Osmena vs.
COMELEC
Paras
 Case is concerned with the validity and constitutionality of RA 7056 which
provides for the national and local elections in 1992, and for synchronized
elections beginning in 1995. It’s filed by a number of local government
officials including Cebu Governor Osmena, Governor Pagdanganan,
Representatives Garcia, del Mar, Bacaltos, and Cainglet.
 They argue that
o The Constitution mandates a synchronized election as early as 1992
so bakit di pa natin gawin na now.
o The provision which allows all incumbent PCM officials to hold-over
til their successors are duly elected and qualified violates XVIII-2
(transitory provisions)
 The same provision shortens the term or tenure of office
of local officials to be elected in the 1992 elections,
contrary to X-8
o Campaign period violates Constitutional provisions on the
COMELEC
o The “difficulties” which were used to justify the passage of RA 7056
weren’t insurmountable problems
 SC issued a TRO against the implementation of the law.
o OSG moved to deny the petition on the ground that it involves a
political question, and that there’s no justification for the exercise
of police power.
o OSG also argues that it’s a valid exercise of legislative power.
Procedural Issues
 SC says that the court has competence to act on the matter because the
question involved is not some discretionary act of Congress or of the
executive that may not be reviewed by the SC. Rather, the question is a
question of legality, and not of the wisdom of the law
o Besides, even if political question, it would still come within the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon the SC by VIII-1
 Where there are serious constitutional questions involved, the
transcendental importance of these questions demand prompt settlement.
Transitory Provisions
 Annex – Sections 2 and 5 of the transitory provisions
 These 2 provisions synchronized the end of the terms of the Senators, HOR,
President, and Vice-President all on June 30, 1992 noontime. The net effect
is that this will synchronize all future elections to once every three years.
o Concomm deliberations explain its origin – it was a suggestion by
Commissioner Davide, since without it the Senatorial seats will
expire in 1990, close to 1992 and so they deemed it better to
synchronize all the posts.
o Commissioner de Castro also explained that the first national and
local officials to be elected in 1987 will all serve until 1992,
assuming that the term of the President will be for 6 years from
1986. In 1992, the president shall have a term til 1998. The next 12
shall serve until 1995, and then local officials til 1995. From then
one, we shall have an election every 3 years.
o Commissioner Davide: In other words, there will be a single
election in 1992 for all, from president to municipal officials.
 It’s thus clear that the Constitution mandates a synchronized national and
local election prior to June 30, 1992, particularly (XVIII-5), on the 2nd Monday
of May 1992
o The 1987 Constitution provides for a 3 year term for elective local
officials. Incumbent officials were elected in January 1988 hence
their term exires in 1991. But it was adjusted to June 30, 1992 to
synchronize the national and local elections.
RA 7056 therefor violates the 1987 Constitution when it provided for 2 separate
elections
 The law set the election for P, VP, 24 senators, and all elective HOR members
on the 2nd Monday of May 1992, while all local government officials only on
November 1992.
 Clearly desynchronized
RA 7056 also violates the constitution by providing for a hold-over term for
incumbents, and by reducing the term of municipal officials 1992-1995
 It’s improper for a statute to provide for a hold-over term for incumbents
when the constitution itself sets the termination date of their term wich in
this case was June 30, 1992.
 Also magiging November 1992-June 1995 which is less than the three year-
term provided in the Constitution itself.
RA 7056 also violates the 90-day period found in IX-9
 Campaign period under the law is P&VP- 130 days, while for HOR members
as well as local government officials it’s 45 days.
Menzon (Leyte Acting VG) vs. Petilla (Leyte Acting Governor)
Gutierrez
 In an August 1990 resolution, the Supreme Court stated that Menzon cannot
successfully assert the right to be recognized as Actng Vice-Governor, and
therefore, his designation was invalid.
o In this motion the primary issue is the emoluments he is entitled to
while actually discharging the duties of the office of the Vice
Governor.
 In 1988, because no Governor was proclaimed in Leyte, the SILG Santos
designated Petilla, then Vice Governor, as Acting Governor of Leyte. SILG
also designated Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Leyte, to the Vice Governor office.
 The Provincial Administrator inquired from the DILG undersecretary the
legality of the appointment of AVG Menzon to the VG office.
o Undersec Rubillar stated that since the old LGC has no provision
regarding the succession in the office of the VG in case of a
temporary vacancy, menzon’s appointment as a termporary VG
was not necessary since the actual VG, petilla, could concurrently
assume both offices H M M M M
 Because of this, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Leyte issued a resolution
holding Menzon’s appointment as AVG invalid
o “no permanent not vacancy in said office”
 Undersecretary Rubillar explained:
o SILG’s designation of Menzon as AVG is not contrary to his letter
because temporary designation is different from succession.
 Because of Rubillar’s explanation, the Regional Director of Local
Government asked Acting Governor Petilla to modify the resolution in order
that it not affect the credibility of the appointment of Menzon as VG.
Petilla refused to modify the resolution lmao. And so Menzon’s emoluments for
having acted as vice-governor couldn’t be paid din.
 Manzon filed a Certiorari and Mandamus case with the Supreme Court.
Meanwhile, the issue on who the Governor is was resolved – it’s. drum roll
please. LARRAZABAL!!!
 The case filed by Menzon was thereafter dismissed because the provincial
treasurer gave Menzon his emoluments.
 Hassle Petilla. Despite the payment made by the provincial treasurer, petilla
asked governor Larrazabal to demand that Menzon pay back all the
emoluments delivered RELAX
Manzon appealed the dismissal of the case because Manzon wants the court to
actually declare na may right siya to the salaries.
There’s a vacancy
There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent.
Hence, there’s a vacancy in the absence of a legally qualified incumbent. In this case,
there’s a vacancy because the Office o the Vice Governor was left vacant when the
duly-elected VG Petilla was appointed as acting governor.
 In the eyes of the law, the VG post was left barren of a legally qualified
person to exercise the duties of the office of the VG.
 Petilla was not shown to have continued to exercise his duties as VG.
Besides, the nature of the duties of a Governor call for a full-time occupant
to discharge them moreso when extended period ang vacancy.
o Precisely, yung automatic assumption ni Petilla of the VG position
rendered the post empty.
The SILG has the authority to designate petitioner
The (old) LGC is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a temporary vacancy
in the Vice-Governorship. This doesn’t mean, however, na walang succession. The
two-year gap na walang Vice-Governor, as argued by the respondents, would cause
disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services.
To obviate the obvious dilemma sa silence ng LGC, the court rules that the president,
through alter-ego SILG, may remedy the situation. The exigencies of public service
demand nothing less than the immediate appointment of an acting Vice-Governor.
We apply CA 588 and RAC 1987 which, although applying only to appointive officials,
may be used in this case. In the absence of any statute and in the best interet of the
public, we see no reason why the procedure under the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case.
 The need for an AVG is for the higher officials to decide, and the judiciary to
adjudicate. In this case, no question naman na it was best for Leyte to have
a full-time governor and an acting Vice Governor.
Consistent with intent of the LGC – continuinity in the performance of duties
By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of succession
provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary
vacancy in the same office. In this case, there was a need to fill the vacancy. The
petitioner is himself the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the
highest number of votes. The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the
temporary appointment.
 right to salary indubitable. Even assuming na hindi puwde ma-appoint, de-facto
officer pa rin siya.
Docena vs. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar
Cruz
 Two persons are claming the same Sangguniang Panlalawigan position in
Eastern Samar by virtue of 2 separate appointments extended to them by
the same authority.
o The first appointment was replaced by the second appointment,
but the second appointment was withdrawn to reinstate the first
one, but the first one was later recalled to reinstate the second one.
o Docena as 1st appointee, Alar as 2nd appointee
 Capito had been elected to and was serving as a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar when he died and petitioner Docena was
appointed to succeed him.
o The appointment of Docena was issued by Secretary Santos of the
DILG.
o Docena took his oath of office and assumed membership in the
Sanggunian.
 The record doesn’t show why but Alar was appointed as well, also by DILG
Secretary Santos. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar
thereafter issued a resolution, recognizing membership of Alar instead of
Docena.
 But this SPES resolution was effectively reversed when Santos wrote a letter
to Alar
o “it appears that blah blah an appointment was already issued to
DOCENA as member of the SPES. The appointment to you is hereby
recalled effective the date of issue”
It was the SPES who provoked the DILG – it issued a resolution reiterating the
recognition of Alar and that the revocation of Alar’s appointment had no basis in law.
 This was supported by an opinion of the Provincial Prosecutor, that the
recall of Alar was void ab initio because Alar’s right to the office had become
vested
Secretary Santos, issued another recall order addressed to Docena. Santos explained
that the appointment extended to him is hereby recalled effective immediately, to
be turned over to Mr. Alar who was appointed by Santos also.
 Docena came to the SC through a mandamus petition to compel the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar to recognize him.
 TRO issued.
Arguments
 Docena argues that both he and Capito ran for the Provincial Board in the
1988 elections under the banner Lakas ng Bansa. They later on would both
join Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino under speaker Mitra who
administered the oath of office to him when he was appointed to the SPES.
o Docena is claiming a preferential right, having placed 9th, next to
Capito, while Alar didn’t even run for office.
 Alar does not contest the qualifications of Docena but contends that the
appointment in Docena’s favor had been superseded by the one in favor of
Alar.
o Alar says that the recall of his (alar’s) appointment was null and
void ab initio for lack of previous hearing.
The appointment had already been accepted by Docena
Docena had already accepted the appointment and in fact he already assumed office
as a member of the SPES. For all intents and purposes, Docena’s appointment was
complete and enforceable at the time it was supposedly superseded by the
appointment of Alar.
Funny how Alar considers the revocation of his appointment as whimsical, capricious,
and wishy-washy, but doesn’t consider his appointment like that in the first place.
There was no reason to recall Docena’s appointment
As Docena’s appointment was issued earlier and had been accepted, and since
Docena already assumed office, he could not thereafter be made to accommodate
Alar. Political rather than legal considerations seem to have influenced the action of
the provincial government in rejecting the petitioner's claim despite its obvious
merit.
Even assuming that the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto, the Court may
in its own discretion consider the present petition a. such and deal with it accordingly.
We find that as a petition for quo warranto, it complies with the prescribed
requirements, to wit, that it be filed on time and by a proper party asserting title to
the office also claimed by the respondent. Acting thereon, we hold that Docena has
proved his right to the disputed office and could not be legally replaced by Alar.
Annex
Sec. 50. Permanent Vacancies in Local Sanggunians. — In case of permanent vacancy
in the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, or
sangguniang barangay, the President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the
Minister of Local Government, shall appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy in
the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod; the governor, in the
case of sangguniang bayan members; or the city or municipal mayor, in the case of
sangguniang barangay members. Except for the sangguniang barangay, the
appointee shall come from the political party of the sanggunian member who caused
the vacancy, and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office.
De Rama vs. CA
Ynares-Santiago
 Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon,
petitioner de Rama wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
seeking the recall of the appointment of 14 municipal employees.
 De Rama sought for their recall on the ground that the appointments of
these persons were midnight appointments of the former mayor – Mayor
Abeja, in violation of VII-15 (huh eh presidential lang to)
o Meanwhile, the CSC allowed the claim for salaries of 3 of the 14
appointees, who say that although the CSC had declared their
appointments to be permanent, Mayor De Rama, through an office
order, prohibited payment to them.
 The CSC denied the recall of appointment for lack of merit. CSC cited its
Omnibus Rules and declared that the appointments were issued in
accordance with pertinent laws, thus, were effective immediately, and
cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority until
disapproved by the CSC.
o The CSC also denied the allegation that these were midnight
appointments, saying na DUH proscription against the president
lang yung contained sa Constitutional provision na yun.
 MORE for the payment of salaries and for the denial of the recall of
appointments denied.
o CSC again reiterated its decision na in the absence of any showing
na these appointments were defective in form or in substance,
contrary to law, they’re valid and in effect.
 CA denied appeal
o RA 7041 – not all appointments must be made within 4 months
from publication of the vacancies.
o Likewise, the CSC rules do not require that vacant positions must
be filled up before the next quarter.
 At a MORE, the CA denied the arguments:
o No screening process and no criteria were adopted by the
Personnel Selection Board in nominating the respondents (ANNEX)
o No posting in 3 conspicuous public places of notice of vacancy
o Merit and Fitness requirements not observed by the selection
board and the appointing authority
o Valid grounds to recall
 Appeal to SC
New issues sa MORE
CA did not err in holding that the MORE grounds were new issues because when Dela
Rama brought the matter of withdrawing the appointments before the CSC, the main
argument was that these were midnight appointments forbidden under the Consti.
The CA and the CSC decided correctly that this prohibition against midnight
appointments only applied to presidential appointments. There is no law that
prohibits local elective officials from making appointments on the last days of his
or her tenure.
Dela Rama didn’t even allege fraud or any anomaly in the appointment of the
appointive officials. His solitary reason was that these were midnight appointments.
Perhaps sensing the weakness of his arguments, Dela Rama filed a supplement to the
appeal as well as a motion for reconsideration wherein he alleged, for the very first
time, that the appointments violated CSC rules and regulations.
Dela Rama faults the CA and the CSC for ignoring his supplemental pleading, while at
the same time arguing that the grounds for the recall aren’t new issues because he
had timely raised them before the CSC.
 While supplemental pleadings may be filed, these should not entirely
substitute the original pleading.
 Under the Rules of Court, a supplemental pleading must state the
supervening events that took place. In this case, the irregularities weren’t
new developments which only happened after the filing of the original
pleading. Accordingly, tama lang na CSC and CA didn’t consider these as
new evidence w/c are the proper subjects of a supplemental pleading.
 The non-posting of notice, merit requirement, and rules on screening
should’ve been included / alleged sa Order of Recall, but it wasn’t, hence
it’s deemed waived.
Valid Appointments
Upon the issuance of an appointment, and the assumption of the position in the civil
service, the appointee acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by
revocation or by removal (except for cause and with previous notice and hearing)
An appointee assuming a CSC position acquires a legal and not just an equitable right
to the position. It’s protected both by statute and by constitutional mandate.
In this case, no hearing nor notice. Dela Rama acted in undue haste to remove them
without regard to due process. In doing so, he overstepped his authority because
there’s no doubt that despite the fact na appointing power siya, he does not have
blanket authority to revoke.
Under the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the RAC, an appointment once
accepted cannot be withdrawn and remains in force til disapproved by the CSC
Annex
RA 7041 - Section 80. Public Notice of Vacancy:
Personnel Selection Board. (a) Whenever a local chief executive decides to fill a
vacant career position, there shall be posted notices of the vacancy in at least three
(3) conspicuous public places in the local government unit concerned for a period of
not less than fifteen (15) days.

(b) There shall be established in every province, city or municipality a personnel

selection board to assist the local chief executive in the judicious and objective
selection of personnel for employment as well as for promotion, and in the
formulation of such policies as would contribute to employee welfare.

(c) The personnel selection board shall be headed by the local sanggunian concerned.
A representative of the Civil Service Commission, if any, and the personnel officer of
the local government unit concerned shall be ex officio members of the board.
David vs. COMELEC
Panganiban
 Two petitions raise the same question: how long is the t erm of barangay
officials who were elected in May 1994? Is it 3 years as under the Local
Government Code of 1991? Or is it 5 years under RA 6679? Syempre they
contend na 5 years. They’re asking that the court order the election in 1997
be rescheduled in 1999 (35)
o Petitioners argue that the LGC 3-year term doesn’t apply to
barangays because RA 6678 is a special law applying only to
barangays
o No express or implied repeal of barangay terms.
o X-8 excepts barangays from the 3 year term.
 COMELEC maintains that the LGC amended RA 6679 because the repealing
clause of the law included all laws, general or special, inconsistent with the
provisions of the LGC.
o COMELEC cited the GAA of 1997 and how it includes appropriations
for both national and local (and barangay) elections.
 Former Senator Pimentel, as amicus curiae, sided with the COMELEC in that
it was the legislative intent to shorten the term of brgy. Officials to three
years, and that such barangay officials should not have a term longer than
their admin superiors.
First Case
 David, as Brgy. Chairman (Brgy. 77) and president of the Liga ng mga
Barangay sa Pilipinas, filed a petition for prohibition to prohibit the holding
of the barangay election scheduled on the 2nd Monday of may 1997.
 SOLGEN filed a four-page comment siding with petitioner praying that the
election be held in abeyance.
 COMELEC filed a separate comment
Second Case
 Petitioner in this case is the Liga ng mga Baranggay – QC Chapter
represented by its president Rillon. It sought to declare Section 43(c) of the
LGC unconstitutional (sets 3 year term from 2nd Monday of May 1994), as
well as the COMELEC resolutions fixing the date for the same, and a 400-
million appropriation.
Brief Historical Background of Barangay Elections
Barangays are ruled by Datos who exercised absolute government powers. When the
Spanish took over, they retained the barangays as a unit but stripped the Dato or
Rajah of his powers. Instead they were supervised by the Encomiendero, and later
on, alcalde mayor and the gobernadorcillo.
 Datus became Cabeza de Barangays, from authoritarian to a mere
employee. It was elective though. Only the poor who needed a salary
accepted the post.
When the Americans took over, barangays became barrios. They were granted
autonomy under the barrio charter and formally recognized as municipal
corporations.
During the martial law regime, they were renamed into barangays. Nevertheless,
their basic organization and functions under the old Barrio Charter were adopted and
expressly referred to as the Barangay Charter. The titles of officials were changed.
 Punong Barangay + 6 kagawads (councilmen)
 Old LGC – 6 year terms (PB, 6 sanggunian, Kabataan chair, Sec, Tres)
 Omnibus election Code – reiterated 6 years and stated na their election shall
be every 2nd Monday of May 1988 and on the same day every 6 years
thereafter
RA 6653 re-scheduled the 1988 May Brgy elections to November, and every five
years thereafter. Hence the term of office was cut down from 6 to 5. The punong
barangay was chosen from among themselves by 7 kagawads, who, in turn, were to
be elected at large by the barangay electorate.
But the November election scheduled by RA 6653 was also delayed and reset to
March 28, 1989 (kaya 1994 ang tapos ng term) by RA 6679 which also provided that
the term of office ends on May 31, 1994.
Under the LGC, several provisions on barangay officials were introduced
 Term reduced to three years (LGC 43(c)) which shall begin after the regular
election of Barangay officials on the 2nd Monday of May 1994
 Punong Baranggay + 7 Sangguniang Baranggay Members + Kabataan Chair +
Sec + tres
 Punong Baranggay is elected by direct vote
I. Clear Legislative Intent to limit the term to 3 years
“emerges as bright as the sunlight”
 LGC was enacted later, and had an irreconcilable conflict. Hence, it’s the
later legislative will.
 LGC provided for a direct vote. During the elections held in May 1994, this
direct vote provision was followed. If we follow this, this means na
petitioner David was voted illegally (directly) and hence can’t be the
president of the national league of barangays.
 GAA provision worth 400 million for the holding of barangay elections.
 LGC is a codified set of laws which apply to each LGU with particularity. It
specifically and definitively provides that the term of office shall be 3 years.
o RA 6679 is a special law, yes, but LGC may be a special law also!
II. Three-Year term not contrary to the Consti
X-8 provides xxx. The Constitution does not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing
any term of office for Barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term
to the law-making body, without any specific limitation or prohibition.

To strike down a law for being unconstitutional, the showing of unconstitutionality

must be clear and unequivocal.

Furthermore, it’s worth noting that the LGC provision providing for a 3-year term was
actually proposed by Constitutional Commissioner Davide.

MR. NOLLEDO. One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be the term
of the office of barangay officials as provided for?
MR. DAVIDE. As may be determined by law.
MR. NOLLEDO. As provided for in the Local Government Code?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

III. Petitioners are estopped from challenging their three-year terms

COMELEC submitted a photox of Alex David’s COC in the May 9, 1994 Baranggay
elections. He expressly stated therein that he was announcing his candidacy for the
office of Punong Baranggay for Brgy. 77 (Caloocan)

David could not have run for the position of Punong Baranggay if, as they claim, RA
6679 was still applicable and not the new LGC because again in RA 6679 the Punong
Barangay was not elected by popular vote but chosen by the elected kagawads.

In other words, following petitioners own theory, the election of Petitioner David as
well as all the barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners was illegal.

The sum total of these absurdities in petitioner’s theory is that barangay officials are
estopped from asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were
elected to, under the law governing their very claim to such offices: namely, RA 7160,
the Local Government Code. Petitioners belated claim of ignorance as to what law
governed their election to office in 1994 is unacceptable because under Art. 3 of the
Civil Code, (i)gnorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.