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a. Definition and General Concepts

i. Definition


FACTS: Loreta C. Sol charged the herein petitioners Sterling Products International and its Radio Director
V. San Pedro with having committed an unfair labor practice act. She alleged in her complaint that she
has been a regular Radio Monitor of respondents-petitioners; that in 1960 filed a complaint against the
said firm for underpayment, money equivalent of her vacation leave from 1952 to 1959, and Christmas
bonus for 1959 = this previous complaint resulted in her dismissal without just cause. The petitioners’
alleged that complainant is an independent contractor whose services were retained by petitioners to
submit reports of radio monitoring work performed outside of their (petitioners') office and that she
was dismissed because her services were no longer required. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
decided that complainant was an employee and not an independent contractor, and ordered her
reinstatement with back wages. Moreover, petitioners are guilty of unfair labor practice. Circumstances
which made it rule that Sol is an employee: (1) Complainant was given an identification card stating that
"Bearer Loreta C. Sol is a bona fide employee of this Company;" (2) when she applied for purchase of a
lot from the PHHC, she was given a certificate to show that she was indeed an employee of the
respondent company for the last five years or six years; and (3) as such employee, she enjoyed the
privilege of borrowing money from the Employees Loan Association of the firm. Also, company not only
hired and fired Mrs. Sol, without third party intervention, but also reserved to itself, possessed and
exercised its right to control 'the end' to be achieved and 'the means' to be used in reaching such end,
namely, the schedule and other instructions by which the monitor shall be guided, and the reports with
specifications by which the company observes and verifies the performance of her work.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of Unfair Labor Practice

HELD: NO. Following the ruling in Royal Interocean Lines, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations - as
respondent Sol was merely an employee and was not connected with any labor union, the company
cannot be considered as having committed acts constituting unfair labor practice as defined in the
Industrial Peace Act, Rep. Act 875. The respondent Sol has never been found to commit any of the acts
mentioned in paragraph (a) of Sec. 4. Respondent Sol was not connected with any labor organization,
nor has she ever attempted to join a labor organization, or to assist, or contribute to a labor
organization. The company cannot, therefore, be considered as having committed an unfair labor



FACTS: Petitioners were permanent employees of respondent NEECO I. They were members of the
NEECO I Employees Association. The Board of Directors adopted Policy No. 3-33, which set the
guidelines for NEECO I’s retirement benefits. All regular employees were ordered to accomplish Form
87, which were applications for either reinstatement, resignation, or separation from service. Also,
certain union officers were promoted to supervisory rank. These events caused apprehension in the
labor organization and deemed as harassment threatening union members and circumventing
employees’ security of tenure. The union held a snap election of officers. Petitioner union passed a
resolution withdrawing the applications for retirement of all its members. Petitioners Marin, Fajardo
and Carilio were compulsory retired and received their separation pay under protest. Javate was
terminated for allegedly misappropriating funds and dishonesty. Petitioners and Javate filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on December 21, 1992 declaring NEECO I
guilty of illegal dismissal. Private respondents elevated the case to the NLRC. They filed their appeal on
December 28, and posted a surety bond on January 5, 1993. Petitioners were reinstated by NEECO I
pending appeal. Javate withdrew his complaint and opted to receive his retirement benefits.


1. Whether or not the appeal was perfected within the 10 day reglementary period.

2. Whether or not NLRC should have deleted en too moral and exemplary damages.


1. Yes. Petitioners contend that the appeal should have been completed with the filing of the supersede
bond by January 4, 1993. However, in a number of cases, the Court has relaxed the rule to resolve
controversies on the merits when there are special circumstances, such as when there was a substantial
compliance with the rule, so that on balance, technical considerations could give way to equity and
justice. Private respondent filed their appeal within the reglementary period. The bonding company
issued the bond on January 4, but it was forwarded to the NLRC only on the following day, January 5.
Since it was the holiday season, The Court found it equitable to eases the rules and consider there was
substantial compliance. Although as to the bond, respondent in its resolution of November 7, 1991
deleted the phrase “exclusive of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees” in
determining the amount of the bond, it provided a safeguard against the imposition of excessive bonds
as the Commission was given the power to reduce the amount of the bond in meritorious cases and
upon motion of the appellant.

2. No. To warrant an award of moral damages, it must be shown that the dismissal of the employee was
attended to by bad faith, or constituted enact oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. As there was ULP, it was proper to impose moral and exemplary
damages; however the damages awarded by the Labor Arbiter were excessive.

ii. Required Relationship




iii. Construction Policy


iv. Law, Nomenclature and Inter-relations of Acts of ULP

Art. 248
Art. 249


FACTS: The Bank discharged herein respondent employees for allegedly having written and published a
libellous letter against the bank president, demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality,
nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank
employees. The court ruled that section 4(a) and (5) of the Industrial Peace Act applies to cases in which
an employee is dismissed or discriminated against for having filed "any charges against his employer."
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances. Good
faith bargaining required of the Bank an open mind and a sincere desire to negotiate over grievances.

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in
giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. Moreover, the discharge of the respondents had nothing to
do with their union activities as the latter in fact admitted at the hearing that the writing of the letter-
charge was not a "union action" but merely their "individual" act. Nevertheless, the court rendered a
decision finding the Bank guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering it to reinstate the respondents,
with full back wages and without loss of seniority and other privileges.

ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the eight (8) employees by the petitioner Republic Bank constituted an
unfair labor practice.

RULING: Yes. The employees shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or
protection even though no union activity be involved, for collective bargaining be contemplated.

The express finding of the court in this case was that the dismissal of the respondents was made on
account of the letter they had written, in which they demanded the resignation of the bank president
for a number of reasons touching labor-management relations — reasons which not even the Bank's
judgment that the respondents had committed libel could excuse it for making summary discharges

In disregard of its duty to bargain collectively this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct,
identified as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization, or as a retaliatory action,
and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and
intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act.


ART. 248

ART. 249


a. Interference, Restraint and Coercion

Art. 248
Art. 255
Art. 277 (g) (h)
Art. 249 (a)


FACTS: The UST Faculty Union (USTFU) informed its members of a General Assembly. One of its agenda
is the election of officers. The Secretary General of UST issued a Memorandum allowing the request of
Faculty Clubs to hold a convocation which the members of the faculty including members of USTFU
attended without the participation of UST administration. Also, an election of USTFU was conducted by
a group called Reformist Alliance. Learning that the convocation was intended for election, some
members walked out but the election was conducted among those present (Gamilla Group). Thus, two
(2) groups claim to be USTFU namely; (1) Marino Group; and (2) Gamilla Group. Marino group filed a
complaint for ULP against UST with the Arbitration Branch. It also filed a complaint before Med-Arbiter
praying for the nullification of the election of the Gamilla Group. A CBA was entered between Gamilla
Group and UST superseding the existing CBA of USTand USTFU. The Med-Arbiter declared the election
of Gamilla Group as null and void. On appeal, the BLR affirmed the decision of Med-Arbiter. On appeal
before this Court, the Court upheld the ruling of BLR, With the decision of this Court, the case before the
Arbitration Branch of NLRC was dismissed for lack of merit. USTFU appeal to the NLRC, the NLRC
affirmed the decision of LA. When the case is elevated to CA, the Court affirmed the decision of NLRC,
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether CA committed serious and reversible error when it dismissed the Petition despite
abundance of evidence showing that Unfair Labor Practices were indeed committed.

RULING: The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of proving it. While
there are exceptions to this general rule, in the case of ULP, the alleging party has the burden of proving
such ULP. Thus, we ruled in De Paul/King Philip Customs Tailor v. NLRC that “a party alleging acritical fact
must support hisallegation with substantial evidence. Any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation
cannot stand as it will offend due processs.”“In order to show that the employer committed ULP under
the Labor Code, substantialevidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been
defined as such relevantevidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

b. Non-union (or withdrawal from) Membership as Condition for Employment

c. Contracting Out to Discourage Unionism

d. Company Dominated Union

e. Discriminating to Encourage / Discourage Unionism

f. Retaliation for Testimony Against Employer

g. Exaction – Feather Bedding






FACTS: The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association - NATU, FGU Insurance Group
Workers and Employees Association - NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association - NATU
(herein referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered
into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., and the FGU
Insurance Group (herein referred to as the Companies).

Two of the lawyers and officers of the Unions namely Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia, tried to dissuade
the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU),
to no avail. Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of
the Department of Justice and were thereafter hired by the companies - Garcia as assistant corporate

secretary and legal assistant, and Enaje as personnel manager and chairman of the negotiating panel for
the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.

On October 1957, negotiations for the collective bargaining was conducted but resulted to a deadlock.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory
results due to the stalemate on the matter of salary increases. This prompted the Unions to declare a
strike in protest against what they considered the Companies’ unfair labor practices. On May 20, 1958,
the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.

On May 21, Jose M. Olbes, the acting manager and president, sent individual letters to the striking
employees urging them to abandon their strike with a promise of free coffee, movies, overtime pay, and
accommodations. He also warned the strikers if they fail to return to work by a certain date, they might
be replaced in their jobs. Further, the Companies hired men to break into the picket lines resulting in
violence, and the filing of criminal charges against some union officers and members. When eventually,
the strikers called off their strike to return to their jobs, they were subjected to a screening process by a
management committee, among the members were Garcia and Enaje. After screening, eighty-three (83)
strikers were rejected due to pending criminal charges, and adamantly refused readmission of thirty-
four (34) officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike.

The CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies, specifically (1)
interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action; and (2)
discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the
basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike. After the trial, the Court of
Industrial Relations dismissed the Unions’ complaint for lack of merit.


I. Whether or not the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice when they sent individual
letters to the strikers with the promise of additional benefits, and notifying them to either return to
work, or lose their jobs; and

II. Whether or not the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
striking members of the Unions in readmission of employees after the strike.


First issue. The Companies contended that by sending those letters, it constituted a legitimate exercise
of their freedom of expression. That contention is untenable. The Companies are guilty of unfair labor
practice when they sent individual letters to the strikers. It is an act of interference with the right to
collective bargaining through dealing with the strikers individually instead of through their collective
bargaining representatives. Although the Unions are on strike, the employer is still obligated to bargain

with the union as the employees’ bargaining representative. Further, it is also an act of interference for
the employer to send individual letters to the employees notifying them to return to their jobs,
otherwise, they would be replaced. Individual solicitation of the employees urging them to cease union
activity or cease striking consists of unfair labor practice. Furthermore, when the Companies offered to
“bribe” the strikers with “comfortable cots, free coffee, and movies, overtime work pay” so they would
abandon their strike and return to work, it was guilty of strike-breaking and/or union busting which
constitute unfair labor practice.

Second Issue. Some of the members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending
criminal charges. However, despite the fact they were able to secure clearances, 34 officials and
members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the
Companies. It should be noted, however, that non-strikers who also had criminal charges pending
against them in the fiscal’s office, arising from the same incidents whence against the criminal charges
against the strikers are involved, were readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances.
This is an act of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a
violation of Sec. 4(a)(4) of the Industrial Peace Act.

The respondent Companies did not merely discriminate against all strikers in general since they
separated the active rom the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the
picket lines. Discrimination exists where the record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers
has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement.







FACTS: This suit is brought by the employer, Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. (PBMC)and its alien
employees against the Social Security System. PBMC is a domestic corporation since 1957 which has
employed Japanese technicians for employment contracts ranging from 6 to 24 months. From April 28,
1957 to October 26, 1958, it employed six Japanese technicians. PBMC inquired with SSS if the said
aliens are subject to compulsory coverage under SSS, to which the latter replied that while they are
compulsorily covered, they are entitled to rebate a proportionate amount of their SSS contributions.
Their employers shall also be entitled to the same proportionate rebate. However, when PBMC filed a
claim with SSS for refund of its premiums, SSS controverted it by saying that at least 2 years of
membership in the system is required to be entitled to a rebate. This requirement was made through an
amendment of the SSS Rules and Regulations which became effective on January 14, 1958-- before the

termination of the employment of the subject aliens. Appellants contend that this amendment impaired
their contract with SSS.


1. Whether or not the said amendment violates the non-impairment clause.

2. Whether due process was observed in implementing the SSS law, resulting in the denial of
appellants' claim for refund of their premium contributions.


1. NO, there was no violation of the non-impairment clause. Invoking the non-impairment clause
assumes the existence of a contract, which is not the case here. Membership in SSS is not the result of a
bilateral, consensual agreement where the rights and obligations of the parties are defined by and
subject to their will. Republic Act 1161 requires compulsory coverage of employers and employees
under the System. It is actually a legal imposition, on said employers and employees, designed to
provide social security to the workingmen. Membership in the SSS is, therefore, in compliance with a
lawful exercise of the police power of the State, to which the principle of non-impairment of the
obligation of contract is not a proper defense.

2. YES, due process was observed. Amendments are effective from the time PROVIDED for by the
statute, which in this case is the time of approval of the president. The date of publication in the Official
Gazette is material only when the statute does not provide a specific date of effectivity. Rule I Section 3
(d) and Rule IX was amended to read as follows:

(d) Aliens who are employed in the Philippines shall also be compulsorily covered (Sec. 3, Rule I)


When an employee under compulsory coverage is separated from employment, his employer's
contribution on his account shall cease at the end of the month of separation; but such employee may
continue his membership in the System and receive the benefits of the Act, as amended, in accordance
with these rules. If he continues paying the 6 per cent monthly premiums representing his as well as the
employer's contribution, based on his monthly salary at the time of his separation; but if at the time of
his separation the covered employee has been a member of the System for at least two years, he shall
have the option to choose any one of the following adjustments of his membership in the System:

1. A refund of an amount equivalent to his total contributions of two and one-half per centum plus
interests at the rate of three per centum per annum, compounded annually;

while the amendment to the Rules may have been lawfully made by the Commission and duly approved
by the President on January 14, 1958, such amendment was only published in the November 1958 issue
of the Official Gazette, and after appellants' employment had already ceased. Suffice it to say, in this
regard, that under Article 2 of the Civil Code,5 the date of publication of laws in the Official Gazette is
material for the purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do not so
provide. In the present case, the original Rules and Regulations of the SSS specifically provide that any
amendment thereto subsequently adopted by the Commission, shall take effect on the date of its
approval by the President. Consequently, the delayed publication of the amended rules in the Official
Gazette did not affect the date of their effectivity, which is January 14, 1958, when they were approved
by the President. It follows that when the Japanese technicians were separated from employment in
October, 1958, the rule governing refund of premiums is Rule IX of the amended Rules and Regulations,
which requires membership for 2 years before such refund of premiums may be allowed.



FACTS: Petitioner union is a local chapter of the Central Luzon Labor Congress (CLLC), a legitimate labor
federation duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), while the individual
petitioners are former employees of private respondent who were officers and members of the
petitioner union. Private respondent is a corporation engaged in packing and crating, general hauling,
warehousing, sea van and freight forwarding. In January 1980, the majority of the rank and file
employees of respondent firm organized the E.G. Gochangco Workers Union as an affiliate of the CLLC.
On January 23, 1980, the union filed a petition for certification election. On February 7, 1980, the CLLC
national president wrote the general manager of respondent firm informing him of the organization of
the union and requesting for a labor-management conference to normalize employer-employee
relations. On February 26, 1980, the union sent a written notice to respondent firm requesting
permission for certain member officers and members of the union to attend the hearing of the petition
for certification election. The management refused to acknowledge receipt of said notice. On February
28, 1980, private respondent preventively suspended the union officers and members who attended the
hearing. The common ground alleged by private respondent for its action was “abandonment of work
on February 27, 1980. All the gate passes of all employees to Clark Air Base were confiscated by a Base
guard. Claiming that private respondent instigated the confiscation of their gate passes to prevent them
from performing their duties and that respondent firm did not pay them their overtime pay, 13th month
pay and other benefits, petitioner union and its members filed a complaint for constructive lockout and
unfair labor practice against private respondent. Private respondent filed a clearance to dismiss certain
employees, the services of 9 union members were terminated on the ground that their contract expired.
9 employees filed illegal dismissal charges. L.A. Bernardo decided in favor of the employees to reinstate
all the suspended/dismissed employees to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges, with full back wages including cost of emergency living allowance from the date of their
suspension/dismissal up to the supposed date of actual reinstatement. The respondent company filed
an appeal with NLRC which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter granting the clearance for

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an error committed by NLRC in rendering judgement?

HELD: The Court ruled that the respondent company is indeed guilty of an unfair labor practice. It is no
coincidence that at the time said respondent issued its suspension and termination orders, the
petitioners were in the midst of a certification election preliminary to a labor-management conference,
purportedly, “to normalize employer-employee relations." It was within the legal right of the petitioners
to do so, the exercise of which was their sole prerogative, and in which management may not as a rule
interfere. In this connection, the respondent company deserves our strongest condemnation for
ignoring the petitioners’ request for permission for some time out to attend to the hearing of their
petition before the med-arbiter. It is not only an act of arrogance, but a brazen interference as well, with
the employees right to self-organization, contrary to the prohibition of the Labor Code against unfair
labor practices. The Court grant unto said workers another P5,000.00 each to answer for exemplary
damages based on the provisions of Articles 2229 and 2231 and/or 2232 of the Civil Code. For “acting in
gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the petitioners’ plainly valid, just and demandable
claims, the respondent firm is further condemned to pay attorney’s fees. The Court considers the total
sum of P20,000.00 fair and reasonable. If only for emphasis, the new Constitution considers “labor as a
primary social economic force." As the conscience of the government, it is this Court’s sworn duty to
ensure that none trifles with labor rights.



FACTS: Enrique Soriano started working with the Company as accounting clerk in 1938 until he was
separated therefrom in July 1960 when he was a Supervisor for General Accounting; which separation,
as alleged by Soriano, was for no valid reason other than his union membership and activities. Soriano
also alleged that in further discouraging his continued membership in, and the activities of, the union,
the company discriminated against the tenure and/or condition of his employment by unlawfully
terminating him ostensibly for dishonesty and inefficiency, but actually and in reality, it was due to his
aggressive and militant union activities; and that to further harass and defeat the legitimate objectives
and activities of the union, the company unfairly and repeatedly denied Soriano's request for
reinstatement after he had exhausted all remedies provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement
and in spite of the favorable recommendation of the Conciliation Service of the Department Of Labor.
The company was also threatening union members with dismissal should the union exercise the right to
strike and persist in further espousing Soriano's case.

The company, on its part, contends that the dismissal was for a just cause and not for union
activities; and that Enrique Soriano committed acts of dishonesty and inefficiency.

The presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision in favor of Soriano.
The company filed a motion for reconsideration, to which Soriano objected. However, the Court of
Industrial Relations en banc granted reconsideration and reversed the decision of the trial judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal from service of Enrique Soriano was discriminatory, there being no
valid reason other than his union membership and activities, and therefore the Company in so
dismissing the former is guilty of unfair labor practice.

HELD: Yes. “After considering the conflicting claims of both parties, we are inclined to give credence to
the findings of the trial Judge, who observed the witnesses on stand as well as scrutinized the evidence
presented. We are of the view that Soriano's discharge for alleged dishonesty, inefficiency was not
based on solid grounds, but in retaliation for his union activities. Respondent company has failed to give
sufficient justification for the peremptory dismissal of an efficient employee with a long record of
service behind him.”

The Supreme Court has noted certain circumstances which strongly indicate that the discharge
of Soriano was motivated by his union activities:

1. He had served as the Union’s Vice-President; as Head of Internal Affairs and as Chairman of the
Screening Committee on Proposals;

2. He had also been designated by the Union Board of Directors as Chairman of the Committee on
Implementation, which Committee questioned the hazy provisions of the Collective Bargaining

3. He had participated in the deliberations conducted in connection with the question of

reinstatement and payment of bonus to the bodega employees, and also in relation to the employees'
hospitalization benefits;

4. In 1960, when Soriano failed to receive an increase in salary, he asked Mr. Alvarez, his
immediate supervisor, for the reason therefor, but he was told to "keep away from union activities";

5. Soriano also wrote Mr. Powers, Manager for Finance of the respondent company, formally
inquiring why he had been denied a salary increase during the past months and why his merit award had
suddenly been reduced;

6. Five days prior to Soriano’s receipt of the Notice of Separation, he had been verbally notified of
the same, and which he protested, but was later on dismissed; and

7. During Soriano’s trial, the Secretary of the Union who was also a member of the Accounting
Staff of the company testified for Soriano; and categorically stated that Soriano was the most outspoken
among the union officers as he was in the know, having access to the books of the company and had
first hand information regarding its financial standing; that the union president had resigned from the
company after things "got hot" for him; and that the union since 1961 is no longer existent as the
members thereof feared company's lockout.

As regards the Company’s contentions, the Supreme Court noted that “the charge of dishonesty
based on petitioner's mistakes spread over the years, is too flimsy to merit serious consideration. We
have on record the undisputed fact that Petitioner has been with respondent company for twenty-two
Years (1938-1960), starting as accounting clerk and slowly rising to the position of supervisor for General
Accounting. All through those years (1938 to 1959), he was a recipient of merit awards.”




FACTS: Petitioners are regular workers of private respondent R.S. Carlos General Enterprises, owned and
managed by Roberto S. Carlos, with co-respondent Sonel L. Labao in charge of personnel. Said company
is engaged in the business of poultry and hog feeds manufacturing and production. The workers
organized themselves into a union and held an organization meeting in the house of one of its members.
They affiliated their union with Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) after office
hours, petitioners met again and planned to talk to the management about their newly organized union
and certain benefits like allowances, overtime pay and service incentive leave pay.

According to the workers, they requested the secretary of their employer, to notify the latter about
their plan to talk to him relative to their requests for allowances, overtime pay and service incentive
leave pay. An hour later, Mr. Carlos arrived and was furious at petitioners' projected plan to plead for
these benefits. They were required, one by one, to return to their work and they regretfully obeyed.
Thereafter, the workers were asked to sign a paper captioned "Notice to All Employees" which was a
notice of their preventive suspension. Petitioners refused to sign and the paymaster, warned them that
"Pag hindi kayo pumirma dito, hindi kayo makakapasok sa Lunes.” Four (4) days after the so-called
strike, respondent employer placed the workers under preventive suspension pending clearance from
the Ministry of Labor and Employment to terminate their services. In opposition, petitioners charged
private respondent for illegal lockout and unfair labor practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal was valid.

RULING: No. What happened on August 19, 1980 was not a strike but a peaceful delegation of workers
to talk to the employer in order to inform the latter formally that the workers already have their own
union and in order to talk to the employer on their just grievances. There is no dispute that R.S. Carlos
was furious at the workers' concerted action and called the police, and thereafter secured warrants of
arrest for the "illegal strike “against 22 workers led by their just elected president. It is likewise
unrefuted that the workers were ordered by Carlos to go back to work which they obeyed and they
were paid their wages for that very same day that they were supposed to be on a " sitdown strike "only
some were paid," but gives no particulars. Respondent employer fully exploiting the situation and

obviously to abort the incipient union, suspended an the workers and two days thereafter filed the
application for clearance to dismiss them. The workers' demands were completely brushed aside with
the summary dismissal of their leaders. Hence, the Court ordered for the reinstatement of the said


FACTS: On January 10, 1968, a complaint for unfair labor practices under Section 4(a), sub-sections 4
and 5 of Republic Act No. 875 was filed by the Acting Prosecutor of the CIR against the private
respondents based on the complaint of petitioner Fortunato Da. Bondoc charging the private
respondents with having discriminated against him in the giving of promotions to its employees because
he was not a member of any labor organization.

The private respondents denied the material allegations of the complaint and, on July 1, 1968, filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to allege a valid cause of action. The CIR deferred the
resolution of the motion until after it had heard the merits of the case.

Petitioner presented evidence in the CIR to show that, in derogation of his seniority, rank, competence,
and fitness, and because he did not belong to any labor union, private respondents discriminated
against him by promoting and appointing Simeon Mendoza on July 1, 1962 to the position of Road
Foreman of the engineering Department, instead of him. Again, on January 1, 1965, Simeon Mendoza,
instead of petitioner, was promoted to the position of General Road Foreman of the Engineering
Department. Private respondents paid no heed to petitioner's protests against such discrimination.
Instead of promoting him, the private respondents assigned him at the Hearing Committee without per
diems. When Simeon Mendoza retired as General Road Foreman, private respondents appointed
someone else-Simeon Malinay-to the vacant position, by-passing the petitioner. Finally, private
respondents subdivided the Central Division of the Engineering Department, thereby reducing
petitioner's area of responsibility. Petitioner alleged he had exhausted all his administrative remedies in

Answering the complaint, the private respondents alleged that petitioner was not next-in-rank to the
position of Road Foreman; that based on individual work merits and the Revised Civil Service Rules,
Mendoza and Malinay obtained higher ratings than the petitioner; that Mendoza was promoted to
Assistant General Foreman because be was next-in-rank; that Simeon Malinay was next-in-rank to
Simeon Mendoza; that when the position of General Road Foreman became vacant, Mendoza was
recommended for the position but his retirement precluded his appointment thereto; that the position
of General Road Foreman was later abolished; that the reorganization was for the best interest of the
company; that contrary to petitioner's allegation, his transfer to the Hearing Committee was done at his
own request. As for per diems, he was paid for the first month, but he was not paid per diems for
services rendered in excess of one month because it would have been contrary to law, rules and

ISSUE: whether or not the private respondents were guilty of unfair labor practice

RULING: Petitioner's allegation that be was discriminated against to force him to join a labor
organization is unconvincing since no specific union was mentioned in his complaint. It is unbelievable
that the private respondents would harass and oppress him to force him to join any labor union for We
do not see how that can possibly be advantageous to the former.

The petitioner does not show how or why the CIR Order allegedly conflicts with the evidence presented
at the trial. We have, time and again, ruled that findings of fact of the CIR are accorded full respect by
the Supreme Court if supported by substantial evidence.


FACTS: The management issued a memorandum circular introducing a profit sharing scheme for its
managers and supervisors the initial distribution. The respondent union wrote petitioner asking for
participation in this scheme but it was denied by petitioner on the ground that it had to adhere strictly
to the CBA. Petitioner distributed the profit sharing benefit not only to managers and supervisors but
also to all other rank and file employees not covered by the CBA. This caused the respondent union to
file a notice of strike alleging that petitioner was guilty of ULP because the union members were
discriminated against in the grant of the profit sharing benefits. Management refused to proceed with
the CBA negotiations unless the last notice of strike was first resolved. The union agreed to postpone
discussions on the profit sharing demand until a new CBA was concluded. After a series of conciliation
conferences, the parties agreed to settle the dispute through voluntary arbitration. The voluntary
arbitrator issued an award ordering petitioner to likewise extend the benefits of the 1987 profit sharing
scheme to the members of respondent union. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the grant by management of profit sharing benefits to its non-union member
employees is discriminatory against its workers who are union members.

HELD: NO. Under the CBA between the parties, there is a clause where the employees are classified into
those who are members of the union and those who are not. The grant by petitioner of profit sharing
benefits to the employees outside the “bargaining unit” falls under the ambit of its managerial
prerogative. It appears to have been done in good faith and without ulterior motive. In the case of the
union members, they derive their benefits from the terms and conditions of the CBA contract which
constitute the law between the contracting parties. Both the employer and the union members are
bound by such agreement. There can be no discrimination committed by petitioner thereby as the
situation of the union employees are different and distinct from the non-union employees. Indeed,
discrimination per se is not unlawful. There can be no discrimination where the employees concerned
are not similarly situated.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED reversed the decision of voluntary arbitrator.