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Case 8:18-cr-00011-TDC Document 10 Filed 04/02/18 Page 1 of 3




Criminal No: TDC-18-0011


The United States and Defendant Transport Logistics International, Inc. ("TLI") have

jointly moved for the exclusion of time from the period during which trial must occur under the

Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. S 3162(h)(2) (2012). The Court may exclude "[a]ny period of

delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to

written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of allowing

the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct." 18 U.S.C. S 3161(h)(2).

Under this provision, the parties seek the exclusion of the period of time from the filing

of the Information through the completion of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement ("DP A")

between TLI and the United States, as represented by the Fraud Section of the United States

Department of Justice, Criminal Division, and the United States Attorney's Office for the

District of Maryland. In the DPA, the parties agree that the prosecution and trial of the charges

contained in the Information in this matter will be deferred for the purpose of allowing TLI to

demonstrate its good conduct, until whichever of the following events occurs first:

1. The United States makes a final determination that TLI has made a willful,

knowing, and material breach of the DP A, as defined therein, and the United States elects,
Case 8:18-cr-00011-TDC Document 10 Filed 04/02/18 Page 2 of 3

consistent with the DP A, to prosecute TLI on the Information, in which event the United States

will request that this case be returned to the Court's calendar; or

2. The United States concludes that TLI is in full compliance with all of its

obligations under the DPA, and the United States, within 30 calendar days after the expiration of

the term of the DPA, as defined in the DPA, files a motion with the Court seeking dismissal with

prejudice of the Information.

The Court notes that a deferred prosecution agreement confers a substantial benefit on a

company for which there is probable cause to charge it with a crime. It should be reserved for

companies that have engaged in extraordinary cooperation and have entirely rid themselves of all

remnants of the prior criminal activity. Here, the Government has represented that TLI fully

cooperated in the investigation, that the Government has filed charges against the two principal

executives of the company, and that one of those executives has already been convicted. At the

same time, the corporation did not self-report the violations, and there remain members of the

Board of Directors who oversaw, or failed to oversee, the company during the time period of the

fraud. Particularly when a very high percentage of the company's business consists of the same

type of uranium transportation work that was secured through fraudulent means, and the DP A

calls for TLI to pay a criminal penalty that is less than 10 percent of the amount contemplated by

the Sentencing Guidelines, there is a risk that a DPA under these circumstances will provide

insufficient deterrence to companies which otherwise would permit fraud, or fail to prevent

fraud, by its senior officials in the future.

However, the Court's authority to take action other than approval of the DPA appears to

be very limited. Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not

interpreted the requirement for "approval of the court" under 18 U.S.C. S 3161(h)(2), the United

Case 8:18-cr-00011-TDC Document 10 Filed 04/02/18 Page 3 of 3

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that the district court may

not "impose its own views about the adequacy of the underlying criminal charges" and may only

fail to approve a DPA if it is not "geared to enabling the defendant to demonstrate compliance

with the law" and is instead "a pretext intended merely to evade the Speedy Trial Act's time

constraints." United States v. Fokker Servs. B. V, 818 F.3d 733, 744 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Under

this standard, the Court must approve the DPA and grant the motion.

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that, for the reasons stated at the March 12, 2018

hearing and in this Order, the period of time outlined above shall be excluded in computing the

time within which an indictment must be filed, or the time within which the trial of the charged

offense must commence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3161(h)(2). Consequently, as of the date of

this Order no time has elapsed under the Speedy Trial Act.

Date: April 2, 2018

United States District J