural reason one only comes to the attributes of
secundum appropriata eis, philosophi cognoscere the divine essence. Nevertheless, the philosophers
potuerunt, cognoscentes potentiam, sapientiam, can know the persons according to what is
bonitatem. appropriate to them, knowing power, wisdom,
goodness.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod, secundum TO THE FIRST, therefore, it should be said that,
expositionem Commentatoris, Aristoteles non according to the exposition of the Commentator,
intendit trinitatem personarum in Deo ponere; sed Aristotle did not intend to posit a Trinity of persons
propter hoc quod in omnibus creaturis apparet in God; but on account of the fact that in every
perfectio in ternario, sicut in principio, medio et creature there appears perfection in a threefold way,
fine, ideo antiqui honorabant Deum in sacrificiis et as in principle, middle and end, therefore the
orationibus triplicatis. Plato autem dicitur multa ancients honored God in triplicate sacrifices and
cognovisse de divinis, legens libros veteris legis, prayers. Now Plato said that many knew about
quos invenit in Aegypto. Vel forte intellectum divine things reading the books of the Old Law,
paternum nominat intellectum divinum, secundum which were found in Egypt. Or perhaps he calls the
quod in se quodam modo concipit ideam mundi, fatherly intellect the divine intellect, insofar as in a
quae est mundus archetypus. certain way he conceives the idea of the world,
which is the archetype world.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod similitudo TO THE SECOND it should be said that the
trinitatis relucens in anima est omnino imperfecta et likeness of the Trinity that shines in the soul totally
deficiens, sicut infra dicet Magister. Sed dicitur imperfect and deficient, as the Master says below.
expressa per comparationem ad similitudinem But it is said that it is clear in comparison to the
vestigii. likeness of the vestige.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod si dictum Richardi TO THE THIRD it should be said that if the saying
intelligatur universaliter, quod omne verum possit of Richard is understood universally, that all truth
probari per rationem, est expresse falsum; quia can be proved by reason, this is clearly false; because
prima principia per se nota non probantur. Si autem the first per se nota principles are not proved.
aliqua sunt in se nota quae nobis occulta sunt, illa However, if there are some things which are in se
probantur per notiora quo ad nos. Notiora autem nota, but which are hidden to us, these are proved
quo ad nos sunt effectus principiorum. Ex effectibus by means of things which are more known to us.
autem creaturarum, Trinitas personarum probari Now, the things that are more known to us are the
non potest, ut dictum est. Et ideo relinquitur quod effects of the principles. But, as was said, from the
nullo modo possit probari; et omnes rationes effects of creatures, a Trinity of persons cannot be
inductae sunt magis adaptationes quaedam, quam proved. And, therefore, it cannot be proved in any
necessario concludentes. Remoto enim per way; and all the reasons adduced are more
impossibile intellectu distinctionis personarum, adaptations than necessary conclusions. Removed,
adhuc remanebit in Deo summa bonitas et then, as impossible, the understanding of the
beatitudo et caritas. distinction of persons, there still remains in God,
the highest good, and blessedness and charity.
AD QUARTUM dicendum, quod philosophi non TO THE FOURTH it should be said that the
pervenerunt in cognitionem duarum personarum Philosophers did not come to the knowledge of two
quantum ad propria, sed solum quantum ad persons as to the properties, but only to
appropriata, non inquantum appropriata sunt, quia appropriations, not insofar as they are appropriated,
sic eorum cognitio dependeret ex propriis, sed because in that case their knowledge would depend
inquantum sunt attributa divinae naturae. Et si on the properties, but rather insofar as they are
objiciatur, quod similiter devenerunt in cognitionem attributes of the divine nature. And if one objected
bonitatis, quae appropriatur Spiritui Sancto, sicut in that they arrived to the knowledge of goodness,
cognitionem potentiae et sapientiae, quae which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, just as they
appropriantur Patri et Filio: dicendum, quod did to knowledge of power and wisdom, which are
bonitatem non cognoverunt quantum ad appropriated to the Father and the Son: it should be
potissimum effectum ipsius, incarnationem scilicet said that they did not know goodness in relation to
et redemptionem. Vel quia non tantum intenderunt its most powerful effect, namely the Incarnation and
venerationi bonitatis divinae, quam etiam non Redemption. One could also respond that they did
imitabantur, sicut venerati sunt potentiam et not venerate divine goodness, which they did not
sapientiam. imitate, as much as they venerated power and
wisdom.

QUESTION TWO
Deinde quaeritur de vestigio, circa quod Then what concerns the vestige is investigated,
quaeruntur tria: quid sit vestigium; de partibus about which three things are asked: what is a
vestigii; utrum in omni creatura vestigium vestige; about the parts of vestige; whether in every
inveniatur. creature a vestige is found.
ARTICLE ONE
Utrum similitudo dei in creaturis, possit dici vestigium
Whether the likeness of God in creatures can be called a vestige

AD PRIMUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod PROCEEDING TO THE FIRST. It seems that the
similitudo creatoris reperta in creatura, non potest likeness of the Creator that is found in creatures
dici vestigium. Per vestigium enim res investigatur. cannot be called a vestige. In fact, by means of the
Sed divina majestas est investigabilis: unde dicitur vestige the creature is investigated. But divine
Rom. 11, 33: o altitudo divitiarum sapientiae et majesty is unable to be investigated: hence it is said
scientiae Dei, quam incomprehensibilia sunt judicia in Romans 11:33: O the depth of the riches and
ejus, et investigabiles viae ejus. Et psalm. 76, 20: et wisdom and knowledge of God, how incomprehensible
vestigia tua non cognoscentur. Ergo videtur quod are his judgments and inscrutable his ways. And
similitudo creatoris in creatura non sit vestigium. Psalm 76:20: and your vestiges were not known.
Therefore, it seems that the likeness of the Creator
in creatures is not a vestige.
PRAETEREA, vestigium est impressio quaedam 2. FURTHERMORE, the vestige is an impression
consequens motum ejus cujus est vestigium. Sed consequent upon the motion of that thing of which
Deus res producit sine aliquo sui motu, Jac. 1, 17: there is a vestige. But God produces a thing without
apud quem non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis himself moving, as is written in James 1:17: With
obumbratio. Ergo vestigium non potest dici de whom there is no change or shadow due to change.
similitudine creaturae, quae a creatore producitur. Therefore, the likeness of the creature that is
produced by the Creator cannot be called a vestige.
ITEM, vestigium, secundum quod hic sumitur, 3. AGAIN, the vestige, as it is taken here, leads to
inducit in cognitionem personarum. Sed per knowledge of the persons. But, as was said,
creaturas non potest haberi cognitio Trinitatis, ut knowledge of the Trinity cannot be had through
dictum est. Ergo similitudo reperta in creaturis non creatures. Therefore, [either] the likeness found in
debet dici vestigium; vel vestigium non ducit in creatures should not be called a vestige; or the
Trinitatem. vestige does not lead to the Trinity.
ITEM, Gregorius dicit, super illud Job 11, 7: 4. AGAIN, Gregory, regarding Job 11:7: Will you
forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes? benignitas perhaps understand the vestiges of God?, says: The
visitationis, qua viam nobis ostendit, ejus vestigia goodness of the visitation, by which he shows the
dicuntur. Ergo videtur, quod vestigium non sit way to us, is called his vestiges. Therefore, it seems
similitudo Dei reperta in creaturis. that the vestige is not the likeness of God found in
creatures.

RESPONDEO dicendum, quod vestigium, I RESPOND saying that the vestige, as it is taken
secundum quod hic sumitur, metaphorice accipitur, here, is taken metaphorically, and properly speaking
et sumitur ad similitudinem vestigii proprie dicti, is taken from the likeness of the vestige which is an
quod est impressio quaedam, confuse ducens in impression, which leads to the knowledge of
cognitionem alicujus, cum non repraesentet ipsum someone in a confused way, since it does not
nisi secundum partem, scilicet pedem, et secundum represent them except according to a part, namely,
inferiorem superficiem tantum. Tria ergo the foot, and only according to the lower surface.
considerantur in ratione vestigii: scilicet similitudo, Therefore, three things are considered in the notion
imperfectio similitudinis, et quod per vestigium in of vestige: namely, the likeness, the imperfection of
rem cujus est vestigium devenitur. Secundum hoc the likeness and that through the vestige one comes
ergo, quia in creaturis invenitur similitudo creatoris, to the thing of which it is a vestige. Therefore,
per quam in ipsius cognitionem devenire possimus, according to this, because one finds the likeness of
et est imperfecta similitudo; ideo in creaturis dicitur the Creator in creatures, through which we can
vestigium creatoris. Et quia magis deficiunt a come to knowledge of him and is an imperfect
repraesentatione distinctionis personarum, quam likeness, therefore, it is said that there is a vestige of
essentialium attributorum; ideo magis proprie the Creator in creatures. And since these are more
dicitur creatura vestigium, secundum quod ducit in greatly deficient in the representation of the
personas, quam secundum quod ducit in divinam distinction of persons than in that of the essential
essentiam. attributes, then, the creature is more properly called
a vestige insofar as it leads to the persons than
insofar as it leads to the divine essence.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod divinae viae TO THE FIRST, therefore, it should be said that
dicuntur investigabiles, quia non ad plenum ipsius the divine ways are called unsearchable because we
opera comprehendere possumus, non quod ex cannot fully comprehend his ways, and not because
creaturis nullo modo in ipsas devenire possimus. from creatures we can in no way come to this.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod in his quae TO THE SECOND it should be said that in the
dicuntur per translationem, sufficit quod attendatur things that are said by translation [movement], it is
similitudo quantum ad aliquid, et non oportet quod enough that the likeness is considered in relation to
quantum ad omnia; alias esset identitas, et non something, and not to all things; otherwise there
similitudo. would be identity and not likeness.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod per vestigium non TO THE THIRD it should be said that we do not
devenimus in cognitionem personarum, nisi valde come to the knowledge of persons through the
confuse; quia per appropriata personis, magis quam vestige, except in a very confused way; because [we
per ipsarum propria, sicut patet ex littera. come to them] by the appropriations to persons
Appropriata autem sunt essentialia, quamvis more than through their properties, as is clear from
similitudinem habeant cum propriis personarum. the text. Now, the appropriations are essential, even
though they have a likeness with the properties of
the persons.
AD QUARTUM dicendum, quod uni rei possunt TO THE FOURTH it should be said that many
esse multa similia; unde non est inconveniens quod things can be similar to one thing; hence it is not
ab eodem transmutentur aliqua diversa secundum inconvenient that from one same thing diverse
diversas similitudines; et ideo potest esse quod things are transposed according to diverse
similitudo reperta in creaturis dicatur vestigium in likenesses; and thus it can happen that the likeness
quantum confuse repraesentat; et opera divinae discovered in the creatures is called a vestige to the
bonitatis in mysterio incarnationis ostensa dicantur degree that it represents confusedly; and the works
vestigia dei inquantum per ea nobis via paratur ad of the divine goodness shown in the mystery of the
veniendum in ipsum. Incarnation are called vestiges of God insofar as
through them, the way to arrive to him is prepared.

ARTICLE TWO
Whether the parts of the vestige are only three or two
Utrum partes vestigii sint tres tantum vel duae

AD SECUNDUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod PROCEEDING TO THE SECOND. It seems that there
debeant esse tantum duae partes vestigii. Vestigium should only be two parts of the vestige. For the
enim est proprietas quaedam creaturae. Sed creatura vestige is a certain property of the creature. But the
habet tantum duas partes essentiales, scilicet creature only has two essential parts, namely,
materiam et formam. Ergo videtur quod secundum matter and form. Therefore, it seems that according
has partes duae tantum sint partes vestigii. to these two parts there are only two parts of the
vestige.
ITEM, videtur quod quatuor. Per vestigium enim ALSO, it seems that there are four. For the
non tantum repraesentatur personarum Trinitas, sed vestige does not only represent the Trinity of
etiam unitas essentiae. Ergo oportet esse tria persons, but also the unity of the essence. Therefore,
respondentia tribus personis et quartum respondens it is necessary that three correspond to the three
unitati essentiae. persons and the fourth correspond to the unity of
the essence.
ITEM, vestigium dicitur in creatura secundum ALSO, the vestige is said of the creature insofar
quod repraesentat creatorem. Cum igitur in as it represents the Creator. Therefore, since many
creaturis repraesententur plurima attributa ipsius attributes of God himself are represented in the
Dei, quae participantur a creaturis, sicut patet per creature, which are participated by the creature, as
Dionysium, videtur quod sint plurimae partes. is clear by Dionysius, it seems that there are many
parts.
ITEM, a diversis inveniuntur partes diversae ALSO, we find that diverse parts are assigned by
assignatae; sicut Sap. 11, 21 dicitur: omnia in numero, diverse [authorities]; as Wisdom 11:21 says: You have
pondere et mensura disposuisti; et Augustinus, disposed all things in number, weight and measure;
ponit modum, speciem et ordinem; et multis aliis and Augustine presents mode, species and order;
modis secundum diversos. Quaeritur ergo de ratione and many others according to diverse ways.
diversitatis assignationum. Therefore, one inquires about the reason for the
diversity of assignments.

RESPONDEO dicendum, quod vestigium I RESPOND saying that the vestige is found in the
invenitur in creatura, inquantum imitatur divinam creature insofar as it imitates divine perfection. Nor
perfectionem. Perfectio autem creaturae non statim the perfection of the creature is not immediately
habetur in suis principiis, quae imperfecta sunt, ut possessed in its principles, which are imperfect, as is
patet in materia et forma, quorum neutrum habet clear in matter and form, neither of which has
per se esse perfectum; sed in conjunctione ipsius perfect being through themselves; but rather is
creaturae ad suum finem. Distantia autem natura possessed in the conjunction of the creature to its
non conjungit sine medio: et ideo in creaturis end. Now nature does not conjoin distant things
invenitur principium, medium et finis, secundum without a middle: and therefore in the creature is
quae tria ponebat Pythagoras perfectionem found principle, middle and end, according to these
cujuslibet creaturae. three Pythagoras presented the perfection of any
creature.
Et secundum rationem etiam horum trium And by reason of these three, the distinction of
repraesentatur in creaturis distinctio divinarum the divine persons is represented in creatures, in
personarum, in quibus Filius est media persona, sed which the Son is the middle Person, while the Holy
Spiritus Sanctus est in quo terminatur processio Spirit is the one in whom the procession of the
personarum. Contingit autem inter duo extrema Persons is completed. Now, it happens that between
esse plura media; et ideo contingit quod principium two extremes there are many middles; and therefore
et medium et finis diversimode possunt assignari, it happens that principle and middle and end can be
secundum quod ex his omnibus, scilicet principio, assigned in diverse ways, according to which from
medio et fine, et multis mediis, quaedam possunt all of these, namely principle, middle and end, and
accipi ut principium et quaedam ut medium et many middles, some are taken as principle and
quaedam ut finis, diversimode combinando; et ideo some as middle and some as end, combining them
contingit quod a diversis partes vestigii diversimode in diverse ways; and therefore it happens that the
sunt assignatae. Verbi gratia, primum quod pertinet parts of the vestige are assigned in diverse ways by
ad perfectionem rei, sunt principia ipsius rei; diverse [authorities]. For example, what first belongs
ultimum autem est perfectio ipsius rei secundum to the perfection of the thing are the principles of
operationem suam ad alias res non tantum prout in the thing itself; what lastly belongs is the perfection
se perfecta est. Inter haec autem multa sunt media. of the thing itself according to its operation with
Est enim dispositio principiorum, sive inclinatio ad respect to other things and not only insofar as it is
esse principiati; est etiam limitatio principiorum sub perfection in itself. In between these there are many
forma principiati, et est forma ipsius principiati et middles. In fact, there is the disposition of the
est virtus et operatio et multa hujusmodi. principles, or the inclination to the being of the
principled; there is also the limitation of the
principles under the form of the principled, and
there is the form of the principled itself, and there is
the power and the operation and many other things.
Potest ergo assignari vestigium, ut pro principio Therefore, the vestige can be assigned insofar as,
sumatur solum illud quod primum est, scilicet ipsa for principle, one only takes that which is first,
substantia principiorum; et pro medio illud quod est namely, the very substance of the principles; and for
immediate sequens, scilicet dispositio principiorum middle, that which follows immediately, namely the
sive inclinatio ad esse principii; et pro fine illud disposition of the principles or inclination to the
totum quod consequitur; et secundum hoc sumitur being of the principles; and for end, all that which is
illud quod dicitur sapien. 11, numerus, pondus et attained; and according to this, one takes what is
mensura; quia numerus pertinet ad pluralitatem said in Wisdom 11, number, weight and measure; for
principiorum, pondus ad inclinationem number belongs to the plurality of principles, weight
principiorum in esse principiati, mensura ad to the inclination of principles to the being of the
terminationem principiorum sub esse creati principled, measure to the termination of the
terminat; ita quod in ista terminatione sumatur et principles under the being of the terminated
terminatio in esse et in operari et in omnibus aliis. created; in such a way that in this termination one
takes the termination in being and in operating and
in all the others.
Item potest aliter sumi, ut pro principio sumatur One can also proceed in another way, in such a
ipsa substantia principiorum et inclinatio et way to take as principle the very substance of
quidquid aliud pertinet ad principia, et pro medio principles and the inclination and every other thing
sumatur ipsa forma principiati, et pro ultimo that belongs to principles, and as middle, to take the
sumatur ipsa comparatio ipsius rei ad ea quae sunt form of the principled, and as the end, to take the
extra rem. Et sic sumuntur illa verba Augustini: quod very comparison of the thing to the reality outside
constat, quod discernitur, quod congruit. Constat of it. And in this way are the words of Augustine
enim res per ipsa sua principia, discernitur per taken: That which consists, that which discerns, that
formam, congruit per comparationem ad alterum: et which agrees. For the thing consists through its very
quasi similiter sumuntur ista, modus, species et principles, it is discerned by its form, and it agrees
ordo; ita quod modus pertineat ad principia by its comparison to another: and these – mode,
determinata sub esse principiati, species ad formam, species and order – are taken almost the same way;
ordo ad comparationem ad alterum; nisi quod ista in the sense that mode belongs to the principles
sunt abstracta et prima concreta; et quasi similiter determined under the being of the principled,
accipiuntur ista, unum, verum et bonum; ut unitas species to the form, order to the comparison to
rei pertineat ad suam determinationem prout ex another; unless these are abstract and the first are
principiis constituta est, et veritas secundum quod concrete; and these – one, true and good – are taken
habet formam, et bonum secundum quod ordinatur almost the same way; as the unity of a thing belongs
ad finem. Item etiam potest sumi pro principio tota to its determination insofar as it is constituted from
res secundum quod est etiam perfecta per formam, principles, and truth according to which it has form,
et pro medio virtus, et pro fine operatio; et sic and good according to which it is ordered to the
sumitur illa Dionysii: essentia, virtus et operatio. end. In the same way, one can taken for principle
the entire thing according to what is perfected by
form, and for middle, power, and for end, operation;
and in this way one takes those of Dionysius:
essence, power, and operation.
Et sic patet quod secundum quod perfectio rei And thus it is clear that insofar as one can
potest intelligi terminari ad diversa, et secundum understand that the perfection of a thing is
quod unum membrum potest multa vel pauca determined in relation to diverse realities, and
includere, invenitur diversitas partium vestigii in insofar as one member can include many or few
omnibus secundum unam communem rationem things, one finds a diversity of parts of the vestige in
principii, medii et finis signatam. all things marked according to one common ratio of
principle, middle and end.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod quamvis sint TO THE FIRST, therefore, it should be said that
duae partes essentiales creaturae, nihilominus although the essential parts of the creature are two,
tamen est accipere habitudinem unius ad alteram, et nevertheless the relation of one to the other is
multas etiam perfectiones consequentes, secundum taken, as well as many consequent perfections,
quas partes vestigii assignari possunt. according to which the parts of the vestige may be
assigned.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod sicut in Deo TO THE SECOND it should be said that as in God
essentia non facit numerum cum personis, ita et in the essence is not numbered with the persons, so
creatura est, quod tribus partibus vestigii substat also in the creature with the three parts of the
ipsum esse creaturae repraesentans essentiam non vestige the underlying being of the creature
connumeratum tribus partibus vestigii. representing the essence is not numbered with the
three parts of the vestige.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod proprietates TO THE THIRD it should be said that the
creaturarum, ex quibus ducimur in divina attributa, properties of creatures, from which we are lead to
quamvis sint plura, habent tamen ordinem ad the divine attributes, even though they are many,
invicem principii, medii et finis, sub quorum still have an order to each other as principle, middle
rationibus in tres personas ducunt, qualitercumque and end, under which notions they lead to the three
diversificentur. persons, in whatever way they are diversified.

ARTICLE THREE
Whether there is a vestige in every creature
Utrum in omni creatura sit vestigium

AD TERTIUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod non PROCEEDING TO THE THIRD. It seems that there
in omni creatura sit vestigium. Similitudo enim is not a vestige in every creature. For, the likeness of
vestigii dividitur contra similitudinem imaginis. Sed the vestige is divided in opposition to the likeness of
quaedam creaturae sunt in quibus est similitudo the image. But there are some creatures in which
imaginis, sicut in homine. Ergo in illis non est there is the likeness of image, as in man. Therefore
vestigium. there is not a vestige in these.
ITEM, vestigium est similitudo imperfecte ALSO, the vestige is a likeness that represents
repraesentans. Sed aliquae creaturae sunt perfecta imperfectly. But some creatures are a perfect
similitudo divinae bonitatis, sicut gratiae gratum likeness of divine goodness, like the grace that
facientes, cum quibus Deus dicitur inhabitare in makes pleasing, with which God is said to dwell in
homine. Ergo in illis non est vestigium. man. Therefore, there is not a vestige in these.
ITEM, si accipiamus singulas partes vestigii, ALSO, if we take the singular parts of the vestige,
quaelibet earum creatura est, sicut modus, vel each of these is a creature, like mode or species. If,
species. Si igitur in qualibet creatura est vestigium, therefore, there is a vestige in any creature, then the
tunc modi erit modus, species et ordo; et ita erit modes will be mode, species, and order; and in this
abire in infinitum, quod nec intellectus nec natura way one will go to infinity, which neither the
patitur. intellect nor nature supports.
ITEM, Ambrosius dicit: lucis natura est ut non sit ALSO, Ambrose says: the nature of light is not to
in numero, pondere et mensura, sicut alia creatura. be in number, weight and measure, as other
In his autem tribus attenditur vestigium, secundum creatures. For in these three one considers the
Augustinum, ut dictum est, art. antecedent.. Cum vestige, according to Augustine, as was said in the
igitur lux sit creatura, videtur quod non in qualibet previous article. Since, therefore, light is a creature,
creatura sit vestigium. it seems that there is not in every creature a vestige.
ITEM, Bernardus: modus caritatis est non habere AGAIN, Bernard says that the mode of charity is
modum. Ergo caritas, cum sit creatura, non habet not having a mode. Therefore, charity, when it is in
modum, speciem et ordinem; et sic idem quod prius. the creature, does not have mode, species and order;
and thus the same as before.

CONTRA, Sap. 11, 2: omnia in numero, pondere et ON THE CONTRARY, it is written in Wisdom 11:2:
mensura disposuisti. Item Augustinus loquens de “You have disposed all in number, weight, and
modo, specie, et ordine, dicit: ubi haec tria magna measure”. Also, Augustine, speaking about mode,
sunt, magnum bonum est; ubi parva, parvum; ubi species, and order, says: where these three are
nulla, nullum. Sed omnis creatura est aliquod greatly, there is great good; where small, small good;
bonum. Ergo omnis creatura habet haec tria. where nothing, no good. But all creatures are some
good. Therefore, all creatures have these three.
RESPONDEO dicendum, quod vestigium I RESPOND saying that the vestige is found in
invenitur in creatura, secundum quod consequitur creatures, insofar as perfect being follows from God,
esse perfectum a Deo, ut supra dictum est, art. as was said above in the previous article. Hence one
praecedenti. Unde in his tantum simpliciter est finds the vestige simply only in those things that are
invenire vestigium quae perfecta sunt in se; et perfect in themselves; and such are only the
hujusmodi sunt tantum individua in genere individuals in the genus of substance.
substantiae.
Accidentia autem non habent esse, nisi For accidents do not have esse, unless
dependens a substantia; unde etiam in accidentibus depending on substance; hence in accidents there is
non est vestigium, nisi secundum ordinem ad not a vestige, unless in relation to substance; in such
substantiam; ita quod accidentia magis sint modi, a way that accidents are more modes, species and
species et ordines substantiarum, quam ipsa orders of substances, than themselves having
habeant speciem, modum et ordinem: nisi effective species, mode and order: unless as efficient cause,
Deus dicatur species, modus et ordo accidentium. God is said to be the species, mode and order of the
Tamen, cum secundum quodlibet accidens addatur accidents. Nevertheless, since insofar as an accident
aliquod esse ipsi substantiae, erit secundum illud adds some being to the substance, one can
esse aliquo modo considerare vestigium. Unde quod according to that being consider the vestige in some
privat illud accidens, privat partes vestigii, scilicet way. Hence, what takes away that accident, takes
modum, speciem et ordinem, quantum ad illud esse; away the parts of the vestige, namely, mode, species,
sicut peccatum, quod privat gratiam, dicitur privatio and order, in accord with that being; like sin, which
modi, speciei et ordinis, secundum esse gratuitum; takes away grace, is called the privation of mode,
nihilominus tamen manent haec tria secundum esse species and order according to gratuitous being;
naturae. nevertheless, these three remain according to the
being of nature.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod in superiori TO THE FIRST, therefore, it should be said that in
semper includitur virtus inferioris, sicut in anima inferior powers are always included in the superior,
etiam est virtus naturae. Anima enim est natura as the power of nature in the soul. For the soul is the
ipsius corporis, quod per ipsam movetur, et dat sibi nature of the body itself, which is moved by the
esse naturale, et super hoc habet proprias soul, and it gives natural being to it, and upon this it
operationes suas: et ideo cum similitudo imaginis has its own operations: and therefore, since the
sequatur animam secundum id quod intellectualis likeness of the image follows the soul according to
est, non excluditur ab ea ratio vestigii, quae that which is intellectual, the notion of vestige is not
consequitur ipsam secundum quod natura quaedam excluded from it, which is consequent upon it
est creata. insofar as a nature is created.
Et similiter etiam dicendum AD SECUNDUM, Also the same is to be said for THE SECOND
quod gratia gratum faciens, secundum id quod addit [objection], that grace that makes pleasing,
aliis creaturis, dicitur perfecta similitudo, non according to what it adds to other creatures, is
quidem simpliciter, sed respectu aliarum creatarum called a perfect likeness, not in an absolute way, but
similitudinum; sed secundum id in quo communicat with respect to the likeness of other creatures;
cum aliis creaturis, habet rationem vestigii. however, according to that in which it shares with
other creatures, it has the notion of vestige.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur TO THE THIRD it should be said that something
modificari aliquo dupliciter. Vel formaliter, et sic res is said to modify another in two ways. Either
dicitur modificari suo modo, qui in ipsa est. Vel formally, and thus one says that the thing is
effective, et sic omnia modificantur ab eo qui modified in its way, which is within it. Or efficiently,
modum rebus imponit; et hinc est quod Deus dicitur and thus everything is modified by the one who
effective modus omnium rerum. Secundum hoc ergo imposes the mode on things; and for this reason one
dico, quod modus creaturae non habet modum quo says that God is effectively the mode of all things.
formaliter modificetur, sed modum modificantem Therefore, according to this, I say that the mode of
effective; et ita est in omnibus aliis partibus vestigii. the creature does not have a mode by which it is
modified formally, but a mode that modifies
effectively; and thus in all the parts of the vestige.
AD QUARTUM dicendum, quod lux in se TO THE FOURTH it should be said that
considerata, creata est in numero, pondere et considered in itself, light is created in number,
mensura, cum habeat finitum esse et posse, sicut et weight and measure, since it has finite being and
aliae creaturae; sed respectu aliarum creaturarum power, like the other creatures; but with respect to
corporalium habet indeterminatam virtutem, eo other bodily creatures it has an indeterminate
quod per lucem omnia corpora aliquo modo power, since all bodies are informed in some way by
informantur et per ipsam omnia corpora inferiora light and through it all inferior bodies are perfected
perficiuntur in suis naturis; et hoc accidit sibi in their natures; and this belongs to it insofar as it is
inquantum est forma universalis et primi alterantis, the universal form and of the first altering, namely,
scilicet caeli; et pro tanto non dicitur in numero, the heavens; and for this reason it is not said to be
pondere et mensura esse creata. created in number, weight and measure.
AD ULTIMUM dicendum, quod caritas potest TO THE LAST it should be said that charity can be
dupliciter considerari. Aut secundum esse quod considered in two ways. Either according to the
habet in subjecto; et hoc modo modum habet being that it has in a subject; and in this way it has a
secundum mensuram capacitatis recipientis, vel ex mode according to the measure of our receiving
natura vel ex conatu. Aut secundum inclinationem capacity, either from nature or from appetite/urge.
in objectum, et sic intelligitur non habere modum: Or according to the inclination to the object, and
quia objectum, cum sit infinitum, non thus it is understood not to have a mode: because
proportionatur voluntati nostrae: unde nunquam the object, when it is infinite, is not proportionate to
tantum potest amare Deum quin amplius amandus our will: hence one cannot love God to the point
sit et se amare velit. that he is not to be loved more, and not want to love
him more.

EXPOSITION OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TEXT


Invisibilia, quantum ad attributa quibus Deus in Invisible, in relation to the attributes by which
se perfectus est: virtus, secundum quam creaturas God in himself is perfect: power, according to which
producit; divinitas, secundum quod creaturae creatures are produced; divinity, according to which
recurrunt in ipsum ut in finem. Vel invisibilia dicit creatures recur to him as to their end. Or invisible is
quantum ad opera, virtus quantum ad potentiam, said with respect to works, power with respect to
divinitas quantum ad essentiam. power, divinity with respect to essence.
Propter excellentiam. Contra, Angelus praecellit On account of excellence: On the contrary, the
hominem, ut in psalm. 8, 7: minuisti eum paulo Angel excels man, as in Psalm 8:7: you have made
minus ab angelis. Dicendum, quod homo et angelus him a little lesser than the angels. It should be said
possunt tripliciter considerari. Aut per relationem that a man and an angel can be considered in three
ad finem; et sic sunt aequales: erunt enim homines ways. Either by relation to the end; and thus they
sicut angeli in caelo, sicut habetur Matth. 22. Aut are equal: for there are men and angels in heaven, as
quantum ad reparationem divinam; et sic homo is stated in Matthew 22. Or in relation to divine
major est angelo, inquantum humana natura reparation and in this way man is greater than the
assumpta est in unitatem personae divinae. Aut angel insofar as human nature has been assumed in
quantum ad utramque naturam in se; et sic natura the unity of the divine person. Or in relation to each
angeli nobilior est. Vel dicendum, quod mundus nature in itself; and in this way the nature of the
accipitur hic, secundum quod est continentia angel is nobler. Or it should be said that the world is
visibilium tantum; et ita inter creaturas mundi, quas taken here, insofar as it contains visible realities;
homo excellit, non computatur angelus. and thus among the creatures of the world, over
which man excels, the angel is not numbered.
Ex perpetuitate namque creaturarum intelligitur In fact from the perpetuity of creatures one
conditor aeternus. Quia causa semper est nobilior understands that the Creator is eternal. Because the
causato; unde si causatum est perpetuum, oportet cause is always more noble than the caused; hence if
quod causa prima sit aeterna; et sic de aliis. the caused is perpetual, it is necessary that the first
cause be eternal; and so also for the others.
Perfectissima pulchritudo intelligitur Filius. One understands that the most perfect beauty is
Pulchritudo consistit in duobus, scilicet in the Son: Beautiful consists in two things, namely,
splendore, et partium proportione. Veritas autem splendor and the proportion of parts. Now truth has
habet splendoris rationem et aequalitas tenet locum the notion of splendor and equality has the place of
proportionis. proportion.

DIVISION OF THE SECOND PART OF THE TEXT


Nunc vero iam ad eam perveniamus But now we have come to the disputation of
disputationem, ubi in mente humana... Trinitatis where in the human mind… we may find the image of
imaginem reperiamus. In parte ista ostendit the Trinity. In this part he shows the Trinity of
Trinitatem personarum et unitatem essentiae per persons and the unity of essence by means of the
similitudinem imaginis: et dividitur in partes tres: in likeness of the image; and it is divided into three
prima ostendit substantiam imaginis, in secunda parts: in the first he shows the substance of the
ostendit, secundum quid attendatur imago, ibi: ecce image, in the second he shows according to what
enim mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se; in one considers the image, where it says: But see, the
tertia, ex similitudine imaginis ducit in Trinitatem mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves
personarum, ibi: quapropter iuxta istam itself; in the third, he leads, from the likeness of the
considerationem... credamus, Patrem et Filium et image, to the Trinity of persons, where it says: In
Spiritum Sanctum unum esse Deum. accordance with this consideration… let us believe
that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God.
Ecce enim mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit But see, the mind remembers itself, understands
se. Hic inquirit secundum quod attendatur imago in itself, and loves itself. Here he inquires according to
mente: et primo assignat imaginem secundum what one considers the image in the mind: and he
potentias; secundo, secundum habitus, ibi: potest first assigns the image according to the powers;
etiam alio modo, aliisque nominibus distingui trinitas second, according to the habits, where it says: The
in anima. Circa primum tria facit. Primo partes trinity in the soul can also be distinguished in another
imaginis assignat: secundo ostendit in eis way and by other terms. Concerning the first he does
similitudinem trium personarum, ibi: haec igitur tria three things. First, he assigns the parts of the image:
potissimum tractemus; tertio ostendit second, he shows in these a likeness of the three
dissimilitudinem, ibi: verumtamen caveat ne hanc Persons, there where it reads: Therefore, we will
imaginem ab eadem Trinitate factam ita ei comparet principally deal with these three; third, he shows the
ut omnino existimet similem. dissimilitude, there where it reads: And yet let him
beware lest he so compare to its maker this image
made by the Trinity as to believe it to be entirely like
it; whatever be the likeness between the two..
Haec igitur tria potissimum tractemus. Hic Therefore, we will principally deal with these
ostendit in tribus potentiis assignatis similitudinem three. Here he shows a likeness of the Persons in the
personarum: et primo inducit probationem; secundo three powers assigned; and first he adduces a proof;
ponit dictorum manifestationem, ibi: mens autem second, he presents a manifestation of what has
hic pro animo ipso accipitur; tertio excludit been said, there, where it reads: now, the mind here
objectionem, ibi: hic attendendum est diligenter. In is taken in the sense of the soul itself; third, he
primo duo facit: primo ostendit similitudinem quo excludes an objection, there where it reads: Here it
ad personarum distinctionem et essentiae unitatem; is necessary to consider diligently. In the first part,
secundo quo ad personarum aequalitatem, ibi: he does two things: first, he shows the likeness with
aequalia etiam sunt non solum singula singulis, sed regard to the distinction of persons and the unity of
etiam singula omnibus. Quam aequalitatem ostendit essence; second, with regard to the equality of
tali ratione. Quaecumque se includunt invicem, sunt Persons, there where it reads: Also, they are equal
aequalia. Sed quaelibet dictarum potentiarum capit not only each to each, but also each to all. He shows
aliam, et quaelibet capit omnes. that equality with this reason. All things that
included one another are equal. Now one of these
powers comprehends the other, and one
comprehends all of them.
Ergo quaelibet est aequalis alteri, et quaelibet Therefore, each is equal to the other and each is
est aequalis omnibus simul, sicut est de divinis equal to all simultaneously, as is the case of the
personis. Minorem probat ibi: totamque meam divine persons. The minor is proved, there where it
memoriam et intelligentiam et voluntatem simul reads: All I remember concurrently my whole memory
memini: et primo de memoria; secundo de and intelligence and will. And first, about memory;
intelligentia, ibi: similiter cum haec tria intelligo, second about intelligence, there where it reads:
tota simul intelligo; tertio de voluntate, ibi: voluntas Similarly, when I understand these three, I
etiam mea totam intelligentiam totamque meam understand all of them at once; and third, about the
memoriam capit. Primum ostendit sic. Quidquid est will, there where it reads: My will also contains my
praesens memoriae, illud est in memoria. Sed ipsa whole intelligence and my whole memory. He shows
tota memoria est sibi praesens. Ergo totam se capit. the first in the following way. All that is present to
Item, quidquid intelligo et volo, scio me intelligere the memory is in the memory. But the whole
et velle. Sed quidquid scio me intelligere et velle, est memory is present to itself. Therefore it is totally
in memoria. Ergo quidquid intelligo et volo est in comprehended. Also, all that I understand and will,
memoria. Ergo memoria capit se totam et I know that I understand it and will it. But all that I
intellectum et voluntatem. Secundo probat idem de know myself to understand and will is in the
intelligentia, hoc modo. Omne quod non est memory. Therefore all that I understand and will is
ignotum, est in intellectu. Sed quidquid est volitum in the memory. Therefore memory totally contains
vel intellectum vel in memoria existens, est non itself and intellect and will. Second, he proves the
ignotum. Ergo omne hujusmodi est in intellectu. same for the intelligence, in the following way. All
Intelligentia ergo capit omnes tres. Tertio ostendit that is not unknown is in the intellect. But all that is
idem de voluntate. Omne illud quo utor, est in willed either in the intellect or existing in the
voluntate mea, quacumque operatione utor; quia memory, is not unknown. Therefore all in this way is
voluntas est universalis motor virium. Sed omni eo in the intellect. Therefore the intelligence contains
quod volo vel intelligo vel memoror, utor. Ergo all three. Third, he shows the same about the will.
omne hujusmodi est in voluntate mea, et sic All that I use is in the will, with whatever operation I
voluntas capit omnes. Quo facto concludit use; because the will is the universal motor of the
similitudinem, ibi: cum itaque invicem a singulis et faculties. But all that which I will, either I
omnia et tota capiantur, aequalia sunt tota singula understand or I remember, I use. Therefore all in
totis singulis. this way is in my will, and thus the will contains all.
Having done this, he concludes the likeness, there
where it reads: And so, since all of them in their
entirety are mutually contained by each, they are
each severally equal to each severally.
Mens autem hic pro animo ipso accipitur. Hic But the mind here is taken to stand for the soul
manifestat quaedam quae dixerat: et primo itself. Here he manifest some of the things that he
quomodo accipiatur mens; secundo quomodo had said: and first in what way is mind taken;
accipiatur memoria, ibi: illud etiam sciendum. second, in what way is memory taken, there where it
reads: It is also to be noted.
Hic attendendum est diligenter, ex quo sensu Here is to be diligently examined in what sense is
accipiendum sit quod supra dixit. Hic removet to be taken what was said above. Here he removes an
objectionem contra illud quod dictum est, tres objection against what was said, that the three
dictas potentias esse unam essentiam: et primo aforementioned powers are one essence; and first he
ponit objectum; secundo solutionem, ibi: sed jam presents an objection; and second a solution, there
videndum est quomodo haec tria dicantur una where it reads: But we must not examine now
substantia. Objectio autem sumitur ex duobus. examine how these three can be termed one
Primo ex hoc quod nulla proprietas est essentia ejus substance. Now the objection is taken from two
cujus est proprietas. Sed potentiae sunt proprietates things. First, from the fact that no property is the
naturales ipsius animae. Ergo non sunt una essentia essence of that which it is a property. But the
animae. Secunda ponitur ibi: et haec tria etiam ad se powers are natural properties of the soul itself.
ipsa referuntur. Et sumitur ex hoc quod istae Therefore, they are not the one essence of the soul.
potentiae dicuntur relative ad invicem; unde et The second is presented there where it reads: And
differunt ab invicem. Ergo mirum videtur quomodo these three also refer to themselves. And it is taken
omnia possint esse una essentia. from the fact that these powers are said relatively to
one another; and hence they differ from each other.
Therefore, it seems strange how all can be one
essence.
Verumtamen caveat ne hanc imaginem ab eadem And yet let him beware lest he so compare to its
Trinitate factam ita ei comparet ut omnino existimet maker this image made by the Trinity as to believe it
similem. Hic ostendit dissimilitudinem: et dividitur to be entirely like it. Here he shows the dissimilitude:
in duas, secundum duas dissimilitudines. Secunda and it is divided into two, according to the two
ibi: rursus et imago, quae est homo habens illa tria, dissimilitudes. The second begins there where it
una persona est. reads: Moreover, this image, which is man endowed
with those three things is one person.
Potest etiam alio modo aliisque nominibus The trinity in the soul, can also be distinguished
distingui trinitas in anima. Hic assignat imaginem in another way and by other terms. Here he assigns
secundum habitus: et primo assignat partes the image according to the habits; and first he
imaginis; secundo probat similitudinem, ibi: haec assigns the parts of the images; second, he proves
autem tria, cum sint distincta a se invicem, dicuntur the likeness, there where it reads: These three things,
tamen esse unum; tertio concludit suam even though they are mutually distinct, yet are said to
intentionem, ibi: mens itaque rationalis considerans be one; third, he concludes his intention, there
haec tria et illam unam essentiam in qua ista sunt, where it reads: And so the rational mind, considering
extendit se ad contemplationem Creatoris. Ostendit these three things and the one essence in which they
autem similitudinem quantum ad tria. Primo are, extends itself to the contemplation of the
quantum ad personarum distinctionem in essentiae Creator. He then shows the likeness with regard to
unitate; secundo quantum ad personarum the three. First, with regard to the distinction of
processionem, ibi: et est ipsa mens quasi parens, et Persons in the unity of the essence; second, with
notitia ejus quasi proles ejus; tertio quantum ad regard to the procession of the Persons, there where
aequalitatem, ibi: nec minor est proles parente. it reads: And the mind is, as it were, the parent, while
Quam ostendit dupliciter. Primo, quia quanta est its knowledge, as it were, its offspring; third, with
mens, tanta se intelligit et amat; secundo, quia haec regard to equality: there, where it reads: Nor is the
tria mutuo se includunt, ibi: sunt etiam singula in se offspring less than the parent. And he shows this in
ipsis. two ways. First, because to the degree that the mind
is great, so also does one understand and love;
second, because these three mutually include one
another, there where it reads: These singular things
also are in themselves.

QUESTION THREE
Ad intelligentiam hujus partis duo quaeruntur: 1 To understand this part, two things are
de subjecto imaginis; 2 de partibus imaginis questioned: first, about the subject of the image;
enumeratis. second, about the parts of the image that have been
enumerated.

ARTICLE ONE
Utrum tantum mens sit subjectum imaginis
Whether the mind alone is the subject of the image

AD PRIMUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod non PROCEEDING TO THE FIRST. It seems that the
tantum mens sit subjectum imaginis. Augustinus mind alone is not the subject of the image. In fact,
enim ostendit, imaginem trinitatis in visu corporali Saint Augustine shows (De Trin. 11, 2 and 3) the
secundum tria quae necessaria sunt ad visionem, image of the Trinity in corporeal vision according to
scilicet res exterior et imago ejus in oculo, et the three things that are necessary for vision,
intentio videntis, quae ista duo conjungit. Visus namely the exterior thing, its image in the eye, and
autem corporeus non pertinet ad mentem. Ergo etc.. the intention of the seer, which conjoins the two.
Now, corporeal vision does not belong to the mind.
Therefore, etc.
ITEM, Damascenus, assignat imaginem in libero AGAIN, John Damascene (De fide orth. 3,18)
arbitrio, quod etiam non videtur esse de assigns the image to the free will, which also does
pertinentibus ad mentem. not seem to belong to the mind.
ITEM, Augustinus: imago trinitatis ibi quaerenda AGAIN, Augustine [writes] (De Trin. 14,18): “The
est in anima nostra, quo nihil habet melius. Haec image of the Trinity is sought for in our soul, there
autem videtur esse ratio superior, secundum quam were there is nothing better. Now, this seems to be
aeternis contemplandis inhaeret. Ergo videtur quod the superior reason, according to which the soul
in ratione superiori sit imago. adheres to the eternal things to be contemplated.
Therefore it seems that the image is in the superior
reason.
ITEM, Dionysius: Angelus est imago divina. Ergo AGAIN, Dionysius [says] (De div. nom., 4): “An
videtur quod non tantum in mente nostra sit imago. angel is a divine image”. Therefore, it seems that the
image is not only in our mind.
CONTRA, videtur quod in nulla creatura sit ON THE CONTRARY, it seems that there is no
imago. Imago enim, ut dicit Hilarius, est rei ad rem image in any creature. In fact, as Hillary says, the
coaequandam discreta et unica similitudo. Sed nulla image is a distinct and unique likeness that co-
res creata coaequat creatorem. Ergo in nulla equates one thing to another thing. But no created
creatura potest imago creatoris inveniri. thing co-equals the Creator. Therefore, in no
creature can one find an image of the Creator.

RESPONDEO dicendum, quod imago in hoc I RESPOND saying that an image differs from a
differt a vestigio: quod vestigium est confusa vestige in this: that a vestige is a confused and
similitudo alicujus rei et imperfecta; imago autem imperfect likeness of something; an image, on the
repraesentat rem magis determinate secundum other hand, represents a thing in a more
omnes partes et dispositiones partium, ex quibus determinate way according to all its parts and the
etiam aliquid de interioribus rei percipi potest. Et dispositions of its parts, from which one can
ideo in illis tantum creaturis dicitur esse imago Dei perceive something of the inner characteristics of
quae propter sui nobilitatem ipsum perfectius the thing. And therefore one says that the image of
imitantur et repraesentant; et ideo in angelo et God is only in those creatures that on account of
homine tantum dicitur imago divinitatis, et in their nobility imitate him and represent him more
homine secundum id quod est in ipso nobilius. Alia perfectly; and therefore one speaks of the image of
autem, quae plus et minus participant de Dei God in the angel and man alone, and in man
bonitate, magis accedunt ad rationem imaginis. according to that is nobler in him. Now, the others,
which participate to greater and lesser degrees in
God’s, come closer to the notion of image.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus in TO THE FIRST, therefore, it should be said that
multis ostendit similitudinem trinitatis esse; sed in Augustine shows that there is a likeness of the
nullo esse perfectam similitudinem, sicut in Trinity in many things; but that in none of them is
potentiis mentis, ubi invenitur distinctio there a perfect likeness, as in the powers of the
consubstantialis et aequalitas. Constat autem illa mind, where one finds consubstantial distinction
tria in visu dicta, non esse consubstantialia, et ideo and equality. For, it is clear that the three said of
solum in mente ponit imaginem. vision are not consubstantial, and therefore he
places image in the mind alone.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod in libero arbitrio TO THE SECOND it should be said that in free will
non potest esse perfecta similitudo, cum non there cannot be a perfect likeness, since there one
inveniatur ibi aliqua distinctio potentiarum; nec does not find some distinction of powers; in fact,
etiam est excellentior pars animae, cum sit tantum neither is this the more excellent part of the soul,
operativa. Constat autem quod contemplativa for it is only operative. Now it is clear that the
nobilior est parte operativa. Sed Damascenus contemplative is more noble than the operative.
assignat ibi imaginem, large vocans imaginem However, Damascene assigns image there, uses
quamcumque similitudinem. Imitatur autem Deum image in a broad way for any likeness. Now, free will
liberum arbitrium, inquantum est primum imitates God insofar as it is the first principle of its
principium suorum operum non potens cogi. own works that cannot be constricted.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod ratio superior TO THE THIRD it should be said that superior
inhaeret aeternis contemplandis, inquantum sunt reason adheres to the eternal things to be
regula et norma agendorum, prout scilicet ex divinis contemplated insofar as they are the rule and norm
rationibus dirigimur in nostris operibus. Unde ibi of actions, insofar as we are directed in our actions
non est imago; sed in illa parte quae aeterna from divine reasons. Hence, there is not an image
secundum se contemplatur. there; but rather in that part that contemplates
eternal things in themselves.
AD QUARTUM dicendum, quod imago trinitatis TO THE FOURTH it should be said that the image
potest attendi tripliciter. Vel quantum ad expressam of the Trinity can be considered in three ways.
repraesentationem divinorum attributorum; et sic, Either in reference to the express representation of
cum divinae bonitates copiosius effulgeant in the divine attributes; and this because divine
Angelo quam in homine, Angelus est expressior goodness shines more brightly in angels than in
imago Dei quam homo, unde etiam signaculum man, as the angel is more expressly an image of God
dicitur Ezech. 28, secundum expositionem Gregorii. than man, for which the angel is also called a sign in
Vel quantum ad distinctionem personarum; et sic Ezekiel, according to the exposition of Gregory
expressior est similitudo in homine quam in Angelo, (Mor. 32,18). Or in reference to the distinction of the
quia in Angelo suae potentiae sunt minus distinctae. persons; and this is more expressly a likeness in man
Vel inquantum ipse Deus est principium rerum; et than in the angel, because in the angel its power are
sic imago invenitur in homine et non in Angelo, less distinct. Or insofar as God is the principle of
inquantum unus homo est principium omnium things; and this image is found in man and not in
hominum, sicut Deus omnium rerum, et inquantum the Angel, insofar as one man is the principle of all
anima est in toto corpore tota, sicut deus in mundo. men, as God is the principle of all things, and insofar
Sed quia ista repraesentatio est quantum ad as the soul is all in the whole body, as God is in the
exteriora, simpliciter concedendum est quod world. But since this representation is in reference
Angelus magis est ad imaginem, quam homo. to exterior things, it should be conceded very simply
that the angel is more an image than man.
AD ULTIMUM dicendum, quod imago invenitur TO THE LAST [objection] it should be said that
in Filio et in creatura differenter, ut dicit the image found in the Son and in creatures differ,
Augustinus, sicut imago regis in filio, et in denario. as Augustine says, as the image of the king in his
Filius enim Dei est perfecta imago Patris, perfecte son and on a coin. For the Son of God is the perfect
repraesentans ipsum: creatura autem, secundum image of the Father, more perfectly representing
quod deficit a repraesentatione, deficit a perfecta him: the creature, on the other hand, as it is
ratione imaginis. Unde etiam dicitur imago, et ad deficient according to representation, is deficient
imaginem: quod de Filio non dicitur. Et ideo non according to the perfect notion of image. Hence,
oportet quod creatura simpliciter adaequet the creature is called both image and in the image:
creatorem: hoc enim tantum verum est de Filio, qui which is not said of the Son. And therefore, it is not
est perfecta imago; sed sicut secundum quid necessary that the creature equal the Creator
repraesentat, ut imperfecta imago, ita etiam absolutely: for this is true only of the Son, who is a
secundum quid coaequat. perfect image; but as according to what it
represents, as an imperfect image, so also it co-
equates in a relative sense.

QUESTION FOUR
Deinde quaeritur de partibus imaginis: et primo Then, the parts of the image are questioned: and
de prima assignatione; secundo de secunda. first, about the first assigning; and second about the
second.
Circa primum quaeruntur quinque: 1 de partibus Concerning the first, five things are questioned:
imaginis quid unaquaeque sit, et qualiter ab invicem first, about the parts of the image, what each is, and
differant; 2 quomodo se habeant ad essentiam, how they differ from each other; second, how they
utrum sint ipsa essentia animae; 3 quomodo se are related to the essence, whether they are the very
habeant ad invicem, utrum scilicet una ex alia essence of the soul; third, how they are related to
oriatur; 4 de ipsis per comparationem ad objectum, each other, namely, whether one derives from the
scilicet respectu cujus objecti attenditur in ipsis others; fourth, about these in comparison to an
imago trinitatis; 5 de ipsis per comparationem ad object, namely, with respect to which object the
actum, utrum scilicet semper sint in suis actibus image of the Trinity is considered in these; fifth,
dictae potentiae. about these in comparison to act, namely, whether
the mentioned powers are always in their acts.

ARTICLE ONE
Utrum memoria pertineat ad imaginem
Whether memory belongs to image

AD PRIMUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod PROCEEDING THUS TO THE FIRST. It seems that
memoria non pertineat ad imaginem. Sicut enim memory does not belong to the image. For as
dicit Augustinus, quod in anima reperies commune Augustine says, that which you find in the soul in
cum brutis, ad sensualitatem pertinet. Memoria common with brute animals, belongs to the
autem est communis nobis et brutis. Igitur cum sensitive appetite. Now, memory is common to us
imago non sit in sensualitate, videtur quod memoria and to brute animals. Therefore, since the image is
ad imaginem non pertineat. not in the sensitive appetite, it seems that memory
does not belong to the image.
ITEM, omnis potentia apprehendens ALSO, every power that apprehends a
determinatam temporis differentiam pertinet ad determinate difference of time belongs to the
sensitivam partem et non ad intellectum, qui est sensitive part and not to the intellect, which is of
universalium, quae abstrahunt a quolibet tempore. universals, which abstract from any time. But
Sed memoria concernit tempus praeteritum. Ergo memory concerns past time. Therefore, it does not
non pertinet ad intellectivam partem in qua est belong to the intellectual part in which there is the
imago, sed ad sensitivam. image, but to the sensitive part.
ITEM, dicitur a Commentatore, quia natura ALSO, it is said by the Commentator, since
intellectiva dividitur in intellectum et voluntatem; intellective nature is divided into intellect and will;
nec ullus unquam philosophus in intellectiva parte and no philosopher has place memory in the
posuit memoriam; qui tamen potentias animae intellective part, even though all have considered
consideraverunt. Ergo memoria non pertinet ad the powers of the soul. Therefore memory does not
imaginem. belong to the image.
ITEM, videtur quod nec intelligentia pertineat ad ALSO, it seems that neither does the intelligence
imaginem. Secundum enim Dionysium, belong to the image. For, according to Dionysius,
distinguuntur quatuor gradus entium, scilicet four degrees of beings are distinguished, namely,
intellectualia, rationalia, sensibilia et simpliciter intellectual beings, rational beings, sensible beings
existentia. Homo autem non continetur sub and merely existing beings. Now, man is not
intellectualibus, sed sub rationalibus. Cum igitur hic contained under intellectual beings, but rather
quaeratur quid sit imago, secundum quod est in under rational beings. Therefore, since here one
homine, videtur quod intelligentia ad imaginem non asks what the image is, according to what is in man,
pertineat. it seems that intelligence does not belong to the
image.
ITEM, potentiae distinguuntur per actus. Sed ALSO, the powers are distinguished by their acts.
nosse et intelligere non differunt nisi forte sicut But knowing and understanding do not differ unless
habere in habitu et intueri in actu, secundum quae perhaps as habitual having and actual seeing,
non diversificantur potentiae, cum ejusdem according to which the power are not diversified,
potentiae sit habere habitum et elicere actum. Ergo since it belongs to the same power to possess the
intelligentia, cujus actus assignatur intelligere, non habit and elicit the act. Therefore, the intelligence,
est alia potentia a memoria, cujus assignatur nosse. to which understanding is assigned as act, is not a
power distinct from memory, to which knowing is
assigned.
ITEM, videtur quod nec voluntas. Voluntas enim ALSO, it seems that neither does the will [belong
est principium operativum. Sed imago quaerenda to the image]. For the will is an operative principle.
est in parte suprema quae est speculativa. Ergo But the image is to be sought in the supreme part,
voluntas non pertinet ad imaginem. which is speculative. Therefore, the will does not
belong to the image.
ITEM, Augustinus: imago est in potentia ALSO, Augustine says: the image is in the power
cognoscendi, similitudo in potentia diligendi. Sed of knowing, the likeness in the power of loving. But
voluntas non est potentia cognoscendi, sed magis the will is not the power of knowing, but rather of
diligendi. Ergo non pertinet ad imaginem sed ad loving. Therefore it does not belong to the image
similitudinem. but to the likeness.
PRAETEREA, illud quod imperat aliis et movet FURTHERMORE, that which commands the
alia, est prius eis. Sed voluntas movet omnes others and moves them is prior to them. But the will
potentias alias, ut dicit Anselmus. Ergo est prior moves all the other powers, as Anselm says.
quam memoria et intelligentia, et ita non respondet Therefore, it is prior to memory and intelligence,
ordini personarum ista assignatio, cum voluntas and thus this assignment does not respond to the
Spiritui Sancto approprietur. order of persons, since the will is appropriated to
the Holy Spirit.

RESPONDEO dicendum, quod omnis proprietas I RESPOND saying that every property that
consequens essentiam animae secundum suam follows the essence of the soul according to its
naturam, vocatur hic potentia animae, sive sit ad nature, is called here the potency of the soul,
operandum sive non. Cum igitur natura animae sit whether this is operative or not. Therefore, since the
receptibilis inquantum habet aliquid de nature of the soul is able to receive insofar as it has
possibilitate, eo quod omne habens esse ab aliquo some possibility, given that everything that has
est possibile in se, ut probat Avicenna, et non sit being from another is possible in se, as Avicenna
impressa organo corporali, cum habeat operationem proves, and is not impressed in a corporeal organ,
absolutam a corpore, scilicet intelligere; consequitur having an operation apart from the body, namely, to
ipsam quaedam proprietas, ut impressa retineat. understand; a certain property follows upon this,
Unde dicitur, quod anima est locus specierum, such that the impressed thing is retained. Hence it is
praeter quam non tota, sed intellectus. Ista ergo said that the soul is the place of the species; not all
virtus retinendi dicitur hic potentia memoriae. however, but the intellect. Therefore this power of
Ulterius, quia anima est immunis a materia, et retaining is here called the power of memory. What
omnis talis natura est intellectualis, consequitur ut is more, because the soul is immune to matter, and
id quod in ipsa tenetur ab ea intelligatur, et ita post since such nature is intellectual, it follows that what
memoriam sequitur intelligentia. is contained in this is understood by this, and in this
way the memory follows understanding.
Item, quia id quod intelligitur accipitur ut Also, since that which is understood is taken as
conveniens intelligenti, ideo consequitur voluntas, agreeing with the one who understands, the will
quae tendit in ipsum conveniens: nec potest ultra thus follows, which tends to the same convenient
procedere; quia voluntas est respectu finis, cum ejus [object]; one cannot proceeds further; because the
objectum sit bonum, et rei perfectio non extendatur will is with respect to the end, since its object is the
ultra finem. Et secundum hoc sunt tres potentiae good, and the perfection of a thing does not extend
distinctae ab invicem, memoria, intelligentia et beyond the end. And according to this, there are
voluntas. three powers distinct from each other, memory,
intelligence and will.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod memoria, TO THE FIRST, therefore, it should be said that
secundum quod hic sumitur, non est communis memory, as it is taken here, is not common to us
nobis et brutis, ut patet ex auctoritate Philosophi and to brute animals, as is clear from the
inducta, in corp., art., quia sola intellectiva anima in [introduced] authority of the Philosopher, in the
se retinet quod accipit, sed sensitiva in organo body of the article, because only the intellective soul
corporali. retains in itself what it receives, while the sensitive
soul [retains what it receives] in the corporeal organ.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod aequivocatur TO THE SECOND it should be said that the term
nomen memoriae. Memoria enim, secundum quod “memory” is taken equivocally. For memory, as it is
hic accipitur, abstrahit a qualibet differentia taken here, is abstracted from any difference of
temporis, ut in littera dicitur, quia est praesentium, time, as is said in the text, because it is regards the
praeteritorum et futurorum; unde sumitur hic pro present things, past things and future things; hence,
memoria quae est potentia sensitivae partis, quae it is taken here as the memory that is a faculty of the
habet organum in postrema parte capitis, et est sensitive part, which has an organ in the back part
thesaurus intentionum sensibilium cum sensu, non of the head, and is the storehouse of the sensible
a sensu acceptarum, ut dicit Avicenna. intentions with the sensation not received by the
senses, as Avicenna says.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod philosophi TO THE THIRD it should be said that the
accipiebant potentias illas tantum quae ordinantur philosophers took only those powers that are
ad aliquem actum. Proprietas autem retentiva ipsius ordered to some act. Now, the property of retaining
animae non habet aliquem actum; sed loco actus of the soul itself does not have an act, but in place of
habet hoc ipsum quod est tenere; et ideo de the act it has the fact itself of retaining; and thus of
memoria sic dicta non fecerunt mentionem inter the memory understood in this way they did not
potentias animae. mention it among the powers of the soul.
AD QUARTUM dicendum, quod, sicut dicit TO THE FOURTH it should be said that, as
Dionysius, natura inferior secundum supremum sui Dionysius says, the inferior nature according to its
attingit infimum naturae superioris; et ideo natura supreme [perfection] touches the lower [perfection]
animae in sui supremo attingit infimum naturae of the superior nature; and thus the nature of the
angelicae; et ideo aliquo modo participat soul in its supreme reaches the lower of the angelic
intellectualitatem in sui summo. Et quia secundum nature, such that in a certain way it participates in
optimum sui assignatur imago in anima, ideo potius intellectuality at its summit. And since the image is
assignatur secundum intelligentiam, quam assigned in the soul according to what is optimum
secundum rationem; ratio enim nihil aliud est nisi in it, it is assigned more according to intelligence
natura intellectualis obumbrata: unde inquirendo that according to reason; for the reason is nothing
cognoscit et sub continuo tempore quod intellectui other than a shadowed intellectual nature; hence it
statim et plena luce confertur; et ideo dicitur esse knows through inquiry and under a continuous time
intellectus principiorum primorum, quae statim what is offered to it immediately and in full light by
cognitioni se offerunt. the intellect; and for this reason one says that there
is an intellect of the first principles, which are
offered immediately to knowledge.
AD QUINTUM dicendum, quod intelligere et TO THE FIFTH it should be said that
nosse differunt: nosse enim est notitiam rei apud se understanding and knowing differ: for to know is to
tenere; intelligere autem dicit intueri. Quamvis have present the knowledge of a thing; now, to
autem cujuslibet potentiae sit tenere suum habitum understand means to see. Now, even though it
et objectum; hoc tamen non est earum, nisi belongs to every power to have its own habit and
inquantum est in eis virtus memoriae, quae object; still this does not belong to such a power
immediate sequitur essentiam naturae, sicut virtus unless insofar as there is the virtus of memory in
prioris semper est in posteriori. them, which follows immediately upon the essence
of the nature, as the virtus of that which is anterior
is always in what is posterior.
AD SEXTUM dicendum, quod voluntatis objectum TO THE SIXTH it should be said that the object of
est bonum. Bonum autem habet rationem finis. the will is good. Now good has the ratio of end. Now
Finis autem est et contemplationis et actionis. Et the end is both of contemplation and of action. And
ideo voluntas non tantum se habet ad partem therefore the will is not only related to the active
activam, sed etiam ad contemplativam: unde part, but also to the contemplative: hence it belongs
pertinet ad supremam partem animae. to the superior part of the soul.
AD SEPTIMUM dicendum, quod Augustinus vocat TO THE SEVENTH it should be said that Augustine
large potentiam cognoscendi, sive quae ordinatur ad speaks broadly of the cognitive power, either as that
cognitionem, sicut memoria, sive qua cognoscitur, which is ordered to knowledge, as memory, or as
sicut intelligentia, sive quae cognitionem that by which one knows, as intelligence, or as that
consequitur, sicut voluntas. Potentiam autem which follows knowledge, as will. Now he calls the
diligendi nominat habitus gratuitos, quibus Deum power of loving gratuitous habits, by which we love
meritorie diligimus; et ideo dicitur quod homo per God meritoriously; and therefore it is said that by
peccatum amittens Dei similitudinem abiit in sinning man loses the likeness to God and goes to
regionem dissimilitudinis, sed non amisit imaginem. the region of dissimilitude, but he does not lose the
image.
AD OCTAVUM dicendum, quod, sicut in artibus TO THE EIGHTH it should be said that as in the
est quod illa quae considerat finem, imperat et arts it happens that the art that considers the end
movet artes considerantes ea quae sunt ad finem, commands and moves the arts that consider the
sicut medicus imperat pigmentario, ut supra dictum means, as the doctor commands the maker of
est, ita etiam est in potentiis animae. Voluntas enim, pigments, as was said above, so also happens in the
quia considerat finem, movet alias omnes potentias powers of the soul. The will, then, because it
quae ordinantur ad finem et imperat eis actus suos. considers the end, moves all the other powers which
Unde quamvis prior sit movendo, non tamen are ordered to the end and commands their acts to
sequitur quod sit prior in esse; sicut etiam finis est them. Hence, even though it is anterior in moving,
ultimus in esse, et tamen movet efficientem. nevertheless it follows that which is anterior in
being; as also the end is last in being, even though it
moves the efficient [cause].

ARTICLE TWO
Utrum potentiae animae sint essentia eius
Whether the powers of the soul are its essence

AD SECUNDUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod PROCEEDING THEN TO THE SECOND. It seems that
essentia animae sit suae potentiae. Primo per hoc the essence of the soul is its powers. First, by the
quod dicitur in littera: ista tria sunt una mens, una fact that it is said in the text: “these three are one
vita, una essentia. mind, one life, one essence.”
ITEM, idem est principium essendi et operandi. 2. ALSO, the principle of being and operating is
Sed anima est principium essendi, cum sit forma identical. But the soul is the principle of being, since
substantialis corporis. Ergo per seipsam est it is the substantial form of the body. Therefore,
principium operationum. Non oportet ergo esse through itself it is the principle of operation.
potentias medias. Therefore it is not necessary that there be
intermediate powers.
ITEM, forma substantialis nobilior est quam 3. ALSO, the substantial form is nobler than the
accidentalis. Sed forma accidentalis facit operationes accidental forms. But the accidental form
suas sine aliqua virtute media. Ergo et forma accomplishes its operations without some
substantialis; et sic idem quod prius. intermediate virtus. Therefore, the same goes for the
substantial form; and thus the same as above.
PRAETEREA, materia prima est sua potentia. Sed 4. FURTHERMORE, prime matter is its potency.
sicut in materia est potentia passiva, ita in forma But as in matter there is passive potency, so in the
potentia activa. Ergo etiam forma essentialis est sua form there is active potency. Therefore also essential
potentia activa; et sic idem quod prius. form is its active power; and thus the same as above.
PRAETEREA, omne illud quod non est de essentia 5. FURTHERMORE, all that is not of the essence of
rei, est accidens. Sed sensus et ratio, quae sunt a thing is an accidents. But sense and reason, which
potentiae quaedam, non sunt accidentia, cum sint are powers, are not accidents, since there are
principia differentiarum substantialium. Ergo sunt principles of substantial differences. Therefore, they
de essentia ipsius animae. are of the essence of the soul itself.

CONTRA, sicut se habet posse ad esse, ita se ON THE CONTRARY, as posse is related to esse, so
habet potentia ad essentiam. Sed in solo deo verum is a power related to the essence. But in God alone is
est dicere, quod suum esse sit suum posse. Ergo in it true to say that his esse is his posse. Therefore, in
nullo alio sua essentia est sua potentia: et ita nec in no other [being] is their essence their power; and
anima. neither is it in the soul.
PRAETEREA, omne agens quod agit per 7. FURTHERMORE, every agent that acts by its
essentiam suam, est agens primum, ut dicit essence is the first agent, as Avicenna says. The
Avicenna. Cujus ratio est, quia omne secundum reason for this is that because all second agents act
agens agit inquantum participat aliquid; et ita agit insofar as they participate something; and so they
per aliquid additum essentiae. Sed anima non est act by something added to the essence. But the soul
agens primum. Ergo non est agens per suam is not the first agent. Therefore, it is not an agent by
essentiam, sed per suam potentiam. Ergo sua its essence, but by its power. Therefore its power is
potentia non est sua essentia. not its essence.
PRAETEREA, cum perfectio et perfectibilia sint 8. FURTHERMORE, since perfection and
proportionata, oportet quod perfectibilia diversarum perfectible are proportionate to one another, it is
proportionum recipiant diversas perfectiones. necessary that the perfectible of diverse proportions
Organa autem corporis animati diversa sunt receive diverse perfections. Now the organs of an
diversarum proportionum in commixtione. Ergo animate body are of diverse proportions in the
diversimode perficiuntur ab anima. Non autem commingling. Therefore, they are perfected by the
quantum ad esse, quia anima, cum sit forma soul in diverse ways. Now they are not perfected as
substantialis, dat unum esse toti corpori. Ergo to being, since the soul, as the substantial form,
oportet quod diversimode perficiantur quantum ad gives one being to the entire body. Therefore, it is
perfectiones consequentes esse, secundum quas necessary that they are perfected in diverse ways as
habent diversas operationes. Has autem to the perfections consequent upon being, according
perfectiones, quae sunt principia operationum to which they have diverse operations. Now these
animae, vocamus potentias. Ergo oportet potentias perfections, which are the principles of the
animae diversas esse ab essentia, utpote emanantes operations of the soul, we call powers. Therefore, it
ab ipsa. is necessary that the powers of the soul are diverse
from the essence, since they emanate from it.

RESPONDEO dicendum, quod effectus proprius I RESPOND saying that it is necessary that the
et immediatus oportet quod proportionetur suae more proper and immediate be proportioned to its
causae; unde oportet quod in omnibus illis, in cause; hence it is necessary that in all of these things
quibus principium operationis proximum est de in which the proximate principle of operation is of
genere substantiae, quod operatio sua sit substantia; the genus of substance, that its operation be its
et hoc solum in deo est: et ideo ipse solus est qui substance; and this is in God alone; and therefore he
non agit per potentiam mediam differentem a sua is the only one who does not act through an
substantia. In omnibus autem aliis operatio est intermediate power different from his substance.
accidens: et ideo oportet quod proximum Now in all of the others operation is an accident:
principium operationis sit accidens, sicut videmus in and therefore it is necessary that the proximate
corporibus quod forma substantialis ignis nullam principle of operation be an accident, as we see in
operationem habet, nisi mediantibus qualitatibus bodies that the substantial form of fire does not
activis et passivis, quae sunt quasi virtutes et have any operation unless by means of active and
potentiae ipsius. Similiter dico, quod ab anima, cum passive qualities, which are like its virtues and
sit substantia, nulla operatio egreditur, nisi powers. Likewise, I say that from the soul, since it is
mediante potentia: nec etiam a potentia perfecta a substance, no operation comes forth unless by
operatio, nisi mediante habitu. Hae autem potentiae means of powers: and neither does a perfect
fluunt ab essentia ipsius animae, quaedam ut operation come forth from a power unless by means
perfectiones partium corporis, quarum operatio of a habit. Now, these powers flow from the essence
efficitur mediante corpore, ut sensus, imaginatio et of the soul itself, some as perfections of the parts of
hujusmodi; et quaedam ut existentes in ipsa anima, the body, when their operations are effected by
quarum operatio non indiget corpore, ut intellectus, means of the body, as sense, and imagination and so
voluntas et hujusmodi; et ideo dico, quod sunt forth; and some as existing in the soul itself, whose
accidentia: non quod sint communia accidentia, operations do not have need of the body, like the
quae non fluunt ex principiis speciei, sed intellect, will and so forth; and therefore I say that
consequuntur principia individui; sed sicut propria they are accidents: not common accidents, which do
accidentia, quae consequuntur speciem, originata ex not flow from the principles of the species, but are
principiis ipsius: simul tamen sunt de integritate consequent upon the principles of the individual,
ipsius animae, inquantum est totum potentiale, but as proper accidents, which are consequent on
habens quamdam perfectionem potentiae, quae the species, originating from its principles. At the
conficitur ex diversis viribus. same time, however, they belong to the integrity of
the soul itself insofar as it is a potential whole,
having some perfection of the power, which results
from diverse forces.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod cum dicitur: TO THE FIRST, therefore, it should be said that as
tres potentiae sunt una mens, non est praedicatio it is said: the three powers are one mind; it is not an
essentialis, sed totius potestativi de suis partibus. essential predication, but of a powerful whole of its
Unde de potentiis imaginis propinquius et prius parts. Hence, of the powers of the image more
praedicatur mens: quia mentis, inquantum proximately and primarily one predicated the mind:
hujusmodi, sunt istae potentiae in quibus consistit because the mind, as such, are of those powers in
integritas imaginis: et minus proprie vita, quae which one consists the integrity of the images: and
tamen includit potentias in generali, quae sunt less properly life, that still includes the powers in
principium operum vitae; et adhuc minus proprie general, that are the principles of the works of life;
dicuntur una essentia, in qua, secundum id quod est and still less properly are they called one essence, in
essentia, non includuntur potentiae, nisi sicut in which, according to that which is the essence, the
origine, eo quod ab essentia oriuntur potentiae, in powers are not included, unless as in the origin,
quibus attenditur imago. Totum enim potentiale, given that from the essence are derived the powers,
quasi medium est inter integrale et universale. in which one considers the image. For, one potential
Universale enim adest cuilibet parti subjectivae whole is like an intermediate between the integral
secundum esse et perfectam virtutem, et ideo and the universal. For the universal is present to any
proprie praedicatur de parte sua. Sed totum subjective part according to being and the perfect
integrale non adest cuilibet parti, neque secundum virtue, and therefore is predicated properly of its
esse, neque secundum virtutem. Non enim totum part. The integral whole, on the contrary, is not
esse domus est in pariete, neque tota virtus; et ideo present in every part, neither according to being nor
nullo modo praedicatur de parte. Totum autem according to virtue. For not all the being of the
potentiale adest cuilibet parti secundum se, et house is in the walls, nor all the virtue, and thus in
secundum aliquid virtutis, sed non secundum no way is it predicated of the part. The potential
perfectam; immo secundum perfectam virtutem whole, however, is present in each part according to
adest tantum supremae potentiae; et ideo itself, and according to some aspect of virtue, not
praedicatur quidem, sed non adeo proprie sicut though perfect; moreover, according to perfect
totum universale. virtue it is present only to the supreme power; and
thus it is predicated in a certain way, but not thus
properly as the universal whole.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod essentia ipsius TO THE SECOND it should be said that the
animae est etiam principium operandi, sed essence of these souls is also the principle of
mediante virtute. Principium autem essendi est operation, but by means of powers. Now the
immediate, quia esse non est accidens. principle of being is immediate since being is not an
accident.
AD TERTIUM dicendum, quod forma accidentalis TO THE THIRD it should be said that the
est virtus alterius, per quam producitur operatio, qui accidental form is the virtus of another, from which
est effectus proportionatus sibi, sicut causae operation is produced, which is the proportionate
proximae; forma autem substantialis non est hoc effect to this as to is proximate cause; now the
modo proportionata operationi, ut dictum est, in substantial form is not proportionate in this way to
corp. art.. operation, as was said in the body of the article.
AD QUARTUM dicendum, quod si per potentiam TO THE FOURTH, it should be said that if by
passivam intelligatur relatio vel ordo materiae ad passive potency one understands the relation or the
formam, tunc materia non est sua potentia, quia order of matter to form, then matter not its potency,
essentia materiae non est relatio. Si autem because the essence of matter is not a relation. If,
intelligatur potentia, secundum quod est principium however, one understands potency, insofar as it is a
in genere substantiae, secundum quod potentia et principle in the genus of substance, according to
actus sunt principia in quolibet genere, ut dicitur, in which the potency and the act are the principles of
12 metaph., sic dico, quod materia est ipsa sua whatever genus, as is said in XII Metaph., thus I say
potentia. Et hoc modo se habet materia prima, quae that matter is its own potency. And in this way,
est primum recipiens, ad potentiam passivam, sicut prime matter, which is the first recipient, is related
se habet Deus, qui est primum agens, ad potentiam to the passive potency, as God, who is the first
activam. Et ideo materia est sua potentia passiva, agent, is related to the active potency. And therefore
sicut et Deus sua potentia activa. Omnia autem matter is to its passive potency as God to his active
media habent utramque potentiam participative, et potency. Now all intermediates have both potencies
potentia materiae non est ad aliquam operationem, by participation, and the potency of matter is not by
sed ad recipiendum tantum. some operation, but only by receiving.
AD QUINTUM dicendum, quod sensus, secundum TO THE FIFTH it should be said that sense, as a
quod est nomen potentiae, non est principium hujus name of a power, is not a principle of this difference
differentiae quae est sensibile; sed secundum quod which is sensible, but is insofar as it denotes the
nominat naturam sensitivam: et ita est de aliis. sensitive nature; and the same [is to be said] for the
other powers.

ARTICLE THREE
Utrum una potentia oriatur ex alia
Whether one power derives from another

AD TERTIUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod una PROCEEDING THUS TO THE THIRD. It seems that
potentia non oriatur ex alia. Quaecumque enim one power does not derive from another. Now, when
simul sunt, unum ex altero non oritur. Sed omnes things are simultaneous, one does not derive from
potentiae simul sunt in anima ex creatione. Ergo another. But all the powers are simultaneously in
una non oritur ex alia. the soul by creation. Therefore one does not derive
from another.
PRAETEREA, omne accidens causatur ex suo FURTHERMORE, every accident is caused by its
subjecto. Sed una potentia non est subjectum subject. But a power is not the subject of another,
alterius, quia accidens non est subjectum accidentis. since the accident is not the subject of an accident.
Ergo una potentia non oritur ex alia. Therefore, a power is not derived from another.

CONTRA, potentiae determinantur secundum ON THE CONTRARY, the powers are determined
actus. Sed actus unius potentiae sequitur naturaliter according to the acts. But the act of one faculty
ad actum alterius potentiae, et originatur ex ipsa; naturally follows upon the act of another faculty,
sicut intelligere sequitur ad hoc quod est tenere and is derived from this; as to understand follows
notitiam. Ergo ita est etiam in potentiis. upon the fact of conserving knowledge. Therefore, it
is also this way in the powers.
Si dicas, quod ordo est in actibus ratione If then one says that the order is is in the acts by
objectorum, et non ratione potentiarum, in idem reason of their objects, and not by reason of their
redibit: quia objecta sunt perfectiones potentiarum, powers, one returns to the same point: since the
et formae ipsarum. Perfectio autem proportionatur objects are the perfections of the powers, and their
perfectibili; et sic idem quod prius. forms. Now, the perfection is proportionate to the
perfectible; and thus the same as before.

RESPONDEO dicendum, quod omnis I RESPOND saying that every plurality, which
numerositas, quae descendit naturaliter ab aliquo descends naturally from some one thing should
uno, oportet quod descendat secundum ordinem, descend according to an order, since from the one
quia ab uno non exit nisi unum; et ideo cum multae nothing comes forth except the one; and therefore,
potentiae egrediantur ab essentia animae, dicimus, given that many powers come forth from the
quod in potentiis animae est ordo naturalis; et cum essence of the soul, we say that among the powers of
omnes fluant ab essentia, una tamen fluit mediante the soul there is a natural order; and even though all
alia; et inde est, quod posterior potentia supponit in flow from the essence, one [power] also flows forth
definitione sui priorem, et actus posterioris by means of the others; and from this it follows that
dependet a priori. Si enim definiamus intellectum, the posterior power supposes the anterior in its
definietur per suum actum, qui est intelligere, et in definition; and the act of the posterior depends on
definitione actus ejus cadet actus prioris potentiae, the anterior. Now if we define the intellect, it is
et ipsa potentia. Oportet enim quod in definitione defined by its act, which is to understand, and in the
hujus actus qui est intelligere, cadat phantasma, definition of its act, the act of the anterior power
quod est objectum ejus, quod per actum falls as well as the power itself. For it is necessary
imaginationis repraesentatur intellectui; et hoc that in the definition of this act, which is to
etiam videmus in accidentibus corporum, quod understand, the phantasm falls, which is its object,
omnia alia accidentia elementorum fluunt ab and through the act of imagination it is presented to
essentia, mediantibus primis qualitatibus. the intellect; and this we also see in the accidents of
the bodies, that all the other accidents of the
elements flow from the essence, by means of the
primary qualities.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod quamvis sint TO THE FIRST, therefore, it should be said that
simul tempore, nihilominus tamen una naturaliter even though they are simultaneously in time,
prior est altera. nevertheless one is still naturally prior to another.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod accidens ex TO THE SECOND it should be said that the
seipso non habet virtutem producendi aliud accident by itself does not have the capacity to
accidens; sed a substantia potest unum accidens produce another accident, but one accident can
procedere mediante alio, secundum quod illud proceed from the substance by means of another,
praesupponitur in subjecto; et ita etiam accidens according that which is presupposed in the subject;
non potest esse per se subjectum accidentis, sed and thus also the accident cannot be per se the
subjectum mediante uno accidente subjicitur alteri; subject of the accident, but the subject by means of
propter quod dicitur superficies esse subjectum an accident is subjected to another; for which one
coloris. says that the surface is the subject of color.

ARTICLE FOUR
Whether the image is considered in the rational powers with respect to any object
Utrum imago attendatur in potentiis rationalibus respectu quorumlibet objectorum

AD QUARTUM SIC PROCEDITUR. VIDETUR quod PROCEEDING TO THE FOURTH. 1. IT SEEMS that the
imago attendatur in istis potentiis respectu image is considered in these powers with respect to
quorumlibet objectorum. Potentia enim ex natura any object. For the power, by the nature of the
potentiae se habet similiter ad omnia sua objecta. power, is related in a similar way to all its objects,
Sed per habitus diversos restringitur ad haec vel ad while by means of diverse habits it is restricted to
illa. Cum igitur assignatio primae imaginis sit these or to those. Therefore, since the assigning of
secundum potentias, non secundum habitus, videtur the first image is according to the powers and not
quod sit respectu quorumlibet objectorum. according to the habits, it seems that it is according
to any object.
PRAETEREA, Augustinus: cum in natura mentis 2. FURTHERMORE, Augustine [writes]: When we
humanae quaerimus Trinitatem, in tota quaerimus, seek for the Trinity in the nature of the human
non separantes actionem temporalium a mind, we seek in everything, not separating the
contemplatione aeternorum. Omnia autem objecta action of temporal things from the contemplation of
vel sunt aeterna, vel temporalia. Ergo respectu eternal things. Now, all objects are either eternal or
quorumlibet objectorum attenditur imago. temporal. Therefore the image is considered in
relation to some object.
CONTRA, ad rationem imaginis exigitur 3. ON THE CONTRARY, the ratio of image
aequalitas. Sed non in omnibus objectis invenitur demands equality. But equality is not found in all
aequalitas: non enim quantumcumque cognosco objects: for it is not [true] that to the degree that I
aliquid, tantum volo illud. Ergo videtur quod non know something, I want it. Therefore, it seems that
respectu omnium attendatur imago. the image is not considered with respect to all
things.
PRAETEREA, secundum istam assignationem 4. FURTHERMORE, according to this assignment
imaginis, intelligentia sequitur memoriam. Sed in of the image, the intellect follows memory. But in
illis quae per acquisitionem cognoscimus, ex those things that we know by acquisition, memory
intelligentia sequitur memoria. Ergo videtur quod follows the intellect. Therefore, it seems that this
ista assignatio imaginis non attenditur respectu assignment of the image is not considered with
quorumlibet objectorum. respect to any object.

RESPONDEO dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, I RESPOND saying that, as was said, in this Dist.,
hac distin., quaest. 3, art. 1, imago dicit expressam q. 3, a. 1, the image means express representation.
repraesentationem. Expressa autem repraesentatio For express representation is in the powers
est in ipsis potentiis propter quinque. themselves on account of five things.
Quorum duo se tenent ex parte ipsius animae, Of these, two have their basis in the soul itself,
scilicet consubstantialitas et distinctio potentiarum, namely, the consubstantiality and distinction of the
et ideo se habent indifferenter respectu quorumlibet powers; and therefore, they are indifferent with
objectorum; alia vero tria, scilicet aequalitas, et respect to any object; the other three, however,
ordo, et actualis imitatio respiciunt objecta, unde se namely, equality, and order and actual imitation
habent diversimode respectu diversorum regard the objects, so that they vary in relation to
objectorum. diverse objects.
Potest autem attendi in potentiis animae duplex Now, one can consider in the powers of the soul
aequalitas, scilicet potentiae ad potentiam et a twofold equality, namely, of a power to a power
potentiae ad objectum. Et haec secunda aequalitas and of a power to an object. And this second
salvatur hic diversimode respectu diversorum equality is saved here in a diverse way with respect
objectorum. to diverse objects.
In illis enim quae per habitum acquisitum For in those things which are apprehended by
discuntur, non servatur ordo, ut dictum est supra, means of an acquired habit, the order is not
qu. 2, art. 3, quia intelligendi actus praecedit actum maintained, as was said above, in q. 2, a. 3, because
memorandi; et ideo non est ibi actualis the act of understanding precedes the act of
repraesentatio ipsius Trinitatis, secundum quod memory; and therefore there is not an actual
intendit illis objectis quae non exprimunt representation of the Trinity itself, according to
Trinitatem. which the [soul] tends to those objects that do not
express the Trinity.
Servatur autem ibi aequalitas quaedam, scilicet However, a certain equality is maintained,
potentiae ad potentiam: quia quaecumque namely, that of the powers to a power: because the
comprehenduntur una potentia, comprehenduntur things that a power comprehends are
alia: non quod quidquid intelligimus, simpliciter comprehended by another; not in the sense that all
velimus; sed aliquo modo in voluntate sunt, things that we understand are simpliciter wanted,
inquantum volumus nos ea intelligere: sed non but that they are in some way in the will, insofar are
servatur aequalitas potentiae ad objectum: quia res we want to understand them. However, the equality
corporales sunt in anima nobiliori modo quam in of a power to an object is not maintained: because
seipsis, cum anima sit nobilior eis, ut dicit corporeal things are in the soul in a more noble way
Augustinus. than in themselves, since the soul is nobler than
they are, as Augustine says.
Si autem considerentur istae potentiae respectu If, however, these powers are considered with
huius obiecti quod est anima, sic salvatur ordo, cum respect to that object which is the soul, then the
ipsa anima naturaliter sit sibi praesens; unde ex order is maintained, since the soul itself is naturally
notitia procedit intelligere, et non e converso. present to itself; hence understanding proceeds
from knowledge and not the converse.
Servatur etiam aequalitas potentiae ad Also, the equality of a power to a power is
potentiam simpliciter: quia quantum se intelligit, maintained simpliciter: because one wants and loves
tantum se vult et diligit: non sicut in aliis, quod velit to the degree that one understands: not as in other
se tantum intelligere, sed simpliciter. Servatur etiam things, that want only to understand, but
ibi aequalitas potentiae ad objectum. Servatur etiam simpliciter. Also, one maintains there the equality of
ibi actualis imitatio ipsius trinitatis, inquantum a power to an object. Also, one maintains there the
scilicet ipsa anima est imago expresse ducens in actual imitation of the Trinity itself, insofar as the
Deum. Si autem considerentur respectu hujus soul itself is the image that clearly leads to God.
objecti quod est Deus, tunc servatur ibi actualis Now if they are considered with respect to that
imitatio. Maxime autem servatur ordo, quia ex object which is God, then there the actual imitation
memoria procedit intelligentia, eo quod ipse est per is maintained. Now, the order is maximally
essentiam in anima, et tenetur ab ipsa non per maintained because from the memory proceeds
acquisitionem. Servatur etiam ibi aequalitas understanding, since it is per essentiam in the soul
potentiae ad potentiam simpliciter, sed non and is not had by this by acquisition. Also, there the
potentiae ad objectum: quia deus est altior quam sit equality of power to power is maintained simpliciter,
anima. but not the power to the object: for God is higher
than the soul.
Unde dico, quod imago quodammodo Hence, I say that the image in some way is
attenditur respectu quorumlibet objectorum; verius considered with respect to any object; more truly
autem respectu sui ipsius, et verissime respectu however with respect to itself, and most truly with
hujus objecti quod est Deus; nisi tantum quod deest respect to that object which is God; only the
aequalitas potentiae ad objectum, quae etiam non equality of a power to an object, which also does not
multum facit ad imaginem. contribute much to the image, is lacking.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod quamvis ista TO THE FIRST, therefore, it should be said that
assignatio imaginis attendatur secundum potentias even though this assignment of the image is
absolute, nihilominus tamen praecipue attenditur considered according to the powers absolutely,
secundum id quod est altissimum in eis; et hoc est nevertheless it is considered principally according to
respectu eorum objectorum quae per sui essentiam that which is highest in these; and this is in relation
sunt in anima. to their objects which are in the soul by its essence.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod Augustinus vult, TO THE SECOND it should be said that Augustine
quod respectu quorumlibet objectorum sit aliquo means that in relation to any sort of object there is
modo imago: sed praecipue respectu hujus objecti an image in some way, but principally in relation to
quod est Deus et quod est anima: ipse enim in that object which is God and that which is the soul:
multis requirit similitudinem Trinitatis, ut ad for he seeks the likeness of the Trinity in many
perfectam imaginem deveniat. things, so as to come to a perfect image.
AD ALIUD patet responsio per ea quae dicta sunt. TO THE OTHER [objection] the response should
be clear by what has been said.

ARTICLE FIVE
Whether the rational powers are always in act
with respect to the objects in which the image is considered
Utrum potentiae rationales sint semper in actu respectu objectorum, in quibus attenditur imago

AD QUINTUM SIC PROCEDITUR. Videtur quod PROCEEDING TO THE FIFTH. It seems that these
istae potentiae non semper sint in suis actibus powers are not always in their acts with respect to
respectu horum objectorum, in quibus praecipue their objects in which the image is principally
attenditur imago. Dicit enim Philosophus, quod una considered. For, the Philosopher says that when a
potentia existente in actu, altera abstrahitur ab actu power exists in act, the other abstains from its act.
suo. Sed istae tres sunt diversae potentiae. Ergo But these three are diverse powers. Therefore, it is
impossibile est quod quaelibet semper sit in suo impossible that each one is always in its act with
actu respectu cujuslibet objecti. respect to an object.
ITEM, Philosophus dicit quod non contingit ALSO, the Philosopher says that one cannot
multa simul intelligere. Sed anima quandoque understand many things simultaneously. But the
intelligit quaedam alia. Ergo tunc non intelligit soul sometimes understands something else.
simul seipsam et Deum. Therefore, it does not then understand itself and
God simultaneously.
ITEM, ad hoc quod anima intelligat vel videat, ALSO, according to Augustine, in order for the
secundum Augustinum requiritur intentio soul to understood or see, the intention of the
cognoscentis, per quam species cognoscibilis in rem knower is required, by which the knowable species
deducatur. Sed quandoque anima intelligit ex is conducted in the thing. But sometimes the soul
intentione se intelligere. Cum igitur non understands to understand itself from the intention.
percipiamus nos intelligere semper animam et Therefore, since we do not perceive ourselves to
Deum, videtur quod intellectus noster non semper understand the soul and God always, it seems that
sit in actu, respectu horum objectorum. our intellect is not always in act with respect to its
objects.

CONTRA, Philosophus dicit, quod intellectus ON THE CONTRARY, the Philosopher says that the
agens semper intelligit. Maxime autem hoc videtur agent intellect always understands. This is seen,
respectu eorum quae semper sibi sunt praesentia, above all, with respect to those things which are
sicut anima et Geus. Ergo videtur quod intellectus, always present to it, like the soul and God.
horum respectu, semper sit in actu. Therefore, it seems that the intellect, with respect to
these, is always in act.
PRAETEREA, dicit Augustinus quod quidquid est FURTHERMORE, Augustine says what is in my
in memoria mea, illud memini. Sed anima et deus memory, I recall it. But the soul and God are always
semper est praesens memoriae. Ergo memoria present to memory. Therefore memory is always in
semper est in actu eorum, et similiter est in aliis. its act and the same thing happens in the others.

RESPONDEO dicendum, quod, secundum I RESPOND saying that according to Augustine


Augustinum differunt cogitare, discernere et thinking, discerning and understanding differ. To
intelligere. Discernere est cognoscere rem per discern is to know a thing by its differences from
differentiam sui ab aliis. Cogitare autem est other things. To think is to consider a thing
considerare rem secundum partes et proprietates according to its parts and properties: hence to think
suas: unde cogitare dicitur quasi coagitare. means something like to deal with together.
Intelligere autem dicit nihil aliud quam To understand means nothing more than the
simplicem intuitum intellectus in id quod sibi est simple intuition of the intellect on that which is
praesens intelligibile. present to it as intelligible.
Dico ergo, quod anima non semper cogitat et Therefore, I say that the soul does not always
discernit de Deo, nec de se, quia sic quilibet sciret think and discern about God, nor about itself,
naturaliter totam naturam animae suae, ad quod vix because in that case anyone would know naturally
magno studio pervenitur: ad talem enim the entire nature of their soul, which is hardly
cognitionem non sufficit praesentia rei quolibet achieved even with great study. For this knowledge,
modo; sed oportet ut sit ibi in ratione objecti, et then, the presence of a thing in any such way is not
exigitur intentio cognoscentis. Sed secundum quod sufficient; but it is necessary that it be present under
intelligere nihil aliud dicit quam intuitum, qui nihil the ratio of object and this requires the intention of
aliud est quam praesentia intelligibilis ad the knower. But, insofar as to understand means
intellectum quocumque modo, sic anima semper nothing more than to intuit, which is nothing more
intelligit se et Deum indeterminate, et consequitur than the presence of the intelligible to the intellect
quidam amor indeterminatus. Alio tamen modo, in any such way, then the soul always understands
secundum philosophos, intelligitur quod anima itself and God in an indeterminate way, and a kind
semper se intelligit, eo quod omne quod intelligitur, of indeterminate love follows. In another way,
non intelligitur nisi illustratum lumine intellectus however, according to the philosophers, one
agentis, et receptum in intellectu possibili. Unde understands that the soul always understands itself,
sicut in omni colore videtur lumen corporale, ita in by the fact that all that is understood is not
omni intelligibili videtur lumen intellectus agentis; understood except as enlightened by the light of the
non tamen in ratione objecti sed in ratione medii agent intellect and as received in the possible
cognoscendi. intellect. Hence, just as in every color corporeal light
is seen, so also in every intelligible the light of the
agent intellect is seen; not however under the ratio
of object but under the ratio of means for knowing.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod hoc est TO THE FIRST, therefore, it should be said that
intelligendum quando potentiae operantur circa this is to be understood when the powers operate
diversa objecta: tunc enim una impedit aliam in actu regarding diverse objects: for then one [power]
suo, vel ex toto retrahit. Sed quando ordinantur ad impedes the other in its act or retracts it completely.
idem objectum, tunc una juvat aliam; sicut illud But when they are ordered to the same object, then
quod videmus, facilius imaginamur. one helps the other; as that which we see, we
imagine more easily.
AD SECUNDUM dicendum, quod Philosophus TO THE SECOND it should be said that the
loquitur de intelligere, secundum quod est operatio Philosopher is speaking about understanding insofar
intellectus completa distinguentis vel cogitantis, et as it is a complete operation of the intellect that
non secundum quod hic sumitur intelligere. distinguishes and thinks and not as understanding
as it is taken here.
AD TERTIUM dicendum similiter, quod intentio TO THE THIRD it should likewise be said that the
intelligentis non requiritur ad tale intelligere, sicut intention of the one who understands is not
dictum est, in corpore art.. required for that understanding, as was said in the
body of the article.

QUESTION FIVE
Deinde quaeritur de alia assignatione imaginis, Then, the other assignments of the image,
scilicet mente, notitia et amore. namely mind, knowledge and love, are questioned.

ARTICLE ONE
Utrum hae partes imaginis, mens, notitia et amor differant ab aliis partibus.
Whether these parts of the image – mind, knowledge and love – differ from the other parts

Sic proceditur. ET VIDETUR quod ista non differt Proceeding to this. 1. AND IT SEEMS that this
a praedicta, si dicitur, quod ista assignatur [assigning] does not differ from the aforementioned,
secundum habitus, illa secundum potentias: imago if one says that this one is assigned according to the
enim attenditur in anima praecipue respectu hujus habits, while the former was assigned according to
objecti quod est anima et hujus objecti quod est the powers; in fact, the image is considered in the
deus. Sed anima non cognoscit seipsam tali modo soul above all with respect to that object that is the
cognitionis, de quo hic loquimur, mediante habitu, soul and that object that is God. Now, the soul does
sed per suam essentiam. Ergo non videtur quod not know itself with that mode of knowledge of
secundum aliquos habitus assignetur imago. which we now speak, by means of a habit, but by
means of its essence. Therefore, it does not seem
that the image is assigned according to some habit.
PRAETEREA, nullus habitus est consubstantialis, 2. FURTHERMORE, no habit is consubstantial,
cum omnis habitus sit accidens. Sed notitia et amor since every habit is an accident. But knowledge and
sunt consubstantiales ipsi menti, ut hic dicitur. Ergo love are consubstantial to the mind itself, as was
non sunt habitus. said here. Therefore they are not habits.
ITEM, mens superius, quaest. 3, art. 1, fuit 3. AGAIN, the superior mind (q. 3, a.1), was taken
accepta non pro habitu, sed pro potentiarum not as a habit, but as the subject of powers.
subjecto. Cum igitur eodem modo notificetur hic, Therefore, because it is qualified by the Master here
sicut supra, a magistro, scilicet pro eo quod in anima as above, namely as that which is most excellent in
est excellentius, videtur quod non sit habitus: et ita the soul, it seems that it is not a habit: and thus this
haec assignatio non est secundum habitus. assignment is not according to the habits.
PRAETEREA, constat quod habitus non operatur 4. FURTHERMORE, one sees that the habit does
sed est principium operandi. Cum igitur hic dicat, not operate, but is a principle of operation.
quod mens novit se et amat se, videtur quod non Therefore, since it is said here that the mind knows
sumatur pro habitu. itself and loves itself, it seems that it cannot be
taken as a habit.
CONTRA, cuilibet potentiae respondet suus 5. ON THE CONTRARY, each of the powers
habitus. Si igitur mens non sit habitus, sed ipsa corresponds to its habits. Therefore, if the mind is
essentia animae, secundum quod hic sumitur, erunt not a habit, but rather the very essence of the soul,
quatuor partes imaginis, scilicet mens et tres habitus according to which it is taken here, there are four
trium potentiarum; et ita non repraesentabunt parts of the image, namely, the mind and the three
trinitatem. habits of the three powers: and thus they do not
represent the Trinity.

RESPONDEO dicendum, quod mens multipliciter I RESPOND saying that, according to some, the
dicitur secundum quosdam. Quandoque enim mind is said in many ways. In fact sometimes
dicitur ipsa natura intellectiva, sicut Dionysius, intellectual nature itself is called a mind, as when
vocat Angelos divinas mentes. Dionysius calls Angels “divine minds”.
Quandoque dicitur ipse intellectus examinans Sometimes the intellect that examines things is
res, secundum quod mens dicitur a metior metiris, called a mind, according to which mind is taken
et juxta hoc etiam supra sumitur, quod mens est from “I measure, you measure”, and on account of
superior pars animae. Quandoque dicitur pro this meaning it is said also above that the mind is
memoria a reminiscendo dicta; et ita dicunt quod the superior part of the soul. Sometimes memory is
sumitur hic: unde dicunt quod mens hic sumitur pro called mind, taken from remembering; and they say
habitu memoriae, et notitia pro habitu intelligentiae that this is how mind should be understood here:
et amor pro habitu voluntatis. Sed quia ista opinio hence, they say that mind here is taken from the
non procedit secundum magistri intentionem, et habit of memory, knowledge from the habit of the
nimis extorta est; ideo aliter dicendum est, quod intelligence, and love from the habit of will.
mens sumitur hic, sicut et supra, pro ipsa superiori However, since this opinion does not proceed
parte animae, quae est subjectum praedictae according to the intention of the Master, and is too
imaginis, et notitia est habitus memoriae, et amor forced, something else should be said, that the mind
habitus voluntatis; et ita haec assignatio sumitur is taken here, as above, as the superior part of the
secundum essentiam et habitus consubstantiales; soul that is the subject of the aforesaid image, and
praedicta autem secundum potentias. knowledge is the habit of memory and love, the
habit of will; and thus this assigning is taken
according to the essence and the consubstantial
habits, the former, on the other hand, is taken
according to the powers.
Unde in ista non est tanta conformitas sicut in Hence, in this there is not a conformity as great
praedicta, nec ita propria assignatio: propter quod as the former, nor a proper assigning: on account of
etiam ultimo ponitur. this it has been placed last.

AD PRIMUM ergo dicendum, quod ad esse TO THE FIRST, therefore, it should be said that to
habitus intellectivi duo concurrunt: scilicet species the being of the intellectual habits two things
intelligibilis, et lumen intellectus agentis, quod facit concur: namely, the intelligible species and the light
eam intelligibilem in actu: unde si aliqua species of the agent intellect, which makes them intelligible
esset quae in se haberet lumen, illud haberet in act: hence if there were some species that had in
rationem habitus, quantum pertinet ad hoc quod itself the light, it would have the ratio of habit,
esset principium actus. Ita dico, quod quando ab insofar as it belongs to this to be the principle of act.
anima cognoscitur aliquid quod est in ipsa non per Thus I say that when something that is in the soul
sui similitudinem, sed per suam essentiam, ipsa not through its likeness, but through its essence is
essentia rei cognitae est loco habitus. Unde dico, known by the soul, the very essence of the thing
quod ipsa essentia animae, prout est mota [nota?] a known is in the place of the habit. Hence I say that
seipsa, habet rationem habitus. Et sumitur hic the very essence of the soul, insofar as it is known by
notitia materialiter pro re nota; et similiter est itself, has the ratio of habit. And knowledge is taken
dicendum de amore. here materially for the thing known; and something
similar should be said about love.
UNDE etiam patet solutio ad secundum: quia HENCE, the solution to the second is also clear:
habitus isti erunt consubstantiales, cum sint in ipsa since these habits are consubstantial, being in the
substantia animae, nec sunt ibi alii habitus. Si autem very substance of the soul, nor are there other habits
diceremus, quod per notitiam et amorem there. Now if we say that by knowledge and love we
significantur actus et non habitus, planius esset; et mean the act and not the habits, this will be clearer;
tunc dicerentur consubstantiales, sicut et de and then we would be called consubstantial, as also
potentiis supra dictum est, dist. 3, quaest. 4, art. 2. about the powers as said above in d. 3, q. 4, a. 2.
TERTIUM ET QUARTUM concedimus. THE THIRD AND FOURTH we concede.
AD QUINTUM dicendum, quod habitus est TO THE FIFTH it should be said that a habit is the
principium elicitivum operationis. Unde, quia elicitive principle of operation. Hence, since
memoria non habet per se actum qui sit simpliciter memory does not have per se an act that is simply an
operatio, non respondet sibi aliquis habitus, sed operation, some habit does not correspond to it, but
eodem habitu notitia, memoria et intelligentia rather by the same habit knowledge, memory and
reducuntur in unam operationem. intelligence are reduced to one operation.

EXPOSITION OF THE SECOND PART OF THE TEXT


In ipsa etiam mente, antequam sit particeps Dei, In fact, in the mind itself, even before it
ejus imago reperitur; etsi enim amissa dei participates of God, one finds his image; in fact, even
participatione, deformis sit, imago tamen dei if it is deformed by having lost the participation of
permanet. Contra: Psal. 72, 20: Domine, in civitate God, the image of God still remains. On the contrary,
tua imaginem ipsorum ad nihilum rediges. one reads in Psalm 72:20: “Lord, in your city, you
Dicendum, quod sicut dicit Glossa super illud Psal. will bring their image to nothing”. It should be said
4: signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine, that as the Gloss on Psalm 4: “Lord, let the light of
triplex est imago dei in homine: scilicet creationis, your face shine upon us”, says, there is a threefold
quae est ratio, inquantum appropinquat ad image of God in man: namely, that of creation,
imitationem divinae intellectualitatis; et dicitur which is the reason, insofar as it approaches the
imago per modum quo truncus in corporalibus imitation of divine intellectuality; and man is called
potest dici imago. Item alia est imago similitudinis, image in the way that a trunk in corporeal reality
quae consistit in distinctione potentiarum can be called an image. As well, another [image] is
repraesentantium trinitatem personarum; et haec the image of likeness, which consists in the
assimilatur imagini in corporalibus, secundum quod distinction of the powers which represent the
distincta est per rationes partium. Trinity of persons; and this is likened to the image
in corporeal things, according to which they are
distinct by reason of parts.
Item est imago recreationis, quae consistit in There is also the image of recreation, which
habitibus gratuitis, et actu imitatur Deum; et haec consists in the gratuitous habits, and imitates God
assimilatur imagini in corporalibus quantum ad in act; and this is likened to the image in corporeal
colores, et alia quae imaginem decorant: et sic dicta things as to colors and the other things that beautify
imago non remanet post peccata, sed aliis duobus the image; and according to this way the said image
modis. does not remain after sins, but the other two ways
do.
Eo enim ipso imago dei est mens quo capax ejus For the mind is the image of God by the fact that
est ejusque particeps esse potest. Videtur falsum. it is capable of him and can be a participant of him.
This seems false.
Omne enim quod capit aliquid, est majus vel For all that grasps a thing is greater or equal to
aequale sibi, sicut Augustinus, arguit de potentiis it, as Augustine argues regarding the powers that
mutuo sese capientibus. grasp each other mutually.
Ergo videtur quod mens nostra non possit Therefore, it seems that our mind cannot grasp
capere Deum. Si dicas quod dicitur capere, God. If you say that grasp is said insofar as God is in
inquantum Deus est in anima, cum ipse sit in the soul, since he is in each creature by essence,
qualibet creatura per essentiam, praesentiam et presence and power, it seems then that insensible
potentiam, videtur etiam quod creaturae creatures grasp God.
insensibiles capiant Deum.
Ad quod dicendum, quod mens nostra dicitur To this it should be said that our mind is said to
capere Deum sicut perfectibile suam perfectionem. grasp God as the perfectible to its perfection.
Objectum enim operationis aliquo modo est For the object of the operation in some way is
perfectio operantis. Mens autem nostra habet the perfection of the operator. Now our mind has
operationem circa Deum per cognitionem et operation about God by knowledge and love which
amorem quam non habent creaturae irrationales. Et irrational creatures do not have. And therefore, he is
ideo capitur a mente sicut a perfectibili, non tamen grasped by the mind as by a perfectible, and not as
sicut a perfectibili proportionato; et ideo non by a proportionate perfectible; and therefore he is
comprehenditur, sed attingitur; unde non sequitur not comprehended, but attained; hence, it does not
quod adaequetur. Memoria vero dicitur ad aliquid follow that he be equaled. Furthermore, memory is
non secundum esse, sed secundum dici. said in relation to something not according to being,
but according to speech.
Ea vero tria sunt quae ad se invicem referuntur. Furthermore, these three are those that are
referred to one another.
Videtur falsum, eo quod memoria non dicitur ad This seems false, since memory is not said in
voluntatem. relation to the will.
Dicendum, quod quamvis non dicatur ad eam It should be said that even though it is not said
sub nomine voluntatis, tamen refertur ad eam in relation to it under the name of will, it still refers
inquantum voluntas est memorabilis. Vel dicendum, to it insofar as the will is memorable. Or it should be
quod referuntur ad invicem secundum relationem said that they refer to one another according to the
originis, inquantum una habet naturalem ordinem relation of origin insofar as one has a natural order
ad aliam, ut dictum est supra, quaest. 4, art. 4. to the other, as it was said above in q. 4, art. 4.
Totamque meam memoriam et intelligentiam et All I remember concurrently my whole memory
voluntatem simul memini. Videtur male dicere: quia and intelligence and will. It seems that this is stated
totum dicitur respectu partium: potentiae autem poorly: because the whole is said with respect to the
animae non habent partes, cum sint simplices. parts; now, the powers of the soul do not have parts,
but are simples.
Dicendum, quod est duplex quantitas; scilicet It should be said that quantity is twofold;
molis vel dimensiva, et hujusmodi totalitas namely, mass or dimensive [quantity], and a similar
attenditur respectu partium in quas dividitur. Est totality is considered with respect to the parts into
etiam quaedam quantitas virtutis, cujus totalitas which it is divided. There is also a type of virtual
attenditur respectu objectorum; et talis est totalitas quantity, whose totality is considered with respect
in potentiis animae. to objects; and this is the totality in the powers of
the soul.
Item, videtur quod una non sit aequalis in Likewise, it seems that one is not equal to all:
omnibus: quia omne totum est majus sua parte. because every whole is greater than its part.
Dicendum quod hoc verum est de totalitate It should be said that this is true of the totality
quantitatis dimensivae vel numerabilis, quae of the dimensive or numerable quantity, which are
ejusdem rationis sunt, et non de totalitate of the same ratio, and not of the totality of virtual
quantitatis virtualis; potest enim contingere quod quantity; for it can happen that one power can have
una virtus potest in tot objecta in quot aliae plures, as many objects as the other powers have, with each
quarum quaelibet in omnia illa objecta potest; one of them regarding all those objects; still, one
tamen una earum non tot modis potest in illa does not regard those objects in all the ways of the
objecta, sicut alia. others.