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Janae Thomas

PHL 461 Metaphysics

Paper 2

In ordinary language, we tend to speak about things that could have happen or have a

chance of happening. Statements like “It might rain today”, “There must be something behind

this door” and “There could have been flying pigs” are all ordinary statements that we may use

with speaking informally, amongst many others. In logic, we called statements like these modal

propositions. Modal logic deals with propositions about possibility and necessity. Saying “It might

rain today” is the same as saying that there is a possibility that it will rain. Although statements

like these in ordinary language have been used throughout history, modality is a fairly new

concept among logicians and philosophers that brings along a new set of questions and problems,

one of these problems being the difficulty of identifying truth-makers for modal propositions. I

argue that:

1. All true propositions must have truth-makers that make their respective proposition true

(as according to Armstrong’s theory of truthmaking).

2. We find truth-makers for true propositions about our world in our actual world.

3. These truth-makers in our actual world tell us what actually exist.

4. To find truth-makers for modal propositions, we must look in the possible worlds that the

respective propositions are true in.

5. We currently have no known way of looking for truth-makers of modal propositions in

possible worlds.
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6. We cannot determine the truth-makers of true modal propositions without looking in

possible worlds.

7. Therefore, we cannot identify the ontological status of these possibilities nor the possible

worlds the possibilities are true in.

As I stated in the beginning of my paper, modality deals with possibility and necessity.

Necessity describes what must happen or what must be true or false. An example of this is a

bachelor is an unmarried male. According to our definition of bachelors in our actual world, this

must be true. Possibility and contingency, on the other hand, describes what has a chance of

happening or what could of have happen. For example, I could have attended a different college

instead of the college I am currently attending now. Each true modal proposition could either be

necessarily true or possibly true. Additionally, modality can apply to either a proposition or to a

thing and its properties. In the proposition “Necessarily, everything that is a triangular is shaped”,

the modality attaches to the proposition because the truth value of the whole proposition is

being analyzed. This type of modality is regarded as De Dicto modality (Melia, 3). When it applies

to a thing and its properties, it is considered De Re modality. The proposition “Rover possibly has

a snout” is an example of this type of modality. The modality is applied to Rover and the property

Rover possess (the property of having a snout) because the possibility of Rover possessing or not

possessing that property is being described (Melia, 3). From these modal concepts, we get the

idea of possible worlds, the way our world could have been. Possible worlds contain all the

possibilities that do not occur in the actual world and those possibilities occur in the possible

worlds. Even with this basic understanding of modality, someone may notice how difficult it is to

find a truth-maker for possibilities because of their nature.

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According to David Malet Armstrong’s theory of truthmaking, for propositions to be true

there must be a portion of reality that makes it true, which is known as a truth-maker (5). The

theory asserts that every truth must have a truth-maker and truth-makers necessitates their

truths (Armstrong, 5). When we apply this to propositions about our actual world, the theory

seems to work. For example, if I were to say “My pants are blue”, someone would observe my

pants and if my pants were in fact blue, then the truth-maker from that proposition would exist,

therefore making that proposition true. If my pants were not blue, then the truth-maker for that

proposition does not exist, making that proposition false. So, truth-maker theory applies

efficiently to veridical propositions about our actual world. However, when we apply truth-maker

theory to modal concepts, it is comparatively difficult to determine truth-makers for modal

propositions. Modality is associated with possible worlds semantics. Take for instance, the

proposition, “There could have been talking dogs”. There is not a truth-maker for this proposition

in our world, making this proposition false (in our world). Although, this proposition may have a

truth-maker in one or more possible worlds where we are not aware of the realities of such

worlds. So, this proposition may be true in a possible world that is outside of our actual world.

But without the means to discover the truth-maker for that proposition in any possible worlds,

we can never determine the ontological status of this possibility or the possible worlds it is true

in.

The same can be said for necessity. A proposition can state that it is necessarily true that

the sky is brown. For a proposition to be necessarily true, it follows that it is possibly true,

according to modal axioms. So, the truth-maker for this proposition cannot be identified in our
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actual world, but it is still possibly true in other possible worlds and the difficulty of identifying

the truth-maker and the ontological status of the possibility and its possible worlds still arise.

Another easy way to think of this problem in ordinary language is to imagine a person

walking into a room with another person already in the room; lets name one person Vicky and

the other person Tim for this scenario. Tim is in this room when Vicky arrives and he is wearing a

purple shirt. Vicky walks up to Tim and greets him and ask him why is he wearing that particular

shirt. Tim responds, “Oh, this old rag? I could have worn my blue shirt, but I was not totally sure.”

Vicky thinks of the blue shirt that Tim have worn in the past and she imagines him in the room

wearing that shirt. In this particular scenario, Tim had a possibility of wearing the blue shirt, but

he chose otherwise and the truth-maker for the proposition “Tim is wearing a blue shirt” is not

present. Therefore, we know this proposition is false. However, in the scenario the proposition

“Tim could have worn a blue shirt” or, in modal terms, “Tim had the possibility of wearing a blue

shirt” is a contingent proposition and could possibly be true. When Vicky imagines Tim wearing

a blue shirt, she is imagining possible worlds where Tim is wearing a blue shirt and the truth-

maker for such proposition is present. But without being able to make those possible worlds

present in our actual world, the truth-maker for the proposition can never be acknowledged.

Thus, the problem of identifying the truth-makers for possibilities still occur. Philosophers have

tried to figure out this problem about possible world semantics. One particular philosopher,

David Lewis, has a different take on the problem at hand.

Lewis, a supporter of possible world semantics, presents and argues for his position in his

article titled “Possible Worlds”. Lewis’ initial argument for the existence of possible worlds

purports that the statement from ordinary language, “there are many ways things could have
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been besides the way they actually are” affirms that there are entities that could be described as

“ways things could have been”, which he identifies as possible worlds (Lewis, 84). He believes

that possible worlds are their own entities and, just like our actual world, have their own realism

or ontological status. The fact that they deal in the realm of possibility and necessity is what make

them what they are and is a brute fact about them and if we can accept certain ideas about our

own actual world, then those ideas must also apply to possible worlds. On the contrary,

opponents of his view do not agree with Lewis’ position and find complications in his reasoning

and have responded to Lewis with apprehensions.

One of the arguments against the realism of possible worlds is that it is false because only

our reality and everything in our reality are the only things that actually exists (86). Lewis

responds to this argument by agreeing that unactualized possible worlds and the unactualized

content within them do no actually exist because actual existence requires existing and being

located in our actual world (86). Under Lewis’ view, the word ‘actual’ is “indexical”, depending

on the circumstances and the world in which the word is used, it gains its reference (Lewis, 86).

When we use the word ‘actual’ in our world we are referring to only our world since it is the

world we exist on. Other inhabitants of possible worlds may even refer to their world as actual

as long as ‘actual’ means the same as if we were to use it. Since other worlds and their content

are not our world or inhabitants of it, then such worlds do not actually exist in our world.

Therefore, this argument does not prove that realism about possible worlds is false, but asserts

that there are more objects than what actually exist.

Another argument against the realism about possible worlds is that it is implausible since

it does follow ontological parsimony (Lewis, 87). Lewis responds to this argument by
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distinguishing between two different kinds of parsimony: qualitative parsimony and quantitative

parsimony (87). For a doctrine to be qualitatively parsimonious, it would have a low number of

different kinds of entity it suggests exists. It would be a doctrine that purports that there are only

chairs rather than chairs and tables, per say. Alternatively, a doctrine is quantitative parsimonious

when it keeps the number of instances of the kinds it postulates low. A quantitative parsimonious

doctrine would purport that there are only 100 chairs rather than 10,000. Lewis argues that his

realism about possible worlds is only quantitatively unparsimonious but not qualitatively

unparsimonious. We already believe in the existence of our actual world. All Lewis is trying to

convince us to do is accept more things of the same kind and not things that are of a new kind

(87).

Lewis concludes his argument by giving reason to why he holds this belief. He explains

how a person already has a set of opinions before studying philosophy and the role of philosophy

as a subject is not to defend or challenge those opinions. Rather, the role of philosophy is to teach

a person how to organize these opinions in a systematic fashion and respect such opinions and

the fact that philosophers have these sets of opinions before studying the subject (Lewis, 88).

Lewis believes that he possesses such common opinions that philosophy should respect, such as

the belief in the existences of tables and chairs and the belief that it is possible that those tables

and chairs could have been arranged differently (88). He finds realism about possible worlds as a

the most successful way to systematically organize his pre-philosophical opinions about the way

world could have been. Thus, philosophy should respect this belief of his.

Lewis’ position and defense for his position is well-stated and has strong reasoning for its

support, but the problem of identifying truth-makers for modal propositions is still present. If
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Lewis’ concept is correct, the realism of possible worlds is just a brute fact about them that make

them what they are. Other philosophers, however, cannot seem to accept the fact of such idea

and demand a better explanation to this problem. Yet, the use of modal terms in ordinary

language and philosophical discussions will continue even without a definite answer to this

problem. Hopefully through these discussions, philosophers will find a solution.

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Works Cited

Armstrong, David Malet. "The general theory of truthmaking." Sakai. 1-17. N.p., n.d. Web. 18

Mar. 2017.

Lewis, David. “Foundations” Counterfactuals. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. 84-91. Sakai. Web. 18

Mar. 2017

Melia, Joseph. "Introduction to modality." Modality (2003): 1-10. Sakai. Web. 18 Mar. 2017.