FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 167968. January 23, 2006.]

VICENTE FLORENTINO , petitioner, vs . MARIANO, CYNTHIA, ADELFA,

all surnamed RIVERA and TEOFILA, MAXIMO, CIRIACO, NORBERTO,
FELICIANO, JUAN GENEROSO, ANGEL, NOLASCO and MARCOSA, all
surnamed MENDOZA , respondents.

De Jesus & Associates for petitioner.

People's Law Office for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENTS; THE OPERATIVE PART IN EVERY

DECISION IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OR THE FALLO, AND WHERE THERE IS A
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FALLO AND THE BODY OF THE DECISION, THE FALLO
CONTROLS. — It bears stressing that a decision that has acquired finality, as in this case,
becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law.
In short, once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed no
matter how erroneous it may be and nothing further can be done therewith except to
execute it. It is settled rule that "the operative part in every decision is the dispositive
portion or the fallo, and where there is conflict between the fallo and the body of the
decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order
while the opinion in the body is merely a statement, ordering nothing." We expounded on
the underlying reason behind this rule in Republic v. Nolasco where, reiterating the earlier
pronouncements made in Contreras v. Felix. Succinctly stated, "where there is a conflict
between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive
portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision." While the body
of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the manner the court's
reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights
upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those rights, and imposes the
corresponding duties or obligations.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTION MUST CONFORM TO THAT ORDAINED OR DECREED IN THE
DISPOSITIVE PART OF THE DECISION; WHERE THE ORDER OF EXECUTION IS NOT IN
HARMONY WITH AND EXCEEDS THE JUDGMENT WHICH GIVES IT LIFE, THE ORDER HAS
PRO-TANTO NO VALIDITY. — More emphatically, Light Rail Transit Authority v. Court of
Appeals declares that "it is the dispositive part of the judgment that actually settles and
declares the rights and obligations of the parties, finally, definitively, and authoritatively,
notwithstanding the existence of inconsistent statements in the body that may tend to
confuse." In this regard, it must be borne in mind "that execution must conform to that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision; consequently, where the order
of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the order
has pro-tanto no validity."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN MODIFYING
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT, SINCE THE
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 MODIFICATION SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED TO
RESPONDENTS. — It bears noting that in the foregoing cases cited, the perceived
inconsistencies referred to alleged ambiguities found in the body of the same judgments.
It is worse in this case because what the trial court did was to amend paragraph (cc) of
the dispositive portion of its final and executory October 20, 1986 verdict in order that the
same would conform to the disquisitions contained in the body of the appellate court's
judgment which had affirmed in full in the decretal portion of the decision dated March 29,
1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 15784, the lower court's ruling. Suffice it to state that this is
anathema to the above-mentioned rules. Hence, the Court of Appeals could not be faulted
for setting aside the trial court's assailed orders of September 13, 2000 and October 31,
2000 and ordering said court "to enforce its Decision dated October 20, 1986 in
accordance with its terms and conditions." It has not escaped our attention that this is the
second time this case has reached us. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals in its March
29, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 15784 Decision, the case at that time had already "been
dragging for almost two decades." What should have been a simple implementation of an
October 20, 1986 judgment in 2000 was delayed by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration questioning the computation of damages which petitioner insists should
be 16.5 instead of 100 cavans each year. This issue had already been long settled with the
issuance of the April 12, 2000 Resolution in G.R. No. 140927 denying with finality
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC INTEREST DICTATES THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN END TO
LITIGATION BY THE PARTIES OVER A SUBJECT FULLY AND FAIRLY ADJUDICATED AND
COURTS SHOULD FROWN UPON ANY ATTEMPT TO PROLONG THEM. — It is to the
interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the parties over a subject
fully and fairly adjudicated. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-
regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various
maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation — republicae ut sit litium, and
(2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause —
nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace
and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious
disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and
happiness. It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the
life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the
prevailing party. Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient
administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the winning party
be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO , J : p

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the February 10, 2005
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62080 as well as its April 26, 2005
Resolution 2 denying the motion for reconsideration.

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 The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals overstepped the bounds of
judicial discretion in reversing the orders of the trial court which substantially amended the
dispositive portion of its final and executory judgment by reducing the damages awarded
to respondents.
The facts 3 as found by the appellate court are not disputed:
The petition stemmed from a complaint filed before the RTC by Mariano, Cynthia
and Adelfa, all surnamed Rivera (hereinafter Riveras) against Vicente Florentino
(hereinafter private respondent) and the latter as third-party plaintiff against
Teofila Mendoza, et al., as third-party defendants (hereinafter Mendozas), for
rescission, annulment, redemption, reconveyance and damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 5761-M.

On October 20, 1986, the RTC rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs

Riveras and third parties defendants Mendozas and adversely to the
defendant and third-party plaintiff Florentino
(aa) declaring the lease contract (Exh. 'G' also marked Exh. '2')
terminated;

(bb) ordering the defendant Florentino to turn over the

possession of the leased premises to the Riveras, with
Florentino being permitted to take all removable
improvements at his expense in accordance with the lease
contract;

(cc) ordering Florentino to pay the Riveras annual lease rental

of P500.00 for the year 1982 up to the time possession had
been delivered to the Riveras and to compensate in cash or in
kind the Riveras' claim for damage for unrealized annual
harvest of 100 cavans from 1978 up to the present;
(dd) ordering further Florentino to pay the Riveras and the
Mendozas attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00;

(ee) dismissing for lack of merit the counterclaims in the

original complaint and the third-party complaint of
Florentino.
SO ORDERED. 4

Aggrieved, private respondent appealed the foregoing decision to the Court of

Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 15784, which affirmed the same in a
decision dated March 29, 1996. Undaunted, private respondent filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC), docketed as G.R. No. 140927,
which the latter denied in its Resolution dated February 9, 2000. Per entry of
judgment 5 issued by the Supreme Court, the said Resolution became final and
executory on June 1, 2000 and was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgment[s]. ESCTaA

Consequently, petitioners filed before the RTC a Motion for Execution 6 of its
decision dated October 20, 1986 which the latter granted on August 14, 2000. 7
Dissatisfied, the private respondent moved for a reconsideration 8 on the ground
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 that the decision sought to be enforced is vague and contrary to the
pronouncement made by the CA in the body of its decision that the petitioners
were deprived of only an area of 1,650 square meters or an annual harvest of 16.5
cavans.

On September 13, 2000, the RTC granted the said motion, the decretal portion of
which reads:

"All told, going by the explanation enunciated by the Court of Appeals,

which this Court must pay obeisance to, paragraph (cc) of the decision
rendered by this Court on October 20, 1986 is hereby CLARIFIED to such
extent that the quantity of the damages which defendant Florentino must
pay the Riveras for unrealized annual harvest is 16.5 (instead of 100)
cavans from 1978 onwards.
SO ORDERED." 9

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied in the
Order dated October 31, 2000.

On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling thus:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED . The
assailed Orders dated September 13, 2000 and October 31, 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Branch 9, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The RTC is
ordered to enforce its Decision dated October 20, 1986 in accordance with its
terms and conditions.
SO ORDERED. 1 0

The Court of Appeals found that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in modifying
the dispositive portion of a final and executory judgment, since the modification
substantially reduced the amount of damages awarded to herein respondents, i.e., from
100 cavans to only 16.5 cavans of palay, annually.
A motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated April 26, 2005. 1 1
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition insisting that the challenged judgment and
resolution of the appellate tribunal is not in accordance with law or applicable decisions of
the Court because there existed an ambiguity in the dispositive portion of the trial court's
decision and the text of the appellate court's judgment. According to petitioner, the orders
of the trial court "merely clarified and quantified" the decision sought to be executed.
Considering that the crux of the controversy centers on a perceived vagueness in the fallo
of the trial court's decision, it is necessary to restate the guidelines on the contents of a
proper dispositive portion enunciated in Velarde v. Social Justice Society, 1 2 viz:
In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should state
whether the complaint or petition is granted or denied, the specific relief granted,
and the costs. The following test of completeness may be applied. First, the
parties should know their rights and obligations. Second, they should know how
to execute the decision under alternative contingencies. Third, there should be no
need for further proceedings to dispose of the issues. Fourth, the case should be
terminated by according the proper relief. The "proper relief" usually depends
upon what the parties seek in their pleadings. It may declare their rights and
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 duties, command the performance of positive prestations, or order them to
abstain from specific acts. The disposition must also adjudicate costs.

In sum, petitioner argues that in substantially reducing the amount of damages, by way of
unrealized income, from 100 cavans to 16.5 cavans of palay annually, the trial court was
merely 'clarifying' an ambiguity between the appellate tribunal's pronouncements in the
body of its decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 15784 which states that —
While it may be true that the only portion of the adjacent riceland that was
affected by the waste water coming from the piggery is only 150 square meters, it
must be noted, however, that this 150 square meters was counted from the
peripheral fence of the piggery and poultry farm which is occupying 5,000 square
meters of prime agricultural land. In the final analysis, the Mendozas, and later
the Riveras, were deprived of an opportunity to cultivate 1,500 square meters of
"encroached" land plus 150 square meters of land contaminated with decaying
piggery sludge. 1 3

and paragraph (cc) of the dispositive portion of the trial court's judgment which, among
others, dictates that it is —
(cc) ordering Florentino to pay the Riveras annual lease rental of P500.00 for
the year 1982 up to the time possession had been delivered to the Riveras and to
compensate in cash or in kind the Riveras' claim for damage for unrealized
annual harvest of 100 cavans from 1978 up to the present. 1 4

We disagree.
It bears stressing that a decision that has acquired finality, as in this case, becomes
immutable and unalterable. 1 5 A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. 1 6 In
short, once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed no
matter how erroneous it may be 1 7 and nothing further can be done therewith except to
execute it. 1 8
It is settled rule that "the operative part in every decision is the dispositive portion or
thefallo, and where there is conflict between the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo
controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the
body is merely a statement, ordering nothing." 1 9 We expounded on the underlying reason
behind this rule in Republic v. Nolasco 2 0 where, reiterating the earlier pronouncements
made in Contreras v. Felix, 2 1 we said:
More to the point is another well-recognized doctrine, that the final judgment of
the court as rendered in the judgment of the court irrespective of all seemingly
contrary statements in the decision. "A judgment must be distinguished from an
opinion. The latter is the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot
prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one
instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So, . . . there is a
distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its Judgment.
While they may constitute its decision and amount to the rendition of a judgment,
they are not the judgment itself. They amount to nothing more than an order for
judgment, which must, of course, be distinguished from the judgment." (1
Freeman on Judgments, p. 6). At the root of the doctrine that the premises must
yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of writing finis to
litigations, the recognition of the truth that "the trained intuition of the judge
continually leads him to right results for which he is puzzled to give
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 unimpeachable legal reasons." "It is an everyday experience of those who study
judicial decisions that the results are usually sound, whether the reasoning from
which the results purport to flow is sound or not." (The Theory of Judicial
Decision, Pound, 36 Harv. Law Review, pp. 9, 51). It is not infrequent that the
grounds of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those
of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often encounter in judicial
decisions, lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear
on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered
result reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the
decision.

Succinctly stated, "where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision
and the body thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the
body of the decision." 2 2 While the body of the decision, order or resolution might create
some ambiguity in the manner the court's reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive
portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise
of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations. 2 3
More emphatically, Light Rail Transit Authority v. Court of Appeals 2 4 declares that "it is the
dispositive part of the judgment that actually settles and declares the rights and
obligations of the parties, finally, definitively, and authoritatively, notwithstanding the
existence of inconsistent statements in the body that may tend to confuse." In this regard,
it must be borne in mind "that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the
dispositive part of the decision; consequently, where the order of execution is not in
harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the order has pro-tanto no
validity." 2 5
It bears noting that in the foregoing cases cited, the perceived inconsistencies referred to
alleged ambiguities found in the body of the same judgments. It is worse in this case
because what the trial court did was to amend paragraph (cc) of the dispositive portion of
its final and executory October 20, 1986 verdict in order that the same would conform to
the disquisitions contained in the body of the appellate court's judgment which had
affirmed in full in the decretal portion of the decision dated March 29, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 15784, the lower court's ruling. Suffice it to state that this is anathema to the above-
mentioned rules. Hence, the Court of Appeals could not be faulted for setting aside the
trial court's assailed orders of September 13, 2000 and October 31, 2000 and ordering
said court "to enforce its Decision dated October 20, 1986 in accordance with its terms
and conditions." 2 6
It has not escaped our attention that this is the second time this case has reached us. As
pointed out by the Court of Appeals in its March 29, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 15784
Decision, the case at that time had already "been dragging for almost two decades." 2 7
What should have been a simple implementation of an October 20, 1986 judgment in 2000
was delayed by the filing of a motion for reconsideration questioning the computation of
damages which petitioner insists should be 16.5 instead of 100 cavans each year. This
issue had already been long settled with the issuance of the April 12, 2000 Resolution 2 8 in
G.R. No. 140927 denying with finality petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the parties over
a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades
every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which
makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation — republicae
ut sit litium, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the
same cause — nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject
the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification
of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility
and happiness. 2 9
It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the
law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing
party. 3 0 Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient
administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the winning party
be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard against any
scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. 3 1
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 10, 2005 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62080, and its April 26, 2005 Resolution, are AFFIRMED. ISTCHE

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 26-32. Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and concurred in
by Associate Justices Mariano C. Del Castillo and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
2. Id. at 33.
3. Id. at 27-28.
4. See also CA rollo, pp. 53-54. Penned by Judge Jesus R. De Vega.
5. Id. at 84.
6. Id. at 82.
7. Id. at 87. Penned by Judge D. Roy Masadao, Jr.
8. Id. at 88-91.
9. Id. at 34.
10. Rollo, p. 31.
11. Id. at 33.
12. G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 283, 313.
13. CA rollo, p. 18.
14. Id. at 53-54.
15. Philippine Veterans Bank v. Estrella, 453 Phil. 45, 51 (2003).
16. Ramos v. Ramos, 447 Phil. 114, 119 (2003).
17. Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Rivera, G.R. No. 164914, October 5, 2005.
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 18. King Integrated Security Services, Inc. v. Gatan, 453 Phil. 293, 296 (2003).
19. Mendoza, Jr. v. San Miguel Foods, Inc., G.R. No. 158684, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 664,
676-677.
20. G.R. No. 155108, April 27, 2005, 457 SCRA 400, 427-428.

21. 78 Phil. 570, 577-578 (1947).

22. Olac v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84256, September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 321, 328.
23. Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores, 438 Phil. 756, 765 (2002).
24. G.R. Nos. 139275-76 & 140949, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 125, 136.
25. Jose Clavano, Inc. v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, 428 Phil. 208, 223
(2002).
26. Rollo, p. 31.
27. CA rollo, p. 19.
28. Id. at 56.
29. Heirs of the Late Faustina Adalid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122202, May 26, 2005,
459 SCRA 27, 41.
30. Garcia v. Yared, 447 Phil. 444, 453 (2003).
31. Ho v. Lacsa, G.R. No. 142664, October 5, 2005.

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