IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION _____ Appellate Case No.

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RICHARD I. FINE, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, SHERIFF OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY LEROY D. BACA, Respondents. ______________________________ Marina Strand Colony II Homeowner¶s Association v. County of Los Angeles, Real Parties in Interest Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BS109420 Hon. David P. Yaffe, Judge ______________________________

VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ______________________________

Richard I. Fine, Prisoner No. 1824367 c/o Los Angeles County Men¶s Central Jail 441 Bauchet Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 Petitioner, In Pro Per

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus I. Parties««««««««««««««««««««««««.. 1 II. Jurisdiction««««««««««««««««««««««.. 2 III. Purpose of Petition and Factual Background«««««««««.. 2 Prayer «««««««««««««««««««««««««« 23 Memorandum of Points and Authorities I. II. Requested Relief «««««««««««««««««««.. 24 Factual and Legal Background««««««««««««««. 24 A. B. C. Fraud Upon the Court From the Outset of the Marina Strand Case ««««««««««««« 24 The Admission Of Fraud Upon the Court And Obstruction Of Justice In The July 13, 2010 Minute Order ««««« 27 Due Process Was Violated by Judge Yaffe ³Judging His Own Actions´ and Receiving LA County Payments When It Was a Party Before Him«««««««..«««. 29 Judge Yaffe¶s Refusal to Set Fine Free«««««.«««. 32

D. III.

Argument ««««««««««««««««««««««. 33 A. The Writ Must Be Granted Because Judge Yaffe Judged His Own Actions «««««««««««««.. 33 B. The Writ Must be Granted Because ³Coercive Confinement´ Did Not Exist And The Incarceration Was Unlawful and Penal From the Outset ««««««««««««« 34 C. Under the Farr Case and U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, the Incarceration Became Penal Immediately «««««.. 34 D. The Writ Must be Granted Because The Actions of Judge Yaffe Are a Sham ««««««««« 36

Conclusion ««..«««««««««««««««««««««.. 38 Certification of Word Count «««««««««««««««««««.. 42

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986)««««««««««««31 Austin v. Smith, 312 F.2d 337, 343 (1962)««««««««««««««.7, 25 BreakZone Billiards v. City of Torrance, 81 Cal.App.4th 1205 (2000)««««..15 Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. ___ (2009)«««««...passim Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328««««««««««««.6, 25 Farr, In Re, 36 Cal.App.3d 577, 589 (1974)«...«««««««««««««..8 William T. Farr, In Re, on Habeas Corpus, 64 Cal.App.3d 605 (1976)«««.8, 34 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)««««««««««««9, 10, 35, 41 Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960)««««««...27, 30 McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972)««««..10, 35, 41 Murchison, In re, 349 U.S. 133 (1955)««..«..«««««««««««passim Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 75 S.Ct. 11 (1954)««««««««...27, 30 Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 «««««..6, 25 Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, et al., Case No. BC 351286 ««««...passim Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)«««««««««««««.«..26, 31, 40 U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878)«««««««««««««.6, 25, 39 Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920)««...«6, 25, 39 Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972)««..«««««««««.31 Statutes California Code of Criminal Procedure § 1219(a)««««««««««««..18 California Code of Civil Procedure § 170.1«««««««««««««.passim California Code of Civil Procedure § 1218«««««««««««««««.19 California Code of Civil Procedure § 6127«««««««««««««««.18 California Senate Bill SBx2-11 ««««««««««««««««12, 13, 14 Rules Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(5)««««««««««««««7 Constitutional Provisions Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution«««««««««...11, 13 Treatises Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499«««««««««««««««««.6, 25 Canons Code of Judicial Ethics, Canons 2, 3B, 3E and 4D(1)«««««««««.passim
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Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus I. Parties Petitioner Richard I. Fine, Prisoner No. 1824367 (hereinafter referred to as ³Fine´), has been incarcerated in the Los Angeles County Jail since March 4, 2009 under a sentence of ³coercive confinement´ ordered in a Judgment and Order of Contempt (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the ³Judgment´) dated March 4, 2009 by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge David P. Yaffe (hereinafter referred to as ³Judge Yaffe´) in the case of Marina Strand Colony II Homeowners Association v. County of Los Angeles, et al, LASC case no. BS109420 (sometimes ³the Marina Strand case´). Fine was counsel to Marina Strand Colony II Homeowners Association in the Marina Strand case until October 17, 2007, when the State Bar ordered him inactive. The California Supreme Court did not affirm the order and did not order Fine inactive. Subsequently, the State Bar recommended Fine¶s disbarment and the California Supreme Court denied review. Fine filed a Federal civil rights lawsuit against the State Bar, the State Bar Board of Governors and the State Bar Chief Trial Counsel based upon their violations of his constitutional rights and fraud upon the court. The case (US DC case no. 10-CV-0048) is presently pending in the U.S. District Court, Central District of California.

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Fine¶s incarceration was a direct result of his challenging Judge Yaffe¶s presiding over a case in which LA County was a party before him while he was taking payments from LA County. Respondent Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles (hereinafter the ³LA Superior Court´) is the court where Judge Yaffe sits. Respondent LA County Sheriff Leroy D. Baca (hereinafter ³Baca´) has custody of Fine. Real Parties in Interest are the parties in the Marina Strand case. II. Jurisdiction The Court has jurisdiction under both the California Constitution and the U.S. Constitution to hear petitions for writs of habeas corpus. III. Purpose of Petition and Factual Background This Petition seeks an immediate writ of habeas corpus releasing Fine from the ³coercive confinement´ in the LA County Jail, where he has been held for over eighteen (18) months, since March 4, 2009. Fine had filed all of his writs through the U.S. Supreme Court, and had filed his Petition for Rehearing in the U.S. Supreme Court when Judge Yaffe issued a July 13, 2010 Minute Order admitting to ³fraud upon the court´ and obstruction of justice in both the Marina Strand case and the Federal court proceedings.

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The July 13, 2010 Minute Order stated that a March 18, 2008 Order was nonexistent, and that Judge Yaffe never intended to decide whether Fine had standing to disqualify him, Judge Yaffe, in the Marina Strand case. These

statements showed Judge Yaffe¶s fraud upon the court and obstruction of justice, as did his reliance upon the nonexistent March 18, 2008 Order in his March 27, 2008 Order Striking Notice of Disqualification, and as basis for not removing himself from the Marina Strand case after he was automatically disqualified by not having responded to Fine¶s March 25, 2008 CCP Section 170.3 Verified Statement of Disqualification. The July 13, 2007 Minute Order stated, in relevant part: ³It has been brought to the Court¶s attention that its Order Striking Notice of Disqualification dated and filed March 27, 2008, refers to an earlier March 18, 2008 draft order that was not filed . . . .´ ³The Court did not intend to make any finding as to whether Mr. Fine had standing to file a Verified Statement of Disqualification pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.3.´ A true and correct copy of the July 13, 2007 Minute Order marked as Exhibit ³1´ is attached hereto and incorporated herein as if set forth in full. Judge Yaffe had relied upon the March 18, 2008 Order to Strike Fine¶s February 19, 2008 Motion to Disqualify all LA Superior Court judges who had received money from LA County in the Marina Strand case.

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The Declaration of Richard I. Fine in Support of the Motion to Disqualify stated, at paragraphs 12 and 13: 12. In the instant case Los Angeles County is a party. The Court [Judge Yaffe] has not disclosed if it is presently receiving money from LA County. 13. In the case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, et al., Case No. BC 351286, in which plaintiff brought suit to enjoin LA County from making payments to LA Superior Court judges, the case was transferred out of the jurisdiction of the LA Court. The July 13, 2010 Minute Order showed that Judge Yaffe knew at all times that he could not strike the February 19, 2008 Motion as a CCP Section 170.3 Verified Statement of Disqualification as to him because he had not disclosed any LA County payments to him, nor had LA County disclosed such. He also knew that precedent existed to disqualify all LA Superior Court judges who were receiving such payments. In the July 13, 2010 Minute Order, Judge Yaffe stated that he struck the February 19, 2008 Motion in a March 20, 2008 Minute Order. However, such Minute Order was never served on anyone. The Notice of Ruling of the March 20, 2008 hearing, served by Joshua L. Rosen, counsel for Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North, Real Parties in Interest in the Marina Strand case (hereinafter collectively referred to as ³Del Rey Shores´) did not refer to a March 20, 2008 Minute Order, nor was such attached. It stated that

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Judge Yaffe struck the February 19, 2008 Motion as a CCP Section 170.3 Verified Statement of Disqualification. On March 25, 2008, Fine filed a Notice of Disqualification of Judge Yaffe. This Notice stated that such striking was illegal as it would have had to have been done within ten (10) days of February 19, 2008 if Judge Yaffe considered the February.19, 2008 Motion to be personal to him. But Judge Yaffe¶s only response was the March 27, 2008 Order, which referred to the nonexistent March 18, 2008 Order. And the March 27, 2008 Order was never served on any person and did not have a certificate of service. At the March 20, 2008 hearing, which was the first hearing in the Marina Strand case that Fine attended, Judge Yaffe, for the first time, admitted to receiving payments from LA County. As stated above, Fine then filed a CCP Section 170.3 Verified Statement of Disqualification, to which Judge Yaffe did not respond. His failure to respond resulted in his automatic disqualification ten (10) days later under CCP Section 170.3(c)(4). Judge Yaffe was given a copy of the Notice of Disqualification at the April 10, 2008 hearing. The Notice of Disqualification was filed by the Clerk on April 11, 2008. The new July 13, 2010 Minute Order, when viewed in context within the series of events from the start of the Marina Strand case on June 14, 2007, and the

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failure of LA County and Judge Yaffe to disclose the LA County payments at the outset of the case, through the concealment of the payments and the false April 18, 2008 Order, its concealment until July 13, 2010, and the circumstances under which it was written (over two years after the fact, and then only when compelled to respond to the exceedingly strong evidence against him submitted in Fine¶s Federal case (USDC case no. 09-CV-01914), showed fraud upon the court and obstruction of justice by LA County, its attorneys, and Judge Yaffe. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 64 (1878): ³There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments.´ The Court continued at 98 U.S. at 66: ³Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally with a contract . . . .´ (citing Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499). The U.S. Supreme Court further stated in Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353-354 (1920): ³Courts are constituted by authority, and they cannot [act] beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal. Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340; Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236.

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Austin v. Smith, 312 F.2d 337, 343 (1962), looking at F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(5), holds: ³« if the underlying judgment is void, the judgment based upon it is also void.´ The concealment of the LA County payments to Judge Yaffe also was a violation of due process. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in the case of Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. ___ (2009), at Slip Opinion page 7, citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927): ³Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.´ The Supreme Court continued at Slip Opinion page 16 in relevant part: ³Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise when²without the consent of the other parties²a man chooses the judge in his own cause.´ The LA County payments to Judge Yaffe, the concealment thereof, the false March 18, 2008 Order, the concealment thereof, and the actions of Judge Yaffe consisting of fraud upon the court and obstruction of justice as finally admitted in the July 13, 2010 Minute Order showed the Caperton statement to be true. The ³coercive confinement´ was ordered by Judge Yaffe to occur while Fine was in the process of seeking writs of habeas corpus to overturn Judge Yaffe¶s March 4, 2009 Judgment and Order of Contempt on the underlying issue of
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whether Judge Yaffe should have recused himself from the underlying Marina Strand case, for having accepted payments from LA County, a party to the case. Neither LA County nor he had disclosed such. Judge Yaffe subsequently made orders in favor of LA County and Del Rey Shores, the County¶s co-applicant for an Environmental Impact Report (³EIR´). The writs also included the issue of whether Judge Yaffe should have recused himself from the ancillary contempt proceeding in which ³he judged his own actions.´ The ³coercive confinement´ was only ordered to ³coerce´ Fine to answer questions about his assets. It was established from the outset that ³there was no substantial likelihood that such contempt order would serve its coercive purpose [and] the commitment would become punitive in nature and subject to the statutory limitation.´ See In Re Farr, 36 Cal.App.3d 577, 589 (1974), cited in In Re William T. Farr on Habeas Corpus, 64 Cal.App.3d 605, 611-612 (1976). Justice William O. Douglas had issued a stay of execution of sentence while the writ of habeas corpus was proceeding. In Re William T. Farr, 64 Cal.App.3d at 611. On June 18, 2010, Judge Yaffe issued a Minute Order in which he admitted that Fine had informed him that Fine was not going to answer any questions. Such Minute Order was not served until July 13, 2010. A true and correct copy of such

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Minute Order, marked as Exhibit ³2´, is attached hereto and incorporated herein as if set forth in full. In such June 18, 2010 Minute Order, Judge Yaffe admitted that Fine had filed a May 17, 2010 Motion for a ³Farr Hearing,´ which Judge Yaffe refused to hold. The Motion was actually filed on May 21, 2010. A true and correct copy of the Motion, marked as Exhibit ³3´, is attached hereto and incorporated herein as if set forth in full. In the June 18, 2010 Minute Order, Judge Yaffe requested other parties in the case to provide information about Fine¶s assets and serve Fine by personal service or by fax. This did not occur. Del Rey Shores was the only party who responded. It did not serve Fine by personal service nor by fax. Fine filed a Declaration Showing No Service, and further informed Judge Yaffe that Fine would not be answering any questions due to Judge Yaffe¶s admission of fraud upon the court and obstruction of justice. A true and correct copy of Fine¶s Declaration, filed August 20, 2010, is attached hereto marked as Exhibit ³4´ and incorporated herein as if set forth in full. On August 23, 2010, Judge Yaffe filed a Minute Order in which he refused to set Fine free. He did not give any legal reason for such decision. A true and correct copy of such Minute Order is attached hereto as Exhibit ³5´ and incorporated herein as if set forth in full.

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Such decision violated the U.S. Supreme Court decisions of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) and McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972). These decisions hold that confinement beyond the time that bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose for which the person is committed is a denial of due process. A reasonable relationship was interpreted in the Jackson and McNeil cases to mean ³penal´ confinement. In California, ³penal´

confinement for contempt of court is five (5) days under CCP Section 1218. Fine has been incarcerated for over eighteen (18) months. At all times, Judge Yaffe knew that the March 4, 2009 Judgment and Order of Contempt and sentence of ³coercive confinement´ were an unlawful imprisonment and a penal imprisonment, as shown in the Demand to Free Fine and other relief filed January 27, 2010. Judge Yaffe¶s sole excuse for not recusing himself at the outset of the Marina Strand case was ³Mr. Fine knew that all judges of this court received compensation from the County of Los Angeles on June 14, 2007, when he filed the underlying case BS190420 on behalf of the petitioner Marina Strand Colony II Homeowners Association.´ (Judgment and Order of Contempt, page 13, lines 18-21.)

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The judgment ignored: (1) the fact that LA County, its attorneys and Judge Yaffe concealed the payments until March.20, 2008, when Judge Yaffe admitted to them under questioning by Fine in court; and (2) that Judge Yaffe should have disqualified himself under CCP § 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) - ³a judge shall be disqualified « for any reason a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to remain impartial´; and (3) that under the Code of Judicial Ethics, Canons 2, 3B, 3E and 4D(1), Judge Yaffe was required to ³avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge¶s activities´ (Canon 2), to ³dispose of matters fairly and in accordance with the law´ (Canon 3B(7) and (8)), ³to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which disqualification is required by law´ (Canon 3E(1)), ³to disclose on the record information that is reasonably relevant to the question of disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure § 170.1, even if the judge believes that there is no actual basis for disqualification´ (Canon 3E(2)), and ³to not engage in financial and business dealings that (a) may reasonably be perceived to exploit the judge¶s judicial position or (b) involve the judge in frequent transactions or continuing business relationships with lawyers or other persons likely to appear before the court on which he serves.´ (Canon 4D (1)(a) and (b)). On March 4, 2009, Judge Yaffe knew that he had violated CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) and Code of Judicial Ethics Canons 2, 3B, 3E, and 4D(1) and

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should have recused himself in the underlying Marina Strand case from the outset, and from the ancillary contempt proceedings, based upon his taking payments from LA County, a party to the case. Judge Yaffe also knew that the LA County payments were held to violate Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution in the case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008), rev. denied 12/23/08. Judge Yaffe further knew that such payments were criminal in that Senate Bill SBx2-11, enacted February 20, 2009 in response to the Sturgeon decision, gave retroactive immunity effective May.21, 2009 from criminal prosecution, civil liability and disciplinary action to governmental entities and officers and employees of governmental entities as follows: ³[N]ot withstanding any other law, no governmental entity, or officer or employee of a governmental entity, shall incur any liability or be subject to any prosecution or disciplinary action because of benefits provided to a judge under the official action of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of this act on the grounds that those benefits were not authorized under the law.´ Senate Bill SBx2-11 further stated, in relevant part, that: ³Judges of a court whose judges received supplemental judicial benefits provided by the County or the Court or both, as of July 1, 2008 shall continue to receive supplemental benefits from the County or Court then paying the benefits on the same terms and conditions as were in effect on that date.´ «. ³Nothing in this act will require the Judicial Council to increase funding to a court for the purpose of paying judicial benefits or
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obligate the state or the Judicial Council to pay for the benefits previously provided by the County, City and County, or the Court.´ Senate Bill SBx2-11 had a 180-day termination provision for counties to notify the Administrative Office of the Courts and the impacted judges if the benefits were terminated during their ³current term while the judge continued to serve as a judge in that court or, at the election of the county when that judge leaves office.´ This provision would not be applicable to LA County as LA County funded the judge¶s payments as part of the annual budget process. Thus the ³terms and conditions as were in effect on that date [July 1, 2008]´ would have expired by July 1, 2009. The payments were voluntary by LA County and Senate Bill SBx211, by its language, did not, and could not, create a compulsory obligation upon County taxpayers to pay compensation to non-County, state-employed judges. Such an act would be misappropriation of funds, an obstruction of justice and a bribe. Even the voluntary payment consists of such criminal acts. That is the reason for the retroactive immunity linked to the effective date of Senate Bill SBx2-11 (5/21/09) linked to payments existing on July 1, 2008, which was the last annual budget for counties prior to the Sturgeon decision. The ³continuation´ of the payments by Senate Bill SBx2-11 violates Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution because the Legislature is not ³prescribing compensation for the judges´, it is only extending immunity to an unconstitutional and criminal
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county payment scheme until the end of the current county fiscal term. By its terms, Senate Bill SBx2-11 prohibits the state from making the payments. The Sturgeon decision held, in the last four paragraphs, that the 1997 Lockyer-Insenberg Trial Court Funding Act did not ³prescribe´ county payments to the judges as the county payments were voluntary and the counties could pay benefits to some people and not others. Senate Bill SBx2-11, by linking the ³continued´ payments to the old July 1, 2008 payments, suffers the same deficiency. The County is not required to make the payments if it was not required to make the payments in 2008. The LA County budget for FY 2009-2010 shows that the payments are based upon Lockyer-Insenberg in the ³Trial Court Operation´ section of the budget. This alone shows the current payments to be illegal. The issue of the continued payments is presently being litigated in the Court of Appeal in Sturgeon. Further, under the California State Constitution, the Legislature cannot authorize the payments by the counties for work already performed. Thus, even if the judges were county employees, or contractors, Senate Bill SBx2-11 would be unconstitutional as to authorizing compensation as of July1, 2008. The Reporter¶s Transcript of the March 4, 2009 hearing shows that Judge Yaffe was aware of the Sturgeon case and Senate Bill SBx2-11, and knew of both

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the unconstitutionality and criminality of the LA County payments to him. (See Reporter¶s Transcript, March 4, 2009, page 7, line 10, to page 8, line 4, and page 16, line 18, to page 15, line 3.) During the contempt proceeding, Judge Yaffe testified on December 22, 2008 that: (1) he received the LA County payments; (2) he did not disclose such on his Form 700 Statement of Economic Interests; (3) he did not have an employment contract or arrangement for providing services to LA County; (4) he did not put the LA County payments into his campaign fund; and (5) could not remember any case that he decided against LA County in the last three years. Judge Yaffe also acted as the judge in the contempt proceeding, ³judging his own actions.´ (See In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).) During the contempt proceeding, LA County Counsel Annual Litigation Cost Management Reports for the fiscal years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 showed that no one won a case against LA County when the case was decided by a LA Superior Court judge. The fiscal year 2008-2009 Annual Report shows one case decided against LA County by a LA Superior Court judge. It was also shown during the contempt proceeding that the LA County Board of Supervisors¶ March 15, 2007 vote approving the EIR by a 4-0 vote was illegal because people related to the Epstein Family Trust (who were the local managing partner of Del Rey Shores) had contributed over $500 to LA Supervisors

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Antonovich and Knabe within twelve months of the vote. This action made their votes illegal under The Political Reform Act and the case of BreakZone Billiards v. City of Torrance, 81 Cal.App.4th 1205 (2000). The failure to disclose this by LA County, its attorneys, Del Rey Shores and its attorneys at the outset of the Marina Strand case was a fraud upon the court. Further, it was shown during the contempt proceeding that the Del Rey Shores development project did not confer a financial benefit to LA County, which was a requirement under the EIR. Given this knowledge, Judge Yaffe still did not grant the writ and strike the EIR. The failure to do such further showed that the LA County payments to LA Superior Court judges, in particular Judge Yaffe, were bribes. Against this background, Judge Yaffe knew on March 4, 2009, before he sentenced Fine to ³coercive confinement,´ that such sentence was ³unlawful imprisonment´ and was only being made to coerce Fine to drop his petitions for writs of habeas corpus, which Fine was not going to abandon. Fine told Judge Yaffe that he would answer the questions if he lost all the petitions and appeals. Thus, there was no reason for the ³coercive confinement´ during the writ process other than to coerce Fine to abandon the writs. Fine stated, at Reporter¶s

Transcript, March 4, 2009, page 10, lines 5-17, as follows: Mr. Fine: ³Okay. So basically, going back to where we are at such time as to my rights of appeal through a writ of habeas corpus is
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exhausted and I lose, then I would answer the questions. Until such time that those rights are not exhausted, I am not answering questions. So we¶re in an interim procedure here, Your Honor, and if you want to try to throw me in jail during the interim procedure, you may be doing another illegal act. You know, that is your position. You¶ve already done illegal acts. If you want to continue down that road, that is a position that obviously you have taken before and may wish to continue taking, but higher courts may come down on you.´ Fine summarized the position at Reporter¶s Transcript, March 4, 2009, page 23, line 3, in relevant part: ³« [W]e are now dealing with the law of the State of California, which said that the acts that you have done are illegal. They gave you immunity for it. You cannot be prosecuted criminally in the State of California for your acts. You « cannot be held civilly liable in the State of California for your acts. You cannot be punished by the Commission on Judicial Performance in the State of California for your acts.´ ³On the other hand, in the Federal system it¶s another story. There, under 18 United States Code Section 1346, you can be held liable for the violations of the implied or intangible right to honest services. You are still subject to Federal criminal prosecution and are still subject to Federal liability.´ « ³I respectfully suggest to you that if you¶re thinking of any type of a sentence and - - which you are indicating here, I suggest that you may want to delay the actual serving of that sentence until such time as we end up finishing off all of the writs because of the fact that what does happen is that even though you may have immunities under State laws, you don¶t have immunities under Federal law for any type of false imprisonment or anything else on this particular order«´

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Knowing that Fine would not answer questions about his assets until the full writ procedure was finished, Judge Yaffe still incarcerated Fine in the LA County Jail on March 4, 2009. Subsequent thereto, during the writ procedure, the LA Superior Court and Judge Yaffe did not oppose Fine¶s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the U.S. District Court, did not oppose two Motions to set Fine free and a Motion for Reconsideration, a Motion to Grant the Writ Based Upon the Opening Brief and a Writ of Mandate to Order a Writ of Habeas Corpus to Set Fine Free in the Ninth Circuit. The LA Superior Court and Judge David P. Yaffe¶s Answering Brief, filed in the Ninth Circuit in the habeas corpus action, stated at page 3, line 15, to page 4, line 1, ³the [contempt] proceedings culminated in a finding of both civil and criminal contempt. Coercive civil confinement pursuant to California Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 1219(a) was imposed.´ At Footnote 4, the brief stated that the basis of the finding of civil contempt was ³Fine¶s failure to answer questions and produce documents at the judgment debtor hearing. . . .´ The March.4, 2009 Judgment and Order of Contempt did not have any criminal charge in it. It did contain CCP § 6127, which is civil, to which Judge Yaffe stated at Reporter¶s Transcript, March 4, 2009, page 9, lines 20-26, that no court order was violated on the charge of practicing law without a license. A criminal charge under

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CCP § 6126 was in the Order to Show Cause re Contempt, but such charge was not in the Judgment. The result is that the ³criminal contempt´ could only relate to the incarceration of Fine as being ³penal,´ and recognized as such by the LA Superior Court and Judge Yaffe. Their Answering Brief stated at page 15, lines 16-18: ³no criminal contempt was imposed against Fine for unlawfully practicing law or for holding himself out as entitled to practice law, and accordingly, that issue is not pertinent to the issue certified for appeal.´ This statement conclusively demonstrated that the incarceration was penal. Under CCP § 1218, penal incarceration is limited to five (5) days. Fine should have been released on March 9, 2009. On January 27, 2010, Fine filed a Demand for Release. The Clerk in

Department 86, Judge Yaffe¶s courtroom at the LA Superior Court, gave the personal/courtesy copy for Judge Yaffe back to Fine¶s filing assistant, Fred Sottile, stating that she only needed one document and refused to keep a copy for Judge Yaffe after it had been given to her for him. (See Declaration of John Fred Sottile, attached hereto, marked as Exhibit ³6´ and incorporated herein as if set forth in full.) On February 3, 2010, Judge Yaffe filed a Response to the Demand. (See Demand and Response, attached hereto, collectively marked as Exhibit ³7´ and incorporated herein as if set forth in full).
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In essence, the Response struck that part of the Demand referring to Fine¶s Declaration as repetitive, arguing that Judge Yaffe had not been served and that no proof existed that the ³coercive confinement´ of nearly twelve months was penal from the outset, was not working, that there was no substantive likelihood that the contempt order would serve its coercive purpose, and that the commitment had not become penal in nature and subject to the statutory limitations. All of these latter arguments were based upon the premise that the writ proceedings were still proceeding. No explanation was given to link this premise to the conclusion that no proof was given to substantiate the Demand. The Response did not address the fact that Judge Yaffe was deciding his own actions in violation of due process as set forth in In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), cited in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. Inc., et al., 556 U.S. __, (2009), decided June 8, 2009, Slip Opinion page 10. On March 24, 2010, Fine filed a Declaration to be Set Free. A true and correct copy, marked as Exhibit ³8´, is attached hereto and incorporated herein as if set forth in full. As shown above, this was followed by the May 21, 2010 Motion for a Farr Hearing, the June 18, 2010 Minute Order (served on July 13, 2010), the July 13, 2010 Minute Order, the August 20, 2010 Declaration, and the August 23, 2010 Minute Order.

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In summary, LA County and its attorneys and Judge Yaffe committed fraud upon the court at the outset of the Marina Strand case on June 14, 2007 by not disclosing the LA County payments to Judge Yaffe. Judge Yaffe violated CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) at the outset of the Marina Strand case on June 14, 2007 by not disqualifying himself. He also

violated Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4D(1) ± by taking money from LA County; Canon 3E(2) ± by not disclosing such on the record; and Canon 3E(1) ± by not disqualifying himself. LA County, its attorneys, Del Rey Shores and its attorneys committed fraud upon the court at the outset of the Marina Strand case on June 14, 2007 by not disclosing that the LA Supervisors¶ vote on the EIR was illegal and that the EIR was not certified. Judge Yaffe violated due process by presiding over a case in which he had received illegal payments/bribes from a party appearing before him without the consent of the other parties and by judging his own actions, amongst other things. Judge Yaffe violated due process by incarcerating Fine while knowing that the incarceration did not have any reasonable relationship to the purpose for which Fine was committed from the outset on March 4, 2009, while the writ process was proceeding, and further after July 13, 2010 when Judge Yaffe admitted to fraud

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upon the court and obstruction of justice. At all times, Judge Yaffe knew the incarceration was ³penal.´ Fine filed a Complaint against Judge Yaffe with the Commission on Judicial Performance. Subsequent thereto, Judge Yaffe issued the July 13, 2010 Minute Order in which he admitted to having committed fraud upon the court and obstruction of justice. Judge Yaffe further announced his resignation from office effective November 2, 2010, with his last day on the bench to be October 2, 2010. Fine filed a ³Notice That All Orders and Judgments in the Marina Strand Case are Void Based Upon Judge Yaffe¶s Admission of ³Fraud Upon the Court´ and Obstruction of Justice in the July 13, 2010 Minute Order of the Court,´ on August 4, 2010. On September 3, 2010, Fine filed complaints with the U.S. Attorney General, the U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, the California Attorney General and the District Attorney for LA County seeking a grand jury investigation and indictments of Judge Yaffe and others for obstruction of justice, violations of the intangible right to honest services ± 18 U.S.C. Section 1346 ± and other federal and state crimes related to the payment of money from counties, particularly LA County, to state and federal judges presiding over cases in which they are a party or in which they have an interest, amongst other violations.

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Prayer Wherefore Petitioner prays 1. The Court grant habeas corpus relief forthwith or, in the alternative, order Respondents to show cause why habeas corpus relief should not be granted; 2. For attorney¶s fees and costs of suit herein, and 3. For such other relief as the Court deems fair and just.

Dated: September 9, 2010

Respectfully submitted,

By: __________________ Richard I. Fine, In Pro Per Verification I, Richard I. Fine, state: I am the Petitioner herein. I have read the

aforementioned Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and know the contents thereof to be true to my own knowledge except those statements made on information and belief. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed September 9, 2010 at Los Angeles, California.

_____________________________ Richard I. Fine
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities I. Requested Relief Petitioner (hereinafter ³Fine´) requests that this Court issue a writ of habeas corpus freeing him from the LA County Jail, where he is being incarcerated under a sentence of ³coercive confinement´ pursuant to a Judgment and Order of Contempt (the ³Judgment´) since March 4, 2009, including an order voiding and annulling all orders and judgments in the case of Marina Strand Colony II Homeowners Association v. County of Los Angeles, LASC case no. BS109420 (the ³Marina Strand case´) and the contempt proceeding. II. Factual and Legal Background A. Fraud Upon the Court From the Outset of the Marina Strand Case

As shown in the Verified Petition, from the outset of the Marina Strand case in June 14, 2007: (1) LA County, its attorneys and Judge Yaffe committed fraud upon the court by not disclosing the LA County payments to Judge Yaffe; (2) Judge Yaffe violated: (a) CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) ± by not disqualifying himself; (b) Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4D(1) ± by taking money from LA County; (c) Canon 3E(2) by not disclosing such on the record; (d) Canon 3E(1) by not disqualifying himself; and (e) LA County, its attorneys, real parties in interest ± Del Rey Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Ventures North (³Del Rey Shores´) and its attorneys committed fraud upon the court by not disclosing that
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the LA County Board of Supervisors¶ vote approving the co-application of LA County and Del Rey Shores for an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) was illegal and the LA County certification was illegal. Fraud upon the court vitiates the entire Marina Strand case. All orders and judgments of Judge Yaffe are regarded as nullities and are void. (See U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 64, 66 (1878); Vallely v. Northern Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353-354 (1920); Austin v. Smith, 312 F.2d 337, 343 (1962) ± ³if the underlying judgment is void, the judgment based upon it is void.´). The U.S. Supreme Court stated in U.S. v. Throckmorton at 98 U.S. at 64: ³There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments.´ The Court continued at 98 U.S. at 66: ³Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally with a contract ...´ (citing Wells, Res Adjudicata, Section 499).´ The U.S. Supreme Court further stated in Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353-354: ³Courts are constituted by authority, and they cannot [act] beyond the power delegated to them. If they act beyond that authority, and certainly in contravention of it, their judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and this even prior to reversal. Elliott v. Lessee of Piersol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 340; Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236.´

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This concealment also denied due process to Fine. The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. ___ (2009), Slip Opinion page 7, citing to Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927): ³Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.´ The Supreme Court further stated in Caperton at Slip Opinion page 16 in relevant part: ³Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise when²without the consent of the other parties²a man chooses the judge in his own cause.´ LA County, its attorneys and Judge Yaffe committed ³fraud upon the court´ and obstruction of justice by not disclosing the LA County payments to Judge Yaffe from the outset of the Marina Strand case until March 20, 2008 when Judge Yaffe admitted to such under questioning by Fine at the March 20, 2008 hearing. This was the first hearing at which Fine appeared. The LA County payments to Judge Yaffe amounted to approximately $500,00.00 from 1987, when Judge Yaffe became a LA Superior Court judge, through the present. On December 22, 2008, Judge Yaffe testified in the contempt proceeding that he could not remember a case in the last three years that he decided against LA County. This indicated that the LA County payments were bribes.

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The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that ³justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,´ Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). Therefore, a judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice. B. The Admission of Fraud Upon the Court and Obstruction of Justice in the July 13, 2010 Minute Order

On July 13, 2010, three years and one month after the June 14, 2007 filing of the Marina Stand case, Judge Yaffe admitted in a Minute Order: ³It has been brought to the Court¶s attention that its Order striking Notice of Disqualification dated and filed March 27, 2008, refers to an earlier March 18, 2008 draft order that was not filed . . . .´ ³The Court did not intend to make any finding as to whether Mr. Fine had standing to file a Verified Statement of Disqualification pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.3.´ On June 14, 2010, Judge Yaffe, LA County, its attorneys, Del Rey Shores and its attorneys committed fraud upon the court by not disclosing the LA County payments to Judge Yaffe and the illegality of the LA Supervisors¶ vote for the EIR and the illegal LA County EIR certification, at the outset of the Marina Strand case on June 14, 2007. Nine months later, on March 18, 2008, Judge Yaffe purportedly ³strikes´ Fine¶s February 19, 2008 Motion to Disqualify all LA Superior Court judges receiving money from LA County on the grounds that Fine did not have standing
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to file a Verified Statement of Disqualification pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.3, amongst other reasons. Two and one quarter years later, Judge Yaffe admits on July 13, 2010 that the March 18, 2010 Order did not exist. It was a ³draft order that was not filed.´ From March 18, 2008 to July 13, 2010, Judge Yaffe: (1) refused to leave the Marina Strand case after he was disqualified when he did not respond to Fine¶s March 25, 2008 CCP Section 170.3 Verified Statement of Disqualification; (2) entered an illegal judgment on April 15, 2008 ordering Fine to pay attorney¶s fees to Del Rey Shores; (3) entered an illegal Order to Show Cause Re Contempt against Fine on November 3, 2008; (4) illegally presided over a contempt proceeding against Fine which commenced on December 22, 2008; (5) entered an illegal Judgment and Order of Contempt against Fine on March 4, 2009 ordering Fine to be incarcerated in ³coercive confinement´ in the LA County jail until Fine answered questions about his assets; (6) refused to provide Fine a ³Farr Hearing´ to release Fine from jail; and (7) committed fraud and obstruction of justice upon the LA Superior Court, the U.S. District Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court by concealing and refusing to disclose the fact the March 18, 2008 Order did not exist, and that he and LA County and its attorneys had concealed the LA County payments to him at the outset of the Marina Strand case.

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C.

Due Process Was Violated by Judge Yaffe ³Judging His Own Actions´ and Receiving LA County Payments When It Was a Party Before Him

As shown in the Verified Petition, the underlying issue in the case was whether the criminal payments from LA County to the LA Superior Court judges mandated the recusal of the judge under due process when LA County was a party before the judge. An element of the issue was whether a judge who had taken such payments could judge his own actions in a contempt proceeding. U.S. Supreme Court cases have held that the answers to both questions were that a violation of due process occurred. In In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), cited in Caperton, supra, Slip Opinion page 10, the Court recited the general rule that ³no man can be a judge in his own case,´ adding that ³no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.´ Under Murchison, supra, it was a denial of due process for Judge Yaffe to preside over the contempt proceedings in the Marina Strand case. In the contempt proceeding, Judge Yaffe was deciding his own actions of taking payments from LA County, not recusing himself and making orders in favor of LA County and its co-applicant for an EIR, Del Rey Shores.

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In the underlying Marina Strand case, it was a violation of due process for Judge Yaffe to preside over the case because the LA County payments were illegal, criminal and, particularly, ³bribes.´ The LA County payments were held to be a violation of Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution in Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4th 630 (2008) rev. denied (12/23/08). Subsequently, Senate Bill SBx2-11, enacted February 20, 2009, effective May 21, 2009, acknowledged county payments to judges to be criminal by giving them immunity from criminal prosecution, civil liability and disciplinary action ³because of benefits provided to a judge under the official action of a governmental entity on the grounds that those benefits were not authorized by law.´ The crimes included misappropriation of funds, obstruction of justice and bribery. The retroactive immunity did not extend to the obstruction of justice of presiding over a case in which a County had made a payment to the judge. It was limited on its face to the making and receiving of payments. The receipt of criminal payments from a party is a violation of due process. Again, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that ³justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,´ Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). Therefore, a judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding does not give the appearance of justice.

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The amount of payment to Judge Yaffe, which was $46,366.00 per year, which was approximately 27% of Judge Yaffe¶s $178,800.00 annual state salary (and totals some $500,000.00 to date), had a ³significant and disproportional influence´ ³coupled with the temporal relationship´ between the time of the payments and the Marina Strand case, which was concurrent, to ³offer a possible temptation to the average « judge to « lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.´ Caperton, supra, Slip Opinion page 16, citing to Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986), quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972), in turn quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). Further, the Court in Caperton stated at Slip Opinion page 16: ³Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, similar fears of bias can arise when²without the consent of the other parties²a man chooses the judge in his own cause.´ This occurred in the Marina Strand case and all other cases where LA County paid the LA Superior Court Judges. In the Marina Strand case and the contempt proceeding, Judge Yaffe rejected all of the Supreme Court precedents which mandated his recusal. Judge Yaffe argued that Fine should have disqualified him at the outset of the Marina Strand case, instead of nine months later. He avoided to state that he and LA County and its attorneys had concealed the fact that Judge Yaffe was receiving payments from LA County before the case began and during those nine months.

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Additionally, Fine left as counsel after four months while Judge Yaffe still concealed the payments. However, even after Fine disqualified him on March 25, 2008, Judge Yaffe still refused to leave the case and judged his own actions in the subsequent contempt proceeding. After violating due process in the contempt proceeding, Judge Yaffe ordered Fine to be incarcerated while the writ process proceeded on the issue of whether Judge Yaffe should have recused himself. D. Judge Yaffe¶s Refusal to Set Fine Free

Faced with a Motion that Fine be set free on the grounds that the incarceration was not ³coercive´ but ³punitive´ from the outset, Judge Yaffe again judged his own actions, in violation of Murchison, supra, and denied due process. Additionally, he was precluded from deciding the Motion because he was a witness to the facts and thus was disqualified from deciding the Motion under CCP § 170.1. Yet, on August 23, 2010, Judge Yaffe refused to set Fine free, without having set the Motion or having had a ³Farr Hearing.´ As shown in the Petition, Judge Yaffe knew that the incarceration would not ³coerce´ Fine to answer questions about his assets, as Fine was determined to complete the writ process on the issue of recusal which superseded the contempt judgment. Judge Yaffe knew that if Fine prevailed, Fine would never have to answer questions. Judge Yaffe knew that incarceration was an unlawful

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imprisonment and ³penal´ from the outset as it was not serving any purpose other than to punish Fine for challenging Judge Yaffe for taking criminal LA County payments and bribes. Judge Yaffe further knew that he did not have subject matter jurisdiction in the Marina Strand case due to the fraud upon the court of LA County and its attorneys and himself of concealing the LA County payments to him. He also knew from the contempt proceeding of the fraud upon the court of LA County, its attorneys, Del Rey Shores and its attorneys of concealing the illegality of the LA County Supervisors¶ vote approving the EIR and the illegality of the LA County certification of the EIR. Finally, he knew of his own fraud upon the court and obstruction of justice by concealing the nonexistence of the March 18, 2008 Order. III. Argument A. The Writ Must Be Granted Because Judge Yaffe Judged His Own Actions. Judge Yaffe judged his own actions by denying Fine¶s freedom. The

incarceration was unlawful from the outset because the answering of questions, which was the purpose of the incarceration, was unrelated to the issue of whether Judge Yaffe should have recused himself. By imposing the sentence while knowing that the writ process was proceeding and that Fine was not going to answer any questions during such
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process, Judge Yaffe was not acting to coerce Fine to answer questions. He was incarcerating Fine to stop him from pursuing his right to habeas corpus relief and he was acting to punish Fine for challenging Judge Yaffe¶s taking of the criminal LA County payments. By refusing to free Fine himself, rather than giving it to another judge as he was required to do under CCP § 170.1, Judge Yaffe violated due process. (See Murchison, supra.) B. The Writ Must be Granted Because ³Coercive Confinement´ Did Not Exist and the Incarceration was Unlawful and Penal from the Outset. As shown in the Petition, Judge Yaffe knew that ³coercive confinement´ to answer questions would not work from the outset. Further, as shown in the LA Superior Court and Judge Yaffe¶s Answering Brief, it was admitted that the incarceration was ³criminal,´ i.e., penal. As such, the incarceration was not only unlawful, but could only last for five days under CCP § 1218. It has now lasted for over eighteen (18) months. C. Under the Farr Case and U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, the Incarceration Became Penal Immediately. Under the case of In Re Farr, 36 Cal.App.3d 577, 584 (1974), cited in In Re William T. Farr on Habeas Corpus, 64 Cal.App.3d 605, 611-612 (1976) ± ³once it was established that there was no substantial likelihood that such contempt order

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would serve its coercive purpose, the commitment would become punitive in nature and thus subject to the statutory limitation.´ As of March 4, 2009, as shown in the Petition, Judge Yaffe knew that Fine was not going to answer any questions unless he lost all the writ proceedings. Fine told him so. Fine also suggested that the sentence be delayed until after the writ proceedings were completed. Judge Yaffe refused. At such time, Judge Yaffe knew that there was no substantial likelihood that the contempt order would serve its coercive purpose and, as of March 4, 2009, the commitment became punitive in nature and subject to the statutory five-day limitation. Fine should have been released on March 9, 2009 at the latest. U.S. Supreme Court precedents hold that confinement beyond the time that bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose for which the person is committed is a denial of due process. (See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) and McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972)). A reasonable relationship was interpreted in the Jackson and McNeil cases to mean ³penal´ confinement under state law. In California, ³penal´ confinement for contempt of court is five (5) days under CCP Section 1218. Fine has been incarcerated for over eighteen (18) months.

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D. The Writ Must be Granted Because the Actions of Judge Yaffe are a Sham. In his Response to the January 27, 2010 Demand, Judge Yaffe claimed he did not receive a service copy. However, the attached Declaration of John Fred Sottile showed that a service copy was hand-delivered to Judge Yaffe¶s clerk, who then returned it and refused to take it, stating that she would only accept the original. It was clear that Judge Yaffe would have known this. In the same Response, Judge Yaffe struck as repetitive that part of the Demand which showed that he was recused under the U.S. Supreme Court cases. This was another example of Judge Yaffe¶s refusal to adhere to the U.S. Supreme Court¶s precedents. He has taken the position that cases like Murchison, supra, do not apply to him. He evidently is also of the opinion that CCP § 170.1 and the Code of Judicial Ethics do not apply to him. Judge Yaffe, in again judging his own actions as he did in the contempt proceeding, concluded that there is no proof that his Judgment would not serve its coercive purpose when he was told it would not on March 4, 2009 and, eleven and a half months later, Fine still had not answered questions, was still incarcerated, and the writ process was still proceeding. Judge Yaffe¶s argument in his Response that Fine should wait until after the writ process was over and then tell Judge Yaffe if Fine was willing to answer questions showed that Judge Yaffe¶s true intent on March 4, 2009 was not to
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³coerce´ Fine to answer questions through the incarceration, but to punish Fine for challenging Judge Yaffe for taking criminal payments from LA County, not disclosing such, and presiding over LA County cases and deciding in favor of LA County. In short, violating due process. On May 21, 2010, when the Supreme Court process was nearing a conclusion, Fine again moved for a ³Farr Hearing.´ Judge Yaffe refused to hear the Motion. He even refused to set it on calendar after the Motion was filed and the fees paid. On July 13, 2010, Judge Yaffe served his June 18, 2010 Minute Order requesting other parties in the case to search for Fine¶s assets and file declarations and serve them personally or by fax. The only party to respond was Del Rey Shores, who did not serve Fine personally or by fax. Fine filed a Declaration Showing No Service by anyone. Judge Yaffe responded by Minute Order, including a copy of the Del Rey Shores Declaration. Fine filed an August 20, 2010 Declaration stating he would not answer any questions, and the reasons therefore, such reasons being the fraud upon the court and obstruction of justice, amongst others. On August 23, 2010, Judge Yaffe, without having had a hearing and by judging his own actions, refused to set Fine free. He did not give any legal reason.

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Conclusion LA County payments to state-employed trial court judges have been occurring since the late 1980s, according to the Sturgeon decision. LA County and the LA Superior Court have known that these payments were illegal since at least November 10, 1988, as shown by a letter from Roger W. Whitby, Senior Assistant, LA County Counsel, approved by DeWitt W. Clinton, LA County Counsel, to Frank S. Zolin, County Clerk / Executive Officer, LA Superior Court, dated November 10, 1988. The letter was produced by LA County in the appellate phase of the Sturgeon case. The LA County payments to the state court trial judges in the LA Superior Court over the 23-year time period of 1987 through the present is estimated to be approximately $300 million. This number is based upon the $127,250,000 paid from 1999-2006. As shown in documents in the Sturgeon case, the approximate $90 million paid from 2006 to 2010, and the approximate $100 million paid from 1987 to 2006. All of the payments were illegal. Based upon the fact that only two cases were decided against LA County by LA Superior Court judges from fiscal year 2005-2006 to 2007-2008, these payments may also be bribes. In fiscal year 20082009, one case was decided against LA County by a LA Superior Court judge.

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From 1987 through the present, Judge Yaffe received approximately $500,000.00 in payments from LA County. According to his December 22, 2008 testimony in the contempt proceeding, he could not remember any case in the last three years that he decided against LA County. Judge Yaffe, LA County and its attorneys committed fraud upon the court by concealing the LA County payments to Judge Yaffe at the outset of the Marina Strand case. Judge Yaffe violated CCP Section 170.1(a)(6)(A)(iii) by not disqualifying himself at the outset of the Marina Strand case. He violated Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4D(1) ± by taking payments from LA County; 3E(2) ± by not disclosing such payments on the record; and 3E(1) ± by not disqualifying himself at the outset of the case. LA County, its attorneys, Del Rey Shores and its attorneys committed fraud upon the court by concealing the illegality of the LA County Supervisors¶ vote approving the EIR and the illegality of the certification of the EIR by LA County at the outset of the Marina Strand case. The frauds upon the court vitiated the Marina Strand case and voided and annulled all judgments and orders of Judge Yaffe, including those of the contempt proceeding, even before reversal, under U.S. Supreme Court precedents of Throckmorton, supra, and Vallely, supra.

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The LA County payments to Judge Yaffe violated due process under the Supreme Court precedents of Caperton, supra, citing Tumey, supra. Judge Yaffe¶s presiding over the contempt proceeding violated due process of a ³judge judging his own actions´, as set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Caperton, supra, citing Murchison, supra. Judge Yaffe¶s admission in the July 13, 2010 Minute Order that the March.18, 2008 Order was a draft order that was not filed showed his fraud upon the court, and obstruction of justice. He concealed this information from the LA Superior Court, the U.S. District Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court for 2¼ years. He did not disclose such until after the Petition for Certiorari was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court. Judge Yaffe ordered Fine incarcerated under a ³coercive confinement´ on March 4, 2009, knowing that he had committed fraud upon the court and had obstructed justice. He knew that he did not have subject matter jurisdiction in the Marina Strand case, that he could not preside over the contempt proceeding, and that he should have recused himself in each of the proceedings. Judge Yaffe further knew on March 4, 2009 that incarceration of Fine would not serve the purpose of the contempt order as he did not have jurisdiction to act and that Fine was not going to answer any questions during the writ proceedings.

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Judge Yaffe violated due process as set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Jackson, supra, and McNeil, supra, by keeping Fine imprisoned beyond five days. He also violated due process by denying Fine a ³Farr Hearing´ and by refusing to set Fine free and not transferring the case to another judge to determine the issue of setting Fine free. In summary, there has not been one relevant Supreme Court precedent that Judge Yaffe has not violated. Judge Yaffe¶s resignation from office in the midst of charges of obstruction of justice is a parallel to Richard Nixon, who resigned the Presidency for having obstructed justice in the Watergate investigation. The California judicial system has been broken for over twenty years due to the illegal county payments to 90% of the state¶s judges. Judge Yaffe¶s resignation demonstrated that the system can be restored and the errant judges removed. The next step is for the Court to obey U.S. Supreme Court precedents and grant the writ, including issuing an order that all judgments and orders in the Marina Strand case and the contempt proceeding are void and annulled.

Dated: September 9, 2010

Respectfully submitted,

By: __________________ Richard I. Fine, In Pro Per
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CERTIFICATION (CRC Rule 8.504(d)) I hereby certify that the foregoing Petition and Memorandum of Authorities contain 9,771 words, according to the word count system of Word 2002, including the title page. Dated: September _____, 2010 By: ___________________ John Fred Sottile

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Declaration of John Fred Sottile I, John Fred Sottile, declare: The following facts are within my personal knowledge and, if called to testify, I could and would competently testify thereto as follows: 1. On January 27, 2010, I went to the filing window at the courthouse at

111 N. Hill Street in Los Angeles. The document that I was there to file on behalf of Richard I. Fine included a Proof of Service that had six names on it, including Judge David P. Yaffe, who was to receive a courtesy copy. When I handed the filing to the clerk, I was informed that it had to be filed directly with Judge Yaffe¶s clerk in Dept. 86. 2. I took the elevator up to his courtroom, where I met his clerk and a

person in uniform whom I assume was a bailiff. The bailiff read the first three or four pages of the document out loud to the clerk, who told her to accept and conform the copies. The bailiff conformed four copies and handed me three back. I, now having too many extra copies, offered the woman an extra copy, one for a file and one for the judge. She said ³No, one would be fine.´ I said, again, ³I have plenty of extra copies, are you sure?´ She said again, ³No, one will be fine.´ I then said, ³Well at least take the original.´ She told me that it was not important to have the original. I said, ³Well, if it doesn¶t matter, do me a favor and take the original.´ She took it and just turned her back on me and went back to work.

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3.

Considering that I had handed a copy and offered an extra copy to

Judge Yaffe¶s people in his very courtroom, I saw no need to also mail a copy. 4. I can¶t imagine how an attempt at personal service such as this could

be construed as not being served. I still have conformed copies in my possession to prove that I was there. 5. copy. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct under the laws of the State of California. Executed this ____ day of September, 2010, at Rancho Dominguez, California. By: ___________________ John Fred Sottile Judge Yaffe¶s response could only have been made with his having a

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PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES I am Fred Sottile. My address is 2601 E. Victoria Street, # 108, Rancho Dominguez, CA 90220. I am over the age of eighteen years and am not a party to the above-entitled action. On September _____, 2010, I served the foregoing document described as VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND DECLARATION OF JOHN FRED SOTTILE on interested parties in this action by depositing a true copy thereof, which was enclosed in a sealed envelope, with postage fully prepaid, in the United States Mail, addressed as follows:

See attached list of Interested Parties and Their Counsel I certify and declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America and the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on this _____ day of September, 2010, at Rancho Dominguez, California. _______________________________ FRED SOTTILE

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Interested Parties & Their Counsel of Record

Party: Los Angeles Superior Court Interested Party: Judge David P. Yaffe Counsel: Kevin M. McCormick BENTON, ORR, DUVAL & BUCKINGHAM 39 N. California Street P.O. Box 1178 Ventura, CA 93002 Party: Sheriff Leroy D. Baca Counsel: Aaron Mitchell Fontana Counsel: Paul B. Beach LAWRENCE BEACH ALLEN & CHOI, PC 100 West Broadway, Ste. 1200 Glendale, CA 91210-1219 Interested Party: Del Rey Shores Dev¶t. Counsel: Joshua Lee Rosen JOSHUA L ROSEN LAW OFFICES 5905 Sherbourne Drive Los Angeles , CA 90056 Interested Party: CA Atty Gen¶l Edmund G. Brown, Jr. Attorney General of California CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Ste. 1100 San Francisco, CA 94102 Petitioner: Richard I. Fine, In Pro Per Prisoner No. 1824367 c/o Los Angeles County Men¶s Central Jail 441 Bauchet Street Los Angeles, CA 90012

Interested Party: Los Angeles County Counsel: Elaine M. Lemke Principal Deputy County Counsel L.A. COUNTY COUNSEL OFFICE 500 West Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012-2713

Interested Party: Judge David P. Yaffe L.A. COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 111 North Hill Street, Dept. 86 Los Angeles, CA 90012

Interested Party: Del Rey Shores Dev¶t. Counsel: R.J. Comer ARMBRUSTER & GOLDSMITH, LLP 10940 Wilshire Blvd., Ste. 2100 Los Angeles, CA 90024 Interested Party: Marina Strand Homeowners Counsel: Rose M. Zoia 50 Old Courthouse Square, Ste.401 Santa Rosa, CA 95404

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