ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS

BY

SHRADDHA AGRAWAL

(ROLL NO. – 1166, 6TH SEMESTER)

SUBMITTED TO FACULTY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

FINAL DRAFT SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF PROJECT

FOR THE SUBJECT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

APRIL 2017
CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
PATNA

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am highly grateful to everyone who has been of great help in completion of this project.
Firstly I am thankful to our faculty of Administrative Law, Prof. S. Ali Mohammad, whose
guidance has been a great contributory factor towards the making of this project with good
research.

I would also like to thank my batch mates and friends without whom I would not have been
able to complete this project. From the day of starting with this project, having discussions at
length with them, has been quite useful in removing my confusions and doubts related to the
topic. Their motivation and encouragement has been of immense help in putting up with the
task of typing the whole project without any problem.

Chanakya National Law University, my institution has played the role of utmost importance
in bringing this project into existence. The uninterrupted net services and a wonderful library
where almost any book can be found have helped in getting the content for this project.

Lastly, I would like to thank the almighty.

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 INDEX

CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................4

CHAPTER II- LEGISLATIVE INTENT & LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BEHIND THE

ENACTMENT OF PART XIV-A OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950...............7

CHAPTER III- BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

TRIBUNALS ACT, 1985......................................................................................................11

CHAPTER IV- CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

TRIBUNALS ACT, 1985.......................................................................................................14

CHAPTER V- REASONS FOR GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND

THEIR CHARACTERISTICS...............................................................................................17

CHAPTER VI- CONCLUSION..............................................................................................20

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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The Preamble of the Constitution of India, declares India to be a Sovereign, Socialist,

Secular, Democratic, Republic. In the wisdom of our framers of Constitution, these
ingredients were essential to establish a society which is egalitarian and a state which bases
itself on the tenets of welfarism.1 Rule of law and the administration of justice; lie at the core
of the phenomena of welfare state. The Constitution of India, by way of the Preamble,
expressly declares that “justice” is ensured to all citizens of the country, justice not only
social but economic and political as well. For justice (social, economic and political) to
prevail it is necessary that:

1. The ‘Justice Delivery System’ is not only robust but also capable (efficient and
effective);
2. There is an expeditious disposal of cases, the trials should be speedy & at the same
time the cases must be decided in due process of law;
3. Forbearance must be paid to the ‘rule of law’2 (in its ideological sense, the concept of
rule of law, represents an ethical code for the exercise of public power, the basic
postulates of which are equality, freedom and accountability);
4. There must be adherence to the three timeless principles of natural justice:
a. Audi Alteram Partem (Rule of Fair Hearing)
b. Nemo Judex In Causa Sua (Rule against Bias)
c. Reasoned Order (Adjudicatory body, adjudicating a dispute must give necessary
reasons for such adjudication)
5. Law is the means, but justice is the end. In a democratic form of government for
justice to prevail, it is necessary that all laws share a common playfield of ‘Salus
Populi est Suprema Lex’ that is, welfare of people is the supreme law.

1
Although words Socialist and Secular were added to the Preamble by way of the Constitutional (Forty-second
Amendment) Act, 1976
2
The term Rule of Law is used in contradistinction to Rule of Man and Rule according to Law. Even in most
autocratic forms of government there is some law according to which powers of government are exercised but it
does not mean that there is rule of law. Rule of Law means that the law rules, using the word “law” in sense of
both jus and lex, it is an ideal and modern name for natural law.

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 ‘Justice according to Law’ is different from ‘Law in accordance with Justice’, where the
latter prevails, welfarism flows.

The Constitution of India, being a product of the philosophy of welfare state, was bound to
recognise the existence of tribunals. Tribunals are being established to provide for speedy
disposal of cases, and thus reduce the pressure on the Civil Courts. Once such a tribunal is
established, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain cases falling within the jurisdiction
of tribunals is barred. One of the main reasons favouring their creation is the delay in the
proceedings in the High Courts. Tribunals have grown in response to the need to provide for
specialised forums of dispute settlement that would possess some expertise and policy
commitment, and would be comparatively cheaper, more expeditious and relatively free from
technical procedures. Tribunals came as a substitute for courts when lesser formalism, greater
expediency, and better expertise were required in adjudication of disputes.3 Professor
Dicey’s discourse on Rule of Law had created a bias against tribunals in the minds of
English, as well as Indian legal practitioners. In India, due to historical reasons, a unitary
system was adopted in which, unlike in France, the tribunals were subjected to
superintendence of the ordinary courts.

The tribunals established under Articles 323-A and 323-B have the same status as the
High Court; as the appeals from these tribunals can go directly to the Supreme Court
under Article 136. Article 323-A empowers Parliament to set up tribunals for dealing with
‘disputes and complaints with respect of recruitment and conditions of service of persons
appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any
State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the
Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government’. Thus,
Article 323-A provides for the establishment of tribunals for adjudicating disputes relating to
service matters of government servants, viz. administrative tribunals.

Article 323-B empowers appropriate legislature, Central or State, depending upon the
legislative competence a propos the subject matter, to set up tribunals for dealing with
matters such as tax, foreign exchange, import and export, industrial and labour disputes, land

3
Dr. Ashok K. Jain, Administrative Law- Supplement 2010, Ascent Publications, Ch.8 – Tribunals, p. S-117.

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reforms, ceiling on urban property, elections to Parliament or State legislatures, production,
procurement, supply and distribution of foodstuffs and such other goods, as may be declared
by the President to be essential goods. Tribunals under Article 323-B can be authorised to try
certain categories of criminal offences and thus impose penal sanctions. This is an innovation
in the Indian legal system for till now criminal punishments were imposed only by the courts
and not by non- judicial bodies.4

 AIM: To discuss the status of Administrative Tribunals in India and their functions.
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: This project involves doctrinal research.
Doctrinal research means the research done with the help of books, journals,
newspapers, magazines, internet sources, etc.

4
Supra 4 at p. S-120

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 CHAPTER 2: LEGISLATIVE INTENT & LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
BEHIND THE ENACTMENT OF PART XIV-A OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA, 1950

For a long time a search was going on for a mechanism to relieve the courts, including High
Courts and the Supreme Court, from the burden of service litigation which formed a
substantial portion of pending litigation. As early as 1958 this problem engaged the attention
of the Law Commission which recommended for the establishment of tribunals consisting of
judicial and administrative members to decide service matters.5 In 1969 Administrative
Reform Commission also recommended for the establishment of civil service tribunals both
for the Central and State civil servants.6 Central Government appointed a committee under
the Chairmanship of Justice J.C. Shah of the SC of India in 1969 which also made similar
recommendation. In 1975, Swarn Singh Committee again recommended for the setting up of
service tribunals.7 The idea of setting up service tribunals also found favour with the SC of
India which in K.K. Dutta v. Union of India8 advocated for setting up of service tribunals to
save the courts from avalanche of writ petitions and appeals in service matters. In the
meantime various States9 had established their own service tribunals. Service Tribunal was
also established in Andhra Pradesh in 1973 by the Thirty-second Constitution Amendment.

It was against this backdrop that Parliament passed Constitution (Forty- second Amendment)
Act, 1976 which added Part XIV-A in the Constitution. Articles 323-A and 323-B enabled
Parliament to constitute administrative tribunals for dealing with certain matters specified
therein. Article 323-A provided that Parliament may by law, provide for adjudication or trial
by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and
conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the
affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of
India or under the control of Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled
by the government. Parliament was further empowered to prescribe by law the jurisdiction,

5
XIV REPORT OF REFORM OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, (1958)
6
REPORT ON PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION, 1969
7
Perspective, (1986) 1 SLJ (Journal Section), pp. 1-5
8
(1980) 4 SCC 38: 1980 SCC (L&S) 485: AIR 1980 SC 2056
9
In Gujarat, 1973; Uttar Pradesh, 1975; Rajasthan, 1976; Assam, 1977; In Bihar, an Act was passed in 1982 but
the Tribunal was never established.

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power, authority and procedure of such tribunals and also to exclude the jurisdiction of all
courts except that of the SC under Article 13610. Empowered by these enabling provisions of
the Constitution Parliament enacted Administrative Tribunals Act, 198511 for the
establishment of administrative service tribunals for deciding service disputes of civil
servants of the Centre as well as of the States which was amended in 1986.12 Article 323-B
(1) empowers the appropriate legislature to provide for the adjudication or trial by tribunals
of any disputes, complaints or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in
clause (2).

The Constitution (Forty- second Amendment) Act, 1976 was the most debatable and
controversial amendment in the constitutional history of India. It effected drastic and
draconian changes in several provisions of the Constitution not only affecting rights of
citizens but also restricting, limiting, curtailing and even totally excluding power of judicial
review of High Courts and of the Supreme Court which was held to be a part of ‘basic
structure’ of the Constitution.

So far as administrative tribunals are concerned, mainly, the Amendment (the Constitution
Forty- second Amendment Act, 1976) made two changes:

1. It took away power of superintendence of High Courts over administrative tribunals

which they possessed under Article 227 of the Constitution; and
2. After Part XIV, it inserted Part XIV-A (Articles 323-A and 323-B) by enabling
Parliament to constitute administrative tribunals for the purposes specified therein.

Scope of Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution of India13:

These two Articles, inserted by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, open a new
Chapter in the Indian Constitutional and Administrative Law, by substantially excluding
judicial review of administrative decisions.

10
Article 323-A(2)(d) and 323-B(3)(d).
11
The Act came into effect on November 1, 1985.
12
I.P. Massey, Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company, 6th Edition, Chapter 13- Constitutional Protection
to Civil Servants and Administrative Service Tribunals, p. 515- 516.
13
Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 8th
Edition 2011, Vol. 9, Part XIV-A: Tribunals, p.2085- 2086.

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 A. The features which are common to these two Articles are:
a. They empower the Legislature to set up Administrative Tribunals for the
adjudication of disputes between the State and the individual, relating to certain
specified matters, and to lay down the jurisdiction and powers of such Tribunals.
b. Such powers (as vested with the Administrative Tribunals, established under Part
XIV-A of the Constitution of India) may include the power to punish for their
contempt.
c. Such law may lay down the procedure to be followed by such tribunals, including
rules as to limitation and evidence.
d. Such law may provide for the transfer to such Tribunals cases which are pending
before a court or other authority at the time of establishment of each Tribunal.
e. Incidental provisions for their effective functioning may be included in such laws.
f. Such law may exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts, other than the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court under Article 32 or 136, in respect of such matters.
g. The provisions of both the Articles shall override the provisions in the Constitution
or any other law, to the contrary.

B. The points on which the two Articles differ are:

a. Article 323-A is confined to matters relating to the public services. Article 323-B
relates to Tribunals relating to any of the matters specified in clause (2), e.g.,
taxation, foreign exchange, labour dispute, land reforms, elections, essential
goods; offences and incidental matters relating to such matters.
b. Under Article 323-A, only one such Tribunal may be created for the Union and
one for each State or two or more States together (no hierarchy). So far as Article
323-B is concerned, the appropriate Legislature is empowered to establish a
hierarchy of Tribunals relating to each subject specified in clause (2).
c. Under Article 323-A, the power to make such law belongs exclusively to
Parliament. Under Article 323-B, the legislative power is divided between the
Union and State Legislatures according to their respective legislative competence
over each of the subjects.
Articles 323-A and 323-B cannot be interpreted to mean that they prohibit the legislature
from establishing tribunals not covered by these articles, as long as there is legislative

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competence under an appropriate entry in the VII Schedule. These two articles do not take
away that legislative competence.14

It is pertinent to note that the word ‘adjudication’ in Article 323-A (1) and 323-B (1) indicate
that the jurisdiction of Tribunals set up under both the Articles shall be confined to the
adjudication of quasi-judicial issues relating to administrative matters, such as-

1. Disputes relating to the services15, as referred to in Article 323 (1).

2. Matters specified in sub- Cl. (a) (i) of Article 323-B (2), for example:
a. Determination of an election dispute.16
b. Assessment of a tax.17
c. Adjudication of Industrial disputes.18
d. Termination of services.19
e. Order of a Revenue Officer, like a Custom Authority, imposing penalty.20
f. Order affecting an individual’s property.21
Procedure22-

1. The Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, which inserted Article 323-A, itself did not
impose any conditions as to how the administrative tribunals will arrive at their
decisions.
2. That has since been laid down by the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

14
State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharthi House Building Co-op. Society [(2003) 2 SCC 412 (Para 36, 37 and 49):
AIR 2003 SC 1043] relying on U.O.I v. Delhi High Court Bar Association [(2002) 4 SCC 275: AIR 2002 SC
1479] and L. Chandra Kumar v. U.O.I [(1997) 3 SCC 261: AIR 1997 SC 1125]
15
U.O.I v. Saxena [2 SCJ 211 (Para 6)]
16
Indira Nehru Gandhi, Smt. v. Raj Narain [AIR 1975 SC 2299 (Para 329): 1975 Supp. SCC 1]
17
Suraj Mal Mohta & Co. v. Viswanatha Sastri [AIR 1954 SC 545: (1955) 1 SCR 448]; Dhakeswari Cotton
Mills v. Commissioner of I.T. [(1955) 1 SCR 941: AIR 1955 SC 65]
18
Express Newspapers v. Workers [AIR 1963 SC 569: 1963 (3) SCR 540]
19
Calcutta Dock Labour Bd. v. Imam Jaffar [(1965) II SCA 226 (230): AIR 1966 SC 282: 1965 (3) SCR 453:
1965 (2) LLJ 112]; State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei [AIR 1967 SC 1269: 1967 (2) SCR 625: 1967 (2) LLJ 266]
20
Pioneer Traders v. Chief Controller of Import and Export [AIR 1963 SC 734 (740): 1963 Supp. (1) SCR
349]; Leo Roy Frey v. Superintendent, Dt. Jail [AIR 1958 SC 119 (121): 1958 SCR 822]
21
Divisional Forest Officer v. Ram Sanehi Singh [AIR 1973 SC 205: (1971) 3 SCC 864]; Sri Bhagwan v.
Ramchand [AIR 1965 SC 1767 (1771): 1965 (3) SCR 218]
22
Supra 24 at p. 2086.

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 CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS ACT, 198523

Background: The framers of the Constitution of India in their wisdom invested the Supreme
Court and the various High Courts with the power of judicial review by specifically enacting
Articles 32, 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution.24 With the enactment of Articles 12, 14,
15, 16, 309 and 311 of the Constitution25, a large number of service matters calling for the
adjudication of disputes relating to the recruitment and conditions of service of Government
servants and also of employees in other fields of public employment started coming up before
the various High Courts whose power of judicial review was invoked for the said purpose by
the aggrieved employees. The contribution by the High Courts coupled with the growth in the
number of employees in the public field and the manifold problems arising in the context of
their recruitment and conditions of service and their implicit faith and confidence in the High
Courts as the unfailing protector of their rights and honour, led to a gradual increase in the
institution and pendency of service matters in the High Courts. This, in turn, focused the
attention of the Union Government on the problem of finding an effective alternative
institutional mechanism for the disposal of such specialised matters. A Committee set up by
the Union Government in 1969 under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice J.C. Shah
recommended for setting up of an independent Tribunal to handle service matters pending
before the High Courts and the Supreme Court.

The Law Commission of India in its 124th Report had recommended for the establishment
at the Centre and the State of an Appellate Tribunal or Tribunals presided over by a legally
qualified Chairman and with experienced civil servants as Members to hear appeals from
Government servants in respect of disciplinary and other action against them.

The First Administrative Reforms Commission had also recommended for the setting up
of Civil Services Tribunals to deal with the appeals of Government servants against

23
Dr. Justice A.R. Lakshmanan, The Judge Speaks, Universal Law Publishing Co., 2009, Chapter:
Administrative Tribunals in India, p.240- 242.

24
Article 32: Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India; Article 136:
Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court; Article 226: Power of High Courts to issue certain writs; Article
227: Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court.
25
Article 12: Definition of ‘the State’; Article 14: Equality before law; Article 15: Prohibition of discrimination
on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth; Article 16: Equality of opportunity in matters of public
employment; Article 309: Recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Union or a State; Article
311: Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.

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disciplinary actions. Some of the State Legislatures thereupon enacted laws setting up
Tribunals to decide such cases. Part XIV-A, comprising Articles 323-A and 323-B was
also inserted in the Constitution of India by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Bill, 1976
with effect from 3rd January, 1977.

Article 323-A, inter alia, authorised Parliament to provide by law for setting up of
Administrative Tribunals for the adjudication of disputes and complaints with respect to
recruitment and conditions of service of certain categories of employees in the field of public
employment including Government servants and also to provide for the exclusion of the
jurisdiction of all courts, except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to
disputes or complaints of such nature. No immediate step was however taken in the direction
of enacting a law for the setting up of Administrative Tribunals as contemplated by the said
Article.

Ultimately, Parliament enacted the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 which received the
assent of the President on the 27th February, 1985. In pursuance of the provisions contained in
the Act, the Administrative Tribunals set up under it exercise original jurisdiction in respect
of service matters of employees covered under the Act.

Significance:

The enactment of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 opened a new chapter in the sphere
of administering justice to the aggrieved Government servants in service matters. The Act
provides for establishment of Central Administrative Tribunal and the State Administrative
Tribunals. The setting-up of these Tribunals is founded on the premise that specialist bodies
comprising both trained administrators and those with judicial experience would, by virtue of
their specialised knowledge, be better equipped to dispense speedy and efficient justice. It
was expected that a judicious mix of judicial members and those with grass-root experience
would best serve this purpose.

The Administrative Tribunals are distinguishable from the ordinary courts with regard to their
jurisdiction and procedure. They exercise jurisdiction only in relation to the service
matters of the litigants covered by the Act. They are also free from the shackles of many of
the technicalities of the ordinary Courts. The procedural simplicity of the Act can be
appreciated from the fact that the aggrieved person can also appear before it personally. The
Government can also present its case through its Departmental officers or legal practitioners.

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Further, only a nominal fee of Rs.50 is to be paid by the litigant for filing an application
before the Tribunal.26 Thus, the objective of the Tribunal is to provide speedy and
inexpensive justice to the litigants.

The establishment of Administrative Tribunals was a right step in the direction of providing
an effective alternative authority to Government employees who feel aggrieved by the
decisions of the Government, in spite of the elaborate system of rules and regulations which
govern personnel management, for judicial review over service matters to the exclusion of all
courts including High Courts other than the Supreme Court, with the end in view of reducing
the burden of such Courts and of securing expeditious disposal of such matters.27

26
See: Section 7 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987
27
This happens to be the viewpoint of Dr. Justice A.R. Lakshmanan, as expressed by him in the book “The
Judge Speaks”, Universal Law Publishing Co., 2009, Chapter: Administrative Tribunals in India, p. 242 (within
the sub-heading “Significance of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985”).

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CHAPTER 4: CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNALS ACT, 1985

Kinds:

The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 provides for three types of tribunals:

1. The Central Government establishes an administrative tribunal called the Central

Administrative Tribunal (CAT), which has jurisdiction to deal with service matters pertaining
to the Central Government employees, or of any Union Territory, or local or other
government under the control of the Government of India, or of a corporation owned or
controlled by the Central Government.

2. The Central Government may, on receipt of a request in this behalf from any State
Government, establish an administrative tribunal for such State employees.

3. Two or more States might ask for a joint tribunal, which is called the Joint
Administrative Tribunal (JAT), which exercises powers of the administrative tribunals for
such States.

Composition:

Each tribunal is to consist of a chairperson and such number of vice-chairpersons and judicial
and administrative members as the appropriate government might deem fit. The ATA
requires that every matter should be heard by a Bench consisting of two members, one
judicial and one administrative. The Act, however, authorises chairperson to allot certain
matters to a single member Bench. The SC maintains that this provision of the Act must be
read subject to the qualification that only matters that do not involve questions of law or
constitutional interpretation could be assigned by chairperson to a single member Bench
Mahabal Ram (Dr.) v. Indian Council of Agricultural Research.

Constitutional validity:

In exercise of the power conferred by Article 323-A of the Constitution, Parliament enacted
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Section 28 of the Act excluded the power of judicial
review exercised by the High Courts in service matters under Articles 226 and 227. However,
it has not excluded the judicial review entirely in as much as the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution was kept intact.

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The constitutional validity of the Act was challenged before the Supreme Court in the leading
case of S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI. Undoubtedly, the question raised was of far reaching
effect and of great public importance.

The Constitution Bench upheld the validity of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
Speaking for the majority, Ranganath Misra, J. (as he then was) observed:

“We have already seen that judicial review by this Court is left wholly unaffected and thus
there is a forum where matters of importance and grave injustice can be brought for
determination or rectification. Thus, exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Courts does
not totally bar judicial review… It is possible to set up an alternative institution in place of
the High Court for providing judicial review… The Tribunal has been contemplated as a
substitute and not as supplemental to the High Court in the scheme of administration of
justice… What, however, has to be kept in view is that the Tribunal should be a real
substitute for the High Court not only in form and de jure but in content and de facto… Under
Sections 14 and 15 of the Act all powers of the Court in regard to matters specified therein
vest in the Tribunal—either Central or State. Thus, the Tribunal is the substitute of the
High Court and is entitled to exercise the powers thereof.”

In concurring judgement, Bhagwati, C.J. observed:

“If this constitutional amendment were to permit a law made under clause (1) of Article 323-
A to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 without setting
up an effective alternative mechanism or arrangement for judicial review, it would be
violative of the basic structure doctrine and hence outside the constituent power of
Parliament. It must, therefore, be read as implicit in this constitutional amendment that the
law excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 permissible
under it must not leave a void but it must set up another effective institutional mechanism or
authority and vest the power of judicial review in it. Consequently, the impugned Act
excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 in respect of service
matters and vesting such jurisdiction in the Administrative Tribunal can pass the test of
constitutionality as being within the ambit and coverage of Clause (2)(d) of Article 323-A ,
only if it can be shown that the Administrative Tribunal set up under the impugned Act is
equally efficacious as the High Court, so far as the power of judicial review over service
matters is concerned.”

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The whole question of constitutionality of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 once again
came under the scrutiny of the Apex Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI. The
Court in this case held that Sampath Kumar was decided against the background that the
litigation before the High Courts had exploded in an unprecedented manner and therefore,
alternative inquisitional mechanism was necessary to remedy the situation. But it is self-
evident and widely acknowledged truth that tribunals have not performed well, hence drastic
measures were necessary in order to elevate their standard by ensuring that they stand up to
constitutional scrutiny. Court further held that because the constitutional safeguards which
ensure the independence of the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts are not
available to the members of the tribunals, hence, they cannot be considered full and effective
substitute for the superior judiciary in discharging the function of constitutional
interpretation. Against this backdrop the court came to the conclusion that Administrative
Tribunals cannot perform a substitutional role to the High Court, it can only be supplemental.
Therefore, clause (2) (d) of Article 323-A and clause (3) (d) of Article 323-B of the
Constitution, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme
Court under Articles 226, 227 and 32 of the Constitution were held unconstitutional and for
the same reason Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 which contains
“exclusion of jurisdiction” clause was also held unconstitutional.

Through this classical case (L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI) the Court has, in one sense, tried to
save the jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts from encroachment by the Legislature by
invoking the doctrine of “Basic Features of the Constitution”.

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 CHAPTER 5: REASONS FOR GROWTH OF ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNALS AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS

Reasons for growth of Administrative Tribunals:

According to Dicey’s theory of rule of law, the ordinary law of the land must be administered
by ordinary law courts. He was opposed to the establishment of administrative tribunals.
According to the classical theory and the doctrine of separation of powers, the function of
deciding disputes between the parties belonged to ordinary courts of law. But, as can be seen
over the period of time, the governmental functions have increased and ordinary courts
of law are not in a position to meet the situation and solve the complex problems arising
in the changed socio- economic context.

Administrative tribunals are established for the following reasons:

1. The traditional judicial system proved inadequate to decide and settle all the
disputes requiring resolution. It was slow, costly, inexpert, complex and
formalistic. It was already overburdened, and it was not possible to expect
speedy disposal of even very important matters: e.g. disputes between employers
and employees, lockouts, strikes, etc. These burning problems cannot be solved
merely by literally interpreting the provisions of any statute, but require the
consideration of various other factors and this cannot be accomplished by the courts
of law. Therefore, industrial tribunals and labour courts were established, which
possessed the technique and expertise to handle these complex problems.
2. The administrative authorities can avoid technicalities. They take a functional
rather than a theoretical and legalistic approach. The traditional judiciary is
conservative, rigid and technical. It is not possible for the courts of law to decide the
cases without formality and technicality. On the other hand, administrative tribunals
are not bound by the rules of evidence and procedure and they can take a practical
view of the matter to decide the complex problems.
3. Administrative authorities can take preventive measures, for example, licensing,
rate-fixing, etc. Unlike regular courts of law, they have not to wait for parties to
come before them with disputes. In many cases, these preventive actions may prove

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 to be more effective and useful than punishing a person after he has committed a
breach of any legal provision.
4. Administrative authorities can take effective steps for enforcement of the
aforesaid preventive measures, e.g. suspension, revocation or cancellation of
licences, destruction of contaminated articles, etc. which are not generally
available through the ordinary courts of law.
5. In ordinary courts of law, the decisions are given after hearing the parties and on the
basis of evidence on record. This procedure is not appropriate in deciding matters by
the administrative authorities where wide discretion is conferred on them and the
decisions may be given on the basis of the departmental policy and other relevant
factors.
6. Sometimes, the disputed questions are technical in nature and the traditional judiciary
cannot be expected to appreciate and decide them. On the other hand, administrative
authorities are usually manned by experts who can deal with and solve these
problems, e.g. problems relating to atomic energy, gas, electricity, etc.
7. In short, as Robson says, administrative tribunals do their work ‘more rapidly,
more cheaply, more effectively than ordinary courts… possess greater technical
knowledge and fewer prejudices against Government… give greater heed to the
social interests involved… decide disputes with conscious effort at furthering
social policy embodied in the legislation’.28

Characteristics of Administrative Tribunals29:

The following are the characteristics of an administrative tribunal30:

1. An administrative tribunal is the creation of a statute and thus, it has a statutory

origin.
2. It has some of the trappings of a court but not all.
3. An administrative tribunal is entrusted with the judicial powers of the State and thus,
performs judicial and quasi-judicial functions, as distinguished from pure
administrative or executive functions and is bound to act judicially.

28
Quoted by Kagzi, The Indian Administrative Law (1973) at p.284
29
Supra 3 at p.235- 236
30
See: The Franks Report of 1957, Command Paper 218, Para 40

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 4. Even with regard to procedural matters, an administrative tribunal possesses powers
of a court; for example, to summon witnesses, to administer oath, to compel
production of documents, etc.
5. An administrative tribunal is not bound by strict rules of evidence and procedure.
6. The decisions of most of the tribunals are in fact judicial rather than administrative in
as much as they have to record findings of facts objectively and then to apply the law
to them without regard to executive policy. Though the discretion is conferred on
them, it is to be exercised objectively and judicially.
7. Most of the administrative tribunals are not concerned exclusively with the cases in
which Government is a party; they also decide disputes between two private parties,
e.g. Election Tribunal, Rent Tribunal, Industrial Tribunal, etc. On the other hand, the
Income Tax Tribunal always decides disputes between the Government and the
Assesses.
8. Administrative Tribunals are independent and they are not subject to any
administrative interference in the discharge of their judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.
9. The prerogative writs of certiorari and prohibition are available against the decisions
of administrative tribunals.

Thus, taking into account the functions being performed and the powers being exercised by
administrative tribunals it can be said that, they are neither exclusively judicial nor
exclusively administrative bodies, but are partly administrative and partly judicial authorities.

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 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

“Nothing is more remarkable in our present social and administrative arrangements than
the proliferation of tribunals of many different kinds. There is scarcely a new statute of
social or economic complexion which does not add to the number.” - Sir C.K. Allen

A sound justice delivery system is a sine qua non for the efficient governance of a country
wedded to the Rule of Law. An independent and impartial judiciary in which the litigating
public has faith and confidence alone can deliver the goods.31

In a democracy governed by rule of law, the only acceptable repository of justice is a court of
law. Judicial review is an integral part of our legal system and basic and essential feature of
the Constitution and it cannot be dispensed with by creating tribunals under Articles 323-A
and 323-B of the Constitution. Any institutional mechanism or authority in negation of
judicial review is destructive of basic structure. So long as the alternative institutional
mechanism set up by any Act is not less effective than the High Court, it is consistent with
the Constitutional scheme.

The faith of the people is the bedrock on which the edifice of judicial review and efficacy of
adjudication are founded. The alternative arrangement must, therefore, be effective and
efficient. For inspiring confidence and faith in the litigating public, they must have an
assurance that the persons deciding their disputes are totally and completely free from
influence or pressure from executive. To maintain independence and impartiality, it is
necessary that the persons appointed in tribunals have judicial and objective approach as also
sufficient knowledge and legal training.32

It is submitted that the following observations of Arrears Committee (Malimath Committee)

must always be borne in mind while dealing with the powers and jurisdiction of tribunals.
After in-depth study, the Committee concluded:

“It must not be forgotten that what is permissible to be supplanted by another equally
effective and efficacious institutional mechanism is the High-Court and not the

31
L. Chandra Kumar v. UOI, [(1997) 3 SCC 261 (306, 311): AIR 1997 SC 1125]; R.K. Jain v. UOI, [(1993) 4
SCC 119 (134)]
32
Ibid.; See also: S.P. Sampath Kumar v. UOI [(1987) 1 SCC 124: AIR 1987 SC 386: (1987) 1 SCR 435], S.S.
Bola v. B.D. Sardana [(1997) 8 SCC 522: AIR 1997 SC 3127 (3166-71)]

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 judicial review itself. Tribunals are not an end in themselves but a means to an end;
even if the laudable objectives of speedy justice, uniformity of approach,
predictability of decisions and specialist justice are to be achieved, the framework of
the tribunal intended to be set up to attain them must still retain its basic judicial
character and inspire public confidence. Any scheme of decentralisation of
administration of justice providing for an alternative institutional mechanism is
substitution of the High-Courts must pass the aforesaid test in order to be
constitutionally valid”33.

33
See: Report of Arrears Committee, (1989-90, Vol. II) Chapter VIII, Para 8- 65, Cited in L. Chandra Kumar v.
UOI [(1997) 3 SCC 261: AIR 1997 SC 1125]

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BIBLIOGRAPHY:

 Shivam Goel, Administrative Tribunals, Academia.edu,

https://www.academia.edu/8065554/Administrative_Tribunals_in_India
 I.P. Massey, Administrative Law, Eastern Book Company, 8th Edition, 2012.
 C.K.Takwani, Lectures on Administrative Law, 31 (2008).
 V.N. Shukla’s Constitution of India, Singh.P. Mahendra, eleventh edition,
Eastern Book Company.
 Pandey J.N, Constitutional Law Of India, 45th Edition, Central Law Agency
 Jain M.P, Indian Constitutional Law, Fifth Edition, Wadhva Nagpur Publication
 http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3905&context=c
alifornialawreview
 http://www.lawteacher.net/lecture-notes/english-legal-system/admin-
tribunals.php

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