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Constitutional Law II – Pre Finals

CONTRACT CLAUSE / NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE


DEFINITION

General Rule: No law impairing the obligations shall be passed. (Art. III, Sec. 10)

Contract Clause: A law which changes the term of a legal contract bet. parties, either
the time or mode of performance, or imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those
expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in its
terms, is law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void.

Exception: A law may impair a contract if it is a valid exercise of police power.


(1) Power of taxation: government may increase taxes covering certain transactions;
(2) Regulation on loans: as a matter of public interest, the government may impose

 restrictions on loans; 


Concept of Mutual Obligation (Section 10, Article III, Constitution)


 Answer to the Definition of Contract Clause: A law which changes the terms
of a legal contract between parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or
imposes new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its
satisfaction something different from that provided in its terms, is law which
impairs the obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void.

Elements/Requisites
(1) When there is substantial impairment which
 Changes the terms of legal contract either in time or mode of performance;
 Imposes new conditions;
 Dispenses with expressed conditions; or
 Authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in the terms.

(2) When a law affects the rights of parties with reference to each other, and not with
respect to non-parties. [Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association v.
Secretary, DILG, G.R. No. 143076, June 10, 2003]

(3) EXCEPTIONS to the rule when the state may impair contracts:
a) Power of Taxation: government may increase taxes covering certain transactions
b) Regulation on loans: as a matter of public interest, the government may impose
restrictions on loans:
- Concept of Vested Right
- Waiver of Right
Cases:
Goldenway Merchandising Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 195540,
March 13, 2013
Goldenway entered into REM (Real Estate Mortgage) with PCI. However, petitioner
failed to settle such obligation, thus, the properties being mortgaged was sold.
Goldenway tried to exercise their right of redemption which under R.A. no 3135 is one
year from the sale but PCI said that the period of redemption passed under R.A. no 8791
which said it was either from sale to registration of certificate of sale or up to three
months whichever shorter. The trial court and the CA ruled against their complaint hence
this petition. They argue that Sec 47 of R.A. no 8791 is a violation of the equal protection
clause due its unfair discrimination against juridical persons. The SC denied the petition
for lack of merit. SC ruled that the difference in treatment was based on the nature of the
properties foreclosed. Commercial properties tied up for a year stand to lose a lot more
assets considering that it cannot generate any economic activity. It was also shown that
the assailed section was in the purpose of keeping banks solvency and liquidity due to
aftermaths of the Southeast Asian financial crisis. Thus, the classification made in this
law is reasonable and germane to the purpose of the law.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (SPEECH AND THE PRESS


1. Definition (Section 4, Article III, Constitution) - No law shall be passed abridging
the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

Nature and Scope of the Right:


 The primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental
postulate of our constitutional system. This right was elevated to constitutional
status … reflecting our own lesson of history both political and legal, that freedom
of speech is an indispensable condition for nearly every other form of freedom.
 The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to
nearly all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly
regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any particular
field of human interest. The protection covers myriad matters of public interest or
concern embracing all issues about which information is needed or appropriate,
so as to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.
(Chavez v. Gonzales)

2. Bases for protection: Promotion of Truth, Enhance Principles of Democracy, and


Expression of Self – Fulfillment of Citizens

Speech, expression, and press include:


1. Written or spoken words (recorded or not)
2. Symbolic speech (e.g. wearing armbands as symbol of protest)
3. Movies and other literary works

3. Why State Restricts and Imposes Limitations on Freedom of Expression: Maintenance


of Peace, Promotion of Community Morals, and Protection of Individual Dignity
Tests applied to Freedom of Speech:
 Dangerous Tendency Test: If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency of
an evil which the state has the right to prevent, then such words. (Loanzon:
Words uttered create a dangerous tendency inciting people to action) (Cabansag
v. Fernandez)
 Clear and Present Danger Test: The danger created must not only be clear and
present but also traceable to the ideas expressed. (Gonzales v. COMELEC)
 Balancing of Interest Test: When a particular conduct is regulated in the interest
of public order and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, and partial
abridgement of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the two
conflicting interests demands greater protection (American Communications
Association v. Douds) (Loanzon: Regulation via police power)

Unprotected Speech/Expression v. Protected Speech/Expression


 Unprotected Speech/Expression: General guidelines, Obscenity, and
Incitement to National Security, False or Misleading Advertisement, Libelous
Speech, Hate Speech and Contumacious Speech
 Protected Speech/Expression: all those excluded from unprotected expression
may include utterances critical of public conduct, ordinary commercial speech,
and satirical speech/parody.

Content Based Restrictions v. Content Neutral Restrictions


(Justice Carpio’s concurring opinion in Chavez v. Gonzales)
 Any content-based prior restraint on PROTECTED expression is unconstitutional
 Only unprotected expression is subject to prior restraint
 Prior restraint presumes that the expression is unconstitutional
 Government has the burden of proof every time it exercises censorship
(Loanzon notes)
 Content Neutral Restrictions is Statistics based
 Content Based Restriction is Opinion based
 Prior Restraint – means official government restrictions on the press or other
forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.

Standards of Review
O’brien Test on Content-Neutral Restrictions:
For validity of content-neutral regulation
1. If it is within the constitutional power of the Government
2. If it furthers an important or substantial government interest
3. If the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
4. If the incidental restriction is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest

Miller Test to determine obscenity:


1. Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest
2. Whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law
3. Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious, literary, artistic, political or
scientific value (Miller v. CA)
RIGHT TO INFORMATION
1. Right to Information (Section 7, Article III) – The right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

 The constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going


negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government, and should not cover recognized
exceptions (Chaves v. Philippine Estate Authority)
 Diplomatic secrets (Diplomatic Negotiations Privilege): Secrecy of negotiations
with foreign countries is not violative of the right to information. Diplomacy is
confidential in nature. While full text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually
confidential, it is in line with the public interest that the offers exchanged during
negotiations continue to be privileged information. Furthermore, the information
sought includes documents produced and communicated by a party external to
the Philippine government. However, such privilege is merely presumptive, and
will not apply to all cases (Akbayan v. Aquino)

The following are covered by the Exceptions/Limitations of the Right to


Information:
1. Privileged information rooted in separation of powers
2. Information of military and diplomatic secrets (Neri v. Senate)
3. Information affecting national and economic security
4. Information on investigations of crimes by law enforcers before prosecution
(Chavez v. Pea)
5. Trade secrets and banking transactions (Chavez v. PCGG)
6. Offers exchanged during diplomatic negotiations (Akbayan v. Aquino)
7. Other confidential matters (Example: Closed door cabinet meetings, executive
sessions, internal deliberations in the Supreme Court)

Limitations
Sereno v. CTRM-NEDA

The constitutional guarantee to information does not open every door to any and all
information, but is rather confined to matters of public concern. It is subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. The State’s policy of full public disclosure is
restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is tempered by reasonable
conditions prescribed by law.

The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern


enunciated in Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State’s
policy of full public disclosure in all transactions involving public interest expressed in
Section 28 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are aimed at ensuring
transparency in policy-making as well as in the operations of the Government, and at
safeguarding the exercise by the people of the freedom of expression. In a democratic
society like ours, the free exchange of information is necessary, and can be possible
only if the people are provided the proper information on matters that affect them. But
the people’s right to information is not absolute. According to Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, the constitutional guarantee to information "does not open every door to
any and all information." It is limited to matters of public concern, and is subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. Likewise, the State’s policy of full public
disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is further subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law.

RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE AND TO SEEK REDRESS OF GRIVANCES FROM THE


GOVERNMENT

Cases
Bayan v. Ermita
“Calibrative Pre-emptive Response during Martial Law is a BP hindering the freedom of
speech, hence, it is not allowed because the state must practice maximum tolerance.
The clear and present danger test must be used to determine the necessity of action.”

Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition,
as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies. It refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use
public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable”
and entitled to protection. Maximum tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all
rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally. There is,
likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation.

The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament
and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our
people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses. Insofar as it would purport to
differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, this was declared null and void.

The Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all
necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No.
880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or
plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality
of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be
required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or
plazas of a city or municipality that has not yet complied with Section 15 of the law.

IBP v. Mayor Atienza


“Two aspects of freedom of speech: (1) Any action against the government, clear and
present danger test must be applied; (2) Other aspect is based on content. “

FACTS:
In 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz, filed an
application with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila for a permit to rally at the foot of
Mendiola Bridge to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and
multi-sectoral organizations. Respondent Mayor Atienza issued a permit allowing the
IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of
the Mendiola Bridge. Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the CA a petition for certiorari
but having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners again, filed before
the SC assailing the appellate court’s inaction or refusal to resolve the petition within the
period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.

The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge, and as alleged by the Petitioners, the
participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program. A few days
later, the MPD instituted a criminal action,against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly
Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.
ISSUE:
Whether the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and
violates the constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly.

HELD:
The Court finds for petitioners. In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely
abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been
heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes
the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable
action on the permit.

Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification
would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any
judicial scrutiny thereof.

GSIS and Garcia v. Villaviza

FACTS:
Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October 7, 2004 mass action participants were
GSIS personnel, among them members of the herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa sa GSIS (“KMG” or the “Union”), a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-
file employees.

On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit issued a
memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause why they
should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally. In reaction,
KMG’s counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said directive on the
ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work on October 8, 2004 in
obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea for reconsideration was,
however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25, 2004, of administrative charges
against some 110 KMG members for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service.

KMG filed a petition for prohibition with the CA against these charges. The CA granted
the petition and enjoined the GSIS from implementing the issued formal charges and
from issuing other formal charges arising from the same facts and events.

CA equated the right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar
activities available to workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court
concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining or
assisting employees’ organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate charges
against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations notwithstanding
the service-disruptive effect of such mass action.

ISSUE: W/N the strike conducted by the GSIS employees were valid

HELD: NO
The 1987 Constitution expressly guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government
personnel to self-organization to complement the provision according workers the right
to engage in “peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law.”. It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987
Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals. In it, we held,
citing MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., that employees in the public service may not engage in
strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right of government
employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations, without
including the right to strike.

Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was positively recognized
in Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise
of the rights of free expression and of assembly, there are standards for allowable
limitations such as the legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding
considerations of national security.

As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its exercise with the
provision “in accordance with law.” This is a clear manifestation that the state may, by
law, regulate the use of this right, or even deny certain sectors such right. Executive
Order 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers
to organize, for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which “enjoins under
pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass action which
will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service” by stating that the Civil
Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in government service
shall be observed.

Public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join concerted mass


actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what
respondent’s members launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike or,
what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The phrase
“prohibited concerted activity” refers to any collective activity undertaken by government
employees, by themselves or through their employees’ organization, with the intent of
effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force
concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and acts
of similar nature. Indeed, for four straight days, participating KMG members and other
GSIS employees staged a walk out and waged or participated in a mass protest or
demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main office building. The record of
attendance for the period material shows that, on the first day of the protest, 851
employees, or forty eight per cent (48%) of the total number of employees in the main
office (1,756) took to the streets during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,leaving the
other employees to fend for themselves in an office where a host of transactions take
place every business day. On the second day, 707 employees left their respective work
stations, while 538 participated in the mass action on the third day. A smaller number,
i.e., 306 employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.

In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in October 2004,
the stubborn fact remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling
activities during their free time, had taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was
they were specifically after. As events evolved, they assembled in front of the GSIS main
office building during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to
convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage and service-delivery
disruption, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by
government personnel.

To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the authority and
responsibility, under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, to
remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause. At bottom then,
petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of administrative charges against the
absenting participants of the October 4-7, 2004 mass action, merely performed a duty
expected of him and enjoined by law. Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in
when he signed the charge sheet, his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and
doubtless within his jurisdiction.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
1. Right to Strike and the Right to Unionize (Section 8, Article 3) - The right of the
people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Scope: The right is recognized as belonging to people whether employed or


unemployed, and whether employed in the government or in the private sector. The right
includes the right to form labor unions, societies or associations not contrary to law.

Case:
In Re: Atty Marcial Edillion: Compulsory membership in the IBP, Atty. Edillon’s refusal to
pay dues is invalid

The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance
of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The
Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer
to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to
further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable
as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of
the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.

Right of Private sector Employees and Government Employee


 This constitutional right also protects the Right of Private Sector Employees and
Government Employees.

Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union


“Religious belief cannot bar a person from joining a private union based on one’s
profession. Constitutional supremacy must be applied.”

Facts:
Petitioner Victoriano is a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and was an employee of
Elizalde Rope Factory and was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union.
Membership with the Union was mandatory as provided for under a collective bargaining
agreement: "Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for
all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement."

Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by
Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement
with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if
such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961,
however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to —
paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but
such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation
of their members in any such labor organization".

Being a member of the INC, a religion that prohibits affiliation with labor organizations,
the Petitioner wrote a letter informing the Union of his resignation. Thereupon, the Union
wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the
service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member.

The CFI ruled in favor of Petitioner and enjoined the company from dismissing him.

In its appeal, the Union claimed that R.A. no. 3350 was unconstitutional on the ground
that 1) prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if
such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto; and, consequently, deprives
said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or
organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious [to the]
Constitution; 2) Impairs the obligation of contracts; 3) discriminates in favor of certain
religious sects and affords no protection to labor unions; 4) violates the constitutional
provision that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right; 5) violates
the equal protection clause; and 6) the act violates the constitutional provision regarding
the promotion of social justice.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 3350 violates the Constitutional mandate to protect the rights of
workers and to promote their welfare notwithstanding the fact that it allows some
workers, by virtue of their religious beliefs, to opt out of Union security agreements.

Held:
NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that the free
exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict,
the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or
religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing
the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be
refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of
being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security
agreements.

More so now in the [1987 and past in constitutions] [...] where it is mandated that "the
State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and
regulate the relation between workers and employers.

We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the
spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by
certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was
Congress itself that imposed that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act
(Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away
the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the
laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience,
exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes. In
the instant case, We see no such compelling state interest to withhold exemption.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION
1. Separation of Church and State (Section 6, Article II) - The separation of Church
and State shall be inviolable.
Concept: The clause prohibits excessive government entanglement with, endorsement
or disapproval of religion (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union: This constitutional
right prohibits excessive government entanglement with endorsement or disapproval of
religion; It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious
profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict contract rights must
yield to the religious profession.)

2. Non-Establishment of Religion Clause/ Free Exercise Clause/ No Religious Test


(Section 5, Article III) - No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Test on Freedom of Religion:


1. Clear and Present Danger
2. Benevolent Neutrality – Compelling State Interest (Estrada v. Escritor): Covers
(1) Accommodation or tolerance of the state; and (2) protection of religious
freedom.
3. Conscientious Objector (Imbong v. Ochoa): Covers (1) Accommodation or
tolerance of the state; and (2) protection of religious freedom

3. Separation of Powers (Section 5(2), Article VI and Section 2(5), Article IX-C)

Basis
 “The principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.
Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much
less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion
and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose
its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are
good for the country” (Imbong v. Ochoa)

Relevant provisions of the Separation of the Church and the State:


1. Art II, Section 6 – The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable
2. Article IX-C Sec 2(5) – Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered
(as political parties)
3. Article VI, Section 5(2) – “For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from … sectors as may be
provided by law excepet the religious sector”
4. Article VI, Sec 29(2) – “No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of
any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary, as such
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium
5. Two Aspects of Freedom of Religion: Freedom to believe and Freedom to Act on
One’s Belief

Academic Freedom
 The right to academic freedom may only be invoked only against the state. All
private educational institutions may prescribe its own requirements to maintain
the standard of quality of academic quality.

PTA of St. Mathew Christian Academy v. Metrobank


Scope of Academic Freedom covers all institutions of higher learning.

There is no violation of academic freedom (Article 14, Section 5(2) of the Constitution
mandates “that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

Academic freedom did not go beyond the concept of freedom of intellectual inquiry,
which includes the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover,
publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence subject to no
control or authority except of rational methods by which truths and conclusions are
sought and established in these disciplines.
It also pertains to the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them. The grant being given to institutions of higher
learning, free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint.

In this case, except for their bare allegation that if the school will be ejected because of
the writ of possession, the students will necessarily be ejected also. Thereby their
learning process and other educational activities shall have been disrupted. The
petitioner school miserably failed to show the relevance of the right to quality education
and academic freedom to their case or how they were violated by the order granting the
writ of possession to the winning bidder in the extrajudicial foreclosure sale.

FREEDOM OF ABODE, FREEDOM TO CHANGE ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL


1. Constitutional Guarantee under Section 6, Article III - The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon
lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
Freedom of movement includes two rights:
1. Liberty of abode
2. Liberty of travel

Limitations: In certain instances both the liberty of abode and right to travel may be
impaired.

Distinction of Liberty of Abode v. Right to Travel


Fr. Bernas: The liberty of abode may be limited only upon lawful order of a court
whereas the right to travel may be limited by administrative authorities as may be
provided by law in the interest of national security, public safety or public health

Writ of Amparo: Remedy to those with threat to life, liberty, or property.


Habeas Corpus: An order to a person or agency to deliver or produce the body of an
imprisoned person so that the court may try him.