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EXAMS TUESDAY NEXT WEEK.

A. composition

-sema vs comelec

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units – province, city,
municipality or barangay – must comply with three conditions. First, the
creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local
Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political
units affected.

Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned

Only by an Act of Congress

Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to increase the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is
vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not


more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law,
who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

xxxx

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,


contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase,
through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4)
empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative
districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.
Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law
that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only
through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, we held that the “power
of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws,”
and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion


legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable
membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be
embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for
regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national
legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,
cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.

a.1. Senate

Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall


be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be
provided by law[MECHANICS FOR ELECTING SENATORS AT LARGE]. –NO OF
SENATORS MAY BE INCREASED

Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of


the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of
age[MUST BE POSSESSED ON THE DAY THE VOTES ARE CAST AS FIXED BY
LAW AND NOT ON THE DAY OF PROCLAMATION], able to read and write, a
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election[DOMICILED IN THE
PHILIPPINES, EVEN IF NOT PHYSICALLY PRESENT IN THE PHIL DURING THE 2
YEAR PERIOD].

Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two
consecutive terms[SENATOR COULD RUN AGAIN THREE YERS AFTER THE
EXPIRATION OF THE SECOND TERM]. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term of which he was elected.

a.2. House of Representatives

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more


than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,


compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.

Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives


unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the
election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and,
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in
which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for


a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of
the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the


Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on
the second Monday of May.

Tobias vs abalos

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section
5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution
clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative
enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress
to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook
the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed
law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to
itself.

Mariano, Jr. vs COMELEC

B. Qualifications and terms of Office

Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board

Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need


not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and
elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise
modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the
force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the


Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the
basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution.8 In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec.
36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of
election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13

b. Residence Requirement

Macalintal vs Comelec

Section 1, Article V of the


Constitution specifically provides
that suffrage may be exercised by (1)
all citizens of the Philippines; (2) not
otherwise disqualified by law; (3) at
least eighteen years of age; and (4)
who are residents in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place
where they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately
preceding the election.

The right of absentee and disabled


voters to cast their ballots at an
election is purely statutory; absentee
voting was unknown to, and not
recognized at, the common law.
Statutes on absentee voting are
regarded as conferring a privilege
and not a right, or an absolute right.
Domicile includes the twin elements
of “the fact of residing or physical
presence in a fixed place” and
animus manendi, or the intention of
returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception,
implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a
given area, community, or country.
The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave
when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends.
If a person’s intent be to remain, it
becomes his domicile; if his intent is
to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence.
A person can only have a single
domicile, unless, for various reasons,
he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.

Ordinarily, an absentee is not a


resident and vice versa; a person
cannot be at the same time, both a
resident and an absentee. However,
under our election laws and the
countless pronouncements of the
Court pertaining to elections, an
absentee remains attached to his
residence in the Philippines as
residence is considered synonymous
with domicile.

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUSTICE PUNO

The majority, thru our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Martinez, rules
that section 2, Article V of the 1987 Constitution mandating Congress to devise a
system for overseas absentee voting operates as an exception to the residence
requirements as the members of the Constitutional Commission manifested a clear
intent “to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin,” viz:[6]

By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be


applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2
indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the
actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad.
The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in
the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy residency
requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.[7] (emphases ours)

The majority further holds that if actual physical residence in the Philippines is
required, “there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate
Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.”[8]

Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not
the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only
proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and
resume residence in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an
explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of
origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section
5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes “provisional registration or a promise
by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise.”

b. 2 Term vs Tenure

Dimaporo vs Mitra

The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be


extended or shortened by the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period
during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be
affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer.
Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These
situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see
Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a
certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut
short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed
to serve its unexpired portion.

in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the
constitution of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not
necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the legislature from
prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are
merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become
vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events.

That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a
certificate of candidacy for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of
voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held is evident from
this exchange between then Members of Parliament Arturo Tolentino and Jose Rono

And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is otherwise.

In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180
above-quoted, this Court categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic
and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another
office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed,
the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can
restore the ousted official.

As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office
produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being
presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner opines, that the other position be
actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section
7, par. 2 of Article VI of the Constitution.

Gaminde vs Mitra

In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between term and
tenure. [T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the
incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent
actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The
tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent.

In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms
of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-
5-3 year terms, we considered the plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2),
Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution
that uniformly prescribed a seven-year term of office for Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the first appointees
terms of seven, five and three years, without re-appointment. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no
need to expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is understood to
coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification (on February 02,
1987).

D. Election of Officers

d.1 Election of Officers

Sec. 16 (2) – The Senate shall elect its president and the house of
representative its speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective members.

Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.

Avelino vs Cuenco

The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in
nature and in doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of separation of
powers.

To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation
of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46
Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1)
and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary. We refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of
the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any
immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the
selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are
at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.
Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the
Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session
Hall — not in the Supreme Court.

d. 2 Qurom – a number sufficient to transact business.

Avelino vs Cuenco

It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23.

In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical
situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate
deliberations in the days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will
support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would
be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that
office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of
the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with
thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the
said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all
their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

d. 3 Rules of proceedings

Section 16, [3]- Each house may determine the rules of proceedings, punish its
members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two thirds of all its
members, suspend or expel a member. A penalty for suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed thirty days.

Section 21 –The senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective


committees may conduct inquiries in and of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.

Arroyo vs de Venecia

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a
rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in
a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the
Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no
quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum
had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum.
The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

d. 4 Discipline of Members

Section 16, [3] - Each house may determine the rules of proceedings, punish its
members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two thirds of all its
members, suspend or expel a member. A penalty for suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed thirty days.

Alejandro vs Quezon

There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, which are familiar to students of
public law. It is here only necessary to recall that under our system of government,
each of the three departments is
distinct and not directly subject to the control of another
department. The power to control is the power to abrogate
and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each
department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the others.
It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is,
to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper
constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended.
The courts must determine the validity of legislative
enactments as well as the legality of all private and official
acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the other
departments.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its
members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to suspend on
appointive member from the exercise of his office for one year,
conceding what has been so well stated by the learned counsel for the
petitioner, conceding all this and more, yet the writ prayed for cannot
issue, for the all-conclusive reason that the Supreme Court does not
possess the power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any
particular action. If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner
without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository
of all wisdom and all power. It would hardly be becoming for the
judiciary to assume the role of either a credulous inquisitor, a
querulous censor, or a jaunty knight, who passes down the halls of
legislation and of administration giving heed to those who have grievances against
the Legislature and the Chief Executive.

Osmena vs Pandatun
Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech
or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives
shall not be questioned in any other place.

The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege


cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the President constitutes


disorderly conduct for which Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that
the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior,
not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also
because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House
knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to,
and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the power to
determine whether Osmena’s conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would
have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to
confer upon a coordinate branch of the government.

Santiago vs Sandiganbayan
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of


suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it.
Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is
bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be
“no ifs and buts about it.” Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the
Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:

“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial


proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension.”

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely


adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before
it.

Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Congress’


Prerogative to Discipline its Members

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against


petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith
issue the order of preventive suspension.

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which
provides that each-
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.”

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive


measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress
and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed
preventive suspension order.

d. 5 Journal and Congressional Records

sec. 16 [4] –

Mabanag vs Lopez Vito

Petition is dismissed without cost. The Court held that to go behind the
enrolled bills which were already authenticated and to investigate the journals
amounts to disregard of the respect due to the coequal and independent
department of the state, and it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the
members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of which
must lead to confusion in the administration of the law.

Duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of Acts and the due
enactment thereof.
Casco vs Gimenez
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term
"urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the
courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by
the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has
been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.

d.5. b Probative Value of Journal

Us vs Pons
See Bernas pp 744

d. 5. C. Matters to be entered in a journal


a. yeas and nays on 3rd and final reading- sec.26[2]
b. veto message of the president- sec.27[1]
c. yeas and nays of repassing a vetoed bill [id]
d. yeas and nays on any question upon request of 1/5 of members present –
sec.16[4]

d.5. d. Journal Entry rule vs enrolled bill theory

astorga vs villegas
The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on the respect due to coequal and
independent departments, which requires the judicial department to accept, as
having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the right manner.

Petitioner’s argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is


conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to
a co-equal department of the government, is neutralized by the fact that the Senate
President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent
clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed
had never been approved by the Senate. Absent such attestation as aresult of the
disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, the entries in
the journal should be consulted.

The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on
the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text
sent to the President and signed by him. The Court declares that the bill was not
duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.

Morales vs Subido

It is contended, however, that in this jurisdiction the journals of the


legislature have been declared conclusive upon the courts, the petitioner
citing United States v. Pons. 6 The case cited is inapposite of it does not involve a
discrepancy between an enrolled bill and the journal. Rather the issue tendered was
whether evidence could be received to show that, contrary to the entries of the
journals, the legislature did not adjourn at midnight of February 28, 1914 but after,
and that "the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the legislature to
effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's
proclamation for the expiration of the special session." In answering in the negative
this Court held that if the clock was in fact stopped, "the resultant evil might be
slight as compared with that of altering the probative force and character of
legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon
uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on
account of the treachery of memory." 7 This Court "passed over the question"
whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its contents and mode of passage.

It was not until 1947 that the question was presented Mabanao v. Lopez-
Vito, 8 and we there held that an enrolled bill "imports absolute verity and is binding
on the courts". This Court held itself bound by an authenticated resolution despite
the fact that the vote of three-fourths of the members of the Congress (as required
by the Constitution to approve proposals for constitutional amendments) was not
actually obtained on account of the suspension of some members of the House of
Representative and the Senate.lawphi1.nêt

Thus in Mabanag the enrolled bill theory was adopted. Whatever doubt there
might have been as to the status and force of the theory in the Philippines, in view
of the dissent of three Justices in Mabanag, 9 was finally laid to rest by the
unanimous decision in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez. 10 Speaking for the
Court, the then Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion said:

Furthermore it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the
term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde" — is
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118,
120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-
18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle
of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree.

By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as


holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there
are certain matters which the Constitution 11 expressly requires must be entered on
the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be
affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question
which we do not now decide. 12 All we hold is that with respect to matters not
expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the
event of any discrepancy.

Arroyo vs de Vencia
e. Congressional Recorde

section 16[4], par 2


(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

f. sessions

f. 1. Regular sessions

section 15 - Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth
Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and
shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until
thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.

Section 16 [5] - (5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without
the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place
than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

f.2. special sessions

Section 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of
July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue
to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days
before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.

Art. 7 secs 10 – 11

Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after
the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law
calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not
earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The
bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2,
Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on
third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be
charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the
requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The
convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed.
No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months
before the date of the next presidential election.

Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of
the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the
office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a
majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President
of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules
and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not
in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-
thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties
of his office.

Article 7 section 18 par 3

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

f. 3. Joint sessions
f.3. a. voting separately

article vii, sec 4. Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by
direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of
the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-
election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for
more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-
President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass,
the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the
election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the
votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in
case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them
shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

11, [4] = If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble,
determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising
the powers and duties of his office.

Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during


the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President
from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall
assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular
session. He may also appear before it at any other time.

Art. Xvii, section


Section 1. [1] - Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may
be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.

f.3. b. voting jointly


art. Vii section 18
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected
with, invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall
be released.