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Notes:

Please upload the main point (2~3 sentences) of the reading by Tuesday, March 27,
4pm.
Be prepared to provide a summary + main takeaway of your readings in section.
This document is to guide your readings only - please refer to these summaries at your
own risk.

II. Foreign Policy

Assessing Adversaries (Feb. 21-26)

1. “White House Tapes and Minutes of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International
Security, vol. 10, Summer 1985, pp. 164-203 (skim).

2. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (translated and edited by


Strobe Talbott), pp. 488-505

 Couldn’t afford to lose Cuba. Would cause the rest of Latin America to reject socialism

 Russia was itself surrounded by American missiles

 Missiles in cuba would:

1. Protect Cuba from the US

2. Equalized nuclear balance of power

 No desire to start war w cuban missiles

3. Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1952-1954, vol. II, National Security Affairs,
part I, pp. 367-370, 491-534, 578-597.

 Memorandum of Discussion at the 148th Meeting of the National


Security Council (June 4, 1953)

– President considers reinforcing defense and warning systems in Alaska (proximity to


atomic bases on the Chukotski Peninsula across the Bering Strait)
– Time is sensitive in the event of a retaliatory attack
– Bomb tests in masonry areas as evidence of what would happen to American big cities
– Fast and effective communication system is a main concern
– US probably could not get any previous warning of a Soviet sneak attack
– However, signs could appear (increasing tension, redeployment of military
forces, etc.)
– Edwards’ committee concluded any Soviet attack during that period would have been
caused by desperation rather than judgment
 Report to the National Security Council by the National Security Council
Planning Board 1 (September 30, 1953)

This document lays out the beliefs of the US in relation to the advancement of
Communism; the policies and ideals the West is willing to uphold; the context in which the
conflict is inserted at the time; the perceptions by US leaders of the USSR intentions; the US
relationships with its allies; and the possible change of course in the US resolutions in case
there is a threat of damage.

– Soviets as a threat to the security, free institutions, and fundamental values of the
US
– Hostility to the non-communist world, particularly the US
– Military power
– Control of communism and means of subversion or division of the “free world”
– Prospect of maintenance of the USSR “mission,” beliefs, and objectives in the context
of a transfer of power
– Soviet strategies are flexible, more on the safe side (concessions are avoided)
– Defense needs to be enhanced against the increasing atomic and conventional military
capability of the USSR; fear of a surprise attack
– Unrest in Eastern Europe: wanting ability to subjugate the people in “rebellious”
countries; psychological and strategic strain on the USSR leaders; however, detachment is
not likely
– China–USSR strong relations
– General war is unlikely considering the context
– Fear of mistakes (attacks) led by miscalculation
– Soviet resolution to divide and subvert the West
– Soviet popular pressure (consumer goods), bureaucracy may lead to negotiations
– Reiteration of US need to keep strong militarily, economically, and “morally”
(ideologically)
– Importance of allies: division of high costs of war and maintenance of the world
balance
– Key points: NATO, Indochina, Formosa
– Coalition: US military power in Europe and Southeast Asia is very important
– Possible points of conflict: trade, bases and defense, US economic aid, interstate
historic issues (Europe), difficulties as a result of the neocolonialist crisis
– Some states view US actions and resolutions as unstable, too hard, and/or inconsistent
with their ideals
– Resentment is strong against the West in uncommitted areas (anti-colonialism, rising
nationalism, conflicting philosophies)
– Plans for economic stability (maintenance and development of the private enterprise,
reinforcement fiscal policies, controlled spending and controlled inflation)
– Federal Government deficit (approx. $4 billion)
– Tax reductions would start in January 1954
– Apparent need to sever rights and freedoms of workers in US for the sake of the
conflict; conflict/balance between productivity and values (popular support for the
government)
– Building a sense of “community”: allies must believe US policies are directed towards
collective benefits
– The US must keep considering negotiation with the USSR and China as a viable means
of action
– The US must maintain the hope and confidence in the superiority of the “free world” in
relation to Communism
– Radical re-examination of these resolutions is possible in the event of impending
danger of attack/significant damage

4. Raymond Garthoff, “Berlin, 1961: The Record Corrected,” Foreign Policy, No.
84, Fall 1991, pp. 142-156.

Garthoff talks about how new Soviet information now becoming


available about events like the Berlin Crisis during the Cold War changes the
picture and our understanding of those events. Now that the narrative is
complete, it greatly highlights the potential value of confidential
communications between leaders in resolving international confrontations.

5. “1983 Politburo Session on KAL-007 Incident,” Foreign Broadcast Information


Service, Soviet Union (27 August 1992), pp. 7-10.

6. Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, “Strategic Defense by Deception,” Intelligence


and National Security, vol. 16, Summer 2001, pp. 152-57.

7. Robert Jervis, “Intelligence and International Politics,” in Alexandra


Gheciu and William Wohlforth, eds., Oxford Handbook of
International Security,

A. Intelligence central to foreign policy. Intersects with a number of political science


approaches.
B. Intelligence = potent form of power
C. Intelligence depends on observer’s theories about state behavior
D. Deception works best when misleading info is relayed through channels the other side
deems to be credible
E. Democracies generally have more accurate picture of the world. Easier for democracies
to empathize, more open society,
F. Intelligence a stabilizing factor during the cold war
G. Means of acquiring info may have heightened tensions
H. Influence of intelligence limited by the fact that it is often inconvenient. Can point out
that current policies are misguided
8. Department of State, “Estimate of Damage to U.S. Foreign Policy Interests,”
Foreign Relations of the US, 1964-1968, (FRUS) vol. XIV, The Soviet Union, pp. 111-
14.

– Paradox: Soviets had bugged the Moscow Embassy, had been reading the
messages to and from Washington, but there is no evidence that they used the
information against the US
– Possible explanation: Soviets sacrificed specific gains in order to avoid being
discovered. However, that does not mean they did not benefit (e.g. by knowing American
decisions before officially contacting the US)
– Soviets had access to classified information, but there is no evidence of political
damage derived from that
– Confidential: prejudicial; Secret: (could cause) serious damage; Top Secret:
(could cause) exceptionally grave damage
– Soviet’s fear of losing the source is motivated by a prioritization of action regarding
information on hostilities (1953 settlement)
– No way to accurately measure the influence of background information on US–USSR
relations

9. Thomas Fleming, “George Washington, Spymaster,” American Heritage,


February/March 2000, pp. 45-51

 Americans were losing the war and G. Washington decided to change strategy
and make espionnage a major part his plans.
 He used a lot of disinformation to confuse the british
 Without this move, Americans would probably have lost the war.

National Intelligence Council, “National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear


Intentions and Capabilities,” November 2007

A. Identifies the intelligence as “estimative” - make judgements about likely


course of future events and their implications on US foreign policy
B. NIE does not assume Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather, it is
examining intelligence to determine nuclear capability
C. Judged that Iranian halted program and is less inclined to pursue weapons as
previously. Nevertheless, there was high confidence that Iran could create
nuclear weapons if it wanted to.
D. This piece contrasts intent versus capability in intelligence assessment

President’s Intelligence Review, October 16, 1964 (


http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1827265/DOC_0005
959489.pdf

12. President’s Daily Brief, August 21, 1968


(http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1827265/DOC_000
5976315.pdf
13. Paul Pillar, “Think Again: Intelligence,” Foreign Policy, Jan/Feb 2012.

This reading which consists of several op eds seeks to address commonly held
misconceptions about American intelligence and intelligence agencies. The
misconceptions addressed are outlined below. For each one, the writers discuss
why they are misconceptions based on on the facts, ultimately concluding, as
Pillar stated, “America’s screw ups come from bad leaders not lousy spies.”
1. Presidents make decisions based on intelligence - The decision to wage
the Iraq war was not based on the reports of WMDs.
2. Bad intelligence led to the Iraq war - Bad leadership did.
3. Intelligence failures screwed up U.S. foreign policy - Failures did not
matter in the big picture of foreign policy.
4. U.S. intelligence underestimated al Qaeda before 9/11 - No, it didn’t.
Agencies had been warning of the threat years before.
5. Hidebound intelligence agencies refuse to change - Reorganization of
intelligence agencies occur frequently. Most effective reforms come
from inside the agencies, not outside.
6. Intelligence has gotten better since 9/11 - Yes, but not because of
increased spending, but because of a shift in America's priorities.
7. Good intelligence can save us from bad surprises - Intelligence could
not predict Arab Spring.

Domestic Politics and Decision-Making (Feb. 28-March 7)

14. Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1950, vol. VII, pp. 157-161, 1242-1249, 1323-
1334 (Korean War decisions).

These are notes and memorandi from several meetings on the subject of the
U.S. Korean War. They give insight into the decision making process for
leaders of states in international relations. They show that how U.S. actions in
Taiwan, though logical to U.S. decision makers, were viewed negatively by
Chinese decision makers.

15. Michael Armacost, The Foreign Relations of the U.S., ch. 6. Thomas Schwartz,
“’Henry,….Winning an Election is Terribly Important’

16. Partisan Politics in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations,”


Diplomatic History, vol. 33, April 2009, pp. 173-190.

 Domestic partisan politics influence foreign policy


 Exemple from Nixon’s recorded discussion about Vietnam before the
American election. His. Strategy is based to beat the Democrat candidate.
 Same with Lyndon Johnson, who got angry about the passing of bill proposed
by Nixon’s ally.
 Difficult to measure because no evidence
 Author tries to look at the history of US foreign policy for examples

17. Bartholomew Sparrow, The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of
National Security, pp. 394-400.

 How Bush administration worked during the period of Gulf War.


 White House and the NSC were the major decision-maker, but the
administration also worked with media, Hill&Knowlton (global public relations
consulting company) sponsored by Kuwait government, and other institutions
and people to get public support for the War.
 Congress was sort of out of the process because the Senate was controlled by
Democrats back then. But had many testimonies and hearings. Sometimes used
Congress for the administration’s benefit (hearing of Kuwaitan woman)

18. Leo Ribuffo, “Religion and American Foreign Policy,” The National Interest,
No. 52, Summer 1998, pp. 36-51 (skim) or Walter Russell Mead, “God's Country?”
Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, Sept./Oct. 2006, pp. 24-43.

Walter Russell Mead, “God's Country?” Foreign Affairs.

In his article “God’s Country? Evangelicals and U.S. Foreign Policy” in Foreign
Affairs, Walter Russell Mead argues that as U.S. evangelicals exert increasing political
influence, they are becoming a powerful force in foreign affairs. In recent years,
evangelicals have voted overwhelmingly Republican, helping to put conservatives at the
helm of U.S. foreign policy, while focusing their energies on a handful of specific issues,
including support for Israel, the promotion of religious freedom abroad and the
alleviation of hunger in Africa. But as evangelicals mature politically, they are showing
interest in a broader array of foreign policy issues, including global warming,
traditionally seen as liberal.

19. Robert Pastor, Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean, ch. 6.

- This reading uses the examples of United States policies in Latin America to
explain interbranch relationships between Congress and the President when it
comes to foreign policy, particularly in checking or overriding the deficiencies
of the other. For example, U.S policy on human rights is often a form of
executive diplomacy (Nixon funneling money to Pinochet’s Chile while Carter
made human rights the foundation of his aid policies), but Congress can check
the influence by passing bills forbidding money to go to “bad” regimes or set
spending limits. Also the relationship between Congress and the President is
important in sending the national message, as mistrust and disagreement
between the branches can be interpreted badly by foreign powers (example in
reading was 1976 conversation between Kissinger and Brazil with Brazil
suggesting that the U.S.’s “commitment” to human rights was based on
Congressional pressure rather than any executive initiatives).
20. Supreme Court of the US, “Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v.
Sawyer”

21. Gary Sick, All Fall Down, ch. 6 (skim).

22. Carroll McKibbin, “Presidential Initiative and Bureaucratic Response:


Delivering the Mariner IV Pictures of Mars,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 23,
Fall 1993, pp. 727-37.

Carroll R. McKibbin: Presidential Initiative and Bureaucratic Response


INTRO
- Presidents/ Vice Presidents have difficulty dealing with the bureaucracy
within government.
- Ex : President Truman called career Foreign Service officers "the striped
pants boys," and said at one point, "the career fellas in the State Department
thought they ought to make policy."
- President Kennedy became so frustrated with the State Department that he
instituted a major reshuffling of its upper echelon, and replaced several key
officials with members of his own staff in the "Thanksgiving Massacre" of
1961.
BACKGROUND
-Lyndon Johnsons attempts to rally up the American people in an effort to
surpass the Soviet Union in the space race of late 1950, early 1960s.
- When faced with financial concerns by the Space council, Johnson
states "Now, would you rather have us be a second-rate nation or should we
spend a little money?"
- To Senator Barry Goldwaters during the 1964 presidential race, Johnson
states "I do not believe that this generation of Americans is willing to resign
itself to going to bed each night by the light of a Communist moon." Johnson
spread similar messages in an effort to further his space race agenda.
- After dealing with the bureaucracy in govt, the Mariner IV launched in Nov
28th 1964, 8 years after the launch of sputnik. Johnsons claimed a victory and
stated that the US had surpassed the Soviet Union when the Mariner sent the
first “blurry” pictures of mars.
The Presidential Initiative
-Lyndon Johnson, believing that the U.S was now in step with the Soviet Union
having accomplishments of its own that were unmatched in the space race
Instructed the release of the best pictures of mars to every head of state in the
world.
-Herman Pollack eventually is headed with the president’s directive.
- NASA relays to pollack that the pictures were actually computerized
recapitulations and were still incomplete
- NASA also had its own plans to release the pictures in a gran manner.
- Pollack attempts to “budge” the pictures out of the hands of NASA by
reiterating it was a presidential initiative. He talks to Bill Moyers (newly
appointed press secretary with connections with the scientific community) and
is assured that the pictures would be sent to him asap.
- Pollack attempts to get 125 printed copies through the art community and is
presented with a 75$ price tag.
-Lack of clear planning and budget meant that only 500 dollars was allotted for
this task of printing the pictures.
After dealing with the art division, NASA had strict guidelines for the caption,
further complicating the initiative.
Conclusion
-Presidents can make demands that seem simple but in reality are far more
complicated.
-Departments of states and many parts of govt have set tasks but Presidential/ad
hoc tasks disrupt the process.
-Interagency rivalry also complicate the process of accomplishing tasks.
-Inadequate records of protocols with foreign govt
-ultimately, the President may have made a reasonable request, but navigating
the complexities of govt made it a near impossible task.

23. “Rex Tillerson May be the Weakest Secretary of State Ever,” Foreign
Policy online, March 10, 2017
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/10/rex- tillerson-might-be-the-weakest-secretary-of-
state-ever/

24. FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. 33, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign
Policy, pp. 420-21 (doc. # 190).

Foreign Relations 1964- 1968 Transcript of conversations between Director


of CIA and Assistant Secretary of Defense Fubini
DCI - Upset with the Bureaucracy in govt and threatens to expose the drama.
ASD - Wants to establish a position in which MCmillan, McCone and Fubini
can work together.
DCI - threatens to quit and call the president to find a new director of central
intelligence.
Conclusion- bureaucracy can make matters heated and is more complicated
than what is presented on the surface.

25. FRUS, 1969-1976, vol. 32, SALT I, 1969-1972, pp. 622-24, 658-62 (docs. #
204, 219).

26. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Turbulent Transitions: Why


Democracies Go to War,” in Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson, and Pamela Aall,
eds., Leashing the Dogs of War, pp. 161-76.
27. Michael Chapman, “Pragmatic, ad hoc Foreign-Policy Making of the Early
Republic,” International History Review, vol. 35, June 2013, pp. 449-64 (skim—in fact
the abstract gives the basic idea).

 in 1823, Edward Everett (professor) supports Greeks in fighting for independence from Ottoman Empire
 Supported by Daniel Webster (Mass. Senator)
 Both draw political power from networking Boston élite circles
 They generate strong philhellenic feeling using religious rhetoric / islamophobia and appealing to Americans’
interventionism
o ”[Greeks are] fellow Christians, ’bowed beneath the yoke of barbarous infidels’. They were fathers and
mothers, ‘condemned to see their children torn from them and doomed to the most cruel slavery’.” (450)
 But Thomas Perkins (trader) opposed movement
o He figured out he could make bank by selling Turkish opium to the Chinese in Canton (Guangzhou)
o This scheme (a lot of Perkins’ trading was illegal) ended up ”adding millions more to Boston’s economy.”
(449)
 Congress voted on offering help to Greece, and the motion failed
o This was consistent with the Monroe Doctrine (”non-entanglement with the Old World”) and George
Washington’s ”separate-hemispheres” ideology
o But mostly, they cared about the development of Boston’s economy which was one of the most important of
the country at the time
 Everett & Webster backed down and did not try to revive the effort
o Historians argued this was proof that they cared more about the political expediency and name-recognition
the fight brought them than the cause itself
 BASICALLY, the takeaway from the piece was that foreign policy often takes a ”pragmatic, ad hoc nature” (especially
in the time period of the Early Republic) that trumps ideological considerations
o While the Greeks were both Christians and revolutionaries (both appealing qualities to American support),
the enormous influx of money generated from Turkish opium was more important in deciding foreign
relations.
o ”As President, Adams appropriated $20,000 to negotiate a most-favoured-nation treaty with Turkey”

a. Josiah Ober, “Classical Greek Times,” in Michael Howard, et al., eds., The
Laws of War, pp. 12-26.
Prior to 450 BC, Greek city states conducted battle by rules

A. Don’t chase down retreating enemy, do not attack non combatants, etc.
B. These were based on the shared socio-economic standing of hoplites,
which constituted a broad middle class between the upper class (who
were more refrained from the combat) and the lower class (who
couldn’t afford armor)
C. The broad range of unequals in the hoplite class translated to a broad
members of the military fighting together as one
D. The common values and nature of amateur farmers fighting leads to the
seasonal, rules based warfare amongst Greek city states

b. How do ancient civilizations fight their wars?


.role of society/ culture in warfare

The Goals of Foreign Policy (March 19-21)

29. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, ch. 5.


 It is the goals pursued by actors and how they go about pursuing these goals that create
the potentialities for power struggle and war
 Project: to draw attention to the close relationship between foreign policy objectives and
the incidence of tension that might lead to a resort to violence
 Goals v. means: customary to distinguish them, but impossible to completely demarcate
the two
 All means can be said to constitute intermediary goals. No goal is ultimate
 Is a nation seeking certain results from policy for the results’ own sake, or merely as
means of reaching more remote goals
 Overt behavior unintelligible except in relation to motivation
 Hopes only become policy goals if decision is reached that risk of national sacrifice will
be made for the realization of these goals. All goals costly
 Aspirations and goals at two ends of a continuum. Mere hopes ←→ goals of vital interest
 States are not single-purpose organizations
 National independence, survival, and territorial integrity take significantly different
shapes in the policy of different countries. Therefore have to be considered as variables
 Possession goals v. milieu goals (shape of environment)
 Possession goals: Competing with others for a share of values of limited supply
 Milieu goals:
 Countries aim to shape conditions beyond their national boundaries
 These goals allow peace to be an objective
 Nations sometimes pressured to act on the principle of collective security
in order to help create a milieu where threats to natural possessions cease
to arise
 However, many states hesitant to sacrifice short term funds for a long term
plan
 Private interests (indirect national goals) v. state interests (national goals)
 Direct national goals: no meaning for private individuals. Independence, security,
etc
 Indirect national goal: furthers national interest and interest of private groups
 Can absorb more resources than is compatible with vital needs of security
and power (like milieu goals)
 Sometimes indirect national goal takes precedence over national core value: West
Germans would rather remain a democracy than reunite with East Germany and preserve
territorial integrity
 National interests always prioritized over universal interests

30. K.J. Holsti, International Politics, 5th ed., ch. 5.

 Many needs and purposes can only be achieved by influencing behavior of other states
 National interest:
 Normative: ideal set of purposes which nation should seek to realize.
 Descriptive: purposes which nation appears to pursue persistently through time.
Realm of facts.
 3rd definition: arena for conflict among individuals and groups whose
conceptions of the national interest have and will always differ widely
 Objective: an image of a future state of affairs and future set of conditions
 Many governments improvise policies to meet specific domestic or external crises.
Transactions between govts unplanned and serve needs of a few private citizens
 Most important decisions made under pressure of immediate crisis rather than long,
thought out policy.
 Govts often pursue incompatible policy simultaneously. Must rank and choose amongst
conflicting objectives
 Political units seek to achieve complete range of private and collective, concrete and
value objectives
 Most states seek collective objects of national security, welfare of citizens, access to trade
 Criteria of objectives:
1. Value of objective: extent to which actors commit resources to realize goal
2. Time element
3. Kinds of demands the objective imposes on other states in the system.
 Categories of objectives:
1. Core values: gov must be committed to these at all times
a. Articles of faith a society accepts uncritically (Monroe Doctrine, command of sea)
b. Related to self preservation of state
c. Perpetuation of particular political, social, economic system based on home territory
d. control/defend neighboring territories. Assets such as manpower/resources
e. ethnic/religious/linguistic unity
2. Mid range goals: impose demands on other states
. Economic betterment demands through international action. Can’t be achieved through
self help because states have limited resources, administrative services, technical skills
a. Primary commitments of many modern governments must be to pursue actions that have
highest impact on domestic welfare/economic needs
b. Govts sometimes translate private business interests into mid range goals, even when
these interests have little impact on general social welfare level
c. Increase state’s prestige. Measured by industrial development/scientific progress
d. Imperialism. Expansion an end in itself. Others seek the advantage of exclusive control
and access of resources through spheres of influence/satellites/protectorates
3. Universal long range goals: no definite time limits. These are rarely prioritized
. Universal demands. Reconstruction of entire international system
a. Never succeed, because threatened states coalesce.
b. The inherent determinism of Marxism grants flexibility to Soviet foreign policy.
 Lenin believed he would see the downfall of capitalism in his own lifetime
 Stalin was less optimistic about world revolution, believed the fall of capitalism would
occur in historical stages
 Charles de Gaulle:
 Importance of nation state in IR: soul of the people
 France as leading force in Europe
 Kissinger believed in interdependence in the international system. Greater
interdependence would lead to less conflict and war

Foreign Policy Objectives (Constructivist Approach)


· Political Units -don’t just react to external circumstances
· What is an Objective? – there is more to the word than the layman’s term
· External Objectives and Value Objectives
· There are three criteria that are used to determine the type of Objective
ü Value – Placed on Objective
ü Time Element – spent or allocated on Objective
ü Demands -the Objective draws from state resources
This then leads to the establishment of 3 categories of Objectives:
1. Core Value & Interests – these are those objectives that are most important
to a state
2. Middle Range goals - these used to be military based but they have changed
& they can
be broken down into 3 categories:
a) Govt meets economic betterment via Social Welfare
b) Increase State Prestige via Industrialization and Technology
c) meets expansion or imperialist type goals
3. Universal Long-Range goals – The dreams and aspirations of a State

Means (March 26-28)

31. K.J. Holsti, International Politics, ch. 9.

Large proportions of the use of economic instruments of policy, either as rewards or


punishments have been directed by industrial countries against developing nations. The
economic instruments of policy are wielded to change attitudes and behaviour on both the
target’s domestic and foreign policies. Examples of coercion and rewards include tariffs, quotas,
boycotts, embargoes, expropriation..etc. Economic pressures by major powers against each
other has a high probability of failure. The most important forms of economic rewards are
foreign aid and military assistance. Having a more diversified source of aid makes countries less
reliant upon single benefactor. Some examples of punishments being used:

-cuban-american relations during the period of the castro regime provide many examples of
american efforts to use economic instruments of policy for foreign-policy objectives.
-1966 UN voted to require member states to desist from trade of certain types of commodities
with Rhodesia
1985 US imposed economic sanctions against Nicaragua in 1985

 Joseph Nye, Jr., The Future of Power, ch. 1.


Questions what power is:

 Power is the capacity do to things and in social situations to affect others to get
the outcomes we want
 Important to define power by looking at who gets what, where, how, and when.
 Power can be defined in terms of resources, but also in terms of behavioral
outcomes.
 For some goals, soft power more efficient than hard power (and vice versa)
 Hard power is push; soft power is pull
 Soft power is the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of
framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to
obtain preferred outcomes
 Smart Power: ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective
strategies

33. George Orwell, “Shooting an Elephant”.

This story, narrated by George Orwell, describes an experience he had while serving as a
sub-divisional European police officer in a small imperial Indian town (1900-1950). The officer
eventually kills an elephant that escaped from its owner. The law at that time stated that if this
animal is a danger to others, law enforcement must kill it. The officer saw that this elephant had
killed a person, but by the time he was close enough to make a decision to kill it or not, the
elephant was not doing any harm. With thousands of locals crowded around watching him, he
felt he had no choice but to shoot the elephant so as to make an example out of him by showing
the people that government enforcement of law was to be taken seriously, and the elephant and
he himself were no exceptions; he does this to show the people that the law enforcement was in a
position of power.This story serves to show how trying it is as a law enforcer at this time to
separate what you think is moral or right from the laws being enforced. Similarly to the nation
who takes up a diplomatic position that may preserve a reputation more than promote self
preservation, Orwell decides to kill the elephant in the name of upholding the imperial facade
that he is so begrudgingly apart of.

34. Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the
Frontier, pp. 49-56, 82-84.
 Indian Land Sales: Was it voluntary?
 Early years of English colonization: Voluntary
 1. Exchange with English products (Alcohol, Guns)
 2. Political alliance with English colonists.
- As Time goes by: Mixed
- 1. Colonists trespassed the boundaries—> Forcing colonial governments to
buy the lands
-2. Ecological change —> Hurt Indian Lands and not valuable anymore —>
Sell lands.
-3. Indian’s engagement with the English colonial economy
- Mortgage, later payment: Land
- End: Involuntary
- The English controlled legal system within which transactions were
enforced.
- Not threatened by the physical power but the Power of legal system: Used
English legal system
- English people thought that they were helping Indians by bringing the
English law (leading them to the path of civilization)

35. Jeremy Pressman, “Mediation, Domestic Politics, and the Israeli-Syrian


Negotiations, 1991-2000,” Security Studies, vol. 16, July-September, 2007, pp.
350-81.

Failed Israeli-Syrian negotiations suggestive of the following:


-Expectations about the role of a partial mediator
-the structure-agency balance and the role of domestic politics (Barak and his obsession with
polls)
-potential pitfalls of diplomatic ambiguity (ambiguity about the withdrawal line). The absence of
clarity helps draws parties closer and agree to hold talks but problematic when talks move
towards implementation
-preparing one’s people for likely concessions

36. Laurent Fabius, “Inside the Iran Deal: A French Perspective,” Washington
Quarterly, vol. 39, Fall 2016, pp. 7-38 (skim).

37. Art and Jervis, pp. 165-76.

Morgenthau’s nine rules of diplomacy:

Four fundamental rules:


 Diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit
- The rules of engagement must be done in a language that both
parties understand. So – the “crusading” party, to maintain
diplomacy, give up the rules to which they engage.

 Foreign policy must be dictated by the national interest and must be


supported with adequate power
 Diplomacy must consider the political perspectives of other nations
 Nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to
them

Five prerequisites:
 Give up the shadow of worthless rights for the substance of real advantage
(see Chapman reading)
 Never put yourself in a position from which you cannot retreat and from
which you cannot advance
 Never allow a weak ally to make decisions for you
 Military is the instrument of foreign policy, not its master
 The government is the leader of public opinion, ”not its slave” (173)

Note: Try to remember author names when studying!

Section 4, Assessing Adversaries


Twigge and Scott, “Strategic Defense by Deception”
• What was the proposed British “bluff” recounted in this reading?

Lie- about surface to missile defense.

NIC, “National Intelligence Estimate, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities”


• How would you summarize the “Key Judgments” of this report?

Pillar, “Think Again: Intelligence”


• How should Pillar’s attitudes towards the intelligence community be characterized
 U.S holds intelligence at a high standard. Its causes a lot more wars than it was
solved them. America has crappy intelligence.

Section 5, Domestic Politics and Decision-Making

Armacost, The Foreign Relations of the U.S., ch. 6


• Armacost considers the consequences of two unique aspects of the US foreign-
policymaking apparatus? What are these two aspects?

Schwartz, “Henry, ... Winning an Election is Terribly Important”


• What is the title of this article referring to? What does this tell us about how foreign policy
decisions are made by elected officials in the US?
- This is reference to Nixons election of 72. Partisan politics puts the
personal goals ahead of the nations- and attempts to manipulate the public
to maintain power.

Sparrow, The Strategist: Brent Scowcroft and the Call of National Security
• What were Craig Fuller’s goals in this reading?

- To show how Bush cercumveted congress in order to influence policy


change. Selling the gulf war to the public.

Pastor, Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean
• How does Pastor characterize the role of Congress in the making of US foreign policy?

-Looks at the relationship between the president and congress. The congress has the power of
the purse and can deny funding for presidential initiatives.

SCOTUS, “Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer.”


• What were the origins of this case? What did the Supreme Court rule? What was their
basic justification for this? Looking at the overview at the top of the Justia page linked to

- Business/private values are more important that national benefits.

McKibbin, “Presidential Initiative and Bureaucratic Response”


• Why were photos from Mariner IV important?
- It showed the accomplishment of the U.S beating the soviets in the space
race.
• What made acquiring these photos difficult?
- Navigating the bureaucracy and getting multiple parts of govt to work
together.

Chapman, “Pragmatic, ad hoc Foreign-Policy Making of the Early Republic”


• What is the general theme of the story Chapman tells? (Just look at the abstract.)

 Both draw political power from networking Boston élite circles


 They generate strong philhellenic feeling using religious rhetoric / islamophobia and appealing to Americans’
interventionism
 Business/private values are more important that national benefits.


Ober, “Classical Greek Times”c
• What is Ober’s argument about the organization and conduct of the Greek military?

Section 6, The Goals of Foreign Policy


Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, ch. 5
• Wolfers distinguishes between goals relating to “national possessions” and goals relating
to the “shape of a state’s environment.” What does he term these two types of goals? What
is the difference between them?
• What is the difference between direct and indirect national goals?

 Possession goals – Competing for limited resources and limiting out side
influences.
 Aligns with direct influence- goals more personally oriented

 Milieu Goals – Aim to shape conditions beyond national boundaries


- Aligns with indirect (private) goals- looking to influence outside powers in
order to change the climate/conditions to better fit their ideals.

Section 7, The Means


Holsti, International Politics, ch. 9
• According to Holsti, when is economic coercion most likely to be effective?
- A well off nation is most effective using its influence on a weaker nation

• According to Holsti, what are the most important forms of economic rewards?
- The most important – Military assistances and foreign aid

Nye, The Future of Power, ch. 1


• Recall the three aspects of “relational power” Nye discusses. Which one does he say
policymakers should focus on? How do the second two aspects or “faces” of relational
power relate to Nye’s notion of soft power?

- Soft power- Diplomatic


- Hard power- Force
- Smart power- navigating, implementing influence to manipulate
conditions
Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier
• Why did Native Americans sell their land to English colonists?
- They didn’t. they were forced to sell it because they trespassed and took
land. They sold, because at least they would get something vs nothing.

• How did the legal system in the colonies come into play? The Indians had to navigate the
English legal system and due to their limited understanding, often suffered the greater loss.

Morgenthau, “The Future of Diplomacy” (Art and Jervis, pp. 165–176)


• Morgenthau lays out “four fundamental rules” of diplomacy. Can you name and explain
one of them?
Diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit
- The rules of engagement must be done in a language that both parties
understand. So – the “crusading” party, to maintain diplomacy, give up the
rules to which they engage.

Section 8, The Use of Force


Art, “The Four Functions of Force” (Art and Jervis)
• Art classifies uses of force into four categories. What is one of them?

Schelling, “The Diplomacy of Violence” (Art and Jervis)


• What does Schelling mean by the “power to hurt”? How does he differentiate between
brute force and coercion?

Hoffman, “What is Terrorism” (Art and Jervis)


• Hoffman considers various ways in which terrorism is distinct from other forms of crime
and irregular warfare. Can you name one way terrorism is distinct?

Art, “The Fungibility of Force” (Art and Jervis)


• In a sentence, what does Art mean when he says that force is “fungible”?

Chenoweth and Stephan, “Why Civil Resistance Works?”


• Chenoweth and Stephan argue that non-violent movements have a key advantage over
violent insurgencies. What is this advantage, and what is one reason why this advantage
exists?

The World Bank, “Shape of Violence Today”


• What is the primary trend in the occurrence of interstate and intrastate violence that the
World Bank identifies?
• According to this reading, what does a focus on interstate war and civil war obscure?

Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, ch. 1


• Why does Jervis say that nuclear weapons “drastically altered statecraft”? What is new

about the world of nuclear weapons?