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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements

G.R. No. 187021 January 25, 2012 defective. He averred that the Spouses’ motion was pro forma because it lacked the
DOUGLAS F. ANAMA, Petitioner, vs.PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, SPOUSES required affidavit of service and has a defective notice of hearing, hence, a mere scrap of
SATURNINA BARIA &TOMAS CO and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, METRO paper. The Respondent Court, however, denied Anama’s motion(s) for reconsideration.
MANILA, DISTRICT II, Respondents.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner questioned the RTC Order before the CA for taking judicial
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the March 31, 2008 Decision1 of the cognizance of the motion for execution filed by spouses Tomas Co and Saturnina
Court of Appeals (CA) and its February 27, 2009 Resolution,2 in CA G.R. No. SP-94771, Baria (Spouses Co) which was (1) not in accord with Section 4 and Section 15 of the
which affirmed the November 25, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 167, Rules of Court because it was without a notice of hearing addressed to the parties; and
Pasig City (RTC), granting the motion for issuance of a writ of execution of respondents. (2) not in accord with Section 6, Rule 15 in conjunction with Section 13, Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court because it lacks the mandatory affidavit of service.
The Facts
On March 31, 2008, the CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition. It reasoned out,
The factual and procedural backgrounds of this case were succinctly recited by the CA in among others, that the issue on the validity of the deed of sale between respondents,
its decision as follows: Philippine Savings Bank (PSB) and the Spouses Co, had long been laid to rest
considering that the January 29, 2004 Decision of this Court became final and executory
Sometime in 1973, the Petitioner, Douglas F. Anama (Anama), and the Respondent, on July 12, 2004. Hence, execution was already a matter of right on the part of the
Philippine Savings Bank (PSB), entered into a "Contract to Buy," on installment basis, respondents and the RTC had the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution enforcing a
the real property owned and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 301276 in final and executory decision.
the latter’s name. However, Anama defaulted in paying his obligations thereunder, thus,
PSB rescinded the said contract and title to the property remained with the latter. The CA also stated that although a notice of hearing and affidavit of service in a motion
Subsequently, the property was sold by PSB to the Spouses Saturnina Baria and Tomas are mandatory requirements, the Spouses Co’s motion for execution of a final and
Co (Co Spouses) who, after paying the purchase price in full, caused the registration of executory judgment could be acted upon by the RTC ex parte, and therefore, excused
the same in their names and were, thus, issued TCT No. 14239. from the mandatory requirements of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Resultantly, Anama filed before the Respondent Court a complaint for declaration of The CA was of the view that petitioner was not denied due process because he was
nullity of the deed of sale, cancellation of transfer certificate of title, and specific properly notified of the motion for execution of the Spouses Co. It stated that the act of
performance with damages against PSB, the Co Spouses, and the Register of Deeds of the Spouses Co in resorting to personal delivery in serving their motion for execution did
Metro Manila, District II. not render the motion pro forma. It refused to apply a rigid application of the rules
because it would result in a manifest failure of justice considering that petitioner’s
On August 21, 1991 and after trial on the merits, the Respondent Court dismissed position was nothing but an obvious dilatory tactic designed to prevent the final
Anama’s complaint and upheld the validity of the sale between PSB and the Co disposition of Civil Case No. 44940.
Spouses. Undaunted, Anama appealed, at first, to this Court, and after failing to obtain a
favorable decision, to the Supreme Court. Not satisfied with the CA’s unfavorable disposition, petitioner filed this petition praying for
the reversal thereof presenting the following
On January 29, 2004, the Supreme Court rendered judgment denying Anama’s petition
and sustaining the validity of the sale between PSB and the Co Spouses. Its decision ARGUMENTS:
became final and executory on July 12, 2004. Pursuant thereto, the Co Spouses moved
for execution, which was granted by the Respondent Court per its Order, dated THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
November 25, 2005. THE CLEAR TEACHING OF THE HONORABLE COURT WITH REGARD TO THE
REQUISITE NOTICE OF HEARING – IT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE PARTIES
Aggrieved, Anama twice moved for the reconsideration of the Respondent Court’s NOT TO THE CLERK OF COURT, THE LATEST (THEN) BEING GARCIA V.
November 25, 2005 Order arguing that the Co Spouses’ motion for execution is fatally SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 167103, AUGUST 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 361; DE JESUS

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
V. JUDGE DILAG, A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1921, SEPTEMBER 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 176; DECEMBER 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 84, 90, "THERE EXISTS A COMPELLING REASON
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NATIVIDAD, G.R. NO. 127198, MAY 16, 2005, FOR STAYING THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT."
458 SCRA 441; ATTY. JULIUS NERI V. JUDGE JESUS S. DE LA PEÑA, A.M NO. RTJ-
05-1896, APRIL 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 538; AND ALVAREZ V. DIAZ, A.M. NO. MTJ-00- Basically, petitioner argues that the respondents failed to substantially comply with the
1283, MARCH 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 213; rule on notice and hearing when they filed their motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution with the RTC. He claims that the notice of hearing in the motion for execution
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION filed by the Spouses Co was a mere scrap of paper because it was addressed to the
THE CLEAR TEACHING OF THE HONORABLE COURT WITH REGARD TO THE Clerk of Court and not to the parties. Thus, the motion for execution did not contain the
REQUISITE AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE – IT SHOULD BE IN THE PROPER FORM AS required proof of service to the adverse party. He adds that the Spouses Co and their
PRESCRIBED IN THE RULES AND IT SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO THE MOTION, counsel deliberately "misserved" the copy of their motion for execution, thus, committing
THE LATEST (THEN) BEING ELLO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 141255, JUNE fraud upon the trial court.
21, 2005, 460 SCRA 406; LOPEZ DELA ROSA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V.
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 148470, APRIL 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 614; ALVAREZ Additionally, he claims that PSB falsified its appellee’s brief by engaging in a "dagdag-
V. DIAZ, A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1283, MARCH 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 213; EL REYNO HOMES, bawas" ("intercalation") operation in pages 54 to 55 of the TSN, dated October 12, 1984.
INC. V. ERNESTO ONG, 397 SCRA 563; CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, 388 SCRA
72, 80-81; AND MERIS V. OFILADA, 293 SCRA 606; Position of the Spouses Co

THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT DID NOT TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION The Spouses Co counter that the petition should be dismissed outright for raising both
ON THE "FRAUD PERPETRATED UPON THE COURT" BY RESPONDENT-SPOUSES questions of facts and law in violation of Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
AND THEIR LEAD COUNSEL. Spouses Co aver that petitioner attempts to resurrect the issue that PSB cheated him in
their transaction and that the RTC committed a "dagdag-bawas." According to the
SINCE THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT REFUSED TO TAKE INTO Spouses Co, these issues had long been threshed out by this Court.
CONSIDERATION THE RESPONDENT BANK’S ACTION – THAT OF:
At any rate, they assert that they have substantially complied with the requirements of
ENGAGING IN A DAGDAG-BAWAS (LEGALLY "INTERCALATION") OPERATION OF A notice and hearing provided under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section 13, Rule 13
PORTION OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES (TSN), OCTOBER 12, of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioner’s allegations, a copy of the motion for the
1984, OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 167, PASIG CITY, IN CIVIL CASE issuance of a writ of execution was given to petitioner through his principal counsel, the
NO. 44940, PAGES 54-55, AND Quasha Law Offices. At that time, the said law office had not formally withdrawn its
appearance as counsel for petitioner. Spouses Co argue that what they sought to be
PRESENTING IT IN ITS APPELLEE’S BRIEF (IN THE OWNERSHIP CASE, CA-G.R. executed was the final judgment of the RTC duly affirmed by the CA and this Court, thus,
NO. CV-42663, LIKEWISE, BEFORE THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT) BY putting the issues on the merits to rest. The issuance of a writ of execution then becomes
CITING IT ON PAGE 14 OF SAID BRIEF, AS IMPLIEDLY COMING FROM THE TSN a matter of right and the court’s duty to issue the writ becomes ministerial.
OF THE TRIAL COURT.
Position of respondent PSB
THINKING THAT THEIR FALSIFIED APPELLEE’S BRIEF WAS MATERIAL IN SAID
CA-G.R. NO. CV-42663. PSB argues that the decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. 44940
entitled "Douglas F. Anama v. Philippine Savings Bank, et. al."3 had long become final
IT COULD NOT RULE THAT THE SAME HAS BROUGHT ABOUT A CRUCIAL and executory as shown by the Entry of Judgment made by the Court on July 12, 2004.
MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE SITUATION OF THE PARTIES WHICH MAKES The finality of the said decision entitles the respondents, by law, to the issuance of a writ
EXECUTION INEQUITABLE (PUNCIA V. GERONA, 252 SCRA 424, 430-431), OR, IN of execution. PSB laments that petitioner relies more on technicalities to frustrate the
THE WORDS OF DEVELOPMENT BANK OF RIZAL V. CA, G.R. NO. 75964, ends of justice and to delay the enforcement of a final and executory decision.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
As to the principal issue, PSB points out that the notice of hearing appended to the ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts
motion for execution filed by the Spouses Co substantially complied with the showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by registered mail,
requirements of the Rules since petitioner’s then counsel of record was duly notified and proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.
furnished a copy of the questioned motion for execution. Also, the motion for execution The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in
filed by the Spouses Co was served upon and personally received by said counsel. lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice
given by the postmaster to the addressee.
The Court’s Ruling
Elementary is the rule that every motion must contain the mandatory requirements of
The Court agrees with the Spouses Co that petitioner’s allegations on the "dagdag- notice and hearing and that there must be proof of service thereof. The Court has
bawas operation of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes," the "fraud perpetuated upon consistently held that a motion that fails to comply with the above requirements is
the Court by said spouses and their lead counsel," the "ownership," and "falsification" considered a worthless piece of paper which should not be acted upon. The rule,
had long been laid to rest in the case of "Douglas F. Anama v. Philippine Savings Bank, however, is not absolute. There are motions that can be acted upon by the court ex parte
et. al."4 For said reason, the Court cannot review those final pronouncements. To do so if these would not cause prejudice to the other party. They are not strictly covered by the
would violate the rules as it would open a final judgment to another reconsideration rigid requirement of the rules on notice and hearing of motions.
which is a prohibited procedure.
The motion for execution of the Spouses Co is such kind of motion. It cannot be denied
On the subject procedural question, the Court finds no compelling reason to stay the that the judgment sought to be executed in this case had already become final and
execution of the judgment because the Spouses Co complied with the notice and hearing executory. As such, the Spouses Co have every right to the issuance of a writ of
requirements under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15. Said sections, as amended, provide: execution and the RTC has the ministerial duty to enforce the same. This right on the
part of the Spouses Co and duty on the part of the RTC are based on Section 1 and
SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides, as follows:
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for
hearing by the applicant. Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. – Execution shall issue as a matter
of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days perfected.
before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice. If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so
SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. – No written motion set for hearing shall be requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof.
SEC. 2. Discretionary execution.—
Pertinently, Section 13 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
provides: (a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.— On motion of the prevailing
party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over
SEC. 13. Proof of service. – Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the
of the party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion,
containing a full statement of the date, place, and manner of service. If the service is by

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to Otherwise, as was said by this Court in Molina v. de la Riva, a case could never end.
appeal. Once a court renders a final judgment, all the issues between or among the parties
before it are deemed resolved and its judicial function as regards any matter related to
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be the controversy litigated comes to an end. The execution of its judgment is purely a
filed in the appellate court. ministerial phase of adjudication. The nature of its duty to see to it that the claim of the
prevailing party is fully satisfied from the properties of the loser is generally ministerial.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order after due hearing. In Pamintuan v. Muñoz, We ruled that once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and
(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments.—A several, separate or partial the judgment debtor need not be given advance notice of the application for
judgment may be executed under the same terms and conditions as execution of a execution.
judgment or final order pending appeal. (2a) [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
Also of the same stature is the rule that once a judgment becomes final and executory,
As can be gleaned therefrom, under Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997 the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right and the granting of
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the Spouses Co can have their motion for execution execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. Otherwise stated, once sought by the
executed as a matter of right without the needed notice and hearing requirement to prevailing party, execution of a final judgment will just follow as a matter of
petitioner. This is in contrast to the provision of Paragraph 2 of Section 1 and Section 2 course. Hence, the judgment debtor need not be given advance notice of the
where there must be notice to the adverse party. In the case of Far Eastern Surety and application for execution nor he afforded prior hearing.
Insurance Company, Inc. v. Virginia D. Vda. De Hernandez,5 it was written:
Absence of such advance notice to the judgment debtor does not constitute an
It is evident that Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not infringement of the constitutional guarantee of due process.
prescribe that a copy of the motion for the execution of a final and executory
judgment be served on the defeated party, like litigated motions such as a motion to However, the established rules of our system of jurisprudence do not require that a
dismiss (Section 3, Rule 16), or motion for new trial (Section 2, Rule 37), or a motion for defendant who has been granted an opportunity to be heard and has had his day in court
execution of judgment pending appeal (Section 2, Rule 39), in all of which instances a should, after a judgment has been rendered against him, have a further notice and
written notice thereof is required to be served by the movant on the adverse party in hearing before supplemental proceedings are taken to reach his property in satisfaction
order to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the application. of the judgment. Thus, in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is not essential that
he be given notice before the issuance of an execution against his tangible property;
It is not disputed that the judgment sought to be executed in the case at bar had already after the rendition of the judgment he must take "notice of what will follow," no further
become final and executory. It is fundamental that the prevailing party in a litigation may, notice being "necessary to advance justice." [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
at any time within five (5) years after the entry thereof, have a writ of execution issued for
its enforcement and the court not only has the power and authority to order its execution Likewise, in the case of Leonardo Lim De Mesa v. Hon. Court of Appeals,6 it was stated:
but it is its ministerial duty to do so. It has also been held that the court cannot refuse to
issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash it, or order its In the present case, the decision ordering partition and the rendition of accounting had
stay, for, as a general rule, the parties will not be allowed, after final judgment, to object already become final and executory. The execution thereof thus became a matter of right
to the execution by raising new issues of fact or of law, except when there had been a on the part of the plaintiffs, herein private respondents, and is a mandatory and
change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution inequitable or when it ministerial duty on the part of the court. Once a judgment becomes final and
appears that the controversy has ever been submitted to the judgment of the court; or executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the
when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is judgment debtor need not be given advance notice of the application for execution
defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that judgment debt has nor be afforded prior hearings thereon.
been paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without
authority. Defendant-appellant has not shown that she falls in any of the situations afore-
mentioned. Ordinarily, an order of execution of a final judgment is not appealable.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
On the bases of the foregoing considerations, therefore, the Court of Appeals acted actually had the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the
correctly in holding that the failure to serve a copy of the motion for execution on motion. The Court held:
petitioner is not a fatal defect. In fact, there was no necessity for such service.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied] This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, mandatory is the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by
At any rate, it is not true that the petitioner was not notified of the motion for execution of failure to comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is
the Spouses Co. The records clearly show that the motion for execution was duly served considered pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the
upon, and received by, petitioner’s counsel-of-record, the Quasha Ancheta Pena filing of the requisite pleading.
Nolasco Law Offices, as evidenced by a "signed stamped received mark" appearing on
said pleading.7 The records are bereft of proof showing any written denial from As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required
petitioner’s counsel of its valid receipt on behalf of its client. Neither is there proof that by the Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for
the Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Offices has formally withdrawn its appearance the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must
as petitioner’s counsel-of-record. Considering that there is enough proof shown on be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of the
record of personal delivery in serving the subject motion for execution, there was a valid court. Principles of natural justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected
compliance with the Rules, thus, no persuasive reason to stay the execution of the without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
subject final and executory judgment.
The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to
Moreover, this Court takes note that petitioner was particularly silent on the ruling of the study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which
CA that he was notified, through his counsel, of the motion for execution of the Spouses it is based.9 [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
Co when he filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s order dated June 28, 2005,
holding in abeyance said motion pending the resolution of petitioner’s pleading filed Likewise, in the case of KKK Foundation, Inc. v. Hon. Adelina Calderon-Bargas,10 this
before this Court. He did not dispute the ruling of the CA either that the alleged defect in Court stated:
the Spouses Co’s motion was cured when his new counsel was served a copy of said
motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s June 28, 2005 Order.8
Anent the second issue, we have consistently held that a motion which does not meet
the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive and the trial
proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced court has no authority to act upon. Service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of
the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule the time and the place of hearing of that motion is a mandatory requirement, and the
1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to failure of movants to comply with these requirements renders their motions fatally
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every defective. However, there are exceptions to the strict application of this rule. These
action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment exceptions are: (1) where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage
of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in of justice especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals
contained therein; (2) where the interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where
In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there was substantial the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of
compliance of the rule on notice of motions even if the first notice was irregular because the court; and (4) where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the
no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion was not considered and degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
resolved until after several postponements of which the parties were duly notified.
A notice of hearing is an integral component of procedural due process to afford the
Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the court. Through
despite the lack of notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was such notice, the adverse party is given time to study and answer the arguments in the
substantial compliance with the requirements of due process where the adverse party motion. Records show that while Angeles’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution
contained a notice of hearing, it did not particularly state the date and time of the hearing.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
However, we still find that petitioner was not denied procedural due process. Upon of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that this Court should write finis to this
receiving the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, the trial court issued an Order litigation.13
dated September 9, 2002 giving petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment. The trial
court ruled on the motion only after the reglementary period to file comment lapsed. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Clearly, petitioner was given time to study and comment on the motion for which reason,
the very purpose of a notice of hearing had been achieved. SO ORDERED.

The notice requirement is not a ritual to be followed blindly. Procedural due process is
1âwphi1

not based solely on a mechanical and literal application that renders any deviation
inexorably fatal. Instead, procedural rules are liberally construed to promote their
objective and to assist in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any
action and proceeding. [Emphases supplied]

At any rate, it is undisputed that the August 21, 1991 RTC Decision11 in Civil Case No.
44940 is already final and executory. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all
the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is
the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing party is entitled to
a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial court’s ministerial duty.12

The Court agrees with the respondents that petitioner mainly relies on mere technicalities
to frustrate the ends of justice and further delay the execution process and enforcement
of the RTC Decision that has been affirmed by the CA and this Court. The record shows
that the case has been dragging on for almost 30 years since petitioner filed an action for
annulment of sale in 1982. From the time the Spouses Co bought the house from PSB in
1978, they have yet to set foot on the subject house and lot.

To remand the case back to the lower court would further prolong the agony of the
Spouses Co. The Court should not allow this to happen. The Spouses Co should not be
prevented from enjoying the fruits of the final judgment in their favor. In another
protracted case, the Court wrote:

As a final note, it bears to point out that this case has been dragging for more than 15
years and the execution of this Court’s judgment in PEA v. CA has been delayed for
almost ten years now simply because De Leon filed a frivolous appeal against the RTC’s
order of execution based on arguments that cannot hold water. As a consequence, PEA
is prevented from enjoying the fruits of the final judgment in its favor. The Court agrees
with the Office of the Solicitor General in its contention that every litigation must come to
an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. Just as a losing
party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution
and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the "life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory
schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. 77353 July 30, 1987 its jurisdiction over the case and, consequently, it has no more power to act upon the
ASSOCIATED BANK, petitioner, vs.HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, in his capacity as petitioner's motion. The mistake is apparent.
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VIII; ROLE, INC. and
ROMEO R. ECHAUZ, respondents. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 removed the record on appeal as a requirement
for the perfection of an appeal. In lieu of the usually expensive and time-consuming
The perfection of an appeal and the jurisdiction of a trial court over a motion for record on appeal, the entire original records are now transmitted to the appellate court.
execution pending appeal are the controverted issues in this petition to review the order
of the respondent court in Civil Case No. 82-7281, dated December 16, 1986, denying In implementation of this amendatory provision, Section 23 of the Interim Rules of Court
the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. provides:

The petition was filed on February 17, 1987. Private respondents Role, Inc. and Romeo 23. Perfection of appeal. — In cases where appeal is taken, the perfection of the
R. Echauz filed their Comments on March 24 and March 27, 1987 respectively. The appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party.
petitioner filed its Reply on June 16, 1987. We treat the Comments as the respondents'
Answers and decide the petition on its merits. xxx xxx xxx

This case has its origins in a complaint for the recovery of a sum of money filed by As long as any of the parties may still file his, her, or its appeal, the court does not lose
petitioner Associated Bank against respondent ROLE, Incorporated and Romeo R. jurisdiction over the case.
Echauz before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 37.
The plaintiff or plaintiffs may not deprive the defendants or co-plaintiffs and neither may
On November 3, 1986, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner. On the defendant or defendants deprive the plaintiff or co-defendants of the right to file a
November 6, 1986, respondent ROLE filed its notice of appeal. On November 24, 1986, motion for reconsideration or to move for a new trial or an execution pending appeal by
respondent Echauz followed suit. immediately filing a notice of appeal. The filing of an appeal by a losing party does not
automatically divest the party favored by a decision of the right to move for a more
Meanwhile, on November 19, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for execution pending favorable decision or to ask for execution pending appeal. It is only after all the parties'
appeal. respective periods to appeal have lapsed that the court loses its jurisdiction over the
case. As pointed out in Universal Far East Corporation v. Court of Appeals (131 SCRA
On December 16, 1986, the respondent court issued the questioned order denying the 642) the period when a court considers and acts upon a motion for execution may take
petitioner's motion for execution on the ground that the notices of appeal seasonably some time. As a matter of fact, the resolution of a motion may take place long after the
filed by private respondents had already been given due course when he issued his expiration of the reglementary fifteen-day period for appeal.
previous orders. According to the court, the filing of the respondents' notices of appeal
and its approval of those notices deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain the As early as 1934, this Court in People v. Ursua (60 Phil. 252) stressed this mode of
motion for execution pending appeal. determining when an appeal is perfected.

This petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus was filed to — (a) annul and set An appeal by the defendant in a criminal case does not result in the court's losing its
aside the order denying the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal; (b) enjoin jurisdiction to entertain a motion for reconsideration filed by the offended party, insofar as
and prohibit the respondents, specifically the respondent court from elevating the records civil liability is concerned, within the 15-day period. Thus we held in Ursua:
of the case to the Court of Appeals pending resolution of the instant petition; and (c)
command the respondent court to assume its jurisdiction and resolve the petitioner's xxx xxx xxx
motion for execution pending appeal.
... If the accused has the right within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of
The questioned order is based on the premise that upon the seasonable filing and conviction, the offended party should have the right within the same period to
approval of the respondents' notices of appeal, the trial court is automatically divested of appeal from so much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him, and his appeal
7
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
should not be made dependent on that of the accused. If upon appeal by the
accused the court altogether loses its jurisdiction over the cause, the offended
party would be deprived of his right to appeal, although fifteen days have not yet
elapsed from the date of the judgment, if the accused files his appeal before the
expiration of said period. Therefore, if the court, independently of the appeal of
the accused, has jurisdiction, within fifteen days from the date of the judgment, to
allow the appeal of the offended party, it also has jurisdiction to pass upon the
motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution in connection with the
civil liability of the accused. (at pp. 254-255).

The above ruling was reiterated in Simsim v. Belmonte (34 SCRA 536) where we stated:

Timoteo Simsim balked at the order to amend the record on appeal. contending
that it was beyond the power of the Court to issue once his appeal had been
perfected by the approval of the record. ...

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

... Furthermore, such a view would place it within the power of one of the parties,
by the simple expedient of immediately perfecting his appeal, to deprive the other
party of the right to ask for a reconsideration of the decision, let alone to have the
court approve his own appeal if such a motion is denied. These consequences
find no justification in the Rules. (at pp. 538 & 539).

As explained in the above case of Simsim, the Rules must be interpreted to avoid
impractical and absurd situations.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The order of the respondent court,
dated December 16, 1986 denying the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal
is SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ordered to retain the records of the case and to resolve
the petitioner's motion for execution.

SO ORDERED.

8
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. L-34589 June 29, 1988 In granting said motion for the exceptional writ over the strong opposition of the NPC, the
ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs.NATIONAL trial court adopted the grounds adduced by movant ECI.
POWER CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
1. x x x.
In these related petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Engineering
Construction, Inc. [ECI] and the Manila Electric Company [MERALCO] question the 2. That the substantial portion of the award of damages refers to the actual or
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 47528-R which set aside the orders of compensatory damages incurred by plaintiff, which are supported by voluminous
the trial court directing execution pending appeal of a judgment for P1,108,985.31 in documentary evidence, the genuineness and due execution of which were
damages in favor of ECI. Petitioners also question the resolution of said court holding admitted and further, no evidence whatever was presented to contest the same;
them liable for restitution of the garnished funds to the National Power Corporation
[NPC]. 3. That this case has been pending for years, as the plaintiff and the Honorable
Court were led to believe that the matter in dispute would be settled amicably;
On August 29, 1968, ECI filed a complaint for damages against the NPC in the then
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 15, alleging that it suffered damages to its 4. That an appeal by defendant would obviously be for purposes of delay;
facilities and equipment due to the inundation of its campsite in Ipo, Norzagaray,
Bulacan, as a direct result of the improper and careless opening by NPC of the spillway
5. That on appeal, the case would certainly drag on for many years, and in the
gates of Angat Dam at the height of typhoon "Welming" on November 4,1967. 1
meantime, the actual loss and damages sustained by plaintiff, who because of
such loss have become heavily obligated and financially distressed, would
On December 23, 1970, the trial court found NPC guilty of gross negligence and remain uncompensated and unsatisfied
rendered its judgment, thus:
6. That also, plaintiff is willing and able to file a bond to answer for any damage
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant which defendant may suffer as a result of an execution pending appeal. 4
as follows:
Subsequently, Deputy Sheriff Restituto R. Quemada who was assigned to enforce the
1. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff actual or compensatory damages in the writ of execution, garnished in favor of ECI all amounts due and payable to NPC which
amount of P675,785.31; were then in possession of MERALCO and sufficient to cover the judgment sum of
P1,108,985.31. 5
2. Ordering defendant to pay consequential damages in the amount of
P233,200.00; * Attempts to lift the order of execution having proved futile and the offer of a supersedeas
bond having been rejected by the lower court, NPC filed with the Appellate Court a
3. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P50,000 as and by way of petition for certiorari. 6
exemplary damages; and
In its challenged decision of October 20, 1971, the Court of Appeals granted NPCs
4. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P50,000 as and for attorney's petition and nullified the execution pending appeal of the judgment rendered by the trial
fees ... 2 court on December 28, 1970, as well as all issued writs and processes in connection with
the execution. One justice dissented. 7
NPC filed a notice of appeal from that decision but before it could perfect its
appeal, ECI moved for and was granted execution pending appeal upon posting a On November 11, 1971, MERALCO sought from the Appellate Court a clarification and
covering bond of P200,000 which it later increased to P1,109,000 to fully answer for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision on the ground, among others, that the decision
whatever damages NPC might incur by reason of the premature execution of the lower was being used by NPC to compel MERALCO to return the amount of P1,114,545.23
court's decision. 3 (inclusive of sheriff's fees) in two checks which it had already entrusted to the deputy
sheriff on February 23, 1971, who then indorsed and delivered the same to ECI.
9
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
Whereupon, in its resolution of January 7, 1972, the Appellate Court held altogether in the absence of proof that the losing party acted with malice, evident bad
thesheriff, MERALCO and ECI liable to restore to NPC the amount due faith or in an oppressive manner.
to NPC which MERALCO had earlier turned over to the sheriff for payment to ECI. 8
Inasmuch as the list submitted by ECI of the estimated losses and damages to its tunnel
Their two motions for reconsideration having been denied, ECI and MERALCO filed project caused by the instant flooding on November 4, 1967 was duly supported by
separate petitions for review before this Court: Nos. L-34589 and 34656, the very vouchers presented in evidence, and considering that NPC, for its part, failed to submit
petitions before us for adjudication. In this connection, it must be made clear that we are proofs to refute or contradict such documentary evidence, we are constrained to sustain
not concemed with the main appeal. For the present, we limit our discussion to the the order of execution pending appeal by the trial court but only as far as the award for
correctness of the extraordinary writ of execution pending appeal and the ordered actual or compensatory damages is concemed. We are not prepared to disagree with the
restitution of the garnished funds---two collateral matters which have greatly exacerbated lower court on this point since it was not sufficiently shown that it abused or exceeded its
the existing dispute between the parties. authority.

We shall deal first with the propriety of the execution pending appeal. With respect to the consequential and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees,
however, we concur with the Appellate Court in holding that the lower court had
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: exceeded the limits of its discretion. Execution should have been postponed until such
time as the merits of the case have been finally determined in the regular appeal.
Execution pending appeal. — On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party the court may, in its discretion, order execution to issue even In the fairly recent case of RCPI, et al vs. Lantin Nos. L-59311 and 59320, January 31,
before the expiration of the time to appeal, upon good reasons to be stated in a 1985 , 134 SCRA 395, 400-401, the Court said:
special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the motion and the special
order shall be included thereon. The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on
the outcome of the main case. Unlike actual damages for which the petitioners
While the rule gives the court the discretionary power to allow immediate execution, the may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of
following requisites must be satisfied for its valid exercise: which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary
damages as well as the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme
party; Court. The existence of the factual bases of these types of damages and their
casual relation to petitioners' act will have to be determined in the light of the
assignments or errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners, after all, while
(b) There must be a good reasons for issuing the execution; and
liable for actual damages may not be liable for moral and exemplary damages.
Or as in some cases elevated to the Supreme Court, the awards may be
(c) The good reasons must be stated in a special order. reduced.

In its assailed decision, the Appellate Court, through Justice Salvador V. Esguerra, Indeed, as later events would show, the Appellate Court was proven right when it
observe that NPC, as defendant in the civil case for damages, was being ordered to pay postulated that it is not beyond the realm of probability that NPCs appeal from
the amount of P 1,108,985.31 pending appeal when practically 40% thereof was made the lower court's judgment could result in the substantial reduction of the
up of awards of damages based on the court's sole and untrammeled discretion. Such consequential damages and attorney's fees and the deletion of exemplary
amount might greatly be reduced by the superior court, especially the items for damages.
consequential and exemplary damages and attorney's fees which by themselves would
amount to the "staggering" sum of P433,220.00
We take judicial notice of the fact that on August 24, 1987, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision on the main appeal. 9 It affirmed the trial court's conclusion
The Appellate Court noted the many instances when on review, the amounts for that NPC was guilty of negligence but differred in the award of damages. While it
attorney's fees and exemplary and moral damages were drastically cut or eliminated upheld the court a quo's award of P675,785.31 as actual damages, it reduced the
10
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
consequential damages from P333,200.00 to P19,200.00 and the attorney's fees Effect of attachment of debts and credits.-All persons having in their possession
from P50,000 to P30,000.00 The grant of P50,000 as exemplary damages was or under their control any credits or other similar personal property belonging to
eliminated. Altogether, the award of damages was modified from P1,108,985.31 to the party against whom attachment is issued, or owing any debts to the same, at
P724,985.31. From that decision, both the ECI and NPC filed their separate appeals the time of service upon them of a copy of the order of attachment and notice as
to this Court. 10 Finally, on May 16, 1988, the Court promulgated its judgment provided in the last preceding section, shall be liable to the applicant for the
affirming in all respects the Appellate Court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 49955-R, thus amount of such credits, debts or other property, until the attachment be
putting to rest the question of negligence and NPCs liability for damages. discharged, or any judgment recovered by him be satisfied, unless such property
be delivered or transferred, or such debts be paid, to the clerk, sheriff or other
The point that the Court wishes to emphasize is this: Courts look with disfavor upon any proper officer of the court issuing the attachment.
attempt to execute a judgment which has not acquired a final character. Section 2, Rule
39, authorizing the premature execution of judgments, being an exception to the general Garnishment is considered as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to
rule, must be restrictively construed. It would not be a sound rule to allow indiscriminately the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. Under the above-
the execution of a money judgment, even if there is a sufficient bond. "The reasons cited rule, the garnishee [the third person] is obliged to deliver the credits, etc. to the
allowing execution must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will proper officer issuing the writ and "the law exempts from liability the person having in his
outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a reversal of the possession or under his control any credits or other personal property be, longing to the
judgment."' 11 defendant, ..., if such property be delivered or transferred, ..., to the clerk, sheriff, or other
officer of the court in which the action is pending." 12
We come now to the second issue of whether petitioners, including the sheriff, are bound
to restore to NPC the judgment amount which has been delivered to ECI in compliance Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, MERALCO, as garnishee, after having been
with the writ of garnishment. judicially compelled to pay the amount of the judgment represented by funds in its
possession belonging to the judgment debtor or NPC, should be released from all
In line with our pronouncement that we are sanctioning in this particular instance the responsibilities over such amount after delivery thereof to the sheriff. The reason for the
execution pending appeal of actual but not consequential and exemplary damages and rule is self-evident. To expose garnishees to risks for obeying court orders and
attorney's fees which must necessarily depend on the final resolution of the main cases, processes would only undermine the administration of justice.
i.e., Nos. L-47379 and 47481, the direct consequence would be to authorize NPC to
proceed against the covering bond filed by ECI but only to the extent of the difference WHEREFORE, the Court in disposing of the two side issues of execution pending appeal
between the amount finally adjudicated by this Court in the main cases [P724,985.31] and petitioners' liability for restitution, hereby MODIFIES the Court of Appeals' decision
and the amount originally decreed by the trial court relating to the consequential and and resolution under review, and rules as follows:
exemplary damages and attorney's fees [P1,108.985.31]. In other words, ECIs bond is
held answerable to NPC for P384,000.
[a] NPC is authorized to proceed against the P1,109,000 bond filed by ECI to the extent
of P384,000 which corresponds to the difference between the awards for consequential
But while partial restitution is warranted in favor of NPC, we find that the Appellate Court and exemplary damages and attorney's fees upheld by the Court in the main cases (Nos.
erred in not absolving MERALCO, the garnishee, from its obligations to NPC with respect L-47379 and 47481) and those decreed for the same items by the trial court;
to the payment to ECI of P1,114,543.23, thus in effect subjecting MERALCO to double
liability. MERALCO should not have been faulted for its prompt obedience to a writ of
[b] MERALCO is declared absolved from any and all responsibilities in connection with
garnishment. Unless there are compelling reasons such as: a defect on the face of the
the amount of P1,114,545.23 representing the NPC garnished funds and therefore
writ or actual knowledge on the part of the garnishee of lack of entitlement on the part of
relieved from the burden of restoring the same to NPC.
the garnisher, it is not incumbent upon the garnishee to inquire or to judge for itself
whether or not the order for the advance execution of a judgment is valid.
SO ORDERED .
Section 8, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court provides,

11
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. 92241 October 17, 1991 On February 2, 1989, Ong filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction with
LILIA T. ONG, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGINIA the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed it on October 18, 1989.
SARMIENTO, respondents.
Hence this petition questioning the validity of the appellate court's ruling upholding the
This petition seeks to review on certiorari, the decision of the Court of Appeals, upholding writ of execution pending appeal.
the writ of execution pending appeal issued by the trial judge.
In upholding the writ of execution pending appeal, the appellate court observed that the
The facts of the case are stated in the Court of Appeals decision. trial judge had, prior to its issuance, duly noted the presence of the circumstances laid
down by Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, allowing execution as an
Private respondent Virginia Sarmiento (Sarmiento) sued Eligio Dee (Dee) for the exception, or pending appeal, even before final judgment; viz:
collection of the amount of P121,759.00, representing the value of construction materials
allegedly obtained by him, for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Dee had earlier xxx xxx xxx
issued checks in the total amount of P40,000.00, but these subsequently, bounced for
insufficiency of funds. Sarmiento also prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary a. . . . motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
attachment.
b. . . . good reasons for issuing execution; and
The complaint was subsequently amended to include petitioner Lilia Ong (Ong) as party-
defendant on the allegation that she and Eligio Dee had issued the checks and that the c. . . . the good reasons be stated in a Special Order (Lao v. Mencias, G.R. No.
construction materials were delivered to the piggery farm of Ong. L-23554, November 25, 1967; 21 SCRA 1021) (See p. 92, Rollo, CA decision).

A writ of attachment was issued by the trial judge and served upon Ong, resulting in the Likewise, it accepted as "good reasons" Sarmiento's statements in support of her
levy of certain hogs valued at P40,000.00. The court later issued a temporary restraining motion, that "the appeal of said defendants is clearly and obviously frivolous and
Order (TRO) against further enforcement of the writ, pending resolution of a motion to dilatory in nature, considering that they have not adduced substantial valid and
quash filed by Ong. meritorious defenses against the plaintiffs." (p. 92, Rollo, CA decision) The
appellate court also ruled that "the filing of the bond required by the court
On November 4, 1988, the trial judge rendered a decision, which was received by Ong constitutes special ground authorizing the court to issue writ of execution pending
on November 29, 1988 (p. 91, Rollo) finding Dee and Ong jointly and severally liable for appeal:
the sum of P121,759.00.
xxx xxx xxx
Dee and Ong filed a notice of appeal on December 2, 1988.
. . . the determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the special reasons
On December 12, 1988, Sarmiento filed a "Motion for Immediate Execution Pending rests upon the sound discretion of the court issuing the writ of execution pending
Appeal," dated December 9, 1988, alleging that the appeal is dilatory and frivolous. appeal. The appellate court cannot interfere with the exercise of this discretion
unless it appears that there had been a grave abuse or excess of authority in
Ong opposed the motion claiming that the trial court no longer had any jurisdiction to act doing so (Buenaventura v. Peña, 78 Phil. 795; Naredo v. Yatco, 80 Phil. 220) or
on said motion since the appeal had clearly been perfected, and besides, there was conditions have so far changed since the order was issued as to require the
already a writ of attachment to secure the court's judgment. intervention of the appella(te) court (Buenaventura v. Peña, supra). In the
present case, this Court finds no abuse of discretion nor a change of condition
On January 26, 1989, the trial judge issued an order granting Sarmiento's motion for since the order was issued as to require the intervention of this court (CA
execution pending appeal, conditioned upon a bond in the amount of P121,759.00. decision, pp. 87-94, Rollo, at p. 92)

12
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
The appellate court also disagreed with Ong's claim that upon filing of her notice On the other hand, We do not agree that the writ of execution pending appeal was
of appeal, the trial court had lost jurisdiction to act on Sarmiento's motion for premised on, or justified by good reasons, i.e. a) that the appeal was frivolous and
execution pending appeal, declaring that the mere filing of appellant's notice of dilatory, and b) sufficient bond required by the court had been posted.
appeal does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the case, since "an
appeal is not perfected on the date the notice of appeal was filed but on the In the case of Roxas v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-56960, January 28, 1988, 157
expiration of the last day to appeal," citing the cases of Montelibano v. Bacolod- SCRA 370), We stated:
Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. 69800, May 5, 1985, 136 SCRA 294 and Yabut
v. IAC, G.R. No. 69208, May 28, 1986, 142 SCRA 124. Execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39 is, of course,
the exception. Normally, execution of a judgment should not be had until and
Thus, the appellate court observed: unless it has become final and executory — i.e., the right of appeal has been
renounced or waived, the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having
. . . when petitioner received a copy of the decision on November 29, 1988, an been taken, or appeal having been taken, the appeal has been resolved and the
appeal thereof was deemed perfected on December 14, 1988, the expiration of records of the case have been returned to the court of origin — in which case,
the last day to appeal by any party. When the private respondent filed her motion execution "shall issue as a matter of right." (Sec. 1, Rule 39 in relation to Sec. 11,
for execution pending appeal on December 12, 1988, it is very clear that the Rule 51)
appeal was not yet perfected. Considering then that the motion was filed well
before the perfection of the petitioner's appeal, the respondent Court has On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not expired, execution of the
jurisdiction to act on the motion. (CA decision, p. 91, Rollo). judgment should not be allowed, save only if there be good reasons therefor, in
the court's discretion. "As provided in Section 2, Rule 39 of the . . . Rules . . ., the
We agree with the Court of Appeals. existence of good reasons is what confers discretionary power on a Court . . . to
issue a writ of execution pending appeal. The reasons allowing execution must
Section 23 of the Interim Rules (implementing the 1981 Judiciary Act, BP No. 129) constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the
promulgated on January 11, 1983, provides: injury or damages should be losing party secure a reversal of the judgment."
(Jaca v. Lumber Co., G.R. No. L-25771, March 29, 1982; 113 SCRA 107, 121)
23. Perfection of Appeal. — In cases where appeal is taken the perfection of the
appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party. It is not intended obviously that execution pending appeal shall issue as a matter
of course. "Good reasons, special, important, pressing reasons must exist to
The Interim Rules brought about a change in the procedure for appeal by dispensing with justify it; otherwise, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, it may well
the appeal bond, as well as the record on appeal (except in cases of multiple appeals). become a tool of oppression and inequity." (Emphasis supplied)
As a result, what determines perfection of the appeal is the expiration of
the reglementary period for appeal (Universal Far East Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Where the reason given is that an appeal is frivolous and dilatory, execution pending
No. 64931, August 31, 1984, 131 SCRA 642; Montelibano vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling appeal cannot be justified. It is not proper for the trial court to find that an appeal is
Co., Inc., supra; Yabut v. IAC, supra; Sonida Industries, Inc. v. Wasan, Sr., G.R. No. frivolous and consequently to disapprove it since the disallowance of an appeal by said
76342, December 4, 1989, 179 SCRA 763. court constitutes a deprivation of the right to appeal. The authority to disapprove an
appeal rightfully pertains to the appellate court (Heirs of Gavino Sabenal v. Hon.
The mere filing of appellant's notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its Benjamin Gorospe, G.R. No. 50168, September 30, 1988, 166 SCRA 145).
jurisdiction over the case. The court may still take cognizance of the other party's motion
for new trial under Rule 37, if he should opt to file one, or, as in the instant case, a Having declared that the trial judge may not rightfully determine that an appeal from its
motion for execution pending appeal, provided of course, such motions are filed within 15 own decision is frivolous or dilatory, it is clear that the writ of execution pending appeal
days from said party's notice of the decision. What is crucial to determine is the would be premised solely on the bond posted by Sarmiento. The next question to be
timeliness of the filing of the motion for execution pending appeal (Sonida Industries, Inc. resolved then is whether or not the filing of a bond, without anything more, can be
v. Wasan, Sr., supra). considered a good reason to justify immediate execution under Section 2 of Rule 39.

13
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
In the case of Roxas v. Court of Appeals, supra. We had occasion to address this issue The other issues raised by Ong on her alleged solidary liability are not proper for
directly. We clarified the doctrine as follows: discussion in this petition for certiorari, being errors of judgment by the trial court,
correctible by appeal and which has been already undertaken by Ong.
. . . to consider the mere posting of a bond a "good reason" would precisely make
immediate execution of a judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated January 26, 1989 granting
the exception. Judgments would be executed immediately, as a matter of course, the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal is hereby SET ASIDE and
once rendered, if all that the prevailing party needed to do was to post a bond to NULLIFIED, having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. Costs against private
answer for damages that might result therefrom. This is a situation, to repeat, respondent.SO ORDERED.
neither contemplated nor intended by law.

There are, to be sure, statements in some of this Court's decisions which do


generate the perception that 'the filing of the bond by the successful party is a
good reason for ordering execution. Petitioner Roxas herself cites City of Manila
v. C.A. to support her postulation of this effect. From that case — which adverts
to Hacienda Navarra, Inc. v. Labrador, et al. (65 Phil. 531) and People's Bank
and Trust Co. etc. v. San Jose, et al. (96 Phil. 895)—she quotes the following:

"From what has been said, it is thus clear that the Court of Appeals erred
in not considering the city's posting to a bond as [heirs of the estate of a
deceased person under administra] (sic) good and special reason to
justify execution pending appeal."

But sight should not be lost of the factual context in which the quoted statement
was made. In that case, the City of Manila had succeeded in obtaining judgment
for the recovery of a piece of land it had lent to the Metropolitan Theater, and
immediate execution became imperative because the theater was insolvent and
there was imminent danger of its creditor's foreclosing a mortgage on the
property. This combination of circumstances was the dominant consideration
which impelled the grant of immediate execution, the requirement of a bond
having been imposed merely as an additional factor, no doubt for the protection
of the defendant's creditor. In Hacienda Navarra, there was a special reason for
immediate execution, in addition to the posting of a bond. There, the Court said
that "Inasmuch as the purpose in depositing the money is to insure its receipts by
the party obtaining a favorable judgment in the above cited civil case, the filing of
a sufficient bond for the delivery of said proceeds secures said receipt." And in
People's Bank, the order involved in the case decreed payment of allowances for
the support of one of the heirs of the estate of a deceased person under
administration, and the urgent need of the party entitled thereto was the
paramount consideration for immediate execution, not the filing of a bond.
(emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing discussions, We have no alternative but to strike down the writ of
execution pending appeal for lack of "good reasons" to justify its issuance.
14
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. L-63188 June 13, 1990 of lis pendens on all transfer certificates of title covering the parcels of land mortgaged to
FERNANDO, PELAGIO, CARLOS, JULIA and JUANA, all surnamed Alfredo Cruz and Aurelio Oxiles.
ARANDA, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELO DE
LARA, MARIA DE LARA, and DOMINADOR, PEDRO, and LIBRADA, all surnamed On March 17, 1977, the Appellate Court, through Justice Guardson R.
RAMOS, respondents. Lood, reversed the decision of the Bulacan trial court and declared the De Laras et al. as
the owners of the disputed lots covered by sixteen transfer certificates of title. The
The instant petition has it roots in the decision rendered on November 29, 1967 by Judge dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
Emmanuel Muñoz of the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I (Malolos)
ordering herein private respondents as well as Tomasa de Lara, Felicisima Ramos and WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment appealed from is hereby
Hilario Ramos as defendants therein to reconvey to herein petitioners, as well as reversed; consequently, dismissing this case against the defendants-appellants
Asuncion Reyes Vda. de Aranda and Maria Aranda as therein plaintiffs several parcels of and declaring them owners of the properties in question with costs against the
land situated in Bigaa (now Pandi), Bulacan and covered by sixteen (16) transfer plaintiffs- appellees. The counterclaim is denied for insufficiency of evidence. 6
certificates of title. Defendants were further ordered to pay P10,00.00 as moral damages
plus P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. 1 This reversal was aimed by the Supreme Court in a minute resolution dated August 1,
1977. 7
Private respondents De Laras et al., appealed from that decision. 2 However, the Arandas,
as the prevailing parties, moved for an execution pending appeal which the trial court granted On February 6, 1978, the lower court, pursuant to the reversal by the Appellate Court in
on March 15, 1968 upon the filing by the Arandas of a bond worth P10,000. CA-G.R. No. 42228-R issued an order which required the Arandas (plaintiffs in
execution) to re convey to private respondents within five (5) days from notice the
As a consequence of the execution pending appeal, the various lots covered by Transfer properties transferred to them by virtue of the writ of execution pending appeal, with the
Certificates of Title Nos. 98049, 98051, 98063, 98064, 98055, 98056, 98057, 98058, exception of the property covered by TCT No. 98052, and authorized the clerk of court to
98060 and 98063 of the Bulacan Registry of Deeds were transferred to petitioners. In execute the proper documents of reconveyance should the Arandas fail to comply. The
addition, a jeepney belonging to private respondent Marcelo de Lara was sold at public order further required the petitioners to return to private respondent Marcelo de Lara the
auction and the amount of P42,159.00 due from Tecson Chemical Corporation to jeepney which was levied on execution or to turn over the proceeds of the sale thereof,
Marcelo de Lara was garnished and turned over to the Arandas. and to reimburse the latter in the sum of P 42,159.00 which had been garnished from
Tecson Chemical Corporation.
During the pendency of the appeal 3 on February 25, 1969, the Arandas mortgaged eight
(8) of the ten (10) reconveyed parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 98049, 98051, 98053, On June 26, 1978, the clerk of court executed the deed of reconveyance in favor of
98054, 98055, 98056, 98060 and 98063 to Alfredo Cruz to secure a loan of P80,000.00. private respondents (defendants) with respect to the lots covered by TCT Nos. 98049,
Similarly on April 17, 1969, the Arandas mortgaged two more lots, covered by TCT Nos. 98050, 98051, 98062, 38605, 98059, 98080, 98061, 98063, 98058, 42055, 98055,
98057 and 98058, to Aurelia Oxiles to secure another loan of P 40,000.00. Both loans were 98054, 98053, 98057 and 98056, all of the Bulacan Registry of Deeds.
payable within one (1) year from the date of the mortgages and said encumbrances were
registered on June 4, 1969. 4
Thereafter, on September 25, 1978, the De Laras et al. filed a motion to nullify the
aforesaid sixteen (16) titles to the disputed properties for failure and/or refusal of the
The loans matured during the pendency of the appeal and because of the failure of the
Arandas to surrender their owner's copy of the said titles to the Register of Deeds in
Arandas to redeem the same, the two mortgages were foreclosed and the encumbered
order that new ones could be issued in favor of private respondents.
properties were sold at public auction to mortgagees Cruz and Oxiles on February 23,
1978 and March 30, 1978 respectively. Eventually, the mortgagees consolidated their
ownership and new transfer certificates of title were issued in their names. After hearing the arguments of both parties in said motion to nullify the titles, the lower
court, on March 15, 1979, issued an order cancelling TCT Nos. 98050, 98062, 38605,
98059, 98061 and 42055 but denied the motion of private respondents to nullify TCT
Meanwhile, on June 11, 1970, while their appeal was still pending before the Appellate
Nos. 98049, 98051, 98053, 98054, 98055, 98056, 98060, 98063 and 98057 and 98058
Court 5 private respondents decided to register with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan notices

15
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
issued in favor of Alfredo Cruz and Aurelia Oxiles respectively, without prejudice to whatever he got by means of the judgment; but he cannot be treated as a wrongdoer
private respondents' filing a separate action for their invalidation. 8 for causing execution to issue, and the defendant's property to be levied on and sold.
It protects him while it remains in force. 14
Having failed in their attempt to nullify the titles now in the names of Cruz and Oxiles,
private respondents filed on January 14, 1980 an amended motion for restitution with The petition for the reconsideration or review of the order denying or dismissing
motion for contempt, which motions were rejected by the trial court in its order dated the motion to find the (Arandas) in contempt of court is not meritorous either. An
August 21, 1980. 9 The court opined that the consolidated ownership of said realty in the appeal cannot be availed of in contempt proceedings where the charge has been
names of mortgagees Cruz and Oxiles could no longer be disturbed in said proceedings. dismissed because contempt proceedings are criminal in nature. 15
However, this would not bar the De Laras, et al. from going after the Arandas in a separate
direct action to seek redress for the former's inability to recover the said properties now in the WHEREFORE, the order of August 21, 1980 is AFFIRMED with the modifications
names of Cruz and Oxiles. 10 above indicated, and the case remanded. for further proceedings until the proper
relief are carried out. 16
On August 9, 1982, private respondents (De Laras et al.) filed a special civil action
for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals to set aside the order of August Hence this recourse.
21, 1980. 11 On November 19, 1982, the Appellate Court, through Justice Jose C. Colayco,
modified the questioned order and ruled in this wise: The pivotal issues presented are:

1. The ... Asuncion Reyes Vda. de Aranda, and an the other(s) ... surnamed (1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the special
Aranda must pay to ... Marcelo de Lara the proceeds of the sale of the jeepney, civil action of certiorari in CA-G.R. No. 14821-SP despite the lapsed remedy of
as shown by the certificate of sale issued by the sheriff, and return to him the ordinary appeal;
amount of P 42,159.00;
(2) Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in granting reliefs to private
2. ... Pelagia Fernando, Maria, and Julia, all surnamed Aranda, must pay to all respondents which are not mentioned in the dispositive portion of the Court of
the (De Laras, et al.) the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgaged parcels Appeals'' derision in CA-G.R. No. 42228-R which reversed the Court of First
of land to Alfredo Cruz and Aurelia Oxiles, as shown by the certificates of sale Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 2366R.
issued by the sheriff.
Anent the first issue, the Appellate Court can legally entertain the special civil action of
The liability of the (Arandas) under these headings can be enforced by writ of certiorari in CA-G.R. No. 14821-SP considering the broader and primordial interests of
execution. justice which compel an occasional departure from the general rule that the extraordinary
writ of certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal, the order of March 15, 1979 having
The (De Laras, et al.) may of course enforce restitution against Alfredo Cruz and become final upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal. 17
Oxiles, instead of demanding their rights under Sec. 5, Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court; but this must be done in a separate civil action, where they can While the lower court correctly denied the motion to nullify the subject titles in the names
demand from the (De Laras, et al.) and Alfredo Cruz and Aurelia Oxiles their of Cruz and Oxiles, it failed to provide private respondents complete restitution as
share of the harvest from the time of the levy. This alternative right is recognized decreed in Section 5, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which states:
in the case of Hilario vs. Hicks (cf. pp. 586, et seq.). But they cannot demand the
amounts realized from the auction sale. 'The right to recover mesne profits is
evidently derived from the right to specific restitution. ... 12 Effect of reversal of executed judgment.-Where the judgment executed is
reversed totally or partially on appeal, the trial court, on motion, after the case is
remanded to it, may issue such orders of restitution as equity and justice may
It must be home in mind in this connection that the proceedings for the execution warrant tinder the circumstances.
of the decision pending appeal are lawful and that 'those who act under the
profess are protected by the law." 13This is the generally recognized rule. After a
reversal, the plaintiff is bound to make restitution-that is, to return to the defendant
16
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
When a judgment is executed pending appeal and subsequently overturned in the fair play.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 19, 1982
appellate court, the party who moved for immediate execution should, upon return of the is affirmed. SO ORDERED.
case to the lower court, be required to make specific restitution of such property of the
prevailing party as he or any person acting in his behalf may have acquired at the
execution sale. If specific restitution becomes impracticable, the losing party in the
execution becomes liable for the full value of the property at the time of its seizure, with
interest. 18

While the trial court may have acted judiciously under the premises, its action resulted in
grave injustice to the private respondents. It cannot be gainsaid that it is incumbent upon
the plaintiffs in execution (Arandas) to return whatever they got by means of the
judgment prior to its reversal. And if perchance some of the properties might have
passed on to innocent third parties as happened in the case at bar, the Arandas are
dutybound nonetheless to return the corresponding value of said properties as mandated
by the Rules.

On the second issue, petitioners argue that the proceeds of the jeepney as well as the
sum of P42,159.00 garnished from Tecson Chemical Corporation cannot be returned to
the De Laras, et al because such return is not expressly included in the dispositive part
of the Appellate Court's judgment in CA-G.R. No. 42228-R.

It will be recalled that the decision of the Bulacan trial court, 19 aside from awarding the
subject pieces of realty to the Arandas, also ordered the De Laras, et al to pay 10,000.00 as
moral damages and another P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. Consequently, to satisfy said
judgment pending appeal, the jeepney of Marcelo de Lara was sold in execution and the
amount of P42,159.00 due from the Tecson Chemical Corporation in favor of Marcelo was
garnished. The proceeds of the jeepney and the garnished amount were later withdrawn by
the Arandas. To deny restitution of these items would be to close our eyes to the unalterable
fact that such items as acknowledged by both parties were used specifically to complete and
satisfy the judgment of the lower court in favor of the Arandas, the plaintiffs in execution, and
from which they have derived benefits since 1968. 20

Indeed, the Court of appeals need not specify in the judgment of reversal that there
should be restitution of the properties, etc. Such restoration is expressly provided for in
Section 5, Rule 39 of the Rules and should apply in the absence of any contrary
disposition in the final judgment of the appellate court.

In sum, what the trial court failed to effect, the Court of Appeals sought to rectify in the
decision under review. h laid down in detail what the trial court should accomplish if only
to give full meaning to the earlier reversal by the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 42228-R
and our affirmance thereof in G.R. No. L-46086 and more importantly, to Section 5, Rule
39. For without that assailed judgment, an intolerably incomplete and inequitous situation
would have remained uncorrected in direct violation of the rules and the basic tenets of
17
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. 135128 August 26, 1999 Promissory Note in the amount of Seven Million Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA. JR. and TERESITA MACEDA- (P7,300,000.00); that the contract for the new Gran Hotel was awarded to Moreman
DOCENA, petitioners, vs.DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and the Builders Co., which demolished the old Gran Hotel and proceeded to build the new Gran
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Hotel; that payment to said contractor was to be taken from the approved Seven Million
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P7,300,000.00) loan, on a progressive manner, based
Movants have the burden of showing why the trial court decision should be executed on actual construction or work accomplishment; that they were required to advance, as
without awaiting the result of the appeal. Absent such justification, its execution pending they did advance, to the contractor their required equity; that as of June 24, 1977, they
appeal cannot be granted. have advanced to the contractor the sum of One Million Two Hundred Sixty Two
Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety Eight Pesos and Thirty Eight Centavos (P1,262,988.38);
The Case that [private respondent] had also released a total of One Million Nine Hundred Eleven
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Pesos (P1,911,360.00), out of their loan, to the
contractor; that [private respondent], through its officer in charge of the project,
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
defendant Oscar De Vera, conspired with the contractor to enable the latter to secure
Court seeking the reversal of the August 14, 1998 Decision2 of the Court of
undue fund releases from their loan; that this was done by the bloating of the value and
Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 47405, the dispositive portion of which reads:
percentage of construction work; that the contractor was able to acquire sixty percent
(60%) of the cost of the projected hotel even as its actual accomplishment was only
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. fifteen percent (15%); that [petitioners] were compelled to file a Complaint for Rescission
The challenged ORDER of respondent Court, dated October 2, 1997, is hereby of Contract and Damages against the contractor; that they also filed a complaint for
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar as it orders partial execution pending Estafa against the contractor and defendant Oscar De Vera; that [private respondent]
appeal. No pronouncement as to costs. and Oscar De Vera spread negative information about them, thus influencing their
suppliers to sue and repossess the items they had supplied; that [private respondent]
The Order4 annulled by the CA was a modification by the trial court5 of the latter's engaged in a series of dilatory effects in the release of their loan funds until the period of
Decision6 dated February 25, 1997 in Civil Case No. 8737, Bonifacio Sanz Maceda their loan availment lapsed; that [private respondent] has threatened to foreclose on the
Jr. and Teresita Maceda-Docena v. Development Bank of the Philippines and Oscar de mortgages they had executed for their loan; and that [private respondent's] acts
Vera. prevented them from completing the new Gran Hotel and from realizing profits therefrom.
[Petitioners] thus prayed (1) that [private respondent] be ordered to release the balance
The Facts of their approved loan, (2) that the interests and other charges imposed on the loan be
nullified, (3) that [private respondent] be made to pay them (a) unrealized earnings
The facts of the case as summarized by the Court of Appeals are as follows: and/or loss of income, (b) actual damages representing additional costs or price increase
in construction labor and materials, (c) moral damages, (d) exemplary damages, (e)
The case commenced on October 15, 1984, with the filing by [petitioners]7 of a Complaint attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit. 1âw phi 1.nêt

for Specific Performance with Damages against [private respondent]8 and one of its
managers, Oscar De Vera. In their Complaint, [petitioners] alleged that they were the In their Answer to the Complaint, [private respondent] and Oscar De Vera averred that
owners of the old Gran Hotel in Tacloban City; that pursuant to their plan to build a new releases on the loan of [petitioners] to the contractor were made through [Petitioner]
Gran Hotel, they applied for an Eleven Million Pesos (P11,000,000.00) loan with [private Bonifacio Maceda, Jr., that on account of the civil case filed by [petitioners] against the
respondent], submitting to the latter a project study of the new hotel, the Philippine contractor, [private respondent] was enjoined from making any further releases on
Tourism Authority's approval of the project, as well as the plans and specifications of the [petitioners'] loan; that while the trial court decided in favor of [petitioners], still [private
new Gran Hotel; that on July 28, 1976, petitioner approved a loan of Seven Million Three respondent] could not make any releases on their loan considering the appeal filed by
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P7,300,000.00) after setting the cost of the project at Ten the contractor; that while said case was pending, at least two suppliers filed cases
Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P10,500,000.00); that [private respondent] against [petitioners] for non-payment of salaries/wages and costs of suppliers; that said
required them to produce Two Million Nine Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos pending case also caused the construction of the hotel project to stop and the period of
(P2,930,000.00) by way of equity, to constitute a first mortgage on several parcels of the loan availment to lapse; that during the negotiation for revival of the loan, [private
land as well as on assets they would acquire out of the proceeds of said loan, to sign a respondent] requested [petitioners] to submit new cost estimates and quotations

18
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
inasmuch as the original cost estimates prepared in 1976 were no longer sufficient to c) To pay plaintiff Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. the sum of Five Hundred
complete the project because of the intervening price increases in labor and materials; Thousand Pesos as moral damages;
that [petitioners] insisted that the project be completed on the original cost estimates,
with the project reduced to fifty (50) instead of the original planned seventy five (75) d) To pay plaintiff Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. the sum of One Hundred
rooms; that during several conferences held between them, [private respondent] Thousand Pesos as exemplary damages;
informed [petitioners] of the terms and conditions for the resumption of their loan; that on
July 18, 1979, it authorized further releases on [petitioners'] loan; that said releases e) To pay plaintiff Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. the sum of P17,547,510.90
amounted to a total of Five Million Three Hundred Forty Seven Thousand Five Hundred representing the additional cost to complete and finish the New Gran
Ten Pesos and Ninety Centavos (P5,347,510.90); that no further releases were Hotel;
thereafter made in view of [petitioners'] failure to comply with the equity build up
requirement; that [petitioners] applied for an additional loan of Three Million Four
f) To pay plaintiff Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. the sum of P100,000.00 as
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,400,000.00); that on July 29, 1982, [private respondent]
attorney's fees and litigation expense.
informed [petitioners] that it had decided to reduce the approved loan amount to Five
Million Three Hundred Forty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Ten Pesos and Ninety
Centavos (P5,347,510.90), which was the amount of the total releases made on their The counterclaims of defendants are hereby ordered dismissed.
original loan amount; that notwithstanding said reduction of amount of the loan,
[petitioners] failed to make payments according to schedule; and that having agreed to SO ORDERED.
all the terms of their transactions, [petitioners] are estopped from questioning the
conditions of the loan as well as the releases thereof. After praying for dismissal of the [Private Respondent] filed a Notice of Appeal, while [petitioners] filed a Motion for
Complaint, [private respondent] and defendant Oscar De Vera counterclaimed for Reconsideration, seeking to increase the amount awarded to them by [the trial] [c]ourt.
P200,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and litigation expenses, P500,000.00 in moral They also filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. [Private respondent] filed its
damages and costs of suit. corresponding Opposition to the two Motions.

On February 25, 1997, [the trial] [c]ourt rendered a Decision in favor of [petitioners], On October 2, 1997, [the trial] court issued its first questioned Order, (1) modifying its
disposing of the case as follows — Decision by increasing the amounts awarded to [Petitioner] Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. and (2)
granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of two awards in its Decision; namely,
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, the Court renders judgment, to wit: (a) the release of the loan balance of P1,952.489.10 as well as payment of 12% interest
p.a. on the amount of P1.003M, from January, 1978; and (b) the payment of
1. The preliminary injunction issued on December 12, 1984 is hereby made P17,547,510.90 representing the additional cost to finish the hotel together with 6%
permanent; interest thereon p.a. from 1987.

2. Defendant Development Bank of the Philippines is ordered, to wit: On November 5, 1997, [private respondent] filed its Notice of Appeal from the February
25, 1997 Decision, as amended by the October 2, 1997 Order of [the trial] [c]ourt. On the
same date, it also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the October 2, 1997 Order insofar
a) To immediately release in favor of plaintiff Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. the
as it grants execution pending appeal. Thereafter, or on March 26, 1998, it filed a
unreleased loan balance of P1,952,489.10. In addition, as to the portion
Supplemental Motion for the approval of a supersedeas as bond in the amount of P35M
thereof amounting to P1.003M, DBP is further directed to pay interest
and to stay the execution pending appeal in the event that its Motion for Reconsideration
thereon at the rate of 12% per annum beginning and counted from
be denied.
January 1978;
On April 3, 1998, [the trial] [c]ourt denied its Motion for Reconsideration and
b) To immediately return to plaintiff Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. the sum of
Supplemental Motion.
P797,988.95 representing the interest/other charges for the period
October 31, 1979 to April 1, 1980;

19
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
The Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) appealed the trial court Decision to the Issue
CA. Thereafter, it also filed with the appellate court a Petition for Certiorari challenging
the lower court's October 2, 1997 Order granting execution of the said Decision pending The solitary issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it
appeal. reversed the October 2, 1997 Order of the trial court granting execution of the latter's
Decision pending appeal. More simply stated, are there good reasons to justify execution
Ruling of the Court of Appeals of the trial court judgment pending appeal?

Ruling in favor of respondent bank, the CA concluded that there existed no sufficient This Court's Ruling
ground or compelling reason to allow the execution of the judgment pending appeal. It
held: The Petition is not meritorious.

There is nothing in the circumstances surrounding the case at bench which is of Sole Issue:
an urgent nature. As may be gleaned from the records and as admitted by
private respondents, themselves, the project has reached 85% completion. With Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal
private respondents' undenied "seven-figure assets and capability to put in the
required equity participation", We see no urgent financial need on the part of
The execution of a judgment during the pendency of an appeal is governed by
private respondent. Then, too, with the financial standing of private respondents
Section 2, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Court,11 which reads:
and their assets, including the hotel itself which they claim to have an appraised
value of P16,632,129.40, private respondents can very well obtain loans for the
project from other financial entities. On the other hand, considering that the Sec. 2. Discretionary execution. —
amounts subject of the execution pending appeal form only a small percentage of
the amount it would take to complete the project, We see no compelling reason (a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal — On motion of
to prematurely order its release since it would have no substantial effect anyway the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court
on the project. Moreover, measured against the injury or damage which such while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the
execution would pose on petitioner should it secure a reversal of the judgment, original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of
the reasons relied upon by respondent Court markedly pales in comparison. After the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution
all where execution made pending appeal is overturned, complete restitution is of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to
required. appeal.

xxx xxx xxx After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending
appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
All things considered, respondent Court should have approved the Thirty Five
Million (P35,000,000.00) supersedeas bond posted by petitioner. Said amount Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated
can adequately assure performance of whatever judgment may be awarded in in a special order after due hearing.
favor of private respondents. Neither is there any danger that the awards in favor
of private respondents will not be answered or that justice will be frustrated as xxx xxx xxx
petitioner is a government owned and controlled financial institution with an
authorized capital stock of Five Billion Pesos (P5,000,000,000.00). With the This rule is strictly construed against the movant, for "courts look with disfavor
stable and sound condition of petitioner, immediate execution is not justified as upon any attempt to execute a judgment which has not acquired a final
there is no danger of the judgment becoming illusory.9 character."12 In the same vein, the Court has held that such execution "is usually
not favored because it affects the rights of the parties which are yet to be
Hence, this Petition.10 ascertained on appeal."13

20
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
There are three requisites for the grant of an execution of a judgment pending Good Reasons not Established
appeal: "a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party; b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and To repeat, an execution pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy, being more
c) the good reason must be stated in a special order."14 Underscoring the of the exception rather than the rule. It is allowed only upon showing of "good
importance of the requisite "good reasons," the Court ruled in Ong v. Court of reasons" by the movant. In the present case, we find no justification for the
Appeals:15 execution, pending appeal, of the awards of P1,952,489.10 under disposition (a)
and more than P17 million under disposition (e).
It is not intended obviously that execution pending appeal shall issue as a
matter of course. "Good reasons, special, important, pressing reasons There is no guarantee that petitioner can indeed complete the project, even if the
must exist to justify it; otherwise, instead of an instrument of solicitude sum referred to in disposition (e) is immediately released. It must be underscored
and justice, it may well become a tool of oppression and inequity."16 that this was the amount needed to finish the project way back in 1987 and was
based on 1987 prices.
Moreover, "the reasons allowing execution must constitute superior
circumstances demanding urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages Equally unjustified is the release, pending appeal, of the remaining portion of the
should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment."17 loan in the amount of P1,952,489.10. As the trial court itself has held in 1987, the
award of more than P17 million under disposition (e) was the amount needed to
In its Order dated October 2, 1997, the trial court ordered execution pending finish the project. Consequently, there was no urgent need for the unreleased
appeal of the following awards: portion of the loan. The said amount was relatively minuscule compared with that
needed for the remainder of the hotel project and would have little effect on its
(a) To immediately release in favor of the plaintiff Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. completion.
the unreleased loan balance of P1,952,489.10. In addition, as to the
portion thereof amounting to P1.03M, DBP is further directed to pay More important, the "compelling reason" given by the trial court for allowing
interest thereof at the rate of 12% per annum beginning and counted execution pending appeal is far outweighed by the injury or damage that private
from January 1978; respondent would suffer if it secures a reversal of the trial court's judgment. If the
trial court is reversed on appeal, petitioners would be hard-pressed to make a
xxx xxx xxx complete restitution to private respondent, to which they already owe more than
P5 million — the amount of their original loan plus accrued interests. In any
(e) To pay plaintiff Bonifacio Maceda Jr. the sum of P17,547,510.90 event, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there is no likelihood that DBP, a
representing the additional cost to complete and finish the New Gran government-owned and -controlled corporation, would fail to answer its obligation
Hotel, plus six percent interest (6%) thereon effective as of the year 1987 if the trial court Decision is affirmed. As held in Valencia v. Court of Appeals:19
until finality. 18
If the judgment is executed and, on appeal, the same is reversed,
In other words, the trial court, pending the appeal, ordered the immediate release although there are provisions for restitution, oftentimes damages may
by the bank of (1) the unreleased amount of the loan agreement and (2) the sum arise which cannot be fully compensated. Accordingly, execution should
needed to complete the construction of the hotel, subject to the filing of a bond of be granted only when these considerations are clearly outweighed by
equivalent amount. superior circumstances demanding urgency and the provision contained
in Rule 39, Section 2, requires a statement of these circumstances as a
security for their existence.
The "good reason" invoked by the trial court was the urgency resulting from
almost twenty years of delay and the yearly increase in costs that made the
completion of the hotel construction more difficult. Reasons Cited by Petitioners

We are not convinced.


21
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
In their Memorandum, petitioners passionately argue that DBP, as the lending bank, has
the obligation to deliver the full amount of the loan. They allege that the bank "unilaterally
reduced the amount of the approved loan and unilaterally terminated the
transaction."20 They also point out that the project has been delayed for 22 years, and
that the award of more than P17 million, with interest, for the completion of the hotel "is
less in value and purchasing power than the original estimate of P10.5 M had the hotel
been finished on its deadline in 1972."

These, however, involve issues that should be resolved in the appeal, not in these
proceedings. The respondent bank itself contends that it could not release the remaining
amount of the loan, because of the stipulation in the loan agreement that such release is
contingent on the amount of work accomplished. Thus, an order of this Court releasing
the balance of the loan, notwithstanding the bank's argument to the contrary, would
certainly be construed as a definitive judgment on the present issue.

Petitioners' argument that the project has been delayed for twenty-two years is not
persuasive either. The release of the amount at this time is tantamount to a
pronouncement that respondent bank was responsible for the delay. Moreover,
petitioners are in effect taking the position that the undertaking of the bank was meant to
finance the complete construction of the hotel. The Court cannot at this time declare that
the bank was the cause of the delay, or that it was obliged to finance the construction to
its completion. To repeat, these questions pertain to the merits of the case, which is on
appeal. It must be stressed that the only issue in these proceedings is whether there are
"good reasons" to justify the execution of the judgment pending appeal.

In sum, petitioners have failed to present adequate reasons to show that the Court of
Appeals committed reversible errors in overturning the trial court's Order. As movants,
they have the burden of showing why the lower court's Decision should be executed
without awaiting the result of the appeal. Absent such justification, execution pending
appeal cannot be granted. 1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

22
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. 88114 December 20, 1990. The Solicitor General's as well as private respondent's comments submit that firearms of
PENTAGON SECURITY and INVESTIGATION AGENCY, Petitioner, vs. VICENTE T. a security agency are not exempt from execution under Rule 39, Sec. 12, par. (b) of the
JIMENEZ, ET AL., and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND Rules of Court which provides:
DIVISION, Respondents.
"Sec. 12. Property exempt from execution. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
The issue raised by petitioner is whether there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the NLRC in upholding the sheriff's issuance of Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution '(b) Tools and implements necessarily used by him in his trade or employment;'"
against licensed firearms owned and used by the petitioner, a security agency, in its Respondents contend that from the above provision, three (3) things can be deduced,
operations. viz:
Petitioner, a single proprietorship engaged in security services, was ordered to pay the (a) Except in paragraphs (j) and (m), Sec. 12, Rule 39, Rules of Court, the
amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETEEN exemptions are accorded to individual debtors.
PESOS AND FOUR CENTAVOS (P157,119.04) representing wages and COLA
differentials due its employees, as computed in a Decision of the NLRC dated 21 (b) The exempt properties are used personally by the debtor or his family, or as
February 1986. On 22 June 1988, a notice of garnishment was issued against petitioner, tools or implements of the debtor in his trade or employment.
addressed to the PC-SUSIA c/o Col. Norberto M. Lina, Camp Crame, EDSA, Q.C. On 5 (c) The properties are necessary for the livelihood of the debtor and his family."
June 1988, Deputy Sheriff Silvino B. Santos issued a Notice of Levy and Sale on (Rollo, p. 58)
Execution of Personal Properties against herein petitioner, which personal properties are
the licensed firearms in question.
Petitioner filed an urgent petition to quash Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution, The term "tools and implements" refers to instruments of husbandry or manual labor
claiming exemption from execution under Sec. 12, par. (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. needed by an artisan craftsman or laborer to obtain his living. Here petitioner is a
business enterprise. It does not use the firearms personally, but they are used by its
Labor Arbiter Eduardo Magno denied the petition. The Motion for Reconsideration was employees. Not being a natural person, petitioner cannot claim that the firearms are
likewise denied. On 21 March 1989, the NLRC issued its resolution which is the subject necessary for its livelihood. Private respondent invites the Court to take judicial notice of
of this petition. the fact that there are security guards rendering service without firearms.
The NLRC held: Petitioner without filing any reply moves for the resolution of the petition.
"Respondent is a security agency. It is admitted that the licensed firearm is an There is no question, in our mind, that a security agency without firearms to equip its
important implement used in the business but this licensed firearm is not the guards is useless.
tools and implements exempted from execution. The question, therefore is
whether a person can run his trade or employment without such licensed firearm. However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by the provision involved is
The answer is in the affirmative since the person can still run the business or personal, available only to a natural person, such as a dentist's dental chair and electric
engage in his trade even without such firearm because there are other fan (Belen v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-16412, 30 Nov. 1962). As pointed out by the Solicitor
alternatives open to him. General, if properties used in business are exempt from execution, there can hardly be
an instance when a judgment claim can be enforced against the business entity.
"Besides, there is no showing that the levied firearms are the only firearms that
the respondent-appellant has in its possession. We affirmatively believe therefore ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. However, for security reasons, and to
that there are firearms still hidden in its armory sufficient enough to answer the prevent the possibility that the firearms to be sold at the execution sale may fall into the
call of its security trade or business. In the remote assumption that no firearms hands of lawless and subversive elements, the sale at public auction should be with the
remains in respondent's custody, as practically flowing from the view of Labor prior clearance and under supervision of the PC-INP authorities.
Arbiter Magno, respondent can lease or buy from legitimate sources. There (sic) SO ORDERED.
are some of the alternatives which even common layman can expediently
comprehend."

23
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. 139284 June 4, 2004 Asuncion and Teopista Macias, acquired the property through a deed of extrajudicial
ASUNCION MACIAS, SANTIAGO CORSAME, SEVERINA PIS-AN VDA. DE MACIAS, settlement executed by the owner of the property which was duly registered in the
RUFINA MACIAS, MARIONITO MACIAS, CERTERIA AMIL, GIL-MO MACIAS, NIDA Register of Deeds. OCT No. 23 was cancelled by TCT No. 2714 which, in turn, was
CORDURA, PASCUAL MACIAS, LIZEL CATUBAY, SANTIAGO MACIAS, cancelled by TCT No. 2833 under the names of the buyers as owners of the property.
MAGDALENA MACIAS SANNY DATO-ON, JAIME MACIAS, VICTORIO MACIAS,
TEODORA MACIAS, PRIMITIVO MACIAS, MA. LOURDES P. MACIAS, ZOSIMA On August 21, 1968, Catalina Macias, for herself and acting for and in behalf of
MACIAS, BENJAMIN UNTO, DAVID UNTO, MILA VAILOCES, ROBERTO UNTO Guillermo, Nicasio, Gualberto, Leonora, Asuncion and Teopista, all surnamed Macias,
DAVID, ROSALINDA UNTO, EUSEBIO UNTO, AVELINA UNTO, RAFAELA UNTO, executed a real estate mortgage over the property with the Central Savings & Loan
CARLOS BUENAVISTA, ALEXANDER UNTO, & CONIE Association (CSLA), as security for a loan of P3,800.00. The instrument was annotated
UNTO, petitioners. vs.MARIANO LIM, and his wife, LEONORA MACIAS, THE BANK at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 2833 as Entry No. 8049.3
OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, THE CENTRAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION, respondents. On August 27, 1968, Julian Mendez, through his attorney-in-fact, mortgaged his
undivided share of the above property also with the CSLA, as security for a loan
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in of P1,000.00. The real estate mortgage was annotated as Entry No. 8074 at the dorsal
CA-G.R. SP No. 48188 which affirmed the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of portion of the said title.4
Dumaguete City, Branch 31, denying the petitioners’ Urgent Omnibus Petition, for the
enforcement of the Intermediate Appellate Court’s decision in AC-G.R. CV No. 58863-R On September 18, 1968, Joaquin Unto and Victoriana Unto Vda. de Macias (plaintiffs, for
and the resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration of the brevity) filed a complaint for reconveyance and cancellation of TCT No. 2833 covering
petitioners. Lot No. 1496 against Catalina Macias, Guillermo Macias, Nicasio Macias, Gualberto
Macias, Leonora Macias, Teopista Macias and the CSLA with the then Court of First
The Antecedents Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch 1.5 The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, in their
complaint that they were the owners of 5/8 portion of Lot No. 1496 of the Dumaguete
Potenciana Unto was the owner, in fee simple, of a parcel of land located in Dumaguete, Cadastre with an area of 13,282 square meters covered by OCT No. 23, and were in
identified as Lot No. 1496 of the Dumaguete Cadastre. Upon her death, the property was actual possession thereof. They also alleged that the real estate mortgages executed by
inherited by her daughter, Josefa Unto-Mendez, which in turn was later inherited by the the private individuals in favor of the CSLA were fraudulent; hence, void. The plaintiffs
latter’s children, Ignacia, Fructuoso, Pio, Alfonso, all surnamed Mendez and one prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
acknowledged natural child, Matias Unto. Ignacia Mendez died and was survived by her
children, Domingo Lumakad and Eugenia Lumakad, who inherited her share of the WHEREFORE, for the foregoing consideration, the Honorable Court is
property. Upon the death of Pio Mendez, his share was inherited by his children, respectfully prayed to render judgment for plaintiffs and against the
Edmundo, Apolinario, Justiniano, Francisco, Conceda, Saturnino and Pilagia, all defendants, viz:
surnamed Mendez.
(1) Declaring the series of fraudulent transfer made by Catalina Macias
The property was titled in the names of Josefa Mendez and Matias Unto’s children and for portions of Lot No. 1496 previously sold to plaintiff as null and void;
grandchildren, under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 23. Domingo Lumakad sold
his share to Eugenia Mendez, the mother of Joaquin Unto, while Julian Mendez sold his (2) Ordering defendant Catalina Macias to reconvey to plaintiffs the five-
share to Joaquin Unto and Victoriana Unto. Marciano Lumakad, another son of Domingo eighths (5/8) shares of Lot No. 1496 owned by them which were sold to
Lumakad, sold his share to Victoriana Unto and Melanio Unto. Francisco Mendez and them by the original owners;
Eugenia Lumakad, through her son, Leonardo Limpalu, sold their share to Matias Unto.
The deeds of sale covering the transactions were not registered in the Office of the
(3) Ordering the cancellation of the mortgage by defendant to the Central
Register of Deeds, nor annotated at the back of OCT No. 23.
Loans and Savings Association;
Sometime in 1968, Catalina Macias, the daughter of Alfonso Mendez, and her siblings
Julian Mendez, Guillermo Macias, Nicasio Macias, Gualberto Macias, Leonora Macias,
24
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
(4) Ordering defendant Catalina Macias to pay to plaintiffs the sum of (b) – ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) as attorney’s fees;
P10,000.00 for moral damages and such exemplary damages as the and
Honorable Court may award;
(c) – the costs of suit.
(5) Ordering defendant Catalina Macias to pay to plaintiffs the sum of
P1,000.00 for attorney’s fees and the costs of suit; SO ORDERED.10

(6) Granting unto plaintiffs such other relief as the Honorable Court may The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC).11 The
deem proper and just under the premises.6 appeal was docketed as AC-G.R. CV No. 58863-R.

The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4823. Meanwhile, the entire property, Lot No. 1496, was subdivided. One of the lots was Lot
1496-B with an area of 2,114 square meters. On October 5, 1976, TCT No. 2833
On November 13, 1968, the plaintiffs caused the annotation of a Notice of Lis covering an area of 13,282 square meters12 was cancelled by TCT No. 9383 covering
Pendens relating to Civil Case No. 4823, Entry No. 8465, at the dorsal portion of TCT Lot 1496-B, which was issued in the name of Catalina Macias.13 Entry No. 8465 was
No. 2833.7 carried over in the said title. On November 10, 1975, Catalina Macias filed an Urgent
Supplemental Motion in Cad. Case No. 5 (LRC Cad. Rec. No. 144) with the then Court of
In the meantime, Catalina Macias, et al., paid their loan to the CSLA. As a result, Entry First Instance (CFI), Branch III,14 for the cancellation of Entry No. 8465 relating to the
No. 8049 on TCT No. 2833 was cancelled on August 14, 1969. However, Julian Mendez notice of lis pendens annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9383, in Civil Case No.
failed to pay his loan. Thus, the mortgagee caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the 4823. The court granted her motion15 on October 11, 1976, although the defendants
real estate mortgage over his undivided share of the property. A sheriff’s certificate of therein had appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court. Thereafter, the
sale was executed by the sheriff in favor of CSLA. The deed was annotated on May 20, Register of Deeds cancelled Entry No. 8465, in compliance with the order of the CFI.16
1971 at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 2833, as Entry No. 12801.8
Catalina Macias executed a real estate mortgage over the property covered by TCT No.
On November 10, 1975, the court rendered its Decision9 in Civil Case No. 4823 9383 in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) as security for a loan on
dismissing the complaint, the decretal portion of which reads as follows: December 15, 1976.17 Upon failure to pay her loan, the bank foreclosed the mortgage
and caused the sale of the property at public auction. The BPI was the highest bidder
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered for P90,250.74. A sheriff’s certificate of sale was executed on June 18, 1982, in favor of
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs: the BPI. The certificate of sale was annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9383.18 As
Catalina Macias failed to redeem the property within the redemption period, the bank
consolidated its title over the property. Thus, on December 29, 1983, TCT No. 9383 was
1) Dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint;
cancelled by TCT No. 14229 in the name of the Bank.19
2) Declaring defendants, surnamed Macias, the true and lawful owners of
On June 29, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) rendered its Decision in AC-
three-fourths (3/4) undivided shares of Lot No. 1496 of the Cadastral
G.R. CV No. 58863-R, reversing the lower court’s decision and entering another one in
Survey of Dumaguete City, as registered in their respective names in
favor of the plaintiffs-appellants therein, declaring them and the defendant-appellee
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2833; and ordering the plaintiffs to deliver
Catalina Macias as co-owners of the property. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
the possession thereof to said defendants, and to vacate the premises;
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is
3) Condemning the plaintiffs, severally and solidarily, to pay to the
hereby REVERSED and another one entered.
defendants the sums of:

(a) – FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as actual damages;

25
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
1) Declaring plaintiff-appellant Joaquin Unto as the absolute owner of 1/2 a) Non-surrender of the owner’s duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title
of the 1/4 share pertaining to Eugenia Lumacad and Domingo Lumacad No. 2833,
of Lot No. 1496;
b) The Court Decision promulgated on June 29, 1984 does not order the
2) Declaring Victoriana Unto as the absolute owner of the other 1/8 share Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City to cancel the mortgage under Entry
of the Lumacad heirs of the same parcel of land; No. 8074 executed in favor of the Central Savings and Loan Association
and the corresponding Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale under Entry No.
3) Declaring plaintiffs-appellants Joaquin Unto and Victoriana Unto as the 12801, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14229 registered in the name
absolute owners pro indiviso of the 1/4 share pertaining to Julian of the Bank of the Philippine Islands covering Lot No. 1496-B under
Mendez; subdivision plan No. Psd-248462. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14229
is a transfer from TCT No. 9383 issued in favor of Catalina Macias with
4) Declaring plaintiff-appellant Victoriana Unto as the absolute owner of an area of about 7,114 square meters.22
the 1/4 share of the late Alfonsa Mendez of the lot in question;
The matter was elevated by the Register of Deeds to the Land Registration Authority
5) Declaring defendant-appellee Catalia (sic) Macias as the absolute (LRA) through a consulta. On September 22, 1992, the LRA, through Consulta No. 1974,
owner of the 1/4 share of the Heirs of Pio Mendez of Lot No. 1496; and directed the Register of Deeds-Dumaguete City to refer the matter to the Court of
Appeals for its resolution. The Register of Deeds complied by means of a "Manifestation"
in the Court of Appeals.
6) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City to cancel Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 2714 and 2833 covering Lot No. 1496 and to
restore Original Certificate of Title No. 23, deleting all the inscriptions The Court of Appeals required the parties to file their comment on the matter but they
appearing on the back thereof, the same being declared herein as null failed to do so. In a Resolution dated June 8, 1993, the Court of Appeals simply noted
and void. the Manifestation filed by the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City and the Resolution of
the Land Registration Authority, without prejudice to any further action that the
parties-in-interest in the case before it may take on the matter.23
Without any pronouncement as to attorney’s fees and costs.
On November 28, 1997, thirteen (13) years after the IAC decision had become final and
SO ORDERED.20
executory, Asuncion Macias-Corsame, Rufina Macias-Ramirez, Ma. Lourdes Partosa-
Macias, Alexander Unto and David Unto, who alleged to be the co-heirs of the plaintiffs,
On August 19, 1984, the Decision of the IAC became final and executory in due course.21 filed an Urgent Omnibus Petition24 in Civil Case No. 4823, with the Regional Trial Court
of Negros Oriental, Branch 31,25 praying that the Register of Deeds be ordered to
Six years thereafter, or on September 25, 1990, David Unto, who claimed to be an heir of implement the Decision of the IAC:
the plaintiffs, submitted the 1984 IAC Decision with the Office of the Register of Deeds-
Dumaguete City for the enforcement of paragraph 6 of the decision which reads: WHEREFORE, this Honorable Court of origin, is respectfully prayed:

6) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City to cancel Transfer 1. To order the Register of Deeds for Dumaguete City to fully implement
Certificates of Title Nos. 2714 and 2833 covering Lot No. 1496 and to restore and/or execute the "Decision" of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
Original Certificate of Title No. 23, deleting all the inscriptions appearing on the Manila, dated June 29, 1984 and made final and executory on August 29,
back thereof, the same being declared herein as null and void. 1984 in this case, especially concerning the dispositive portions of
paragraphs 1-5, inclusive as to the absolute ownership of the property
However, David Unto failed to surrender to the Register of Deeds the owner’s and paragraph 6 of the same ordering the Register of Deeds of
duplicate of TCT No. 2833 because the same had already been cancelled. The Dumaguete City to cancel TCT Nos. 2714 and 2833 covering Lot
Register of Deeds told him that the decision could not be implemented on the No. 1496 and restore the OCT No. 23 deleting all the inscriptions
following grounds: appearing on the back thereof, the same being declared null and void"
26
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
(underlining ours), and further ordering the same Register of Deeds to the case as he was not one of the litigants in the IAC case. However, the court
register and annotate in OCT No. 23 after its restoration and the sharing reconsidered its December 11, 1997 Order and denied the motion of the movants, on the
of the absolute ownerships of the parties-in-interest concerned which are ground that the said motion was filed beyond the five-year period from the date of finality
the portions of the said decsion (sic) that have not been implemented in of the IAC decision.
so far as registration of the same decision is concerned up to this late
date; The movants filed on April 7, 1998 their Motion for Reconsideration of the January 8,
1998 Order alleging that the original parties in Civil Case No. 4823 had implemented the
2. That, if and when the Register of Deeds for Dumaguete still refuses to IAC decision by causing the subdivision of Lot No. 1496 into four (4) lots, Lot 1496-A,
implement and/or execute the said portions of the decision, he be 1496-B, 1496-C and 1496-D,31 and that Lot 1496-A was occupied by the heirs of Joaquin
declared in Indirect Contempt of Court under Sec. 3 (b) of Rule 71 of the Unto, Lot No. 1496-B and Lot No. 1496-D were occupied by the heirs of Victoriana
Revised Rules of Court for disobeying and/or refusing to implement Macias, and Lot 1496-C was occupied by the heirs of Catalina Macias. They also filed
and/or execute a legitimate and lawful judicial order or decision of a Supplemental Motion32 on April 13, 1998 praying, inter alia, that they be substituted as
the Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court, Manila; and order the proper parties-plaintiffs in lieu of the original plaintiffs, who had already died pendente lite. They
sanctions to the officer or officers concerned who may have made such also alleged that the heirs of Catalina Macias had executed a deed waiving their rights
apparent violation or violations; and if possible furnish a copy of the Order over the property in their favor, which waiver was filed in Civil Case No. 7999 pending at
to the Office of the Ombudsman, Visayas Area, Cebu City, Philippines; the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch V.
and
On April 27, 1998, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion for reconsideration
3. That the herein petitioners as Co-Heirs of the late JOAQUIN UNTO and the supplemental motion of the movants, reiterating that their omnibus motion was
and VICTORIANA UNTO-MACIAS be granted any other relief or remedy filed beyond the five-year period provided for in Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
under the given premises.26 as amended:

The five movants alleged, inter alia, that the Consulta of the Register of Deeds cannot Considering the allegations and the arguments in the plaintiffs’ motion for
prevail over the decision of the IAC and that the parties in Civil Case No. 4823 and the reconsideration as well as the supplemental motion, and considering that the
movants themselves, after the death of the original parties in the said cases, had agreed decision of the Court of Appeals which has been final for 13 years and it was only
to implement the decision of the IAC. However, the agreement was not filed and after the 13th year of its finality that plaintiffs appeared and moved for the
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. Acting on the motion, the court granted execution of said judgment, notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court
the petition and ordered the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution on allowing in certain cases late execution of final judgment even beyond the period
December 11, 1997.27 of five (5) years not however, exceeding ten (10) years, the said motion for
reconsideration is hereby denied for lack of merit.
Mariano Lim (herein respondent) filed a Manifestation28 on December 23, 1997 informing
the court that he had purchased Lot No. 1496-B covered by TCT No. 4229 from the BPI SO ORDERED.33
in good faith and for value; Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court had issued a Writ of
Possession in his favor on October 6, 1997; and, the Urgent Omnibus Petition filed by The movants and twenty-five others, who alleged to be the co-heirs of the original
the co-heirs of Joaquin Unto and Victoriana Unto-Macias partook of a motion for the plaintiffs, filed a complaint, on April 27, 1998 against CSLA, BPI, Leonora Macias and the
issuance of a writ of execution for an already stale IAC decision. He also alleged that the Sheriff, docketed as Civil Case No. 12212 for quieting of title, reconveyance and
movants were guilty of forum shopping. damages. In addition, they filed, on July 22, 1998, a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals34 assailing the lower court’s Orders dated
On December 24, 1997, Lim filed a Motion to Stay Execution29 in Civil Case No. 4823 on January 8, 1998, and April 27, 1998, alleging that the trial court issued the same with
the ground that the decision of the IAC sought to be implemented had became final and grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners
executory on October 5, 1984; hence, the said decision could no longer be enforced by alleged, inter alia, in their petition that:
motion considering that the prescriptive period therefor had long lapsed. On January 8,
1998, the court issued an Order30 declaring that Lim had no personality to intervene in
27
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
(A) IN REVERSING ITS OWN ORDER DATED DECEMBER 11, 1997, (b) After trial, the inexistence of instruments—(1) the Order of October 11, 1976
WITHOUT THE PROPER MOTION TO THAT EFFECT, IN EXCESS OF in a cadastral motion, Cad. Case No. 5, cancelling the annotation of lis
JURISDICTION, TANTAMOUNT TO A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION pendens in Entry No. 25538 of TCT 9383, (2) the Real Estate Mortgage by a
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION; non-owner, with the BPI, the Sheriff’s Sale dated June 18, 1971, (3) the
annotation of Entry No. 12801 of TCT No. 14229 in the name of the Bank of the
(B IN NOT CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THE PREVAILING PARTY Philippine Islands, Dumaguete; (4) the Real Estate Mortgage by a non-owner
CONTINUED OCCUPATION, POSSESSION AND ENJOYMENT OF THE with the CESLA; (5) the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale dated May 20, 1971, in Entry
PROPERTY IN QUESTION FROM 1984 UP TO THE PRESENT TIME, No. 12801 of TCT No. 2833, -- be all declared null and void insofar as the
WITHOUT THE OBJECTION OF THE DEFENDANTS, EXCEPT IN NOVEMBER plaintiffs are concerned;
1997 WHEN LIM, WHO IS NOT A PARTY IN THE CASE, CLAIMED TO HAVE
BOUGHT THE LAND FROM BPI; THUS, THE CA DECISION WAS ALREADY (c) The defendants being in bad faith, be ordered to pay plaintiffs the amount
SUBSTANTIALLY SATISFIED; AND IT IS NOT ANYMORE COVERED BY THE of P200,000.00, as moral damages;
PRESCRIPTIVE 5-YEAR PERIOD;
(d) The adjudication in the dispositive portion of the CA Decision, as stated on
(C) IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE TORRENS SYSTEM DOES NOT page 3 hereof (sic) be followed;
SHIELD ANY TITLE FRAUDULENTLY PROCURED.35
(e) And the defendants be ordered to reimburse plaintiffs P50,000.00 incurred for
The petitioners asserted that: (a) before their deaths, the original parties in Civil Case attorney’s fees, docketing fees, and other incidental expenses.37
No. 4823 had implemented the decision of the IAC and had taken possession of the
portions of the property alloted to them under the said decisions; (b) the delay of the In its comment on the petition, the respondent BPI alleged that whether or not it acted in
implementation of the decision of the IAC was caused by the financial difficulties of the bad faith when it purchased the property at public auction covered by TCT No. 14229 is
original defendants in Civil Case No. 4823 and not the fault of the petitioners; (c) TCT a factual issue, and, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not the proper subject of a
No. 14229 in the name of respondent BPI is void because the bank acquired the property petition for certiorari and prohibition. Hence, the Court of Appeals should dismiss the
in bad faith; (d) the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens by the CFI acting as a petition.
cadastral court in LRC Case No. 5, despite the pendency of the appeal of the petitioners
from the decision of the RTC is illegal because the cadastral court had no jurisdiction to On March 31, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the petition. The
resolve the said motion of Catalina Macias relating to Civil Case No. 4823; (d) Lim had appellate court held that the petitioners’ Omnibus Motion was barred, citing Section 6,
no personality to intervene in Civil Case No. 4823; and, (e) the trial court had no authority Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA did not rule on the validity of
to set aside, ex parte, its December 11, 1997 Order. the sale of the subject property by respondent bank to respondent Lim and its other
related issues since these are now the subject of the complaint filed by the petitioners
In his comment on the petition, the respondent Lim averred that the petitioners were against the respondents in the RTC of Negros Oriental docketed as Civil Case No.
guilty of forum shopping because the issues raised by the petitioners in their petition 12212, an action for quieting of title, declaration of inexistence of instrument and
were, likewise, the subject of their appeal to the Court of Appeals from the Order36 of the damages filed by the petitioners against the respondents.
RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 41, in LRC Case No. 2000, and of the complaint of the
petitioners against the respondents filed in the RTC of Negros Oriental with a prayer for a The Issues
writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 12212 wherein
they prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
In the present recourse, the petitioners assigned the same errors assigned by them in
their petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that (a) after
due hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be immediately issued in
(A) IN VIOLATING THE DEEPLY EMBEDDED SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE
accordance with Rule 58 of the new Civil Procedure, enjoining the defendants
IN COMPUTING THE TIME LIMIT FOR SUING OUT AN EXECUTION;
Lims to take off the guardhouse, the guards, and enclosing fence they put up in
Lot 1496 of Lot 1496-B;
28
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
(B) IN DECIDING WITHOUT DUE PROCESS, AS THE PETITIONERS WOULD Respondent CSLA, for its part, maintains that no mutual or oral agreement was entered
HAVE PRESENTED EVIDENCE THAT THE PREVAILING PARTY CONTINUED into by the original parties of the case to satisfy the 1984 IAC Decision; otherwise, the
OCCUPATION, POSSESSION AND ENJOYMENT OF THE PROPERTY IN petitioners would not have filed the present petition. It asserts that Lot 1496-A which it
QUESTION FROM 1984 UP TO THE PRESENT TIME, WITHOUT THE purchased from the Sheriff, only a small portion thereof is being occupied by one of the
OBJECTION OF THE DEFENDANTS, EXCEPT IN NOVEMBER 1997 WHEN petitioners;40 and that it is not incumbent upon the respondent to enforce the 1984 IAC
LIM, WHO IS NOT A PARTY IN THE CASE, CLAIMED TO HAVE BOUGHT THE Decision.41 It maintains that the respondent court did not commit any error in its assailed
LAND FROM BPI; THUS, THE CA DECISION WAS ALREADY decision; and that a motion to execute the judgment, which had become final and
SUBSTANTIALLY SATISFIED; AND IT IS NOT ANYMORE COVERED BY THE executory thirteen (13) years earlier, is already barred by laches and prescription.42
PRESCRIPTIVE 5-YEAR PERIOD;
On the other hand, respondent BPI asserts that it is a mortgagee in good faith and did
(C) IN DECIDING AGAINST THE TORRENS SYSTEM LAW THAT IT DOES not, in any manner, act in collusion with co-respondents. As such, it contends, the
NOT SHIELD ANY TITLE FRAUDULENTLY PROCURED.38 petitioners had no cause of action for damages against it. It points out that the petition is
not verified by all the petitioners and that the certification of non-forum shopping is,
The petitioners contend that the five-year period under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of likewise, not signed by all of them. It also claims that the petition was filed out of time.43
Court was superseded by the implementation of the IAC decision by the original parties
in Civil Case No. 4823, causing the subdivision of the property into Lots 1496-A, 1496-B, The issues for resolution in the petition at bar are (a) whether the petitioners have a
1496-C and 1496-D, corresponding to the shares of the parties. Thus, the parties took cause of action against the respondents for the nullification of the January 8, 1998 and
possession of their respective shares. The petitioners posit that they had not been April 7, 1998 Orders of the RTC in Civil Case No. 4823; and, (b) if, in the affirmative,
disturbed in their possession of the property until Mariano Lim filed his Manifestation and whether the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
Motion to Stay Execution in Civil Case No. 4823. They also allege that the delay in the lack of jurisdiction in denying the Omnibus Petition of petitioners Asuncion Macias-
enforcement of the IAC decision was caused by the financial difficulties of the defendants Corsame, Rufina Macias Ramirez, Maria Lourdes Parton-Macias, David Unto and
in Civil Case No. 4823. Alexander Unto.

The petitioners submit that the cancellation by the CFI , Branch III, in LRC Case No. 5 of The Court’s Ruling
Entry No. 8465 annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9383 despite the appeal of the
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 4823, the execution by the Sheriff of the The petition is bereft of merit.
Certificate of Sale over a portion of the property in favor of respondent BPI, the
cancellation of TCT No. 9383 and the issuance of TCT No. 14229 in the name of Although the first issue was not raised by the parties in the Court of Appeals and in this
respondent BPI and the sale by the latter of the said property to respondent Mariano Lim Court, we may still take cognizance of the said issue and resolve the same, such issue
would not preclude the enforcement of the IAC decision for the cancellation of TCT No. being intertwined with the issues raised by the parties and necessary in arriving at a just
2833 and the restoration of OCT No. 23. They argue that the Sheriff, respondents decision of the case.44
BPI/CSLA and Lim had knowledge of the pendency of the appeal from the decision of
the RTC in Civil Case No. 4823. They assert that the cancellation by the cadastral court
Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2, of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that a petition for
of Entry No. 8465 annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9383 is null and void for the
prohibition and certiorari may be filed only by the aggrieved party/parties. The person
added reason that the then Court of First Instance, Branch III, as a cadastral court, had
aggrieved referred to in the said sections pertains to one who was a party in the
limited jurisdiction and have had no authority to cancel the said entry relating to the
proceedings before the lower court. If a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one
pendency of Civil Case No. 4823.
who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed
order.45 The Court notes that the only movants in the Urgent Omnibus Petition filed in
In his comment on the petition, respondent Mariano Lim asserts that the Court of Civil Case No. 4823 were the petitioners Asuncion Corsame, Rufina Ramirez, Ma.
Appeals did not commit any abuse of its discretion, as it only applied the correct law and Lourdes Macias, Alexander Unto and David Unto, who alleged that they were the co-
jurisprudence on the matter.39 He claims that the petitioners are guilty of forum shopping heirs of the plaintiffs in the said civil case. In their supplemental motion, they prayed that
since an identical case had been filed by them in the RTC of Negros Oriental, docketed they be substituted as parties-plaintiffs in lieu of the original plaintiffs. However, the trial
as Civil Case No. 12212. court failed to resolve the said motion. Neither did the movants (petitioners) reiterate their
29
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
plea for substitution in their motion for reconsideration of the court’s January 8, 1998 the petitioners are the real parties-in-interest, as parties-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4823,
Order. Neither did they file a petition for mandamus in the Court of Appeals to compel the as the petitioners in the Court of Appeals and in this Court.
RTC to resolve their supplemental motion for their substitution as parties-plaintiffs, in
lieu of the original plaintiffs. The twenty-five other petitioners in the Court of Appeals and It bears stressing that a review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a
in this Court never filed any motion for their substitution as parties-plaintiffs before the matter of discretion. Where, as in this case, there is no sufficient showing that the
lower court. It was only in the Court of Appeals that they alleged, for the first time, that petitioners are the real parties-in-interest as petitioners in the Court of Appeals and in
they were heirs of the original plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4823. They were, likewise, this Court, their petition may be dismissed.47
unable to show, at least prima facie, that they are the only heirs of the original plaintiffs in
the said civil case, both in the appellate court and in this Court. We also note that, The trial court cannot be faulted for issuing the January 8, 1998 Order which set aside its
although the petitioners alleged in their supplemental motion that Victoriana Unto died on December 11, 1997 Order, and, in effect, denied the Urgent Omnibus Petition of the five
November 8, 1989, and that Joaquin Unto died on March 8, 1978, the movants failed to (5) petitioners; and its Order dated April 27, 1998, denying the movants’ (petitioners’)
append certified copies of the Certificates of Death of the said plaintiffs, or to adduce motion for reconsideration of the same.
proof that the said plaintiffs were already dead, and that they were survived by their
heirs, the movants therein, and by the other fourteen (14) petitioners in the Court of
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Appeals for that matter. This would have enabled either the appellate or trial court to
order the proper substitution, conformably to Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date
SEC. 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel.— Whenever a party to a pending
of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may
counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.
The purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments by
action is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights.48
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be subtituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Generally, once a judgment becomes final and executory, the execution thereof
becomes a ministerial duty of the court.49 The prevailing party can have it executed as a
matter of right by mere motion within five years from date of entry of the judgment. If the
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a mere motion after the lapse of
appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
five (5) years from the date of its entry, the said judgment is reduced to a mere right of
action in favor of the person whom it favors which must be enforced, as are all ordinary
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if actions, by the institution of a complaint in a regular form.50 Thus, the recourse left for the
the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may petitioners is to revive the judgment through an independent action which must be filed
order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of within ten (10) years from the time the judgment became final.51 The ten-year period
an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall within which an action for revival of a judgment should be brought, commences to run
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in from the date of finality of the judgment, and not from the expiration of the five-year
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered period within which the judgment may be enforced by mere motion.52
as costs.46
In the case at bar, the entry of judgment of the IAC decision sought to be enforced was
The bare allegation of the petitioners that they are the heirs and are co-owners of the made on August 19, 1984.53 Plaintiffs Joaquin Unto and Victoriana Unto Vda. de Macias,
property subject of the IAC decision will not suffice. There must be competent or their respective heirs or their successors-in-interest, had until August 19, 1989 within
preponderant proof that they are, indeed, heirs of the original plaintiffs and co-owners of which to enforce the IAC Decision by mere motion. They failed to file such motion. They
the property subject of the IAC decision. Absent such evidence, it cannot be argued that
30
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
also failed to revive the judgment by an ordinary action within the ten-year period. They It is incredible that the original parties implemented the IAC decision by causing the
waited for thirteen long years before they sought to have the 1984 IAC Decision subdivision of the property and by taking possession of their respective shares therein,
enforced. Worse, they did so only on November 28, 1997, by a mere motion for the and yet failed to file any motion in the trial court to enforce paragraph 6 of the IAC
issuance of a special order for the enforcement of paragraph 6 of the IAC decision. Such decision. Even the request of David Unto for the Register of Deeds to implement
a motion is not an action to revive the judgment of the IAC within the contemplation of paragraph 6 of the IAC decision was made only on September 25, 1990, more than six
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as amended. years after the entry of judgment of the IAC decision was made. The plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 4823 (the petitioners herein) even failed to file in the Court of Appeals their
That the delay in the execution of the judgment was due to the financial difficulties of the Comment on the matter despite the order of the appellate court.
defendants in Civil Case No. 4823 is irrelevant. It is the prevailing party who is entitled,
as a matter of right, to a writ of execution in its favor. It is not an option of the losing party IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the petition is
to file a motion for the execution of the judgment to compel the winning party to take the hereby DENIED due course. The Decision dated March 31, 1999 and the resolution
judgment.54 The petitioners, as the prevailing parties in the judgment sought to be dated June 23, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48188 are AFFIRMED.
enforced, can file their motion or independent action within the periods therefor Costs against the petitioners.
notwithstanding any financial difficulties of the losing party. They should only concern
themselves with the execution of the judgment. Otherwise, their inaction may be SO ORDERED.
construed as a waiver. The petitioners slept on their rights for thirteen years; perforce,
they must suffer the consequences of their gross inaction.

We have ruled that the running of the five-year period may be interrupted should there be
an agreement of the parties to defer or suspend the enforcement of the
judgment.55 However, the petitioners failed to prove in the court a quo that the original
parties in Civil Case No. 4823 had any agreement to enforce the IAC decision and that
they had already implemented the same. They failed to adduce in evidence any written
agreement executed by the parties in the court a quo. Bare allegations, without more, do
not meet the quantum of evidence needed to establish the same as a fact. We agree
with the following disquisitions of the Court of Appeals:

The Untos’ argument that this case is an exception to the said five year period
limitation is untenable. In the first place it is based on bare allegations
unsupported by hard evidence. In the absence of sufficient proof, We cannot just
accept as is their claims that the interruption or delay in the execution was due to
arrangements they have entered into and also that the financial difficulties of the
Maciases was a cause for the delay. Assuming hypothetically that the litigants
had made arrangements among themselves, this could not have included
Paragraph 6 of the dispositive portion which is directed on the Register of Deeds
and who is the petitioners’ target for their prayer for compliance and execution.56

While it is true that Lot No. 1496 was subdivided and that one of the subdivision lots is
Lot No. 1496-B covered by TCT No. 9383 under the name of Catalina Macias, the
petitioners failed to prove that the subdivision of the property was based on the
agreement of the parties in Civil Case No. 4823 to implement the IAC decision.

31
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. 149053 March 7, 2007 In the CA, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Motion to Set Aside the CA Resolution of
CENTRAL SURETY AND INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, vs.PLANTERS December 7, 1992 and to Re-Open Appeal with Prayer for Preliminary
PRODUCTS, INC., Respondent. Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order."7 On March 3, 1994, the appellate court issued
a resolution restraining the RTC judge and the deputy sheriff from enforcing the writ but,
This appeal on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court hinges on a pure question on motion of respondent, the CA lifted the TRO and dismissed petitioner’s urgent motion
of law, that is, whether execution of judgment can be ordered by mere motion despite the on March 24, 1994.8
lapse of five years from entry of judgment.
Through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner elevated
The antecedent facts follow. the CA’s dismissal of its urgent motion to this Court. In its petition, petitioner argued that
it failed to pay the docket fees only because the CA’s judicial records division did not "re-
Sometime in 1977, Ernesto Olson entered into a dealership agreement with respondent send" the notice for it to pay said fees. On July 11, 1994, we dismissed the petition9 and
Planters Products, Inc. whereby he agreed to purchase, in cash or credit, fertilizers and this dismissal became final on September 14, 1994.10
agricultural chemicals from respondent for resale. To secure Olson’s faithful compliance
of his obligations, Vista Surety and Insurance, Co. (Vista Insurance) and petitioner On June 18, 1999 or 6 years from the entry of judgment of the RTC’s
executed a surety undertaking in favor of respondent. decision,11 respondent filed another motion for issuance of alias writ of execution in the
trial court.12 On August 20, 1999, the trial court issued an order granting the writ.
After several deliveries, Olson failed to pay respondent prompting the latter to claim the Petitioner filed an MR of said order but the RTC denied it.
amount due from petitioner and Vista Insurance. However, both refused to settle their
liabilities to respondent as Olson’s sureties. Petitioner thereafter went to the CA via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge for issuing
On June 25, 1979, respondent filed an action for collection of sum of money1 against the writ despite the fact that more than five years had elapsed since the RTC’s decision
Olson, Vista Insurance and petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch of November 6, 1991 became final and executory. Invoking Rule 39, Section 6 of the
58. Summons were accordingly served (except as to Olson whose address could not be Rules, petitioner insisted that the RTC decision could no longer be enforced by mere
located). motion but only by court action.

In a decision2 dated November 6, 1991, the trial court found petitioner and Vista The CA dismissed the petition for patent lack of merit.13 It held that:
Insurance liable to respondent. They were ordered to pay the following: (1) P372,502
representing the unpaid principal amount plus interest; (2) 25% of the total amount While it is true that the judgment sought to be executed became final and executory on
recoverable as attorney’s fees and (3) cost of suit. March 12, 1993, it bears stressing that the delay was caused by petitioner’s dilatory
maneuvers filed in this Court and all the way to the Supreme Court, viz: the Very Urgent
Petitioner alone appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On December 7, 1992, the CA Motion to Set Aside Resolution of December 7, 1992 and to Re-Open the Appeal with
dismissed petitioner’s appeal for failure to pay the required docket fees.3 On March 12, Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order which resulted in the
1993, the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal became final and executory; entry of judgment issuance of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated March 3, 1994 enjoining respondents
followed on May 27, 1993.4 from enforcing the subject decision; the Motion for Reconsideration of [the] Court of
Appeals Resolution dated March 24, 1994; and Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme
Court which was ultimately dismissed by the High Court on July 11, 1994.
On October 12, 1993, respondent filed in the RTC a motion for execution of judgment
following the CA’s dismissal of petitioner’s appeal.5 The RTC issued the writ on October
21, 1993.6 The writ, however, was not implemented so respondent filed an ex xxx xxx xxx
parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution which the trial court granted on
February 24, 1994. WHEREFORE, for patent lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 65,
[S]ec. 8[,] 2nd par.[,] Rules of Civil Procedure.

32
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
Petitioner filed an MR but this was likewise denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
14 Triple costs against petitioner whose counsel is hereby warned of severe disciplinary
sanctions for any further attempt to delay the final disposition of this case.
The only relevant issue for our resolution is whether the execution of a final judgment
may be made by mere motion despite the lapse of five years. SO ORDERED.

In this case, we answer in the affirmative.

Under Rule 39, Section 6,15 the rule is that a final judgment may be executed by mere
motion within five years from the date of entry of judgment. However, the rule is not
absolute and admits one notable exception and that is when the delay in enforcing the
judgment is caused by the party assailing the filing of the motion.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,16 we declared that, on meritorious grounds, execution of


final judgment by mere motion may be allowed even after the lapse of five years when
delay in the execution is caused or occasioned by the actions of the judgment debtor
and/or is incurred for his benefit.

Similarly, in Camacho v. Court of Appeals,17 we ruled that the five-year period allowed for
enforcement of judgment by mere action is deemed effectively interrupted or suspended
when the delay in the execution is occasioned by the oppositor’s own initiatives in order
to gain an undue advantage.

Based on the attendant facts, the present case falls within the exception. Petitioner
triggered the series of delays in the execution of the RTC’s final decision by filing
numerous motions and appeals in the appellate courts, even causing the CA’s issuance
of the TRO enjoining the enforcement of said decision. It cannot now debunk the filing of
the motion just so it can delay once more the payment of its obligation to respondent. It is
obvious that petitioner is merely resorting to dilatory maneuvers to skirt its legal
obligation.

Lastly, in Republic and Camacho, we ruled that the purpose of the law in prescribing time
limitations for enforcing a judgment or action is to prevent a party from sleeping on his
rights. Far from sleeping on its rights, respondent pursued its claim by persistently
seeking the execution of the RTC’s final judgment of November 6, 1991. It would be
unjust to frustrate respondent’s effort to collect payment from petitioner on sheer
technicality. While strict compliance to the rules of procedure is desired, liberal
interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve
the ends of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

33
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. 168913 March 14, 2007 The petition fails.
ROLANDO TING, Petitioner, vs.HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO,
AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID, Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree
EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents. provides:

In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983, then SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. – The
Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, granted judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the
the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration of title expiration of thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment.
to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.

The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, 1977. Judge After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to
Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982 directing the Land forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the
Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding
certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio. certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis
supplied)
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot. The application was In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without
docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.1 opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as
the case may be, and ordering its registration in his name constitutes, when final, res
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, judicata against the whole world.9 It becomes final when no appeal within the
Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Anabelle reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.10
L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioner’s
application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer2 calling attention to the The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court’s approval in
December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza’s application for registration of
on January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioner’s application the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
on the ground of res judicata.
Explaining his position that the December 10, 1976 Decision in LRC No. N-983 had
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion become "extinct," petitioner advances that the LRA has not issued the decree of
of respondents, dismissed petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata. 31ªvv phi1.nét

registration, a certain Engr. Rafaela Belleza, Chief of the Survey Assistance Section,
Land Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari which raises the sole issue of whether (DENR), Region 7, Cebu City having claimed that the survey of the Cebu Cadastral
the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N. Extension is erroneous and all resurvey within the Cebu Cadastral extension must first
be approved by the Land Management Services of
Petitioner argues that although the decision in LRC No. N-983 had become final and
executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of registration has been issued by the Land the DENR, Region 7, Cebu City before said resurvey may be used in court; and that the
Registration Authority (LRA);4 it was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct" decision spouses Lirio did not comply with the said requirement for they instead submitted to the
belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents’ motion to dismiss LRC No. 1437-N;5and as court a mere special work order.11
no action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents after the lapse of the
ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant judgment passé[d] into There is, however, no showing that the LRA credited the alleged claim of Engineer
extinction."6 Belleza and that it reported such claim to the land registration court for appropriate action
or reconsideration of the decision which was its duty.
Petitioner thus concludes that an "extinct" judgment cannot be the basis of res judicata.7

34
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and
decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership
the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of
data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree,
it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place
They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land
cadastral land registration proceedings."12 (Emphasis supplied) registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final
without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
As for petitioner’s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment
or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.
the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment
may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within Costs against petitioner, Rolando Ting.
five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations[,]
SO ORDERED.
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents
and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive
period, the same does not lie.

Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.13 enunciates the raison d’etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not
apply in land registration proceedings, viz:

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION


RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR
TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.

We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment,
except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case
has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except
by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the
provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years
by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special
proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil
action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the
adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time
as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing
party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or
fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of
35
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. L-31077 March 17, 1978 Pascual opposed the motion to dismiss. He cited the rule that a sheriff has no authority
ARABAY, INC., petitioner, vs.Hon. SERAFIN SALVADOR, Presiding Judge of the to attach the property of a person other than the judgment debtor (Codesal vs. Ascue, 38
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch, and BENJAMIN M. Phil. 902).
PASCUAL, respondents.
The Caloocan court in its order of may 19, 1969 denied the motion to dismiss and
Ventilated in this case is the ever-recurring question as to the jurisdiction of a Court of reiterated its prior order that upon the filing or a bond in the sum of P5,000 a writ of
first Instance to issue, at the instance of a third-party claimant, an injunction restraining injunction should be issued to enjoin the auction sale. The motion for the reconsideration
the execution sale of properties which were levied upon by a judgment creditor in a case of that order was denied in the court's order of July 11, 1969.
decided by another Court of First Instance.
On October 13, 1969 Arabay, Inc. filed in this court the instant petition for certiorari and
In a decision dated October 7, 1968 in Civil Case No. 71710 of the Court of First prohibition wherein it assailed the injunction order. The issue is whether at the instance
Instance of Manila, "Arabay, Inc. vs. Florencio A. Soyangco", Judge Manuel P. of a third-party claimant the Caloocan court can enjoin the sheriff from selling the
Barcelona ordered Soyangco to pay the plaintiff the sum of P36,874.49 plus six percent properties which he has levied upon to satisfy the judgment of the Court of First Instance
interest from January 10, 1967 and P2,000 as attorney's fees. of Manila.

Soyangco did not appeal. Pursuant to the writ of execution issued in that case, a deputy We hold that the Caloocan court can stop the execution of the Manila court's judgment
sheriff of Rizal levied upon forty pieces of personal property found in Soyangco's against properties not belonging to the judgment debtor. The injunction in that case
residence at Navotas, Rizal and served notice that the same would be auctioned off to would not constitute an interference with the process of a court of coordinate and co-
the highest bidder on March 8, 1969. equal jurisdiction.

On March 6, 1969 Benjamin M. Pascual filed a third-party claim with the sheriff. He as a third-party claimant, Pascual has the right to vindicate his claim to the properties
alleged that he owned the said pieces of personal property because they were sold to levied upon by means of a proper action. That right is recognized in Rule 39 of the Rules
him by the deputy sheriff of Caloocan City for P8,106.16 to satisfy a judgment against of Court, which provides:
Soyangco in Civil Case No. 61193, "Esteban F. Ferrer vs. Florencio Soyangco" of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, as shown in the certificate of sale dated June 30, 1967. SEC. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. — If property
levied on be claimed by any other person than the judgment debtor or his agent,
On March 13, 1969 Arabay, Inc. posted an indemnity bond for P8,106.16 in favor of the and such person make an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession
sheriff. The auction sale was rescheduled on March 28, 1969 but the sale did not take thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serve the same upon the
place because Pascual sued the sheriff and Arabay, Inc. in Civil Case No. C-1545 of the officer making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the officer
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch XIV. Pascual prayed in that case shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment creditor or his
that the auction sale be enjoined, that the levy be declared void and that the defendants agent, on demand of the officer, indemnify the officer against such claim by a
be ordered to pay moral damages and attorney's fees. The Caloocan court in an ex bond in a sum not greater such than the value of the property levied on. In case
parte order dated March 26, 1969 enjoined the sheriff from proceeding with the auction of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court
sale. issuing the writ of execution.

Arabay, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the injunction suit. It invoked the rule that no court The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of the property, to
has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of any third-party claimant unless a claim is made by the latter and unless an action
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction (Cabigao and Izquierdo vs. Del Rosario and Lim, 44 for damages is brought by him against the officer within one hundred twenty
Phil. 182; Philippine National Bank vs. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525; Li Kim Tho vs. Sanchez, (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained
82 Phil. 776; Lacuna vs. Ofilada, 106 Phil. 313; Hacbang and Bardelosa vs. Leyte shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the
Autobus Co., Inc., 118 Phil. 110; Nat'l. Power Corp. vs. Hon. De Veyra, etc. and City of property by any proper action.
Baguio, 113 Phil. 662).

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
The third-party claimant is to obligated to file an action for damages against the sheriff in claimant is involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying the judgment or process
case an indemnity bond was filed by the judgment creditor. The third-party claimant may of another court of the same rank or category, a power which devolves upon the proper
file a separate and independent action to establish ownership to the property levied upon appellate court.
by the sheriff. In that action, he may secure an injunction to restrain the sale of the
attached property. (Abiera vs. Court of Appeals, L-26294, May 31, 1972, 45 SCRA 314; The raison d'etre for that rule is that an effective ordering of legal relationships in civil
Bayer Philippines, Inc. vs. Agana, L-38701 and San Francisco Oil & Paint Co., Inc., et al. society is possible only when each court is granted exclusive jurisdiction over the
vs. Bayer Philippines, Inc., L-38801, April 8, 1975, 53 SCRA 355, 366; Queblar vs. property brought to it. To allow coordinate courts to interfere with each other's judgments
Garduño, 67 Phil. 316; Potenciano vs. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196; Agricultural Credit or decrees by injunctions would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder
Administration vs. Lasam Farmers' Cooperative Marketing Asso., Inc., L-29278, July 31, the proper administration of justice, especially if they are branches of the same court
1969, 28 SCRA 1098). (Nat'l. Power Corp. vs. Hon. De Veyra, etc. and City of Baguio, 113 Phil. 622, 625).

When the sheriff, acting beyond the bound of his authority, seizes a stranger's property, That rule is not violated when the judge of another branch, who annuls or modifies the
the writ of injunction, which is issued to stop the auction sale of that property, is not an order issued by another judge, acts in the same case and belongs to the same court
interference with the writ of execution issued by another court because the writ of (Eleazar vs. Zandueta, 48 Phil. 193).
execution issued by another court because the writ of execution was improperly
implemented by the sheriff. Under that writ, he could attach the property of the judgment But the rule is infringed when the judge of a branch of the curt issues a writ of preliminary
debtor. He is not authorized to levy upon the property of the third-party claimant (Polaris injunction in a case to enjoin the sheriff from carrying out an order of execution issued in
Marketing Corporation vs. Plan, L-40666, January 22, 1976, 69 SCRA 93, 97; Manila another case by the judge of another branch of the same court (Philippine National Bank
Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, 88 Phil. 94, 102). vs. Javellana, 92 Phil. 525).

In the instant case, respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction and did not commit any An amended writ of possession issued to the mortgagee in a case of judicial foreclosure,
grave abuse of discretion in enjoining the auction sale because, as already stated, "a which was filed in the court of First Instance of Manila, cannot be enjoined in a
sheriff has no authority to attach the property of any person under an execution except subsequent case file in the same court by the mortgagor (Lacuna vs. Ofilada, supra).
that of the judgment debtor. If he does so, the writ of execution affords him no
justification for the action is not in obedience to the mandate of the writ. So long as the
In another case, it was held that the writ of garnishment which was issued by the Court of
officer confines his acts which are not justified by the writ are without authority of law. An
first Instance of Manila to enforce a judgment for P240,000 against the City of Baguio
injunction is a proper remedy to prevent a sheriff from selling the property of one
and which enforced by attaching its deposits in the Philippine National Bank, could not
person for the purpose of paying the debts of another." (Syllabus, Codesal and Ocampo
be enjoined by the Court of First Instance of Baguio on the theory that the funds
vs. Ascue, 38 Phil. 902).
garnished are exempt from execution. Relief against the writ of garnishment should be
sought in the court which issued the writ and which has the power to grant the injunctive
In the Abiera case, supra, Angelina Puentevella secured a judgment against Raul remedy. "Thereby, conflict of power is avoided between different courts of coordinate
Javellana for a sum of money from Branch II of the court of First Instance of Negros jurisdiction." (National Power Corporation case, supra).
Occidental. To satisfy that judgment the sheriff levied upon certain properties claimed by
Jovita de la Cruz. She and her husband filed an action in Branch VI of the same court
The execution of a final judgment rendered by one branch of the Court of First Instance
wherein they alleged that they were the owners of the said properties. They secured an
of Manila cannot be enjoined by another branch at the instance of the judgment debtor
injunction from Branch VI to restrain the sheriff from taking possession of the properties
(Araneta and Uy vs. Commonwealth Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 522; Ongsingco vs. Tan,
and from proceeding with the auction sale thereof. It was held that the injunction was not
97 Phil. 330; Mercado vs. Ocampo, 72 Phil. 318).
and interference with the writ of execution issued by Branch II since the said properties
could not be levied upon by the sheriff.
Similarly, Branch 14 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal has no jurisdiction to annul an
execution sale, which was held pursuant to a writ of execution issued by Branch 12 of
It is noteworthy that, generally, the rule, that no court has authority to interfere by
the same court. Branch 14 cannot interfere by injunction with the execution proceedings
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having
with were held to satisfy the judgment rendered by Branch 12. Relief from the sale
equal power to grant the injunctive relief, is applied in cases, where no third-party
37
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
should be secured from Branch 12. (De Leon vs. Salvador, L-30871 and Bernabe vs.
Cruz, L-31603, December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 567. Same situation in
the Cabigao case, supra; Hubanib vs. Insular Drug Co., 64 Phil 119, and Orais vs.
Escaño, 14 Phil. 208, 212. See Castañeda vs. Ago, L-28546, July 30, 1975, 65 SCRA
505 and Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637).

On the other hand, it should be noted that a Court of First Instance or a branch thereof
has the authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance of, and to act in, a suit to annul a
final and executory judgment or order rendered by another Court of First Instance or by
another branch of the same court. In such a case, there is no interference by one branch
of the court with the judgment of another branch of the same court because after a case
had been finally terminated in one branch and an action to annul the judgment is filed in
another branch, the cause of action in the second case would be different from that in the
first case. (Francisco vs. Aquino, L-33235-6, July 29, 1976, 72 SCRA 140; Vda. de Ursua
vs. Pelayo, 107 Phil. 622; Gianan vs. Court of Appeals L-29306, December 18, 1971, 42
SCRA 537, 545, revoking the ruling laid down in J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Torres, L-
24717, Dec. 4, 1967, 21 SCRA 1169; Mas vs. Dumara-og, 120 Phil 825; Sterling
Investment 318; Tan vs. People, L-25460, March 13, 1968, 22 SCRA 1020. As to search
warrant, see Pangkalinawan vs. Gomez, L22585, December 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 1275).

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. 84497 November 6, 1989 On February 11, 1985, Special Civil Case No. 454 was amended to include as additional
ALFONSO ESCOVILLA, JR., CECILIO M. MERIS and CUISON ENGINEERING and petitioner, Conchita del Rosario and as additional respondent, Cecilio M. Meris. As
MACHINERY CO., INC., petitioners, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SIBAGAT prayed for in the petition, a temporary restraining order was issued directing the
TIMBER CORPORATION and CONCHITA DEL ROSARIO, respondents. respondents to refrain from proceeding with the public auction sale scheduled on
February 14, 1985.
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modifications the decision of the lower court in Special Civil Case No. 454 entitled However on March 6, 1985, after the temporary restraining order had lapsed and upon
"Sibagat Timber Corporation and Conchita C. del Rosario v. Alfonso Escovilla, Jr., motion of Cuison Engineering & Machinery Co., the RTC of Davao City issued an order
Cecilio M. Meris and Cuison Engineering and Machinery Co., Inc." in Civil Case No. 13699 directing Deputy Sheriff Escovilla to proceed with the auction
sale of the subject motor launch "Pixie Boy No. 5" with authority to lawfully retrieve the
In Civil Case No. 13699, entitled Cuison Engineering and Machinery Co., Inc. v. del same wherever it may be stored or berthed.
Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc.", a decision dated March 24, 1981 was
rendered by the then Court of First Instance, Branch II (now Regional Trial Court, Branch Pursuant to such order, Escovilla took custody of the motor launch and set the auction
IX), Davao City awarding to Cuison Engineering and Machinery Co., Inc. a certain sum of sale on March 27, 1985.
money and damages. The Court of Appeals eventually affirmed the decision which
became final and executory on June 29, 1984. Thereafter, Cuison Engineering and Despite the orders of the court in Special Civil Case No. 454 directing the Sheriff to
Machinery Co. sought the execution of the subject decision and a corresponding writ of return the motor launch and to desist from proceeding with the auction sale, the auction
execution was issued on December 27, 1984 by the RTC, Branch IX, Davao City. sale was conducted upon motion of Cuison Engineering and Machinery Co., Inc. and
upon order of Judge Saludares in Civil Case No. 13699.
On January 26, 1985, petitioner Deputy Sheriff Alfonso Escovilla, Jr. levied and seized
one (1) unit electric welding machine. A third party claim over said item was filed by On March 27, 1985, the subject motor launch was sold at public auction by Deputy
Mariano Rana office manager of Sibagat Timber Corporation, one of the private Sheriff Joseymour R. Robiza in lieu of Escovilla who was then in Gen. Santos City, South
respondents. Cotabato.

Because of such levy, Special Civil Case No. 454 which was an action for prohibition Meanwhile, trial on the merits was held in Special Civil Case No. 454, and on June 5,
with preliminary injunction and damages was filed on February 5, 1985 before the RTC, 1986, the court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Branch IV of Butuan City entitled, "Sibagat Timber Corp., Petitioner v. Alfonso Escovilla,
Jr. and Cuison Engineering and Machinery Corp., Inc., Respondents." WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

On February 7, 1985, petitioner Deputy Sheriff Cecilio M. Meris seized and levied one (1) l. Commanding respondent Sheriff Alfonso Escovilla, Jr. to return the motor
unit motor launch named "Pixie Boy No. 5" by virtue of the writ of execution issued in launch Pixie Boy No. 5 at his own expense to its rightful owner Conchita C. del
Civil Case No. 13699. Rosario in Butuan City in the same condition when it was taken in 1985; or, in the
event of loss or inability to recover said motor launch, to pay its value of
On February 8, 1985, private respondent Conchita del Rosario, claiming ownership over P500,000.00;
the motor launch filed a third party claim over the subject property.
2. Ordering the forfeiture of the indemnity bond put up by First Integrated
Consequently, a sheriff's indemnity bond filed for the third party claim of Conchita del Bonding & Insurance Co., Inc. of Davao City under Sheriffs Indemnity Bond No.
Rosario was approved by the Davao Court. PIRCI/RIRO/00011-85 dated February 12, 1985 in the total amount of
P120,000.00 in favor of Conchita C. del Rosario;
On the same date, February 8, 1985, petitioner Cecilio M. Meris prepared the notice of
sale setting the auction sale of the motor launch on February 14, 1985. 3. Declaring the sale of public auction of the motor launch Pixie Boy No. 5
conducted by Deputy Sheriff Joseymour Ecobiza to be illegal and void from the
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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
beginning, and nullifying the corresponding certificate of sale issued and signed 3 Ordering respondent Deputy Sheriff Alfonso Escovilla, Jr., to return to Sibagat
by him; Timber Corporation at Butuan City the electric Welding Machine at the expense
of Cuison Engineering & Machinery Co., Inc.;
4. Ordering respondent sheriff Alfonso Escovilla, Jr. to return to Sibagat 'Ember
Corporation at Butuan City, at his own expense, the electric welding machine he 4 Directing respondent Cuison Engineering & Machinery Co., Inc. to pay
improvidently and illegally seized. Conchita del Rosario, the sum of P120,000.00 representing unearned income of
the motor launch "Pixie Boy No. 5", and to pay Sibagat Timber Corporation the
5. Finding sheriff Alfonso Escovilla, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having sum of P2,500.00 as actual and compensatory damages for the deprivation of
committed contempt against this Court and ordering him to pay a fine of Five the use of the electric welding machine.
Hundred (P500.00) Pesos;
However, the above amount due to Conchita del Rosario is without prejudice to
6. Directing respondents Alfonso Escovilla Jr. and Cuison Engineering & charging the same to the indemnity bond put up by the First Integrated Bonding
Machinery Co., Inc. to pay Conchita C. del Rosario, jointly and severally the & Insurance Co., Inc. of Davao City under Sheriff's Indemnity Bond No.
following sums: P120,000.00 representing unearned income of the motor launch FIBCI/MIRO/00011-85 dated February 12, 1985, in the total amount of
Pixie-Boy No. 5 for 60 days at, P15,000.00 as moral damages as well as P120,000.00 in favor of Conchita del Rosario, and subject to the corresponding
P5,000.00 as litigation expense; order of the court in the proper case. (Rollo, p. 69)

They are also ordered to pay Sibagat limber Corporation in the sum of The petitioners raise the following question of law:
P22,500.00 as actual and compensatory damages for the deprivation of the use
of the electric welding machine; WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR PROHIBITION WILL STILL PROSPER AS A
REMEDY FOR ACTS ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED.
Both respondents are also ordered to pay, jointly and severally, P15,000.00 as
and for attorney's fees, plus the cost of this suit. (At page 59) The petitioners claim that when the public auction sale was conducted on March 27,
1985 and the corresponding sheriff's certification of sale was issued in favor of the
From said decision, the petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the winning bidder, the petition for prohibition was already rendered moot and academic
decision of the RTC, Butuan City with some modifications, to wit: because the acts sought to be enjoined in the prohibition proceedings have already been
performed.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
but modified to read as follows: The petitioners' contention is untenable.

1 Ordering respondent Sheriff Alfonso Escovilla, Jr., to return the motor launch There is no dispute that the private respondents are indeed the actual owners of the
"Pixie Boy No. 5" to its rightful owner Conchita C. del Rosario in Butuan City in subject properties by virtue of a sale in their favor by Del Rosario and Sons Logging
the same condition when it was taken in 1985, at the expense of Cuison Enterprises, Inc. Such finding is based on evidence on record which this Court does not
Engineering & Machinery Co., Inc.; or in the event of loss or inability to recover find any reason to disturb. Moreover, there is nothing in the petition nor in the petitioners'
said motor launch, for the latter to pay its value of P120,000.00; memorandum to suggest that the properties sold in execution of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 13699 belonged to the judgment-debtor in that case. This petition merely
2 Declaring the sale at public auction of the motor launch "Pixie Boy No. 5" attacks the procedure adopted by the respondents.
conducted by Deputy Sheriff Joseymour Ecobiza to be illegal and void and
nullifying the corresponding Certificate of Sale issued and signed by him; In such a case, the point to be borne in mind is that the power of the court in the
execution of judgments extends only over properties unquestionably belonging to the
judgment debtor. As the Court stated in Bayer Philippines, Inc. v. Agana, (63 SCRA 355
[1975] ):

40
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
... In Herald Publishing, supra, We intimated that the levy by the sheriff of a responsible for the continuance of the wrongful possession and for the sale and
property by virtue of a writ of attachment may be considered as made under conversion of the goods and for all real damages which the owner might sustain (see
authority of the court only when-the property levied upon unquestionably belongs Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. 11 [1979], p. 303).
to the defendant. If he attaches properties other than those of the defendant, he
acts beyond the limits of his authority. Otherwise stated, the court issuing a writ Thus, in this case, even if the auction sale has been conducted and the sheriffs
of execution is supposed to enforce its authority only over properties of the certificate of sale was issued in favor of the winning bidder, the liability of the judgment
judgment debtor, and should a third party appear to claim the property levied creditor and consequently, the purchaser to the real owners of the properties levied and
upon by the sheriff, the procedure laid down by the Rules is that such claim executed is not extinguished. We also take note of the trial court's finding that Sheriffs
should be the subject of a separate and independent action. (at p. 366) Escovilla and Meris misled the Davao court as to the ownership of the properties they
had seized knowing quite well that the petitioners in Special Civil Case No. 454, the
This is precisely the very nature of the proceedings in the action for prohibition with prohibition case, were the actual owners of the property. This brings us to the other point
preliminary injunction filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial Court of raised in this petition.
Butuan City which is sanctioned by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As held
in Rivera vs. Florendo (144 SCRA 643 [1986] ): Corollary to the main issue raised is the argument that the Regional Trial Court of Butuan
City cannot restrain or interfere with the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Another fundamental rule which appears to have been violated in the case at bar Davao City which is its coordinate and co-equal authority on matters properly brought
is that no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the other, a court before it. This issue has been clearly settled in the case of Traders Royal Bank v.
should not by means of a preliminary injunction transfer the property in litigation Intermediate Appellate Court, (133 SCRA 141 [1984] ) where the Court held:
from the possession of one party to another where the legal title is in dispute and
the party having possession asserts ownership thereto. (Rudolfo V. Alonso, 76 Generally, the rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the
Phil. 225, February 28, 1946). Similarly, the primary purpose of an injunction is to judgments or decrees of a concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal
preserve the status quo, that is the last actual peaceable uncontested status power to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction, is applied in cases where
which preceded the controversy. (at pp. 659660) no third-party claimant is involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying
the judgment or process of another court of the same rank or category, a power
In the instant case, the private respondents properly instituted Special Civil Case No. 454 which devolves upon the proper appellate court (Arabay Inc. v. Salvadro, 82
which is a separate and independent action to vindicate their claims over the subject SCRA 138). The purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict of power between
properties. If at all the petitioners had any doubts as to the veracity of the third-party different courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and
claims, then the separate action instituted was the proper forum to ventilate such smooth functioning of their proceedings. (at p. 148)
protestations. The action for prohibition was filed on February 5, 1985. On February 18,
1985 the respondent Sheriffs admitted having seized the disputed properties but assured WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court
the court that they will not remove them from its jurisdiction nor sell or dispose of the of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
same.
SO ORDERED.
From the start, the petitioners were cognizant of the third-party claims filed with the
sheriff and the separate action instituted against them so they were fully aware of their
liabilities to these third-party claimants who were not even parties to the case sought to
be executed.

The rule is clear. If a third party claim is filed, the sheriff is not bound to proceed with the
levy of the property unless he is given by the judgment creditor an indemnity bond
against the claim. The judgment creditor, by giving an indemnity bond, assumes the
direction and control of the sheriffs action; so far as it might constitute a trespass and
thus he becomes, to that extent, the principal and the sheriff, his agent. This makes him
41
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
A.M. No. P-92-766 March 27, 1995 The ocular inspection revealed that complainant's lot, Lot No. 1326, is alleged by her to
LOURDES SUMALJAG EVANGELISTA, complainant, vs.LUISA be facing the Agua Dulce Street and from there continues down to the edge of the
PENSERGA, respondent. Malbasag River. The house of the Aguirres stands on an old abandoned river bed, which
respondent claims is public land. While not contesting complainant's claim that the
Herein complainant was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2171 of the MTCC of Ormoc City boundary of her property is the Malbasag River, respondent contends that said boundary
for unlawful detainer against defendant spouses Jose and Zoila Aguirre. Judgment was is only up to the Aguirres' house since the river flowed through and over the land where
rendered by the MTCC of Ormoc City in favor of complainant, ordering the defendant the Aguirres' house now stands before it changed its course. No one could say with
spouses to vacate the subject property (a parcel of land described as Lot 1326 with a certainty when the river changed its course and whether complainant's lot covers the
house thereon) and to pay complainant the sum of P8,120.00 in accrued rentals. On area down to the present location of the Malbasag River.
appeal, the decision of the MTCC was affirmed by the RTC of Ormoc City. Thereafter,
the trial court issued a writ of execution on April 28, 1992. The writ was implemented by The Commissioner refrained from making a pronouncement in his report as to whether
herein respondent as Clerk of Court IV and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of the MTCC of Ormoc City. the Aguirres' house is inside or outside the property of complainant. He recommended
that a surveyor be appointed at the expense of the parties to determine whether the
On April 30, 1992, the writ was returned by respondent, who stated in her return that the house the Aguirres were occupying at the time the writ was served is on the land of
writ was partially satisfied and that the defendants had already vacated the subject complainant. This recommendation was not acted upon by Executive Judge Escano. The
house. In satisfaction of the money judgment, respondent accepted the sum P100.00 latter in turn submitted a Report to this Court based on the Commissioner's findings and
and a promissory note from the defendants/judgment debtors promising to pay P100.00 the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties.
monthly until the entire amount of P8,120.00 is fully paid. Respondent alleged that she
accepted the sum of money and the promissory note from the defendants because she In his Report, Judge Escano pointed out that respondent misled the court in making it
found that none of the movables found in the house where the defendants were staying appear in her return that the defendants had already vacated the house subject of the
belonged to them. decision when in fact defendants were still living in the same house standing on the
same lot but already renovated by defendant's daughter's common law husband,
When respondent turned over the payment to the complainant, the latter objected to the Raymundo Codilla (Rollo, p. 120).
manner of implementation of the writ, alleging that the same was contrary to the court's
judgment, and maintaining that the defendants were still occupying the subject property. After a careful examination of the record, We find that no valid reasons exist to warrant
Respondent explained that the defendant showed her documents evidencing their respondent's inability to implement the writ insofar as effecting the ejectment of the
granddaughter's title to and ownership of the house they were occupying, as well as their Aguirres from the disputed house is concerned. Respondent should have continued to
son-in-law's ownership of the movables in the said house. implement the writ of execution despite the presence of an alleged claim of a third
person on the subject property pursuant to and as provided for in Sections 13, 15 and 17
Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
unreasonably refusing to implement the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 2171 alleging
among others that the documents referred to by respondent were already considered by This Court had occasion to rule on the remedies of a third person whose property was
the court in the ejectment case. seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of a judgment debtor. The third party
owner may invoke the supervisory power of the court which authorized such execution.
In a resolution dated June 30, 1994, the Court referred the case for investigation, report Upon due application by the third person and after summary hearing, the court may
and recommendation to the Executive Judge Francisco H. Escano, Jr. of the RTC of command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the
Ormoc City, Branch 12. rightful owner or possessor (Sy v. Discaya, 181 SCRA 382 [1990]). In this particular
instance, the said court can determine whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in
During the hearing and investigation of the case, a dispute arose as to whether the the performance of his duties in the execution of judgment. The court cannot pass upon
property owned by complainant included that presently occupied by the Aguirres, the the question of title to the property with the character of finality.
judgment debtors. The parties consented to an ocular inspection of the premises in
dispute. Judge Escano appointed the Clerk of Court of the RTC to act as Commissioner Another remedy which the third person may avail of is the remedy known as terceria as
to conduct the ocular inspection and submit a report thereon. provided in Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. This is done by serving on the
42
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
officer making the levy an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment Respondent failed to follow the procedure laid down by the Rules of Court on execution
creditor. According to the said rule, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, of final judgment. She simply should have filed a return stating why she could not
unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer, indemnifies the execute the writ of execution instead of entering into the "compromise" with the judgment
officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater than the value of the property debtors (the Aguirres), which she is not authorized to do.
levied on. An action for damages may be later on brought against the sheriff.
Executive Judge Escano also found that respondent asked for and received P500.00
The above mentioned remedies are without prejudice to any proper action that a third- from Anita Sumaljag, complainant's niece, to cover expenses for the enforcement of the
party claimant may deem suitable, to vindicate his claim to the property. This proper writ but without rendering an accounting thereof after the execution. Respondent
action is distinct and separate from that in which the judgment is being enforced (Ong v. admitted this fact and must also be found culpable for the said omission.
Tating, 149 SCRA 265 [1987]). Hence, a person other than the judgment debtor who
claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded from taking other legal It is well settled that the sheriff’s duty in the erection of a writ issued by a court is purely
remedies to prosecute his claim (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, ministerial. As stated in the Manual for Clerks of Court, when a writ is placed in the
193 SCRA 158 [1991]). hands of a sheriff, it is his duty in the absence of instructions, to proceed with reasonable
celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate. He has no discretion
It did not help that the Aguirres succeeded in utilizing legal processes to have the house whether to execute it or not (Young v. Momblan, 205 SCRA 33 [1992]).
they were living in titled in the name of their granddaughter, Jeveline Codilla, and the lot
on which it stood transferred to their son-in-law, Raymond Codilla. The latter transfer was In the present case, respondent's duty was to implement the Writ of Execution. His claim
effected in March 2, 1992, after the RTC had already affirmed the MTCC's decision in the that third persons happen to claim the subject property does not justify his partial
ejectment case on February 10, 1992. enforcement of the writ.

In its memorandum report dated July 8, 1994, the Office of the Court Administrator noted From the foregoing, it is very clear that respondent failed to observe the proper
that the declaration of the house on the abandoned river bed in the name of Jeveline procedures laid down by the Rules on execution of final judgments when the property to
Codilla was made to make it appear that Jeveline was the one who built said house. be levied upon is claimed by third persons. Instead, she opted to settle issues raised by
Likewise, the sale from Aguirre to Codilla was done in fraud of creditors. Both the tax the alleged third persons/owners of the subject property which is beyond her power to
declaration of the house in Jeveline Codilla's name and the sale of Jose Aguirre's land to do.
Raymundo Codilla were designed to defeat any judgment rendered against them to pay
complainant back rentals up to 1987 (Memorandum, p. 4), We remind respondent that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice from the presiding judge to the lowliest
The Office of the Court Administrator further surmises that it is possible that respondent clerk should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility (Villamayor v. Cruz,
aided and guided the Aguirres in their legal maneuverings so that the judgment in Jr., 227 SCRA 239 [1993]). They must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate and invigorate
complainant’s favor would be rendered ineffectual, but since there is no solid evidence to the oft-stated principle that a public office is a public trust; all public officers and
back up this suspicion, it must remain as such, a mere suspicion. employees must at all times be accountable to the people, and perform their duties and
responsibility with care and diligence that the nature of those duties demands (Re: Judge
Meanwhile, respondent's acceptance of the sum of P100.00 as initial payment and a Enrique T. Jocson, 227 SCRA 756 [1993]).
promissory note from the Aguirres in satisfaction of the money judgment is another
matter altogether. Respondent acted without and in excess of her official duty in securing As a sheriff, respondent is bound to discharge her duties with prudence, caution and
such manner of payment from the judgment debtors. attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. The
sheriff, an officer of the court upon whom the execution of a final judgment depends must
Under the law, respondent was only authorized to do the following: oust the Aguirres be circumspect and proper in his behavior (Eduarle v. Ramos, A.M. P-94-1069,
from the subject property; place complainant in possession thereof; satisfy back rentals November 9, 1994).
out of the personal properties of the Aguirres, and if personal properties could not be
found, satisfy the money judgment out of the real property of the Aguirres, as required by
Sections 13 and 15 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Ex-Officio Sheriff — Luisa Penserga guilty of
exceeding her authority in enforcing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 2171
and failing to render an accounting of the sum she received for expenses in enforcing the
said writ and hereby imposes upon her a FINE in the sum of P5,000.00 with WARNING
that commission of the same or similar acts or omissions will be dealt with more
severely.SO ORDERED.

44
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. L-37051 August 3l, 1977 On August 3, 1959, respondent presented to the court a motion to declare petitioner, her
ANITA U. LORENZANA, petitioner, vs.POLLY CAYETANO and COURT OF counsel and the sheriff guilty of contempt; that they be punished and held liable in
APPEALS, respondents. damages to the petitioner. The presiding judge held the motion in abeyance until the
decision of the court in the ejectment cases shall have been rendered.
Appeal by certiorari from the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 31082-R
entitled "Polly Cayetano, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Anita U. Lorenzana, et al., Defendants- Acting upon the petitioner's ex-parte motion and urgent motion for demolition in the two
Appellees" and from the resolution of the Court denying petitioner's motion for appealed ejectment cases, Civil Case No. 29664 and Civil Case No. 29665, the court on
reconsideration. September 28, 1959 ordered that "a writ of demolition be issued ordering the Sheriff of
Manila or any of his deputies to demolish any or all improvements erected and existing
We find in this case a perfect example that proves the -validity of that classic legal dictum on the parcel of land subject of the above- entitled cases. which consists of an area of
that a man's house is his castle where the wind may enter, the rain may enter but neither about 700 square meters." (Record on Appeal, p. 55). The writ of demolition was issued
the King nor the King's men may enter without the consent of the owner. by the Sheriff on September 30, 1959.

The records show that 'In 1958, petitioner filled n the Municipal Court of Manila ejectment Upon procurement of this order or demolition, petitioner, together with her counsel and
cases for non-payment of rentals against her tenants occupying different stalls in that the deputy sheriff proceeded once more to respondent's premises on October 1, 1959
quonset hut situated in the San Lazaro Estate (corner of C.M. Recto St. and Quezpn and moved the fence where it was illegally placed by them on July 27, 1959. On the
Blvd., Manila, adjacent to the Bilibid Compound) with a floor area of 360 square meters. same day, October 1, 1959, respondent filed an urgent motion for the suspension of the
leased by her (which she afterwards purchased) from the Manila Railroad Company and execution of the writ of demolition, which motion was denied by the court the next day,
later from the Bureau of Lands together with the use of the land north and wouth of the October 2, 1959.
quonset hut with an area of 340 square meters. The private respondent, on the other
hand, occupied the area north of the quonset hut which area was also leased by her from The records further establish that on November 27, 1959, petitioner, her lawyer, Atty.
the Manila Railroad Company and subsequently from the Bureau of Lands, and on which Paculdo, and Sheriff Cruz went back and moved the fence 1 Meter more into the
her house stood. Hence, the areas occupied by the two principal protagonists are premises of the respondent; that on February 19, 1960, the respondent filed an ex-
adjacent to each other. parte motion to withdraw the petition for contempt on the ground that "conferring with
Judge Bayona after this petition was heard, the petitioner was informed that not being a
The ejectment. cases having been decided by the Municipal Court in favor of the party to the above-numbered cases, she is like an intruder to act on her petition."
petitioner, the same were appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I. The (Record on Appeal, p. 80).
Court affirmed the decision of the municipal court and ordered the defendants-tenants to
vacate the premises leased. Upon refusal of the tenants to vacate the premises, the On October 1, 1959, the respondent Polly Cayetano filed in the Court of First Instance of
court granted a partial execution of the judgment and on July 20, 1959, a writ of Manila, Civil Case No. 42001 against the petitioner Anita U. Lorenzana, Atty. Nereo J.
demolition was issued, specifically commanding the Sheriff of Manila "to demolish the Paculdo and Deputy Sheriff Jose L. Cruz for damages with mandatory injunction. The
premises subject of the above-name cases" (Record on Appeal, p. 4). defendants therein filed a motion to dismiss, which was opposed by the plaintiff, and the
Court, Branch XVII, denied on December 19, 1959 the motion to dismiss and the petition
Thereupon on July 27, 1959, Petitioner together with her counsel, Atty. Nereo Paculdo for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The defendants filed their answers.
and Deputy Sheriff Jose L. Cruz proceeded and entered the premises of the respondent
and in spite of her protests that she was not a party to the ejectment cases in which the Under date of March 9, 1962, the Court issued the Decision dismissing the complaint of
demolition order was secured and that her premises was not subject of said ejectment the plaintiff as well as the counterclaim of the defendants Anita U. Lorenzana and Atty.
cases, they destroyed the latter's fence including flower pots trellises and electric Nereo J. Paculdo for lack of sufficient evidence. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
installations and carted away the materials thereof and built another fence 5 meters into the plaintiff but denied by the Court. Not satisfied with the Decision of the Court, Polly
the premises of the respondent, boring holes into the cemented garden or patio of her Cayetano appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision
house. appealed from, and ordered "defendant-appellee Lorenzana to restore to appellant the
possession of the property invaded and occupied by her as shown in Exh. L-1 to L-4; to
put back appellant's fence and other valuable improvements in their place before the writ
45
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
of demolition was served; ordering defendants, Lorenzana and Cruz, to pay jointly and We also find no merit in the contention of the petitioner that respondent having been duly
severally to the plaintiff-appellant the sum of P5,500.00 as actual and moral damages, heard by the Court, she was not deprived of her day in court and was accorded the due
and pay the costs, except defendant, Paculdo." process of law.

The above Decision is now sought to be reviewed in the instant petition for certiorari It cannot be said that the constitutional requirements of due process were sufficiently
upon the following assignment of errors: 1. That the Court of Appeals erred in holding complied with because the respondent had been duly heard. Indeed, respondent was
that the writ of demolition issued by Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Manila heard but simply hearing her did not fulfill the basic conditions of procedural due process
presided over by Judge Bayona could not be legally effected against respondent Polly in courts. When respondent appeared before the court to protect and preserve her
Cayetano; II. That the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the private respondent's property, the Court had not lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the property of the
failure to pursue her remedy before a higher court did not to amount a waiver of her respondent because the premises of the respondent was not included in the ejectment
rights; III. The Court of Appeals erred in holding in effect that a writ of execution and an cases and the judgment in said cases could not affect her property, much less demolish
order of demolition can be collaterally attacked in an action specifically brought for the same. In the leading case of El Banco-Españ;ol-Filipino v. Palanca 3 cited
recovery of damages; and IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the issuance of in Macabingkil v. Yatco, et al., 4 We laid down the court's constitutional requirements of due
the writ of demolition by Judge Bayona was in violation of Section 14, Rule 39. process, thus -

This case hinges on the legal effects of the writs of demolition issued in the ejectment As applied to judicial proceedings. . . it may be laid down with certainty that the
cases wherein the respondent was not a party thereto . The writs were issued by virtue requirements of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present
of the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch I), the namely: (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear
dispositive portion of which states, as follows: "WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over
condemning the defendants ... to vacate the premises; ordering herein defendants... to the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the
pay rent to plaintiff ... plus attorney's fees and costs." proceedings: (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4)
judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
The petitioner contends that the respondent having voluntarily appeared before the court
and invoked its jurisdiction seeking affirmative relief by filing on August 3, 1959, a petition Respondent pursued various steps to protect her property from the invasion and
to declare Lorenzana, Atty. Paculdo and Sheriff Cruz in contempt and holding them liable encroachment of the petitioner, abetted by her counsel and the deputy Sheriff. She filed
in damages, and by filing on October 1, 1959, an urgent petition for the suspension of the a motion for contempt; she protested to the Sheriff of Manila; she appealed to the
execution of the writ of demolition, she could no longer contest the efficacy of the writ. Director of the Bureau of Lands; she filed an urgent motion to suspend the writ of
There is no merit to this contention and We find no error in the ruling of the Court of demolition. Although the motions for contempt and for suspension wer heard by the
Appeals that the writ of demolition could not be legally effected against the respondent. court, such action s taken af ter the jugdgment had become final and executory did not
make the respondent a party litigant in the ejectment cases. The respondent remained a
It must be noted that respondent was not a party to any of the 12 ejectment cases stranger to the case and she cannot be bound by the judgment rendered therein, nor by
wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did not make her appearance in the writs of execution and demolition issued in pursuance to said judgment.—
and during the pendency of these ejectment cases. Respondent only went to court to Intervening as a prejudiced owner of improvements being wrongly demolished merely to
protect her property from demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had oppose such order of demolition upon learning that the said order was directed against
become final and executory. Hence, with respect to the judgment in said ejectment premises not her own, is not the same as being a party to the suit to the extent of being
cases, respondent remains a third person to such judgement, which does not bind bound by the judgment in the case where such order of demolition was
her; 1 nor can its writ of execution be enforced against her since she was not afforded her day issued. 5Furthermore, it must be noted that said petitions were filed after the promulgation of
in court in said ejectment cases. 2 the decision in the ejectment cases and while in the process of execution. lt. is not proper to
speak of an intention in a case already terminated by final judgment .6
The vital legal point here is that respondent did not derive her right or interest from the
defendants-tenants nor from the plaintiff-landlord (the herein petitioner) but from the Respondent, not being bound thereby, may avail herself of the proper action afforded by
Bureau of Lands from which she had leased the property. She is neither a party nor Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the proceedings where
successor in interest to any of the litigants in the ejectment cases. property levied upon is claimed by a third person, stating as follows:
46
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
...Tile officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of the property to any We see no merit in the claim that the denial or dismissal of Potenciano's claim in
third-party claimant unless a claim is made by the latter- and unless an action for the court below constitutes a bar to the present action. Potenciano, it is true, did
damages is brought by him against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from not appeal, from the disapproval of his claim. But it should be borne in mind that
the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained shall prevent such appeal is not proper in such cases. (Queblar v. Garduñ;o supra). As was said in
claimant o any third person ffrom windicating his claim to the property by any proper that case, the appeal that should be interposed "if the term 'appeal' may properly
action... (Emphasis supplied) be employed, is a separate reivindicatory action against the execution creditor or
the purchaser of the property after the sale at public auction, or complaint for
Respondent acted within and exercised her right when she filed the proper action to damages to be charged against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of
vindicate her claim afforded to her by Sec. 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the sheriff." Such reivindicatory action is resurged to the third-party claimant by
against the instruders or trespassers before the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch Section 15 (now 17) of Rule 39 despite disapproval of his claim by the court
XVII, in Civil Case No. 42001 for dam with mandatory injunction. If she did not insist on itself. (Planas v. Madrigal & Co., supra; Lara v. Bayona, L-7920, May 10, 1955),
her motion for contempt which the court held in abeyance and was later withdrawn by and it is the action availed by Potenciano in this case.
her, if she did not appeal from the order of the court denying her motion to suspend the
writ of demolition, such failure did not amount to a waiver of her right to pursue the The petitioner contends that a writ of execution and an order of demolition cannot be
proper action or remedy provided to her by the Rules of Court. It is of no moment that the collaterally attacked in an action specifically brought for recovery of damages, and that
respondent did not file a motion to quash the writ of execution or file a petition for relief said action for damages and mandatory injunction (Civil Case No. 42001) filed by the
under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court or file a petition for certiorari and prohibition respondent with Branch XVII was nothing less than an action to review the validity of the
with a higher court after her petition to suspend the writ of demolition had been denied as order of demolition issued by Branch I in the ejectment cases which have long become
suggested by petitioner. The law has specifically given her the remedies to vindicate her final.
claim to the property. When the property of one person is unlawfully taken by another,
the former has a right of action against the latter for the recovery of the property or for We are not in accord with this contention. The civil case filed by the respondent for
damages for the taking or retention, and he is entitled to his choice of these two damages and the restoration of the property destroyed aid her premises taken unlawfully
remedies. 7 under the writ of demolition was not brought to reverse, impugn or set aside the
judgment in the ejectment cases but to declare that the writ of demolition should not have
We find no legal compulsion for respondent to pursue the remedies suggested by the been applied to that portion of the land and the building occupied by her, as correctly
petitioner, for the rights of a third party claimant should not be decided in the action stated by the Court of Appeals. To put it succinctly the judgment and the demolition
where the third-party claim has been presented, but in a separate action to be instituted orders were valid and binding to the tenants but not to the respondent and her property.
by the third person. 8 In Queblar v. Garduñ;o 9 this Court held that: Fundamentally, it is the wrongful execution of the judgment and the writ that is the basis
of the claim for damages.
Strictly speaking, the appeal interposed by the third-party claimant- appellant is
improper, because she was not one of the parties in the action who were If the judgment and the writs of execution and demolition were alleged in the complaint
exclusively Venancio Queblar as plaintiff and Leonardo Garduñ;o as defendant. for damages, this was not necessarily a collateral attack on said processes of another
Considering the provisions of said section 451 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as branch of the Court but averments to prove the wrongful, illegal and unauthorized
amended by Act No. 4108, the appealed order was not appealable. The appeal exercise of the writs; it is merely a statement of the legal basis which the sheriff
that should have been interposed by her, if the term "appeal" may properly be exceeded, abetted by the petitioner.
employed, is a separate reivindicatory action against the execution creditor or the
purchaser of her property after the sale at public auction, or a complaint for The contention of the petitioner that a branch of a Court of First Instance cannot interfere
damages to be charged against the bond filed by the judgment creditor in favor of with or nullify decisions, orders or proceedings of another branch of the same court and
the sheriff. therefore the writs of execution and demolition cannot be impugned is not exactly on all
fours with and hence not applicable to the case at bar. The settled rule has been clearly
In Potenciano v. Dineros, 10 We ruled that: laid down in Abiera v. Court of Appeals, 11 wherein the Court, after a review of the doctrines
in Cabigao v. Del Rosario & Lim, 44 Phil. 192; Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., v. Ramos,
88 Phil. 94; Hacbang, et al. v. Hon. Clementino Diez, 8 SCRA 103 (May 30,1963)
47
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
and National Power Corporation v. Hon. Jesus de Veyra 3 SCRA 646 (Dec. 22,1961), held SO ORDERED.
that —

No court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a


court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the
relief sought by injunction.

For this doctrine to apply, the injunction issued by one court must interfere with
the judgment or decree issued by another court of equal or coordinate jurisdiction
and the relief sought by such injunction must be one which could be granted by
the court which rendered the judgment or issued the decree.

Under Section 17 of Rule 39 a third person who claims property levied upon on
execution may vindicate such claim by action. A judgment rendered in his favor
—- declaring him to be the owner of' the property — would not constitute
interference with the powers or processes of the court which rendered the
judgment to enforce which the execution was levied. If that be so — and it is so
because the property, being that of a stranger, is not subject to levy — then an
interlocutory order, such as injunction, upon a claim and prima facie showing of
ownership by the claimant, cannot be considered as such interference either

The right of a person who claims to be the owner of property levied upon on
execution to file a third-party claim with the sheriff is not exclusive, and he may
file an action to vindicate his claim even if the judgment creditor files an
indemnity bond in favor of the sheriff to answer for any damages that may be
suffered by the third-party claimant. By "action," as stated in the Rule, what is
meant is a separate and independent action.

With respect to the fourth assignment of error, petitioner's contention appears to be quite
tenable in that under See. 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court which the Court of
Appeals applied, the notice required before demolition of the improvements on the
property subject of the execution, is notice to the judgment debtor, and not to a stranger
or third party to the case like the private respondent herein. Nonetheless, the claim that
the Court of Appeals misconstrued the aforecited Rule is as immaterial and
inconsequential as the application of this legal provision is superflous and unnecessary
for the affirmance of the Court's decision.

The Manifestation filed by petitioner in the records dated June 1, 1977 with Annexes A,
B, C and D, is Noted.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is dismissed, and the appealed
judgment is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

48
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. L-49576 November 21, 1991 adverse claim with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, claiming that they had become the
JOSEFINA B. CENAS and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, petitioners, vs.PS. absolute owners of the property by virtue of Certificate of Redemption, dated July 20,
ANTONIO P. SANTOS and DRA. ROSARIO M. SANTOS and HON. PEDRO C. 1977, issued by the City Sheriff of Quezon City; and on May 11, 1978, filed with the
NAVARRO, Presiding Judge, CFI-Rizal, Br. III, respondents. respondent court a verified Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction to enjoin
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal from proceeding with the public auction sale of the property
This is a petition for review on certiotari seeking to annual and set aside the August 28, in question. To this petition, petitioners filed their Answer on May 18, 1978.
1978 decision ** of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 20435
enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal and any other person in his behalf from Private respondents filed a Motion to Amend Petition together with the Amended Petition,
proceeding with the auction sale predicted upon the petition for extra-judicial foreclosure which was opposed by the petitioners. The trial court, in its Order of July 17, 1978,
prayed for by petitioner Josefina B. Cenas; and the December 4, 1978 Order of the same denied the motion and ordered the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda.
court denying the motion for reconsideration.
After the parties have submitted their respective memoranda, the trial court rendered its
On May 3, 1976, the spouses Jose Pulido and Iluminada M. Pulido mortgaged to Pasay judgment dated August 28, 1978 in favor of private respondents, the dispositive portion
City Savings and Loan Association, Inc. their land covered by TCT No. 471634, subject of which reads:
of this case, to secure a loan of P10,000.00. The said mortgage was registered with the
Registry of Deeds on the same date and was duly annotated in the title of the property. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial Sheriff of Rizal
and any other persons acting in his behalf are hereby enjoined from proceeding
On May 18, 1976, the said mortgaged land was levied upon by the City Sheriff of with the auction sale predicated upon the petition for extra-judicial foreclosure
Quezon City pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the then Court of First Instance of prayed for by respondent Josefina B. Cenas.
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-2029 entitled, "Milagros C. Punzalan vs. Iluminada
Manuel-Pulido"; and eventually, on July 19, 1976, the same was sold to herein petitioner The trial court held that the redemption of the subject property effected by the herein
Josefina B. Cenas who was the highest bidder in the execution sale. private respondents, "wipe out and extinguished the mortgage executed by the Pulido
spouses favor of the Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc."
On January 18, 1977, Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc. assigned to
petitioner Cenas all its rights, interests, and participation to the said mortgage, for the Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial court, in its Order of December
sum of P8,110.00, representing the unpaid principal obligation of the Pulidos as of 4, 1978, denied the same. Hence, the instant petition.
October 6, 1976, including interest due and legal expenses. Thus, petitioner became the
purchaser at the public auction sale of the subject property as well as the assignee of the The First Division of this Court, in the Resolution of March 2, 1979, gave due course to
mortgage constituted thereon. the petition. Petitioners failed to file their brief on June 9, 1979 while respondents failed
to file their brief within the required period. Consequently, this case was considered
On July 19, 1977, herein private respondent Dra. Rosario M. Santos redeemed the said submitted for decision without respondent's brief in the resolution of November 26, 1979.
property, paying the total sum of P15,718.00, and was accordingly issued by the City
Sheriff of Quezon City a Certificate of Redemption. Petitioners raised two (2) assignment of errors, to wit:

On April 17, 1977, petitioner Cenas, as the assignee of the mortgage loan of the Pulidos I
which remained unpaid, filed with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, a verified
petition for extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage constituted over the subject
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRE-EXISTING MORTGAGE
property. Accordingly, the subject property was advertised for sale at public auction on
OBLIGATION OF THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR CONSTITUTFD ON HER PROPERTY
May 15, 1978.
WAS WIPED OUT AND EXTINGUISHED UPON THE PAYMENT OF THE
REDEMPTION PRICE WITH THE SHERIFF REPRESENTING THE PURCHASE PRICE
On the other hand, private respondents, spouses Antonio P. Santos and Dra. Rosario M. PLUS INTEREST DUE THEREON WITH THE REDEMPTION PERIOD OF ONE (1)
Santos, apprised of the impending auction sale of the said property, filed an affidavit of

49
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
YEAR FROM THE DATE OF THE EXECUTION SALE OF THE SAID PROPERTY TO Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, provides for the time, manner and the amount
SATISFY THE JUDGMENT DEBT OF THE SAID JUDGMENT DEBTOR. to be paid to redeem a sold by virtue of a writ of execution. Pertinent portion reads:

II Sec. 30. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions.
Notice to be given and filed. — The judgment debtor, or redemptioner, may
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE INSTANT ACTION FILED BY redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within twelve (12) months
THE HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR NOT BEING PROSECUTED IN THE after the sale, on paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per
NAME OF THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST AS PROVIDED BY SECTION 2, RULE 3 centum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption,
OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT. together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may
have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last-named amount at the
The instant petition is impressed with merit. same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the
redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made,
the amount of such other lien, with interest. . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
There appears to be no question that respondents Santos spouses are the real parties in
interest in this case.
Under the above-quoted provision, if the purchaser is also a creditor having a prior lien to
that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made,
Under Section 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a real property sold by virtue of a writ of
the redemptioner has to pay, in addition to the prescribed amounts, such other prior lien
execution, may be redeemed by —
of the creditor-purchaser with interest.
(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the whole or any part of
In the instant case, it will be recalled that on May 3,1976, the Pulidos mortgaged the
the property;
subject property to Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc. who, in turn, on
January 8, 1977, assigned the same to petitioner Cenas. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1976,
(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or mortgage on the property pursuant to the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-2029 (Petitioner Cenas is not
sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the judgment under which the a party in this case No. Q-2029), the subject property was sold to petitioner Cenas, being
property was sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed redemptioner. (Emphasis the highest bidder in the execution sale. On July 19, 1977, private respondent Dra.
supplied) Rosario M. Santos redeemed the subject property. Therefore, there is no question that
petitioner Cenas as assignee of the mortgage constituted over the subject property, is
The judgment debtor, whose property was levied on execution, may transfer his right of also a creditor having a prior (mortgage) lien to that of Dra. Rosario M. Santos.
redemption to anyone whom he may desire. The term "successor in interest" includes, Accordingly, the acceptance of the redemption amount by petitioner Cenas, without
among others, one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for the demanding payment of her prior lien — the mortgage obligation of the Pulidos — cannot
purpose of redemption (Magno v. Viola de Soto, 61 Phil. 80). It is not disputed that Dra. wipe out and extinguish said mortgage obligation. The mortgage directly and immediately
Rosario M. Santos as an assignee of her sister Iluminada M. Pulido's right of redemption, subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the
redeemed the questioned property as "successor in interest" of said judgment debtor. fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted (Art. 2126, Civil Code).
The latter interposed no objection thereto while petitioner Josefina Cenas acceded Otherwise stated, a mortgage creates a real right which is enforceable against the whole
unconditionally to the redemption of the property sold on execution. world. Hence, even if the mortgaged property is sold (Art. 2128) or its possession
transferred to another (Art. 2129), the property remains subject to the fulfillment of the
However, the main issue in this case is whether or not the redemption of the questioned obligation for whose security it was constituted (Padilla, Civil Code annotated, Vol. VII, p.
property by herein private respondents wiped out and extinguished the pre-existing 207, 1975 ed.).
mortgage obligation of the judgment debtor, Iluminada M. Pulido for the security of which
(mortgage debt) the subject property had been encumbered. It will be noted that Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is silent as to the effect of the
acceptance by the purchaser, who is also a creditor, having a prior lien to that of the
The answer is in the negative. redemptioner, of the redemption amount, without demanding payment of her prior lien.
Neither does it provide whether or not the redemption of the property sold in execution
50
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
sale freed the redeemed property from prior liens. However, where the prior lien consists
of a mortgage constituted on the property redeemed, as in the case at bar, such
redemption does not extinguish the mortgage (Art. 2126). Furthermore, a mortgage
previously registered, like in the instant case, cannot be prejudiced by any subsequent
lien or encumbrance annotated at the back of the certificate of title (Gonzales v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 587 [1988]).

Moreover, it must be stressed that private respondents redeemed the property in


question as "successor in interest" of the judgment debtor, and as such are deemed
subrogated to the rights and obligations of the judgment debtor and are bound by exactly
the same condition relative to the redemption of the subject property that bound the latter
as debtor and mortgagor (Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 125 [1989]; citing the case
of Gorospe vs. Santos, G.R. No. L-30079, January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 191). Private
respondents, by stepping in the judgment debtor's shoes, had the obligation to pay the
mortgage debt, otherwise, the debt would and could be enforced against the property
mortgaged (Tambunting vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 176 SCRA 493 [1989]).

Nevertheless, considering the lapse of time that the parties have been in status quo and
the fact that private respondents erroneously believed that the questioned property was
freed from any lien after the redemption, equity dictates that the foreclosure be allowed
only after the private respondents shall have been afforded the chance to settle the
mortgage obligation but failed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the questioned August 28, 1978 judgment of the trial court is Reversed
and Set Aside. Petitioner Josefina B. Cenas may proceed with the foreclosure of the
mortgaged property after the private respondents shall have failed to settle the mortgage
debt plus interest and legal expenses, within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision.

SO ORDERED.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. L-53798 November 8, 1988 question from Valentin in the amount of P100,00.00. Atty. Roxas also told Sheriff Nanquil
ALBERTO C. ROXAS and NENITA DE GUIA, petitioners, vs.MARINA BUAN, COURT that he introduced improvements consisting of one bungalow house and one store and
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBALES, BRANCH 1 AND THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF that Valentin is no longer residing in the premises [See Petition, Annex "F", p. 20, Rollo].
OF ZAMBALES THRU HIS DEPUTY, ATILANO G. NANQUIL, respondents.
In view of the petitioners' refusal to abide by the writ of possession, private respondent
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, the petitioners filed on August 30, 1979 a "Motion for Contempt" against Alberto Roxas and Nenita de
question the order of the Court of First Instance of Zambales dated January 16, 1980, Guia. On September 12, 1979, the petitioners through counsel filed with the respondent
placing respondent Marina Buan, the purchaser in a foreclosure suit, in possession of a court their answer thereto arguing that they cannot be held guilty of contempt of court
house and lot claimed to belong to the petitioner Alberto C. Roxas. because they were not made parties to the main action.

The antecedent facts are as follows: On August 19, 1975, Arcadio Valentin constituted a On January 16, 1980, the respondent trial court, finding merit in petitioners' position that
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage on a two-storey residential house and lot in favor of they could not be declared in contempt, issued an order the dispositive portion of which
private respondent, Marina Buan, to secure the loan of P78,328.08 granted by the latter reads as follows:
to the former.
WHEREFORE, the petition for contempt of Court against the adverse claimant
Upon failure of Valentin to pay the loan on its maturity date, Buan applied for an Atty. Alberto Roxas and Mrs. Nenita de Guia is DISMISSED. The respondents
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage which was duly published and advertised for public Atty. Alberto Roxas and Mrs. Nenita de Guia are, however, ordered to
auction by Olongapo City Sheriff Ramon Y. Pardo on September 29, 1977. Private immediately vacate the disputed house and lot in question within a period of
respondent was the winning bidder in the auction sale and the City Sheriff issued a fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order under pain of contempt of Court. [p.
Certificate of Sale duly registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds on October 26, 31, Rollo.]
1977. Valentin had a period of one (1) year from the date of registration within which to
redeem the mortgaged properties. The period for the redemption of the property in Disagreeing with the portion of the order directing them to vacate the property,
question having expired without the property being redeemed by Valentin, a Final Bill of petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 28, 1980. However, the
Sale was thereafter issued by the City Sheriff or, November 3, 1978. respondent court, denied their motion on February 28, 1980.

After Valentin failed to deliver possession of the properties, Buan filed before the Court of Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition on April 12, 1979.
First Instance of Zambales a "Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession." As this This Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on May 19, 1980.
was not contested, a decision was rendered by respondent court on June 19, 1979, the
dispositive portion of which reads: The petitioners maintain that the respondent court gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order complained of, upon the theory that it
WHEREFORE, let the corresponding writ of possession be issued ordering the was predicated upon a writ of possession which was ineffective as against them, being
Provincial Sheriff of Zambales or any of his lawful deputies to remove the third parties. Thus, the order is null and void. They also insist that the private respondent
respondent or any person claiming interest under him from said house and lot should file an independent action to recover the property, otherwise, there will be a
located at No. 9-B Katipunan St., East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, and to place violation of due process of law if they are not given their day in court to prove their
the petitioner in possession thereon. The respondent is also ordered to pay the adverse claim.
petitioner the amount of P1,000.00 as reasonable attorney's fees, plus costs of
suit. [ Emphasis supplied.] [Petition, Annex "C", p. 16, Rollo.] The Court finds petitioners' contention without any legal or factual basis.

A writ of possession addressed to the Provincial Sheriff of Zambales was issued on In the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages, possession of the property may
August 22, 1979. The return on the writ as embodied in the Sheriff's Report dated August be awarded to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale during the pendency of the period of
28, 1979 showed that when Deputy Sheriff Atilano G. Nanquil tried to execute the writ of redemption under the terms provided in Sec. 6 of Act 3135, as amended (An Act to
possession, he found that petitioners were occupying the premises and refused to vacate Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special Powers Inserted In or Annexed to Real
the same, on the alleged claim of Atty. Roxas that he bought the house and lot in
52
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
Estate Mortgages), or after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a That I ordered the adverse occupants Atty. Alberto Roxas to vacate the premises
separate and independent action [IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corp. v. Nera, of the house and lot in question on or before August 27, 1979;
G.R. No.
L-21720, January 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 181]. This is founded on his right of ownership That up to the present, Atty. Alberto Roxas and Mrs. Nenita de Guia refused to
over the property which he purchased at the auction sale and his consequent right to be vacate the same, claiming that the house and lot in question was bought by the
placed in possession thereof. former from the said defendant in the amount of P100,000.00 and he also
introduced improvements thereon consisting of one (1) bungalow house and one
This rule is, however, not without exception. Under Sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Revised (1) store;
Rules of Court, which was made applicable to the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgages by Sec. 6 Act No. 3135, the possession of the mortgaged property may be That defendant Arcadio Valentin is no longer residing on the properties in
awarded to a purchaser in extrajudicial foreclosures "unless a third party is actually question. [p. 20, Rollo.]
holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor." [Clapano v. Gapultos, G.R. Nos.
51574-77, September 30, 1984, 132 SCRA 429, 434; Philippine National Bank v. Adil, Contending that petitioner Roxas is a party actually holding the property adversely to the
G.R. No. 52823, November 2, 1982, 118 SCRA 110; IFC Service Leasing and debtor, Arcadio Valentin, petitioners argue that under the provisions of Act No. 3135 they
Acceptance Corp. v. Nera, supra.] As explained by the Court in IFC Service Leasing and cannot be ordered to vacate the property. Hence, the question of whether, under the
Acceptance Corp. v. Nera, supra: circumstances, petitioner Roxas indeed is a party actually holding the property adversely
to Valentin.
... The applicable provision of Act No. 3135 is Section 6 which provides that, in
cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made, "redemption shall be governed by It will be recalled that Roxas' possession of the property was premised on its alleged sale
the provisions of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty- to him by Valentin for the amount of P100,000.00. Assuming this to be true, it is readily
six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure in so far as these are not apparent that Roxas holds title to and possesses the property as Valentin's transferee.
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." Sections 464-466 of the Code of Civil Any right he has to the property is necessarily derived from that of Valentin. As
Procedure were superseded by Sections 25-27 and Section 31 of Rule 39 of the transferee, he steps into the latter's shoes. Thus, in the instant case, considering that the
Rules of Court which in turn were replaced by Sections 29-31 and Section 35 of property had already been sold at public auction pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure,
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 35 of the Revised Rules of Court the only interest that may be transferred by Valentin to Roxas is the right to redeem it
expressly states that "If no redemption be made within twelve (12) months after within the period prescribed by law. Roxas is therefore the successor-in-interest of
the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled to a conveyance and Valentin, to whom the latter had conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of
possession of the property ..." The possession of the property shall be given to redemption [Rule 39, Sec. 29 (a) of the Revised Rules of Court; Magno v. Viola, 61 Phil.
the purchaser or last redemptioner by the officer unless a party is actually holding 80 (1934); Rosete v. Prov. Sheriff of Zambales, 95 Phil. 560 (1954).] Consequently,
the property adversely to the judgment debtor. [Id. at 184-185; Emphasis in the Roxas' occupancy of the property cannot be considered adverse to Valentin.
original.]
Thus, in Belleza v. Zandaga [98 Phil. 702 (1956)], the Court held that where the
In the instant case, respondent Deputy Sheriff Atilano G. Nanquil reported the following purchaser in an execution sale has already received the definitive deed of sale, he
in his return on the writ of possession: becomes the owner of the property bought and, as absolute owner, he is entitled to its
possession and cannot be excluded therefrom by one who merely claims to be a
This certifies that I have personally served a copy of the Writ of Possession "successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor," unless it is adjudged that the alleged
together with a copy of the Notice to vacate issued in the above-entitled case successor has a better right to the property than the purchaser at the execution sale.
upon the defendant Arcadio Valentin and upon the adverse occupants Atty. Stated differently, the purchaser's right of possession is recognized only as against the
Alberto Roxas and Mrs. Nenita de Guia on August 23, 1979. judgment debtor and his successor-in-interest but not against persons whose right of
possession is adverse to the latter. The rule was reiterated in Guevara v. Ramos [G.R.
That undersigned had explained to them the contents of said writ; No. L-24358, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 194].

53
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
The rule in Belleza, although relating to the possession of property sold in execution
sales under what is now Sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, is also
applicable to the possession of property sold at extrajudicial foreclosure sales pursuant
to Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135 [see IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corp. v.
Nera, supra]. Thus, as petitioner Roxas is not a party holding the property adversely to
Valentin, being the latter's successor-in-interest, there was no bar to the respondent trial
court's issuance of a w.-it of possession upon private respondent Buan's application.

It does not matter that petitioner Roxas was not specifically named in the writ of
possession, as he merely stepped into the shoes of Valentin, being the latter's
successor-in-interest. On the other hand, petitioner de Guia was occupying the house as
Roxas' alleged tenant [Rollo, p. 24]. Moreover, respondent court's decision granting
private respondent Buan's petition for the issuance of a writ of possession ordered the
Provincial Sheriff of Zambales or any of his deputies to remove Valentin or any person
claiming interest under him" from the property [Rollo, p. 16]. Undeniably, petitioners fell
under this category.

As petitioners have failed to establish that grave abuse of discretion, as would warrant
the issuance of the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for, tainted the issuance of the
assailed order, the petition must fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order
issued by the Court on May 19, 1980 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

54
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. 87140 September 7, 1989 bills of defendant the sums equivalent to 25% thereof, as shown graphically in
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, Exh. 'A-2- Motion' from October 15, 1983 to October 11, 1985. As reflected in
Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 8, DOMINADOR B. ADRIANO, Deputy Sheriff, ALLIED Exh. 'A-Motion' an amount of P 51,745,319.15 was due to defendant as of
CONTROL & ELECTRIC CORPORATION, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL December 31, 1982 and after deducting the 25%, a balance of P37,532,763.17
BANK, respondents. was left due to defendant (Exh. 'A-3- Motion' and Exh. 'A-5-Motion'). However, ...
when defendant ceased operation in 1985 it left unpaid electric power bills in the
Highlighted by the special civil action of certiorari at bar is the regrettable lack of amount of P15,941,625.35 plus interest of P2,643,514.76 as of August, 1986 or
familiarity with and the consequent misapplication of procedural rules governing in the total amount of P18,585,140.11 (Exh. 'A-6- Motion'); deduct this from the
execution of final judgments. P37,532,763.17 and a balance of P18,947.623.06 was left due to defendant but
Mr. Vinoya further testified that it is not due to Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. but
The instant action arose from an attempt to execute a final judgment rendered on a balance of the advances made by Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. in the
October 8, 1987 in Civil Case No. 8739301 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 1 The construction of the power lines (TSN, p. 24, Sept. 26,1988).
case had been instituted by Allied Control and Electric Corporation (hereafter, simply ACEC)
to recover a sum of money from Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. (hereafter, BBGMI). The On the strength of this testimony -- which included, it must be stressed, a denial by the
judgment ordered BBGMI to pay ACEC its indebtedness of P 264,401.00 interest thereon at witness that the amount of P18,947,623.06 was due to BBGMI, this being "but a balance
the rate of 16% per annum and "penalty charge" at 3% per month beginning May 15, 1985, of the advances made by ... (the latter) in the construction of the power lines respondent
and the further sum of P 66,100.00 equivalent to 25% of the overdue obligation as attorney's Judge resolved to direct the NPC to pay ACEC "its judgment rendered in October 8,1987
fees. The judgment having become final, execution was ordered by the Court at ACEC's out of the remaining credit NPC holds in favor of defendant," and ordered his deputy
instance on December 18, 1987. sheriff (respondent Adriano) "to garnish and attach the said credit due Batong Buhay
Gold Mines, Inc." In justification His Honor invoked Section 15, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Evidently the attempt at execution failed. Hence, ACEC filed on August 19, 1988 an "Ex- Court, authorizing the sheriff charged with execution of a money judgment to levy on
Parte Motion for Examination of Debtor of Judgment Debtor," alleging that the National "debts" and "credits" 3 in addition to "real property, stocks, shares, .. and other personal
Power Corporation (NPC) was a debtor of BBGMI and praying that certain officials of the property, or any interest in either real or personal property," pointing out, too, that the NPC
NPC be required to appear before the Court and examined regarding its debt to BBGMI. official, Vinoya, had later admitted that "this amount of P18,947,623.06 is due to defendant
This was granted by respondent Judge, who scheduled the examination 49 on Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. (tsn. pp. 28-29, Sept. 28, 1988; tsn p. 5 Oct. 21, 1988)."
September 28, 1988 and on posterior dates." The Manager of NPCs General Accounts Sheriff Adriano accordingly garnished such of the funds of the NPC on deposit at the
Division, Ariel Vinoya, appeared in response to subpoena and was duly examined on Philippine National Bank, Escolta, Manila, as were "sufficient to cover the sum" required to be
oath. The gist of his testimony is set out in respondent Judge's Order of November paid by respondent Judge's Decision of October 8, 1987.
15,1988 2 viz:
The NPC filed a "Manifestation" dated December 20, 1988 for the avowed "purpose of
... Witness testified that sometime in 1980, National Power Corporation and bringing to .. (respondent) Court's attention certain facts and information in respect of its
defendant Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. entered into an agreement, whereby at Order dated November 15, 1988 " 4 these being:
that time Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. needed the supply of electricity from
NPC, however, at that time there was no transmission lines connecting the 1) the Court had "no jurisdiction to issue the Order of November 15,1988 ... since movant
mining site to the lines of NPC and it was not yet within the program of activities NPC was never a party in the said civil case ..(h)ence, the aforesaid Order of
of NPC to construct those lines. Thus, Batong Buhay ... offered to finance the Garnishment is null and void insofar as movant NPC is concerned;"
construction of the line which they did (TSN, pp. 16-17, Sept. 28, 1988). Under
that arrangement, NPC is going to reimburse Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. the 2) NPC was "not in possession nor in control of any ..property belonging to BBGMI nor
amount that they have spent for the construction of the line by crediting 25% of does BBGMI have any receivable of whatsoever kind and nature from NPC;" and NPC
defendant's monthly electric power bills until the actual cost shall have been fully ceased to have any "legal obligation to pay or amortize the balance of the cost of the
paid and without interest (1st paragraph, Exh. B-2) ... (T)he transmission lines transmission line constructed by BBGMI" after the latter ceased operations," a
were in fact erected and installed by defendant and NPC supplied electric power proposition shown by the following circumstances:
to the mining site and as agreed upon NPC deducted from the monthly power

55
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
a) the "transmission line from the mining site of ... BBGMI to the lines of the NPC The Court subsequently gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
which was financed and constructed by BBGMI was a dedicated line for BBGMI submit memoranda. Said memoranda have since been received.
mine site ... (and) was intended and was only utilized for ... supplying electric
power from the NPC lines to the ... mine site; The Court rules that in authorizing the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 87-
39301 against l stranger to the action, on the theory that the latter was a "debtor of the
b) according to Vinoya, "under the arrangement between NPC and BBGMI, the judgment debtor," respondent Judge was guilty of grave abuse of discretion tantamount
former is going to reimburse BBGMI the amount that the latter spent for the to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
construction of the line by crediting 25% of BBGMI's monthly electric bill until the
actual cost shall have been fully amortized and paid without interest;" but Vinoya It is true that Rule 39 empowers a Court to order the examination of a judgment debtor.
failed to state or stress "that under the same arrangement ... it is only after full This is clear from Section 39 of the rule:
payment and amortization by NPC of the total cost of the transmission line
financed and constructed by BBGMI that ownership of said transmission line will SEC. 39. Examination of debtor of judgment debtor.- After an execution against
be transferred ... to NPC; the property of a judgment debtor has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in
part, and upon proof, by affidavit of a party or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the
c) the NPC-BBGMI "Agreement was rendered inoperative and ineffective by judge, that a person, corporation, or other legal entity has property of such
reason of the breach thereof by BBGMI when it ceased operation in 1985 ... (for judgment debtor, or is indebted to him, the judge may, by an order, require such
the) cessation of operation ... resulted in the stoppage of the supply of electric person, corporation or other legal entity, or any officer or member thereof, to
power by NPC to BBGMI and likewise effectively removed or did away with the appear before the judge, or a commissioner appointed by him, at a time a place
agreed mechanics by which NPC is to pay/amortize the cost of the transmission within the province in which the order is served, to answer concerning the same.
line as agreed upon;' it resulted, too, in the loss of any value or utility of the The service of an order shall bind all credits due the judgment debtor and all
transmission line to NPC, "the same having been intended solely for the benefit money and property of the judgment debtor in the possession or in the control of
and use of BBGMI. such person, corporation, or legal entity from the time of service; and the
judgment may also require notice of such proceedings to be given to any party to
No action was apparently taken by respondent Judge in response to this Manifestation the action in such manner as he may deem proper.
which was, to all intents and purposes, a motion to set aside the Order of November 15,
1988. And for aught that appears on the record, neither was any traversing pleading or It was thus clearly within respondent Judge's prerogative to require the appearance, by
paper ever presented by ACEC. subpoena, of officials of the NPC to appear and be questioned regarding the latter's
claimed indebtedness to the judgment debtor, BBGMI. But just as clearly, it was not
What happened next was that on February 17, 1989 the Philippine National Bank debited within His Honor's power to order the payment by the alleged debtor of the judgment
NPC's "account (S/A No. 010572194-3 for Eight Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand Eight debtor to pay the claimed debt without indubitable admission or conclusive proof that the
Hundred Six and 20/100 (P828,806.20) representing P 828,796.00 amount of Cashier's debt existed and was demandable. The applicable provision is not, as was respondent
Cheek delivered and paid to .. Sheriff Dominador B. Adriano, ... .5 Judge's erroneous notion, Section 15 of Rule 39, which merely states the procedure that
the sheriff should follow in the enforcement of a money judgment against the judgment
Hence, the present action of certiorari instituted by NPC praying for "the setting aside of debtor himself, i.e., to levy on property of the judgment debtor, including "debts" or
respondent Judge's Order dated November 15, 1988 ..and commanding respondent to "credits," and sell the same, etc., but which obviously does not at all treat of the propriety
desist from executing the writ of garnishment issued by respondent Sheriff in Civil Case and requisites for collecting such "debts" or "credits" from third persons. The relevant
No. 87-39301." For the reasons shortly to be explained, the Court decreed on March 15, provisions are those embodied in Sections 42 and 45 of the same Rule 39. Section 42
1989 the issuance of a temporary restraining order "enjoining the respondents from reads as follows:
enforcing and/or implementing the (challenged) Order," and a preliminary mandatory
injunction "commanding respondent Deputy Sheriff Dominador B. Adriano and/or Allied SEC. 42. Order for application of property and income in satisfaction of
Control and Electric Corporation to RETURN to respondent Philippine National Bank the judgement.- The judge may order any property of the judgment debtor, or money
amount of P828,806.20 ... debited from petitioner's ... Account SA No. 010-572194-3." due him, not exempt from execution, in the hands of either himself or other

56
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
person, or of a corporation or other legal entity, to be applied to the satisfaction of The record demonstrates that the supposed indebtedness of NPC to BBGMI was denied
the judgment, subject to any prior rights over such property, .... not only by the representative of NPC who gave testimony at the summary hearing
scheduled by His Honor, but also by its lawyers who, in a formal pleading, detailed the
Section 45, on the other hand, states the following: facts and circumstances in substantiation of the thesis of non-liability. Of course, the
respondent Judge's Order makes a general reference to later admissions supposedly
SEC. 45. Proceedings when in debtedness denied or another person claims the made by Vinoya, the NPC representative. Such unspecified admissions are, of course,
property. - If it appears that a person or corporation, alleged to have property of not only contradictory of the earlier denial of Vinoya, but are themselves contradicted by
the judgment debtor or to be indebted to him claims an interest in the property the subsequent assertions of the NPC through its lawyers. This state of things, when the
adverse to him or denies the debt, the court or judge may authorize, by an order least that can be said is that it is doubtful if there has been a categorical admission of
made to that effect, the judgment creditor to institute an action against such liability on the part of the NPC, cannot operate to invest the respondent Court with
person or cor poration for the recovery of such interest or debt, forbid a transfer jurisdiction to order NPC to pay its alleged indebtedness to BBGMI. The only disposition
or other disposition of such interest or debt until an action can be commenced that said Court could legitimately have made in the premises, was that indicated in
and prosecuted to judgment, and may punish disobedience of such order as for Section 46 of Rule 39, above quoted, i.e., authorize ACEC, as judgment creditor, to bring
contempt. Such order may be modified or vacated by the judge granting the a separate action against NPC, as alleged debtor of BBGMI, the judgment debtor, for
same, or by the court in which the action is brought at anytime, upon such terms establishment by satisfactory proof of the postulated indebtedness of NPC to BBGMI,
as may be just. and consequent payment to it ACEC of so much of that indebtedness as corresponds to
the amount of its judgment.
A reading of these two provisions leaves no doubt about the proposition that after
summary examination of a person or entity alleged to be a debtor of the judgment debtor The ruling herein made dictates the mode of resolution of ACEC's pending motion (dated
or holding property belonging to the latter, in accordance with Section 39, Rule July 10, 1989) 7 advising of its willingness to reserve the loan it had applied for from PNB
39, supra execution may issue against such person or entity only upon an Escolta "in the custody of PNB in compliance with the resolution of ..June 19,1989," a loan
incontrovertible showing that the person or entity in fact holds property belonging to the which, incidentally, it appears that it has already obtained in the sum of P829,000.00. 8
judgment debtor or is indeed a debtor of said judgment debtor, i.e., that such holding of
property, or the indebtedness, is not denied. In the event of such a denial, it is not, to WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is GRANTED. The Order of November
repeat, within the judge's power to order delivery of property allegedly belonging to the 15,1988 in Civil Case No. 87-39301 is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary
judgment debtor or the payment of the alleged debt. A contrary rule would allow a court restraining order and mandatory injunction issued by this Court on March 15,1989 are
to adjudge substantive liability in a summary proceeding, incidental merely to the process CONFIRMED AND MADE PERMANENT. Respondent Allied Control and Electric
of executing a judgment, rather than in a trial on the merits, to be held only after the party Corporation (ACEC) is commanded, IMMEDIATELY upon service of notice of this
sought to be made liable has been properly summoned and accorded full opportunity to judgment, to deliver and pay to petitioner National Power Corporation the sum of
file the pleadings permitted by the Rules in ventilation of his side. This would amount to a P828,796. 00 and P10.20 debited against the latter's account in the Philippine National
denial of due process of law. So has this Court in fact already had occasion to rule. In a Bank on February 17, 1989, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
1977 case, Economic Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Torres 6 the Court said: said date. Costs against respondents, excluding the Philippine National Bank.

.. the only power of the court in proceedings supplemental to execution is to SO ORDERED.


make an order authorizing the creditor to sue in the proper court to recover an
indebtedness due to the judgment debtor. The court has no jurisdiction to try
summarily the question whether the third party served with notice of execution
and levy is indebted to defendant when such indebtedness is denied. To make
an order in relation to property which the garnishee claimed to own in his own
right, requiring its application in satisfaction of judgment of another, would be to
deprive the garnishee of property upon summary proceeding and without due
process of law.

57
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. 132497 November 16, 1999 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Pasig City, which on March 14, 1990, rendered a
LUIS MIGUEL YSMAEL and JOHANN C.F. KASTEN V, petitioners, vs.COURT OF decision reviving the judgment in Civil Case No. 3039.
APPEALS and Spouses PACIFICO LEJANO and ANASTACIA
LEJANO, respondents. Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, but their appeal was dismissed in
a resolution dated October 8, 1992 of the appellate court. Private respondents brought
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 1 dated January 26, the matter to this Court which likewise dismissed private respondents' petition on
1998, dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside an order of the January 11, 1993.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Pasig City, which allowed private respondents to redeem
certain parcels of land sold to satisfy the judgment rendered against them and in favor of Accordingly, on September 9, 1993, the trial court issued a writ of execution, as a result
petitioners. of which the rights, interests, and participation of private respondents in several parcels
of lands, covered by TCT Nos. T-47699, T-50009, T-54010, T-50011, T-50391, T-50392,
The facts are not in dispute. They are as follows: T-50393, T-50394, and 16274 of the Register of Deeds of Batangas, were levied on
execution. On March 15, 1995, private respondents' rights, interests, and participation in
Petitioners brought suit for sum of money against private respondents in the then Court said lands were sold at public auction to petitioners, represented by their counsel of
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 29, and obtained judgment in their favor on October 2, record Atty. Fernando R. Arguelles, Jr., who offered the highest bid for P700,000.00. The
1980. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision, dated October 2, 1980, reads: 2 sale to petitioners was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu,
Batangas on July 25, 1995. The certificate of sale stated in pertinent parts: 3
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered directing defendants (herein private
respondents) Pacifico Lejano and Anastacia Lejano to pay, jointly and severally, The period of redemption of the real properties described above will expire one
each of the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) the following: (1) year from and after the date of registration of this Certificate of Sale.

1. P120,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum from November 25, 1975, It is hereby required of said highest bidder, that a statement of any amount of
until fully paid; assessment or taxes which may have been paid on account of this purchase and
such other liens chargeable to the redemptioners, with PROOF hereof, be
2. P120,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum from November 25, 1976, submitted within thirty (30) days immediately preceding the expiration of the
until fully paid; period of redemption, furnishing the defendants a copy thereof, as required by
law, for purposes of computing the actual amount payable by the defendants in
3. P120,000.00 with interest at 12% per annum from November 25, 1977, case of redemption.
until fully paid;
On July 16, 1996, private respondents' counsel wrote to petitioners' counsel Atty.
4. P115,620.00 with interest at 12% per annum from November 25, 1978 Fernando R. Arguelles, Jr. and Deputy Sheriff Sofronio M. Villarin, informing them that
until fully paid; private respondents were exercising their right of redemption. Private respondents asked
petitioners for a computation of the redemption price. The letter stated in pertinent
parts: 4
5. P50,000.00 for moral damages;
In behalf of the co-owners of defendant Pacifico Lejano, et al., namely: Juliet
6. P40,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
Lejano-Lagarijos, Amparo Lejano and Leopoldo Lejano, et al., of the parcels of
land subject of public auction sale in the above entitled case, we are exercising
7. P25,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of suit. the right of redemption pursuant to Section 30, Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court.
We are, therefore, requesting that compliance be made with respect to the last
The decision remained unexecuted for a long time as petitioners were unable to locate paragraph of the Certificate of Sale with respect to the "actual amount payable by
property belonging to private respondents. However, in 1989, before the right of action the defendants in the above entitled case in case of redemption."
upon the judgment could prescribe, petitioners filed a case for the revival of the judgment
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We understand that the period of redemption will expire on 25 July 1996. Hence, amount of his (their) purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereon in
immediately upon receipt of this letter, please furnish us with the requested total addition, up to the time of the redemption, together with the amount of any
redemption price of the subject property. assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after
purchase, and interest on such last-named amount at the same rate; . . ."
Deputy Sheriff Villarin received the letter on July 16, 1996 while Atty. Arguelles received (emphasis supplied), there would appear to be a need for the judgment debtor or
the same on July 17, 1996, 5 but they did not bother to reply. redemptioner to inquire as to the total amount of redemption money to be paid
and, therefore, it would not be proper to argue that the plaintiffs or the Sheriff to
The twelve-month period of redemption expired on July 19, 1996. Although the certificate whom the aforestated letter was addressed could not be faulted for nor
of sale was registered on July 25, 1995, the twelve-month period ended on July 19, answering the query. Thus the delay in paying the correct amount of the
1996, considering that the latter year was a leap year. However, thinking that the last day redemption price could not be solely attributed to the defendants since the
of the period of redemption was on July 25, 1996, private respondent Pacifico Lejano plaintiffs or the Sheriff are partly to blame. At least the defendants have shown
went to the office of Atty. Arguelles on said date and tendered to him two cashier's their good faith in trying to settle the redemption price within the period provided
checks drawn on Far East Bank and Trust Company in the amount of P784,000.00. One by law which was simply ignored by the plaintiffs who appeared to profit more if
check was for P700,000.00, representing the purchase price at the execution sale, and the properties are not redeemed by reason of the higher value of said properties.
another was for P84,000.00, representing 1% interest per month on the purchase price
from July 25, 1995 to July 25, 1996. The checks came with a letter, dated July 25, 1996, As to the other argument that there was no valid tender of payment of the
giving notice of private respondents' intention to exercise their right of redemption. Atty. redemption price because the cashier's checks are not considered legal tender,
Arguelles, however, refused to accept the payment. In a note to private respondent suffice it to state that in Ramon Tan v. Court of Appeals, et al., (G.R. No. 100555,
Pacifico Lejano, Atty. Arguelles claimed he had no authority to receive payment for December 20, 1944), the Supreme Court ruled:
petitioner Luis Ysmael.
Now, what was presented for deposit in the instant case was not just an
Accordingly, private respondent called up petitioner Ysmael's office, but he was informed ordinary check but a cashier's check payable to the depositor himself. A
that petitioner Ysmael was not in, and it was not known when he would return. Unable to cashier's check is a primary obligation of the issuing bank and accepted
make a tender of payment, private respondent filed the next day, July 26, 1996, a motion in advance by its mere issuance. By its very nature, a cashier's check is a
for consignation in the trial court. Petitioners opposed the motion, arguing that the period bank's order to pay drawn upon itself, committing in effect its total
of redemption had already expired and that there was no valid tender of payment resources, integrity and honor behind the check. A cashier's check by its
because the cashier's checks were insufficient to cover the total redemption price. peculiar character and general use in the commercial world is regarded
substantially to be as good as the money which it represents. . . .
In the order dated October 21, 1996, the trial court granted private respondents' motion
for consignation, thus: 6 Anent the objection that the total amount covered by the two cashier's checks
falls short of the correct amount of the redemption price tendered by the
[I]t is not denied that on July 16, 1996, defendants' (private respondents') counsel defendants, the same should be rectified by requiring them to pay the right
wrote plaintiffs' (petitioners') counsel and Sheriff Sofronio Villarin, who conducted amount.
the auction sale, requesting for computation of the redemption price to be paid
which letter was received by the addressees on the same date (Motion for The dispositive portion of the order reads:
Consignation, par. 3). This was well within the redemption period which expired
on July 19, 1996 per computation of the period made by the plaintiffs WHEREFORE, the Motion for Consignation is hereby granted. Defendants are
(Opposition, par. 4). Plaintiffs or the Sheriff never bothered to answer the letter. hereby allowed to consign/deposit the two (2) checks issued by Far East Bank
In this regard, plaintiffs further argue that they cannot be faulted for their failure to and Trust Company both dated July 24, 1996 in the sum of P700,000.00 and
give defendants a statement of the total amount of the redemption price since P84,000.00 with the Office of the Clerk of Court, Pasig City. Likewise, plaintiffs
that is so provided in Sec. 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rejoinder, par. C). are hereby directed to give a statement of account to the defendants of their
Be that as it may, since the aforecited section in providing for the amount obligation for the latter to be able to settle their account fully and the same to be
payable to the purchaser (herein plaintiffs) by way of redemption speaks of "the likewise deposited with the Office of the Clerk of Court.SO ORDERED.
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Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. As their motion was denied, they filed a In the instant case, there is no question that the certificate of sale registered in the Office
petition for certiorari and mandamus in the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate of the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas on July 25, 1995. Consequently, the right
court dismissed their petition January 26, 1998. Hence, this petition for review of redemption should have been exercised on or before July 19, 1996, the 360th day
on certiorari. after July 25, 1995 considering that 1996 was a leap year.

Firstly, petitioners argue that the twelve-month period of redemption expired on July 19, However, apparently equating the phrase "twelve (12) months" in Rule 39, §30 with one
1996, but that private respondent Pacifico Lejano tendered payment, to petitioners' year of 365 days, private respondents reckoned the period of redemption as ending on
counsel only on July 25, 1996. Secondly, they claim that even assuming that the tender July 25, 1996 since the sale registered on July 25, 1995. Indeed, the certificate of sale
of payment was made on time, the same was invalid because (1) Atty. Arguelles had no stated that "the period of redemption . . . will expire one (1) year from and after the date
authority to receive payment, and (2) the amount of P84,000.00 tendered to pay for the of registration . . ." There was thus an honest mistake on a question of law. Rule 39, §28
1% interest per month on the purchase price was insufficient, the actual interest due of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure now provides that the period of redemption shall be
being P112,000.00. "at any time within one (1) year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale," so
that the period is now to be understood as composed of 365 days. Neither petitioners nor
We find the foregoing contentions to be without merit. the sheriff corrected private respondents' mistaken impression, leading the latter to
believe that July 25, 1996 was indeed the last day of the period of redemption.
First. Rule 39, §30 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided that "within twelve months after
the sale," the judgment debtor may redeem the property sold at public auction, thus: Moreover, private respondents on July 16, 1996 and July 17, 1996, i.e., within 12-month
period as provided in Rule 39, §30 of the former Rules of Court, gave notice to Deputy
Sec. 30. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive Sheriff Sofronio and petitioner's counsel of their intention to redeem the lands sold. In the
redemptions. Notice to be given and filed. — The judgment debtor, or same letter, private respondents requested a statement of the redemption price which
redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within petitioners and the deputy sheriff chose to ignore. When private respondent Lejano's
twelve (12) months after the sale, on paying the purchaser the amount of his tender of payment was refused by Atty. Arguelles, Jr., private respondents consigned
purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereof in addition, up to the payment in the trial court on July 26, 1996. The combination of these circumstances
time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which makes it inequitable to rule that private respondents lost the right of redemption by his
the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last delay of six days to redeem the property. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
named amount at the same rate. . . correctly held that private respondents had tried in good faith to exercise their right of
redemption. As the appellate court stated:
Written notice of any redemption must be given to the Officer who made the sale
and a duplicate filed with the registrar of deeds of the province, and if any . . . such special circumstances exist, namely: (1) the highest bidders
assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any (petitioners) did not submit a statement of "any amount of assessment or taxes
lien other than that upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof must in which may have been paid on account of their purchase to be submitted within
like manner be given to the officer and filed with the registrar of deeds; if such 30 days immediately preceding the expiration of the period of redemption,
notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such furnishing the defendants (private respondents) a copy thereof, as directed in the
assessments, taxes, or liens. certificate of sale;" (2) despite receipt of the letters from private respondents,
petitioners and deputy sheriff Villarin never made a reply; (3) notwithstanding that
petitioners' counsel was their agent in the auction sale in which the properties in
Under Art. 13 of the Civil Code, a month, unless designated by name, is understood to
question were sold to petitioners, said counsel, Atty. Fernando R. Arguelles, Jr.,
be equivalent to 30 days, while a year is understood to be of 365 days. Thus, the rulings
when private respondents wanted to exercise their right of redemption went into
of this Court under the 1964 Rules stated that the 12-month period of redemption under
technicalities by saying his authority was limited to just the bidding.
Rule 39, §30 is equivalent to 360 days counted from the registration of the certificate of
sale. 7 Within the said period, the redemptioner must pay the purchaser the full amount of the
redemption price, otherwise the redemption is ineffectual. 8 Concurrence of the above circumstances is a good occasion to remind
petitioners that "every person must, in the exercise of his right and in the
performance of his duty, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
honesty and good faith" (Art. 19, Civil Code). Private respondents wanted to Sec. 35. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period. By
exercise their right of redemption. Petitioners would do well if they adhere to the whom executed or given. — If no redemption be made within twelve (12) months
teaching of aforequoted article. The policy of the law is liberality in favor of after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled to a conveyance and
redemption. possession of the property; or, if so redeemed, whenever sixty (60) days have
elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and
Although it is required that full payment of the redemption price must be made within the the time for redemption has expired, the last redemption, or his assignee, is
redemption period, the rule on redemption is actually liberally construed in favor of the entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment debtor
original owner of the property. The policy of the law is to aid rather than to defeat him in shall have the entire period of twelve (12) months from the date of the sale to
the exercise of his right of redemption. 9 As the Court of Appeals observed, this Court has redeem the property. . . .
allowed parties in several cases to perfect their right of redemption beyond the period
prescribed therefor. In Delos Reyes v. IAC, 10 for instance, the amount deposited in the trial Since we have ruled that private respondents validly exercised their right of redemption
court four (4) days after the lapse of the redemption period was considered an affirmation of within the prescribed period, petitioners are not entitled to the writ of possession.
the earlier timely offer to redeem and, thus, a valid payment. On the other hand, in Castillo
v. Nagtalon 11 and Bodiongan v. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court upheld a redemption made by WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
the judgment debtor or the redemptioner in good faith even if the payment tendered was less
than the redemption price. In these cases, the judgment debtor was allowed fifteen days from
the finality of the Court's decision to complete the redemption price. SO ORDERED.

In the case at bar, private respondents seasonably notified petitioners' counsel and the
sheriff on July 16, 1996 that they were redeeming the property sold on execution and
asked for a statement of the redemption price. There can be no doubt of the earnest
intent of private respondents to exercise their right of redemption. Their tender of
payment on July 25, 1996, after petitioners' counsel and the sheriff had ignored their
letter, should therefore be considered an affirmation of the timely notice to redeem, even
if such tender was made six (6) days after the expiration of the redemption period.

Second. Petitioners also question the validity of the tender of the two checks to Atty.
Arguelles on the ground that the latter had no authority to accept payment on their behalf
and that the interest payment on the purchase price in the amount of P84,000.00 was
insufficient. However, it appears that the first question was never really raised in the
courts below and, therefore, petitioners cannot now be allowed to raise it for the first time
without offending basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. 13 Anent the claim that
the interest on the purchase price was insufficient, the Court finds the same to be baseless.
The amount of P84,000.00 is the interest on the purchase price of P7,000.00, computed at
the rate of 1% per month for 12 months.

Third. Nor is there any merit in petitioners' contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
not directing the issuance of a writ of possession in their favor. Under Rule 39, §35 of the
former Rules of Court, the issuance of a writ of possession is proper only if the
ownership of the property sold on execution has been consolidated in the name of the
purchaser, in view of the redemptioner's failure to exercise the right of redemption.

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G.R. No. 156829 June 8, 2004 Since petitioner failed to comply with his obligations under the compromise agreement
RAMON D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner, vs.MA. TERESA L. MONTENEGRO, for despite the lapse of the periods provided therein, respondent Teresa filed a motion for
herself and as the mother and natural guardian of the minors, ANTONIO AMELO the execution of the judgment. The trial court granted the motion and issued a writ of
and ANA MARIA PIA ISABEL, both surnamed "MONTENEGRO," respondents. execution on 15 February 1999.

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil A second writ of execution and a notice of garnishment, issued by the trial court on 21
Procedure, petitioner Ramon D. Montenegro seeks the reversal of the 8 November 2002 May 2001 and and a notice of garnishment issued on 28 May 2001 weon 28 May 2001,
Order1 in Civil Case No. 94-8467 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Bacolod City, respectively, were returned unsatisfied.
holding him guilty of indirect contempt for his repeated failure to appear at the scheduled
hearings for his examination as judgment obligor and imposing on him the penalty of In several conferences3 called by the trial court, petitioner admitted his failure to comply
three (3) months imprisonment and a fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000), and of with his obligations under the compromise agreement but alleged that he was no longer
the subsequent 3 January 2003 Order2denying his motion for the reconsideration of the 8 in a position to do so as he was already insolvent. In the conference held on 6 March
November 2002 Order. 2002, respondent Teresa manifested that she would file a motion for examination of
petitioner as judgment obligor. The trial court gave her 30 days within which to file the
On 14 June 1994, respondent Ma. Teresa V. Lizares-Montenegro (hereinafter, appropriate motion and informed petitioner that he would have 30 days to file a comment
respondent Teresa), for herself and as mother and guardian of her two minor children or reply to the motion.
Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia Isabel, filed with the trial court below a complaint for
support against her husband, herein petitioner Ramon D. Montenegro. The case was On 14 March 2002, respondent Teresa filed a motion to examine petitioner as judgment
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-8467. Four years after the filing of the complaint, obligor under Sections 36 and 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In her motion, she
petitioner and respondent Teresa executed a compromise agreement which was alleged that there is an urgency for the examination to be conducted at the earliest time
submitted to the trial court for approval on 13 October 1998. On the same date, the trial since petitioner was about to migrate to Canada. Acting on the said motion, the trial court
court rendered a Decision approving the compromise agreement and ordering the parties issued on 19 March 2002 an Order granting the motion for examination of petitioner as
to comply with it. The parties did not appeal from the Decision; hence, it became final judgment obligor and setting his examination on 22 March 2002. On the same day the
and executory. motion for examination was granted, petitioner filed with the court a Manifestation
alleging that the grant of the motion for examination iwas premature because he still
Under the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner obligated himself to: would have 30 days from receipt of the motion, or until April 14, 2002, within which to file
a comment or opposition thereto as agreed upon during the conference on 6 March
(1) Pay the respondent the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) 2002.
representing her entire share in their conjugal partnership of gains, Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000) of which is payable upon signing of the compromise Thus, oOn 22 March 2002, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared for the scheduled
agreement while the remaining balance of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000) hearing. On that date, the trial court issued an order re-scheduling the hearing to 10 April
must be paid within one (1) year from the execution of the compromise 2002 and requiring the petitioner to explain why he should not be held in contempt of
agreement. court for disobeying the 19 March 2002 Order.

(2) Establish a trust fund in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000) in On 26 March 2002, petitioner filed a Compliance with Motion to Re-schedule
favor of his children Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia Isabel within sixty (60) Proceedings. He explained that he did not attend the 22 March 2002 hearing because he
days from the approval of the compromise agreement. was under the impression that he still had 30 days from the filing of the motion to
examine him as judgment obligor within which to respond to the motion; besides, his
(3) Obtain an educational plan or an investment plan to cover tuition and other counsel was not available on 22 March 2002 due to previously scheduled hearings.
matriculation fees for the college education of Ana Maria Pia Isabel within one (1)
year from the approval of the compromise agreement. At the hearing on 4 April 2002 of the Compliance with Motion to Re-schedule
Proceedings, counsel for petitioner manifested that his client already left for Canada on
26 March 2002 and will be unable to attend the 10 April 2002 hearing, and that petitioner
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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
would be available for examination on the last week of July or first week of August 2002. imprisonment for three months and ordered him to pay a fine of P20,000. His motion for
Counsel prayed that the hearing be thus reset accordingly. The trial court denied the reconsideration of the Order having been denied by the trial court in its Order of 3
motion and informed the parties that the hearing scheduled on 10 April 2002 will proceed January 2003, petitioner filed the petition in the case at bar.
as scheduled.
The petition raises pure questions of law. After the issues were joined, we resolved to
On 5 April 2002, petitioner filed a manifestation reiterating that he would be unable to give due course to the petition.
attend the 10 April 2002 hearing because he was already in Canada. Counsel for
petitioner likewise manifested that he would also be unavailable on the said date Having raised only questions of law, petitioner is bound by the trial court’s findings of
because he would be in Manila to attend to his other cases. fact.

On 17 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order directing the petitioner to show cause The core issue to be determined is whether, based on the facts found by the trial court,
why he should not held in contempt of court for failure to appear on the 10 April 2002 at the latter erred in holding the petitioner guilty of indirect contempt for willfully disobeying
the hearing for his examination as judgment obligor. In his Compliance and Explanation the orders of the trial court requiring him to appear for purposes of examination as a
filed on 28 June 2002, petitioner alleged that he was unable to attend the 10 April 2002 judgment obligor at in the hearings scheduled on 22 March 2002, 10 April 2002, and 23
hearing because he was in Canada and had no intention to abscond from his obligation. October 2002.

On 13 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for the hearing for We rule in the negative.
examination of the petitioner on 3 July 2002. A subpoena was issued against the
petitioner and served at his address of record. Respondent Teresa also caused the The totality of petitioner’s acts clearly indicated a deliberate, and unjustified refusal to be
service of the subpoena at 8051 Estrella Avenue, San Antonio Village, Makati City where examined as a judgment obligor at the time the examination was scheduled for hearing
petitioner is allegedly residing. by the trial court. His Such acts tended to degrade the authority and respect for court
processes and impaired the judiciary’s duty to deliver and administer justice. Petitioner
The 3 July 2002 hearing did not push through as the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash tried to impose his will on the trial court.
Subpoena Ad Testificandum4 on 28 June 2002. In the motion, petitioner admitted that
8051 Estrella Avenue, San Antonio Village, Makati City, is his present address but Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a
alleged that Makati City is more than 100 kilometers away from Bacolod City; thus, he manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is
may not be compelled by subpoena to attend the 3 July 2002 hearing in Bacolod City. In clothed.6 It is defined as "disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority,
this motion, petitioner did not allege that he was still in Canada. justice and dignity."7 The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of
In its Order of 2 September 2002, the trial court denied the Motion to Quash judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to the due
Subpoena Ad Testificandum, but re-scheduled the hearing to 23 October 2002. On 22 administration of justice.8
October 2002, the day before the scheduled hearing, petitioner filed a manifestation
manifestation informing the trial court that he was still in Canada and would not be able The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct contempt and
to attend the 23 October 2002 hearing; however, he would be in Manila on the first week indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as
of December 2002. He moved that the hearing be re-scheduled on 9 December 2002. to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward
The manifestation, however, did not contain a notice of hearing. the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.9
On 23 October 2002, petitioner did not appear at the scheduled hearing, prompting the
trial court to issue an order citing him in contempt of court. On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular acts
which constitute indirect contempt, thus:
In its Order of 8 November 2002, the trial court declared petitioner in contempt of court
under Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court5 and imposed on him the penalty of

63
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect."12 On
in his official transactions; the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a
court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made.13 If the purpose is to
a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil.14
from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real In the present case, the contemptuous act was the petitioner’s refusal to attend a hearing
property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any for his examination as judgment obligor, upon motion by the respondent Teresa. It must
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled be pointed out that the purpose of Section 36 of Rule 39 is to provide the judgment
thereto; obligee a remedy in case where the judgment obligor continues to fail to comply with its
obligation under the judgment. Petitioner’s refusal to be examined, without justifiable
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings reason, constituted indirect contempt which is civil in nature.
of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
Petitioner’s deliberate willfulness and even malice in disobeying the orders of the trial
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or court are clearly shown in the pleadings he himself had filed before the trial court.
degrade the administration of justice;
In his Manifestation of 19 March 2002 petitioner insisted on his right to file a reply or
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such comment on the Motion to Examine Defendant as Judgment Obligor until 14 April 2002
without authority; solely on the basis of the purported agreement at the conference on 6 March 2002.
Petitioner merely brushed aside the Order of the trial court requiring him to appear on 22
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; March 2002 for the hearing by not appearing in court. Petitioner cannot simply assume
that his manifestation would suffice for the trial court to re-schedule the 22 March 2002
hearing. That portion of the manifestation filed by petitioner on 19 March 2002, which
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an
reads:
officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
3. In the meantime, we have no other option but to cancel the setting on March
In relation to the foregoing, Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court also provides that
22, 2002 until Respondent shall have submitted his Reply/Comment and the
"a party or other person may be compelled, by an order or subpoena, to attend before
issue is finally laid to rest by the issuance of a final Order for that purpose.
the court or commissioner to testify as provided in the two preceding sections, and upon
failure to obey such order or subpoena or to be sworn, or to answer as a witness or to
subscribe his deposition, may be punished for contempt as in other cases." This demonstrates beyond doubt arrogance, haughtiness and disrespect. While petitioner
provision relates specifically to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. apparently disagrees with the 19 March 2002 Order of by the trial court, he did not file a
motion for its reconsideration. Neither did he file a motion to reset the scheduled hearing
on 22 March 2002. We have ruled that a motion for continuance or postponement is not
Indirect contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by the court by issuing an order
a matter of right but is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.15 Petitioner sought
or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
to deprive the trial court of the discretion; he took it upon himself to cancel or to order the
punished for contempt or (2) by the filing of a verified petition, complying with the
court to cancel the 22 March 2002 scheduled hearing.
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings.10 In the present case, the trial court initiated
the proceedings for indirect contempt by issuing two orders11 directing the petitioner to
show cause why he should not be punished for indirect contempt. Petitioner makes a belated claim in the present petition that his failure to attend the 22
March 2002 hearing was due to the fact that he was already on his way to Manila on 22
March 2002 in preparation for his 26 March 2002 trip to Canada. However, such
Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature
explanation was not stated in the 19 March 2002 Manifestation and 5 April 2002
and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the
Compliance and Motion to Re-schedule Proceedings. The explanation is either a delayed
authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
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afterthought or an unguarded confession of a deliberate plan to delay or even avoid his suggesting the hearing to be reset to 9 December 2002. Such manifestation to re-
examination as a judgment obligor. schedule the 23 October 2002 hearing was, for all intents and purposes, a motion to
postpone the hearing , but the pleading did not contain a notice of hearing.
Neither can petitioner rely on the alleged irregularity in the trial court’s grant of the motion
to examine him as judgment obligor before he was able to file a reply or comment. It is of no moment that petitioner was eventually examined as judgment obligor on 17
Section 36 of, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows, as a matter of right, the plaintiff who December 2002, nine (9) months after the original setting. His subsequent appearance at
is a judgment obligee to examine the defendant as judgment obligor, at any time after the the hearing did not wipe out his contemptuous conduct.
return of the writ of execution is made. Section 36 reads as follows:
We shall now take up the penalties imposed by the trial court.
Sec. 36. Examination of judgment obligor when judgment unsatisfied. — When
the return of a writ of execution issued against property of a judgment obligor, or Under Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person found guilty of contempt of
any one of several obligors in the same judgment, shows that the judgment court against a Regional Trial Court may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty
remains unsatisfied, in whole or in part, the judgment obligee, at any time after thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. The penalties
such return is made, shall be entitled to an order from the court which ofor imprisonment for three months and a fine of twenty thousand pesos are within the
rendered the said judgment, requiring such judgment obligor to appear and be allowable penalties the trial court itit may impose. However, the penalties of
examined concerning his property and income before such court or before a imprisonment and fine may be imposed one at a time, or together.
commissioner appointed by it, at a specified time and place; and proceedings
may thereupon be had for the application of the property and income of the In the present case, the nature of the contemptuous acts committed are civil in nature.
judgment obligor towards the satisfaction of the judgment. But no judgment Section 7 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides for indefinite incarceration in civil
obligor shall be so required to appear before a court or commissioner outside the contempt proceedings to compel a party to comply with the order of the court. This may
province or city in which such obligor resides or is found. (Emphasis supplied) be resorted to where the attendant circumstances are such that the non-compliance with
the court order is an utter disregard of the authority of the court which has then no other
Thus, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in scheduling the examination of recourse but to use its coercive power.16 It has been held that "when a person or party is
petitioner on 22 March 2002. On the contrary, it acted with utmost judiciousness to avoid legally and validly required by a court to appear before it for a certain purpose, when that
a miscarriage of justice because petitioner was reported to be about to leave for Canada, requirement is disobeyed, the only remedy left for the court is to use force to bring such
a fact which petitioner did not refute in his Manifestation of 19 March 2002. person or party before it."17

It is noteworthy that while petitioner insisted that he still had until 14 April 2002 to file a The reason for indefinite incarceration in civil contempt proceedings, in proper cases, is
reply or comment on the motion for examination, he also manifested through counsel on that it is remedial, preservative, or coercive in nature. The punishment is imposed for the
5 April 2002 that he already left for Canada on 26 March 2002 and will not be back until benefit of a complainant or a party to a suit who has been injured. Its object is to compel
the last week of July or the first week of August 2002. It is obvious then that petitioner performance of the orders or decrees of the court, which the contemnor refuses to obey
wanted to gain time to avoid being examined. although able to do so.18 In effect, it is within the power of the person adjudged guilty of
contempt to set himself free.
With respect to the 10 April 2002 hearing, it is established that petitioner was already in
Canada at the time of the scheduled hearing. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that the In the present case, however, the act which the trial court ordered the petitioner to do
re-scheduling of the hearing to 10 April 2002 was brought about by his unjustifiable has already been performed, albeit belatedly and not without delay for an unreasonable
failure to attend the 22 March 2002 hearing. length of time. As such, the penalty of imprisonment may no longer be imposed despite
the fact that its non-implementation was due to petitioner’s absence in the Philippines.
Subsequently, despite petitioner’s 19 March 2002 and 5 April 2002 manifestations that
he would return to the Philippines sometime during the last week of July or first week of We are not unmindful of the nature of the judgment from which the present controversy
August 2002, petitioner did not attend the 23 October 2002 hearing. Again, instead of arose. Six years have elapsed from the time the compromise agreement for the support
filing a motion to reset the hearing, petitioner filed a manifestation the day before the of the children of petitioner and respondent was executed. We take judicial notice of the
scheduled hearing, informing the court that he will be unable to attend the hearing and
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amount of expenses which a travel outside the country, particularly to Canada, entails,
much more so when the person traveling to Canada is trying to establish himself in the
said country as an immigrant. Petitioner’s claim for insolvency is negated by his frequent
travels to Canada. We thus exhort the parties, specifically the petitioner, to resort to all
reasonable means to fully satisfy the judgment for support based on the compromise
agreement, for the paramount interests of their minor children.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The 8 November 2002


Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Bacolod City in with Civil Case No. 94-
8467 is modified. As modified, the penalty of for imprisonment is deleted therefrom, while
the penalty of fine of P20,000 is affirmed.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 66641 March 6, 1992 airconditioning units subjects of the contract of sale were not in fact delivered, and
FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE hence, respondent Manaog was not indebted to petitioner.
COURT and JOVITO Z. MANAOG, respondents.
After trial, the CFI of Rizal rendered its decision, in favor of respondent Manaog, the
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent appellate court dispositive portion of which states:
(now Court of Appeals) affirming the decision of the trial court which awarded damages
to private respondent arising from the alleged wrongful execution of a final judgment. Premises considered, it is the finding of this Court that the defendant acted in
utmost bad faith, and utilized all means within its control to harass, humiliate and
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: embarras the plaintiff and the court finds the defendant liable for having acted
high handedly and in bad faith. The Court hereby sentences the defendant to pay
On April 24, 1975, petitioner Filinvest Credit Corporation (Filinvest for brevity) filed a the plaintiff the amount of P10,099.00 with interest thereon at the rate of 14%
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) against starting September 24, 1977 until fully paid; to pay plaintiff the amount of
respondent Jovito Manaog and a certain John Doe, for replevin and/or recovery of sum P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay plaintiff attorney's fees in the
of money representing arrearages in the payment of the two airconditioners bought by amount of P5,000.00 as well as costs of suits. SO ORDERED. (p. 38, Rollo)
respondent Manaog from Heritage Mercantile Corporation. The latter as vendor assigned
the contract of "sale with reservation of title" to petitioner Filinvest. The contract of Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, petitioner Filinvest appealed to the Court
sale provided among others for a downpayment in the amount of P2,100.00 by of Appeals. On January 16, 1984, the Court of appeals rendered a decision which
respondent Manaog upon execution of the contract and the balance in installments of affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court.
P538.00 each month; and that the failure of respondent Manaog to pay two installments
will make the whole obligation due and demandable. Hence this petition was filed with the petitioner assigning the following errors:

Because respondent Manaog failed to pay the monthly amortization, petitioner Filinvest a. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court gravely abused its discretion in
sent letters of demand to respondent Manaog demanding payment. The latter did not not holding private respondent a joint fraud-feasor even when the facts clearly
respond however to any of the demands, thus, prompting petitioner Filinvest to file the show him to be so;
aforementioned complaint. Respondent filed his answer and counterclaim to the
complaint alleging that the airconditioners are defective (p. 39, Rollo) On October 3, b. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court erred in not holding that private
1975, the date of the scheduled hearing, respondent Manaog failed to appear. Hence, respondent had no cause of action against petitioners;
petitioner was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte.
c. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court erred in reopening the question of
On November 25, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner and delivery as private respondent admitted delivery before the City Court of Manila;
dismissed respondent Manaog's counterclaim. The trial court subsequently issued a writ further such issue is barred by prior judgment;
of execution which was duly served upon respondent Manaog. By virtue of the said writ
of execution, a sale by public auction was conducted by the sheriff on October 5, 1977
d. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court erred in not holding that the lower
and a return thereof was made on October 27, 1977.
court had no jurisdiction over the subject of the action as the complaint is in
reality a collateral attack upon;
On November 11, 1977, respondent Manaog filed a motion to suspend execution of
judgment, which was granted by the trial court. It appears however that the sale at public
1) a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction; and
auction had already been conducted.
2) a writ of execution validly issued by a Court of competent jurisdiction;
On April 28, 1978, respondent Manaog filed a complaint before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal (now Regional Trial Court) for damages alleging that the
judgment which was made the basis of the execution was wrong because the

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e. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court erred in allowing private c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
respondent recovery even when it conceded the latter's gross negligence in the that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears
protection of his alleged rights; upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto. (emphasis ours)
f. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court erred in applying the principle of
abuse of right in the instant case; The aforequoted legal provision contains the fundamental principles of res
judicata, finality of judgment and estoppel by judgment which are interchangeable in
g. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court erred in not holding the third- meaning. They embody the same rule that once a judgment has become final and
party defendant Badere liable to Petitioner for indemnification or reimbursement executory, the issues therein should be laid at rest.
of what the latter was ordered to pay private respondent. (pp. 7-8 Rollo)
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects. The first is the effect of a judgment as a bar
The assigned errors boil down to the basic issue of whether or not the losing party may to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action.
file a an action for damages based on the same facts and issues involved in the first The second aspect is that it precludes relitigation of a particular fact or issues in another
action where judgment rendered therein had become final and had been fully executed. action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action (Lopez v. Reyes,
G.R. No. L-29498, March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 179). Thus, a party by varying the form of
Petitioner contends that although respondent Manaog's complaint is one for damages action or method of case presentation cannot escape the effect of the principle of res
arising from the wrongful execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 242126 filed by judicata nor can a party avoid an estoppel of a former judgment by bringing forward in a
petitioner for recovery of sum of money, the subject of the action for damages is in second action new or additional grounds in support of his case or defense or new
reality, the validity of the judgment in the said civil case which should be properly arguments to sustain it, the facts remaining the same at least where such additional
attacked in a direct action to annul judgment. It also contends that the question of matter could have been pleaded and adjudicated in the prior action.
delivery, which was already settled in Civil Case No. 242126 cannot be reopened by
respondent Manaog in his action for damages; that if it were true that no delivery was It is worthy to note that the complaint filed by petitioner Filinvest against respondent
made to respondent Manaog, the letter should have disclosed this fact when Civil Case Manaog in Civil Case No. 242126 was for recovery of sum of money representing unpaid
No. 242126 for sum of money was filed against him. monthly installments for two airconditioning units bought by respondent Manaog. The
latter filed an answer, as shown by the facts of the case, alleging that the airconditioning
We find the petition impressed with merit. units are defective. Respondent Manaog did not however raise as defense the non-
delivery of the said units. In fact, respondent Manaog did not present any evidence for
his defense to prove non-delivery. When trial court rendered judgment in favor of
Section 49 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
petitioner Filinvest, respondent Manaog allowed the judgment to become final and
executory and the execution thereof be fully enforced before disclosing certain facts
Sec. 49. Effect of Judgment. The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a which should have been raised and proven during the hearing of the case. Hence, he is
court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or now precluded from claiming in a subsequent action for damages that the judgment
order may be as follows: against him was erroneous because he did not receive the airconditioning units from
petitioner.
xxx xxx xxx
If respondent Manaog was not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, he should
b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly have appealed the case to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period of fifteen
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation days after receipt of the decision before the judgment of the trial court becomes final and
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title executory. However, if the judgment had become final and executory, there are only
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating three ways under the law by which said judgment may be questioned: 1) by petition for
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; relief 2) by direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the judgment where the
alleged defect is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained in the judgment,
and 3) by direct action, as certiorari, or by a collateral attack against the challenged
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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
judgment which is void upon its face or that the nullity of the judgment is apparent from
its own recitals (People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 59979, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 143).
Respondent Manaog's action for damages which was founded on the alleged wrong
judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 242126 does not fall within any of the ways
enumerated above. Although the action was titled as one for damages, respondent
Manaog, was in effect, alleging the nullity of the judgment against him as being without
factual basis, which is the reason why he sought damages before the trial court. This is a
collateral attack upon a final judgment which cannot be done if the said judgment is valid
and regular upon its face, as in the case at bar.

In view of the foregoing, We find that the respondent appellate court committed
reversible error in affirming the ruling of the trial court which disregarded the final
judgment in Civil Case No. 242126 as a bar to a relitigation in a subsequent action of the
facts and issues raised therein. Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy
and judicial time and interest of litigants as well as the peace and orders of society all
require that stability be accorded the solemn and final judgments of the courts or
tribunals of competent jurisdiction (Lee Bun Ting, et al. v. Aligaen, et al., G.R. No. L-
30523, April 22, 1977, 76 SCRA 416).

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 16, 1984 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 48766 February 9, 1993 That on February 6, 1958, private respondent (Angeles Dico) filed her
GODELIVA S. DULAY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF NATURAL fishpond application (Fp. A. No. 18206) to occupy the area covered by
RESOURCES, as a formal party and in his Official Capacity, THE DIRECTOR OF petitioner's fishpond lease agreement;
THE BUREAU OF FISHERIES & AQUATIC RESOURCES, in his Official Capacity,
and ANGELES DICO, in her Private Capacity, respondents. That her application was disapproved on the ground that the area she
applied had already been awarded to Juan Quibete, predecessor-in-
Petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay comes to this Court and asks Us to confine public interest of the petitioner, under Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E, and that a
respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources within his motion for reconsideration thereon was denied;
jurisdiction and to uphold the principle of res judicata in administrative proceedings by
nullifying (1) his February 24, 1978 order giving due course to the letter-petition of private That on February 29, 1964, Juan Quibete meanwhile sold and/or
respondent Angeles D. Dico requesting for the reopening of Fishpond Conflict case of transferred his rights and interests over the area under Fishpond Permit
Mrs. Angeles Dico against Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and petitioner Mrs. Godeliva No. F-738-E to one Petronilo Retirado;
S. Dulay and the "Cancellation of Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2165 of Mrs. Godeliva
S. Dulay" and (2) his telegrams dated August 14, 1978 stating that petitioner's motion for That on April 28, 1964, private respondent Angeles Dico filed a protest
reconsideration of said February 24, 1978 interlocutory order "cannot be entertained" with the Philippine Fisheries Commission alleging that Juan Quibete was
and advising petitioner of the continuation of the formal investigation of the private occupying and improving lot (Lot No. 489-C) which was not the area
respondent's letter-petition scheduled for September 4 to 9, 1978. covered by his fishpond permit and that he transferred his rights and
interests over the said area without the approval of the Secretary of
This present conflict stems from two earlier cases decided by the Office of the President, Agriculture and Natural Resources;
both of which have attained finality. As condensed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
these are as follows: That the Philippine Fisheries Commissioner dismissed the protest on
October 16, 1964 and declared that Lot No. 489-C was the same area
1. Re: DANR Case No. 2898 entitled "Angeles Dico v. Juan Quibete" granted to Juan Quibete under his fishpond permit and not any other lot;
Annex ("A") 1
That from the decision private respondent Angeles Dico brought her case
The salient antecedent facts stated in the decision of the Office of the President to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who dismissed her
dated November 14, 1969, are as follows: appeal on December 7, 1965;

That by a barter agreement entered into between Juan Quibete and Jose That after denial of a motion for reconsideration, she appealed to the
Padios sometime in 1932, the former exchanged his parcel of land Office of the President. Her appeal was in turn dismissed in the decision
situated at Sitio Palaypay, municipality of San Dionisio, province of Iloilo, of November 14, 1969.
for the latter's fishpond area of about 24 hectares located at sitio Talaba-
an, municipality of Cadiz (now Cadiz City), province of Negros 2. Re: DANR Case No. 3447 entitled "F.P.A. No. V-3-3852, Angeles Dico,
Occidental; Applicant-Appellant v. Juan Quibete, Claimant-Appellee" (Annex "F") 2
That Juan Quibete, also in 1932, applied for a Fish and Game Special The facts of the case are as follows:
Permit over the area (F.P.L.A. No. 1709). The application was
disapproved because the area covered thereby was not yet declared
That on November 13, 1965, while DANR Case No. 2898, supra, was still
available for fishpond purposes. The records of that application were lost
pending decision by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
during World War II so much so that Juan Quibete had to renew his
private respondent Angeles Dico filed with the Director of Lands a free
application in 1945 (Fp. A. No. 716). His application was approved on
patent application (No. V-3-3852) for a 4-hectare dry portion of Lot 489-C
February 10, 1949 and Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E was issued;

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
covered by Fishpond Permit 6. On October 28, 1977, private respondent (Angeles Dico) submitted a letter-
No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete; petition to the respondent officials (Annex "L") requesting for a "reopening of
fishpond conflict of Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and Mrs.
That Juan Quibete, claiming preferential right over the area applied for, Godeliva S. Dulay based on newly discovered evidence". It was there alleged
protested to the application; that Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete did not cover the area in
question (Lot No. 489-C) located in Sitio Talaba-an, Municipality of Cadiz (now
That the Director of Lands, in a decision dated May 30, 1967, rejected the Cadiz City) but Lot No. 487 located in Barrio Luna, Cadiz City. She prayed that
application of private respondent Dico and directed Juan Quibete to file petitioner's Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2169 be cancelled and, in lieu
the appropriate public land application, if qualified, for the 4-hectare dry thereof, a new one be issued in her name.
portion;
7. Petitioner moved to dismiss the letter-petition on the ground of res
That a motion for reconsideration having been denied, private respondent judicata (Annex "M"). She argued that the two administrative decisions in DANR
Dico appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; Case No. 2898 and DANR Case No. 3447 (Annexes "A" and "F"), involving the
same parties, subject matter and cause of action, have already become final and
settled the matter once and for all.
That under the same set of facts found in DANR Case
No. 2898 aforesaid, the Secretary affirmed on July 9, 1970 the decision
of the Director of Lands (Annex "F"), stating that the 4-hectare area 8. Claiming that res judicata is not applicable, private respondent opposed the
subject of the appeal covered a portion of the same tract of land which motion to dismiss (Annex "P"). This was the subject of a rejoinder (Annex "Q")
was the subject matter of DANR Case No. 2898; which was again excepted to by private respondent on the argument that res
judicata does not apply in cases where the government has to exercise its
inherent power to regulate (Annex "R").
That private respondent Dico moved to reconsider the Secretary's
decision, Annex "F", but her motion was denied on January 26, 1971. A
second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied per Order dated Respondent Director held resolution of the motion to dismiss in abeyance. In an
May 5, 1971. "Interlocutory Order" dated February 24, 1978, he reserved to resolve the motion
"until after termination of the investigation" brought about by private respondent's
letter-petition. 3
3. As already stated, Petronilo Retirado became the successor-in-interest of Juan
Quibete by virtue of a deed of transfer of rights and improvements executed by
Juan Quibete in favor of Petronilo Retirado on February 29, 1964 over the area By reason of the denial not only of her Motion to Dismiss the letter-petition of respondent
covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete (Annex "A"). Angeles Dico dated October 28, 1977 but also the denial 4 of her motion for
reconsideration 5 and the insistence of respondent Director in conducting his investigation on
September 4 to 9, 1978 at the Bacolod City Fisheries Office, 6 the situation had become
4. Ultimately, petitioner (Godeliva S. Dulay) succeeded to the rights and interests urgent for petitioner. Thus, she filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of
over the area in question. On May 21, 1973, the heirs of Petronilo Retirado preliminary injunction or restraining order claiming that unless one is immediately issued,
executed a "Deed of Sale of Fishpond Improvements and Transfer of Rights" respondent will proceed with the investigation as scheduled, and if petitioner refuses or fails
(Annex "J") transferring their rights and interests in favor of the petitioner over a to appear in said investigation by reason of this petition, the respondents will proceed with the
portion of Lot No. 489-Cconsisting of 19.15 hectares, more or less, and covered investigation and reception of evidence ex-parte as clearly threatened by the respondent
by their Fishpond Permit No. 158-2. Director in his telegrams to the petitioner and his counsel, marked as Annexes "I", "U", "W"
and "W-1" herein.
5. On October 22, 1974, after application with the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, petitioner was issued a fishpond lease agreement (No. 2169) As prayed for, We issued a temporary restraining order in the Resolution of September
[Annex "K"] over a portion of Lot 489-C consisting of 18.3675 hectares, expiring 7, 1978. 7
on December 31, 1998.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
Private respondent Angeles Dico's request for the reopening of the case of "Dico vs. once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and
Quibete, et al." and the cancellation of the Fishpond Lease Agreement of petitioner quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within
Godeliva S. Dulay on the ground of fraud committed by Juan Quibete and Petronila their jurisdiction. 10
Retirado is anchored, allegedly, on the following pieces of newly-discovered evidence, to
wit: DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete" was decided by the
Office of the President on November 14, 1969. 11 Since the same was not brought to the
(1) Order of then Philippine Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Rolden, dated courts for judicial review, the same has long become final and executory.
May 12, 1964, recognizing the fishpond application (No. 18206) of private
respondent, dated Feb. 6, 1958, over the area in question located at Barrio DANR Case No. 3447, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete" involved Free Patent
Daga, Talaba-an, Diotay, Cadiz City; Application No. V-3-385 of private respondent Dico. The Director of Lands in a decision
dated May 30, 1967 rejected her application. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
(2) The Plan of the Bureau of Lands for the entire area of Lot 489 of which the Resources affirmed the same on July 9, 1970. 12 The findings of fact in said DANR case,
subject area is a portion; which were found by the Secretary to be the same facts in DANR Case No. 2898, are
deemed conclusive by operation of law. 13 Said DANR case, not having been brought likewise
(3) The Fishpond Application (No. 18950) of Juan Quibete (herein petitioner's to the courts for judicial review has also become final and executory. 14
successor-in-interest) for 5 hectares covered by Lot 489-B (25 hectares), situated
at Barrio Daga, Talaba-an, Diotay, Cadiz City, was denied by Hon. Jose R. Private respondent points out that the Director of Lands, Ramon N. Casanova, treated
Montilla Assistant Director of Fisheries on May 19, 1960 because Juan Quibete her motion for reconsideration as a petition for relief from judgment. That may be so but
was already a holder of a previously approved fishpond application under Permit Director Casanova's action was not in accord with the administrative rules on appeal.
No. 738-E under Lot 487 covering a 20-hectare area situated at Barrio Luna, Actually, the next step that private respondent should have taken from the July 9, 1970
Cadiz City; Decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was to appeal the same
to the Office of the President within 30 days from receipt of said Decision. 15 Private
(4) The Plan of the aforesaid Lot 487; respondent received the Decision on September 21, 1970, 16 and should have been appealed
the same by October 24, 1970, the last day of filing. Instead she filed a motion for
reconsideration only on November 3, 1970. Clearly, the July 9, 1970 decision of the
(5) Affidavits of three (3) persons who attest to the fact that Juan Quibete's Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in DANR Case No. 3447 had become final
fishpond area (Lot 487) is located at Barrio Luna, Cadiz City. The witnesses are and executory.
Mansueto D. Alarcon, then Municipal Secretary of the Municipality of Cadiz,
Negros Occidental dated January 6, 1965; Patrolman Eligio O. Javier, member of On the assumption, however, that private respondent's November 3, 1970 motion for
the police force of Cadiz, Negros Occidental, dated October 22, 1963 and reconsideration was properly treated as a petition for relief from judgment, thereby also
Melecio Quibete, son of Juan, executed in May 1964. 8 assuming that E.O. 19 (1966) was not applicable to private respondent's case, a careful
review of her alleged "newly discovered evidence" does not support the charge of fraud.
After an exhaustive review of the records of the case, We grant the petition and make
permanent the temporary restraining order issued earlier on September 7, 1978. Private respondent's allegation is that petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Juan Quibete,
was given Lot 487 under Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E while Lot 489-C, which she
Private respondent's letter-petition, 9 filed October 28, 1977, states clearly that it is a applied for under Fp. A. No. 18206, was what Juan Quibete actually improved. He sold
"Request for Reopening of Fishpond Conflict of Mrs. Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete, his rights over this Lot 489-C to Retirado, who in turn sold his rights to petitioner.
Petronilo Retirado and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay based on New Discovered Evidence . . . ."
Actually, private respondent filed on February 6, 1958 with the Bureau of Fisheries
It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of Fishpond Application, Fp. A. No. 18206, to occupy Lot No. 489-C after having allegedly
administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon verified from the records of the Bureau of Forestry that there was no prior lessee. 17 Her
their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the application was initially denied on the ground that said Lot 489-C, mistakenly written as Lot
doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
487 in Quibete's original sketch, had already been granted to Quibete under Fishpond Permit The matter having become final as of August or September 1970, 27 it was grave abuse of
No. F-738-E as early as February 10, 1949. 18 discretion on the part of public respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources to give due course to private-respondent's letter-petition of October 28, 1977
In fact, it appears that what private respondent applied for was the very area of her requesting for a re-opening of the fishpond conflict involved herein.
husband, Celso Dico. This was confirmed by the Assistant Director of Forestry in his
letter dated October 15, 1963 to the Commissioner of the Philippine Fisheries WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Ordered
Commission. 19 ANNULLED and SET ASIDE are the (1) February 20, 1978 Order of the public
respondent giving due course to the letter-petition of private respondent and the (2) two
Private respondent protested on April 18, 1964 the denial of her application. To allow for August 14, 1978 telegrams issued by public respondent setting private respondent's
further verification of her claim, the November 6, 1963 order denying her application was letter-complaint for formal investigation. The temporary restraining order issued last
set aside by the order of May 12, 1964 20 — the first alleged newly-discovered evidence of September 7, 1978 is hereby made PERMANENT. Costs against private respondent.
private respondent — and another verification made on May 23, 1964 by one of the
Commission's investigators, Mr. Cesar Alelis. 21 It was established that it was Quibete's Lot IT IS SO ORDERED.
489-C which private respondent was claiming, although erroneously labelled as Lot 487 by
Quibete himself in the handwritten sketch he submitted to the Bureau of Fisheries on
December 5, 1946. 22 Consequently, private respondent's Fishpond Application No. 18206
was denied with finality by the Philippine Fisheries Commission on October 16, 1964. 23

Again, acting on the motion for reconsideration of his Office's denial of private
respondent's appeal of said October 16, 1964 Order, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources ordered on March 6, 1968, one of the lawyers in his Office's Legal
Division, Atty. Guillermo B. Bautista, to conduct another investigation and ocular
inspection of the fishpond in dispute. 24

The results were the same. It was Lot 489-C that was improved by Juan Quibete and not
Lot 487. A surprise that cropped up in this latest investigation was the withdrawal by
Melecio Quibete, son of Juan Quibete, of his statements in favor of private respondent
which he said he made during the initial investigation regarding private respondent's
Fishpond Application No. 18206 only because he was promised money to do so. 25 It
turned out that private respondent welched on her promise. Since private respondent's claim
to the land is anchored on her purchase of said land, together with improvements, from
Melecio Quibete, 26 the withdrawal by the latter of his statements renders private respondent
Dico's claim fallacious.

To sum up, the matter of which lot Juan Quibete improved as a fishpond and which rights
he sold to Retirado was investigated TWICE after the Philippine Fisheries Commission
reinstated private respondent's Fishpond Application No. 18206 in its Order of May 12,
1964. Both investigations — more than three years apart with investigators from different
offices — showed that Juan Quibete occupied and improved Lot 489-C although in the
different documents, including maps, which make up this case, it was designated as Lot
487. Thus, no merit can be given to private respondent's alleged pieces of evidence,
number 2 and 5(page 7-8, supra) as all these HAD already been studied thoroughly by
both Investigator Alelis and Atty. Bautista in these separate investigations.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. 110401 August 23, 1995 Private respondent denied that it had agreed to waive the time clause. It asked the court
EDGARDO GUEVARA and LOURDES GUEVARA, petitioners, vs. HON. HERMINIO I. to dismiss petitioner's complaint on the ground that it was barred by the judgement in the
BENITO, Presiding Judge of Branch 132 of the RTC of Makati, and FAR EAST prior case (Civil Case no. 87-4140) decided by the RTC of Manila.
BANK & TRUST CO., respondents.
On March 17, 1993, the RTC granted private respondent's motion and dismissed the
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the orders of March 17 and May 7, 1993 of the case (Civil Case No. 92-2818). On May 7, 1993, it denied petitioner's motion for
Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 132) in Civil Case No. 92-2818. reconsideration. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

The facts are as follows: The only issue in this case is whether the judgment based on the compromise
agreement in Civil Case No. 87-4140 constitutes res judicata in the subsequent case
On March 16, 1992, the herein petitioner spouses Edgardo and Lourdes Guevara and between the same parties. We hold that it does not.
the private respondent Far East Bank & Trust Co. entered into a compromise agreement
to Civil Case No. 87-4140 which petitioners had brought in the Regional in the Court of For a judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case (1) it must be a final judgment;
Manila, for the recovery of property foreclosed by the bank. Attached to the agreement (2) the court which rendered it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
was a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by the parties and made a part of the parties; (3) it must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the two cases
agreement, whereby in consideration of the sum of P498,960.00 the bank agreed to identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
resell to petitioners the property which the latter formerly owned, which had been
foreclosed by the bank. All elements of res judicata, except the last, are present here. For while there is an
identity of parties, there is none as to subject matter and cause of action between Civil
Under the compromise agreement, petitioners were to give a downpayment of Case No. 87-4140 and Civil Case No. 92-2818.
P45,000.00 and pay the balance of P453,960.00 in twelve (12) monthly installments of
P37,830.00 each, starting February 4, 1992, plus interest a t the rate of 32%. Should The subject matter of the first case (Civil Case No. 87-4140) was the resale to petitioners
petitioners fail to pay any installment on time, it was stipulated that they would forfeit all of the property which the bank had acquired through foreclosure sale, whereas the
payments made and the bank would then be entitled to rescind the Deed of Conditional subject matter of the second case (Civil Case No. 92-2818), is the rescheduling of
Sale. payment of the property after the parties originally fixed it in their compromise
agreement.
On March 30, 1992, the RTC approved the compromise agreement and rendered
judgment in accordance with its terms and conditions. Nor are the causes of action in the two cases the same, so much so that the same
evidence would not support both of them, which is the test of the identity of causes of
Petitioners paid the first three installments. On September 30, 1992, however, they filed action. Indeed the causes of action cannot be the same for the reason that, if true, the
a complaint, which they later amended on December 18, 1992, in the RTC of Makati, cause of action in the complaint in Civil Case No. 92-2818 only arose after the judgment
alleging that because of race rioting in Los Angeles, California following the acquittal of in Civil Case No. 87-4140.
police officers involved in the manhandling of Rodney King, a black, petitioners' film
business in California was disrupted, with consequent delay in payment by the State of To be sure petitioners' later claim, if granted, would result in the modification of the
petitioners' claim for film and television projects, and that petitioners requested and judgment in the first case, but no more so than if on account of force majeure petitioners
private respondent agreed to waive the time clause of the monthly installments, starting were granted further time within which to discharge their obligation under that judgment.
with the installment due on May 4, 1992. However, so it was alleged, the parties failed to
fix the schedule of payment of the balance of the purchase price which then amounted to The principle of res judicata does not apply, since it extends only to the facts and
P386,605.78. Petitioners prayed that a new period for payment of the balance be fixed conditions as they existed at the time the judgment was rendered. (Calña v. Court of
and that private respondent be ordered to reconvey the property to them upon full Appeals, 239 SCRA 252 (1994) Petitioners' claim is that private respondent agreed to
payment of the balance. waive in their favor the time clause in the Deed of Conditional Sale starting with the
installment which became due on May 4, 1992. They are thus alleging facts which did

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
not occur until after the judgment by compromise had been rendered in Civil Case No.
87-4140 on March 30, 1992. This case is governed by the ruling in Lao Lim v. Court of
Appeals, 191 SCRA 151 (1990) that a compromise agreement and that any cause of
action that might arise after the making of the agreement and that any cause of action
which may arise from the application or violation of the compromise agreement is not
barred by what was settled in the prior case.

It may very well be that petitioners are claiming novation of the compromise agreement
merely to escape the effects of their noncompliance therewith or that if there is indeed
any new contract it is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. This is, however, a
matter of defense and proof which is properly left for determination by the trial court after
trial.

WHEREFORE, the orders dated March 17, 1993 and May 7, 1993 issued in Civil Case
No. 92-2818 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. (Branch 132) are REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. 100156 June 27, 1994 In Civil Case No. 3022, defendants were declared in default. Petitioner claims that said
ISIDORA SALUD, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MELANIA defendants were then in the United States and were unable to answer the Complaint. On
GUERRERO, respondents. February 19, 1982, the then CFI of Cavite rendered a decision granting the late Guerrero
the right to redeem the properties in question. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the which became final and executory on July 31, 1986. Efforts of petitioner to intervene in
unjust application of the doctrine of res judicata to a non-party to a case. As the stringent, the appellate court were in vain.
mechanical application of res judicata to the case at bench will work injustice, we grant
the petition. On the other hand, the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3023 was tried on its merit. Teodoro
G. Salud was able to answer Guerrero's Complaint. After trial, the trial court dismissed
The facts in brief: the Complaint on January 10, 1982. It held that the late Guerrero had no right to redeem
the litigated property as its sale "is not in esse." The Court of Appeals, in G.R. No. CV-
Petitioner Isidora Guerrero Salud and her late husband, Eusebio B. Salud, are the 2529, also affirmed this Decision.
registered owners of an undivided one-half (½) share in certain parcels of land situated in
Bacoor, Cavite. They are referred to as the Poblacion and Habay properties and the San The controversy between the parties did not die down. To frustrate the right of
Nicolas property, respectively covered by TCT No. RT-9269 and TCT No. RT-9268 of the redemption granted to the deceased Clemente Guerrero in Civil Case No. 3022,
Cavite City Register of Deeds. 1 To be exact, these properties are registered in the name of petitioner Isidora Salud initiated Civil Case No. BCV-86-60, dubbed an Action to Quiet
"Isidora Guerrero . . . married to Eusebio Salud, and Clemente Guerrero . . . married to Title/Remove Cloud from Title, Declaratory Relief plus Damages before the RTC of Imus,
Melania Andico." Petitioner Isidora Guerrero Salud and Clemente Guerrero are sister and Cavite. Sued was Clemente's widow, private respondent Melania Guerrero. The latter
brother. The latter is the deceased husband of private respondent. moved to dismiss the complaint on ground, among others, of res judicata.

On October 20, 1967, petitioner and her late husband, executed a deed wherein they In an Order 4 dated March 19, 1987, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioner
sold their one-half (1/2) share in the Poblacion property to their daughter Maripol appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which, however, rendered an affirmance.
Guerrero for TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00), while the Habay property was sold
to their children Norma Salud Vianzon and Eusebio G. Salud, Jr., for FIVE THOUSAND Hence, this petition.
PESOS (P5,000.00). 2
The rules of res judicata are of common law origin and they initially evolved from court
On November 3, 1967, petitioner and her late husband, also sold their one-half (½) share decisions. It is now considered a principle of universal jurisprudence forming a part of the
in the San Nicolas property in favor of their children Eusebio Salud, Jr., and Teodoro G. legal system of all civilized nations. 5 In our jurisdiction, the principle of res judicata was
Salud for THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00). 3 incorporated as part of our statutory law. The principle was enacted as sections 306 and 307
of Act No. 190. 6 Later, it became sections 44 and 45 of former Rules 39. 7 Under the present
After the execution of the deeds, it is alleged that petitioner and her late husband Rules of Court, it appears in section 49 of Rule 39, viz:
changed their minds. They did not register the deeds of sale. Instead, they continued in
possession of the properties, and exercised other acts of ownership, including the Sec. 49. Effect of judgments. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
mortgaging of the lots subject of the deeds. by a court or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or order, may be as follows:
The relationship between the Salud and Guerrero families soured. On June 4, 1980, the
late Clemente Guerrero, husband of private respondent, filed with the Court of First xxx xxx xxx
Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, two (2) complaints docketed
as Civil Cases No. 3022 and 3023. In Civil Case No. 3022, he sued Eusebio Salud, Jr., (b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly
the spouses Norma Salud and Artemio Vianzon and Maripol Guerrero. In Civil Case No. adjudged or as to any other mater that could have been raised in relation thereto,
3023, he sued Eusebio Salud, Jr., and Teodoro G. Salud. He sought to exercise his right conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title
of redemption as a co-owner of the controverted properties.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating In some cases the public at large also has an interest in seeing that rights and
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; liabilities once established remain fixed. If a court quiets title to land, for example,
everyone should be able to rely on the finality of that determination. Otherwise,
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in- many business transactions would be clouded by uncertainty. Thus, the most
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which important purpose of res judicata is to provide repose for both the party litigants
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and and the public. As the Supreme Court has observed, "res judicata thus
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. encourages reliance on judicial decision, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the
courts to resolve other disputes."
The above rule expresses the two (2) aspects of res judicata. As pointed out by
Moran, the first aspect is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a In our age, where courts are harassed by crowded dockets and complaints against slow
second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second foot justice, frequent technical reliance on the preclusive breadth of res judicata is
aspect precludes the relitigation of a particular fact of issue in another action understandable. The importance of judicial economy and avoidance of repetitive suits
between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. 8 The first aspect are strong norms in a society in need of swift justice. Be that as it may, there should not
is known in traditional terminology as merger or bar; in modern terminology, it is be a mechanical and uncaring reliance on res judicata where more important societal
called claim preclusion. The second aspect is traditionally known as collateral values deserve protection. So we held in Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 11
estoppel; in modern terminology, it is called issue preclusion. 9
Assuming in gratia argumenti that the prior judgment of dismissal with prejudice
There is universal agreement on the principles underlying res judicata, 10 viz: was validly rendered within the lawful discretion of the court and could be
considered as an adjudication on the merits, nonetheless, the principle of res
. . . . Two maxims of the English common law best summarize the general judicata should be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of
policies underlying this doctrine. They are: first, that no person should be twice justice to technicality (Republic v. De los Angeles, No. L-30240, March 25, 1988,
vexed by the same claim; and second, that it is in the interest of the state that 1159 SCRA 264). The application of the said principle, under the particular facts
there be an end to litigation. Thus, principles of res judicata serve both private obtaining, would amount to denial of justice and/or bar to a vindication of a
and public interests. legitimate grievance (Ronquillo v. Marasigan, No. L-11621, May 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 304). It is worth stating here that the controversy in the instant case is not
The interest of the judicial system in preventing relitigation of the same dispute just an ordinary suit between parties over a trivial matter but a litigation initiated
recognizes that judicial resources are finite and the number of cases that can be by then natural mother over the welfare and custody of her child, in which the
heard by the court is limited. Every dispute that is reheard means that another State has a paramount interest. The fundamental policy of the State as embodied
will be delayed. In modern times when court dockets are filled to overflowing, this in the Constitution in promoting and protecting the welfare of children shall not be
concern is of critical importance. Res judicata thus conserves scarce judicial disregarded by the courts by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve
resources and promotes efficiency in the interest of the public at large. the family and the youth.

Once a final judgment has been rendered, the prevailing party also has an The case at bench presents an exceptional instance where an inflexible application of
interest in the stability of that judgment. Parties come to the courts in order to the doctrine of res judicata will not serve our constitutional policy favoring fairness, the
resolve controversies; a judgment would be of little use in resolving disputes if heart of due process. Petitioner was not a party in Civil Case No. 3022 and was not
the parties were free to ignore it and to litigate the same claims again and again. given any chance to contest the claim of Guerrero. Her children, then in the United
Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be States, were the ones sued. They failed to answer, and were declared in default. Thus,
corrected through appeals procedures, not through repeated suits on the same the late Clemente Guerrero, husband of private respondent, obtained a favorable
claim. Further, to allow relitigation creates the risk of inconsistent results and judgment by default from the trial court pursuant to which he was given the right of
presents the embarrassing problem of determining which of two conflicting preemption over the contested lots. Petitioner attempted to intervene in the case but
decisions is to be preferred. Since there is no reason to suppose that the second unfortunately, her motion for intervention was denied. The late Guerrero, therefore,
or third determination of a claim necessarily is more accurate than the first, the prevailed primarily because his claim was not disputed. In contrast was the result in Civil
first should be left undisturbed. Case No. 3023 where Guerrero claimed the same right of preemption against the other
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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
children of petitioner. In this case, however, one of the children of petitioner sued by interest, therefore, was not at all represented in Civil Case No. 3022 where judgment
Guerrero, was in the Philippines and he answered the Complaint. The case was tried on was obtained by default. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule of justice and cannot be
its merit and the trial court dismissed the Complaint of Guerrero. It found that the right of rigidly applied where it will result in injustice. 13
preemption of Guerrero was not yet in esse.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision dated May 23, 1991 of the respondent court is
The difference in the results of Civil Cases No. 3022 and 3023 accentuates the necessity REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. BCV-86-90 is remanded to its court of
not to give res judicata effect to the default judgment in Civil Case No. 3022 where origin for further proceedings. No costs.
petitioner was a non-party. The demands of due process present a weightier
consideration than the need to bring an end to the parties' litigation. For more important SO ORDERED.
than the need to write finis to litigation is to finish it justly, and there can be no justice that
satisfies unless the litigants are given the opportunity to be heard. The constitutional right
to due process of petitioner cannot be defeated by the argument that petitioner is a privy
of her children in Civil Case No. 3022, and hence is bound by its judgment. Case law,
both here and in the United States, recognizes privity of interest under the following
situation: 12

The historic and most common situation in which privity is upheld exists when a
person acquires an interest in the subject matter of the suit after it was filed or
decided. Successors-in-interest, whether they obtain their interests by virtue of
an assignment, by inheritance or by law are bound along with their predecessors
by the rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel. This is necessary in order to
preserve the finality of judgments; otherwise a person confronted with an adverse
decision might subject the winning party to the prospect of continual litigation
simply by transferring his interest in the subject matter of the suit to another who
could begin the suit anew.

A second well-defined privity relationship arises when legal appointed


representative parties, such as trustees and executors, are involved; those
individuals are deemed in privity with those whom they represent. Since parties
litigating in representative capacity have no interests of their own, but either sued
or are sued on behalf of the beneficiaries whom they serve.

Privity also has been universally recognized when it is determined that the newly
named party in the second suit actually controlled or participated in litigating the
first action. Although the non-party will not be bound by res judicata because
different claims are involved, identical issues that were necessarily and actually
litigated will be precluded. Having received one opportunity to defend or
prosecute those issues, he may not be allowed another.

Petitioner does not fall in any of the above categories. She is not a successor-in-interest
of her children in Civil Case No. 3022. Petitioner's children were not sued in Civil Case
No. 3022 in a representative capacity. It is also clear that petitioner did not control or
participate in Civil Case No. 3022 for her motion to intervene was denied. Petitioner's
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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004 On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement5 where some of the
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent. conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including
the following:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 59550 which dismissed the petitioner’s petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No.
Rules of Civil Procedure to annul the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, 120083-Cavite) located at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family
Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying the marriage of the petitioner Ancheta. Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the resort Munting
and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building, pavilion, swimming pool and all
denying the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution. improvements. All of the shares of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were
distributed one-third (1/3) to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12) each.6
This case arose from the following facts:
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in thereto, the respondent vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight children during their coverture, whose names buildings and improvements thereon. The petitioner, with the knowledge of the
and dates of births are as follows: respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.

a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA – born October 6, 1959 In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. – born March 7, 1961 nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. The
case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662. Although the respondent knew that the
petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite,
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA – born May 18, 1962
he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM
Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, "where
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA – born April 8, 1963 she may be served with summons."7 The clerk of court issued summons to the petitioner
at the address stated in the petition.8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA – born October 29, 1965 petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioner’s son, Venancio Mariano
B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.9
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA – born March 6, 1967
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to the
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968 court stating that the summons and a copy of the petition were served on the petitioner
through her son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA – born November 19, 19703
RETURN OF SERVICE
On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the
petitioner and their children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and its
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40, against the respondent for the annexes was received by the herein defendant thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III]
dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for as evidenced by the signature appearing on the summons. Service was made on June 6,
support and support pendente lite. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735. At 1995.
that time, the petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon,
BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila.4 June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES – Execution, Satisfaction & Effects of Judgements
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR. WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render Judgment
Sheriff10 granting the Petition.

The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the respondent 1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional Trial
filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on Court, Branch 14, Naic, Cavite).
June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said date, there was no
appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for the State and offered 2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner
no objection to the motion of the respondent who appeared with counsel. The trial court
granted the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified in his behalf and adduced
documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the
b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The clerk of court issued
a Certificate of Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996.12
c. P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for every
hearing;
On February 14, 1998, Valentine’s Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were
married in civil rights before the municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite.13
d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the
Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of e. Costs of suit.14
the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the following
respondent committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition in Sp. ground:
Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF
Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, when in truth and in fact, the respondent We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of any
knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. clear and specific averment by petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
According to the petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
in the said case, and ultimately secure a favorable judgment without any opposition petitioner. Neither is there any averment or allegation that the present petition is based
thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the respondent caused the service of the petition only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the
and summons on her by substituted service through her married son, Venancio Mariano assumption that extrinsic fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it was not availed of,
B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the respondent was a or could not have been availed of, in a motion for new trial, or petition for relief.15
resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed to deliver to her the copy of the
petition and summons. Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution, appending
favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and thereto an amended petition in which she alleged, inter alia, that:
(2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She further contended that
there was no factual basis for the trial court’s finding that she was suffering from 4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioner averred that she learned of the Order of jurisdiction.
the RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the
affidavits of the petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III. 5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period after
discovery of the extrinsic fraud.
The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor,
thus: 6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have been
availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

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7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel. otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of
new trial, appeal or relief from judgment through her own fault or negligence before filing
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other her petition with the Court of Appeals, she cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of
appropriate remedies were no longer available through no fault of petitioner; the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.19
neither has she ever availed of the said remedies. This petition is the only
available remedy to her.16 It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available
through no fault of her own. The petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the avail of such remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in the rule precisely to avoid
respondent’s marriage was null and void for the court a quo’s failure to order the public abuse of the remedy.20 Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be limits
prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion between the thereto. Once a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a
parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State. competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to sue anew. The
prevailing party should not be vexed by subsequent suits.21
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the ordinary
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that the CA remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition for relief, were no longer available through no
erred as follows: fault of her own. She merely alleged therein that she received the assailed order of the
trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioner’s amended petition did not cure the fatal
defect in her original petition, because although she admitted therein that she did not
1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought to be
avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment, she did not
annulled.
explain why she failed to do so.
2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.
We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and
denying admission of the amended petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of
3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the requirements of Appeals failed to take note from the material allegations of the petition, that the petition
the Rules of Court. was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court. No. NC-662 were not served on her. While the original petition and amended petition did
not state a cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioner’s Motion to Admit the Amended extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause of action for the
Petition; and in not admitting the Amended Petition. nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the
person of the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality.17 ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through
no fault of the petitioner.
The petition is meritorious.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed
An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of
amended, to annul a judgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC may the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need
be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If based on not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the
extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.18 The petitioner must allege in the without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a
petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer available through no fault of hers; whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by laches.23
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In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in method extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the
light of the material averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also circumstances categorized by statutes.31
on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the
failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of the complaint. She As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes
claimed that the summons and complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the
Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give her the said summons and complaint. same day, the summons was served on and received by Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta
III,33 the petitioner’s son. When the return of summons was submitted to the court by the
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its annexes sheriff on June 21, 1995, no statement was made on the impossibility of locating the
will show that it is, prima facie meritorious; hence, it should have been given due course defendant therein within a reasonable time, or that any effort was made by the sheriff to
by the Court of Appeals. locate the defendant. There was no mention therein that Venancio Mariano Ancheta III
was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that jurisdiction is acquired by Piñas, where the petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly residing. It turned out that
a trial court over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III had been residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that
and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of summons his father merely showed him the summons and the complaint and was made to affix his
and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a case has been filed against signature on the face of the summons; he was not furnished with a copy of the said
him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands summons and complaint.
of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a valid waiver
renders the judgment of the court null and void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the 4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona,
court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the case against him unless he Cavite, I have been residing on the adjoining land consisting of two (2) lots later
is validly served with summons.26 apportioned to my father as his share of the conjugal partnership. Since then, I
have been residing therein up to the present.
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy
thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to 5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated on my
her.27 However, if there is impossibility of prompt service of the summons personally on father’s lot), my father came to see me and then asked me to sign and I did sign
the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the summons may be papers which he (my father) and the Sheriff did not allow me to read. Apparently,
effected by substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the said Rules: these papers are for the Summons to my mother in the case for annulment of
marriage filed by my father against her. I was not given any copy of the
SEC. 7. Substituted service.— If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served Summons and/or copy of the complaint/petition.34
within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies of of the petitioner and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded
defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
thereof.28
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final order
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of service should be strictly of the trial court. However, we cannot but express alarm at what transpired in the court a
followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. quo as shown by the records. The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to file an
Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the motion of the respondent herein to
that substituted service may be made by stating the efforts made to find him and declare her in default. The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he
personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that such effort interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith received
failed.30 This statement should be made in the proof of service to be accomplished and the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner
filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary because substituted service is a derogation without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court
of the usual method of service. It has been held that substituted service of summons is a and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:

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Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that
their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.35 prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting
attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and
Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which fabricated.
provides:
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.— If the institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger
the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our
between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family
to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.36 members alone.43 Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should
stay together must not depend on the whims and caprices of only one party, who claims
that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the guidelines in the
her marital duties and obligations.
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the State: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550
are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 be
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings conformably with the Decision
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
of this Court and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such SO ORDERED.
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.38

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its pronouncement in Republic
v. Court of Appeals,40regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State.41 The trial court, abetted by the
ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public prosecutor, waylaid the Rules of Court
and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of this Court.

The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and
zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as
a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the
exposure of an invalid one as well.42

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