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Nash Equilibrium

A solution concept in game theory

Relationships Subset of Rationalizability, Epsilon-equilibrium, Correlated equilibrium Evolutionarily stable strategy, Subgame perfect Superset equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, of Trembling hand perfect equilibrium, Stable Nash equilibrium, Strong Nash equilibrium Significance Proposed by John Forbes Nash

Used for All non-cooperative games Example Rock paper scissors

In game theory, Nash equilibrium (named after John Forbes Nash, who proposed it) is a solution concept of a game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy unilaterally. If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other players keep theirs unchanged, then the current set of strategy choices and the corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium. Stated simply, Amy and Bill are in Nash equilibrium if Amy is making the best decision she can, taking into account Bill's decision, and Bill is making the best decision he can, taking into account Amy's decision. Likewise, a group of players is in Nash equilibrium if each one is making the best decision that he or she can, taking into account the decisions of the others. However, Nash equilibrium does not necessarily mean the best cumulative payoff for all the players involved; in many cases all the players might improve their payoffs if they could somehow agree on strategies different from the Nash equilibrium (e.g., competing businesses forming a cartel in order to increase their profits).

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1 Applications 2 History

2 Prisoner's dilemma 4. Instead. it is a way of predicting what will happen if several people or several institutions are making decisions at the same time. It has also been used to study to what extent people with different preferences can cooperate .1 Examples 9 Computing Nash equilibria 10 See also 11 Notes 12 References ○ ○ ○ 12. we must ask what each player would do.1 Where the conditions are not met 6.2 Where the conditions are met • • • • • • 7 NE and non-credible threats 8 Proof of existence ○ ○ 8.3 Network traffic 4. taking into account the decisionmaking of the others. In other words. Nash equilibrium has been used to analyze hostile situations like war and arms races[1] (see Prisoner's dilemma). and also how conflict may be mitigated by repeated interaction (see Tit-fortat).1 Coordination game 4.5 Nash equilibria in a payoff matrix • 4 Examples ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ • • 5 Stability 6 Occurrence ○ ○ 6.2 Formal definition 4.• 3 Definitions ○ ○ 3.1 Informal definition 3.3 Other references • 13 External links [edit] Applications The Nash equilibrium concept is used to analyze the outcome of the strategic interaction of several decision makers.1 Game theory textbooks 12. and if the outcome depends on the decisions of the others.1 Alternate proof using the Brouwer fixed point theorem 9.2 Original Nash papers 12.4 Competition game 4. The simple insight underlying John Nash's idea is that we cannot predict the result of the choices of multiple decision makers if we analyze those decisions in isolation.

[3] . The contribution of John Forbes Nash in his 1951 article Non-Cooperative Games was to define a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium for any game with a finite set of actions and prove that at least one (mixed strategy) Nash Equilibrium must exist in such a game. imagine that each player is told the strategies of the others. [edit] Definitions [edit] Informal definition Informally. the best output for one firm depends on the outputs of others. and also the occurrence of bank runs and currency crises (see Coordination game). a set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if no player can do better by unilaterally changing his or her strategy. and treating the strategies of the other players as set in stone. subsequent refinements and extensions of the Nash equilibrium concept share the main insight on which Nash's concept rests: all equilibrium concepts analyze what choices will be made when each player takes into account the decision-making of others. how to organize auctions (see Auction theory). game theorists have discovered that it makes misleading predictions (or fails to make a unique prediction) in certain circumstances. and even penalty kicks in soccer (see Matching pennies). then that set of strategies is not a Nash equilibrium. Therefore. One particularly important issue is that some Nash equilibria may be based on threats that are not 'credible'. However. They showed that a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium will exist for any zero-sum game with a finite set of actions. each strategy in a Nash equilibrium is a best response to all other strategies in that equilibrium. Suppose then that each player asks himself or herself: "Knowing the strategies of the other players. The modern game-theoretic concept of Nash Equilibrium is instead defined in terms of mixed strategies. Therefore they have proposed many related solution concepts (also called 'refinements' of Nash equilibrium) designed to overcome perceived flaws in the Nash concept. Since the development of the Nash equilibrium concept. or what happens if a game is played in the absence of perfect information. firms choose how much output to produce to maximize their own profit. Other applications include traffic flow (see Wardrop's principle). It has been used to study the adoption of technical standards.[2] [edit] History A version of the Nash equilibrium concept was first used by Antoine Augustin Cournot in his theory of oligopoly (1838). their analysis was restricted to the special case of zero-sum games. However. which is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. and whether they will take risks to achieve a cooperative outcome (see Stag hunt). in 1965 Reinhard Selten proposed subgame perfect equilibrium as a refinement that eliminates equilibria which depend on non-credible threats. But if every player prefers not to switch (or is indifferent between switching and not) then the set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium. In Cournot's theory. Other extensions of the Nash equilibrium concept have addressed what happens if a game is repeated. The concept of the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium was introduced by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their 1944 book The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. To see what this means. A Cournot equilibrium occurs when each firm's output maximizes its profits given the output of the other firms. where players choose a probability distribution over possible actions. However. can I benefit by changing my strategy?" If any player would answer "Yes". Thus.(see Battle of the sexes).

. for some player.. n} chooses strategy xi resulting in strategy profile x = (x1. Note that the payoff depends on the strategy profile chosen. with an example payoff matrix shown to the right. X Sn is the set of strategy profiles and f=(f1(x).... i. An . that is A game can have either a pure-strategy or a mixed Nash Equilibrium. . 3 3.The Nash equilibrium may sometimes appear non-rational in a third-person perspective. there is exact equality between and some other strategy in the set S. This is because it may happen that a Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.. i. For such games the Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium may be more meaningful as a tool of analysis..e.. Player 2 adopts strategy A Player 1 adopts strategy A Player 1 adopts strategy B 4. The Nash equilibrium may also have non-rational consequences in sequential games because players may "threaten" each other with non-rational moves.. neither player has incentive to change strategy due to a reduction in the immediate payoff (from 3 to 1). When the inequality above holds strictly (with > instead of ) for all players and all feasible alternative strategies.. Let x − i be a strategy profile of all players except for player i.e. on the strategy chosen by player i as well as the strategies chosen by all the other players. If instead.. there is still a Nash equilibrium. 4 3. then the equilibrium is classified as a weak Nash equilibrium. 1 Player 2 adopts strategy B 1. [edit] Formal definition Let (S. The players should thus coordinate. both adopting strategy A. then every n-player game in which every player can choose from finitely many strategies admits at least one Nash equilibrium. . When each player i {1. A strategy profile x* S is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no unilateral deviation in strategy by any single player is profitable for that player. (in the latter a pure strategy is chosen stochastically with a fixed frequency). f) be a game with n players. where Si is the strategy set for player i. S=S1 X S2 . two strategy game. Although each player is awarded less than optimal payoff. Nash proved that if we allow mixed strategies. 3 A sample coordination game showing relative payoff for player1 / player2 with each combination [edit] Examples [edit] Coordination game Main article: Coordination game The coordination game is a classic (symmetric) two player. then the equilibrium is classified as a strict Nash equilibrium. to receive the highest payoff. If both players chose strategy B though. .. fn(x)) is the payoff function. 4. xn) then player i obtains payoff fi(x).

What has long made this an interesting case to study is the fact that D < A (i. each player improves his situation by switching from strategy #1 to strategy #2. when Drive on the Right 0. (100%. high sales are expected for both firms. few sales result. where the probabilities are (0%. 100%) for player two. then there are three Nash equilibria for the same case: two we have seen from the pure-strategy form. it is not an equilibrium. If we admit mixed strategies (where a pure strategy is chosen at random. 50%).100%) for player one. If the firms do not agree on the standard technology. is also a coordination game. but now C > A > D > B. The Prisoner's Dilemma thus has a single Nash Equilibrium: both players choosing strategy #2 ("betraying"). no matter what the other player decides. Because C > A and D > B. [edit] Network traffic See also: Braess's Paradox . (0%. 0 equilibria. with payoffs 100 meaning no crash and 0 meaning a crash. 100 both choose to either drive on The driving game the left or on the right. [edit] Prisoner's dilemma Main article: Prisoner's dilemma (note differences in the orientation of the payoff matrix) The Prisoner's Dilemma has the same payoff matrix as depicted for the Coordination Game. the coordination game can be defined with the following payoff matrix: Drive on the In this case there Drive on the Right Left are two pure strategy Nash Drive on the Left 100. and having to choose either to drive on the left or to drive on the right of the road.e. 0 100. Driving on a road. "both betray" is globally inferior to "both remain loyal"). We add another where the probabilities for each player is (50%. The globally optimal strategy is unstable. If both firms agree on the chosen technology. 0%) for player two respectively. 100 0.example of a coordination game is the setting where two technologies are available to two firms with compatible products. For example. Both strategies are Nash equilibria of the game. and they have to elect a strategy to become the market standard. 0%) for player one. subject to some fixed probability).. and (100%.

75. the goal in this case is to minimize travel time. socially optimal. X is the number of cars travelling via that edge. The "payoff" of each strategy is the travel time of each route. or ACD). 50 via ABCD. as is usual. ABCD. When that happens. If we assume that there are n "cars" traveling from A to D. Consider the graph on the right. which is less than 3. Values on edges are the travel time experienced by a 'car' travelling down that edge. [edit] Competition game .75. if. not maximize it. 100 cars are travelling from A to D. where x is the number of cars traveling on edge AB. For the graph on the right.Sample network graph. where each strategy is a route from A to D (either ABD. Thus. and 25 via ACD. for example.5. However. In the graph on the right. then travel time for any single car would actually be 3. then equilibrium will occur when 25 drivers travel via ABD. Equilibrium will occur when the time on all paths is exactly the same. no single driver has any incentive to switch routes. since it can only add to his/her travel time. Notice that this distribution is not. what is the expected distribution of traffic in the network? This situation can be modeled as a "game" where every traveler has a choice of 3 strategies. An application of Nash equilibria is in determining the expected flow of traffic in a network. actually. payoffs for any given strategy depend on the choices of the other players. If the 100 cars agreed that 50 travel via ABD and the other 50 through ACD. Every driver now has a total travel time of 3. a car travelling via ABD experiences travel time of (1 + x / 100) + 2.

2 1. 0 2. 1 3. 40 5. 25 0. This game has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium: both players choosing 0 (highlighted in light red). and otherwise win nothing.1.A) 40 is the maximum of the first column and 25 is the maximum of the second row. -1 3. 2 -1. For (A. For other cells. 10 than with formal Option B 40. We can apply this rule to a 3x3 matrix: Option A Option B Option C Using the rule. Same for cell (C.3). A Payoff Matrix Indeed. 5 15. 0 25. 2 -1. then there are 4 Nash equilibria (0.and 3. 3 0. In the table to the left.A). 3 '3' larger number than the other. [edit] Nash equilibria in a payoff matrix There is an easy numerical way to identify Nash Equilibria on a Payoff Matrix.C).C). for cell (B. The rule goes as follows: if the first payoff number. This rule does not apply to the case where mixed (stochastic) strategies are of interest. if one Player 1 chooses player chooses a -2. 4 3.B) 25 is the maximum of the second column and 40 is the maximum of the first row. (A.B). -1 '1' they both win the smaller of the two Player 1 chooses -2. In this case formal analysis may become too long. 0 numbers in points. for example. 0 5. we can very quickly (much faster Option A 0. -2 2. 15 analysis) see that the Nash Equlibria cells are Option C 10. 2 4... 3 2. when starting at the green square it is in player 1's interest to move to the purple square by choosing a smaller number.1.0.2. .then the cell represents a Nash equilibrium. 10 (B. -2 2. in the duplet of the cell. Any other choice of strategies can be improved if one of the players lowers his number to one less than the other player's number. is the maximum of the column of the cell and if the second number is the maximum of the row of the cell .. and it is in player 2's interest to move to the blue square by choosing a smaller number. -2 '0' choose an integer Player 1 chooses from 0 to 3 and -2. '2' In addition.This can be Player Player Player Player illustrated by a 2 2 2 2 two-player game chooses chooses chooses chooses in which both '0' '1' '2' '3' players Player 1 chooses simultaneously 0. then A competition game he/she has to give up two points to the other. If the game is modified so that the two players win the named amount if they both choose the same number.. either one or both of the duplet members are not the maximum of the corresponding rows and columns. It is especially helpful in two-person games where players have more than two strategies.. and (C. 5 10.2..

100%) or (100%. Check all columns this way to find all NE cells. Strong Nash almost never exists. [edit] Stability The concept of stability. the Strong Nash concept is some times perceived too "strong" in that the environment allows for unlimited private communication. a Strong Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which no coalition. an infinitesimal change) in probabilities for one player leads to a situation where two conditions hold: 1. useful in the analysis of many kinds of equilibria. CPNE is related to the theory of the core. [edit] Occurrence . since any minute change in the proportions of each strategy seen will lead to a change in strategy and the breakdown of the equilibrium. If condition one does not hold then the equilibrium is unstable. 0%). they will be both at a disadvantage. the cell represents a Nash Equilibrium. can cooperatively deviate in a way that benefits all of its members [5]. An NxN matrix may have between 0 and NxN pure strategy Nash equilibria. If either player changes his probabilities slightly. If either player changes his probabilities. John Nash showed that the latter situation could not arise in a range of well-defined games. can also be applied to Nash equilibria. The equilibria involving mixed-strategies with 100% probabilities are stable. Strong Nash equilibrium has to be Pareto efficient. the player who did not change has no better strategy in the new circumstance 2. but has to be inferred from statistical distribution of his actions in the game. Stability is crucial in practical applications of Nash equilibria. If only condition one holds then there are likely to be an infinite number of optimal strategies for the player who changed. Strong Nash equilibrium allows for deviations by every conceivable coalition [4]. As a result of these requirements. If these conditions are met. The equilibrium is said to be stable. A Nash equilibrium for a mixed strategy game is stable if a small change (specifically. k. then a player with the small change in his mixed-strategy will return immediately to the Nash equilibrium.This said. since the mixed-strategy of each player is not perfectly known. In cooperative games such concept is not convincing enough. The Nash equilibrium defines stability only in terms of unilateral deviations. The (50%. However. In the "driving game" example above there are both stable and unstable equilibria. A refined Nash Equilibrium known as Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibrium (CPNE)[4] occurs when players cannot do better even if they are allowed to communicate and make "self-enforcing" agreement to deviate. the actual mechanics of finding equilibrium cells is obvious: find the maximum of a column and check if the second member of the pair is the maximum of the row. then the other player immediately has a better strategy at either (0%. taking the actions of its complements as given. In this case unstable equilibria are very unlikely to arise in practice. the player who did change is now playing with a strictly worse strategy.50%) equilibrium is unstable. Further. In fact. and his opponent will have no reason to change his strategy in turn. If these cases are both met. Every correlated strategy supported by iterated strict dominance and on the Pareto frontier is a CPNE[6]. Formally. it is possible for a game to have a Nash equilibrium that is resilient against coalitions less than a specified size.

all the other criteria. 2. 5.If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium and is played among players under certain conditions. and know that they know that they know that they meet them. both are the fundamental bottom line of survival. The players have sufficient intelligence to deduce the solution.[7] Or. Introduction of imperfection will lead to its disruption either through loss to the player who makes the mistake. This is a major consideration in “Chicken” or an arms race. In this case there is no particular reason for that player to adopt an equilibrium strategy. The players all will do their utmost to maximize their expected payoff as described by the game. In many cases. 3. it may not be known to all players. as a theoretical concept in economics and evolutionary biology. Players wrongly distrusting each other's rationality may adopt counter-strategies to expected irrational play on their opponents’ behalf. There is common knowledge that all players meet these conditions. even though the equilibrium must exist. it is unknown due to the complexity of the game. meet [edit] Where the conditions are met Due to the limited conditions in which NE can actually be observed. and so on. This conclusion is drawn from the "stability" theory above. but also they must know that they all know that they meet them. 3. The criterion of common knowledge may not be met even if all players do. or observed in practice in human negotiations. or through negation of the common knowledge criterion leading to possible victory for the player. a computer capable of flawless logical play facing a second flawless computer will result in equilibrium. Sufficient conditions to guarantee that the Nash equilibrium is played are: 1. However. for instance in Chinese chess. as when playing tic-tac-toe with a small child who desperately wants to win (meeting the other criteria). [edit] Where the conditions are not met Examples of game theory problems in which these conditions are not met: 1. Intentional or accidental imperfection in execution. So. including this one. the NE has explanatory power. in fact. Researchers who apply games theory in these fields claim that strategies failing to maximize these for whatever reason will be competed out of the market or environment. and in evolutionary biology gene transmission. they are rarely treated as a guide to day-to-day behaviour. the third condition is not met because. The first condition is not met if the game does not correctly describe the quantities a player wishes to maximize. The payoff in economics is utility (or sometimes money). not only must each player know the other players meet the conditions. ensuring a no-loss no-win scenario). 6. the prisoner’s dilemma is not a dilemma if either player is happy to be jailed indefinitely. 4. for example. if known. In these situations the assumption . For example. The players are flawless in execution. The players believe that a deviation in their own strategy will not cause deviations by any other players. (An example would be a player suddenly putting the car into reverse in the game of chicken. 2. For instance. which are ascribed the ability to test all strategies. 4. then the NE strategy set will be adopted. The players know the planned equilibrium strategy of all of the other players.

player two only stands to gain from being unkind if player one goes left. if rational behavior can be expected by both parties the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium may be a more meaningful solution concept when such dynamic inconsistencies arise. bi is a relation from the set of all probability distributions over opponent player profiles to a set of player i's strategies. However. Therefore. Define . This eliminates all non-credible threats. that is. The image to the right shows a simple sequential game that illustrates the issue with subgame imperfect Nash equilibria. However. The non-credible threat of being unkind at 2(2) is still part of the blue (L. such that each element of is a best response to σ − i. [edit] Proof of existence As above.[verification needed] [edit] NE and non-credible threats Extensive and Normal form illustrations that show the difference between SPNE and other NE. strategies that contain non-rational moves in order to make the counter-player change his strategy. The Nash equilibrium is a superset of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. bi.that the strategy observed is actually a NE has often been borne out by research[citation needed]. The blue equilibrium is not subgame perfect because player two makes a non-credible threat at 2(2) to be unkind (U).U)) Nash equilibrium. If player one goes right the rational player two would de facto be kind to him in that subgame. The subgame perfect equilibrium in addition to the Nash Equilibrium requires that the strategy also is a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of that game. let σ − i be a mixed strategy profile of all players except for player i. We can define a best response correspondence for player i. In this game player one chooses left(L) or right(R). which is followed by player two being called upon to be kind (K) or unkind (U) to player one. (U.

) [edit] Alternate proof using the Brouwer fixed point theorem We have a game G = (N." (See Nasar. you know. No player could do any better by deviating. Let for . All of the action sets Ai are finite. The finiteness of the Ais ensures the compactness of Δ. When Nash made this point to John von Neumann in 1949. the existence of the fixed point proves that there is some strategy set which is a best response to itself. It is also easy to check that each fi is a continuous function of σ. Now Δ is the cross product of a finite number of compact convex sets. We see that We now use g to define as follows.A. p. 94.u) where N is the number of players and the action set for the players. 1998. We can now define the gain functions. "That's trivial. That is.One can use the Kakutani fixed point theorem to prove that b has a fixed point. Since b(σ * ) represents the best response for all players to σ * . and it is therefore a Nash equilibrium. von Neumann famously dismissed it with the words. we let the gain for player i is The gain function represents the benefit a player gets by unilaterally changing his strategy. We now define where for . Let denote the set of mixed strategies for the players. there is a σ * such that . and so we get that Δ is also compact and . and hence f is a continuous function. It is easy to see that each fi is a valid mixed strategy in Δi. For a mixed strategy on action be . That's just a fixed point theorem.

convex.a) = 0. giving us that the entire expression is 0 as needed. we first note that if Gaini(σ * . Therefore we may apply the Brouwer fixed point theorem to f. Note then that . Also we shall denote as the gain vector indexed by . By our previous statements we have that and so the left term is zero.a) > 0 then this is true by definition of the gain function. So f has a fixed point in Δ. Gaini(σ * . To see this. For this purpose. . Since f(σ * ) = σ * we clearly have that Since C > 1 we have that that is some positive scaling of the vector . and such that So let . Therefore. So we finally have that . Now assume that the gains are not all zero.a) > 0. I claim that σ * is a Nash Equilibrium in G. Now I claim . call it σ * . Now assume that Gaini(σ * . Therefore we see that actions in Ai. it suffices to show that This simply states the each player gains no benefit by unilaterally changing his strategy which is exactly the necessary condition for being a Nash Equilibrium.

the sum of the probabilities for each strategy of a particular player should be 1.where the last inequality follows since is a non-zero vector. assign A the probability p of playing H and (1−p) of playing T. In addition. But this is a clear contradiction. [edit] Computing Nash equilibria If a player A has a dominant strategy sA then there exists a Nash equilibrium in which A plays sA. and assign B the probability q of playing H and (1−q) of playing T. Therefore σ * is a Nash Equilibrium for G as needed. If sA is a strictly dominant strategy. A plays sA in all Nash equilibria. the probability of a player choosing any particular strategy can be computed by assigning a variable to each strategy that represents a fixed probability for choosing that strategy. +1 point to B if A and Player B plays T B play the same Matching pennies strategy and wins a point from B if they play different strategies. so all the gains must indeed be zero.[3] [edit] Examples Player A plays H Player A plays T In the matching pennies game. Player B plays H −1. This creates a system of equations from which the probabilities of choosing each strategy can be derived. −1 −1. −1 player A loses a +1. his expected payoff for each strategy should be the same. . In games with mixed strategy Nash equilibria. If both A and B have strictly dominant strategies. In the case of two players A and B. there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which each plays his strictly dominant strategy. +1 +1. To compute the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. there exists a Nash equilibrium in which A plays sA and B plays a best response to sA. In order for a player to be willing to randomize.

Thomas. Groseclose (2002). Chiappori. S. 1138-51.E[payoff for A playing H] = (−1)q + (+1)(1−q) = 1−2q E[payoff for A playing T] = (+1)q + (−1)(1−q) = 2q−1 E[payoff for A playing H] = E[payoff for A playing T] ⇒ 1−2q = 2q−1 ⇒ q = 1/2 E[payoff for B playing H] = (+1)p + (−1)(1−p) = 2p−1 E[payoff for B playing T] = (−1)p + (+1)(1−p) = 1−2p E[payoff for B playing H] = E[payoff for B playing T] ⇒ 2p−1 = 1−2p ⇒ p = 1/2 Thus a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this game is for each player to randomly choose H or T with equal probability. pp. 'Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer'. . Harvard University Press. ^ P. American Economic Review 92. and T. 1980. [edit] See also • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Adjusted Winner procedure Best response Braess's paradox Complementarity theory Conflict resolution research Cooperation Evolutionarily stable strategy Game theory Glossary of game theory Hotelling's law Mexican Standoff Minimax theorem Optimum contract and par contract Prisoner's dilemma Relations between equilibrium concepts Self-confirming equilibrium Solution concept Equilibrium selection Stackelberg competition Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium Wardrop's principle [edit] Notes 1. ^ Schelling. copyright 1960. 2. The Strategy of Conflict. Levitt. ISBN 0674840313.

B. Essentials of Game Theory: A Concise. Princeton. Fudenberg. Concepts". MIT Press. Roger B. ^ Nash proved that a perfect NE exists for this type of finite extensive form game[citation needed] – it can be represented as a strategy complying with his original conditions for a game with a NE. A comprehensive reference from a computational perspective. A course in game theory. (1997). ISBN 978-0-674-34116-6 Rubinstein. Lucid and detailed introduction to game theory in an explicitly economic context. ^ R. Game-Theoretic.. Avinash and Susan Skeath.0095. ISBN 978-0-691-00395-5 . Such games may not have unique NE.1996. San Rafael. M. and Logical Foundations. ISBN 978-1-598-29593-1. Introduction to Nash equilibrium. ^ D. Game theory: analysis of conflict.org . ISBN 978-0-262-65040-3 . ^ a b B. D. Martin J. doi:10. Gibbons. Aumann. Free online at many universities. MIT Press.1016/0022-0531(87)90099-8.pdf. Journal of Economic Theory 42: 1–12. Robert (1992). Oskar and John von Neumann (1947) The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior Princeton University Press Myerson.masfoundations. Ariel. (1999). W. Martin. Osborne.scienceoftheweb. [edit] References [edit] Game theory textbooks • • • • Dixit. Wooders (1996). Harvard University Press. Yoav. (1959). Game Theory for Applied Economists. "Coalition-Proof Equilibria I. An introduction to game theory. • • • • • • [edit] Original Nash papers .org/15-396/lectures/lecture08. Whinston (1987). http://www. New York: Cambridge University Press. Shoham. Leyton-Brown. 1992). N. 7. ISBN 978-0-521-89943-7. see Chapter 3. (Second edition in 2004) Dutta. Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic. http://www. Princeton Univ. Downloadable free online. ISBN 978-0-262-04169-0 . Multidisciplinary Introduction.3. Press. Games and Economic Behavior 17: 80–112. Retrieved 2008-11-07. "Preliminaries of Game Theory". An 88-page mathematical introduction.gtessentials. Osborne. Bernheim. Yoav (2008). 6. (1994). A modern introduction at the graduate level. "Coalition-Proof Equilibrium". 4. ^ a b von Ahn. 5. D. Peleg. Leyton-Brown.org .1006/game. http://www. CA: Morgan & Claypool Publishers. Prajit K. Kevin. Strategies and games: theory and practice. Norton & Company.J. Princeton University Press (July 13. Moreno. see Chapter 2. Kevin (2009). Morgenstern. Oxford University . doi:10. Suitable for undergraduate and business students. J.W. Acceptable points in general cooperative n-person games in "Contributions to the Theory of Games IV". Shoham. Luis. Drew and Jean Tirole (1991) Game Theory MIT Press. Games of Strategy. but at least one of the many equilibrium strategies would be played by hypothetical players having perfect knowledge of all 10150 game trees[citation needed].

The Game's Afoot! Game Theory in Myth and Paradox.wikipedia. Simon and Schuster. Sylvia (1998). Mehlmann. John (1950) "Equilibrium points in n-person games" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 36(1):48-49. Inc.• • Nash. Nasar. American Mathematical Society (2000). [edit] Other references • • • v•d•e [edit] External links Complete Proof of Existence of Nash Equilibria [hide][hide] Topics in game theory Normal-form game · Extensive-form game · Cooperative game · Succinct game · Information set · Preference Definitions Nash equilibrium · Subgame perfection · Bayesian-Nash · Perfect Bayesian · Trembling hand · Proper equilibrium · Epsilon-equilibrium · Correlated equilibrium · Equilibriu Sequential equilibrium · Quasi-perfect equilibrium · Evolutionarily stable strategy · m concepts Risk dominance · Pareto efficiency · Quantal response equilibrium · Self-confirming equilibrium · Strong (or Coalition-proof) Nash equilibrium Strategies Dominant strategies · Pure strategy · Mixed strategy · Tit for tat · Grim trigger · Collusion · Backward induction · Markov strategy Symmetric game · Perfect information · Simultaneous game · Sequential game · Classes of Repeated game · Signaling game · Cheap talk · Zero-sum game · Mechanism design · games Bargaining problem · Stochastic game · Large poisson game · Nontransitive game · Global games Prisoner's dilemma · Traveler's dilemma · Coordination game · Chicken · Centipede game · Volunteer's dilemma · Dollar auction · Battle of the sexes · Stag hunt · Matching pennies · Ultimatum game · Minority game · Rock-paper-scissors · Pirate game · Dictator game · Public goods game · Blotto games · War of attrition · El Farol Bar problem · Cake cutting · Cournot game · Deadlock · Diner's dilemma · Guess 2/3 of the average · Kuhn poker · Nash bargaining game · Screening game · Trust game · Princess and monster game Minimax theorem · Nash's theorem · Purification theorem · Folk theorem · Revelation principle · Arrow's impossibility theorem Games Theorems See also Tragedy of the commons · Tyranny of small decisions · All-pay auction · List of games in game theory Retrieved from "http://en. John (1951) "Non-Cooperative Games" The Annals of Mathematics 54(2):286295.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium" . Nash. A. "A Beautiful Mind".

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