REPUBLIC ACT No.

75

AN ACT TO PENALIZE ACTS WHICH WOULD IMPAIR THE PROPER OBSERVANCE BY THE
REPUBLIC AND INHABITANTS OF THE PHILIPPINES OF THE IMMUNITIES, RIGHT, AND
PRIVILEGES OF DULY ACCREDITED FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS IN
THE PHILIPPINES

Section 1. Any person who shall falsely assume and take upon himself to act as a diplomatic,
consular, or any other official of a foreign government duly accredited as such to the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines with intent to defraud such foreign government or the Government of
the Philippines, or any person, or in such pretended character shall demand or obtain, or attempt to
obtain from person or from said foreign government or the Government of the Philippines, or from
any officer thereof, any money, paper, document, or other thing, of value, shall be fined not more
than five thousand pesos, or shall be imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, in addition to
the penalties that may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code.

Section 2. Any person, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attaché, who shall act in the
Republic of the Philippines as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to, and
registration with, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall be fined not more than five thousand pesos,
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, aside from other penalties that may be imposed by
law.

Section 3. Any person, who with intent to deceive or mislead, within the jurisdiction of the Republic,
wear any naval, military, police, or other official uniform, decoration, or regalia of any foreign State,
nation or government with which the Republic of the Philippines is at peace, or any uniform,
decoration or regalia so nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive, unless such
wearing thereof be authorized by such State, nation, or government, shall upon conviction, be
punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or
by both such fine and imprisonment. 1awphil-itc-alf

Section 4. Any writ or process sued out or prosecuted by any person in any court of the Republic of
the Philippines, or by any judge or justice, whereby the person of any ambassador or public minister
of any foreign State, authorized and received as such by the President, or any domestic or domestic
servant of any such ambassador or minister is arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or chattels are
distrained, seized, or attached, shall be deemed void, and every person by whom the same is
obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in executing it,
shall upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years and a fine of not
exceeding two hundred pesos in the discretion of the court.

Section 5. The provisions of section four hereof shall not apply to any case where the person
against whom the process is issued is a citizen or inhabitant of the Republic of the Philippines, in the
service of an ambassador or a public minister, and the process is founded upon a debt contracted
before he entered upon such service; nor shall the said section apply to any case where the person
against whom the process is issued is a domestic servant of an ambassador or a public minister,
unless the name of the servant has, before the issuing thereof, been registered in the Department of
Foreign Affairs, and transmitted by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Chief of Police of the City
of Manila, who shall upon receipt thereof post the same in some public place in his office. All
persons shall have resort to the list of names so posted in the office of the Chief of Police, and take
copies without fee.

Section 6. Any person who assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons or in any other manner offers
violence to the person of an ambassador or a public minister, in violation of the law of nations, shall
be imprisoned not more than three years, and fined not exceeding two hundred pesos, in the
discretion of the court, in addition to the penalties that may be imposed under the Revised Penal
Code.

Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall be applicable only in case where the country of the
diplomatic or consular representative adversely affected has provided for similar protection to duly
accredited diplomatic or consular representatives of the Republic of the Philippines by prescribing
like or similar penalties for like or similar offenses herein contained.itc-alf

Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: October 21, 1946

ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEÑA, HERMINIHILDA, MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG,

CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES
M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M.
PALACIO MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEÑA,
FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ,
ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA
M.BUCO, PATRICIA A. ERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT,
JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA
PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA,
LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD
L. TURLA, et al.
In their capacity and as members of the “Malaya Lolas Organization”,

– versus –

THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF

FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N.
GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO

G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

FACTS:

This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with
the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in
the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ,
DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers
who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the
Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims
of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the
Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims
for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the
respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt
with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five
years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING:

Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.

Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that
“the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative–‘the political’–departments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate,
complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess
the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question
whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government
is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not
to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided
that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against
Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in
foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our
country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which
authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an
extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the
Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a
claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the
Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate
or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within
the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a
claim on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to
diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by
whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting.
Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not
adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national
law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions
remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of
international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term
describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction
should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole,
and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the
former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be
held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense
that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international
norms of equivalent authority

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Facts:
Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting
Assistant Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve
(12) crates, were allowed free entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action
Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates “contain large quantities of highly dutiable
goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC officers,
Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects
of Verstuyft.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is
entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to
members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the
search warrant be suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the
quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the
quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC. WHO
joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.

Issue:

Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure
under the diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled
to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA
formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The
Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed
said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search
warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of

powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea
of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the
Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not
so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the
executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him
in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. (World Health
Organization vs. Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131, November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 243)

Facts:
On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against
Asian Development Bank. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and
the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified
respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered
by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of
securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian
Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the
Agreement Between The Bank and The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The
Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had
waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor
Magnayi. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA
referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the
void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a
petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit

2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies,
ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving
rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit

3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition

4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this case

Held:

1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal
process of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee
operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Bank’s
officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their
official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities
and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government which must be respected.

Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB
is independent of the municipal law. "One of the basic immunities of an international
organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs
and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious
reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local
courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere
in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the
organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of
such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."

2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial
transaction, which should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering
into service contracts with different private companies. “There are two conflicting
concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to
the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive
theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts
jure imperii of a state, but not with regard toprivate act or acts jure gestionis.

“Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party
cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical
question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of
business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular
act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign
activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not
undertaken for gain or profit.”

The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the
ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not
attach.

3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of
persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when
challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the
conduct of the country's foreign relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case
whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine
government before the international community. When international agreements are
concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of
seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this task falls
principally on the DFA as being the highest executive department with the competence
and authority to so act in this aspect of the international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon.
Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:

"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead
sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the
state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,' where the
foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the
Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If
the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the
Attorney General to submit to the court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to
immunity.

"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to
the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA
130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be
sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino,
48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to
that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander
of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent
Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in a manifestation and
memorandum as amicus curiae.

"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal
Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The
Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim
of sovereign immunity.

"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local
courts by the respondents through their private counsels. In cases where the foreign
states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own
determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved."

4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has,
under special circumstances, so allowed and entertained such a petition when (a) the
questioned order or decision is issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or (b) where the order
or decision is a patent nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to obtain
in the present case. When an adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter before him,
his action that assumes otherwise would be a clear nullity.

Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August
1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID. (DFA vs NLRC, G.R. No. 113191, 18
September 1996)