[G.R. No. 127240.

March 27, 2000] applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization.
ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. marie Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that -

FACTS These rules shall not apply to land registration,

cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
Ong Chia was born in Amoy, China. he arrived at the port of
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed
character and whenever practicable and convenient.
in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually
(Emphasis added)
started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had
four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified
petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the
and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. The documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in
State was convinced and they proposed that the petitioner should fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of
be admitted as citizen of the Philippines. The trial court granted action considering that decision in naturalization proceedings are
the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. not covered by the rule on res judicata]Consequently, a final
favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on
moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis
The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
of the same documents.
appealed contending that petitioner: (1) failed to state all the
names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his
former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed
to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2; (4) has no
known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes
have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2;
and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977

petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special
Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, [] in which
petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he
had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong."

As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989

petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must
fail. The state also annexed income tax returns[7] allegedly filed by
petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could
hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner
failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that,
although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had
been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again
in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without
the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977.
It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage
contract, if there be any.

The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage

contract[8] and a Joint-Affidavit executed by petitioner and his
wife. These documents show that when petitioner married
Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had
been required in accordance with Art.76 of the Civil Code because
petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as
husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage.
This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started
living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married.

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant

Certificate of Residence,[10] petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street,
Iloilo," but he did not include said address in his petition.

The Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already

noted, reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application
for naturalization in the lower court and brought up for the first
time on appeal . . It ruled that due to the importance of
naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising
questions not presented.

ISSUE

WON THE EVIDENCES PRESENTED BY THE STATE BEFORE THE

CA ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE ON THE GROUND THAT THEY ARE
NOT FORMALLY OFFERED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.

HELD

NO. The court held that the evidences are admissible. The court
noted that under Rule 143 of RRC that the rule on formal offer of
evidence (Rule 132, 34) being invoked by petitioner is clearly not
G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

FACTS

Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. Zulueta

entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the
presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport,
and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use
in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification
from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
her husband.

Dr. Martin brought action for recovery of the documents and

papers and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after
trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo
Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the
properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or
those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress"
and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf
to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin.

The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final

and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in
question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE

WON THE DOCUMENTS FORCIBLY OBTAINED BY ZULUETA MAY

BE USE AS EVIDENCE AGAINST MARTIN.

HELD

NO. Indeed the documents and papers in question are

inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there
is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one
of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity
or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the

spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may
testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
spouse while the marriage subsists.6Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do
with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
FACTS
Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn
Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother,
Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking
about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband,
appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan.
Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together
with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm. Kathylyn was left alone in
the house.
Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house
of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went
inside the house through the back door of the kitchen to have a
drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there,
and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of
his mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from
Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the
back of the house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was wearing
a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at
the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant
and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near
her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar
and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the
lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed
that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked
her where her husband was as he had something important to tell
him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately
left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and
found that the lights in her house were off. She called out for her
granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. She went up the ladder to the
second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She
found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get
a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that
was cold and rigid.9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out
that it was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn. She
called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given
a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn
sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of
her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer
assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that
a dead woman was found in Isabel Dawang’s house. Together
with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found
the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that
appellant was seen going down the ladder of the house of Isabel
Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.He was charged with Rape
with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant
pleaded "not guilty."After trial, appellant was convicted of the
crime of Rape with Homicide and was accordingly, sentenced
to Death.
ISSUE
WON THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND THE DNA
EVIDENCE ARE SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT YATAR BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT
HELD
YES. Subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) of the sperm specimen from the vagina of the victim was
identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all
living organisms.23 A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it
does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a
person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat,
bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue,
and vaginal and rectal cells. 24 Most importantly, because of
polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals
have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to
a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as
fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would
leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood,
or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime
scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture
could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the
assault.27Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there
was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If
properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA
can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the
scene of the crime.28
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen
found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the
following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife
were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the
victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the
house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received
from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in
the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by
Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30,
1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting
strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn
Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel
at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m.,
this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when
the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina
Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the
ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found
dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of
Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba,
lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from
her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with
her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the
victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty
white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with
blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the
DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant
escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently
apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction,
must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of
others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there
is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36
G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007 It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since
they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who
uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which
NENA LAZALITA* TATING, Petitioner,
may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing
vs.
them.25 Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity
FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, represented by SALVADOR
to cross-examine the affiant.26 For this reason, affidavits are
MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
APPEALS, Respondents.
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon. The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA
FACTS committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight.

The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of
land denominated as Lot 56 of Subdivision plan Psd-31182,
located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The
subject lot, containing an area of 200 square meters, was owned
by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title. Daniela sold the subject property to
her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena).
The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of
Nena.4 Subsequently, title over the subject property was
transferred in the name of Nena.5 She declared the property in her
name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon
for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988. 6 However, the
land remained in possession of Daniela.
Private respondents should have presented other evidence to
sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no
intention of disposing of her property when she executed the
subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his
complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and
not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant.28 Aside
from Daniela’s sworn statement, private respondents failed to
present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim.
Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that
Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract
of sale with petitioner.

Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had

actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement
between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject
property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by
mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her
defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did
not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the
title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property
reconveyed to her.Daniela leaving her children as her heirs,
namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who
predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein petitioner.

Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the
sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a
consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their
rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena
did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.
Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her son Salvador, filed a
complaint with the RTC against Nena praying for the nullification
of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor,
cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena, and issuance
of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela.

Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation attended the

execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied
having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos. She prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint, and in her counterclaim, she asked
the trial court for the award of actual, exemplary and moral
damages as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.12

Trial court held in favor the heirs of Daniela and declaring the
Deed of Sale null and void. Nena filed an appeal with the CA. The
CA rendered its Decision affirming the judgment of the RTC.

Nena’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its

Resolution dated August 22, 2002.15

ISSUE

WON THE SWORN STATEMENT BY DANIELA PRESENTED AS

EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT THE CONTRACT OF
SALE IS SIMULATED.

HELD

NO. In the present case, the main evidence presented by private

respondents in proving their allegation that the subject deed of
sale did not reflect the true intention of the parties thereto is the
sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial
court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private
respondents’ evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also
accorded great probative weight to this document.

There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn

statement. However, the admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence
depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of
evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency
to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence
may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.
G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA y BELLO, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS
Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports Complex in
Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his assailant ran
away. Bolanon was still able to walk to the house of his uncle
Rodolfo B. Estaño in order to seek help. His uncle rushed him to
the Philippine General Hospital by taxicab. On their way to the
hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it was Salafranca who had
stabbed him; that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital
at 2:30 am despite receiving medical attention; and that the
stabbing of Bolanon was personally witnessed by Augusto
Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years, who was in the complex
at the time.
Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a
long period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued. He
was finally arrested on April 23, 2003, and detained at the Manila
City Jail. After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, The evidence is
clear that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2)
stabbing blows to the victim while holding Johnny Bolanon with
his left arm encircled around Bolanon’s neck stabbing the latter
with the use of his right hand at the right sub costal area which
caused Bolanon’s death.
Not only because it was testified to by Augusto Mendoza but
corroborated by Rodolfo Estaño, the victim’s uncle who brought
Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when he
aided Bolanon and even on their way to the hospital while the
latter was suffering from hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able
to say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the
RTC,citing the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to
Salafranca as his assailant,8 and Salafranca’s positive
identification as the culprit by Mendoza.9 It stressed that
Salafranca’s denial and his alibi of being in his home during the
incident did not overcome the positive identification, especially
as his unexplained flight after the stabbing, leaving his home and
employment, constituted a circumstance highly indicative of his
guilt. Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists
that the State did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE
WON THE DYING DECLARATION OF BOLANON TO ESTANO IS
ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE AND THUS THEREFORE ENOUGH TO
CONVICT SALAFRANCA FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER.
person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement,
Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having sustained
a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estaño, was then
experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon succumbed in
the hospital emergency room a few minutes from admission,
which occurred under three hours after the stabbing. There is
ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the
imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own
statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of
his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion
of his physician. Bolanon would have been competent to testify
on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the
dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for
murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae
and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay
rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements
are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediately attending circumstances.21
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res
gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the
assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was referring to a startling
occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then on
board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus
had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca as the
assailant. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was
made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling
occurrence. The statement was relevant because it identified
Salafranca as the perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances
which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act
and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." 22 In a
general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate
its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with
the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication.23 The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when
the circumstances are such that the statements were made as
a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. 24 The test of
admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore,
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it
characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself,
and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.25

HELD

YES. It appears from the foregoing testimony that Bolanon had

gone to the residence of Estaño, his uncle, to seek help right after
being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estaño had hurriedly dressed
up to bring his nephew to the Philippine General Hospital by
taxicab; that on the way to the hospital, Estaño had asked
Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter had told Estaño that
his assailant had been Salafranca; that at the time of the
utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard time
breathing, causing Estaño to advise him not to talk anymore; and
that about ten minutes after his admission at the emergency ward
of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and had been pronounced
dead. Such circumstances qualified the utterance of Bolanon as
both a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae,
considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of
the victim an hour before his death and right after the hacking
incident bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part
of the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay
rule.18

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence

due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when
the following requisites concur, namely: (a) that the declaration
must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death; (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the
declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death; (c)
that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that the
declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.19

All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his

ante-mortem statement to Estaño, identifying Salafranca as the
G.R. No. 128538 February 28, 2001
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT
HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and LEOPOLDO
HALILI, respondent.
FACTS
SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC for brevity) through its
chairman, private respondent Danilo Arrieta and vice president,
Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment
House Inc., (hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The
loan carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges
of 2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal upon
non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the
payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private respondent
Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement
binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on
the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI
then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and Halili, but
notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.
SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for a sum of money with a
prayer for preliminary attachment against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action.
Petitioner contended that the promissory note upon which SIHI
anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding
effect for lack or failure of consideration.
derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in
these rules.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries
no probative value.8 However, the rule does admit of an exception.
Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same
is admissible.9
The rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a
litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to
cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified
to by a witness are hearsay.10 However, the right to cross-examine
may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine
the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was
afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine
the other party's witness.
Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these
opportunities. No error was thus committed by the respondent
court when it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner had
waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It
is now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay
evidence.
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of Appeals
correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness
as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge.
Thus, the requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.

On the pre trial, the plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta
and Pablito Bermundo agreed that the latter executed a
promissory note last December 13, 1983 for the amount of
P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.2

SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-

examination of said witness was postponed several times due to
one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case
was calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or
its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was finally
declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-
examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted
for decision.

The lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.

On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show, by a

preponderance of evidence, that the latter had a case against it.
SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI to prove its
claim was insufficient as the competency of the witness was not
established and there was no showing that he had personal
knowledge of the transaction. SCC further maintained that no
proof was shown of the genuineness of the signatures in the
documentary exhibits presented as evidence and that these
signatures were neither marked nor offered in evidence by SIHI.
Finally, SCC pointed out that the original copies of the documents
were not presented in court.

ISSUE

WON THE TESTIMONY OF SIHI’S LONE WITNESS IS ADMISSIBLE

AND SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE GENUINESS OF THE
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON THE GROUND THAT
IT IS NOT CONSIDERED AS HEARSAY

HELD

YES. The court held that the Court of Appeals found that SCC
failed to appear several times on scheduled hearing dates despite
due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing
dates, petitioner was supposed to cross-examine the lone witness
offered by SIHI to prove its case. Petitioner now charges the
appellate court with committing an error of law when it failed to
disallow the admission in evidence of said testimony pursuant to
the "hearsay rule" contained in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.

Rule 130, Section 36 reads:

SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;

hearsay excluded. – A witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are