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CONFIDENTIAL/

ATTORNEY WORD PRODUCT

M_F. HO RANOVM
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

TO : ALLEN R . PURVIS, x-2152

FROM : KAREN X . JASA, X-2385

DATE : NAY 7, 199 0

R£ : SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS IN JOIN W . HILL COLLECTION

1 . INTRODUCTION

John Wiley Hill, founder of the public relations fire .


Hill 5 Knowlton, Inc ., played a key role in the formation of the
Tobacco Industry Research Committee . His papers were donated to
the Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin, in
April, 1964 . A significant portion of this collection, the client
files, was only recently made available to the public . Sources
at the WSHS inform us that Or . Richard W . Panay, plaintiff's

advertising expert 1 C_yc}y,glye, hasvisited the archive several


tines since the private papers were released, in addition to at
least one visit prior to the Cyg So~gOe trial . The existence of
these documents raises difficult discovery and evidentiary issues .

Or . Pollay first referenced the papers of John W . Hill


in the bibliography to his chronological "Notes on the History of
Adve rt ising," prepared for CiRoliene . More recently, the April
15, I v90, issue of Tobdc ee On '1 ( th e Tobacco Products Liability
Project-5 newsletter) contained a report that the Hill papers are
the Davis for an upcoming article by Dr . Pollay . The TPLP article

indicates that the ant : tobacco group has 'some archival records "

660704707
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Memorandum to Allen R . trivia
April 12, 199 0
Page 2

of TIRE, "detailing the industry's c ordinated response to the


'health s e . Although to the best oo f our knowledge Pollay's
article has not yet appeared in print as promised, the TPLP article
puts counsel for the industry on notice that plaintiffs intend to
use the Hill materials to help "prove" that the industry carefully
orchestrated" a response to the crisis that would "reassure" the
public and protect industry profit s

In response to Dr . Pollay's activities, I visited the

WSHS and took extensive notes on the collection .

The papers of Sohn W . Hill document the reasons for the

creation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee and provjde


details of the Committee's early activities . They offer an

insider's view of the respense of the tobacco manufacturers to

the 1953-1954 'health scare . Edell argued during Ci cUn a that

the TIRC w essentially a public relations vehicle, Conceived at


first to calm the controversy and reassure smokers and later

employed to foster the appearce of a controversy . The PipoPone


jury rejected Edell's argument that the tobacco industry c nspired
. However, documents from the
to confuse and mis in form the ppublic
Hill collection could be used to provide new support for conspiracy
and misrepresentation claims -- especially When taken out of context
and used with documents previously made available to plaintiffs'
counsel through discovery . This is perhaps best typified by an
excerpt from a document that was circulated among top Hill 4
Knowlton staff members in preparation for the agency's first setting

with the newly fornad Committee in De cembe r, 1953 :

There is only one problem -- confidence, and how to -


tablishit public a and now to create it sin
a perhaps long interim entificcdoubts must remain .
hen scientifi
And, most important, how toifree millions of American
from the guilty fear that is going to arise deep in their
biological depths -- regardless of any pooh-poohing logi c

680704708
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Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 1 3 , 199 0
Page 3

every time they light a cigarette . No resort to m


logic ever red panic yet, whether on Madison Avenue,
Mail Street C Or in a psychologist's Office . And no
recitation of a rguments pro, ignoring or argument s
careful balancing of the two together, is going
to deal with such fear not .

That, gentlemen, is the nature of the unexampled challenge


to this office .

Many of the Hill documents concerning the TIRC are admin-


istrative or Informational, with little or no sensitive content .
This memorandum does not attempt to describe all of the Hill know-
meats, but focuses instead on those documents that are most likely
to be used to support a plaintiff's smoking and health case against
On e industry, based on issues raised in Cipollone . With a few
",Options, are documents described here have not been located in
company files, and accordingly have not been made available to
plaintiffs' counsel for use smoking and health cases- Thus,
the Hill collection represents a new source of documents and infor-
mation for plaintiffs' counsel as well as for the industry . Where
duplicates of Hill documents were found in the Lorillard and Philip
Morris document collections in Kansas City they are noted herein ,
are duplicates of documents produced by CTR in New Jersey or

Texas cases, and duplicates of documents produced by Reynolds in


Earner (although comparison of Hill documents with the Barnes pro-
duction is by no moans complete) . It is unlikely that Tobacco
Institute files hold duplicates of Hill documents ; however, a sea rch
of TI produced documents was done .

John Hill began his public relations ca eer in 1927 .


His operating philosophy was established on two major principle s

680704709
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Memorandum to Allen R . Purv is
April 13, 199 0
Page 4

that were included in a booklet Hill & Knowlton gave to new clients :

First, that public opinion is the altiaate arbiter of


most questions in today's world of rapid evolution and
bewildering change .

second, that effective public relations must begin with


the development of sound management policies that are
in the public interest.

In 19 2 0, Hill took Donald Knowlton, with whom he had

worked at Union Trust Company of Cleveland, as his part ner . That


same year, Hill moved to New York to establish an office to better
serve the firm's new client, the American Iron and Steel Institute .

When John Hill died in the late 19 7 01, the firm was the largest
public relations firm in the world . Hill S Knowlton is now a subsi-
dia ry of the WPP Group of London, England .

association with the tobacco m nufac-


Hill & Knowlton's
turers began in 1953 when Hill was asked to help the industry
deal with the crisis precipitated by news of a cancer-cigarette
link . Hill described the industry's approach to the problem in his
1958 book, cQ ppatte Pub1 {„ Reltians :

[An] ample of sound policy expressed in effective


public relations by an association of manufacturers is
found in she tobacco manufacturing industry .

Scientific ations that cigarettes were causing


lung cancer, which began to gather monAntum in 1954,
had the immediate result of a drop in the industry's
sales . Manufacturers and their employees were affected ;
scares of thousands of tobacco growers Were economically
concerned . And millions of American smokers had the
greatest of all stakes -- their on health -- involved .
The industry retained public relations counsel, then
formed organisation called the Tobacco Industry
Research Council, which had but one basic policy ; to

660704'710
C
Memorandum to Allen R . Pu
April 13, 199 0
Page 5

follow all procedures that might be required in the public


interest .

The accusation against the industry's chief product


was based on scientific suspicion growing out of statis-
tical studies and experiments with Animal, . No conclusive
or clinical proof was at hand . Hot the industry had no
thought of waiting passively upon events .
Expressing Its genuine concern over the whole problem
of cigarette smoking and health, it took a step unprece-
dented in American industry . It invited a group of out-
standing scientists, each of unchallengeable reputation,
to constitute themselves as "Scientific Advisory Board,"
for the purpose of making grants to individuals and Insti-
tutions for research into the problem . Substantial funds
were appropriated ($2 .200,000 in the first four years)
and more were promised a needed .

The money for in. . . grant, is provided by the industry


without any strings any kind . The SAB's decisions as
to the research grants are final . The results of the
various research projects will be reported to the public
in the font of scientific papers .

There was no thought that even such a concrete demons-


tration of the industry's acceptance of public responsi-
bility would shut off the critics, nor that it necessarily
should .

However, once this sound basis of public interest w


established the industry was and position to draw
some public attention to other sides of the question .
The normal American sense of fair play came to bear at
this point, and the public evidently credited the fact
that, despite sensational charges, the truth i not yet
known and the industry itself is doing what it can to
speed the availability of tree and reliable answe r

In 1958, the industry formed the Tobacco Institute in

response to a perceived need to distance the TSRC f rom public role-

Hill, John W Corporate Public Relation AM, of Mo d


Mangdroug ht, Harper is Brothers Publishers, New To

680704711
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Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 6

tions activities . Hill & Knowlton assisted the Institute in devel-

oping and implementing its public relations agenda until late 1968

when its contract was allowed to expire . Hill & 1L owlton's rela-

tionship with the TIRC/CTR endured on a limited basis until about

1969 when leopard Zahn left Hill & Knowlton to establish his own

firm, taking the CTR account with him .

The John W Hiil Pacer s

11111's papers were donated to the Wisconsin State Histori-


cal Society in 1964 .3 The WSHS divided the documents into two
sets, "non-client files" and "client files ." The non-client set,

consisting of "correspondence
"
1 and non-correspondence ," was cram -
diately catalogued . The copies of letters, memoranda and othe r
cations with the firm's many clients are arranged alphabeti-
cally,'t just as theywere in Hill's files . The non-correspondence
subset is arranged by topic and includes drafts of Hill', two books,
newsletters, speeches, clippings and other printed material . The
documents in the non-client files were made available to the public
and the file names were listed in the register to the collection ,

The thi rt y-one ca rt ons of documents which make up the


Second set, the client files, were sealed and placed in the
archive's storage facility . According to the terms of Hill's gift ,

Zahn became an employee of Hill & K owlton in January, 1954 .


fie worked on the TIKC/cTH account from that time until he
established his Own firm in 1969 . Zahn's activities on behalf
of the industry came under attack in Hpone . The Hill
documents contain additional "evidence" to support Edell's
arguments .

The Wisconsin State Historical Society is located on the campus


of the pniversity of Wisconsin, 30N . Carroll, Madison, Wisconsin .

660704712
Memorandum to Allen EL Pervis
April 1 3 , 199 0
Page 7

they became available for public review in April, 1989 . The exis-
tence of the client files is noted in the register but no file
names are give , and balance of a sho rt age of personnel and funds
the HSErS does
n not intend to catalog the client files . However,

the TSBC materials within these files are easily accessible because
the file folders are clearly labeled and the years contained in
each carton marked on the outside . It was here that Pollay found
the documents reportedly referenced in his article .

Both the clientand non-client files contain documents


related to the TIRO . The correspondence files in the heretofore
sealed, non-client set hold, for example, co_ -cations conce rn ing
the arrangements for placement of °A Frank statement," the develop-
ment of the White Paper and the selection o- SAS members . These
Tier documents are not readily discernable because they are inter-
filed chronologically within fifteen cartons of Hill A Knowlton
correspondence, most of which is unrelated to tobacco matters .
On the other hand, the printed material and press releases on
smoking and health issue, in the nun-correspondence files (available
to the public from the beginning) are easily identified because o l
the file namesIt
. was in this subset of the non-client file s
that Polley found the two documents noted in his chronology .

Throughout the Cipollone trial, Marc Ede ll relied heavily


upon a document produced by both Lorillard and CCR to support his
allegations regarding the reasons for the formation of the TSBC .
He used the dccuaent, ' preliminary Recommendations for the Cigarette
Manufacturers,' in his opening statement when he characterized t,e
formation of the TIRO as careful, yell-planned strategy" designed
to reassure the publicaregarding the recently publicized hazard s

680704713
Memorandum to Allen R . Pu rv is
April 13, 199 0
Page 6

of smoking . He quoted extensively from the document during his


examination of Joseph F . Cullman, ]rd and utilized the document
several other times during the Course Of the trial . Dr . Joel Cohen,
expert witness for the plaintiff, referred to the document in pre-
senting his "information environment" theories .

"Preliminary Recommendations" can be found i g


A copy of
the Hill collection . More importantly, its themes are repeated in
other documents in the Hill collection which were not previously

available . These documents provide additional argumentation for


Edellla claims that it was the "serious problem of public relations"

that motivated creation of the r1RC and that the industry's reasons
for creating the TSRC had more to do with selling tobacco than
with getting at the t ruth about smoking and health .d One such
document reveals that R .S . Reynolds explored the possibility Of a
unilateral respons to the crisis before subscribing to the joint
effort . "Suggested Approach and Co mm ents Regarding Attacks on Use

of Cigarettes," December 14, 1953, asked "What can or should the

A .J . Reynolds Tobacco Company, Winston-Salem, N .C ., do view of

towering public attacks on its products by the medical profession


and others?" Hill 6 %nowlton's response stressed the importance of
restoring public faith in the tobacco indust ry and put Reynolds
on notice that public relations considerations might have to guide
Company policy :

That the two objectives were at least equally important is


supported by a statement by W .T . Hoyt, executive secretary of
TSRC, Janua ry 20, 1955, in a document produced by CPR (TM
0020074/0076 at 0076) : "Within this framework we have furthered
and coordinated the two major purposes for which the Committee
was organ zed, namely the public relations phase and the
research program " Additional support for the argument that
the industry viewed public relations as being as important as
research is found in "Program Projects," January 15, 1954, a
11 111 document disco sed elsewhere in this memorandum .

680704714
Memorandum to A ll en R_ Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 9

. there is probably a more serious issue involved


here than solely charges concerning the harmful effects
of cigarettes . These charges could well raise in the
minds of the public the integrity of its manufacturers
producing cigarettes .

If unanswered or left unchallenged, these charges could


ue loss of sale [ sic] in the immediate future as well
as damage to the Company's reputation .
serious charges and/or implications have been
levelled against the u of cigarettes by professional
men who apparently have stature and reputation in thei r

To counteract this situation, any public relations program


must have either equally valid findings or scientific
data which discount or refute the acts .already presen
to the public by the medical profession

In any program designed to c e the medical profession


or the public about the validity of the a of the prod-
uct, independent and scientific research and clinical
testing are absolute basic requirements .
Regardless of what happens in the immediate situation,
the Company should consider a basic long-range program .
This would call for integration of new efforts with exis-
ting programs of communications with opinion leaders
and the public at large .

Such a program should be designed to increase public


confidence in the Company, well a acceptance its
products . In some instances this will call for a dramatic
approach .

But in any event it will call for a possible realignment


of existing Company policy and perhaps the development
of a new public relations policy for guidance throughout
the entire Company .

Hill 6 Rncwlton also veconcended that Reynolds issue a


statement designed to reassure the public . The eight points to

be made in the statement corresponded closely to those eventuall y

680704715
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Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 1 0

included in "A Frank Statement ." Hill wro te, "Until new scientific
data or facts are available that the Company could tell the public
about, it would seem that they will have only a variation of the
above message to communicate" -- a prediction which could be
employed by a plaintiff's attorney to show just how li tt le the
industry's position has changed since 1953 .

Paul Hahn's telegrams led to a meeting of tobacco man on


December 14, 1953 . It was at this meeting that a decision for

joint action was reached . The next day, Hill A Knowlton met with
hoe of the tobacco executives to explore a short list of topics
which included the question : Are you ready to accept the concept
that public health and public welfare are a sacred responsibility
and are paramount to all ether co siderations?'H Assuming an answer
in the affirmative, the Hill c Knowlton
n document listed the
available alternatives :

T Three co s
Ignore the charges, hope the crisis sub-
sides and depend upon consumer desire
and habit to maintain long-term smoking
volume ;

Telegram from Paul M . Hahn to tobac company presidents, at


a1 ., December 10, 1953 . Hahn suggested that the objective of
the proposed meeting "would be indust ry response to these
charges exposing their lack of scientific foundation ." That
Hahn resorted to suggesting a joint effort is an indication
of how serious he believed the threat posed by the publicity
to be . then, as n the industry was intensely competitive .
Additionally, the industry had been prohibited from engagin g
any sort of concerted action since the 1911 Dissolution
Decree which broke up the "Tobacco Monopoly . "

This commitent
." is reflected in the warding of "A Frank
Statement

660704716
c
Memorandum to A ll en R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 11

B . Counter-attack and fight back by challeng-


ing the attacks as based on inconclusive
and/or inadequate research or due to ques-
tionable and unsound motives of the critics
or Otherwise confuse the issue :

Neutralize effects of the charges by


cooperating with the scientific critics,
by sponsoring new independent scientific
and clinical research broad scal eon
a and by emphasizing impartial investigatio n
until the charges ae eventually disproven
(sic] or demolished, and by refraining from
activities that stress dangerous aspects
of the use of cigarettes . '

The presentation was successful : Hill & Knowlton got the


assignment . The urgency of the situation demanded that the staff
at Hill & Knowlton work quickly to pull together a plan that would
address the indust ry 's needs . Public relations counsel for each

of the tobacco manufacturers were also consulted : Tommy Ross


(American Tobacco Co .), Hen Sonnenberg (Philip Morris( and Sidney

Wain (Lorillard) lent their ideas and perspectives to the plan for
the TIRC .a

What was probably a early version of "Preliminary Recom-

mendations" provided the basis for an evening meeting of the Hill

6 Knowlton Plans Board on ecumber 21, 1953 . This document con-

tained the suggestion that the manufacturers' group be named "Ciga-

rette Research Committee" .

7 . Liggett chose the first course . Other contemporanecuo


documents found in the Hill collection reveal that the tobacco
company membe[ of the TIRO war, di,id,d in opinion as to
whether course B or C was the app ropriate course of action .
"Letter of Transmittal to Manufacturers," December 22, 1953 .

660704717
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 1 2

It is believed that the work Core, word] "Research" is


eeded in the n a to give weighand added credence to
the Committee's statements . However, the word cannot be
use unless the industry is prepared to back it up with
d genuine joint action and support . The research
to be sponsored by the Committee would be of two kinds,
mely (a) medical research to be financed jointly and (b)
editorial and statistical research in all phases of the
cigarette problem to be carried on through public re la-
tions counsel .

The name "Cigarette Information Committee" i not favored


because while the Committee will engage in communications
to the public, to calls it merely an "information" group
would be to Unit its cope and itsimpact upon the public
mind .9

The document also recommended as a first step the prepar e

tion of

statement announcing the action [the formation


of th e TIRC] and it purposes and reassuring the public
with these points :

a . Cigarette macro regard health of


nation paramount to all other consi-
derations-

b . They are disturbed by widespread


publicity given to adverse effects
of cigarette smoking upon health .

C . Unfortunately, the public has heard


little of the reassuring results o f

"Prelimtary Rec endations" c ontained the sa suggestion


for the group's name . These excerpted paragraphs contain sig-
nificant statements which do not appear "Preliminar y
Recommendations ." The comparable paragraph in "Preliminary
Recommendations' reads, ' The word 'research' should be included
in the name of the Committee to establish the fact that the
group will carry on sponsor fundamental scientific research
and will not be solely an information agency
.'

G80704718
C
andum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 13

researches (sic] of such distinguished


organizations National Cancer
Institute and others, which show no
link between smoking and lung cancer .

d. Because of our deep Concern in the matter,


we are taking these stops ,

(i) rousing a joint research committee of


Cigarette makers :

(ii) Setting aside a joint fund


of 5500,000 or $1,00,000)
for further medical research
into a problem of national
importance ;

(iii) Pledging to the publi c


that it will get all the facts
as they become available .1 0

Hill a Ak owlton submitted its plan to the indust ry on


DICIMJOII 29, 1953, It the Plaza Hotel . minutes from that meeting

show that "the 9Proposed program dated December 24, 199, (a refer-
ence to 'Preliminary Recommendations" ) was reviesee3 and accepted
In general by all present . This included agreement with the urgency
of getting such a program under way immediately . " The group also
agreed to release "a frank statement of the cigarette manufacturers'
position on the recent lung cancer publicity" as soon as possible .
This statement was to be placed as an advcrtisementsince . .

Only thronch advertising Could such a statement be assured hig h

10 . "Draft Of Proposals for Cigarette Makers for Discussion by


Hill and %nowlton, Inc . Planning Committee, Monday Evening,
December 21, 1953 ." Again, note the similarity to the points
Made in "A Frank Statement .'

680704719
Memorandum to Allen e . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 1 4

v is ibility, full quotation and freedom from adulteration with nega-


tive in£ormationJ 1 1

The Hill collection contains many documents re levant to

the preparation for placement of "A Frank Statement ." The majority

of these documents are administrative, but they do show unequivo-


cally that the industry viewed the announcement of the formation

of the TIKC as an advertisement, that the advertisement was written


by Hill E Knowlton and that it 'was intended to provide reassurance
to the public . The Hill documents sh ow that this was done straight-
forwardly, with no intention to deceive . However, the fact that
the languagewe* developed by a public relations agency detracts
from defendants' arguments that this We, an ea rn est statement of
intent from the manufacturers to the public .

The tone of these early documents makes i_ clear that the


conpanies' initial reaction to the adverse research reports was
that they we exaggerations, with no real scientific basis . A
good plaintiff's lawyer could use these documents to argue that
the companies weren't really sincere about "A Frank Statement"--
they only went along with it because it was recommended by public
relations counsel as a way to quickly smooth over the erupting
controversy . At the very least, these documents support an argument
that the TIAC was Hill & Knowlton's idea, and not the creation o_

a sensitive, responsible indust ry .

11 . "Notes on Minute, of the Tobacco Industry Research commttee


Meeting December 28, 1953 ."

680704720
All,, F. PurVi

April a 13, 199 0


Page 15

III . OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES of THE TIR C

Edell argued during Cipollone that the companies wanted


to "neutrali2e" info rmation regarding cigarette smoking's effect
on health . 12 He suggested that the companies have always known
none about the health effects of smoking than they have communicated
to their customers . The Hill documents could be used to provide
support for the argument that the TTRC was formed to promote the
public imp re ssion of a need faith effort to understand whether
tobacco had a role in cancer causation, while in reality them u-

facturers used the TIRO to cloud the issues and confuse the public .

Documents written early in Hill E Xnwlton's assn iation


with the industry show that information work" was Seen ad a
important function of public relations counsel . A document

reported by polity to contain the v rning that it should be


-considered highly confidential and a receive the min-Inv of
ci rculation" ("Report of Activities Through July 31, 1954") states :

A continuing important function is to build up the TIXC


as a reliable and authoritative source of facts relating
to the tobacco and health problem .

This dome document contains a case history" detailing the steps

Hill 6 lo:owlton routinely took to insure attention to

"positive" stories -- in this case the publicizing of the NCI's


Dr . Russet's talk at Sao Paulo, Brazil in 1954 at the Sixt h

oollone transcript pp . 12492/1-3 through 12492/1-22 . Edell


also charged that there was conspiracy among the t
compan not to do in-house research . No substantiation for
that charge has been found in the Hill documents .

680704721
C
anaum to Allen R. Pu
April 13, 199 0
Page 1 6

International Cancer Congress . An advance copy obtained by Hill &

Kn ow lton revealed that Dr . Hooper '& speech contained 'new wo rt hy


material concerning lung cancer and particularly concerning the
lack of a proven link between lung cancer and smoking ." No press
distribution of the talk had been planned by the NCI . Hill 6
Knowlton reproduced the 5 venteen -page created a shorter
paper,

"highlight" vartion, and sent both under a cover note to editors,


science writers, editorial writers and feature writers .

Perhaps vo e, from a defense standpoint, the

description of th e immediate problems confronting the indust ry


contained an early inte rn al planning memoranda .

ttohle9 I
The very first problem to establish some public
Confidence in the industry's leaders themselves, so that
the public will believe their assertions of their own
Interest in the public health . . . .

problem 7
To reassure the public, and still instinctive fears,
this interim when definitive facts for giving complete
still lacking
yare ; when scientific doubts mos t
rebels ; and when new "unfavorable' information can emerge
from rsome laborator at any time, to act as a bomb shell
on the whole tobacco industry -- if it has meanwhile
tried to pooh-pooh the unfavorable finding to date . . .
.

proble_.
How to validate this message of assurance . .For the
public, a issue touching the deepest of human fears and
instinctsnis involved - the issues of uncontrollable
disease and death . Hence cigarette companies eight not
readily be forgiven, if their approach to this proble m
stemmed only from eagerness to protect their a ings,
and if they twisted the research of medical s e (which
seeks to save en) into a device to save stockholder
, s

sso7047zz
andum to Allen F . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 1 7

In the past, indust ry has given little twists to the


facts of science, to convert them into sales propaganda,
without much risk . The cigarette industry has indeed
been doing this for years We can therefore readily
understand its assumptions that the sae technique will
work now, in devising propaganda . But it highly
important to note that the deep issues of life-and-death
that are involved make highly doubtful the question
as to whether the familiar techniques can be relied on .
The stakes a e too large ; the penalties for l os ing could
be too great . . . .

1 How can we immediately to identify the tobacco


companies completely with concern for the public good?
This accomplishment -- if we can manage it - would throe
everything else into proper focus, and would show the
answers to the other eario a problems .

Problem 6
we have one essential job . . . .Stop public panic,
without even getting in the position of giving false
assurances, or of giving false emphases . . . .

A plaintiff's atto rn ey may suggest that the industry,


secure in its superior knowledge of the scientific issues and with
the help of the most urbane public relations counsel available,
purposefully manipulated public opinion and to a large degree public
knowledge of an issue that, to repeat Fill & Knowlton's poetic
phrase, touched -the deepest of human fears and instincts . "

An attachment to the January 18, 1936, TIRC meeting agenda


which outlined the objectives of the Committee's "Information Ser-

vic could be interpreted as advocating suppression of information


and industry pressure an writers .

TO avoid encouraging or stimulating further publicity


or, the subduer .

680:04'723
C

Memorandum to Allen R . Pu rv is
April 13, 199 0
Page 1e

To see that those we know to be planning to write


or talk about smoking and health get all available
facts .

3 . To keep Committee members informed of the trend of


publicity and public discussions on the inches of
interest .

4 . To handle correspondence and inquiries from the


press, public, ee oatoms, etc .1 3

In contrast, the description of the purposes and objec-

tives of the TIRO which was given to candidates for the Research

Director14 position emphasized that research would be directed


toward illuminating the lung cancer-tobacco link and implied that

the information given to the public would be directly related to


progress in that area :

To aid and assist rsearch into tobacco use


and health, and particularly into th e alleged
relationship between the use of tobacco and
lung cancer .

To make available to the public factual informa-


tion on th is subjec t . 1 5

The "ground rules" developed during th e attempt to


attract a Scientific Director, listed ten --responsibilities and
prerogatives" of the Scientific Director, including the provisio n

13 . "Program Projects," ennuary 15, 1954 .

14 . The terms "Research Director" and "Scientific Director" are


used interchangeably throughout the Hill documents and in
this memorandum .

is . "Objective," gating in part the THRC 9y-Laws . Part of packet


of and Helen" developed under the direction of A . Grant
Clarke ofor submission to prospective Scientific Director s

680704724
C
Memorandum to Allen R . Pu rv is
April ll, 199 0
Page 1 9

that "The Scientific Director shall not be charged with the problems

of directly handling public information, but shall be available


for consultation with individuals charged with that responsibil-
ity . .1e "Preliminary Recommendations,' however, specified that it

was the Research Director`s responsibili ty to direct "continuing

Public Relations Research," described as :

a continuing research project to collect, coordinate


self di ss eminate (where practical) available information
on various medical research activities bearing on per-
tinent phases of cigarettes and health . 1 2

Again, the contrast between publicly and privately stated objectives


might be used to plaintiff's advantage .

Plaintiffs may wish to call attention to the differences


between the True', publicly stated objectives and handwritten no es
apparently taken by Hill during an October, 1954, TIRC meeting
which arguably provide a more candid assessment of the objectives
and progress of the TIRC :

1 . Stated policy of committee (a) answer attacks where


possible (b) help writers and others who enquired
and stimulate attention to benefit s

2. By this largely defensive procedure we hoped that


the furor would die dow n

But it hasn't died most . The attacks are continuing


and increasing from individuals and groups havin g

16 . "The Scientific Director ." Part of packet of "ground rules"


developed under the direction of Grant Clarke for submission
to prospective Scientific Directors .

17 . "Preliminary ReCmenlations For Cigarette Manufacturers,"


December 29 . 1953,prod uced in Cipollone by Lorillard and CTR .

680/04725
C
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 20

various motivations, among which the most harmful


is she desire for publicity . Then there are
ders like Osehner and Graham who have taken aposl-
o -
ticn and seek to defend and justify it . And then
there is the Carrie Nation type of anti-cigarette
crensader . Taking them all together they are keeping
public fear and hysteria stirred up .

As time has gone [sic] the real motives of many of


the crusaders have become and more clear .
Unsoundness and fallacies haver become apparent
any of the statistical studies and theories . Also
various scientists have Some up with views cm ati-
cally opposed to the anti-cigarette people, ao at
least casting doubt on their conclusions . (Most
attacks] Haven't made page 1 .

However we have not taken issue with the attackers


openly challenged their facts, 3 reasons (a)
because of the policy of not keeping alive the con-
troversy ('o) because if we entered into controversy,
with scientists this might attend the S .A .B . and
(c) we wanted avoid any appearance of making the
to callous to human hurting .
industry appear

Last night the P .R . group discussed these matters


and cre impatience was expressed "at the T . I . R .c .
notwer more on the offensive . There was stron g
feeling that the T .I .R .C . should take what Sec .
Dulles calls a "agonised reappraisal" of policy .
It was felt that with a ong B .A .B . at work the
industry could [het roble be accused of id and
indifference to the plain . . ts tosaid, and
Dr l ),
it will I explain
. why heee today if
that while the S .A.B . cannot engage in scientific
controversy
T I . R . C at this stage, there was s no reason why
the . A . C . cannot .
In addition to all the defensive things we are now
doing it was suggested that we

1 . Prepare a comprehensive report to the


public which will put the problem in proper
prospective, point out in layman's language
the vulnerable points in the Hammon -Horn
report and other attacks

680704726
C
Allen R . Ynr,1S
April 13, 199 0
Page 21

That we explore the possibility of inspir-


ing some sort of meeting or conference in
some tobacco state which could take action
to counteract the recent PH [Public Health]
resolutions

That we proceed actively with . the work


of informing Congress .

That we find a way to smoke o t the govern-


ment public health survey
w on the P .H .
[illegible )

That we find more platforms for telling


the tobacco story . Make use of industry
writings to put controversy in perspective .

Objectives net forth in Hill & Mowlton•s first annual


Public Relations Report to the TIRC (December, 3954) also have a

decidedly public relations slant :

(1) moderating hysteria by making it known that


the of lung cancer and heart disease ar e
cause o r causes
know ; (2) making it generally known that medica l
science does cept statistical and other inconclusive
evidence so far p roduced as establishing a causal rela-
tionship between smoking and disease ; (1) bringing to
public attention any unsound methods or fallacious castle-
along i connection with anti-smoking statistics or labor-
ato ry experiments ; (4) gaining the active support of
doctors and scientists still maintaining an open mind ;
(5) establishing a soundly based relationship with the
press aimed toward full and fair reflection of the
P.Scoblisnedd facts ; and (6) earning public confidence by
maintaining a nuiritific approach to the scientific Arab-
lean and avoiding actions that would cast doubt on the
indstry's motives . l

"Public Relations Progress Report and Program for the Tobacco


Indust ry Research Committee," December 30, 1954 . Produced by
Reynolds in Bane? (50194 1204/12!61 .

680704727
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 22

John Hill offered his private opinion as to what the


primary objective of the TIme was and how it might be accomplished
in a January 11, 1955, letter to Tommy Ross, public relations Coun-

sel for American :

To my mind, the No . 1 objective of the program next year


should be to show up all of the s entific fallacies and
misrepresentations that have been accepted at face value
by an unsuspecting public . i believe this will be far
more effective if it is accomplished by objective scion-
tists, rather than by i,terrstwd parties . But if it
cannot be done by the fonder, it will have to be done
by the latter .1 9

Documents in the Rill collection could be used by plain-


tiffs' counsel to argue that there was a discrepancy between the
publicly stated purposes of the TSRC and privately articulated
industry goals . Using these documents, plaintiffs could argue

that the manufacturers' most important short-term goal was to


reassure the public and that their long-term goal was to fund
scientific research which Would challenge the validity of the
rese ar ch linking cancer to cigarette use .

TV . USE ORESIgj$OR_ FOR PUB Rd{ .i~T,LGj"5 $pW'OP. P S

During Cipollone, plaintiff claimed that the industry's

Initial response upon learning of the studies linking cigarettes

with cane was to consult a sophisticated public relations firs


and that it was only upon the advise of that public relations firm

that the decision to support independent research was finall y

on John W . Hill to T .J . Ross, January 11, 1955 .

680704728
C
Memorandum to Allen It Pu rvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 2 3

made .20 Edell tried to show that the research supported by the
Tobacco Industry Research Committee was never intended to find out

if cigarette smoking was a cause of cancer, ethat it was set up to

either disprove the allegations that smoking was a primary ideologi-

cal [sic, etiological] factor in sa diseases or to suggest ways

of adopting or codifying cigarettes ." Edell also suggested that

TIRC research was done to "convince the public of the complexity

of the disease process of lung caer' and to "suggest that it was

some kind of Rost Factor, s mething that was internal to the smoker,

that resulted in the development of lung cancer ."2 1

Certain of the Hill documents can be Used defensively

by the industry to refute Edell's claims . For a apple, Hill &


Knowlton's first advice to the industry was that it demonstrate a
good faith effo rt , as noted in "Suggested Approach and Perrault
Regarding Attacks on Use of Cigarettes," December 14, 1953 . HoW-
er, Hi ll & Xnowlton's progress report nine months later could
be interpreted by plaintiffs' central as revealing that the industry
research program was established primarily to meet public relations
objectives :

more the industry had nothing to point to that it ws


doing a year ago, it can now point to the Scientific
Advisory Board and ScientificDirector (sic] . Study of
editorials shows that a large portion of good will won by
the industry has been due to favorable impression created

20 . In the opinion of plaintiff's advertising witness, Joel Cohen :


"The industry's response to the emergency was public relations
instead of conducting r search to find our more about what
was going on and whether the public was adequately informed
or providing informative to the public ." (Cipollone trial
transcript, 4]04/19-22) .

21 . C}pojle^ transcript p . 3108/5-7, p . 3100/11-14 and pp .


30]1/25-3032/1-6 .

660704729
Memorandum to Allen R . PUNTS
April 13, 199 0
Page 24

the public appointment of the Board and


announcement of minces a program .2 2

The TIRC Was to undertake "medical laboratory r ch,"

under the guidance of the Research Director and the SAB g98 rBut of
equal importance were .

Statistical research pertaining to health and vital data,


to be done bastatistician hired for that purpose ;

Editorial research to answer inquiries and counteract


erroneous statements, to be done by a ical science
writer on the public relations staff ; and e 6
Foreign study to ascertain the uterus of smoking and
health matters in other countries .2 3

One of Hill 6 Knowlton's first actions upon being

consulted by the industry was to inte rv iew the research directors


of four of the cigarette companies, Reports of theme Confidential,
ve ry candid 'talks" with Dr . Harris B . Percale (t.rillard), Or .
Robert N . Dupuis (Philip Morris), Mr . H .R . Hanmer (American) and
Mr . Grant Clarke (Reynolds' 'Morrie of Research Information") are
found in Hill's TIRC files . The research directors provided general
information regarding current cancer research, liberally sprinkled
with Opinion, hearsay and conjecture . For example, Dr . Dupuis ,
snting on Sloan-Kettering research, suggested a personal talk
with Messrs . Sloan or Kettering to bring to their attention the
fact that lung cancer might also be correlated with the incidence
of atmospheric pollution from automobile exhaust : . . how happy
would these automobile gentlemen be to have their Foundation gettin g

'Program of Tobacco Industry Research Committee," September


9, 3954 .

"Program Projects," 3anuary 15, 1954 (paraphrased) .

660704730
Memorandum to All,, R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 2 5

into that subject?" Mr . Banes characterized Wynder as the men

of an itinerant reformer . . . young, impetuo s, immature . . . .

I've heard stores [sic) . Said one research scientist to Me, His

research stinks .' Another, '2 know he was taken off a team of
interviewers, because he put words in people's mouths .'" Cancer

also relayed a story of the origins of New York University's


research on lung cancer and tobacco -- with paper and tobacco

cooperating .-- Clarke apparently spent side time bragging about


his connections with editors and science writers and then stated ;

We've been running s erch [sic), as you know .


It wasn ' t publicized b cause we didn't believe it good
to publicize . That has been o attitude . Maybe we'll
have to change -- I don't knew r My own attitude is
should continue our own independent research, each company
doing its own, and even duplicating that done in other
companies . We are coordinating, screening research righ t

One document might be used by plaintiff to show that

the establishment of the Scientific Adviso ry Board and the selection


of a respected scientist as Scientific Director were aimed primarily
at providing a foundation from which public relations activities
could be launched :

it contemplated that a basis for a positive


program of public information would be provided when the
Scientific Advisory Board and Scientific Director had
been selected and were at work, and when various
Preliminary editorial research projects were well under
way . These things have been accomplished and the
Committee now had th e basis needed for car ry ing on a
long-range plan of public relations activities aimed at
keeping the following facts before the public :

1 . That there is no proof that smoking is a cause


of lung cancer ;

680704731
r
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 26

That an impa rt ial and independent Board of


scientists, doctors and educators IS advising
the TIRC, as a public Service, on all problems
of tobacco one and health ;

That the TIRC is determined, through a long-


range program, to make every possible effort
to help get the facts through laborato ry and
statistical research ;

That initial funds for research have been appro-


priated and m Ore will be provided as warranted
to help in getting the answers by cientific
means ~

That all of the laborato ry r search recommended


by the Advisory Hoard and financed by the TIRC
will be carried on by recognized and independent
laboratories, institutions and hosp 2 tals .2 4

Any separation of the scientific and public relations


aspects of the TIRC that may have been intended wa clouded when
Hill & Remelted endeavored to capitalize on the reputations and
achievements of the SAB . For example, Will a Knowlton elected
quickly to . new information linking cigarettes and health . A draft
of a statement to he issued under T .V . Hartnett's name informed
the public that the SAB had examined the report rega rd ing benzpyrene
(referred to only a the compound found in burning cigarette
paper") and ached reassuring conclusions regarding it .n An
attentive plai tiff's a tt orney will notice that the statement was
dated the day before the report was released . It identified tobacco

interests with public interests, concluding, ''What the cigarette


menu actuvers and the public want to know is whether or not burning
cigarette paper c ntains any element in an amount harmful to huma n

29 . Public Relations Report and % endations for Tobacco Indus-


try Research Committee, June 1 , 1954 .

680704732
C
Memorandum to A ll en R . Purv is
April 13, 195 0
Page 2 7

beings . No evidence of this is now know [sic) to the manufae-

turers .'x25

Leonard Zahn recommended that SAB activities be exploited

for public relations purposes :

As developments warrant, and Subject to approval of the


Scientific Advisory Board, information on the work of
the Board should be released to the public . Two such
announcements have been made and a proposed third is
attached .

careful analysis must be made of each TIRO stammered


research grant as the results approach publication in
regular scientific or medical journals to whether
the information should receive wider publicity and dis-
tribution . Pallor towarsuch publicity must be in head
ing with the well-accepted freedom Of action given the
SAB in its administration of the research program . . . .

There was a realization that the indust ry could not "speak


as harshly or directly as it might like, because of considerations
related to the 'position and attitude" of the SAB . However, H il l
6 Knowlton was quick to reassure tobacco company representatives
to TIRO that it was "going over the whole picture to be sure that
we are doing eve ry thing possible to protect the indus tr y is such
instances ."27 Edell argued during Ci o nfe that the tobacco each-

-A Statement by Mr . T .V . Hartnett," draft, October 31, 1954 .


Memorandum from Leonard Zahn to the TIRC, September 9, 1955 .
This passage takes on added significance in light of Ede ll 's
focus in c jCi oonh n zahn's treatment of Bomberger . Zahn's
cnolions deposition is, of course, available for use i n

27 . Memorandum from R .W . Darrow to W .T . Hoyt, March 6, 1956 .

680704733
C
Memorandum to Allen R .
April 13, 199 0
Page 2 B

lecturers tried to hide what they knew about the dangers of smoking,
that they tried to suppress unfavorable research while encouraging
irrelevant o safe" research, and that these tactics were directed
toward the 1'IRC's main purpose, which was to reassure smokers that
smoking would not harp them . Plaintiffs will find support in these
documents for the allegation that "protecting the industry" meant
convincing the public that the industry was sincere its desire
to resolve the cigarette smoking and health issue .2 8

ROLE of THE RESEARCH DIRECTOR AND THE SAt


l

Plaintiffs have suggested that one of the purposes of


the TIRC was to provide the industry with scientific experts who

could act as spokesmen on behalf of the industry . The Hill docu-


ments con irm that company executives and public relations counsel ,

well as the Industry Technical Committee, played an active role


in the selection of the RIRC'S Scientific Director and the scien-

tists Who were appointed to the SAS, and that certain scientists
did make puffin statements promoting "the other side of the contro-
ray ."

The TIRC promised in "A Frank Statement" to select a

scientist of unimpeachable integrity and national repute" to direct

research activities of their new organization . The original plan


War to select a Research Director immediately, and then allow him

to guide and advise the Committee as they fulfilled other oblige-


tions It forth in their announcement, including selection of mem-

Cipollone transcript p . 3117/12-14 . In addition to Edell's


allegations, Judge Ice Sasokin ruled during the trial that
from the evidence presented to that point, a jury could reason-
hilly find that the TIPS had been 'nothing but a hoax created
for public relations purposes ."

680704734
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvi
April 13, 199 0
Pace 2 9

bars for the SAD . It fell to the company research directors (the
Indust ry Technical Committee) headed by A . Grant Clarke, to seek
out the scientist who would fill that job . The Committee a un-
tered a discouraging reluctance on the part of scientists to become
aff il iated with the TIRC . Public relations activities continued
at full speed, while the research part of the plan faltered, in
the absence of a knowledgeable and committed leader-29 Dr . Harold
Larry Stewart, a respected pathologist employed by the United States
Public Health Service (the National cancer institute) was first
offered and declined the appointment . At One point, in March, the
committee was led by Clarke to believe that Or . Albert Tannenbaum3O
'would consent to the position of Scientific Director, if only he
could be satisfied of the objectives of th e TZRC and the indepen-
dence of the position . Grant Clarke accordingly drew up a set of
"around mutes" which included a sho rt statement of the purposes
and objectives of the TIRC .

Despite TSRC's efforts, Tannenbaum did not accept . Pain-

aware of the increasing anount of time between release of " A

29 . Staff Memo No . 10, March 23, 1954, states, 'Staff has handled
hundreds of interviews and phone calls and much a espondence
with medical people, chemists, laboratory and equipment spe-
cialists, and others offering suggestions Or anting to do
specialized work Careful files i
being maintaine to be turned over to the director whe n s
d chosen meanwhile, interest in the Committee continue s
high, with the a staff receiving many calls from the various
news and information media . "

30 . That the person in question was Dr . Albert Tannenbaum is an


assumption- The Hill documents refer to the candidate only
"Dr . Tannenbaum ." Dr . Albe rt Tannebaum was Director o f
Cancer Research at Chicago's Micheal Reese Hospital in the
1950s . A news article (Nw York JDUrra I_Am-riavn, October
5, 1956) quoted him as saying that he believed lung cancer
probably Wes caused by a multiplicity of influences . "

660704735
C

April 13, 1990


Page 3 0

Frank Statement" and the appointment of a Research Director, the

TSRC decided to proceed with selection of the SAB . There was the

hope that the scientists would feel more comfortable a members

of a group and that one would eventually consent to become the


leader .

John Hill attended interviews with prospective SAS members


whenever he could . Correspondence with Paul Hahn during March,

1954, reflected Hill's active interest in the search for BAB mem-
bers . At one point, Hill suggested that Dr . Max Cutler be con-
sidered for appointment to the SAM, describing him a "student
of the problem in which we interested," a past "witness in court
cases,` and monsoon who "gets along wonderfully wi th people . Hill
sent Cutler's favorable quote from the White Paper (discussed later
in this memorandum) to George Whiteside (Chadbourne & Parke), who
as a member of the TSRC Law Committee was involved in Clearing
candidates for the SAS .

The TTRC and Hill & enovlton recognized the value of

maintaining close ties with scientists, even though they occasion-

ally chafed under the restrictions imposed by this relationship .

By taking a firm stand on the work of this Board, the


TTRC is solid ground . But in doing this, it is pre-
eluded from engaging in oggn femphasis in Original) scien-
tific controversies without the approval of Dr . Little
and th e Board .

The December TO, 1954, "public Relations Progress Report

and Program for the Tobacco Industry Research Committee" revealed

the industry's strong motivation for selecting prominent scientists

to serve on the SAD, no matter how intractable some of them might


prove to be at times :

660701736
r
Memorandum to Allen R .
April 13, 1 99 O
Page 31

. the basic component for dealing with the problem


remains the scientific community . Therein are any
friends and neutrals who will aid a and public relations
program . The greatest asset the Tobacco Indust ry Research
Committee has today is the Scientific Adviso ry Board
which stands as symbol of wisdom, integrity and sin-
cerity . Rest to that is the growing confidence of doctors
and scientists in the validity of the basic approach of
the Tobacco Indust ry Research Committee to the problem
through independent scientific research .3 1

John Hill's notes, referred to earlie r, contained an


additional analysis of the worth of the SAP : - - . with a strong
S .A .B . at work the industry could (not ever) be accused of callous
indifference to the problem . "

Four weeks after the first set of invitations were

issued, & Knowlton document announced, 'Wi th help


an internal Hill

of 36K, TIRC has succeeded in getting some of the top cancer expe rt s
in the country to join its advisory board ." Dr . Little consented
to move to the position of Research Director in Jul', 1954 .

One document referred to during the Cis g lone trial hinted

th at there was tension between C .C . Little and the TIRC almost


from the beginning . Edell used a document produced by A rthur D.
little Co . to show that the Board of Directors of the Tobacco Indus-

t ry Research Committee was unhappy with D r . Little as far back as


late 1954, and tried to find sameo a else (who would be more tra
. The document
cable)tofihpsncetfiDro

stated that the TIRE w asting about" for a c ssor for Dr .


Little only six months after he accepted the appointment as Scienti-

31 . "Public Relations Progress Report and Program for the Tobacco


Industry Research Committee," December 30, 1954 .

680704737
C
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 3 2

Yic Director of the TIR C . neither confirmed nor


This charge
contradicted by documents in the (till collection . However, th ere
is little doubt that Dr . Little's stubborn adherence to his princi-
ples caused industry exe cu tives some headaches .

Correspondence between John Hill and Dr . Little produced


in New Jersey and Texas confirms that the question as to how indus-
try interests care best served won a constant one . Dr . Little
continually advocated a conservative approach, while less patient
Company representatives pushed to utilize the EAR to counteract
adverse research results . For example, th e Hill files contain
numerous drafts of "A Repo rt to the Nation by Perform of the Tobacco
Industry R search Council ." This advertisement was to be th e "first

annual report" of th e FIND, and relied heavily on the a Irk and


integrity of the BAB for content . According to the one proposed

version of the advertisement, it is possible to say that all of


the pledges given to the public 12 months ago are being fulfilled ."
This draft described the aim of the Scientific Adviso ry Board :

to penetrate the fog of unproven theories and in-


.... laniva evidence regarding the effect of tobacco on
heal th , and seek out the truth . One of the first
steps to be taken by the s entific Advisory Board was the
development of a program intended to ascertain facts not
Only pertaining to smoking and heal th , but to contribute
further understanding of cancer, heart disease and other
public health problems .

The document restated the industry position regarding


past and present charges against tobacco, cocduding :

Meanwhile, the public can be assured on th ese points :

1 . No proof exists today that tobacco is a


cause of lung cancer or heart disease .

680704738
Memorandum to Allen H . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 33

All phases of tobacco and health will be


painsta3indly studied under a broad program
of research developed by the Scientific
Advisory Board .

The scientific stature and unquestioned


integrity of th e members of the Scientific
Adviso ry Board provide a guarantee to the
American people that the Board's ultimate
finds will be objective, impa rt ial and
wholly in the public interest .

Whatever these finding may be, they will


be accepted by theCmoemmitte 2 the Tobacco
Industry Research .3

The question whether this advertisement should he placed

generated a great deal of controversy, particularly between TIRC


public relations counsel and Dr, Little . It appears that the pro-

ject was eventually dropped and the advertisement never run .

Vi . OVEMEN9 TO A MOREAGGRFSSiV' P_TOR H

Documents in the Hill collection reveal that although


the industry's first response to the acrisise may have been to

defend itself against what it considered to be unsubstantiated and


unfair charges, th e m ment toward a more affirmative response
soon gained a foothold OVe
. There is no clearest date f ro m which the
industry moved to a more aggressive posture ; indeed, th e pros and
over of taking affirmative action against indust ry critics seems
to have been debated regularly in early meetings of industry
leaders .

AP :_p~yt O -yam- TjP.Itch


" For Fact
Ana filth,- November 30, 1954 .

680701739
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 34

From its inception . the TIRC was advised by its public


relations Counsel and by others to keep a low profile . The industry
could not allow itself to be drawn into public arguments regarding
the link between cigarette smoking and disease . The sane day that
"A Frank Statement" appeared, E .C .X . Read (an employee of Hill &

Knowlton) offered advice to hill regarding how the TIRO should


proceed to meet its objectives :

There would sam to me to be for more. danger of fanning


the flames by making too many statements, etc ., tha n
there would be in keeping relatively quiet except where
is necessary to nail down incorrect statements by
it
others . Now that one good statement out from the
committee, I believe the controversy should be given
every chance to die a natural death . Maybe it won't,
but let's give it the benefit of the doubt .

The TIRC's strategy during the first year was to maintain

a low profile, answering only those attacks which demanded a

We are not interested in stimulating or encouraging the


publication of any a rt icles or news stories on the subject
of tobacco and cancer or the work of the committee . our
sole interest is in knowing what is being writted and in
getting our side of the story over if an article is sched-
uled for publication .3 3

As stated by Leonard Zahn, "TIRC's public relations policy


has been to avoid stimulating new or additional public attention to
the subject and at the same time to take steps that would help
the public maintain a balanced view of the situation ." Zahn cuun-

seled that the 'llRC should "continue its present policies and acti-

33 . Memorandum from Bert C . Goss to the publicity department of


Hill 6 Knowlton, January 8, 1954 .

6&0704740
c
Memorandum to Allen R . Retain
April 13, 199 0
Page 3 5

vities through which a steadily improving credibility and under-

standing is being established with the press and public ." On a

more practical note, in June, 1956, members of the TIRC acknowledged

that their organization till is not in a position to support

strongly a positive stand against the charges made against smoking .'

After his appointment as Research Director in nid-1954, Dr . Little

reaffirmed the soundness of this position . Yet, some industry


leaders were impatient with the apparent reluctance of Hill &

Knowlton and the TIRE to adopt a more aggressive posture in dealing

with industry 'enemies . Not everyone in the industry group agreed


that maintaining a low profile would yield the desired results .

Correspondence in Hill's files reveals that many members advocated


a more affirmative, if not aggressive," approach, before the TIRC
was a year old . Indeed, the adopted strategy was not as successful

as had been hoped . Bert Coss wrote to Hill in March, 1954 : "The
subject is hardly dying down . "

It fell to John Bill to maintain the balance between


o e faction's desire for a strong statement of the industry case
and or . Little's reluctance to allow the 5AB to be used let public

relations purposes . hill took every opportunity to Convince the

more aggressively postured members of the TIRC that the Research

Director was working with them in their efforts :

Fortunately, Dr . Little has a keen understanding and


appreciation of the industry's public relations problem,
and has given many evidences of his willingness to co-
operate . (Examples - his widely quoted sediments on the
Hammond-Foxe Report, his press inte rv iew, his re lease on
the industry research plans-)3 4

"Public Relations Progress Repo rt and Program for the Tobacco


Industry Research Committee," December 3 0, 1954 .

680704741
C
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 3d

The on-going discussions probably prompted John Hill to


suggest in late 1954 that members of his staff convene to discuss

"full marshalling and statement of the case for tobacco to date ."

Hill received support for his plan to put tobacco's case forward
more assertively . A January It, 1955, letter from George Weissman

(Philip Morris) to Hill stated, your progress report and

public relations program for TIRO sounds fine . I am particularly

interested in Your statement on page 4 concerning a core aggressive

Program of public relations activity .' Paul Hahn (American) and


T .V . Hartnett (Brown & Williamson) also pressed for a more vigorous

response . And, a letter from Paul Hahn to John Hill dated February

5, 1958, noted that `In recent weeks, Or . Little has countenance

and participated in a somewhat more affirmative approach . . . . 1 d1

By 1960, two years after the Tobacco Institute was forced,

Hahn advocated a "drastic revision" in the industry approach to


public relations, a redoubling of positive efforts to at the
public toward straight ." In a letter to Tim Hartnett, Hahn stated

that he had no quarrel with or . tittle's basic position that s v-

entific findings should be independent and free from non-


scientific interpretation . "

on the other hand, the public relations problem calls


for the creating of a general awareness of the fact that
,pientjbic findings and opinions contradict the exag-
gerated anti-tobacco material released to the press .
This shield be done fl continuing and c istent cam-
paign . It should not be stifled by a philosophy of reluc-
tance in public utterance .3 5

35 . Is on Paul Kahn to T .V . Hartnett, June 13, 1960 .

680704742
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 1 3 , 199 0
Page 37

Hill responded to Hahn-to criticism with the assurance


that Hill & Knowlton would :

do what we could to utilize the positive aspects


of tobacco`s case and that this program would represent
some change of pace f row the past activity in that there
would be a continuing endeavor to get public exposure for
each and every significant bit of evidence favorable to
smoking .3 6

It is clear that the differences of opinion as to the


industry's proper response to evidence of a cigarette-cancer link
which exist today are long-standing . plaintiffs May use the Hill

documents in conjunction With mo recent industry publications


to argue that the industry has a history of attempting to deceive
the public through aggressive public relations campaigns .

yrr THE WRITE PAPER

One of the first projects unde rtaken by Hill & Enowlton

on behalf of their new client was publication of a White Paper,

onto formally known as "A Scientific perspective on the Cigarette


Controversy .' Amer s public relations counsel had begun Work
On the white Paper prior to the formation of the TIRO : the daft
was offe re d to the Committee when the need for this kind of
[ e became apparent The Hill papers reveal that industry
people perceived urgent need for the White Paper project to
help soothe the fears of the public . Hill described the booklet
as a compilation Of t

36 . Memorandum r "Meeting with Mr . Paul M . Habn," from John W .


Hill to T .V .eHartnett, R .G . Darrow, C ar l 1TOmpson, W .T . Hoyt
and Bart Goss, June 1 7 , 1960 .

680'704743
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 38

excerpts from important scientific articles pub-


lished in this country and abroad which present a balanced
view of the situation and pa rt icularly which present the
other side of the controversy, as distinguished from the
view promoted by Doctors Graham, Ochsn and Wynder, who
have contended that cigarette smoking caused canaer .3 7

Plaintiffs will argue that the white Paper was just one
more attempt by the industry to offer reassuring "science" to suck-

, when, in fact, many of the contributors to the White Paper


had close ties to the industry . Additionally, although great care

Was taken by Hill d Knowlton to obtain signed releases from the


scientists quoted in the White Paper, the Hill papers reveal that

some of these scientists later accused the industry of using the

statements out of context .

One scientist apparently did not complain about being

quoted out of context . Dr . Max Cutler (considered at one time as


a candidate for the SAD) was asked to provide a "statement from

you which we can quote" for the White Paper . The statement is

described as "unsolicited" in the White Paper :

1 feel strongly that the blanket statements and perils-


signs have appeared in the press that there is
direct and causative relation [emphasis riginal)
between smoking of cigarettes, and the numberoof ciga-
rettes smoked, to cancer of the lung are absolutely unwar-
ranted .

37 . Letter from John W . Hill to Alan Campbell-Johnson, February


17, 1954 . Hill & Knowlton established a relationship with
Campbell-Sohnson, Ltd ., a public relations firm based in London,
at about the mark time that the TSRC was forming . There are
number of communications with the English public relations
firm in the Hill Papers . Mill relied on Campbell-Johnson to
koep him abreast of developments overseas the smoking
controversy and to keep hi, apprised of public response to
these developments .

680704744
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 3 9

Medical literature has numerous examples of such falla-


nclusions which have been proved to be wrong in
the. light of subsequent experience . This whole question
of cause and effect deducted on statistical basis is
subject to the greatest fallacies . One way I like to
emphasize it is to say the simply because one finds bull-
frogs after a rain does not mean that it rained bullfrogs .

To accept the conclusion that has been drawn of a direc t


sal relationship between smoking and cancer of the
lung simply because there has been an increase in both,
appears to me unscientific and hazardous .

From all the available evidence, I think it is u vable


that in a very Small, probably infinitesimal percentage
of s sitive individuals smoking may ultimately prove to
be one of nume rous contributing factors in lung cancer .

Under these c mstances, is it wise to scare the public


and create s
widespread anxiety among millions of people
on the. flimsy evidence that has been presented?3 e

Concern that the white paper might be perceived as com-


mercial in character, and designed to promote the smoking of tobacco

and tobacco consumption" caused the TTAC to limit its distribution


to financial analysts, writer, physicians, tobacco trade organiz-
ations and the media . Still, the white Paper was seen by the TIRc
and Hill b %nowlton as an important and beneficial resource .

38 . TI document 11560 and CTR documents cnco2o900/0919 and


HT0021078/1n97, Produced in Cipollone, "A Scientific Perspec-
tive on the Cigarette Controversy ." Also, Lorillard
00490805/0824 and 80690483/0503, neither produced ; Philip
Morris 100503998 7 /0008 and 1005070571/0590, neither produced .

6807(4745
C
Memorandum to Allen R . Purv is
April 10, 199 0
Page 40

VIII . CONTACTS W DITORS WRI HRS ANp PUBLIS RS

The Hill Papers do not provide explicit support for recent


allegations that the industry has used its advertising dollar clout
to gain influence . However, the documents do reveal the significant
role meetings with editors, publishers and science writers played
in th e public relations strategy, and the amount of time and effort
that went into preparing for th em . A plaintiff may try to show
that the tobacco industry exploited the public. . ass iation of
journalism with "objectivity" by offering so-calledocisleading
information to science writers in order to promote the impres on
th at there w a controversy . plaintiffs may also suggest that
the independence and integrity of Clarence Cook Li tt le was compro-
mised by his participation in this effo rt .

Hill E Knowlton representatives began meeting with editors


and publishers almost immediately after the firm was retained by
the industry . Company executives and officers of the '1'1Rc, Or .
Little and even members of the sell were often included in these
meetings, because it was re cognized that these meetings would be
"most effective if Messrs . Hartnett, Hahn, McComas and other top
executives from New York, as well as Dr . Little, ban find it conven-
ient to participate ." The expressed Purpose othe meetings was
to "give the publishers a full understanding of the objectives of
the Committee and its approach to the problem, and to bring about
a better balanced treatment of the subject in the press .

Alth ou gh Dr Little was fier ce ly protective of the inte-


grity of the SAN, lie was are of the need for cooperation With
the public relations people The industry needed his help to
present and legitimize its position . From the beginning, it wa s

680704746
Memorandum to Allen R . Par
April 13, 199 0
Page 4 1

understood that Dr . Little's duties at TXRC included meetings with


science writers, editors and publishers . Statements at meetings
or press conferences and re ports on medical issues were often writ-
ten by Hill & Knowlton using Dr . Little's name, with a eye toward
distribution to the scientific and general press . Staff memoranda
reported meetings of Or . Little and science writers in the TIRC
offices at Hill 6 Knowlton . One such report is Hill and Knowlton,
Inc ., Staff Memo No . 19, September 22, 1955 . Another memorandum
from Carl Thompson to A .W . Darrow, May 12, 1955, reports on the
May 16 meeting of Dr . Little with science writers . Part of the

discussion concerned 'safe' cigarettes :

Diboll (Earl Ubell, one of the first syndicated 'heal th "


writers] persisted iquestions relating to what kind of
findings would be acceptable as proving cigarettes are
harmful to health, maintaining th at, (sic] the longer sach
decision w c delayed the longer it would be before a
safe cigarette would be possible .

Dr . Little's best answer to this series of questions v


that you can't talk about making a safe' cigarette until
you know you have a harmful one .

Another inte rn al Hill 6 Knowl ton m an d


the importance of Dr . Little's attendance at all diced

people from Time and Reader's D'meet .

Hill 6 Knowlton's first mid-year public relations report


to TIRO noted :

Dr . Little would be the logical spokesman for the Board


in connection with such reports or any other statement s

680704747
April 13, 1990
Page 4 2

to be made to the press, on the air, or before groups .3 9

Another mid-1954 c n cation from John Hill to TSAC


P re sident, T .V . Hartnett Outlined public relations goals for the
TUC . Among these Were "Top Level Press Contacts '

We are planning a series of meetings with top editors


and publisher, of New York n wspapers and n magazines
over the next few weeks . . e. The purpose of theme meet-
ings would be to give the publishers a full understanding
of the objectives of the Committee and its approach to
the problem, and to bring about a better balanced treat-
ment of the subject in the press .

And, under "Press Activitiesl :

We are continuing to work with a number of publications


and writers n suggestions for possible articles of a
positive nature . Steps have been taken to inane, ail-
ability to the press and other writers of all materials
at hand which work toward a balanced perspective on the
subjem .4 0

Hill & Knowlton Informational Memoranda produced in Cinol-


lone are replete with references to "positive" stories Which are

to appear in one publication or another . These references ale


vague, often saying no more than'informaticn was furnished to the
wr . r . The Hill & Knowlton internal documents from the client
files are more informative, in that they reveal many details o f

39 . "Public Relations Report and Recommendations For Tobacco Indus-


try Research Commit[ , June 10, 1954 .

40 . Letter from John W . Hill to T .V . Hartnett, July 8, 1954 .


similar language is found in a July a, 1954, memorandum from
R . W, narrow to W .T. Hoyt .

680704748
Memorandum to Allen R . Purv is
April 13, 199 0
Page 4 3

these contacts . The objective, to get the indust ry side of the

mentioned in many documents . A report


sto ry before the public, is
of a conversation with an eminent medical and science writer (not
identified) warned, this type of writer obviously requires ve ry
special treatment, advice seeking, etc . Being highly respected in
the field, thiswriter in not going to he greatly affected by wishes
of the publisher, etc .' Another memorandum noted that conference s
a underway with the editor of peasant Magazine to work up a
story on "the other side" to balance a negative article that had

recently been published in that magazine . A do


a nt article was

eventually authored by SAB member Dr . William Rienhoff . A


plaintiff's attorney could compile enough "evidence" from documents

obtained through discovery and the Hill Papers to argue convincingly


that the TIRC, through Hill 6 prowling, influenced the creation

and/or placement of most, if not, all of the ,positive" stories

that were written about smoking in the 19S0 s

Hill i anowlton use continually arranging "background


discussions" with important editors and publishers . on occasion,
writers were provided more than just background information for
their stories

are drafting various story outline, for submission to


top magazine writers . W will offer to provide backgroun
un d
research to the writers . Such as review of history of
charges against tobacco, a B think-piece
on hysterical undertones on cigarette controversy, et c

This sake memorandum also noted that a piece on the numer-

o - approaches to the solution of cancer that would "place charges

against cigarettes in perspective wa, also being prepared "for

placement with a s,lected magazine writer ." The writer was not

identifiable from the context .

880704748
C
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 44

Articles Published in Reader's-gjgest in the early 19505


were a constant source of irritation to the tobacco industry .
Indust ry representatives were unsuccessful in getting the publishers
of eat Oioes *,t to move from their anti-cigarette stance . A
memorandum from John W . Hill to the TIRO, May 3 . 1954, reported

that" uch factual material on the subject" of tobacco and health


had been given to James Morahan and Lois Mattox Miller :

They have assured as that they were studying all sides


of the question and would do a balanced article . However,
there arc indications that When it finally appears the
pieta may prove to be another of the Header's Digest
attacks against tobacco .

A series of documents in the Hill collection regarding


what was apparently an attempt to moderate the Reader's Digest
,trade demonstrates a tactic taken by Hill & Knowlton that is
similar to that taken by Tiderock some years late r . Through Elect
Rabat (Chairman of the Board of Warner-Hudnut, Inc . and a director
of the American Cancer Society), Hill & Anowlton contacted Dr .
Paul de Kruiff, a scien writer Whose work had been published in
Rider's Digest The "Confidential Repo rt , Tobacco Indust ry • Research
Committee" (October 19, 1954) noted that meetings had been held
with Hobst the Hill documents provide a more complete picture of
the events that transpired . Dr . de Eruiff was approached by the
industry concerning the possibility of his writing an article that
Would 'bring in the balancing, and therefore contradictory [to the
Hammond-Horn report) testimony of other scientific authorities .'
Hill & Knowlton reported to T .V . Hartnett regarding the proposed
meeting ;

6607040750
C
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 4 5

obviously, it would be beneficial to the industry's


position if the READERS' DIC£ST were to present a balanced
article which made it clear that the facts on the causes
of lung cancer have not been established and that ther e
more than one side to the alleged relationship of
cigarette smoking to lung earner .

Such an article would gain stature from Dr . de Xruiff's


reputation for integrity and his standing in the field
of science .

There was the suggestion that both the TIRC and the ACS

would benefit by cooperating ' individually' with on de fruits in


Writing the article . At one meeting, Dr . de Krviff had proposed
that there be a joint payment to him for his work by the American

Cancer Society and the TIRC . Boost suggested that de Krviff be


paid for consultant se a , "possibly at the rate of $10,000 a

year for five years . . . .

Negotiations with Dr . CA Kruiff broke down, ostensibly

because he "Wanted to engage in an extended research project, the


results of which were not too clearly defined " Dr . do Kruiff

told the TIRC that ::

.he would not be content merely to give both sides


of the argument, but to be so of the facts that he
could make positive statements . His views were not for
sale, he said, and he Could not say in advance what his
conclusions Would be . .Apparently, Mr . Boost had in
end an article of a certain kind which could he prepared
in a matter of weeks, while Mr, (sic, Dr .] de Rruif£ ha d
mind a part-time consultant's job over extended
period, serving both the TIRC and Me American Cancer
Society, with the possibilities of article or series
of articles which might or might not favor tobacco, and
which might or night not be printed in the Reader's
Digest .

650704751
C
Memora ndum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 4 6

Mr . Ha rt nett, Dr . Little and the Hill and Knowlton people


were agreement that the proposal was too vague And
nebulous to justify any immediate decision Cr action .4 1

Or, us Kruiff was finally told that for ethical reasons


the TTRC could not be in a position to pay Mr . [sic, Dr .] de
Krvi£f" and the proposal was not pursued further .

Other documents in the Hill collection reveal that it was


not un sual for Hill & owlton to pay writers for stories . The

1955 TIRC budget proposal provided for costs of assignments

contracted to outside scientific writers working on special


Publication projects .' John Pfeiffer, a science writer, vas paid
by Hill S Knowlton to prepare a booklet that was a popular approach

to the subject of lung cancer . A memorandum from Carl Thompson to

John Hill noted, his article is to cover the positive aide Of the

lung cancer smoking story .-

A memorandum from Darrow to Thompson dated March 17,


1955, stated that Darrow had reviewed an outline for "the Tibby

Russell" story done by Jim Payne, a science writer who was


eventually put o staff . No additional information is currently
available regarding this story . )

it sounds like an interesting and salable piece .


should concentrate our time and attention on those stories
which directly carry out our TSRC assignment of focusing
stature-building attention Dr . Little and his own
work . Jim understands that ve cannot afford to invest
TIRC time in any articles which wilnot serve the idea s

41 . "Draft of letter from either Mr . Ha rtnett or Mr . Hill to Paul


M . Hahn," November 15, 1954, repo rt ing on meeting of Elmer
Dobst, Or . Shaver and Paul de Kruiff with Dr . Little and
Messrs . Hartnett, Hoyt, Hecker, Hill and Darrow .

690704752
C
memorandum to Allen It . Purvis
April 13, 199 e
Page 4 7

behind our assignment focusing national attention


n Dr . Little as a scientist, thereby un dergirdinc th e
strength of his position with the Scientific Adviso ry
Board and TIRC .4 2

A later memorandum (April, 1955) bemoaned the fact that


giving Payne the amount of money he w requesting for his work
would nn us well over our budget for writing activities this
month ."

As noted earlier, Polley referred in his chronology to


"Smoke Without Fear," the booklet written. by science writer Donald
G . Cooley, with industry ' encouragement .' Several other documents
regarding Hill & Knowlton Contacts with Cooley may be found in
these files . The writer of one memorandum advised that said be
taken to insure that Hill d Knowlton and the TIRC nut be closely
associated with this particular editorial project :

. let's proceed most Carefully on the Fawcett project


["Snake Without Fear'], keeping in mind that the industry,
the TIRO and H&K simply mutt not be in a Qosition of
appearing to chant this title to the public .

Cooley`s 33 -page pamphlet was published by the edito r-


of TRUE Magazine . Hill & Knowlton arranged for marked copies to
be made available to participants in a meeting of the American
Cancer Society .

As part If its duties, Hill & Knowlton assembled and


dined a working catalog" of helpful scientific "backgroun d

42 Memorandum from R .W . Darrow to Carl Thompson, March 17, 1955 .

43 . "TSRC Checklist," August 17, 1954 .

66090.1'753
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 4 8

information" to be supplied to writers and "for use in answering


attacks ." staff were available to x rch stories for writers,
and other resources, including an extensive card file of c ent
published views on smoking and health, a scientific bibliographical
file on lung cancer and a complete indust ry , trade press and
research mailing list, were developed . Two copies of the -working ;
catalog" (requested of CTR by plaintiff in cjo11pne and Marc) may
be fo un d in the Hill collection .

R .W . narrow provided the x1RC wi th an explanation of


Rill 8 Fnowlton's "public information activities" expenses for
195$ . It explained that the increased activities and attendant
expenses were made necessa ry by growing press and public interest
in the subject of tobacco and health, and by additional efforts to
get th e industry's case before the public . A "quick rundown o n
projects underway in 1955" listed editorial projects,
incudinq
o :

PAGUA story scheduled for April issue by Jr . Rienhoff


entitled, our Ahead and Smoke Moderately . "4 4

gEDgyd, T(l~g,X (pocket weekly) story for an early April


issue on, roughly, the Phony Lung Cancer Scare .

Ostrow book "Why k s being rushed .

Public Affairs mnitteepamgjliet igoing into type after


further r .Phis has been considerably changed
from early iviolent anti-cigarette document, but still
net acceptable . However, it is learned that American
Cancer Society, which v to buy ioo, 00 0 copies, now has
hacked away from this commitment . It is known that the
author (McCrady) and other, a cry upset about the
toning do wn of original manuscript by Public Affair s

44 . William F . Rienhoff, Jr, wav a member of the SAb in 1955 .

66070475}
C

April 13, 1990


Page 4 9

Committee editors after scientists reviewed th


5 e4
manuscript . . . .

Patrick McCrady took a hard-line against smoking and


was an outspoken critic of will & knowlton's efforts on behalf of

the TIRO . The pamphlet he was writing for the American Cancer
Society was a so of great Concern to Hill & Knowlton .

Documents in the Hill collection reveal that a great deal of effort


went into achieving a "toning down ." A memorandum from Carl
Thompson to R .W . narrow acknowledged the problems concerning the
McCrady manuscript and outlined Hill b %nowlton's response !

1) We have conferred with Its click, Educational


Association for the Public Affairs mmittee (of the
American Cancer Society), and advised him of the complete
unectpbability of the document it is presently
written . He advises thatreason the w have th e
to make whatever suggestions emanuscript thin k
necessary to make a acceptable pamphlet for the Public
Affairs Committee to issue . . . .

After this outline is discussed it is possible that w


will Want to assign either Joe Lubin -- who would be
acceptable - or Jack Pfieffer to prepare a version of
this manuscript . . It is doubtful that the whole
project can be killed . At this point it is questionable
if it would even be desirable . Certainly we should see
how for o effo rt s to cooperate are successful before
running the risk of urging the on-publication of a
booklet dealing with the lung cancer problem .4 6

T .V . Hartnett eventually reviewed the p ro ofs for


M cC rady's pamphlet and pronounced the document 'materially improved
over its original statue ." Eventually titled "Smoking = Lun g

45 . Memorandum from Carl Thompson to John W . 1111.1, February 24, 1955 .

46 . Memorandum from Carl Thompson to A .W . Darrow, January 4, 1955 .

6S0t04l5y
C

April 13, 1990


Page 5 0

Cancer?," the Public Affairs Committee pamphlet was sent to the


companies' individual public relations counsel with a note from

Hill S Knowlton : "The original document underwent several

revisions upon advice of competent scientists, cancer researchers

and others The public relations progress report for 1954 noted

only that "opportunity to review the manuscript add suggest changes


and alterations has been obtained . "

Hill & %nawiton's earliest recommendations for action


in response to adverse smoking and health stories included the

suggestion that an attempt be made to interest Edward R . Marrow

in 'a well-balanced discussion of the entire subject, use [sic]


Company ideas and/or personnel . This is particularly important,
and perhaps this is one single activity which now could neutralize
loose talk on the subject ."4 7

When first approached by the Indust ry in December, 1953,


Hill a Knowlton suggested that a statement "he read on radio and
television by Ed narrow or some equally important <oentator ."
The influential Morrow was seen as important factor to be
utilized in the drive to reverse public thinking . When Edward R .
urr eventually decided to host a two-part show on lung cancer
in 1955, Hill & Knowlton stayed in close touch with the producer
of the show . A meeting between CBS's Arthur Morris and Dr . Little

was arranged at Morrow's request .

47 . "Suggested Approach and Comments Regarding Attacks on Use of


Cigarettes," December 14, 1953 . See also "Fear and Sitters,"
Hass car, Week, November 14, 1953, p . 54 .
48 . "Draft of Proposals for Cigarette Makers for Discussion by
Hi11 and Knowlton, Inc . Planning Committee, Monday Evening,
December 31, 1953 ."

680704756
C
Memorandum to Allen R . Purv is
April 13, l99 0
Page 5 1

Dr . Little has convinced Morris that careful screening


of inte rv iewees Should be conducted to determine in
advance that those selected to appear on the 'See It
Now' program be different in their Opinion about the
effect of cigarettes on health but must speak With me
mind on the n eed for further research to ascertain the
real facts . This is a matter that Morris intends to
stress in hisg dealings with Fred Friendly, co-producer
of the show .

Dr . Little convinced Morris that nothing but harm would


be done on a program that featured strong debate over the issues

of tobacco and health . He suggested that he would not care to


appear on the sane program with any of the two or threescientific

men whose opinions about tobacco and health were more emotional
than objective .

By December, the TIRO had been assured of advance notice

of the data the "cancer show" would be presenting . More Labor-

rankly ,

Mr . Friendly had told him they had done their best to


make the program a balanced o but that due to the
superior presentation by the tobacco people, he [Friendly]
a
believes that if anyone gets break in the program i t
would be the tobacco industry .5 0

In the meeting with M r . Runyan and Mr . Read of the Ameri-


can Cancer Society referred to earlier, Hill 6 %novlton denied
having initiated the idea of a 'See It Now ' segment on the subject

of smoking and health . However, C&5' decision to listen to the


industry's position may have been influenced by th e fact that Phili p

49 . Memorandum from Ed Doherty to Carl Thompson, August 26, 1954 .

50 . Memorandum from ache W . Hill to T .V . Hartnett, re "Edward R .


Morrow Prograe, "SEE IT NOW ."

680104'75
Memorandum to Allen R . purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 5 3

Morris advertised extensively on CBS during this time, sponsoring


such popular shows as "I Love Lucy" and "Public Defender ." Whatever
the origin of the idea, Hill E Knowlton and TSRC Were pleased with
their efforts . Trans cr ipts of the two shows on that subject were
among materials routinely supplied to the press as "background
material ."

After only nine months as TIRC public re lations counsel,


Hill A Knowlton expressed satisfaction with the results of its

efforts :

Where then editorial opinion had overwhelmingly


swallowed the anti-cigarette state hook, line and
s inker , today editorial opinion indicating a
wide awareness that the case has not been proven .
Editorial editorial San be cited to this ef-,
fect . The sets is true for columnists .

Where there v s little scientific material and few


facts on the side of the industry a year ago, such
material is beginning to accumulate today . (Examples
Hueper Russ, critical analyses of Hammond-Horn,
etc . )

Where there were articles appearing on the side


of cigarettes a year ago, these are beginning to
appear new . (Examples - True magazine - booklet
"Smoke Without Fear," Saeger piece in Medical Digest,
coming article Harper by Engel, Abatis l Press
Service series on Reaper, to a tion a few .)51

AEN'RTISffiG CTAIM L

During Cipollone, Polley focused on advertisements froc


the 1930s and 19400 which attempted to reassure doctors as to th e

51 . "program of the Tobacco industry Research Committee," September


0, 1954 .

GS0704758
Memorandum to Allen R . Purvis
April 13, 199 0
Page 5 ]

convinced, would marshal-


harmful effects of smoking . Doctors, one
Cate this reassurance to their patients, or at least would nut
warn them to quit smoking . The TPLP description of Pollay's impend-
ing article states that "[t]he companies voluntarily admitted that
their o advertising and competitive practices had been a prin -
cipal factor in creating a health problem . . . . 11

Maynard brought to public attention the Philip Morris


advertisements run in medical journals which Edell introduced dur-
ing cineuone as "further evidence of the tobacco industry's calcu-
lated and successful efforts, beginning in the 1930's, to confuse
the American public in general, and doctors in particular, about
the dangers of cigarette smoking ."5 2

The outrageous claims being made in cigarette advertis-


ing were a source of concern to Hill & Knowlton when the firm was
first contacted by the industry . The public was increasingly skep-
tical of any action or statement by a cigarette manufacturer, as
noted in a Hill 6 Knowlton memorandum :

The public probably is already irritated by existing


cigarette advertising, witness the ridicule resulting
from claims and counterclaims of the various -
factnrers . This attitude will have some bearing on the
type of public relations activities to rbe under-

While it might be a delicate area for us, we should be


emphatic about individual company advertising . I don't
know anyone who doesn't think that cigarette advertise-
ments are utter hogwash . I doubt if any other single
factor has been as instrumental in bringing the FTC, th e

52 . Helmond P re ss Release, March 26,

680704759
C

andum to Allen R . Purvis


April 13, 199 0
page 5 4

medical profession, and segments of the public, down of


the heads of the tobacco .5 3

In preparation for the December 1953, meeting with R .J .

Reynolds mentioned earlier, John S . Dudes (Hill d Knowlton) informed

Hill of the circumstances surrounding the doctors survey that formed

the basis of Reynolds' advertising claim that "more doctors smoke


Camels than any other cigarette ." Ducar reported that the claim

was not valid . Positive survey results were obtained through a


clever artifice . Doctors going into a medical meeting were asked

if they smoked and if so, what brand they were carrying .

Unbeknownst to the people who read the ads based on these


claims, was the fact that the interv iewers had placed in
the doctors' hotel turns on their arrival cartons of
Camel cigarettes . The chances are that the doctors ran
out of cigarettes on arrival, and conveniently put a
pack of Camels into their own mockers .

This period Of Camel adve rt ising V already respect


because of the involvement of A . Grant Clarke, the smoking and
health "expert" employed by A .J . Reynolds through its advertising
agency . In addition to his involvement in the Camel Medical Rela-
tions Division and the Bureau of Information, Clarke took an active
role in the Search for a Scientific Director for TIRC . Plaintiffs
may at se a point make much of the fact that C'_srke, the employee
of an advertising agency, was so widely involved and influential
in scientific matters .

53 . "Suggested Approach and Comments Regarding Attacks on Use o


Cigarettes," December 14, 1953,

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memorandum to Allen P . Purvis
April 1 3 , 199 0
Page 55

SIRMAR Y

We can anticipate that the cigarette industry will at

some point be compelled to respond to Policy's charges concerning


the Tohn W . Hill documents . While the documents contain no "smoking

gun," a plaintiff's attorney might use them effectively to supple-

ment and support existing charges against the industry . The pos-

sibility of a broad distribution of the documents to plaintiffs

necussitates that we be prepared to deal with the questions and


fresco that would arise . on a more positive side, the Hill docu-

ments also contain some useful information that may help defense

counsel place issues and events surrounding the formation of the


TIRC in perspective .

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