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Describe the Administrative Code of 1987.

Held: The Code is a general law and “incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles
of governance (Third Whereas Clause, Administrative Code of 1987) and “embodies changes in administrative structures and
procedures designed to serve the people.” (Fourth Whereas Clause, Administrative Code of 1987) The Code is divided into seven (7)
books. These books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of departments, bureaus and offices
under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the
rules on the national government budget, as well as guidelines for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers both the internal administration, i.e., internal organization, personnel and recruitment,
supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties
outside government. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno])

What is Administrative Power?

Held: Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of
his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998

What is an Administrative Order?

Held: An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and
carrying out the legislative policy. (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno])
What is the Government of the Republic of the Philippines?
Ans.: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of
the government are exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms
through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the provincial,
city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. (Sec. 2[1], Introductory Provisions, Executive Order No.

What is an Agency of the Government?

Ans.: Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. (Sec. 2[4],
Introductory Provisions, Executive Order No. 292)
What is a Department?
Ans.: Department refers to an executive department created by law. For purposes of Book IV, this shall include any instrumentality,
as herein defined, having or assigned the rank of a department, regardless of its name or designation. (Sec. 2[7], Introductory
Provisions, Executive Order No. 292)

What is a Bureau?
Ans.: Bureau refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any department. For purposes of Book IV, this shall include any principal
subdivision or unit of any instrumentality given or assigned the rank of a bureau, regardless of actual name or designation, as in the
case of department-wide regional offices. (Sec. 2[8], Introductory Provisions, Executive Order No. 292)

What is a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation?

Ans.: Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with
functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or
through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-
one (51) per cent of its capital stock; x x x (Sec. 2[13], Introductory Provisions, Executive Order No. 292)

When is a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation deemed to be performing proprietary function? When is it deemed to
be performing governmental function?
Held: Government-owned or controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary functions or both, depending on
the purpose for which they have been created. If the purpose is to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the
function is proprietary. If it is in the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the
public in general, the function is governmental. Powers classified as “proprietary” are those intended for private advantage and
benefit. (Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366, 425, Sept. 11, 1998, En Banc [Purisima])

Discuss the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (or Prior Resort).

Held: Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply this doctrine to cases involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in character. It applies “where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.”

In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve
a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Villaflor v. CA, 280 SCRA
297, Oct. 9, 1992, 3rd Div. [Panganiban])

Discuss the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. What are the exceptions thereto?
Held: 1. Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such
remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court’s jurisdiction is
fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of
cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing,
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true
to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity
to correct its error and to dispose of the case.

This doctrine is disregarded:

when there is a violation of due process;
when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
when there is irreparable injury;
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval
of the latter;
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding;
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
(Paat v. CA, 266 SCRA 167 [1997])

FACTS: Dr. Esteban has the background of a competent person able to handle a high post. He used to teach in the Philippine College
of Commerce when he was invited by Dr. Blanco to teach in PLM. Blanco was then the president of PLM. He later assigned Esteban
as the VP for Academic Affairs. His appointment is however merely ad interim. Thereafter, he received notifications of renewal of his
term every time his term would lapse. Until in 1975 when he asked Blanco to appoint him as the permanent VP. Blanco however
refused to appoint him and he assigned Esteban to a lower post instead. Blanco also said that the Board of Regents was not able to
approve his appointment as VP for it was withdrawn. Esteban file with the CSC and the CSC ruled in favor of him. PLM appealed to
the trial court and the court affirmed the CSC. PLM again appealed to the IAC and the IAC ruled in favor of Esteban again.

ISSUE: Whether or not Esteban’s appointment became permanent.

HELD: Esteban had been extended several “ad-interim” appointments which PLM mistakenly understands as appointments
temporary in nature. An officer ad interim is one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the
absence or temporary incapacity of its regular incumbent.

But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. In referring to Esteban’s appointments, the term is
not descriptive of the nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it is used to denote the manner in which said appointments
were made, that is, done by the President of the PLM in the meantime, while the Board of Regents, which is originally vested by the
University Charter with the power of appointment, is unable to act.

Later, in its Resolution 485, the PLM Board of Regents verified Esteban’s appointment without condition nor limitation as to tenure.
As of that moment, it became a regular and permanent appointment. Note further that “. . . an ad interim appointment is one made
in pursuance of par (4), sec 10, Article 7, of the [1973] Constitution, which provides that ‘the President shall have the power to make
appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’ It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance
that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim
appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an ‘acting’ appointment which is merely temporary good until another permanent appointment is issued.”



Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a professional manager as administrator of the
SBMA…provided that “for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as the
chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”


(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.

(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted

(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would
be useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post.

(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President.

(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances and other emoluments which he may have received
pursuant to his appointment.


(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective officialshall be eligible for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The
subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government
post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where
a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without
need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for example, an
elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if
specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no
choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to
appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President
with the power to appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate.
Such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the
officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of
congressional authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an
elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign first
from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualificationbefore he may be considered fit
for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to
another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA;
hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as
SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with
jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.

Bermudez vs. Torres G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge of the Office of Provincial
Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of Justice Guingona for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty.
Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Yap of the Second District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos
to the office. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner Bermudez challenged the
appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed
under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
“all provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of the Secretary.”

Issue: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to the
appointment of Quiaoit

Held: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an
individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the
last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to
render it effective.

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and

When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be
understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. The Pres. is the head of government whose
authority includes the power of control over all “executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Control means the authority of an
empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his
duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has the
power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can therefore be inferred that the Pres. can
interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.

The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary” found in Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code
should be interpreted to be a mere advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding
or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The
Pres., being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments,
bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the
scope of his authority.


Petitioner was appointed after Admin Officer retired. Privaterespondentfiled a protest with the MSPB. The same was dismissed.
Uponappeal, MSPB reversed. It found that both petitioner Abila and privaterespondent Eleria met the minimum eligibility and
education requirements forAdministrative Officer IV, but ruled that respondent Eleria had the edge interms of rank and
experience as an Administrative Officer. The Board alsoheld that respondent Eleria was holding a position next in rank to that of
thevacancy, which circumstance, according to the Board, under Section 4 of theCivil Service Commission Resolution No. 83-
343, gave her "promotionalpriority" over petitioner.

Whether the respondent Commission has authority to substitute
itsown judgment for that of the official authorized by law to make anappointment to the government service, in the matter of we
ighing an appointee's qualifications and fitness for a position, after it has been shownthat the appointee possesses the minimum
qualifications prescribed for theposition.

No. CSC has no such authority, the power of appointment, which
isessentially discretionary, being vested by law in the head of the officeconcerned. The head of the office is the person on the
spot. He occupies theideal vantage point from which to identify and designate the individual whocan best fill the post and
discharge its functions in the government agency
heheads. The choice of an appointee from among those who possess therequired qualifications
is a political and administrative decision calling forconsiderations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of
servicewhich can best be made by the head of the office concerned, the
personmost familiar with the organizational structure and environmentalcircumstances within which the appointee
must function. The Court notes that a vacant position in the Civil Service may be filled bypromotion, transfer of present
employees, reinstatement and re-employmentor appointment of outsiders who have the necessary eligibility. The next-in-
rank rule invoked by respondent Commission to justify its choice of respondent Eleria over petitioner Abila, applies only where a
vacancy is
filledby promotion, a process which denotes a scalar ascent of an officer toanother position higher either in rank or salary. A pro
motion involves asituation quite different from the situation in the case at bar where theappointment of petitioner Abila
was effected through lateral transfer from aposition in one department of the city government to a position of
greaterresponsibility in another department of the same government. The Court further notes that even if the vacancy here had
been filled bypromotion rather than by lateral transfer, the concept of "next in rank" doesnot import any mandatory or
peremptory requirement that the person next inrank must be appointed to the vacancy. What Section 19 (3) of P.D. No. 807,the
Civil Service Law, provides is that if a vacancy is filled by a promotion, theperson holding the position next in rank thereto
"shall be considered for promotion."

Civil Liberties Union VS. Executive Secretary

Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for
petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO
284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in
addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the
corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of
the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or
assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those
provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet
under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec.
8 of article VIII.

Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the
number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to
not more that two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices
or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them
from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular
instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.

Aquino vs Civil Service Commission; [208 SCRA 240; GR 92403, April 22, 1992]
Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

(Public Officers, Appointments: Grounds for Protest, CSC)

Facts: Petitioner was designated as Officer-in-charge of the Division Supply Office by the DECS Regional Director in view of the
retirement of the Supply Officer I.
Two years thereafter, the Division Superintendent of City Schools issued a promotional appointment to private respondent as Supply
Officer I in the DECS division. The Civil Service Regional Office IV approved her appointment as permanent.

Petitioner filed a protest with DECS Secretary questioning the qualification and competence of private respondent for the position of
Supply Officer I.

Finding the petitioner better qualified than the respondent, the DECS Secretary in a decision sustained the protest and revoked the
appointment of private respondent, and petitioner was issued a permanent appointment as Supply Officer by the DECS Regional
Director. Said appointment was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office IV.

In an appeal to the CSC, public respondent CSC found the appeal meritorious, thus revoking the appointment of petitioner and
restoring private respondent to her position under her previously approved appointment.

In the case at bar, petitioner assailing the revocation of his appointment, invokes the rulings in previous jurisprudence that the CSC
has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position for that
would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority.

Issue: Whether or not appointment of the respondent can be revoked.

Held: No. It is well settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes position, he acquires a legal,
not merely equitable right, which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him
either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause and with previous notice and hearing.
Said appointment cannot also be revoked on the ground that the protestant is more qualified than the first appointee. The protest
must be for a cause or predicated on those grounds provided for under Sect 19 (6) of the Civil Service Law (PD 807), namely:

1) that the appointee is not qualified;

2) that the appointee is not the next in rank; and

3) in case of appointment transfer, reinstatement, or by original appointment, that the protestant is not satisfied with the written
special reasons or reason given by the appointing authority.

Note: “for a cause” means “for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is,
legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that
officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover, the cause
must relate to and affect the administration of office and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting
the rights and interests of the public.”


[ G.R. NO. 111471, SEPTEMBER 26, 1994 ]

Rogelio R. Delgado, a mayor of San Carlos, Negros Occidental, appointed his wife Victoria T. Debulgado as Head of the General
Service Office of the City Government of San Carlos. The Civil Service Commission disapproved the promotions it violated the
prohibition against nepotic appointments and not to promotional appointments.

Does nepotism apply to promotion?

Yes. The prohibitory norm against nepotism covers all appointments without any distinction between different kinds or types of
appointments. Section 59 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292) covers all appointments to the national, provincial,
city and municipal government as well as any branch or instrumentality thereof and all government owned and controlled
corporations. The promotional appointment of Victoria by her husband, the mayor falls within the prohibited class of appointments.
The court ruled that the Civil Service Commission had the authority the promotional appointment extended to the petitioner.

De Rama vs. CA G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitoner Conrado De Rama wrote a letter to the CSC
seeking the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees. Petitioner justified his recall request on the allegation that the
appointments of said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, done in violation of Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14 employees for lack of merit. The CSC
dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these were “midnight” appointments, pointing out that the constitutional provision relied
upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing President and cannot be made to apply to local elective
officials. The CSC opined that the appointing authority can validly issue appointments until his term has expired, as long as the
appointee meets the qualification standards for the position.

Issue: Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor are forbidden under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution

Held: The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those made
within 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no
law that prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

Baltazar Camporedondo vs National Labor Relations Commission

312 SCRA 47 – Business Organization – Corporation Law – Government Owned and Controlled Corporation vs Private Corporation
Baltazar Camporedondo was the administrator of the Surigao del Norte chapter of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC). In 1995,
a PNRC auditor found out that Baltazar had unremitted collections amounting to P109,000.00. Baltazar, unable to restitute said
missing amount, then filed for early retirement. He later filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PNRC. He filed the case with
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). He averred that he was forced to retire because of the erroneous audit. The Labor
Arbiter, affirmed by the NLRC, ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case because PNRC is a government owned and controlled
corporation (GOCC). Baltazar however argues that PNRC impliedly became a private corporation when its charter was amended to
give it authority to secure loans, etc.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine National Red Cross is a private corporation.
HELD: No. The simple test is to find out whether or not a corporation is public or private is to determine if it has its own charter for
the exercise of a public function or was it incorporated under the general corporation law. PNRC has its own charter (R.A. 95). Its
subsequent amendment did not convert it into a private corporation. As a GOCC, it is subject to its own charter and its employees
are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance

On October 7, 1989, Rafael M. Salas was appointed by the PAGCORChairman as Internal Security Staff Member (ISS) and assigned to
the Casinoat the Manila Pavilion Hotel.ISS members do not directly report to the Office of the Chairman, and
issubject to the control and supervision of an Area Supervisor who onlyimplements the directives of the Branch Chief Security
Officer. The BOD of PAGCOR terminated him on Dec. 3, 1991 grounds: loss of confidence.Salas was allegedly engaged in proxy
betting – in affidavits of 2 customers,claiming to have been used as gunners.CA reversed finding that Salas is not a confidential
employee and cannot bedismissed on that ground, applying the“proximily rule” enunciated in Case 63: Grino V. CSC & Case 60: De
los Santos V. Mallare 10. CA also held that PD 1869 Section 16 has been repealed by Section 2 (1),Article IX-B of the Consti.

1.Whether Salas is a confidential employee?
2. Whether the Pinero doctrine is still applicable?

Every appointment implies confidence, but more more than ordinary confidence is reposed in theoccupant of a position that is
primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office,but
primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom frommisgivings of betrayals of

personal trust or confidential matters of the State.
In Pinero, et. al. V. Hechanova, et. al. “since the enactment of RA 2260: the 1959 Civil Service Act, it is the nature of the position
which finally determines whether a position is:a.)primarily confidential,b.)policy determining orc.)highly technical.Senator Tanada:
“in the 1st
instance, it is the appointing power that determines the nature of the position.In case of conflict, then it is the Court that determines
whether the position is primarily confidential ornot.”-Employees occupying various positions in the Port Patrol Division of
the Bureau of Customs, whichis part of the Customs police force, is not in itself sufficient indication that there positions
areprimarily confidential.
1. No.Salas’ position is the lowest in the chain of command. His job description isordinary, routinary and quotidian in character. His
pay is only P2,200 permonth.He does not enjoy that “primarily close intimacy” which characterizes aconfidential employee.Where
the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority,the element of trust between them is no longer
predominant.Citing Case Tria V. Sto. Tomas, “the fact that sometimes, private respondentmay handle ordinarily confidential matters
or papers which are somewhatconfidential in nature does not suffice to characterize his position as primarilyconfidential.”
2. Yes. PD 1869 can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive incases of conflict.1986 Constitutional
Commission Records The primary purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in providing forthe declaration of a position
asa.)primarily confidential,b.)policy determining orc.)highly technicalis to exempt these categories from competitive examinations as
a means fordetermining merit and fitness.It must be stressed further that these positions are covered by the security of tenure,
although they are considered non-competitive only in the sense
thatappointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive examinations forpurposes of determining merit and
fitness.CSC Resolution 91-830 does not make PAGCOR employees confidential,merely reiterates exemption from civil
service eligibility requirement.In reversing the decision of the CSC, the CA opined that the provisions of Section 16, PD 1869 may no
longer be applied in the case at bar because thesame is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2 (1), ArticleIX-B of
the 1987 COnsti. This is not completely correct. On this point, we approve the more logicalinterpretation advanced by the CSC to the
effect that “Section 16 of PD 1869insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of the CivilService Law & Rules has
been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the1987 Consti & EO 292: Administrative Code of 1987.

However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section16 which provides that “All employees of the casinos
and related servicesshall be classified as “Confidential” appointees.” While such executivedeclaration emanated merely from the
provisions of Implementing Rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959
Rule XXSection 2 The power to declare a position as:a.)primarily confidential,b.)policy determining orc.)highly technical,as defined
therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in EO 292: Administrative Code of 1987Book V. Civil Service
CommissionSection 12. The Commission shall have the ff powers and functions: (9).
Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarilyconfidential, highly technical or policy determining. This later
enactment only serves to bolster the validity of the categorizationmade under Section 16 PD 1869.Be that as it may, such
classification is not absolute and all-encompassing.Prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1959, there were
2 recognized instances when a position may be declared primarilyconfidential:
1:when the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of CivilService, has declared the position to be primarily
confidential;2:in the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists “close intimacy”
between the appointing powerwhich ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment of freedomfrom misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State.
RA 2260: Civil Service Act (June 19, 1959)
Section 5.
“The non-competitive or unclassified service shall be composed of positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-
competitive orunclassified service or those which are policy determining, primarilyconfidential or highly technical in nature.”
General Rules Implementing PD 807: Civil Service RulesSection 1. “appointments to the Civil Service, except as to those which are
policy determining, primarilyconfidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness to
bedetermined as far as practicable by competitive examinations.”

VITUG, J ., concurring:
- Highlighted the phrase, "without prejudice to the filing of administrativecharges against (Salas) if warranted," found in the
dispositive portion of thedecision of the appellate court. It would seem to me that the adverse
findingsarrived at by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR which the Board of Directors relied upon to terminate the services of Salas
on ground of loss of confidence could well be constitutive of the administrative infractions thatthe appellate court must have had in
mind. The case should be remanded to the CSC to specifically meet head-onPAGCOR's foregoing findings and to thereby fully
ventilate, as well as passupon, the appeal to it (CSC) on the basis with an opportunity for a hearingadequately accorded to Salas

1) Whether the term “compensation” in P. D. No. 198, §13, asamended by P. D. No. 768 and P. D. No. 1479 does not include the
allowancesand per diems which had been disallowed in this case, considering §2(i) of P.D. No. 1146 as amended by RA 8291, which
provides that
“compensation”means “the basic pay or salary by an employee, pursuant to hisemployment/appointment, excluding per diems, bon
uses, overtime pay,allowances and any other emoluments received in addition to the basic paywhich are not integrated into the
basic pay under existing laws.”2) Whether the prohibition in PD 198, §13 against the grant of additionalcompensation to board
members must be deemed repealed by virtue of §22of R. A. No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law,
whichtook effect on July 1, 1989.* If yes to 1 and 2, then the members of the board of directors of waterdistricts are entitled to
receive benefits in addition to those authorized to bepaid pursuant to their charter and the guidelines of
the LWUA after theeffectivity of R. A. No. 67583) Whether the disallowance of duplication of claims of transportationallowance of

various BWD employees, as well as the grant of RATA, riceallowance, and excessive per diems to members of the board of directors
of BWD, would impair vested rights, violate any rule against diminution of benefits, and undermine the management prerogative of
water districts; and

1) NO. The definitions of the term “compensation” in the statutesrelied on by petitioners are for limited purposes only and cannot
be deemedto comprehend such other purposes not specifically included in theprovisions thereof.

Words and phrases in a statute must be given their natural, ordinary, andcommonly-accepted meaning, due regard being given to
the context in whichthe words and phrases are used. The provision petitioners cite as basis refers to the basis for the computationof
employer and employee contributions to the GSIS as well as the benefits towhich such employees are entitled. In the same manner,
under §32 of theNIRC, “compensation” includes fees, salaries, wages, commissions, andsimilar items for purposes of recognizing
taxable income. The definitions of the term “compensation” in these statutes are for limitedpurposes only and cannot be deemed to
comprehend such other purposesnot specifically included in the
provisions thereof.Under P. D. No. 198, §13, per diem is precisely intended to be thecompensation of members of board of
directors of water districts.By specifying the compensation which a director is entitled to receive and bylimiting the amount he/she
is allowed to receive in a month, and, in the sameparagraph, providing “No director shall receive other compensation” than the
amount provided for per diems, the law quite clearly indicates that directorsof water districts are authorized to receive only the per
diem authorized bylaw and no other compensation or allowance in whatever form.2) NO. The Salary Standardization Law does not
apply to petitioners becausedirectors of water districts are in fact limited to policy-making and areprohibited from the management
of the districts, as provided by §18 thereof.R. A. No. 6758, §4 specifically provides that the Salary Standardization Lawapplies to
“positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, nowexisting or hereafter created in the government, including GOCCs
GFIs.” The Salary Standardization Law adopts a Position Classification Systemclassifying positions into four main categories, namely:
professionalsupervisory, professional non-supervisory, sub-professional supervisory, andsub-professional non-
supervisory, and the rules and regulations for itsimplementation.A review of the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law will
thatthe Salary Standardization Law does not apply to petitioners becausedirectors of water districts are in fact limited to policy-
making and areprohibited from the management of the districts. The fact that §12 and §17 of the Salary
Standardization Law speak of allowances as “benefits” paid in addition to the salaries incumbents arepresently receiving makes it cle
ar that the law does not refer to thecompensation of board of directors of water districts as these directors do notreceive salaries
but per diems for their compensation.3) NO. The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by publicofficers does not estop
the Government from making a subsequent correctionof such errors – practice, without more, no matter how long continued,
cannotgive rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law.Management prerogative refers to the right of an employer to regulate
allaspects of employment, such as the freedom to prescribe work assignments,working methods, processes to be
followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal andrecall of
work. Clearly, the existence of such right presupposes the existenceof an employer-employee relationship.
As to the BWD board of directors:
The BWD board of directors are notemployees of BWD. As already noted, their function, as defined by P. D. No.198, is limited to
policy-making.Moreover, as also noted before, the right of directors of water districts to thepayment of compensation is expressly
provided for in PD 198, thus pre-empting the exercise of any discretion by the water districts.


Posted by kaye lee on 11:37 AM

GR NO. 135805, dated 29-Apr-1999

Pedro Dacoycoy, respondent, is the vocational school administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades in Northern Samar.
After formal investigation by the CSC, he was found guilty of nepotism on two counts. CSC imposed on him the penalty of dismissal
from the service.

Respondent filed motion for reconsideration, anchoring on the the argument that he was not the appointing or the recommending
authority. CA reversed CSC's resolution ruling that the respondent did not appoint his 2 sons, therefore he is not guilty of nepotism.

Whether or not respondent is guilty of nepotism.

Yes. The law (Sec 59 Nepotism, (1) ) defines nepotism as all appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of
a relative of the
1. appointing or
2. recommending authority, or of the
3. chief of the bureau or office, or of
4. the persons exercising immediate supervision over him.
The word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of

CSC found respondent guilty of nepotism as a result of the appointment of his 2 sons Rito, a driver and Ped, a utility worker, as their
are under his immediate supervision and control as the school administrator.



Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private respondents, are public schoolteachers. Some time in September and October
1990, during the teacher’s strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason they were administratively charged with 1) grave
misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglectof duty; 4) refusal to perform official duty;
5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL. They were placed under preventive
suspension. Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90 day period. Margallo was dismissed from the service. The three others
were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to reprimand only. Hence their
reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during the period of their suspension and pending appeal
(before the CA exonerated them).


Whether the teachers are entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if they are subsequently exonerated.


YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back wages, the respondent must be exonerated from
the charges and his suspension be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive, and it is actually considered
illegal if the respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence he should be reinstated
with full pay for the period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service Decree states that the respondent “shall be
considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins.” On the other hand if
his conviction is affirmed the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar
the respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period of suspension pending their appeal would be considered as part of the
preventive suspension, entitling them to full pay because they were eventually exonerated and their suspension was unjustified.
They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.


Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup d’état was crushed, DILG
Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him to show cause why he should not be suspended or
removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. A sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan
against Aguinaldo for acts committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively
participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.

The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation. Later, the
Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Vice-Governor Vargas was
installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.

Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatoryinjunction and/or restraining order with the SC,
assailing the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government. Petitioner argued that: (1) that the power of respondent
Secretary to suspend or remove local government officialunder Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987
Constitution; (2) that since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not
appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be proved by
proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under
the Revised Penal Code.

While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan. Three
petitions fordisqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had been removed from office.

The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision of the Secretary has not yet attained
finality and is still pending review with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the
way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.


1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration case moot and academic

2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the President

3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be removed from office.


1. Yes. Aguinaldo’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending moot and
academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among thecandidates for
governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public officialcannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a
prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for
acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant
from the legislativebranch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in
the President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision
over local governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the
President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present
Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the legislature the power and authority to enact a local government
code, which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this
court had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present Constitution, until such
time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of the DILG secretary to remove local elective
government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.

3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum of proof required is only substantial
evidence. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992)