B

3

mt

bflT

mm^mt^^^m
mWMMM.
vL».-.'.'X'.*,''.'.».'

^•l.'i

I.'' ';

'•

1

J

I

I

!

i

,

i'

A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFANTRY TACTICS

;

A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INFANTRY TACTICS
BY

COLONEL BECA
Translated bv Permission of the Author
BY

CAPTAIN
5///

A.

F.

CUSTANCE

Battalion Worcestershire Regiment, and King's Messenger Late Captain 2gth Worcestershire Regiment

With
Commanding \o.

a

Preface

by

COLONEL HACKETT

PAIN,

C.B.

7 District Southern

Command

LONDON GEORGE ALLEN
:

c^-

UNWIN LTD.
W.C.

RUSKLX HOUSE

40

MUSEUM STREET

1915

"^/^

PREFACE
" In any garrison town on the Continent not a day passes but some pamphlet, book, or article is published

on something military." The above sentence from the introduction of the translator of this brochure serves as food for reflection. Can it be said that in its proper proportion the same is the case in this country ? On the contrary, it must be admitted that this is not so this laxity may be attributed to the smallness of the regular forces and to the
;

lack of intelligent interest in things military by the general public, and consequently the " no demand." But although the standing armies of the country are not numerically large, this cannot be said of the armed forces of the crown, which, including the territorial army and the various organized contingents of the oversea dominions amount to the respectable figure of, 700,000 excluding the regular and irregular native

troops of India and elsewhere, and consequently it would be thought that there was room for a much more extended output of military writings. Be this as it may, it is a pleasure to welcome this most interesting and instructive study, containing as it does the essence of recent military thought and tracing the evolution of modern infantry tactics from their inception until to-day. In the first place, attention is directed to the
"

moral factor " so particularly emphasised in this The moral factor descending as it does from study. the very earliest times, is as important to-day as it

333799

viii.

PREFACE

then, with its record teUing of the complete confidence so necessary of the troops in themselves and in the character and will of the commander in whose hands their destinies are placed. But important as is the cultivation of " morale " in the troops themselves it must not be forgotten how much of this " morale " can be derived from the moral support of the nation itself If we turn to the great military nations of the Continent we see how strong is the sympathy between the army and the nation, how proud are the feelings of the latter in the welfare and development of the former, and what knowledge the people possess of things military. This all tends to the increase of the moral of the troops who feel they embody the patriotic sentiments of the whole people. With us the regular army is small compared to the mass of the nation a large portion always on foreign service things military practically unknown to the bulk of the people, and, regrettable though it be, for these reasons the army cannot be said to derive the full measure of moral support from the nation which a wider knowledge of military
;
;

was

would undoubtedly create. Those who have had experience of command on active service of troops of our own, and possibly other
affairs

nationalities, well

know how

strongly the

human

factor

comes in. The comments on " morale " in this work can be read with advantage, not only by the soldier but also by the civilian interested in military affairs.

What will undoubtedly interest the reader of this study is hovvin the courseof time the French losing sight of the teachings of Bonaparte became impregnated by a defensive spirit in their tactics, while on the other hand the Germans assimilated the vigorous methods of the great Captain. This is the more extraordinary, as the French possessed first hand the rich store of experience bequeathed to them by that master which they failed to study or forgot. This however cannot
be said of them to-day, no army studies and practices

PREFACE

ix-.

the offensive, so suitable to the French temperament, more than the French army, and nowhere are there It may be keener advocates of Napoleonic methods. as well to indicate here, but very briefly, the tactical tendencies in Germany and France. The Germans, relying on superior numbers, moving their columns abreast on a greater or less front according to circumthough in sufficient depth proceeded by the stances mass of their numerous cavalr}', trusting to this cavalry and to their prearranged system of spies to procure intelligence, will, with the utmost rapidity assume the offensive and engage vigorously along their whole front wherever their adversary is to be found, at the same time endeavouring to envelope one or both of his flanks. The employment of strong strategical advance guards is not advocated, nor is the retention of strong reserves, other than reserves already detailed in the various columns, contemplated the force thus economised being utilised for enveloping movements. The French, on the contrary, do not rely entirely on advanced cavalry, but form strong strategical advanced guards pushed forward to obtain information of the dispositions, line of advance, and strength of an adversary, and thus enable the commander of a force to screen the advance of his own columns, to decide in which direction he will move and to give time for the concentration of his forces in the required direction. According to circumstances, the offensive action of the advanced guard is vigorousl}' continued by further force with the prime object of disclosing, or making, a weak spot upon which the decisive attack will be launched. The French, also, adhere to the employment of general reserves, to giveexpression tothese principles. The discussion and candid criticisms w^hich arose amongst Continental military experts over the so-called new or Boer tactics of the South African war is interesting, but whatever defensive tendencies might have been disclosed to the Continental critics in our Infantry

;

X.

PREFACE

Training, 1902, and Combined Training, 1902-3, this cannot be said of the training manuals now in use. Both Infantry Training of 1905 amended in 1908, and Field Service Regulations, Part I., Operations 1909^ embody a thoroughly offensive spirit, and it is hoped that the attack with its strong moral backing will always remain the bed rock of our training. Troops must be continually and systematically trained to the attack until it becomes, so to speak, " a matter of course," otherwise when the time comes their inclinations will not be so whole-hearted in the offence, and there will be a tendency to think more of the less daring role, the defence. The formations which were adopted by the French at the battle of Coulmiers, their only victory in the war of 1870, when they had nothing but raw troops to oppose to the trained soldiers of Germany is very instructive, showing the difficulties in which the French leaders were placed in order to devise formations which v/ould make up for the want of training and discipline of their troops. Although successful on this occasion it made no difference to the final result of the campaign, and it should forcibly bring home the difficulty of a tactical re-arrangement at the last hour. Chapter VI. gives the theoretical aspect of modern battle, and commences with the object and uses of covering detachments which are in other words small mobile columns pushed to the front, and the flanks of the advancing main columns of an army and their advance and flank guards. The function of these columns is fully laid down in the latest French Infantry Training, and in recent grand manoeuvres in France, these small swiftly moving columns were much used, they generally consisted of two battalions of infantry, one squadron of cav^alry, one battery of field artillery, and one field company of engineers pushed out to various, though not beyond supported distances of the main columns, and employed in many ways they
;
:

PREFACE
fortified

xi.

and held

villages or

minor

tactical

points,

gathered information, and were a veritable thorn in the side of the advancing opposing cavalry, whose enterprise they often checked. Mixed columns of this nature can be utilised in various ways, for example, as "bait," holding points d'appui, and in defence to
establish false fronts their strength is sufficient to enable them to set up a determined resistance, and their handiness enables them to extract themselves
:

when necessary and
well

commanded

desirable. Judiciously used and these columns are undoubtedly of

great value.
It

Reference is made to the use- of smoky shrapnel. may not be widely known, but at least one con-

tinental military

power

is

in

possession of shrapnel

shell of this description.

Given favourable weather

conditions

it

is

hardly necessary to point out the

advantage to be gained by attacking infantry supported in their advance by the artillery using shrapnel of
nature, covering the firing line or trenches of the defence with a thick pall of smoke, rendering for the time being, the movements of the attackers invisible. Ordinary shrapnel shell bursting in numbers produces a considerable quantity of smoke but not to the extent of the special shell here alluded to. Let us for a moment, problematical though it be, attempt a glance into the tactical future, and endeavour to see how more nearl}- it is likely to affect the soldier. After a careful consideration of this brochure, it will at once be apparent, that the evolution of infantr}/ tactics, as we know them to-day has been arrived at after a long and very gradual process. Born, as it were, during the French revolution in 1792, reaching manhood in 1870, and vigorous age on the field of Manchuria, the history of tactics shows in the thorny paths of controversy which it has traversed,, and the many and bloody fields it has witnessed, how gradual and slow this evolution has been, and it will
this

xii.

PREFACE

therefore appear more than probable that the appHcation of the tactics of to-day are not likely to alter greatl}^ in the future, or at any rate experience very sudden radical changes. The arrival of the automatic rifle, however, with its possibilities will most surely require a still higher standard of discipline and self control, and consequently increased attention will have to be devoted to the further development of these and other qualities in the soldier. Every known method of co-operation and support between artillery and infantry infantry and infantry not forgetting machine guns must not only be further developed, but the best method of co-operation must become ingrained in both services through constant and continual mutual practice. The difficult task for the most effectual distribution of the artillery in the attack in the several roles it will be called upon to play as in the engagement of the artillery of the •defence the close personal support, as we may describe it, of the attacking infantry the concentration of the fire of dispersed batteries on the chief points of the defender's line to be assaulted, and the judicious placing of batteries to stem the counter attack will in the future require to be more widely understood and studied in order to develop to the full this powerful arm, the most effective support of the infantry, and whose assistance is now more than ever essential. Although not directly affecting the training of the individual soldier, the advent of the various types of air craft will most certainly affect his morale. The feeling that the enemy has seen and knows all the dispositions, even though this may not be literally the case, is bound to produce a depressing condition, and the anxieties of the commanders will be enormously increased, particularly in the case of the latter, for, ^ven if provided with the same sort of appliances, the fear will be present that some skilled observer has
;

;

;

"

PREFACE

xiii.

marked some movement on the secrecy of which may hinge the fate of some deHcate combination. Observations from a swiftly moving aeroplane must always Officers who have a natural be very difficult. aptitude for rapid observation should be trained, and search should be made for likely aspirants in order to commence as soon as possible the prolonged training which will undoubtedly be necessary before these The officers can be considered thoroughly reliable. dispositions to be made in the movement of troops, to evade the full effect of the science of flying, must be carefully considered, whether this takes the form of frequent movement by night with its attended exhaustion to marching columns, or the use of large bodies of mounted troops to be used as a reserve which can be unexpectedly produced without undue fatigue to themselves, and whose vigorous surprise action will be unpleasantly welcomed by an enemy. These and other arrangements, not only passive but also active, must be diligently thought out and experimented with, not only to render the information procured by these aerial scouts abortive, but to prevent the " morale
of the troops receiving in any way a set back. In conclusion it has always struck the writer that something of the nature of this work was required to enable officers to grasp in a simple and comprehensive manner some of the reasons which have governed the It is not always evolution of the tactics of to-day. for example, the admirable that a military library military library of the Royal United Service Institutis available for the acquisition of information first tion hand, nor amongst non-regular officers is time always at their disposal to search out for themselves the various authorities referred to in most militar)- works. A study of this brochure is consequentl\' very strongly recommended to officers, particularly of the territorial army and the army of the overseas dominions, and our thanks arc due to the translator fjr enabling us to

xiv.

PREFACE

have at our disposal such an admirable and instructive But most necessary as the study of history is, book. the practical side must not be lost sight of, commencing as it should, with well regulated and judicious must ever remain the foundation of drill, which In no discipline the sheet anchor of the battle field. army is precision in drill more highly thought of than in the German army, from whom we derive much of the theoretical teachings of the art of war, and it may be taken for a certainty that in their army, time would not be devoted to accuracy in drill if it was not considered necessary and essential.

G.

Hacket

Pain,
Colonel.

CONTENTS
CHAP.

Preface

Introduction
I.

...... .....
.

VAGE

vu
i

General Considerations
^,

.

.16
.

II
III.

(^continued)

21

The Theories upon which Modern
Tactical Regulations have been

Founded
IV. Vulnerability

.

.

.

-3^
73
^5

tions

....••
of

Infantry

Forma-

V. Infantry Methods VI. Modern Battle

.

.

.

.

.

.

-95

DEVELOPMENT
OF

INFANTRY TACTICS
INTRODUCTION
The
of
writer has often

been struck by a curious
visits in

fact in the

course of long residence and frequent

various parts
serious
or

Europe,

that

is,

the

manner

in

which

professional

matters are treated and discussed as

serious

and professional

by most

continental

nations,

and as

matters deserving and

possessing

interest.

In our own

country the absence of the
question of real

interchange of ideas on any
as

moment

is,

a

subject

of ordinary

conversation, sadly conspicuous.

Another very

striking point

is

" professional " foreigners

seem

to

how very much more know about the theories

and conduct of their own particular profession in our country, than we do concerning the same professions in Now, this is not because they travel or see more theirs than we do on the contrary, next to the Americans we Why is it probably travel more than any other people. then ? And the fact would appear to be true not only in
!

;

general, but in particular cases.

The one with which we have to deal at the present moment is, Military matters. The military profession and the art of war are the

2

DEVELOPMENT OF
most noble,
in

grandest,
studies
;

interesting

and absorbing of
most
virtues,

all

them

are to be found
intellectual

as well as

practically

unlimited,

study, knowledge, recreation
to find a profession
bilities

in

and physical scope for fact it would be difficult
possessing
greater possi-

or science

Yet we, the and has seen, are the very people greatest Empire the world who take the least trouble and interest, and who are It means generally the most ignorant regarding them!
attractions of every description.
Is it our character something wrong somewhere, surely We do not seem to be brought up to, or our education ?
!

and taught to want to learn. Why do we leave our public school and our university and consider ourselves Finished, and with a kind of idea
that

we have done with books and

learning; whereas our

foreign friend (although he has probably attained a really higher standard of general knowledge at the age of 20 or

21) seems, to
to close his

some

of us

who know him
that
is,

fairly intimately,

school books with pleasure

certainly, but at the

idea that he has

now Begun

!

he seems to

feel that

he

is

now

properly prepared to

commence

the real pursuit

of general and expert knowledge.

His appetite, instead of being like ours, satiated, has on he is anxious to get at and the contrary been whetted he will not only lose no opportunity of acquiring it master
;

;

knowledge
will seek

in the
it

particular profession he has chosen, but
will force

whenever possible,
their opinions.

others to argue

and
"

give

him
to

Our

Boys' "
this,

ideas

would
is
it

appear to be
fault?

somewhat
is
it

different
fathers'

but

their

Or

their

and grandfathers' before them, their uncles' and great uncles', who insisted on always being " boys " all their lives, and Peter Pan-like would not grow up
!

!

INFANTRY TACTICS
Anyway
somewhere.
-

3

this train of

thought once suggested

may

lead

From personal experience the writer has seen some and knows there are many military clubs abroad which, (from the members' own choice, be it noted) are centres of professional theories and discussion.* In any garrison town on the continent not a day passes
but some
pamphlet,

book,
not

or

article,

is

published
writers

on
or

something military,
*'

by

" professional "
soldier,

experts," but
;

by every and any
all

even irrespective
it

of rank
writers,
fully

they are

" professionals " as
;

were, expert

and theorists everyone of them has his thought out and much discussed pet point on
arguers,

strategy, tactics,

gunnery, signalling, ballooning, or what

not,

which

his brother of^cers, friends

and acquaintances
all

(because his relations, friends and acquaintances have

been

soldiers

and

all

know something about and
them
to

take an
vital

interest in these matters, they recognise

be of

importance to themselves and their country) are only too
delighted to discuss and argue with him, with real mutual
pleasure and enjoyment

We
serious

are

conversation
loss

nowadays continually hearing that the is lost, but do we at all realise that
;

art
it is

of

a

conversation,
is

and

especially
in

professional

conversation,
is

one of the chief ways
this,

which knowledge

acquired

?

Deprived of

the most pleasant

means of

carrying on our education,

we

are faced by the necessity of

hard and dry study of books, which we must confess necessitates considerable " encouragement," shall we call it,

from senior authority

!

=<=

Please understand that the writer does not want the "
1

Rag

"

transformed into a technical training college

4

DE VEL OPME NT OF
There
is

amongst us, not so much of the on war written by the masters, these are actual great works of course all available, but of the lighter, shorter and
a great want

argumentative "brochures," essays and pamphlets which

and encourage thought by causing argument, and perhaps in more real benefit than the solid which " foundation stones " of the greater masters. Does and dry average man learn as much by arguing some point not the
stimulate
result

over his head, once he has acquired a knowledge of the " rules of the game," as he fundamental does from the reading of those rules ? At all events it

which

is

not

teaches

him

to apply
Sir

what he has mastered.

Gene ral

Ian Hamilton a short while ago noticed

with regret the small proportion of officers

who possessed

a knowledge of foreign languages, he deplored the rarity with which foreign technical works are translated into
English, and says that unless such works are studied British
officers

cannot keep

in

touch with continental opinion.
is

This clearly indicates that he
opinion that we
foreign opinion.

undoubtedly therefore of
with

should keep in touch
,

and study
"

Writing on these remarks the " Tunes " says

:

Lord
or

Esher

and

Sir

Ian

Hamilton,

whether

consciously
their

unconsciously, are trying to

make up by

initiative

for the defects of our public school education.

In other
continuous

professions
until,

the

training

of an apprentice

is

so far as his capacity permits, he

becomes an adept.

The

average officer goes to Woolwich or Sandhurst before
is

his education

complete, and begins his military training

with insufficient grounding in literature, history, geography,

languages and science."

Lord Esher asks whether the

intellectual

equipment of
life

the average British officer of high rank and middle

is

INFA NTR Y TA CTICS
equal
to

5

that

of

men
in

of the

same standing
that

in

other

professions,

and while admitting
peers other
in the

many hold
life,

their

own

with

their

walks

of

he reluctantly
to judge,

concludes that

opinion of

many competent

the average do not.

In seeking for the cause Lord Esher

thinks that between the ages of 25 and 35 the lives of

young
often

officers are wasted,

and

that failure in after years

is

due

to the

want of continuous education during

this

period of their military career.

Now

this state of things

could so easily be improved
great deal in the

;

they could do such a very
if

way

of educating themselves,

only the
it

" general idea " were different.
is

In continental armies

so.

Why ?

Because they are always
for pleasure,

writing, reading,

talking

and arguing

and

their

one desire and
their
"

code of honour requires them
profession than their neighbour.

to

know more about
it

Their " esprit de corps
lies

seems

to

be on a different footing,

principally in the

pride taken in the professional knowledge and efficiency of
their service as a whole.

Thus
;

it

would appear that true
the conception of the
is

patriotism

is

the mainspring

it

is

duties of citizenship, of a realisation of what
patria."
It
is

due "pro
is
it

not a very pleasant thought, but
it

not

just possible that at the present time

would do us no

harm

to
in

examine ourselves
this

in

this

respect.

There are
that the
real

many

country

who
is
it

are

of opinion

essence of our patriotism

not based on quite such firm

and sound foundations loyal devotion to and
effort,

as

should be,
that

i.e.

on a strong,

realisation

we owe our every

our brains and our bodies, to the uttermost sacrifices

to the

Motherland, and that

it

has drifted and degenerated

into just a sort of "playing the game,"

which

is

simply a
forbid

natural phrase of the sporting
that this be the case.

instinct.

Heaven

6

DEVELOPMENT OF
A WORD
ON Continental Organisations and
Formations.

Owing
that
is

to the different standpoint

from which we

start,

the difference in the ordinary duties which have to

be performed by our army when compared with those of continental countries, our organisations have drifted in

many ways
most
military
its

far

European
machine

from the recognised principles governing Hence the reason why our armies.
is

at the present

day so very different
its

in

general construction as well as in
it

detailed workings,
critics

and why

is

such an enigma to foreign

and

to a

great extent vice versa.

The unique
bilities

position

we occupy,
have

the special responsiin a

manner estranged we have been, so to speak, thrown very much on our own resources for the development and solution of our military problems
which face our
services,

us from continental standards and principles, and

;

in other countries their

" desideratum "

is

very

much

the

same everywhere,
and
studies

so that in tackling the various problems

of national defence

are greatly spurred

and preparedness for war, their brains on and helped out by
all

imperative rivalry and competition, for they are nearly

working on parallel

lines,

and therefore experts of

different

nationalities are forced to

keep the very sharpest lookout
behind.

on the development of thought and the evolution taking
place around them so as not to
fall

Perhaps we are somewhat inclined to exaggerate the
dissimilarity

between our problems and those of others.
have got rather into the way of
study

We

almost appear to

thinking that
resources

we were thrown completely on our own
initiative

and

for

and

advancement,

deprived of salutary competition and

criticism

on

parallel

iNFANTkY TACTICS
lines,

7

of rivals similarly situated.

This would undoubtedly

appear to

be

one

of
its

the

reasons

why our

academically, behind

European neighbours.

army is, If we go

on the
different

false

principle that our requirements are so very

from those of other nations that comparisons and mutual study and knowledge are of comparatively little
value,
is

there not

the great danger of military egotism
the
"
it

and narrow-mindedness, of a general disregard of evolution and thought going on around us, because
does not apply to
military matters.

us "

a phrase so often heard in our

One must

not forget that no person,
its own Each one of

family, army, or nation
lines

can work entirely upon

and show a

total disregard of others.

them is but the men, a nation
any other army.
the

part of a whole.
is

A man

must meet other

necessarily a rival

and competitor with
advance along
I

every other nation, and an army must be prepared to meet
All

must

to a great extent

same

road.

One
is

nation cannot say, "

play Rugby,
rules

therefore

what

the

use

of

knowing

the

of

But they may some day be challenged for a game of " Soccer," and they cannot then pick up the
Association."
rules

and
is

art of the

game
it

after the ball

is

in

play

!

The

simile

a poor one but

may

help to convey the idea.

There are
" two
military

not, in Napoleon's words,

"two

strategies" or
in

tactics "

or

two

right

ways of doing anything
or

matters,
this

nor can

there

ever will

there

be.
for

Has not
led

comparative disregard
unwittingly
established

shown

by us

contemporary continental opinions and theories
us
to

almost
likewise

the

verge

of,

perhaps,

disregarding

some

firmly

modern

principles,

which continental experts are agreed possess very nearly
the importance of axioms
?

Fortunately there

is

an

increased

amount of

interest


S

DEVELOPMENT

Oh^

being displayed by the whole nation in our methods, and
the ventilation of theories and arguments the
increase.
is

gradually

on

Also,

there

appears

to

be an

incipient

demand for translations of foreign technical works. The following brochure on the Evolution of Infantry
which the writer has translated, and which describes the present state of thought on the Continent, and gives an
tactics,

interesting

and very
of

instructive outline of the causes leading
in

up

to,

and which have resulted

the

most up-to date
in

application

fundamental laws and principles
will,

the

Tactical Regulations of various countries

he hopes,

be pleasant reading to every

man keen on

the service.

To

help the reader understand certain passages, a few

notes and diagrams of Continental formations are given.

They may not be absolutely correct in minor detail, but will be found more or less reliable as regards principles, and may be taken as fairly typical of most Continental
armies.

Note.

— In

constituted

most Continental armies a Regiment more or less as follows at war strength
:

is

A

Regiment (strength about 3000) divided

into 3 Battalions.

FICI

FiG.m..

04

n
<?>

O

o
\

•f

*^>

3
a.

4-

o
s
'^

y
(>

3'

5

:^

O
^
*?^?
»<
•f

o
n A

>

I

O"

O
* •

^

A -

^^

a

O^
-1

••

•<-

I

^iffigf^^g^iijf^^

FIC.V
INF. REGT
IN

BATTLE FORMATION

^

Total

frontage

700

Metres Bn

^

2'^."

Bn.

i*.'.

30. M,

50 M
s;

30 M.
2'?''

I

Coy.

Coy.

s;
I

Coy

( 2 ^^

Bnj

(I^TBn.j

E
O o
)0

I I

SUPPORTS
I

II
2Secs.(l*'"Coy)

'

2Secs.(2".''Coy.}

I

I I SUPPORTS II Secs( 2 Sees (I 2 Sees. (2 "-^ Coy)
(I^.-^Bn)

'-^

Coy)

'

6

o
10'

BATTALION

I

RESERVES

I

llllll
4»fCoy.(2^°BN)
3n<i Coy.(2'*.'' Bn)
J

4 '^ Coy.

(i ^."^

Bn)

5'-5^

Coy.

(i*7Bn.}

r d o
I

I
X o o
I

I

I
3*^"

I
Bn. Regimental Reserve

I
I

I'

X:'

2"f^"Coy. C3'*-^Bn}

»s.'"Coy.(3«''BN)

o

III
4^Coy.(3«?BN)

III
3*-^CoyC3«.^BN)

FIG. VI
2".d

INFANTRY BRIGADE
Re^imenr

IN

2'l4Ba,

<


TCo^j.

Total frontage of
I

Brigade

/

\^

I^.^Coy./

\^2'^^Coy./''

\

l^'Coy./

o

\/

^ Sees.
UJ

4-

Sees.

11
c^
o

II

Z'

Ij

J

1.

4^'?Coy.

.S^d Coy.

I

/^

3^.^

Battalion

The Reserves adopl: iheformdUon

BATTLE FORMATION
1^.^

Regiment

/^

1200-1500 Metres.


\
0) \

\

0""^

IV Coy/

\r

V 73
tj

C a
>

II

4.

Sees.

II

4. Sees.

<

4-;.^

Coy.

3'"'*

Coy.

Z'
3^«^

_>^
Battalion

TTiosl

suilaile

^ tke^ffrozutd^

j6

development

Ot

THE EVOLUTION OF INFANTRY TACTICS
General Considerations

The

laws of social evolution, punctuated in each lengthy
world's
history

period of the
science

by noteworthy

strides

in

and

in

the industrial arts,
all

have exercised their
mark, and imposed

influence on the perfecting of

things, both in the old

and

in the

new

world, and

left

their

certain characteristics

on

their

contemporary methods of

warfare.

War, being a phase of
reflect

social existence,

must necessarily
is

the modifications which the latter

continually

undergoing.

The
cultured

favourable

reception
to

accorded by the
the

whole of

Europe

the sound principles which impose
individual,

upon

every

able-bodied

obligation

of

military service, raised mobilisation to colossal proportions

never previously approached.

The

citizen

is

a soldier,

and the nations become armies, almost realising the ideal so ably described by Von der Goltz in " La nation armee. The enormous masses of present day mobilisations, the consequent increase of material employed and of the inevitable accessory services which must be prepared
at

once to meet

all

requirements both of personnel and

circumstances, the co-operation and mutual understanding

which should
service,

exist

between the various branches of the
armies,

the intelligence and perfect authority which must

direct all

movements of modern

all

these clearly

INFANTRY TACTICS
indicate

IJ

the

stupendous

difficulties

inseparable

from an

army

as regards both

supreme and intermediate command.

The enormous masses which oppose each other in modern wars have .increased battlefields to dimensions
never even approached in the greatest wars of the past.

The

operations at Saint Private in
a front of
i

1870, in which the

Germans attacked on
the enveloping

2

kilometres, at that time

considered enormous, are insignificant when compared with

movements

carried out in

the late war in

the Far East, where the Japanese at Liao-Yang and

Cha-Ho

attacked on a front of 60 kilometres and in proportionate

depth

!

If to these

extended frontages we add the employment
chemical
flat

of

modern

powders
trajectories

of

extraordinary

power,
in

causing extremely

and a great increase
is

depth of the beaten zone, the immediate result the supreme control of all operations on the

to

make
to

battlefield

more and more difficult, and makes it necessary to resort such means as balloons, field telegraphs and telephones the chief sources of information and control.

as

We
by the

have

lately learnt

what an important part was played
Military balloonto
is

latter in the

Russo-Japanese war.
infancy,
is

ing, as

yet

in

its

however bound
it

play an

important
a

part

in

the

war of the future:

already

most useful instrument for obtaining information in besieged or blockaded fortresses, and it will attain yet greater importance when the difficult problem of the perfect
control of the airships
is

solved.

A

careful

and continuous preparation during times of

peace therefore becomes absolutely imperative as a safeguard against possible eventualities, for the time when
troops could serve their a})[)renticeship after a declaration
of war are long past.

18

DEVELOPMENT OF
Convinced of
this truth, all civilised nations are

devoting

every

effort

towards

raising

the
so

intellectual

and moral
a solid

courage

level

of their

forces,

as

to possess

guarantee of well-trained strength should any serious crisis threaten the peace or endanger the nation's most sacred
rights or interests.

After

the

great
all

impulse

towards

reform

experienced

European armies during the golden period throughout brilliance, the war of 1870 marks the time of Napoleonic of miUtary "renaissance," which has in recent times occupied the attention of the politicians and general staffs
of the most progressive armies.

A

feverish

progress and for the application of

movement towards new more
in

studies,

for

greater

scientific principles,

convulsed the whole of Europe.

Heated discussions
everywhere,
trials

the

press,

careful

experiments
frequent

at

the

various

schools

and

manoeuvres in the
in fact

field

over

varied terrain, every effort

deficiencies

tending towards freeing the art of war from the and imperfections which obstructed the
its

appreciation and study of the real value of
phases.

evolutionary

And

establishing during this period of incessant

work and
with
the

perfecting

of scientific

discoveries,

the

tactical formulae, all of

which had

to

be done
in

in

new harmony

important

improvements
alterations
in

arms which were
war
material,

every day producing more astonishing and decisive results.

The

progressive

in

all

the
the

continual

reduction

the

calibre

of

small

arms,

introduction of quick-firing guns and the most important

invention

of

smokeless powders
as longer range

bringing

about greater
the

precision as

w^ell

and

flatter trajectories,

experiments of every description carried out at practical schools and the lessons taught by the Transvaal and the

INFANTRY TACTICS
terrible

tg

Russo-Japanese wars
factors

in fact, the

sum

of

all

these

upon the minds of enlightened experts in the military world, all came and imprinted a new aspect and turned in a new direction the
study of tactical questions. In
its

important

working strongly

turn the question of the effect of

fire,

acquiring

especial importance since the introduction of

arms capable
the most

of developing a very rapid
careful

fire,

has

demanded

study by those nations which devote the highest

attention to both the material and intellectual progress of
their military forces

and

to the continual perfecting of their

methods of war.

The
to

great

penetration

of

projectiles,

increasing

the

vulnerability of troops in masses, naturally caused tacticians

by the enemy's
tions

adopt more open formations directly the zones beaten fire were reached; hence the innumerable

theories recently

propounded

for substituting

deep forma-

by others more appropriate and
extraordinary power of

less vulnerable.

The
lying

modern

quick-firing

arms

enables a perfect hail of projectiles to be poured on ground

which

between a defended position and the points from the attack will commence; and topographical

conditions
difficult

when

carefully utilised
it

make

the attack extremely
at

by obliging

to

be prepared

a

much

greater
fire,

distance,

by a proper concentration and intensity of
sufficient to crush the

which must be
be

defence and enable

the assaulting troops to approach, and to these latter will

committed the arduous task of pushing home the
Everything points therefore towards new methods, and

decisive attack.

it

is

their consideration

which dominates the thinking

j)art

of the military world,

and hence the gradual
in

l)ut

steady
battle

evolution which

has been taking place

modern

20
tactics,

DE VEL OP ME NT OF

respect not only as regards Infantry, but also with are the complements of to the other arms, which assist and
" queen of battles." the preponderating action of the

INFANTRY TACTICS

21

II

final

In the very true words of Ardant du Picq, battle is the object of armies, and man is the first instrument of
battle.

Strictly speaking therefore,

nothing can with any degree

of confidence or advisability be laid

down

regarding military

organisations without a profound knowledge and study of

the essential instrument, man, and his moral temper in the
critical

hour of

battle.

In the complicated game of strategical moves and tactical combinations, the human factor cannot be overlooked, for
it

is

a

moral factor and

consequently

subject

to

the

psychological influences of the battlefield.

The human
the
gift,

heart, as

Marshal Saxe used

to say,

is

the

starting point of everything in war.

Generals
it

know how

to

work upon

in a

who have manner which

produces those unexpected movements and combinations which take an adversary by surprise and result in his
downfall.

In
the

General Negrier's opinion, no matter how
skill

brilliant

commander, the secret of his combinations, the precision of his movements of concentration,

of the supreme

or

the
in

numerical
obtaining,

superiority

which he
escape

may have
him
if

succeeded
without

victory

will

the

soldier be not well " tempered," does not act instinctively

being driven,

and

if

he

be

not

individually

possessed of the fixed determination 10 conquer or die.

-T)

DEVELOPMENT OF
requires

He

more moral courage

at the present

day than

ever he did before.
All his powers, both moral
into play during

and physical,

will

be brought

many

hours, subjected to a high nervous

tension causing physical waste,
this ordeal

and

to help

him through

he

will

have to rely on the steadfastness of his
spirit.

courage and the quality of his fighting

The

records of history, which are nations' eternal lessons,

show us that not only
exercises

times, but likewise in

most ancient periods and mediceval more recent days, the moral factor a preponderating, if not decisive influence on the
in
all

achievements of

great leaders.

In ancient times two types of military tactics opposed

each other, the Greek and the Roman, both based upon
their organic unit.

the

The Greek was the Roman, of a more The Phalanx and

result of

mathematical reasoning

;

intimate knowledge of the

human
tactical

heart.

the Legion

!

Here we have the

explanation in a nutshell of the fighting formations of these

two ancient nations.

The Phalanx possessed

a purely defensive character.

It

represented a solid mass, which could not be subdivided Hence its weakness. without becoming disorganised.

By

contrast, the

Roman

organisations were adopted with
spirit of

a special view to offence and in the

conquest.
into
their

The Legion could be subdivided and broken up fractions, and was therefore a tactical unit which made
formations more flexible and manageable.

The
Greek

inherent

qualities

of
its

Phalanx, aggravated
expansion,

by

a mass formation like the want of mobility, prevented

forcing
its

upon

them

an

exclusively

defensive role, which in

turn necessarily led to ruin,

INFANTRY TACTICS
heavy yoke,
which
later

23

enforced submission, and to the imposition of the victor's

reduced their

states

to

mere

Roman provinces. Roman tactics, which
from the " armed
for

city " of

underwent successive modifications Romulus' time to the formation

of standing armies in the days of the Emperors, withstood

many

years the onslaughts of the barbarian world, but

the vastness of their previous conquests obliging them to

keep up very extended
unduly
scatter
their

lines

of communication, and to
in

forces

distant

localities,

was

undoubtedly

one

of

the

causes

of

their

subsequent

decadence and weakness.

The ebb and
traces

flow of successive

invasions caused

all

of regular tactics

to disappear

when

the wave
itself

of

barbarians overwhelming their frontiers spread
the

over

Roman

Empire, cruelly seared by the enormous hordes
Teutons, Normans, Gauls, Franks

of Saxons, Cimbrians,

and Goths, who

finally

accomplished the work of destruction

of the old world.

The
a

invasions of the barbarian races corresponded with

long

period of social

disintegration

in

the

European

continent, with the rapid decadence of social laws, with the

destruction of
fall

all

civic

and warlike

virtues,

and hastened the

of the tottering
first

Roman

Empire,

During the
succeeded

part of the mediaeval period they never

in establishing

any perfect standard governing

tactical formations,

which frequently varied and appear to
accordance with the particular theory or
teachings
in

have been more

in

fancy of each commander, than to have been guided by

any principles or laws applied from
study of previous battles.
It

the

and

was

the

period

which

Cavalry had

its

supremacy as the

tactical

arm.

In that fearful maelstrom when barbarians met barbarians,

24

DEVELOPMENT OF
all

Europe was devastated,
witliout
it

institutions

were swept away

being possible

to at

once substitute them by

others.

The noble sentiment
its

of individual independence

which characterised the savage of the mediaeval period, a
trait

which derives
nations.

strength from man's moral nature,
in the organisation of

was one of the fundamental elements

modern

Military

Patronage,

that

bond which grew amongst
was nevertheless the
the

barbarian fighters, and which, without destroying individual
liberty or affecting general

equality,

foundation

of an hierarchical of
civilisation

dependence, constituted a

new element
of feudalism,
political

which was
in

forerunner

already

containing
particular

itself

the

germ of

liberty.

One

race of conquerors stood

out in that obscure period of the middle ages by reason of
its

civilising

tendency.

It

w\as

the Arabs,

who

for four

centuries in

Europe shaped

the art of war, also distinguish-

ing themselves as the leaders in sciences, arts and letters.

A
their

careful study of the evolution of the

Arab race and of
Aquitania,

marvellous powers

of expansion

throughout Persia,

Syria,

Egypt,
it

Mauritania,

Spain

and

would
arms

reveal that

was

chiefly the

moral factors which exercised
of their

a

preponderating influence in the success

during their long series of conquests.

The
most

re-establishment

of the

old religion
to

of xA-braham

was a most powerful inducement, spurring
faint-hearted,

war even the

on

whom

the

dogmas of
the

fatalism or the

inevitable stream of

all

human

actions forced to submit to
great

a rigid
affected

discipline,

thus

facilitating

conquests

by from overpowering the whole of France by the energy of
this prodigious race, w4iich

was only prevented

Charles Martell.
After the chaos, which was the result of the torrent of

;

INFANTR V TACTICS
invasions,

25

there at

last

succeeded a period of creation or
various nations

social re-organisation

during which

came
and

into being,

which again underwent successive modifications
militias

due to the influence exercised by the feudal
armies during successive wars.

The
special

influx of the

varied form
features

of civilisation

imprinted

characteristic

on

their

contemporary

military organisations

history of humanity,

the tactics
consisted.

and all these important periods of the and these were naturally reflected in adopted by the two arms of which armies then
Cavalry, which at the

beginning of mediceval

times was the principal arm, had to give way to Infantry as

soon as the Crusades to
armies.
-^

the

Holy Land

clearly

demon-

strated the superiority of the latter in the composition of

*

-x-

*
Piccj,

*
the
effect of

According to Ardant du
troops

an army of

upon other troops
effect
is

is

both moral and material.
its

The
;

material effect of a force

is

power of destruction

its

moral

the result produced on the

enemy by

his

estimate of that power.

In battle two moral factors are ever present, over and

above the material

;

the stronger naturally predominates

very frequently the victor suffers greater losses than the

vanquished; the moral

effect is

not only present in ratio to
it

the real effective power of destruction,

is

also exercised

by an imagined power, which
reserve
"

in the siiape of the " general

threatens to renew the
right,
left,

by appearing on the
" Moral power or
struck

combat with fresh troops and by enveloping or
Marshal Bugeaud, always
force."

attacking in flank or rear.
force," says

me

as

more potent than physical
is

Moral strength

engendered by the confidence implanted

26
in subordinates, intelligence, tact

DEVELOPMENT OF
and
is

kept alive and nourished by acts of

and bravery.
example of valour and coolness
is

In battle a

brilliant

indispensable either to sustain or kindle
the subordinate ranks.

moral strength in

A deep analysis and study of batde would show that from most ancient times, over and above the high sentiments of honour, love of country or sense of duty which
animate armies, the means usually fostered
play
the moral forces
either by
for bringing into

raising your

own

or

by

causing a corresponding

depression in

your adversary's,

consist in attacking in flank or rear, in

some

well thought

out and unexpected movement, or by the employment of

some new invention which
It

will

take the

enemy by
stoical

surprise.

was the moral forces

at

high pressure, the sense of the

duties

of citizenship, patriotism

and

self-denial,

carried to heights of sacrifice which

made almost superhuman
Thermopile.

heroes of the Spartans, when under Leonides they immortalised themselves in the passes of

Alexander's

great

campaign against the Persians was
the moral force was pre-

remarkable for deeds in which

dominant.

The

battles of Granicus, Issus

and Arbela
is

fully

prove

this.

Hannibal, that cunning Carthaginian,

noteworthy

for the

manner
the

in

which he employed every means by which he

strength of his own troops, and at same time exercise a depressing and sometimes even crushing effect upon his formidable adversaries. Only his great genius, his prestige and his influence over

could increase the moral

his troops can explain

how he was

able for

1 7

years to wage

open war

in the territories of

powerful

Rome.

At Trebia,

with a master-hand, he prepared a trap into which Sempronius allowed hiinself to
fall,

and

in the thick of battle

INFAiYTRY TACTICS
found himself surprised by a vigorous attack
in rear, led

27

by

Magon, Hannibal's brother. At Trasimenus he succeeded
Flaminius into
a
defile,

in

drawing

the

Consul

close

to

a lake,

where he was

surrounded by the whole Carthaginian army, which won a
signal victory

and

practically annihilated the

Roman

army.

The day
troops,

of the battle of Canna$, the simple fact that

Hannibal had caused purple tunics to be issued to his and who thus differed from the naked Gauls, caused
it

such astonishment that

at

once brought about great
1

loss

of moral in the enemy's lines

His clever dispositions for the battle, prepared with the undoubted intention of enveloping the Roman forces, which Hasdrubal's cavalry threw into disorder on attacking

them

in rear, reveal the sagacity of the Carthaginian,
for every

who

was always on the watch

and any ruse or expedient

by which he could terrorise or bring great moral pressure to bear upon his redoubtable enemies. Hannibal was finally beaten by Scipio Africanus at Zama, owing to the tactical action of Masinissa's cavalry which
attacked him in flank and rear.

At the
succeeded

battle

of

Aix

against

the

Teutons,

Marius
in

in attacking

them

in rear,

which resulted

an

extraordinary defeat, in which

100,000 Teutons and only

300 Romans are said to have fallen. At Cheronea, Sylla only possessed about one-third the strength of Archilau's army, which consisted of 110,000

men he
;

nevertheless succeeded in taking the latter in rear

by

surprise,

and

in

gaining a great victory.
to

Ccesar,

the

conqueror of Gaul, frequently resorted

various stratagems calculated to puzzle his adversary, In his campaigns against he could then more easily crush.
the Gauls, Helvetians, Belgians,

whom

Germans and

Britons, he

28

DEVELOPMENT OF
his quaUties as

had many opportunities of demonstrating
at the battle of Pharsalia

a great general, but his most brilliant feats were accomplished

where the great Pompey,
his numerical strength,

his

adversary, possessed twice

which

nevertheless did not prevent his defeat, thanks to C?esar's
dispositions.

The

latter

disconcerted his

enemy by sending
cavalry,

against
this

him

infantry,

mixed with each cohort of

and

proved altogether too
left

much

for the

opposing cavalry.

Pompey's
their

wing, taken in rear by a clever move, lost

morale and were seized with panic, which brought
their destruction

about

and gave Caesar
art of

his victory.
his successes in

This great master of the

war ow^ed
in a

a great measure to the moral means employed by
the greatest

him with

acumen^ he possessed

high degree the

knowledge of the moral influences in battle, possessed the great genius of knowing how to make use of the most trivial incidents, to increase the morale of his own army

and bring about a corresponding depression
adversary.

in that of his

In the middle ages,
other leader
of armies

Mahomet knew better how to get on his

than
side

any
that

dominant moral force which facilitated the long series of uninterrupted victories which rendered famous the period of
his greatness.

In more modern times,

it

is

also easy to

trace the effects of moral factors
battles.

on the

results of great

of Francis

In 1525, Charles V. defeated at Pavia the French army I., the latter's morale being from the very first

shaken by the perfected arquebus with which the Spaniards
were armed.

The
extent,

victories of

Gustavus Adolphus were, to a certain
to

undoubtedly due
his

introduced into

army.

many notable innovations The clothing of troops in

INFANTkV TACTICS
uniform, which dates from this time
;

29

the greater mobiUty of
;

the Artillery and the improvements in the small arms
of

the use
his

made-up

cartridges, the
in

new formations adopted by
and
towards attaining

infantry

— everything
more rapid
fire

fact

was aiming towards greater
a
adversary, whose morale was

mobility,

loading,

superiority of

over the

profoundly affected

by

the

innovations

and
in

discipline

displayed by the Swedish

army during

the Thirty Years' War.

Conde and Turenne were both masters
taking
full

the

art

of

advantage of moral factors, also of executing

on the
morale.

battlefield those tactical

movements which
fall

greatly
in

disconcert an

adversary

and bring about a
at

his

Conde's turning movement
of the

Rocroi,

executed

with

unsurpassed energy, makes one grasp the wonderful hold
situation,

quick appreciation
this

and prompt
general

action,

which

characterised

distinguished

of

the

Seventeenth century.
Frederick
alterations
in
II.

of Prussia,

armaments,

by introducing considerable and by further reducing the
laid

depth of Infantry formations,

the foundation of the
to their material

famous "
moral

linear " tactics,

which owing

and

effects

enabled the Prussian arms to obtain such

great results,

and paved the way

for the

aggrandisement of

that small central

European

state.

The wars
phase
in

of the

French Revolution,
led
to

marking a new

tactical

evolution,

the

abolishment of

" linear " tactics with their rigid formations,

and replacing

them by
degree

belts of skirmishers,

enemy, affected
towards

his

whose mobility paralysed the morale, and thus contributed in no small
successive
victories

the

won
with

by

the

Republican troops, infused as
patriotic spirit.

they were

the most

^,o J

DEVELOPMENT OP
In the wars during the Consulship and the Empire, the
their side

French armies had on

almost throughout
morale,

the the

preponderating factor of a superior

due

to

tremendous personal prestige and confidence inspired by
the greatest military genius of

modern times
to

:

Napoleon.

In the course of
the

many hard
often

fought battles, in the days of

Empire,

it

was

necessary
besides

adopt

on the

battlefield

formations

which,

producing
raise the

good
morale

material effects, should at the

same time

of the French troops

and depress

that of their adversary.

The enormous masses which made up
columns
at Eylau,

the

attacking
of Plevna,

Waterloo, and the
in

last battle

heavy and powerful

material power of offence, were also
effect

intended to produce a moral
of skirmishers

upon the enemy.
fire

In the present day of rapid and smokeless
action

the

has

been

raised

to
in

the

highest

importance and has assumed a new phase

which each
will,

man

must,
to

with

full

freedom and independence of
strike his

endeavour
Lindenau,

approach and
fighting
in

enemy.
says
for

" Infantry

the

future,"
call

Colonel
the

von

" will

more than ever

strongest

determination on the part of each independent

will."

Modern weapons

are practically valueless in the hands

of faint-hearted men, no matter

how

numerically

strong.

On

the other hand, the demoralising effects of rapid and
fire

smokeless

make themselves
necessary to

in proportion to the coolness
It is therefore

the more felt on an enemy, and energy of each combatant. work, and to work hard, for the

proper development of a nation's moral forces.

Those
fruit in

efforts at

training the morale will later on bear

the soldier
will

when he

is

put

to

the hard test of

battle,

where he
hand.

have to face death being dealt by an

invisible

INFANTRY TACTICS
The
African

31

lessons one has been able to learn from the South

and Russo-Japanese wars
Boer
guerilla,

fully

substantiate this

assertion.

The

with

his

ideas

of

citizenship,

impregnated

with

religious

and
spirit

patriotic

sentiments,

strengthening his courage and
the whole world

of sacrifice, proved to race can fight to a

how

a proud

and

virile

finish for its liberty.

The

Japanese, conscious of the marvellous strides

made
race

in their

country by a civilisation which coupled with the

elevated
naturally

moral

and

intellectual

standard

of

a

industrious
in

demonstrated

and ambitious of glory, have a brilliant and irradicable manner, by the
virtues

courage and heroism with which they fought, the extent of
their

patriotic

and

their

magnificent

fighting

qualities, raising to a

high pinnacle the military honour and

prestige of the flag which, as a

symbol of the fatherland,
battle-

they triumphantly
fields.

displayed

on the Manchurian

It

is

by fostering

all

the virtues of citizenship, which
races, that the

should be possessed by
of a nation
is

virile

moral strength
of

developed, which like that of the Japanese
exciting

Empire
world by

is

now
pro

the

admiration

the

whole
spirit

its

whole-hearted devotion to duty and the
patria,

of sacrifice,

with

which
so
as

they

are

imbued,
to

striving after a

glorious

death

to clear a path

victory for the survivors.

Armies
barely able

which

are

not

constantly

kept

up

to

the

necessary standard are nothing more than mere
to

cripples,

hide

their

weaknesses,

till

some day

a

properly trained adversary shows up their deficiencies and

proves them to possess feet of clay.

Those who consider of minor importance the

culture of

32
their vitality

DEVELOPMENT OF
and moral
into
;

training,

and who do not
factor,

realise its

power
their

as

an exceedingly potent
a
state

are surely leading

army

of

latent

degeneracy
in peace,
it

and
will

demoralisation

if

they

be not fostered

lead to certain failure

and ruin in war. The Russian giant, which the criminal want of forethouc^ht on the part of its rulers caused to be impotent in face of Japanese attack, to-day offers a sad example of
these truths.

And

so

obvious

are

the

examples of the two wars

referred to, so deeply have they impressed French experts with the foregoing ideas, that in their new Infantry

Regulations

is

to

be

found

the

following
constitute
life

suggestive

paragraph

:

"

The

moral
;

forces

the

most

powerful factors of success
efforts,

they give

to all material

and dominate a commander's decisions with regard Honour and patriotism inspire the utmost devotion the spirit of sacrifice and the fixed determination to conquer, ensure success; discipline and
to the troops' every act.
;

steadiness guarantee the necessary obedience

and the
^

co-

operation of every
ik

effort.

^

^

^

^

^

In a notable sociological study recently published, on the subject of the instruction of officers and the education of troops generally, Paul Simon, a distinguished French
Artillery

proves clearly by unanswerable arguofficer, ments that the problem of laying down sound regulations on the scientific for battle tactics can only be based knowledge of the human machine man, that is by the study of physiology, psychology and sociology.
"

The

modifications," he writes, " which periodically affect

produced by the constant evolution of the principal factors in war, i.e., the weapon and the man."
tactical theories are

INFANTRY TACTICS
bases
the science of arms,

33

Tactical science, therefore, possesses two indispensable
:

nature.

And

these two should
all officers.

and the science of human form the foundation for

the instruction of
It
is

usual for officers to

be

made

to study diligently

the science of arms, their use
little

and

their effects, but to

pay

or no attention to the study of the

human

heart and

the psychology of troops.

The

intellectual education of
in their

most

officers therefore

leads

them,

attempts to

solve tactical problems,

into the

error of
to

attributing

an
or

unduly

preponderating

influence

the

material

ballistic factors,

and

to

more

or less entirely neglect

the

psychical and moral factors.
It
is

these false methods

which must imperatively be
this, that

changed.

The
man,
courage
bility,

result of

sound reasoning

is

the study of

of the psychical factors of battle

— strength
and and

of

will,

and cowardice,
should
in

discipline,

coolness

excita-

emotional

contagion,
the

pessimistic
intellectual

optimistic

temperament,

education

of

officers take precedence of the study of arms and of the

merely material factors.

But unfortunately
the rule.

*******
in practice the very reverse
is

usually

produced by the fire of a body of troops are the precision of the necessarily the result of two things

The

effects

:

weapon, and of the

man who

uses

it.

Seasoned troops, well trained

in

practice

and

familiar

with danger, especially those belonging to northern races,
will
fire

almost as accurately on the battlefield as on the
will

range,

and

therefore

profit in the highest

degree by

the qualities of

modern

arms.
3

34

DEVELOPMENT OF

Troops of more southern races, of a more nervous and impressionable temperament if not seasoned, are more
emotional and not as likely to shoot accurately.

The

effects of fire are therefore

to a great extent

more

the result of

human

physiological and psychical than of

ballistic factors.

Good

troops will

accomplish more with an indifferent
will

weapon than bad troops
the world.
Ht

do with the best weapon
"k "k

in

^

Ht

^
fire

^

The
state of

material effects of

have

less influence

on the

morale of troops, than their physiological temper and their

mind

at the

moment
as

of battle.

Napoleon says
the

that in military affairs

you can put down
the

moral

factor

three

quarters

of

whole; the
wrote

balance, one quarter only js allowed A leader's knowledge of war

for the material.
is

incomplete,

Marmont,

if

in addition to his skill in conceiving technical

combinations he does not possess a knowledge of the

human

heart,

if

he have not the power of gauging the
his

momentary temper of
the enemy.

own

troops,

and

also

that

of

These varied

inspirations are the moral factors in war,

mysterious forces which lend momentary powers to armies

and which are the key to the reasons why at times one man is equal to ten, and at others ten worth no more than one.
*
;;.

*

-K-

-Sf

*

-it

Admitting as undeniable the
factors in battle,
it

influence

of the

moral

naturally forces

upon us the necessity

of devoting our utmost attention in peace to the soldier's

moral education, to ensure his turning out a really sound

combatant
enemy's

whom we

can thoroughly

trust

when under an

fire.

INFANTRY TACTICS

35

"This education," says Von der Goltz, "should be built up on patriotism, on a sense of duty, and on the trust in God."
In Germany the efforts of all infantry officers are directed not only towards the professional instruction of their men but also towards developing their will power, based upon
the

acquirement and growth of

initiative,

the confidence

of subordinates in their leaders, and by trying to cultivate in all ranks sentiments of honour, of duty to the Father-

land and the

spirit of sacrifice.

Possessing an intimate knowledge of psychology, of the moral temper of the infantrymen under fire, the Germans do

not for a

moment make

light of the
will

powerful and intense

emotions which modern battle

evoke.

The
"

strongest of

casualties,

them appears to be that by the sight of killed and wounded.

caused by

The percentage

of troops in action," says General Kuropatkin

of casualties visibly affects the morale " the degree ;

of the effect depends chiefly upon the nature of the action, and upon the space of time in which the casualties occur."

According

to the instinctive calculation taking place in

the soldier's mind, the conviction takes hold of one or other
unit
that
it

can stand no
the

more.

This

instinctive con-

viction

is all

more dangerous and powerful the shorter
on
is

the

space of time within which occur the casualties
based.
lost

which that conviction
10 hours there

Suppose a battalion has
is

200 men during a space of

its holding on to the has been attacked than there would be of another battalion doing so, which had only lost say 30

greater probability of
it

position in which

men

in 5 minutes.
latter the
is

In the

amount of

physical and material force reits

maining

greater than in the former, but

moral strength

36
is

DEVELOPMENT OF
for the

moment

infinitely less,

because the

effect pro-

duced by the
of time

casualties occurring within the shorter space

is much greater. The primary condition

of

success

is

the

soldier's

capacity to withstand for a longer period than his adversary,

not only material casualties, but also severe attacks on his
morale.

swayed, more
individual.

Now, a mass of troops is, like all crowds, more nervous and impressionable than a
It
is

easily

single

as

easily

infected

with panic as with

heroism.

In the psychology of battle the

efforts of

must
"

ever

be

directed

towards

preventing

commanders panic, and
says

towards raising each individual

spirit.

Not only does the supreme

command,"

Von

Lichtenstern, "exercise the greatest influence on the soldier's
bearing, but also every single subordinate leader, whatever
his rank.
all

The

soldier usually follows the latter's example,

more instinctively according to the manner in which The Captain these have known how to gain his confidence. and the Subaltern have in our own times won more than
the

one

battle."

It is

not so
all

very

unusual

to

come

across

influential

leaders of

ranks with well balanced minds

the

gift

of being able to pull the strings of the

who possess human heart

and whose bare presence is sufficient to inspire troops to deeds which they would not perform were such men not
amongst them.
forces,

History records innumerable leaders
gift

who

possessed the special

of bringing out the psychological

which

in

a

moment

transform

the soldier into a
willingly sacrifices

hero and the hero into a martyr who
himself in the cause of his idolized chief.

Turenne,

Conde,

Napoleon,

Massena

and

Lannes^

INFANTRY TACTICS
amongst
others
in

37
II.

France,

Frederick

of

Prussia,

Souvaroff and Skobelef in Russia are

all brilliant

examples,

veritable magicians able to inspire their troops,

who would

follow

them unquestioningly,

willingly

pouring out their

blood for their country, for a cause or an idea which for

them is embodied in the person of their commander. Such is the powerful effect of moral factors which have in the past, and will again in the future, be exercised on
troops by popular leaders.

This
nations

is

the great

lesson

of every age which

modern
are
of

are

now
the

studying

with

particular

attention,
factors

conscious

of

importance which
in

moral

unquestionably assuming
battle.

determining

the

issues

38

DEVELOPMENT OP

III

The Theories upon which Modern Tactical
Regulations have been Founded
If we wish to gather a more or
less

accurate knowledge

of the ideas which have led up to present day infantry regulations, it is necessary to take a retrospective glance

and note what
different periods,

tactical

evolution

has

taken

place

at

and

to

hark back to the

latter part of the

Eighteenth century when the controversy between the upholders of the "linear'' formations and those of " deep"
formations were brought to a head by the publication of
the French Regulations of 1776.

The chief points of the tactical questions which became so acute at that period, were in essence identically the same as those which are at the present day being so
vehemently argued by the best known French tacticians. After the Seven Years' War, France, greatly impressed

by the successes of the Prussian arms, allowed herself to be carried away by the new theories, and introduced into her army the principal innovations and formations adopted
by Frederick II. in the Prussian army. The adoption of "line" formations was however vehemently opposed by Folard and by General Mesnil-

Durand, giving as

their reasons the

mistaken

fire

tactics

employed, and the well known attack, but advocated deep formations which they held would favour the natural characteristic of French infantry.

impetuosity of the French

INFANTRY TACTICS
Mesnil-Durand
battalion,


for

favoured
it

a a

deep

formation

the

turning

into

"massed double

column,"

covered in front by a line of skirmishers consisting of the
Light Infimtry and Cirenadier companies.

The

tactical

controversy
the
at

known

as

the

Querelle des
France,
to

deux Ordres caused
which continued
through
the
till

utaiost
last

excitement in
w^as

Guibert
in

able

carry

ideas

contained

his

Essai

General de

Tactique, in which he showed that Infantry Regulations

should enable that arm to develop
i.e.,

its

two characteristics,
advocated a

fire

effect

and

assault.
files in

He

therefore

uniform formation three
Notwithstanding
advocates
of

depth

for fire effect,

and a
of the

formation in column for the assault.
lively

opposition

on the

part

deep

formations,

amongst
the

whom
of

were
the

Maizeroi, Rohan, and de Broglie,
linear tactics of Frederick II.

principles

prevailed,

and were

finally

embodied
until

in the

Regulations of 1791, remaining in force

the
in

French

Revolutionary Wars

marked

a

new

phase

the evolution of Infantry tactics.

found

At war with the whole of the rest of Europe, France herself forced to call upon the whole of her

population en masse in order to present a front to the
formidable coalitions threatening her.

The new

formations

demanded experienced
filled

officers

and

these were lacking, for the late change of government had

caused the prisons to be

with suspect officers,
fly

who had
to

not unfortunately for themselves been able to

the country.

Under
abandon

these circumstances

it

was found necessary
practice,

the rigid linear formations which required great

precision, discipline,

and previous

and

substitute

another type of battle formation, which was the beginning
of the

new

tactics.

46

DEVELOPMENT OF
These
tactics consisted in the

lines

of

skirmishers,

acting

very

employment of extensive much on their own

and making use of cover to approach within enemy whose mass formations they seriously disconcert by their fire at short range, and would follow up this effect by at once hurling upon them the battalions in solid columns which had assaulting troops
initiative,

decisive range of the

been kept

in reserve

up

to the

moment

of assault.
unofficial

This was the system which brought about the
but spontaneous

abandonment of
first

and which continued in of the Republic and of the

1791 regulations, practice during the whole period
the

Empire.

The
to

great mobility of Infantry in this

open formation,

facilitating a

simultaneous attack in front and flank, gave

the

And though
formation,

French armies a decided degree of superiority. the Republican troops were not always
owing to the lack of
the
solidity of the

fortunate, chiefly

new

yet

provident
i.e.,

and

excellent

measures

introduced by Carnot,

the

blending in the various

regiments of the new recruits with the seasoned veterans, together with the experience gained in the first few

campaigns, was sufficient to enable the new tactics, suited as they were to the fiery French temperament, to triumph
over the solid formations with which

Frederick

II.

had

achieved his

brilliant victories.

became a dead
fighting

Without harking back to the 1791 regulations, which letter, the armies of the Republic, and
First

later those of the

methods which
subject.

Empire, gradually established new are well known from Morand's

work on the

He

was of opinion that cut and

dried regulations should be reduced to a

"The
the

art

of skirmishing," he used to say,

minimum. "embraces
of small,

science

of war.

The movement

mobile

INFA NTR V TA CTIC^
bodies
right,

4l

of troops

covered by skirmishers to front,

rear,

and

left,

each one of which can extend or close
comprises
all

in

any
on,

direction,

the

useful

or

possible

manoeuvres on the
this

battlefield."

great general

of the
subjects,

First
for

As we will realise further Empire was a true

prophet

on

tactical

many

years

ago

he

predicted the lines which
followed.

tactical

evolution

has actually

The

sharp reaction which set in against the men, and

the institutions of the Revolution and of the Empire, caused a revival of Guibert's principles in the Regulations of 1831, which were but a modification of the line tactics of

Frederick
lines,

II.

The

Prussians were working on sounder

for

they were, on their side, adopting the tactical

ideas which
fields.

had been
official

in

vogue on Napoleonic
of

battle-

In

their

regulations

1843

and 1847, the
theories,

Prussians practically

embodied Morand's
skirmishers, followed

which
line

were that a battle formation should consist of a
entirely

first

composed of
in

battalions

by a second of column, which performed the double role
troops.

of supports

and assaulting

In 1845, as a result

of the rigorous action of Marshal Bugeaud,

new
gun.
the

tactical

regulations were issued for French Rifle regiments which

had,

since

1842, been armed with a
influence

rifled

This
tactical

strong

man's

made

itself

felt

in

evolution of the second quarter of the Nineteenth century. " A loose formation," the Marshal would say, " is the
true battle formation.
It is
fire,

only in this way that infantry
lies their
;

can

fully

develop their

wherein

real strength.

Bad

infantry opens
its fire."

fire

at

long range

good

infantry

is

jealous of

In the Crimean War, in

which the Russians usually

42

DEVELOPMENT
that

OP'

fought in deep columns, one point was very noticeable,

and

was that precisely as had

happened

in

the

campaigns of the Revolution and of the Empire, hardly
ever were the instructions contained in their regulations/
)

adhered
'J'he

to.

fighting

value

of

skirmishers

was

once
of

more
reinline,

demonstrated,

and the principle of the

utility

forcements to lend successive impulses to the general
definitely established.

During the campaign of 1859, both the French and Austrian Infantry fought on battle tactics
in

adopted
Charles.

the days

of Napoleon and

of the

Archduke

The French,
tradition,

despising the enemy's

fire

by instinct and

and

in spite of the superiority of their

own arm,
lines

make impetuous skirmishers when possible,
used
to

advances

in

great

of

utilising the cover afforded

by

the ground,

which, as a

and would approach the Austrian infantry rule, would try to avoid close quarters and

give ground as soon as assault appeared imminent.

Notwithstanding the lessons of these campaigns, which
pointed to the elaboration and perfecting of the principles

and

formations

instinctively
still

adopted on
1862,

all

battlefields

since 17S9, the French

adhered
in

to the ordinances of
still

183 1, which, although revised

contained

its

fundamental principles.
In
1867,
there

were
for

published
troops

in

France
the

some
"

"Summary
in

instructions

on

battlefield,"
:

which

the

procedure

was

thus

outlined

The

battalion,

consisting of six companies, will form in close
It

column.
each
will

will

be covered by two companies, of which
Skirmishers
latter,

place one section in support.
in
its

will

precede the battalion

advance, and the
deploy, and
fire

on

reaching a suitable range

will

volleys to

INFANTRY TACTICS

A%

prepare the attack, whilst the skirmishers fall round to the The troops will then rapidly flanks and keep up their fire.

reform

in

close column,

and proceed
by the
fire

to the assault with

fixed bayonets, supported
ins:

of skirmishers occupy-

the intervals,"
regulations of 1869 were
still

The French
of those of
1

a modification

with this difference, that in the portion referring to the skirmishing formation they allowed of its being subdivided into groups of companies, instead of

79

1,

obliging
tactical
rules,
is

it

to act always

as a whole, debarred
fact,

from any
fast

subdivision;

in

nothing

but hard and

nowhere allowing that freedom of manoeuvring which

imperative on a

modern

battlefield.

Whilst

the

French cotinued

to

base

all

their

tactical

regulations

on the general lines and of the ordinances, drawn up by the advocates of the tactics old of Frederick II., let us observe upon what lines their
enemies,
the
Prussians, were advancing in the
science.

mischievous principles

improve-

ment and development of their military General von :Moltke, studying with
French
great
tactics

great attention the

on the

battlefields of 18 14

and 181 5, with
of

sagacity
at

and a marvellous

intuition

the

art

of

war/

once grasped their general defects,
of
or
centralisation
this
is

which were

the immediate result of the initial error
centration
realised

undue con-

of

command.
Germany's

He

clearly

(and

the secret of

glory

and
all

strength), that military centralisation was at the root of

delays and mistakes in mobilisation.
the fact that
it

He

at

once grasped

would be impossible for one brain to master and control the details and workings of all the elements which go to make up a modern army; and

therefore, regardless of tradition

and precedent,

fearless of

44
opposition

DEVELOPMENT OP
and
individual
interests,

he

brought

about

complete decentralisation and broke up Prussian red tape,
exposing the mistakes and ignorance which he gradually

stamped out of
this

their

military organism.

He, however,

wished to put his theories to the
disputing France's action in
better

test of actual war,

and

in

Bismarck was only half disposed
Italy
in

to indulge him,

by

1859.
to

Bismarck's
avoid actual

judgment,

however,

caused

him

hostilities, w^hich

might perhaps have proved too dangerous,
w^hich

but set himself to prepare politically, and on a small scale,

some opportunity
Bismarck was
great Prussian's

would tend towards the gradual
instrumental
affair

fruition of Moltke's designs.

undoubtedly
experiment.

in

bringing

about the Schleswig-Holstein
first

which served as the

In that campaign certain deficiencies and imperfections
in his

system became apparent, and these were

at

once

corrected.

Then Bismarck
the

which

to carry out the

new field in sanguinary experiments demanded
cast

about

for a

by the

Chief of

General

staff.

And

soon

this

Machiavelian politician found the means of bringing about

what was required of him.
Prussia had long cherished ambitions of preponderance
in

Germany, and

this she

could not hope to accomplish

without excluding Austria from the Teuton confederacy in

which she had
herself

for

centuries
to

reigned supreme. her former
ally,

Feeling

strong

enough

fight

whose

had been demonstrated in the Danish Campaign, Germany trumped up a pretext for declaring war.
military weakness

The
with

instantaneous mobilisation of the Prussian army, the
it

speed with which

concentrated,

which

it

entered

its mobility and the ease upon the campaign, completely

disconcerted the Austrians.

INFANTRY TACTICS
What
slow moving

45

marvellous power had thus transformed the once

Teuton
;

?

One

man,

jNIoltke

;

one

idea,
!

decentralisation

one

force, multiplicity of tactical units

From

the actual points of
their

concentration

the

various

army corps commenced
all

movements

in

harmony with
units, they

the general plan of campaign,

made up
idea,

of

many

conformed

to the

supreme
use

being well trained by
initiative,

previous
principles

practice

to

intelligent
tactical

sound
co-

of administration,

and

strategical

operation.

Operating
leconnoitring
Infantry
Artillery

with

extraordinary

mobility
country,

and

carefully

enormous
Cavalry

tracts of

the Prussian
for

and

would prepare the way
of
suitable

the

action

by the choice

and

good

positions.

In

action,
its

under
with

the company own commander

intelligently
in

led,

manoeuvred
the

perfect

harmony with

general plan of battle, and acted either independently or
its

own

higher unit as required by circumstances.

Thus

the loss or incapacities of the supreme
little

commander
of the

could have
operations
;

influence

on the general

result

a current of resolute

and

intelligent initiative

of the

had been established between all the component elements army without in anyway affecting cohesion, and this
enabled the General Staff to be perfectly assured of the

unanimous and well-directed
realisation of
its

efforts of

everyone towards the

strategic plan.

The

Prussians

Battalion and the

had preserved two battle units, the Company, which then became, and has-

ever since remained, the real fighting unit.

to

Making the company autonomous and raising its strength about 250, Prussia adopted company columns as the
battle

preparatory

formation,

on account of

their being

46
flexible

DEVELOPMENT OF
and manageable,
sort of ground.
facilitating

any

sort of mancjeuvre

on any
of the
prestige

This

fact increased the in

importance
influence,

company commanders, who gained

and authority what was correspondingly lost by the Battalion Commander, whose responsibility, especially in the Bohemian campaign, became greatly restricted.

Thus we

see the French persisting in adhering to
II.,

many
whilst

of the principles of the linear tactics of Frederick

the more deeply thinking Prussians were steadfastly remodelling their battle tactics on Napoleonic methods.

The

conflict

between the two schools of
in

tactics lasted all

through the Nineteenth century,

the

same way

that

it

continues in the Twentieth, but the roles were inverted.

Thus

it

came about

that

the Prussians
in

abandoned

for

ever line formations,

and adopted

the

1866 campaign

the principle of successive impulse, and the perpendicular

formations so

constantly

employed by Napoleon.
distinct portions

They

divided their columns

into three

—Vanthan

guard, Mainbody, and Reserves, each one capable of fighting

independently,
horizontally,

placed

perpendicularly

rather

and actuated more by successive impulse than
effort.

by simultaneous
keep

The Vanguard's duty was
it

to

commence
lines
:

the battle
its

and
con-

up

for as
It

long as circumstances and

strength
first

would

allow.

was divided into two

the

sisting of

company columns,

the second of battalions in

" double columns."

To assume
first

actual battle formation the battalions

in

the

would, during the advance, gradually close in on their two centre companies, which naturally resulted in
line

caused these should not, however, be allowed to exceed 80 metres between the two centre companies and those on either flank. In the general
:

intervals of varying extent being

INFANTRY TACTICS
advance the
first

47

line

would

halt

before

entering

the

Austrian Infantry's zone of

fire;

half the two flank

com-

pany columns would then extend as skirmishers, about 300 metres in front of the intervals between the other company
columns.

The

skirmishers began the action

and were
in

rein-

forced from time to time by half companies and sections of
their

own

Battalions,

the latter

coming up

close

order

and

availing themselves as

much

as possible of all

natural

cover.

The

skirmishers'

special duties were

to

drive back the

opposing skirmishers, and endeavour to engage the enemy's if unable to do so they fell back into the intervals, first line
;

and the whole first line would then renew the attack. At about 300 metres from the enemy's position volleys
were
fired
;

if

the

adversary
to

gave

ground,

or

clearly

indicated

an inclination

retire,
;

the pursuit would be
if

carried out only by the skirmishers

on the other hand,

the

enemy preserved

a bold front,
after

the volleys

would be
still

followed by a rapid

fire,

which the companies

in

close order would hurl themselves, cheering lustily

upon the
en-

enemy.
Should
this

assault

be

repulsed,

the

companies

deavoured to

retire

in as

good order

as possible covered

by the skirmishers, who frequently had to sacrifice themselves in trying to stem the enemy's counter-attack,
until

such time as their own companies should have had
in

time to reform

some
the

suitable position in rear.

This was the opportune
the

moment

for the intervention of
in

second

line

;

battalions

columns of double
to the attack,

companies would
as those

in their turn

advance

going

through almost identically the same phases and dispositions

adopted by the

first line.

The Vanguard

acting vigorously on the offensive thus

48
constituted
the

DEVELOPMENT OF
first

nucleus of forces for the battle

;

it

frequently not only

commenced
already

but decided the action, or

kept
battle

it

up

till

the bulk of the troops were able to get into

formation,

having

assisted

the

general

offensive

movement by

delivering vigorous attacks on the

enemy's

flanks or by executing turning or enveloping movements, and which were on most occasions brilliantly

carried out.

The
were

tactics

therefore
in

employed by the Prussian infantry in 1866 based on the judicious employment of

companies
battle

"company column," which allowed

of the

becoming a series of small actions fought by the company commanders, comparatively independent, without
awaiting superior instruction, but always working towards
the

common

tactical goal.

This

company
Corps,
in
its

column

was

the

preparatory

battle

formation adopted by practically the whole army.
the
Fifth

Only

commanded by
in

General

Steinmetz,

persisted

fighting

column of

half battalions

and

keeping
officers,

units under the

command

of the

more
of

senior

and the

results thus
less

achieved do not appear to

have been any
formation

successful
it

than those
that

company
former
scattering

columns, but rather was
partially

recognised
the

the

avoided

mistake

of

infantry in lines of insufficient strength, which in the face of

an

active,

bold and well-led adversary might produce very
only lasted six weeks, and the
in so short a period

grave results.

The Bohemian campaign

marvellous successes achieved
older ideas on warfare
armies.
All the

bore

testimony to the superiority of Moltke's theories over the
still

adhered to by other European once commenced to revise their

Powers

at

regulations

and remodel

their military organisations, only

INFANTRY TACTICS
towards
reform
off

49

France remained almost unconcerned by the movement

which

was

everywhere

else

manifest.
brilliant

Going

on a wrong scent she put down the
of the
fire

successes

Prussians
their

in

1866
the

to

the

rapid

and
she

accurate

of

new

Dreyse

weapon,

and

therefore set

herself to

bring out

Chassepot, which

should be an improvement upon the Prussian arm, and
relegated to secondary importance the study of the tactical

methods adopted by them
attache
in

in that

memorable campaign.
Stoffel their

In spite of the repeated warnings of Colonel
Berlin,

of General

Lebrun and even of the

Belgian

Chief of the Staff Renard,

who was
of

so

much

attached to France, Napoleon III. and his government did

not

recognise

the

ominous
failed

gravity
to

those

practical

demonstrations

and
the

take

any
storm.

precautionary

measures

against

approaching

Misled

by

incompetent generals and by courtiers
if

who

flattered him,

not actually blinded by his surroundings. Napoleon III.

became the puppet of Bismarck's policy, who discrediting him in the eyes of Europe over the Luxemburg question was now preparing to entangle him with a Hohenzollern
candidate for the Spanish throne, a trap into which the
unfortunate Emperor
fell like

a blind

man
all

or an ingenu

!

Bismarck's intrigues

had triumphed

along the
fact.

line.

War

with France
•X-

became an accomplished
*

*

**<*
:

*

Prince Frederick Charles, a distinguished Prussian general,

having carefully studied the French methods of fighting both in the Crimean and Italian campaigns, summed up
the results in the following conclusions
"

Three points

must be simultaneously looked to, which will enable our army to beat the French the first is to develop the military

qualities of

each individual private soldier, the second

is

4

5o

DEVELOPMENT OF
is

to appoint leaders with

arms, the third

an intimate knowledge of all three to oppose to the French accustomed as

they are to war and victory, more subtle and less formal
tactics."

Prussia

made

every

effort

to

realise

the

conditions

indicated by the illustrious general,

and the campaign of the proof of the correctness and soundness 1870 furnished of the principles w^hich he had laid down. Prince Frederick Charles in 1868 proposed some
provisional
instructions
for
:

the Prussian

Infantry based

upon
I St.

the following

maxims

Employ skirmishers, company columns.
Increase
infantry's
in
this

starting

from

the

basis

of

2nd.

way mobility, and
rather

{i.e.

company
it

column)
requisite

allow

the

freedom of action.
3rd.

Adopt deep
increases the

than

wide

formations,

which

power

of resistance of the flanks

and

puts a check on your troops being too rapidly used
up.
4th.

To

place the higher units in echelon in preference to " checkerwise," this provides the best means of support, and gives impetus to the assault carried out

by the skirmishers.
In 1869 some instructions were published and applied those instructions were
:

during the manoeuvres of that year
the
official

precursors of the regulations issued on the 3rd

August, 1870.

new

Amongst the formations advocated in the we ought to notice "line of company columns," " Hne of column by half battalions," and the the fundamental "assaulting column on the centre"
regulations


a

infantry formation equally suitable as

battle

formation

1

tNFANTR V TA CTlCS
for attack

5

and

for

retreat,

when

the

enemy's cavalry
is

is

superior to your own.

This formation
in

really

" double

column," possessing

addition

to

autonomy, strength

and mobility, the reason
in

for its adoption.

The

regulation

attack formation was carried out by half battalions so that

each battalion two companies were immediately behind

the skirmishers and carried on the action as long as possible,
whilst the

remaining two

companies followed either as
to

support or reserves.

This

formation,

exposed

the

fire

of

the

French

Chassepot, was found to be very vulnerable, and naturally
resulted in the adoption of the

company column.
Prussians
at

The

heavy losses
to impress

suffered

by

the

Reischoffen,

Vionville and at Saint Privat caused the

Emperor William
abandoning
decisive

upon

his officers the advisability of

column

formation

when

they

arrived

within

infantry range,

and

also insisted

on the attack being better
the

prepared by
In
the

artillery.

attack

on

Saint

Privat

Prussian

Guards

Division adopted a formation in which lo single lines were

spread over a depth of 350 metres, so that one can easily

understand how

in

10 minutes they lost 6,000

men

!

In the action at Bourget the Prussian

adopted a

less

vulnerable
units

formation
did
the

Guards already

^they

made

use

of

skirmishers;

other

same,

and

finally

the

formation of huge lines of skirmishers was, so to
officially

speak,

recognised, which was almost harking back to the
tactics

French
tended

under the
assuming

Empire.
a

The
an
a

fighting

line
:

towards

well-defined

character

it

seemed

naturally to resolve itself into

advanced and
;

principal line.

The

battles

assumed

chief endeavours of the Prussian officers

be to bring about the tactical

new aspect the now appeared to envelopment of an enemy

^2

DEVELOPMENT OP
they considered possessed

more courage than skill, him by a well sustained and overwhelming fire, and to crush advance step by step. The method of procedure of the

whom

advanced

line

can be described in a few words

:

to

get

across the open ground in

open order with
fire

all

possible
at

speed, and pour a concentrated
close quarters.

into

the

enemy

As regards depth
various

this

was
:

briefly the disposition of the

attacking

troops

up

to

the

moment
to within

of actua^

assault the skirmishers

would advance

350-400
in rear

paces of the enemy's skirmishers;

150-200 paces

came

the

first

line of supports, either in small

columns or

in

extended order.

The second

line in

company columns

would follow some 600-700 paces in rear of the supports. Should these come under severe fire the company column The whole either knelt or lay down. would open out. Before carrying out the actual assault the two lines would
amalgamate and form a dense skirmishing line 150-200 louring the whole campaign the paces from the enemy,
Prussians

made

very

frequent

use

of

rapid

fire,

only

resorting to volley firing

when on
-^

the defensive, in trenches,

or from behind

good natural

cover.
-x-

^

-x-

*

When
about

the war of 1870 broke out, the French

army was
their

absolutely impregnated with purely defensive ideas, brought

by

the

powerful

fire

effect

which

new

breachloading

rifle

was supposed

to possess.

fearful disasters they

These ideas were undoubtedly one of the causes of the The introduction of the met with. Chassepot caused the French to commit the initial mistake
of systematically assuming the defensive, arguing that they would thus reap greater advantages from the ballistic
superiority of
their

weapons; and therefore the French

INFANTRY TACTICS
troops,

53

committed from the very commencement of the
to a defensive
tactics,

campaign
with

strategy,

naturally followed
at

up
the

defensive

absolutely

variance

with

French

soldiers, 'fighting characteristics,

which are

distinctly

impetuous and offensive.
In this way the French disregarded a valuable asset, the

important factor which results from the moral superiority

gained

over

the

adversary
tactics,

by the
either

army which
better

boldly
still

assumes

offensive

alone or

if

combined The employment

with offensive strategy.
of the defensive

was encouraged by

the "Instructions summaraires de combat" issued by the The regulations of 1869, although Ministry of War in 1867.
laying

down
that

a

than

of

more handy and mobile battle formation 1867, by adopting columns of double
still

companies, nevertheless
of defensive tactics

contained the inherent defects
it

towards which

leaned strongly.
extent

The

regulations were to a great

based on

the

instructions issued to the Rifle Regiments in 1845, which

had already been partially applied to the infantry of the Although the line by the "Instructions" of 1860-2.
Battalion was the unit, the troops were frequently employed,
especially those acting as
light

Infantry,

by double and

even single companies.

two each divided into " half sections," which were "sections,"
consisted of

The company

again subdivided into two " squads."
to

The

battalion told off

commence

the attack, would send forward two companies
:

in the following formation

4 squads

in a first line

extended

as skirmishers, these were followed

supports, the remaining 2
left

by 4 other squads as "sections" {\ Coys.) right and

formed the reserve. In rear of these 2 companies, the remainder of the battalion (4 Coys.) would follow, either in " company " or " half company column."

54

DEVELOPMENT OF
three
;

A

battalion

regiment

would

adopt

a

similar

formation

4

companies of the two leading

battalions

formed the three leading lines, the remaining 8 companies in " column " would form the actual line of battle, and
the third battalion followed in rear of the centre.*

Not agreeing with the defensive
official

spirit

which pervaded
advocating

all

tactical instructions, Marshal Niel had published a

pamphlet
adoption

Instruction
of

sur

le

combat,

the

strong

attacking

columns,

which

should

energetically assault the

enemy

after the attack

had been

prepared by the

fire

of two of the companies of the battalion

sent forward as skirmishers.

Marshal Niel's instructions were issued to many officers in the French army actually after the war of 1870 had

broken

out, but

it

was impossible

for

them thus
spirit

at

the

eleventh hour to assimilate the offensive
tactics,

of these

battles of Worth, Vionville, Gravellote

and hence the reason why they fought the defensive and Sedan, in which

they were cruelly mauled.

When months later, Generals Aurelles de Paladin and Chanzy attempted to remedy the errors which had been committed from the commencement of the campaign, and
'•'

It

may

be as well here to remind the reader that

in

nearly al

Regiment on a war footing consists of 3 battalions of 4 companies each, and that in talking about continental organisation we must not be misled by the terms
continental armies a

"battalion" or take

it

to

be used

in

our sense.

Also that our
soldiers,
in

term

"Regiment"

is

meaningless to foreign
ist battalion

who

cannot understand how a
really nothing but a
territorial

may

be

India and

the 2nd battalion at home, not realising that our "
is

Regiment"

same

group of 2 or more units bearing the name, but really absolutely independent of each

other as regards organisation and

command,

INFANTRY TACTICS
made
the
greatest
efforts

55

to

revive the

spirit

and the

impetuous character of the French soldier, and fought offensive battles with raw troops, they won the battle of
Coulmiers with the

Army

of the Loire, and this affords the

most convincing proof of the

erroneous

tactical

lines

followed by the generals of the Second Empire, who inaugurated their defensive tactics by a series of disasters, and which tactics they declared were the best owing to the
superiority of their Chassepots over the Prussian Dreyse
It is
!

interesting to note the battle formation adopted by

General Chanzy at Coulmiers

with inexperienced troops,

who needed most
moral force

careful leading in order to preserve their

moment. The Infantry Divisions columns of double companies, were formed in deploying intervals 600 paces distance, and in by battalions " chess " formation. These two lines were preceded by two of skirmishers also at a distance of 600 paces, the lines
at the critical

two

lines, in

skirmishers' supports about

skirmishing

line,

300 paces in rear of the second and covering the intervals between the
first

battalions of the

line.

The

first

line of skirmishers

was also preceded
In
this

at

500 paces by a line of Cavalry scouts.
the

formation

troops
their
;

felt

themselves

strongly

supported, which raised

morale and increased their

confidence in their leaders

moreover. General Chanzy

a great point of encouraging the troops

made who were becoming
Chanzy's
efforts

disheartened or giving ground to return to the attack, which

was greatly
only

facilitated

by

this disposition.

were crowned with complete success, and resulted
victory

in

the

gained

by the
lesson of

French
to

in

that

disastrous

campaign.
It

took this

bitter

persuade the French to
rigid

abandon those

vestiges

the

" linear "

tactics

favoured by Prussia in the Eighteenth but discarded by her

:

56

DE EL OPMENT OF
I

in

the Nineteenth century,

when they recognised the

ad-

vantages of deep formations.

Such was the position of ideas in 1870 in the controversy between the partisans of the two schools of tactics, which ever since Guibert's time had been rivals for popularity on
every battlefield.
•X-x-

^

^

-x-

*

After

the peace of Frankfort, France

devoted herself

wholeheartedly to the task of military reorganisation, and
to the revision of her tactical regulations.

New

regulations were published in
:

1875, based on the

following principles
I St.

2nd.

The preponderating The impossibility The
The
necessity
for

influence of

fire effect

of fighting

or

manoeuvring

in

close formations within effective range.
3rd.

extending
in

troops

in

the

First

Line,
4th.

and make them move
of

open order.

necessity

turning the skirmishing line into

the actual battle or

main

line.

doctrine contained in the ist and 2nd principles showed the essence of defensive tactics, and brought about the bitter criticism and violent attacks made upon

The

still

these regulations during successive years by officers of the

newer generation who,

full

of enthusiasm at the

brilliant

achievements of the Napoleonic wars,

clamoured

for

a

return to the tactics of those times, with the vigorous
energetic attack of columns in mass formations.

and

The

natural

outcome of

this

paper war was the appear-

ance of the regulations of 1884, containing a decidedly offensive character and attributing more importance to
manoeuvring than
formation
to
fire,

and outlining a preparatory

battle

line of

company columns

— considered

suitable

INFANTRY TACTICS
for the

57

advance of troops composing the 2nd and 3rd Hues
regulations did not however fully satisfy the

of battle.

The 1884
once

partisans of the Napoleonic school,
raised, bringing

whose protests were
in

at

about the appearance
le

1887 of the
to

InstYuctions

pour

combat^

which

reduced

210
it

metres the fighting frontage of the battalion so as to give
greater strength

and density
in

;

advancing and

fighting

in

echelon were both revived, the idea being to secure a continual

forward impulse

the firing line.

Definite rules

were laid down for the assault, and separate troops detailed
for the assault

and

for the preparatory stage.

The decided
great

leaning towards offensive tactics, a ontraiice,
in a

which pervade French regulations, can be attributed

measure

to

the

notable
" Give
a
finish,

writings

of

the

Russian
are

General,

Dragomiroff.
to
fight

me
and

troops
I

who

deto
his.

termined

to
!

will

undertake
of

show good
Napoleonic

tactics tactics

"

was

a

favourite

saying

are based on unshakable foundations,
will

and upon principles which
changes
in

never

be

affected
finds

by

armaments.

In

them

one

perfect

skirmishers
effect,

harmony between open and close formations, between and columns, between fire and bayonet
principles
to
sufficiently

broad and
will

elastic

to
fit

allow

leaders

formulate plans which

exactly

ground

and circumstances.
There
exists

an enormous gulf between the

tactics of the
II.

early Nineteenth century
their " linear formations."

and those of Frederick
this

with

Naturally

writings

of

nature,

representing
fail

the
to

apotheosis of the

Napoleonic school, could not

impress French tacticians, and exert considerable influence
in radically altering the regulations of 1875.

;

58

DEVELOPMENT OF
Dragomiroff was likewise instrumental
in

causing

the

retention in the Russian
his

Army

of Souvarow's doctrines,

and

famous aphorism " La
was
fully

balle est folle, la bayonette seul

est gaillarde,"

acted up to in the 1877-8 campaign.
in

The bayonet
true tactical

assault,

which

Souvarow's opinion was the

mode

of procedure, consisted of an impetuous
rapidly,

charge in mass, in which the troops
straight at the

moved enemy without checking,
endeavouring to get

marched

firing or altering

their formation, only

at the adversary

as quickly as possible

and route him with the bayonet.
to

These were
to

certainly prhna-facie elements of success

be absolutely

determined

get

at

the

enemy,
in

to

manoeuvre resolutely and
masses.
the three
tacticians

rapidly,

and

assault

him

dense

The
to

fearful losses sustained

by the Russians in
their later
;

battles of

Plevna, however, caused
their

modify

battle

formations

to

adopt

extended formations which, together with their systematic
defensive tactics,
in the late

have brought about the great disasters
-jf -x-

Russo-Japanese War.
-X-

*

-^

*

The Germans, notwithstanding
tive spirit
in

their essentially conserva-

regard to tactical regulations, also modified

their infanty regulations

and banished
in all

their usual formation

of three

files,

recommended

their regulations since

18 15 by

all

their highest authorities,

and which of course

actually dated from Frederick the Great.

The German
moment,
the very
first
:

tactical regulations, in force at the present

practically date

from

ist

September, 1888, and on

page

is

found one of Napoleon's most celebrated
is

maxims
in war."

"

Only that which

simple can ensure success

And

consistent with the spirit of this

maxim

the

whole regulations are remarkable for their simplicity and the absence of formalism. In the portions dealing with

INFANTRY TACTICS
battle,
istic
it

59

merely lays down principles.
is

The

chief character-

of the regulations

not

only

the absence of any

rigid rules, but the actual prohibition of

them.
or rather

Under

these circumstances,

the regulations,

the principles contained in them, are not easily affected by

any changes

in

inatei'ial

;

they possess the

undoubted

advantage of escaping the very frequent technical variations.

Improvement
general

in

armaments
for

will

only

very slowly effect

established

principles,

although they necessitate

changes of means,

which very reason the German

regulations refrain from laying

down any
we

rigid

methods.
very

As

a corollary to the instructions,

find superiors

carefully cautioned not to interfere in anything
right

which by

comes within the province of
this

their

subordinates,

except of course in case of either error or negligence.

In

initiative

way it is possible to develop in all ranks that and professional aptitude which are essential to

success.

The

regulations only lay
in

down

three formations

for a

batallion

close

order

:

" Double
" Line of

" Batallion

Column," and
usual

Company Column," Company Columns."
is

The Regiment's

formation

" line

of

double

companies by batallions."
In action, dense lines of skirmishers under captains and
subalterns
are

thrown forward, and endeavour from the
fire.

very beginning to obtain a superiority of

All forma-

tions are perpendicular to facilitate continuous propulsion.

And

the whole regulations are impregnated with a strong,

offensive spirit.

The French
They
column
"

regulations of 1884 were revised in 1888

and

reissued in 1889 after the adoption of the magazine
definitely

rifle.

approved of " open
;

double company
they increased
a

as

a

preparatory formation

6o

DEVELOPMENT OF
preparatory

batallion's fighting front to

previous

and

account of their

rigidity,

350 metres, and abandoned the battle echelon formations on and not allowing all ranks sufficient
the
:

scope to exercise

initiative.

They were followed by
contained

1894 regulations,

which

two innovations

the

employment of
intervals

" forma-

tions to a flank,"
files

and a formation with

between

during the approach to a position.
lays

down more fully the duties of skirmishers and and allows for the extension of whole companies in the fighting line, and thereby doing away wdth a company's
It

scouts,

own

support.
for,

This

last

point

was
lost

however

strongly

condemned,
role of the

by doing away with these supports, the
a great deal of
its

company commander

importance, besides being directly opposed to the tactical
principle of successive impulse, the very essence of
battle.

modern

Tactical Controversy at the Present Day
It
is

a truth borne out by experience and

eminently

instructive, as taught

by

historical lessons of

contemporary
success

wars, that immediately following

on any
to

brilliant

gained
at

by either belligerent, a strong current of opinion
manifest,

once becomes
result

tending

show

that

the

final

of the campaign was brought about by one

particular, or series of

improvements, or as the direct

result

of

some new

invention.

To

the destructive power of their
first,

modern arms were
the successes of the

attributed almost exclusively at

Prussians in 1866 and 1870, the Russian victories in 187778,

the

Boer's

defence
in

in

the Transvaal

and the

later

Japanese

triumphs

Manchuria,

but

little

importance

being attributed to the

tactics, the clever

combinations of

INFANTRY TACTICS
the three arms, the intelligent

61

command

of the troops, to

say nothing of the decided offensive spirit in connection

with other moral factors, which at various times exercised
decisive results in various operations
I

The

precision, rapidity of fire

and

flatness of trajectory

of modern weapons, making the approach to

a

position

extremely
the best

difficult,

has led tacticians to try and discover

way

in

which infantry can get across fire-beaten
to

country,

subject
will

the

least

possible

loss,

and
or

what
to a
less

formations

be the least

vulnerable.
all

This led

hundred proposed formations

tending

more

towards making the lines thinner, wnich besides increasing
the difficulty of control by the supreme

weaken the actual

fighting elements

commander, would on account of their

exaggerated extensions.

The

teachings of the South African

War caused some
for

tacticians to believe that the best

way

advance would be by successive lines of skirmishers, each line being absolutely independent of what came behind, thus doing away with the firing line, supports
infantry to

and reserve formations as practised by nearly every European Army. Major Calwell of the British Army, in his book on modern tactics, favours this formation, and
considers that troops should be in extended order at 2,500 yards from the enemy.
ideas propounded by Calwell and other tacticians of same school were adopted in the British Infantry the

The

Regulations
skirmishers
against a

issued
are

in

April

1902,

in

which
basis

lines
for

of

considered

the

correct

action
the

well-armed adversary, and lays

down

that

attack should usually be carried out by successive lines of

skirmishers

who would advance, making

use of all available

cover up
all

560 yards; they would gradually strengthen the leading line, which would thus

to the decisive range of

62
attain

DEVELOPMENT OF
great
density,

would endeavour
enemy's

to

completely or
at

partially

envelop

the

position

the

closest

possible distance.

As regards extended order the regulations are excessively demanding that each individual soldier should think and act on his own initiative and bring into use all
exigent,
his physical as well as his intellectual faculties, bearing in

mind

the

common

goal aimed

at,

and require him

to be

an expert, active and resourceful skirmisher.

To

attain this ideal,

it

is

indispensable to carefully utilise

and develop individual intelligence and initiative, and on no account allow the men to become mere machines. In
fact,

that the true test of the efficiency of a battalion

is

in

the

standard

attained

by the private soldier as an

individual combatant.

From
battle,

this short outline

one may

infer that the British

Regulations

decidedly

pointed

towards

individualism

in

which necessitated an elaborate apprenticeship not
the length of service with the colours.
partially

in

harmony with
Calwell's

theories,

adopted

in

the

British

Regulations, received a measure of notice in French and

so

German circles, but were not however received with quite much favour as they were in Great Britain after the
South African War.
In

Germany they were honoured by

discussion in military circles, in which
tactical authorities in that country,

a somewhat heated some of the highest

such as von Ca^mmorer,

von

Schlicting,
part.

von

Scherff,

von Bogulowski and von der
themselves

Boek, took

The
claim

first

two

mentioned pronouncing
only

in

favour of a more careful utilisation of ground by infantry,
that

the

way

to

remedy,

or

at

all

events
lies

diminish the losses

caused

by modern weapons,

in

INFA NTR V TA CTICS
greater extensions

63

and
is

in

the initiative a outrance of the

combatants; that
the

to say, they accepted in a general sense

new ideas evoked by the South African War. The tactical process which characterised the

so-called

" Boer tactics " consisted of:
(a)

Making

full

use

of the

topographical features of the

country.
(b)

The employment
In
carrying out

in very

open country, of very thin
lasting

lines of skirmishers
(c)

extending 10-15 paces.
10 seconds,
only,
if

"rushes"

as

much, and covering 20-30 yards
prevent
the

so

as to

enemy from

taking

deliberate

aim

whilst skirmishers were

on the move. by the small

The "rushes"
This

are carried out alternately
line.

groups forming the general
style of action

was practiced
considered
if

in

1902 at Doberitz

close to Berlin, with the Emperor's approval.

The

results

attained

were however
lines,

unsatisfactory

as

the

weakness of these
attack,

subjected to a sudden flank

was demonstrated, and the lack of cohesion and
extremely vulnerable formation

difficulty of control of this

amply proved. General von

Scherff,

the

most

highly

thought

of
the

representative of the older school, strongly

condemned
from

new
very

ideas, hotly maintaining

that in battle there are

two
the

pronounced
:

roles

which are
higher

inalienable

commanders belongs the general plan and conduct of the battle, and to the junior commanders belong the selection of the means by which The latter should be that plan should be carried out.
commanders
to

the

allowed to use
regulations,

all initiative
tliat

within the limits of well defined

and

therefore, for the

conduct of

battle,

64

DEVELOPMENT OF
regular

movements,
principles

formations

and

clearly

defined

must be

laid

down.
less

This did not imply the
;

establishing of any fixed or unalterable formations

all

he

advocated being a more or element concerned,

regulated form of attack

which would ensure combined
for,

effort

on the part of every

he argued, an attack conducted on

these principles, like a torrent incessantly driven onwards

by the

reserves,

well as material effect

would produce a much greater moral as upon an adversary, than would be
great

the case with the
theories.

extensions

required by the

new

Von

Scherff considers that

from

the

very

commencelife

ment dense

lines of skirmishers
fire.

must be pushed forward

to obtain a superiority of

The energy

or

of the

attack must be kept

up by

a constant stream of reserves.
in his criti-

General von Bogulowski was also conservative
cisms,

and considered that the existing regulations with but one or two minor alterations should be adhered to. He favours frontal attack, which raises the attacking troops'
moral power, and considers that the South African war

proved that
lying
fire,

more
for
at

casualties

occur

by keeping
assault.

troops

down

a considerable time under

the enemy's

than by

once delivering a vigorous
it

How-

ever,

be the reason what

may, either that the lengthy
on the value of the so-called
Doeberitz

discussions shed

some
or

light

" Boer

tactics,"

that

the results of the experimental
at

manoeuvres
offered

carried

out

and

Tempelhof

sufficient

proof for the directors of the

German

army,

or

lessons of
clearly

more conclusive the Russo-Japanese war which have once more
probably on

account of the

demonstrated the importance of a vigorous offensive,

the fact remains that at the last

German manoeuvres
traces

the
the

methods

adopted

showed

no

whatever

of


INFANTRY TACTICS
theories raised after the South African war.

65

The

leaning

towards the offensive a outraiice was clearly predominant,
together with the strong decisive methods which have for

many

years characterised

German
-x-

military tactics.

*

*

*

*

*
the

The

lessons

supposed to have been learnt from
their bearing

South African war, together with
evolution, also raised

on

tactical

a stormy discussion amongst

some

of the highest authorities in France.

ideas.

General Negrier appeared as the champion of the new He published in the " Revue des Deux Mondes "
articles

some noteworthy
military
circles,

which created great

interest in

interesting,

where the discussion became lively and Negrier's arguments being strongly condemned

amongst others by Generals Bonnal and Langlois. In a brochure published in 1904, entitled La evolution actuelle de la tactique, General Negrier explains his ideas

on infantry
thus

tactics in the following

manner

"The development
:

of the

attack"

may be

described

the battlefield
to

now

consists of two zones, one from

1800
In

700 metres of the enemy, the other from 700
is

metres to the point from which the assault
the
first

delivered.

zone

the

attacker

will

not

deploy unless

forced to do so, on account of the nature of the ground.

He
fire,

advances in the usual close formation without opening but making use of any natural cover till he arrives

within 700 metres of the enemy. the
this

He
line

has
is

second
line

zone.
fire

A

skirmishing

now reached now formed;
short,

opens
In

and gains ground by
this
firing line

sharp
or

rushes.

rear of

follow two, three

four

more

lines of skirmishers,

who

of course

do not

fire.

Each
of

line consists of

the

other

lines,

whole units, absolutely independent which advance and halt under the

66

DEVELOPMENT OF

orders of their respective commanders, as the ground in 800 or 900 their front is left clear by the preceding line.

metres

in

rear

of these

skirmishing

lines,

reserves

will

No battalion will remain in be stationed under cover. close order, and the whole of the troops will always lie down. These are to all intents and purposes the principles
contained in the regulations of 1875."

General

Bonnal,

criticising

Negrier's

theories,

draws

attention to their similarity to the tactical principles laid

down

in

the

British

regulations

of

1902, which
with

in his

opinion

contain

mistakes

analogous

those of

the

French regulations of 1875, being impregnated with a
defensive
spirit as well

as the tactical errors of Frederick

the Second's school. " For," he argues, " the British tactical regulations lay

dow^n

certain

instructions

diametrically

opposed
:

to
s'

the

essential

principles of

Napoleonic

tactics

Oii

engage

V

partout et puis Von voitP As an example it is sufficient to quote the following from the British regulations: "the advance guard will use every means in its power (except
reconaissance in force) to discover the enemy's dispositions."

General
following

Negrier
:

answers

Bonnal's

criticisms

in

the

manner

" Napoleon's

principle.

On £ engage partont
still

et

puis

'^^

Von

voit, is

undoubtedly

true,

but

its

application has
it

now become more

difficult,

and the means by w^hich
different.

must be attained are necessarily

Instead

of

employing a considerable portion of one's troops to clear up the enemy's dispositions, one must nowadays resort to "network" {rideaux) consisting of small bodies, but
usually

composed

of

all

three arms, in proportions varying

with circumstances and the nature of the ground.

These

INFANTRY TACTICS
groups guard
direction

67

all lines of communication in the enemy's and protect the flanks; they thus establish a safety zone round the main army, within which its commander can manoeuvre at will." Next we find General Langlois condemning the new ideas in vogue in the British army and approved of by Negrier, in "Quelques enseignements de la guerre sud-africaine."

He
"

inveighs against the pernicious theories of the so-called
tactics," in reality identical with those which,

new

favoured

by France

in

1868, had led to the disasters of 1870, and

which reappeared periodically whenever any advance was made in armaments, tending to prove that the power of

modern weapons made
favouring
the

the

attack

more
it

difficult

whilst

defence,

and giving

considerable

and

unforeseen advantages.
conclusions of some writers," says General Langlois Consequences tactiques des pwgres de Varniement, " tend neither more nor less than towards depriving the

"The

in his

supreme commander of the control of the battle, depriving him of the right or even the possibility of securing a
decisive result through the

moral forces

at his disposal,
i.e.

combined effort of material and and to leave in the hands of

the skirmishers,
to

to the individual soldier

who

is

subject

any and every emotion or surprise, the decision of a battle in which literally hundreds of thousands of men may
be taking part, and upon the result of which may perhaps depend the country's liberty and the nation's future."
General Langlois, studying with the greatest attention the
organic
characteristics

as

well

as

the

tactical

methods

adopted by the opposing sides in the South African War, mentions in parenthesis that neither one side nor the other showed any decided wish to get at the enemy quickly

and crush him, which should be the

characteristic of

modern

:

68

DEVELOPMENT OF
He
lays

methods.

some

stress

on the

fact

that the Boers

did not carry bayonets, and that even had they done so

they would never have pushed

home an
truly

assault, for as the

unfortunate

Captain

Gilbert

remarked,
control,
;

to

do

so

requires discipline, cohesion

and perfect

which can
General
to

only

be attained by standing armies

so

that

Langlois, after sound and careful consideration,

comes

the conclusion the tactics adopted by the British generals,

and

which

at

the

commencement

of

the

campaign

occasioned such serious disasters, were characterised by
(a)

(b)

The absence of properly organised protection. The want of knowledge of the duties of Advanced
Guards.

(c)

The

total

absence of the knowledge of the principles

of manoeuvring.
(d)
(e)

The

neglect of preparatory action.
to

At once passing
whole
front.
so,

the

decisive

stage

along the

This being

the British disasters must be attributed
to the excellence of

more

to their

own shortcomings than
;

the Boer methods the latter were, as a rule, unenterprising and passive adversaries, who might by adopting a vigorous
offensive have turned into very grave defeats the reverses

suffered

by the British troops

in the

first

period

of the

campaign.
In opposition to the inconsistent and slender formations new tactics, Langlois strongly upholds solid formations
results
;

of the

which are productive of decisive

not the compact

and

rigid

columns of Eylau, Wagram, Waterloo and Plevna,
will
it

but formations of sufficient density to ensure the success of
the attack, for
it

not be sufficient to just get up to the
is

enemy's position,

necessary to press the attack, parry

INFANTRY TACTICS
counter-attacks, reconnoitre, in fact to

69

increase

any measure
without

of success,

accompHshed

the

do the utmost to and this cannot be employment of considerable

forces conveniently concentrated.

To

make

his

assertions

more

conclusive,

Langlois

describes the result of an actual tactical epcperiment, which consisted in placing
in

opposition

two armies of equal

and each manoeuvring according to the opposed tactical All the methods doctrines. employed on one side were those which have been aimed at by the lessons of history, by the study of modern campaigns as modified to suit the requirements of modern
armaments.
Langlois

strength and composition,

On

the other side were

employed the theories
of the
to start
latter

which have been claimed as the
entrusted
the

tactics of the future.

command
who had
full

to

a

distinguished general officer

from the very
only
in

beginning,

and allowed him

liberty of action,
:

imposing upon him the following obligations

to

march

small columns on an extensive front, and to endeavour to
bring about the immediate envelopment of the adversary.

On

his side, Langlois

adopted a
very

flexible,

echelon and deep
his adversary

formation.

From

the

commencement

experienced great difficulty as regards proper control over
the small columns scattered on a wide front, which were

constantly threatening to bring about a premature general

engagement initiated and conducted by their respective commanders, and thereby commit the supreme commander
to a series of

independent actions without co-ordinate or

uniform

effort.

A
front,

formation of small columns moving on an extended

making

it

everywhere vulnerable,
depth
being

is

contrary to
to

all

sound

principles,

indispensable

sound

manoeuvring.

»fd

DEVELOPMENT OF
Therefore, as a contrast, the deep formations adopted by

General Langlois, which facihtated every sort of action and

ensured Hberty of manoeuvring, contained the
success

seeds

of

by guaranteeing

cohesion

between
in

the

various

component

parts who. possessing greater power, were able

to act with greater energy
their offensive tactics.

and uniformity

furtherance of

In conclusion
ability,

:

deep formations,

in spite of their vulner-

are

superior

and preferable
less dirigible.

to

linear

formations

which are weaker and

We
late

reap more positive and conclusive lessons from the

Russo-Japanese struggle

than
find

was the case

in

the

Anglo-Boer War.
strategy

Here

we

the Japanese offensive

and

tactics

completely overpowering the Russians,

who were

systematically on the defensive.

Consider
" Infantry.

these

criticisms,

of real

tactical value,
:

made

by an eye witness of the battle of Si-Ho-Iau

— We

find the

Japanese on the offensive, with
in

dense lines of skirmishers, followed by reserves
order and even in massed columns."

close

This

is

far

enough

removed,
African

in all

conscience, from the " Boer tactics" with

which our ears have been deafened ever since the South

War

!

The

action was
;

the whole front

commenced by fire being opened along and when the preparatory Artillery fire was
sufficient,

considered to have been

dense lines of skirmishers

commenced
bursts of
fire

to

gain

ground, periodically opening violent
the reserves in close order

("rafales") whilst

supported

the

movement by
fire

gradually

reinforcing

the
"

main

line.

The Russian
and sometimes

seems to have consisted chiefly of" rafales
even during the actual
battle.

volleys,

On

the Japanese side "rafales" appeared to be the only

INFANTRY TACTICS
form of
fire

^1
fire is

employed.

The

violence of the Japanese

frequently mentioned in the above account.

In battle, the

Japanese infantry discard their knapsacks and carry only
rifle

and ammunition. At a conference held
officer.

in St.

Petersburg by the General

Staff,

referring to the general conduct of the battle of Sha-Ho, a

General Staff

Captain Bolduiriev, who had returned
the following interesting

from the

front,

made

comments

:

"As
and the
been.

regards the Infantry's

(Russian) action,

frequent

mistakes were

made

in the

employment
that

of the smaller units

fire-tactics
It

were not always what they should have

frequently

happened
far

young

officers

were

carried away by excitement, and advanced prematurely and

dehvered assaults from

too great distances.

battle on an enormous front, manner of ground, becomes extremely difficult and on all for the supreme commander, particularly so in an enclosed

The

control of a

modern

or mountainous country

:

the direct result of this fact

is

the

necessity for greater initiative
part of battalion

and

tactical

knowledge on the
for the result

of a battle

may
the

often

and company commanders, depend upon them.
failed
to assist

The

Artillery

and co-operate with the
owing
chiefly to the ex-

Infantry to

requisite

extent,

cessive range at which batteries were brought into action."

The
strict

general conclusion arrived at by the Conference was
in controlling troops in action
all

that the essential point

was

co-operation between
eff'ort

grades of commanders and

the

combined

of

all

arms.

The
-x-

only way to obtain

which, being frequent manoeuvres in times of peace. -^ ^ * Tt ^

In France prolonged
of the " new-tactics "
school, and which
if

controversy between the advocates

and the adherents of the Napoleonic
carefully considered

resolved

itself

72

DEVELOPMENT OF
between linear and depth principles,
its

into the old controversy

received

death-blow by the issuing of the new Infantry

Regulations on 3rd December, 1904.
It is a

noteworthy text book which condenses into 106
governing the education
soldier in the fighting

pages a complete set of principles

and

instruction of the

methods of
sight of the

both small and large
only on the

units.

Without ever losing

constant evolution in armaments and tactics, and based not
teachings of recent
the

wars but also on

sound

Napoleonic principles,
clear,

definite

new Regulations lay down in a and unhesitating manner the methods of
la veine des hatailles.

instruction
It

and action of

completely breaks away

from the former formalism
to give

and from dogmatic infantry in modern
flexibility possible,

rules incompatible with the action of
battle,

and endeavours

all

the

emphasising the necessity for the intimate
;

co-operation of all arms

and without
fire

failing to recognise the
effect,

growing importance of infantry
to the
it

gives

first

place

importance of manoeuvring,

to a steady

advance which

considers the only decisive, irresistible factor.

In spite of the theories of the partisans of the " newtactics,"

who doubt

the possibility
well

of dislodging a wellthe

armed adversary from a
regulations

chosen position,

new

taking their

cue from the Russo-Japanese war

(which only confirmed the previously expounded doctrines of
General Langlois), maintains that a resolute bayonet assault
carried out by " echeloned infantry in deep

and

flexible
is

formations, will prove entirely successful

if

the assault

properly prepared."

Anyway

the new^

PVench regulations, making the means

dependent upon the object, deal the coup de grace to the doctrines so tenaciously put forward by the advocates of
the "

new

tactics."

INFANTRY TACTICS

*t

7

IV
Vulnerability of Infantry Formations.

According mechanism

to

the

tactical

principles

governing

the

or conduct of

modern

battle, the
is

advance over

the zone beaten by the enemy's

fire

carried out by the

leading battalions of the

first line,

or rather by the

advanced
but de-

companies

in lines of I

company, section or squad columns
fire,

so long as they are only exposed to Artillery the enemy's infantry

ploying into single rank or even extending as soon as they

begin to

feel the effects of

fire.

To
of
its

arrive at the mathematical limit where, vulnerability,
it

becomes necessary
It is

to

on account abandon one

formation and adopt the other.

necessary to calculate

the comparative degree of vulnerability of various formations at different distances,

when exposed

to artillery

and

also to infantry

fire.

Comparative

Vulnerability of Formations Artillery Fire

under

endeavour to give just a rough idea of the For experiments carried out at various European schools.
will

We

purposes

of
at

experiment,

a

"section

of

a

continental

company

war strength,
section

i.e.,

40 men, was taken as the
in

experimental unit."

Suppose
artillery

this

advancing

single

rank

under

fire.

Against infantry and light works, artillery
three

usually

employs

types

of

projectiles— shrapnel

74

t)E VEL OP ME NT
shell,

OF
however, only used

common
at

and

case.
it

The
scatters

latter,

short

ranges,

as

almost

immediately on

leaving the muzzle.

Therefore this leaves us the shrapnel
as

and common

shell

the most

commonly used
1

against

infantry at the longer ranges.

Ordinary shrapnel contains about
but on
to

60

leaden bullets,
is

explosion
this

the

number

of projectiles

increased

abrut 240,

increase being

caused

by the pieces

of the cast iron frames used to keep the bullets in position

within

the shell.
at

Shrapnel can
in
its

be exploded either on
through the
air.

impact or
the latter

any point
is

flight

If

method

trajectories,

employed the explosion causes a series of which the French call hi gcrhe jusanfe. If
air,

the explosion occurs in the

the angle of the gerbe

is

about 36°

at

1,000 metres, and an area 300 x 500 metres

in front of the point of explosion will

be dangerous.

The

effect

produced on a
interval

target

depends of course on
of

the horizontal

or

distance between the point

explosion and the target.
[n the
fire

P>ench

artillery

they are taught to regulate their

so that the

horizontal distance between the point of

explosion and the target shall be about 75 metres.

At 2,500 metres the 240
shrapnel
section
are

projectiles

thrown
the
ly''

by the
upright
at
its

very

evenly

distributed

over
of

of

a

cone

formed by an angle

apex.

The opening
distance
of

of the gerbe

is

y^^,

and
be

therefore,

at

a

75

metres from

the point of explosion, the
will

diameter of the cone of dispersion

TO ^ 75

I'll-

01"

22-5 metres.

A

surface equal to the base of the cone would receive 240
;

projectiles

this surface in square

metres would be

INFANTRY TACTICS

75

NR = 3-1415
The
is

X 11-25

^""^

==

397'6

sq. metres.

average exposed surface presented by a
s([.

man
in

standing

-60

metres

:

a

section of 40

men
to

single

rank

would therefore represent a surface equal
•60 X

40 = 24

sq. metres.

Therefore, the

number

of projectiles which

would

strike

them would be
397-6
:

24

::

240
sq.

:

X

240 X 24
X

m.

=
397-6

14-4 projectiles.

Thus we
out

see

that

one shrapnel
penetration

fired

with
in

theoretical
single rank
is,

precision would put
of action.

15 out of the 40

men

The

of these projectiles

however, not very great, and they would rarely pass through
say, a

knapsack containing the usual

articles.

This small penetrating power has led

to

the abandoning

of line formations at the longer ranges where only artillery
fire is

experienced, and to the adoption of deep formations,
present
a

which

smaller

exposed

surface

and
line

thereby

considerably diminish losses.
If

instead of placing the forty
in single
file,

men

in

we place

them

the vulnerability of the section would
is,

be reduced

to a fortieth, /.f., -f^p that " gerbe " to be parallel with the ground

supposing the

and perpendicular
flight

to the formation.

But as these conditions are practically

impossible because of the natural
projectiles,

downward
flight

of the
is

and

also

because the
file

of each bullet

not parallel, this formation in
to the

would also be exposed

downward
its

effect of the fire,

which would appreciably

increase

degree of vulnerability.

:

76

DEVELOPMENT OF
Likewise, taking into consideration that in the preliminary
troops will rarely be advancing absolutely in profire, it is

stages

longation of the axis of the enemy's

also therefore

necessary in one's calculations to reckon with the degree

and effect of this oblique angle of advance. Working on these lines, the French, at

their

" Ecole

Normale de Tir"

at Chalons,

taking

y^y

as the

minimum
of

for this angle of obliquity,

proceeded to work out, by the
formations, and
arrived

most careful and elaborate experiments, the degree
vulnerability

of various

infantry

at the following table of formations in their relative degree

of vulnerability,
ist.

commencing with the

greatest

2nd.

Company in column Company column

of sections. of sections
at

deploying

(or

greater) intervals (2 deep). 3rd.
4th.

Company Column at deploying Company Column by sections, Company Column by
Company Column,

(or greater) interval.

4 deep, at deploying

(a greater) interval.

5th.
interval.

sections,

4 deep,

2

paces

6th. J
interval.
7th.
}.

4 deep, at deploying (or greater)
paces interval.

8th.

9th.

Company Column, 4 deep, Company in line, 4 deep. Company in line, 8 deep.
formations in Nos.

2

The dense
other,

5,

6,

7

and 8 present
cover each
in line "
is

small vulnerability surfaces, because the

and

their frontage

is

small.

men Company "
it

not

included in

the classification, as

would obviously
above
table^

present the greatest target, besides being an impractical

formation in the advance.
the
first

According

to the

three

formations must at once

be set aside as

INFANTRY TACTICS
extremely vulnerable
six to consider.

77
this

under

artillery

fire

;

leaves us

Dense

columns

are

however

cumbersome
fatigue
to

and

not

handy, besides occasioning great
Also, they are

the

troops.

more

liable to

heavy loses

in a short

space

of time, which greatly affects morale.

Therefore, without

however abandoning them altogether,
to adopt a rather

it

would be preferable

more

flexible

formation adapted to the

ground even though

slightly

more vulnerable on paper.

by the French technical and experimental authorities " Under artillery fire, employ for preference a formation
:

Thus we

find the following conclusions arrived at

of

'

sections,'

or

better

still

of

'

squads,'

4

deep

at

deploying or (preferably) greater intervals."

A

comparison of the calculations made
of

for the various

angles

descent
:

and

obliquity led

to

the

following

conclusions
(a)

The formation which
is

presents the least vulnerability

that of
i.e.^

which the frontage represents \ of the

depth,
(b)

company

with a front of

8.

The

vulnerability

of formations

of

2

abreast

is

almost equal to that of 4 abreast when the angle of descent is very sharp, ix.^ at long ranges, and
especially
if

the troops are advancing at
fire.

all

obliquely

to the line of

Nevertheless, at long ranges a

company

or

section

may move

in

file

(2

abreast)

provided they are advancing
the enemy's
It is
fire.

in a

direct line with

reasonable to suppose that what would be seen by
2

a battery would be simply

men

(always supposing the

ground did not slope very considerably) and that it would therefore frequently happen that the artillery would not

78

.

DEVELOPMENT OF
sufficiently attractive

consider the target

to

warrant

any

great expenditure of ammunition.

But

in

the prehminary

advance (marche d'approche) one must not only consider the
vulnerability of a formation; one must
also necessary to

and keep
quick

as

remember that it is make use of natural features of ground, much as possible out of reach of the enemy's
guns.

firing

Therefore
:

the following points

must

likewise be paid attention to
(c).
ist.

Make

use of

all

cover.

2nd. Seek hidden lines of approach.
3rd.

Avoid ground on which

projectiles are seen to

fall.

4th.

Keep

troops as

much
select

as possible out of sight of

the enemy.
5th.

For preference
projectiles.

cover capable of stopping

6th.

Make

use of knapsacks as cover
halt
for

neccessary to

when it becomes any length of time on

exposed ground.
(d).
I

St

For preference, the company should advance by half companies or sections in fours with large intervals,
8

men

abreast even,

if

the ground permits of
to

it.

2nd. With battalions and larger bodies
units at

place

the

(minimum)

interval of

150 metres and

500 metres distance.
(e)

With

special reference to

"open double column," and
ground and circumstances
file,

" chess formation."
3rd.

On

exposed ground,

if

permit, carry out the advance by alternate rushes
(preferably by squads in
or fours) at irregular

intervals, carefully preserving the direct

Hne of the

enemy's

fire,

INFANTRY TACTICS
4th.

79

Echelon the various units in some way, but at variable distances, and in advancing make them zig-zag at the double to prevent fixed aim being
taken.

Relative Vulnerability of various Formations UNDER Infantry Fire

The

results

arrived

at

with

regard

to

the

relative

vulnerability of infantry formations when exposed only to Artillery fire, are equally applicable against small arm fire
at distances, at

which a

rifle

bullet will not penetrate

more

than one man.

As

a result of the experiments

made
rifle,

to
it

determine the

penetrating power of the " Lebel "

was found that

beyond i,6oo metres its bullet would not often pass through more than one man. At shorter ranges it is quite possible that its great penetration may produce considerable effect on deep
formations,

which

would
or

also

suffer

severely

from

a

plunging
either

fire;

nevertheless,

by adopting deep formations
fire

by sections
effects

squads, at deploying intervals, the

deadly

of

the

enemy's
of

will

be

lessened

because

the

small

frontages

these

small

columns

will render correcting

and

fixing of aim, especially at the
difficult.

longer ranges,

much more
natural.

At medium
increases, as
is

ranges, however, this degree of vulnerability
It is

admitted that

in firing volleys

at this type of formation, at r,ooo metres the bullets scatter

in

proportion

to

the front

presented.

Therefore

under

these conditions the result of a volley will be the polygonous grouping of projectiles, with an average deviation of 1-85
metres.

The

volley will

scatter

in

width

to

the

extent

" (1-85 of 8 " deviations

x

8 metres), the bullets being

more

8o
thickly

DEVELOPMENT OF
grouped
is

in

the centre naturally.
2
i

This width, 14-8

metres,

the frontage presented by
if

men

in single rank,

who would
whereas
if

in line

come

within the cone of dispersion,

the section were in a deep formation, the whole
it

40 men of which cone of dispersion.

consists would

be included

in

the

Hence

the necessity, in most cases, of adopting a single

rank formation before getting within 1000 metres of the

enemy's position.

To

preserve cohesion, facilitate
full

proper direction being
it

maintained and exercise

control,

would be advisable to

advance in deep formations by sections or squads as long as
possible'; in practice,

however, these formations can only be

adopted so long as the width of the cone of dispersion is equal to the frontage of either of the above units when
deployed
in single rank.

The more
which
is

contracted the cone

of dispersion becomes, the greater necessity will there be
to extend into single rank,
less vulnerable, as
it

avoids

the great penetrating

effects

of

modern arms

so

serious at ranges below 1,200 metres.

The width

of the cone of dispersion being
it

much

greater at
fire

the longer ranges,

naturally follows that,

under infantry
that at

at these long ranges, deep formations by small units at deploy-

ing intervals will be the most suitable,

and

medium

and short ranges one
So long
of course,
as the

will

be forced to adopt single rank.
fire is

enemy's

perpendicular to the line

of advance, the deep formation with a front of four

men

is,

more vulnerable than
fire,

that with a front of two.

But
two

if

exposed to oblique
most.

then the unit with a front of

will suffer

The

very careful experiments which have been carried

out on the Continent, mostly seem to agree that for the
preliminary advance {marche
d''

approche) carried out by


INFANTRY TACTICS
small
units
in 8i

battle

formation,

the

least
file;

vulnerable

formations are: for a squad of 20 men,
of 40,
If

for a section

tion

column of fours. we admit, in principle, that the most suitable formaup to the commencement of the attack should be
rank,
units
it

single

follows

that

the

intervals

between the

various

during

the

marche d'approche
;

must

be

proportionate to their strength
longer ranges,
there
is

and

also because, at the
It

a wider
to

cone of dispersion.

would therefore be wise

commence

the approach by

half companies or sections in perpendicular columns, for

the large intervals between the units,
effects of wind, etc.,

together with the

on the enemy's
fire

fire, will

tend to throw

a large percentage of that

into the intervals,

and thus
less

diminish

casualities

and
fire.

render

the

formation

vulnerable to infantry

at

Below we give the results arrived at after the experiments Chalons, where they took the angle of obliquity at one:

tenth

I St.

A Company
formations.
artillery fire,

in line

is

the

As
it

it is

also the

most vulnerable of all most vulnerable under

must therefore never be adopted on
is

the battlefield.

2nd. Half

than

Company Column in fours Column of Sections (also in
formation of half

more vulnerable

fours) at intervals

at least equal to their frontage.

The
fire

which, however,
only,

Company Columns in fours, may be adopted when under Artillery must be avoided when under infantry fire.
of

3rd. For units of the strength of a section or upwards,

the

formation

column of

fours

is

always less 6

vulnerable than

file.

S2
4th.

DEVELOPMENT OE
For a squad, column of fours is more vulnerable than single or double rank at any distance under
1,500 metres
metres.
5th.
;

for a section, at

anything under 800

A Company
at

column of sections
than
a

in fours at

intervals
is

least

equal

to the sections' frontage,

more

vulnerable

company

in

single

rank only

under 1,300 metres, or than company at ranges under 1,000 metres.
6th.

in line only

A A A

long line in two ranks

is

nearly twice as vulner-

able as single rank.
7th.

long double line with intervals between

files

is

less vulnerable than single rank.

8th.

lonsf

double
file
:

line at

is

of fours or

800 metres

more vulnerable than column for a squad, and at

1,000 metres for either a section or half company.

From

the

above observations the following

practical

rules were evolved.
I St.

Up

to within

1,300

metres

of

the position,

the

Company should advance by
2nd.

sections or squads in

fours at considerable intervals.

the

From a distance of 1,300 metres, moment when the fire becomes
line with intervals

or rather from
effective,

adopt

double
3rd.

between
files
;

files.

The advance
when
actually
single rank.

with open

is

especially suitable

on the move

during a halt get into

4th.

If the frontage

is

not sufficient to admit of

all

units

extending either into single rank or double rank
with open
files,

those

who

are
in

unable to extend

should for preference advance

column of

fours

up

to within a 1,000 metres.

INFANTRY TACTICS
Though bearing
proper use
of
these principles in mind,
real
it

83

should not
is

be forgotten that the
all

way

to

minimise losses
natural

to

make
the

available

cover.

And
laid

principles or laws of vulnerability
solely
in

must not be
or

down
is

regard to isolated targets,

ground which

horizontal or parallel with the line of sight.
first to recognise the importance which on certain terrain would be most effective. Except for riccochets, ground slopes do not affect the effects of fire on a thin line. The case, however,

Paquij was one of the
fire,

of " inclined "

when dealing with deep formations. Let us consider, for example, a formation of avera^re depth say a battalion advancing to attack in battle
is

quite different

formation

We

will

it w^ould occupy a depth of about 500 metres. suppose the distance between the skirmishers

to be 200 metres, and 300 metres between supports and reserves, and that the advanced line is [,000

and the supports

metres from the enemy.

The
the

supports would be in small columns of fours, and
or eic^hts, with In this formation the three leading in each case, cover the remainder so long as the also
in

reserves

columns of fours

considerable intervals.

ranks

will,

trajectory of the enemy's fire

ground

:

Now

is more or less parallel with the being one of the advantages of the formation. we must consider two cases

this

:

First Case

Formation is Adopted on Parallel or Horizontal with THE Enemy's Line of Sight.
this
is

—When

Ground which

In this case the controlled
against one of the lines
will

fire,

which

will

be directed
first,

let

us suppose

the

usually be the only one visible

which

will

produce a beaten

zone covering the whole formation.

84

dj^velopM^Mt
The

op;

Unes would be comprised

distances between the firsthand the two toUowing in the errors of elevation, and the

line of sight passing along the

ground hne of the

first will

do the same with the second and third. The maximum fire were directed effect would therefore be obtained if the the second or hne of supports, with sights correctly at
adjusted to 1,200 metres.

Second Case

—When
slope.

the Formation Ground.
If very

is

on Sloping

(a)

Upward
aimed
effect

pronounced, controlled

fire

at any one of the lines will not have

much

on the other two.
slope.
If the angle of the slope coinfire, fire,

(b)

Downward
cides with

the
will

formation
all

enemy's be subject to a " grazing "
trajectory of the
will

the

and

three

lines

come
the

within
first

the
line

"dangerous
only

zone."
usually

In

this

case

would
third

be

visible,

but

the

second

and

would be

hit

unless

some
a

special

feature

of the

ground enabled them
Finally,

to obtain cover.

when
it is

firing

at

sloping

towards

you

(or

on

deep formation on ground level ground which you
line.

command)

necessary to aim at each separate

If

you wish to hit the reserves or third line, better results would be obtained by concentrating fire on each separate unit of which it is composed, owing to the intervals between them, than by scattering fire all along its whole front.
In firing at a crest-Hne the effects produced on the second and third lines wdll diminish considerably if your elevation is inclined to be low, and increase considerably
with a higher elevation,
all

the

more so when

the slope

behind the

crest-line

is

steep.

INFANTRY TACTICS

85

V
Infantry Methods
Infantry
"
tactics

can roughly be divided into two parts
"

:

fire tactics " at

long ranges, and

bayonet

tactics "

when
to the

at close quarters.

The

latter phase, stretching

back

days

of the

supremacy

of

the
;

arme

blanche,

held

a

glorious record for

many

centuries

even up to the middle
of the old school of

of the Nineteenth century the ideas
infantry fighting prevailed in
all

the great
in

European wars.

But the successive improvements
of
to

arms and the invention chemical powders, attaching increased importance new seem to have definitely established the fire arms,
influence

preponderating

of

fire

as

infantry's

principal

means of action. even embodied

This was the prevailing idea, and was
in

some

of

the

tactical

regulations.

According to the then prevalent theories in the majority of cases, battles would be decided without the intervention
of the bayonet
fire
;

the concentration of a sufficiently intense
it

upon

certain points,
side
to

was supposed, would force one
the

or other

yield

when

attacker got to

within

200-300 metres range.

To-day these ideas are received with a certain amount of reserve and another theory seems to be favoured.
Starting from the standpoint that
fire is

the only really

efficacious preparatory means of both morally and materially

shaking

the

enemy,

some
the

easily

impressed

theorists,

influenced

no doubt by

new

characteristics

which


86

DEVELOPMENT OF
infantry fighting, were led to

modern weapons have given
element,
i.e.^

beheve that the advent of a certainly most important
" fire
tactics,"

practically

represented

the

beginning and the end of modern battle.
they subordinated
all

Consequently

tactics to

it,

which was equivalent to

openly

admitting

that

the

defensive

was

the

most

advantageous form of action, and thus
prevalent principle or

corroborated the

maxim

that,

the

more

perfect the

weapon, the greater
defensive tactics.

will

be the strength

and advantage of

From
tactics

these ideas also springs that other species of axiom
are

dependent upon the nature of the weapons
only been accepted under a prudent

employed
reserve,

— which has
;

for

such a principle does not yet bear the hall
it

mark of success
battlefield,

has not yet

been

tried
factors,

on the

real

where some other important
its

such as the

superior manoeuvring,

movements and the
object
to

ability of its

commander, the

tactical

be attained and the

various combinations, also exercise considerable, frequently
decisive influence in securing victory.

The

Austrians in 1859 and the French in 1870 received

conclusive proof of the results of fighting systematically on
the defensive, with the idea of scoring through the excellence of a weapon reputed to be superior to that of their adversary,

and

to

whose supposed

effects general

tactical principles

were sacrificed.
not establish

The

Austrians' " Lorenz " rifled gun did

the

expected superiority over the French,

armed with a smooth bore weapon, because the latter adopted a vigorous offensive which amply made up for the
inferiority of their arms.

Likewise the Prussians' " Dreyse

"

triumphed over the
latter carried further,

French " Chassepot,"

for

although the

was more accurate and rapidly loaded, yet was

in

less

INFANTRY TACTICS
skilful

87

and bold hands, the

fire

being controlled by officers

who were

altogether ignorant of

modern

fire

tactics,

which

were employed against them with considerable

skill

and

complete success by

their adversaries.

The

tactics

of the French

infantry

which were, so to

speak, subservient to the " Chassepot,"

and led
attitude,

to

their

almost invariably adopting a defensive

was un-

doubtedly one

of

the

chief causes

for

the

disastrous

reverses experienced by

them

in

1870.

Reaction against these tactical methods was not long in

coming, and

at

the present day the theories of the most
All are

renowned
factor in

authorities are very different indeed.
fire,

agreed that the power of modern
battle,
is,

although an important

when

all is

said

and done, but a more

potent means of deciding the result between the adversaries.

Usually, the effect of

fire

is

not decisive unless accom-

panied by a vigorous forward movement, which is the only real factor which ensures the possibility of imposing your
will

upon the enemy.
tactics in their true sense,

It is offensive

adopted either

from the very commencement of the battle, or following on a very strong defensive attitude, which can nowadays assure
decisive

success

;

in

the attack,

fire

effect

is

commonly

looked upon as the most powerful preparatory factor for materially and morally weakening the enemy one wishes to
drive from a position,

and

as the best

means of
difficulties

facilitating

the advance and approaching your objective without being

unduly delayed by the obstacles or

which the

enemy may have succeeded
of advance.

in creating in the attacker's line

The two

currents of opinion which

we have endeavoured
:

to outline have brought into

being two distinct schools

88

DEVELOPMENT OF
advocating
defensive

one

methods,

the

other

strongly,

upholding the offensive.

Under
tactical

the influence of the
regulations
of
in

first

of these,

the French

1875

were

drawn up, but were

1894 inspired by the second. Fire, which is so important on the defensive, is likewise the best means of helping the advance on the offensive. Without a wellIt is the primal aid to forward movement.
superseded by others
directed,

powerful and effective

fire,

i.e.,

without proper

preparation, there can be no forward movement with any hope of success and without offensive movement, without
;

an energetic, strong and resolute advance, you cannot hope out to to succeed in the tactical task you have set
accomplish.

These are the rational principles which predominate in the French Regulations of 1904, from which the following is " Forward movement will prove decisive and an extract the offensive, therefore, which alone gives irresistible
:

;

scope to

this

movement,

will in
its

most cases be assumed."

Fire, notwithstanding

great power, was never

by

itself

able to turn an energetic defender out of his position.

The campaigns
in the

of
all

1870, of 1877-78, and the late war

Far East, have
decisive

demonstrated
are obtained,

in a conclusive

that

results

not by

fire,

manner but by

manoeuvre,
battles

mobility,

and the advance of

infantry.

The

of Saint Privat, Plevna, Lyao-Yang,
truth of this.

Sha-Ho and

Mukden, amply demonstrate the

A

bayonet charge

will

not often be driven home, but

the moral effect produced by a resolute advance, strong determination to get
at the

by the
will

enemy's position,

cause him to retreat without awaiting the assault.
the bayonet will

Fear of
to
in

make him

give ground

and oblige him
rare

abandon

his position.

There are but

instances

INFANTRY TACTICS
which the defence has stood
even
instance
the
to receive

89

a bayonet charge

;

the Turks in their redoubts on
in

Mount

Skobeleff did so, but

that

attacker

triumphed over the
a recent
:

defender's pertinacity.

This

is

what Von der Goltz,
assault

in

pubHcation,
" It
is

writes regarding the

on a position
fire

indis-

pensable to obtain a superiority of

(both Artillery and

Infantry), to ensure a favourable result to the attack, for that

superiority

is

the surest guarantee of success.

Nevertheless

we
the

shall never

be able

to dispense with

having to approach

position.

the

enemy and with endeavouring to penetrate his Anyone who confines his efforts to dislodging defender by fire alone will be sadly disillusioned. The
must unavoidably
steadily

attacker

advance through the

hail of bullets directed

on him."
is

In conclusion,

fire

a powerful preparatory element

movement, but cannot be considered a decisive means of action. Infantry's principal method
assisting the forward

consists

in

movement which, aided by
*
*
fire
-X;;=
;;c

fire,

will

produce
::=

decisive results.
5!c

*

-!'

*

Movement and
action,
battle.
it is

being Infantry's two real means of

necessary to study their practical application in

The Advance of the Line of Battle
The necessity of make up the firing
modern and to
getting the various units,
line over the

— Rushes.
which go to
in the
fire,

ground, by a judicious
has
resulted

combination of manoeuvre and

fire,

practice of successive rushes alternated with

the advance of small bodies which

is

in

vogue

in

nearly every well organised service at the present day.

A

continuous, uninterrupted

advance on the objective

90

DEVELOPMENT OF
" decisive zone,"
this
i.c.^

would be the quickest and most advantageous means of
getting to the
to ranges
is

under 600
to

metres

;

but

manner of advancing
fire, fire,

bound

be

checked by the enemy's
to halt

which

will oblige the attacker

and reply

to that
at

and these

halts will usually

have to commence

about r,ooo metres.
onwards, therefore, the attacker
will

From
practical

this distance

be forced
it

to
will

alternate

advance and
time occupied

fire.

As long

as

be advantageous to advance the whole line
for the
in

simultaneously,

one movement

is

necessarily shorter than advancing by fractions,

and

will

not

expose

you

to

heavier

casualities.

In

Von

Scherff's

opinion, forward rushes by the w^hole line will ensure greater

cohesion and cause less disorder.

According to some
whole
only

tacticians, the principle of

pushing the

line simultaneously

forward should be resorted to
able to assist the skirmishers

when

the

artillery
its

is

effectively
artillery

with

the line
it

and that in the absence of must advance by alternate rushes. Be
fire,

this

as

may,
by

most modern regulations advocate the

advance
artillery.

The

rushes, independently of the strength of each " rushing " unit must not be
alternate
tfie

too

little,

so that

general advance

may be

carried out

with the greatest possible

method and

precision, under strict

and

at the
is

This

why

same time comparatively independent control. the half company has been selected as the
According
to

most

suitable unit.

General Boguslowski, a

section

(40 men), should be the smallest unit allowed to

" rush " independently.
at

Now we come

to

the question
line

:

what distance should the advance by the whole
?

be

abandoned, and rushes by fractions commenced
Perhaps
at

This question cannot be answered by any definite

rule.

600 metres from the

position,

maybe more,

INFANTRY TACTICS
The
intensity

91

of the enemy's
this point.

fire

and the nature

of the

ground must regulate

it should as a length of each halt must be variable however, be short, so as not to paralyse the general forward impulse but it also depends on the distance which

The

;

rule,

;

will

have to be covered
rounds
is

in the

next rush.

Five

the

maximum which
halt.

should

ever

be
at

expended during any one
the double.
of

Rushes must be made
regulations,

The

length of each has also been the subject

much

discussion.

The

British

based

on

South African experience, said that in open ground they
should not exceed 75-90 metres.
says

General

Von Boguslowski
maintains that at

5060 metres. Von Lindenau, on
at

the other hand,

distances exceeding 800 metres

rushes of only 40 metres

can be made, and
outside.

shorter

ranges

25

metres

at

the

In the

German manoeuvres

of 1902, rushes of

20-30

prevent the adversary from noticing the
to concentrate his fire

metres were carried out by small units, the idea being to movement in time

on the moving

target.

Fire Tactics

On

the continent,

at

the present day,

there are

two

opposing currents of opinion regarding the nature of fire which should usually be employed by infantry, one
favouring

independent

or

individual
fire.

fire,

the

othe

upholding the advantages of collective

The

British regulations

say that individual
will

fire

should

usually be used.

That volleys

but rarely be resorted

to except at large or well defined targets, or as a

means of
individual

controlling the

fire.

The German

regulations

likewise advocate

92
fire,

DE VEL OPME NT OF
slow or rapid according to the importance or nature of
Tlie individual soldier
is

the target.
of initiative.

allowed a great deal

He

is

allowed to choose the
fire,

moment
and
select

for
dis-

opening

or

ceasing

on

the

appearance

appearance of his adversary.
target,

He
if

must
is

also

his

and estimate the range
the

he

any distance from or
tactical

unable to hear the instructions given by his commander.

On

other

hand some other

regulations,

amongst them the French, Russian, Spanish and Portuguese,

show greater preference for collective fire. There is no doubt that fire by word of command ensures concentration on a certain objective, produces a greater moral effect upon the enemy, allows of the fire being kept under control, and avoids waste of ammunition; but
is also necessary to bear in mind that it demands great "sang froid" from everyone, especially the commanders, and that it would seldom be used in actual warfare except
it

under certain conditions of range, country,
special types of troops.

etc.,

or with

In that excellent work. Etudes

siir le

combat, Colonel

Ardant du Picq declares that

fire

small favour in real warfare, as

by word of command finds he himself had observed in

the campaigns in the Crimea and in Italy.

The

writer

however
fire
is

is

himself of opinion that the long
will allow of the

range at which
suitable

nowadays opened

employment of both kinds of fire, and that it would with advantage be controlled by word of command at the longer distances, and allowed to become individual
at the shorter.

The

soldier's
in

temperament
considering

is

a factor which

must not be

overlooked

this

important

subject.

The

races which keep most cool in action, usually the Northern
races,

can with greater safety allow the individual soldier a

tNFANTRV TACTICS
greater
especially

93

amount of independence with regard to fire, if he has received thorough and careful instruction

during peace training.

On

the other hand, Southern races
it

being more highly strung and impressionable,
to to

pays better
officers

keep the troops longer under control, to allow the keep them well
in

hand and prevent an exaggerated
limits are

waste of ammunition prior to the decisive attack; therefore,
for

the latter, volleys wuthin certain

certainly

advisable.

To-day a new form of
in action.

fire

has been adopted by infantry

We
It

refer

to

" Rafales " or

bursts of

fire,

which

until

recently

had only been employed by
in their late

artillery.
first

was the Japanese

war who

introduced

this style of fire

on

a large scale.
" consist

These " Rafales
fire,

of rapid and violent bursts of
effects

which produce paralysing
actual
casualties,

on the enemy, not
the

only in

but through

moral

effect

caused by their suddenness and violence.

With

the

Japanese,

these

short

outbursts

coincided

with the forward

movement

of their supports or reserves in

compact formations,
lasted.

for the violence of the fire

caused the

Russians to remain under cover for as long as the "rafale"

The
to

teachings of the Russo-Japanese war led the French
this style of fire in their regulations of 1904.
last

adopt

Another question which has during the
exercised the

few years

minds

of tacticians

is

the great

advantage

derived

in

battle
fire.

through

obtaining

and preserving a

superiority of
It is

acknowledged that

artillery

must co-operate actively

with the infantry in endeavouring to obtain this superiority
w^henever the latter
is

unable to do so by

its

own unaided

94
efforts.

DEVELOPMENT OF

Nowadays, close relations between these two arms more than ever necessary. The gun and the rifle must co-operate. Infantry plays the most important part, for on
are
its

success depends the result of the battle

;

therefore

it

is

more important
allow
itself to

for artillery to support its infantry, than to
artillery duel.

be drawn into an
is

This opinion
given by the

stated clearly
:

enough

in

some

instructions

German Emperor

are but a tool placed in a general's hand overcome obstacles and open up a way for the most important element, the element which must be first under all circumstances, and the only one which can assure
to

"The guns

victory

;

I refer

of course to the infantry."

INFANTRY TACTICS

95

VI

Modern Battle
{a).

Instruments of "Contact" "Reconnaissance" " AND " Preparation
" final object of armies
is

The
Picq,

Battle," says
if

Ardant du

and the object of
up of
every

battle should be,

not the actual
at all events

and
your
In

total destruction of the

enemy's

forces,

the breaking
will

his resistance

and the imposition

of

upon him.
instance
battle
is
is

nearly

preceded by pre-

liminary operations, whose object
tion

the gaining of informadefinitely

by the

commanders

before

committing
with

themselves to decisive action.

These operations consist

in

establishing

contact
all

the cavalry, and subsequent skirmishes in which

arms

may be engaged, and

finally

leading

up

to the

engagement

of the advanced guards.

The

succession
of

of

improvements
powders

in

arms

and

the the

introduction

smokeless

has

rendered

supreme command
difficult.

on the
the

battlefield

more and
by
fire

more
used

In

the

old

days

smoke produced

roughly to

indicate what was happening;

the greater or

less density of the

clouds of

smoke

facilitated inferences

from personal observation, and the infantry and artillery Nowadays the absence of lines were clearly indicated.

smoke makes

a rapid

and accurate estimate of the enemy's

96

DEVELOPMENT OF
and the value of personal

dispositions extremely difficult,

observation by a
It

has therefore

commander is practically reduced to nil. become necessary to obtain greater and
of the scouting

more accurate information by means
again,

reconnaissance operations which precede the battle.

and But

modern
"

rifles

and

quick-firing

guns have likewise
reconnaissance
present

greatly

increased
duties,

the

difficulties

of the

and

" contact

which

up

to

have been

chiefly carried out

by cavalry.
three
for

All this has necessitated the resort to " covering detach-

ments

"

gaining

information

composed of all and
screen,

arms,
;

for

purposes

of

safety

these

detachments
prevent

are placed

ahead of the advance guard and behind the

general

cavalry

and are
the

meant

to

any
the

bodies of the enemy's cavalry, which
vigilance

may have escaped
cavalry
screen,

or

broken through

from

obtaining information.
Artillery

resistance

great
to

and Infantry give these detachments power of the and the cavalry the necessary mobility range and invisibility of modern fire enables them
;

occupy extensive

" points d'appui,"
for a

and enables them
is

to deceive the

enemy
If

considerable time as to what

in front of himi.

attacked by superior strength these

detachments can easily withdraw and seek the support of
the advance guard, which they would then join. These " covering detachments," forming a mobile safety
screen, covering the front

and

flanks of

an army on the
ought to be in

move, would considerably
marching
direction,

facilitate the

army's change from

to fighting formations, for, as they
all

possession of

strong points and roads in the enemy's

they render easier and less dangerous the moveunits, allowing

ments of the various higher

them more space

and time.

INFANTRY TACTICS

c^y

By means of this system of reconnaissance, the supreme commander can keep himself full}^ informed as to the
situation,

the

positions occupied
first

by the enemy, and can
for the

decide on the
troops.

general

movements

attacking

Usually, however, the information obtained
will

in

this

way

hardly be sufficient to enable a

commander

to select

with accuracy the point on which the supreme and com-

bined

efforts of the attack will

To

select this point with

have to be directed. any certainty it will be necessary
whole front by commencing a

to feel the

enemy along

his

preparatory action, which will alone enable a
to obtain

commander

any precise information regarding the adversary's

dispositions.

Condensing these principles and accepting the ideas of
the highest tactical authorities of the present day, we find

army in the field, to clear up the situation and at same time protect itself from any bold coup on the part of its adversary, must be preceded by the following instruthat an

the

ments of Contact, Reconnaissance, and Preparation
{a) Cavalry reconnoitring screen,
{b)
(r)

:

pushed well forward.
all

Covering detachments, composed of

three arms.

Advanced Guards,
will

also of

all

three arms.

We
each

now endeavour
these
forces

to shortly
in

go into the duties of
properly
constituted

one of

any

service.

Reconnoitring Cavalry.
Its

particular mission

is

to explore the ground,
to

to

find,

get into,

and keep touch with the enemy so as

keep the

Head
The

Quarters' Staff informed, and ensure their

full liberty

of action.

brigades of cavalry entrusted with these reconnais7

98

DEVELOPMENT OF

may be reinforced by horse artillery and machine gun detachments, but the obtaining of information in this manner is often greatly impeded by the opposing cavalry. Under the most favourable circumstances, and
sance duties

even when the cavalry succeeds

in

eluding

the

enemy's

advanced troops, they
minute reconnaissance
are at
all

will
if

seldom be able

to carry out

any

the enemy's protective measures

properly organised.

The
offer

cavalry

may encounter an advance guard which
It
is

will

an energetic resistance and prevent any reconnaissance
only with
the

being carried out.

help

of another
of

element, which besides mobility also
resistance, that reconnaissance can

possesses power

be carried any further.

Therefore resort

is

had

to

:

Covering Detachments
These are composed of the three arms, and
varies according to circumstance
;

their strength

as a rule,
artillery

battalions of infantry

and a battery of
is

one or two would make

up each detachment.
Their special duty
to "feel " the

enemy, and usually to
from which

do one of two things

:

either

draw him on, or keep him back.
positions,

The

occupation

of

extended
fire,

they can keep up a heavy

may

deceive the

enemy and
is

cause him to commit errors under the impression that he

him to the combring up and deploy large bodies of troops parative weakness of these detachments renders them flexible and mobile, and enables them to manoeuvre with They form a moveable protective considerable secrecy. net around the front and flanks of the army. They support the advanced cavalry, they explore the ground ahead of the advance guards, get into and keep
being opposed by considerable
strength, leading
;

INFANTRY TACTICS
and
the

99

touch with the enemy, only giving way to heavy pressure do not allow themselves to become inextricably

engaged, but

by occupying successive positions
" for
it.

facilitate

coming

into action of the

advance guards by holding

" points d'appui

On

the offensive, the role of these detachments
;

is

chiefly

reconnaissance

on the defensive,
if
is

it is

protection.

These detachments,
superior
strength

in

contact

with

an

enemy

in

who

attempting to envelop

a flank

must

fight

stubbornly,

events retard such

movement

and endeavour to prevent or at all when forced to retire, they
;

must constitute themeslves flank detachments of the leading portion of the army, and thus prevent its being forced
to increase
its

front.

Advanced Guards
These are not only an element of protection, but they are the principal reconnoitring factors in advance of columns on the move. Being more powerful than the
"covering
detachments,"
they

can

complete

the

reconnaissances

which the

latter's

weakness may have prevented them from

carrying out thoroughly.

Advanced Guards feel the enemy along the whole front, and must even attempt to overlap his flanks; they

commence

the

preparatory

actions,

which

enable

the

supreme commander

to obtain the necessary information. to act

They must endeavour

up
the

to

Napoleon's
voit.

On

s'engagc partout et puis Von
energetic action

maxim The advanced

:

guard's

has

advantage of avoiding

or attacks en Vair and allow a commander the time and space which are absolutely indispensable for him to make his plans and assume his proper dispositions.

premature deployment,

false direction

loo

DEVELOPMENT OF
(B.)— General Laws of Tactical Evolution

To make
first

a careful study of

modern
if

battle,

it

is

necessary

to consider briefly the general development of tactical

evolution, which has modified,
principles of battle, at
all

not the actual fundamental

events the variable

means by

which certain objects are attained and which are the direct more decisive result of the important and every-day
in armaments. Ardant du Picq has already codified some of these rules, and General Langlois has now elaborated more fully the

improvements

tactical rules in their application to

modern requirements,

and which have been unanimously accepted by the highest
authorities
ist

on

this vital question.

Rule

Improvement in Modern Small Arms HAS rendered Frontal attack in nearly every CASE MORE Difficult, Arduous and Precarious.
is

—The

This statement

in itself so
it.

obvious that we

need not
superiority

waste time in proving
offensive the aftacker

To

be able to advance on the
establish

must needs

a

of

fire

which

at

once necessitates one of two things, either

superiority in numbers, or

more
this

skilful

use of his weapon

and marksmanship. The immediate result of
forced upon

first

rule

is

the necessity
less

the attacker of adopting

less vulnerable,

dense and

more

flexible formations, which in their turn

demand of the individual soldier greater initiative, courage and a much higher morale, to enable him to withstand the
trying ordeal of the assault.

2nd Rule The Improvements in Small Arms Facilitate Enveloping of Flanking Movements.

The

use of high explosives and the precision of

modera


iNFANTRV TACTICS
facilitate

:

lot

weapons, by increasing the dimensions of the beaten zone, the envelopment of a defensive position. And

surprise

movements
attacks

will

be more frequent

owing

to

the

absence of smoke.

Flank

necessitate

considerable
to

manoeurving
so,

hence

the

reason

why
all

ability

do

mobility,

flexibility

and

rapidity

of action

go on

acquiring

ever

increasing importance in

operations.

3rd

Rule

The Progressive Increase in the Power OF Artillery Favours the Attack, be it Flank OR Frontal.
greatly

The

increased

decisive

range

of

modern

manoeuvre under cover, and thereby secretly concentrate at chosen points from which he can unexpectedly launch his troops.

Artillery enables the attacker to

The defender
modern

is

a smaller

gainer from

the powers of

Artillery than the attacker.
invisibility of batteries favours

The
than

the attacker rather
is

the

defender,

because

the

former

usually

in

occupation of a greater number of points, and leaves the defender in great perplexity and uncertainty as to the exact spot at which he means to drive home the decisive
attack.

He

can therefore select
all his efforts in

this point at his leisure

and concentrate

that direction.

This principle also, however, applies to the defender, but only on assuming the offensive, either in the form of counterattack or, better
still, by a complete change to the offensive, wherever he can muster a numerical superiority of two to one. The dense clouds of smoke produced by modern shell

when they explode,
decisive attack.

can

be

profitably
this

utilised

in

the
to

Artillery

might by

means be able

blind the

enemy

for a considerable

space of time, during


102

DEVELOPMENT OF

which he would be unable to make good use of his fire^ and thereby open up the way for the assaulting troops. At this stage we arrive at the idea favoured by many, i.e., that cavalry and light batteries could with advantage be employed in the decisive attack, and which confirms
the theory

now

universally

accepted,

that

the

improve-

ments

in

armaments demand the much more intimate

co-operation of the different arms.

4th B-ULE

TO

The Extent of Battle Frontages Tends Increase. They are ever Becoming more
for this is not only the increased
is

AND MORE Extensive.
The reason
numbers of
troops engaged, but
also

an outcome of the desire to

avoid having one's flanks turned.
fire

The
fire.

rapidity of

modern

almost enables

one

to

consider as occupied, ground

which can be
This
the
"
is

effectively

beaten by
tacticians,

why

certain

professing to believe in
to

new

tactics,"

attach

undue importance
is

the

so-

called guerre de rideaux, which

in reality

nothing but

the natural

first

act of the struggle,

and

constitutes, so to

speak, the preparatory action, or one of the two principal

phases of modern battle.

But the
to bring

battle of "

Rideaux
results,

"

factorily, for thin lines of great extent

must always end unsatiswould rarely be able
it is

about decisive

because

absolutely neceseffort of strong
will

sary to decide a battle

by the concentrated
;

masses of troops
5th

at a

given point

nothing else

do

it.

Rule

The Side on the Defensive has every DAY MORE Facility as well as Reason for Adopting Deep Formations.
is

This rule

diie to three

arisen in connection with the

new circumstances which have improvements in modern arms

:

INFANTRY TACTICS
ist.

ioj

The

art of getting
is

into

touch with an enemy in

position
difficult

becoming a much more lengthy and

operation.

2nd.

The
and

length and power of resistance of small mobile

well-commanded bodies of troops increases

every day.
3rd.

Strong lines of batteries can
with greatly reduced

now be

established

numbers of

infantry to protect

them.

The
in

difficulty

getting

into

which the attacker nowadays experiences touch when the defender's covering

detachments are properly handled, enables the side on the defensive to preserve its depth, which is indispensable for

sound manoeuvring.

The

attacker

may be eluded and

the

action

of his

reconnoitring troops absolutely

nonplussed, by bodies of

troops sent forward by the defence to

make

a great show,

and temporarily occupy positions or " points d'appui." If these detachments are well handled the adversary will often
find himself forced to bring

up and deploy

large bodies of

troops to endeavour to turn a possibly fictitious flank,

6th

Rule The Attacker must Continue to Increase AND Perfect the Organisation of the Troops BY WHICH HE GETS INTO TOUCH^ STRENGTHENING AND Adopting them to New Requirements.

r\

As we have seen, the attacker's first duty is to " feel " the enemy along his whole front, so as to obtain sufficient
information to be able to grapple with him.

This cannot be done by cavalry alone,
necessary strength and power of resistance.

for

it

lacks the

To

carry out a thorough reconnaissance, cavalry require

the support of other arms in sufficient strenirth to enable

lc4

DEVELOPMENT OF
and
find out

it it

to break through the opposing screen
hides,

what

hence the
;

necessity

for the
if

mixed detachments

already referred to

the latter,

pushed well forward, are

able to prolong for a considerable length of time the battle
preliminaries,

and this will usually be most advantageous. Advanced guards, both on the offensive and defensive,

should therefore always be preceded by these detachments.
7th

Rule

— Improvements in Armaments Continually

the Power Resistance of of Permanent Fortifications or Works of High Relief and Inversely Increase the Value of Light Works.
Diminish
j

In former days, the strength of fortifications lay entirely
in the height

and thickness of and
that
in

their parapets,

the depth of

their

ditches
;

the

strength

of their

accessory
lies

defences
in

nowadays, true power of resistance
is

in

fire,

the

rifle

in

man

— the

active

force.

Latest

improvements and inventions,
but continue to prove

like all their predecessors,

do

the preponderating
forces.

importance in

war of the active over the passive
shallow shelter trenches
are

Nowadays, instead of works of high
representing an extended line of
flanks
fire

relief,

series

of

successfully employed, they
well protected
lines

on the

and supported

in

rear

by other

of shelter

trenches, which latter constitute powerful supports for the
Artillery.

This power
strength
position.

is

derived
trench,

not

from

the

actual material

of

each

but

from

their

number and

Also, the effects of

modern

infimtry

fire

have endowed

the

simple

shelter

trench

with

considerable

power

of

resistance.

And

here therefore we find the reason for the

INFANTRY TACTICS

io$

great attention lately devoted to infantry entrenching tools,

all

and the advantages to be derived from the closer intimacy of combatants with the fourth arm, i.e., the Engineers. General Langlois, in his Enscignements des deux
recenfes,

guerj-es

discussing

tactical

evolution

in

its

bearing

on preparedness

for war, arrives at the
:

following

conclusions, which he clearly proves.
I St.

The importance
ever increasing,
mobility.

and

facility

of

manoeuvring

is

hence the growing necessity

for

2nd. of
3rd.

Modern
all

warfare

demands

the intimate co-operation
solid organization.

arms and consequently more
war
requires

Modern

the

highest

morale of

combatants.
4th.

Every step forward in armament minimises the value of mere numbers.
hardly necessary to

It is

run
:

through the arguments

proving the above propositions

they are irrefutable and at

once apparent

to the student,

and therefore can be looked

upon as actual axioms.
(C).

The Part Played
great

by

Infantry;

Suitable

Fighting Formations.

The
on

masters, by

defining

the

general

rules

of

tactical evolution,

spread light and indicate the true lines
;

which

to

work
;

they stamp

modern

warfare with
is

its

special features

they do not forget that battle

the final

object, the raison d'etie of armies.

All theories therefore
battle
to

which on the contrary relegate
are
false,

a

secondary place,

chimerical,

and

likely to lead

one

astray.

The
tactical

infinite

evolutions

amount of material accumulated in peace, and all strategic calculations, must

]o6

DEVELOPMENT OF
be
considered
as

therefore

means
the

of

attaining

that

desideratum.

The

essential

rules

for

conduct

of

battle

are

unchangeable.

At every period has
enemy,
keep
in

it

been necessary

to reconnoitre the

and hand the reserves destined to be thrown in at the decisive moment, be it either with a view to breaking through the enemy's front, the enveloping or turning of
his flanks, or for
It is

to prepare the action, select the point of attack

any

sort of counter stroke.

therefore necessary to study these essential laws of
especially
in

battle,

their application
in

to infantry,
is

which

being the principal factor

an army,

the

arm which
employed,

must exercise
for
tactics.

a direct influence
tactics

on the

tactics

"combined"

depend

essentially

on "Infantry"

Proceeding logically therefore, from the greater
smaller,

to

the

from the general to

the particular, the
instructions

German
by

regulations

commence

their

on

battle

enumerating general principles, from which must naturally
be evolved the laws which are to determine the methods
of procedure of the various units, and which must
lead

them

to

play

a

combined and co-ordinate
rules,

part in the

general plan.

In laying

down any
the soldier

the action of any part must

always depend on that of
part.

some other and more important
in

Thus

must be trained

accordance with

the part which will have to be played by the company, the

company
its

trained according to the Battalion's role,

and

in

turn the Battalion's training must form the corollary to

the methods adopted by the higher units.

Basing
battles,

all

fighting

rules

on the general principles of
into

the

Germans

really divide battle

two

parts,

INFANTRY TACTICS
which we
will

107

translate

as

the

" Intellectual "

and the

purely " Material."

The former

consists of combinations

and

dispositions, the latter of mechanical execution.
will

We
In

call

them the

" Intellectual

Phase

"

and the
consider

" Mechanical Phase."
the

mechanical

phase

we

need

only

execution.

According

to

Von

Scherff's definition,

it is

" the expres-

sion or manifestation of a given force

On

the other hand, the Intellectual Phase

on a given object." is an absolute
missions
are

question of brain work, by which
entrusted to the various units.

different

Thus we
execution.
his

establish the distinction

between conception and

To

explain this difference, General Lewal, in
talks of "battle tactics"

work on

tactics,

and

" battle

strategy," the

one referring only
regulations
attack,

to the execution, the other

to combinations.

The German
between
the

make

a considerable difference

consequent

upon

the

unexpected

meeting of two adversaries both on the
attack undertaken against

move,
in

and the
position.

an enemy already
various

In the former

case

the

troops would

extend

successively, as they arrived at the

the adversary being also
likewise.
It is

head of the column, and unprepared would be obliged to do

the duty of the leading troops of a column deployments, to clear the ground on which they must be executed, and gain time to allow of their being
to cover these

properly carried out.

These deployments must be carried out
possible so as not to delay the attack.

as

smartly as

attack until the whole force

Very precious time might be lost by postponing the had deployed at the head of a

column.

Jo8

t)EVELOPMENT OP
these circumstances the regulations

Under
appeal to

the

enterprising

initiative

of

all

make a strong commanding
for

ranks, not imposing

upon them any

limitations whatever,

except those

which are absolutely indispensable
that
initiative

the

necessary cohesion and regular progress of the attack.
It
is

clear

this

must

necessarily

be

exercised in the sudden encounters which are so likely to

occur in future wars.

Commanders
Guards
are

of the smaller units, of which the

Advanced
these

composed,

must
the

be

imbued
in

with

pronounced ideas of offensive
be advantageous to
forestall

initiative.

It will naturally

enemy

extending and to

act quickly with whatever troops are available, taking care

however

to avoid embarrassing the

supreme commander's

general plan.

In the second case, that

is

if

the

enemy

is

already in a

chosen and prepared position, the attack must from the
very

commencement be undertaken
it

methodically.
for

Under

the circumstances
initiative of

would not do

the

inopportune

of the battle to

some subordinate to perhaps cause the result become a matter of chance. Once an
apparently
or

adversary

has

renounced
small
units,

the

offensive,

all

commanders

of large

must allow

their

supreme conmiander
It is

full

liberty to select

and indicate the

objectives of the attack.

necessary therefore that the troops should at once
their

take

up

positions
it is

in

accordance

with

supreme
have any
fire

instructions, for

only as the result of proper preparation

that the attack can be

commenced

if it

is

to

chance of success, the obtaining of a superiority of
being of course also essential.

At distances over i,ooo metres
be acquired by the
artillery, at

this superiority

can only

i,ooo metres the effects of

INFANTRY TACTICS
infantry
artillery,
fire

109

may be

considered as about equal to that of
i.e.,

and

at shorter distances,
fire is

under 600 metres,

the effect of infantry
artillery.

undoubtedly greater than that of
of the
-^

The above
contained ^
-x-

is

the substance

latest

instructions

in the

German
*

Infantry Regulations.
-X-

-^

*

Decisive
offensive

results

can

only

be

obtained

by adopting

methods this is the idea we find running through nearly all contemporary regulations. From the very earliest times, and through all successive innovations, preparation and execution are the two great
phases which characterise offensive action.
often find battle divided into a greater number of phases in technical works, such as " reconnaissance,"

We

"initial

action,"

and

finishing

up with

"pursuit"

or

" retirement."

The

latest

manual
offensive

in the

French army,
discusses

in

the sections

devoted to

action,

three phases
final

— the

preparatory, the

executive,

and

the

(achevement)

corresponding to the German's " preparation, assault of and

occupation of the breach."

The
the

object of the

attack

is
it

not merely to

occupy a
which he

position held by the enemy,

consists rather in driving

enemy from every

successive

position
this

in

attempts to offer resistance.
fully

And

object can only be

achieved by a vigorous offensive.

It will frequently necessitate frontal

and decisive methods

of attack, which alone will produce what Napoleon used to
call "
It

revenement,"
is

i.e.,

complete success.

in

decisive attack that

we must look
for the

for the true

doctrines

of infantry fighting,

decisive

attack

is,

unquestionably, the most complete manifestation or rather

1

10

DE VEL OP ME NT OF
Every other form or method
in the whole.
is

the highest ideal of infantry.
of action
It
is

embodied
is

in

it,

Hke the part

to

infantry that
desired,

one must always look when a

decisive result

when preparing
in

the final success,

which
tions

is

the result either of the instructions and combinawell

adopted by the supreme head

conducted

battles, or of the initiative or

subordinate in badly managed

actions.

"In
every

battle,"

says

Von
its

Scherff,

"artillery

must use

effort to

render

co-operation effective, to

make

it

decisive in fact,

and thereby enable the infantry

to reap the

benefits thus available
profit."

and extract from them the maximum

In other words

:

in the

common
to

struggle the artillery

is

expected to prepare and the infantry to decide, but the
artillery's

ideal

must be

decide so as

to

enable

the

infantry to reap the full benefit.

La
;

rehie

des

hatailles

is

essentially

the

executive

arm at the supreme moment of decisive battle the sister arms must do what they can to assist and supplement the infantry's efforts, but the latter must unquestionably lead
the way. " After
is

all,"

as

Verdy du Vernois used
is
it

to say, "

when

all

said
?

and done, what
It

that

constitutes a decisive

attack
action,

consists

in

obtaining
;

by

force,

by violent
to
it is

a

definite

object
in the

in

effecting

and turning
battle, for

account a breach

enemy's order of

not necessary to force your adversary at every point along
his front, in order to disorganise

and throw

his dispositions

into confusion.
this is

To

effect a rupture in

the enemy's line,
to drive

what infantry must do when ordered

home

a decisive attack.

To

expel the
is

enemy from

the position

he

is

tenaciously holding, that

infantry's true mission.

1

INFA NTR V TA CTICS
" It follows, that in a decisive attack preparations

1 1

and

plans must also be of a very decided character.

factors,

means of action, as well as the most important and a resolute and energetic forward movement whose object is still at the present day (what"Infantry's
are
fire,

ever

may be

said to the contrary) the bayonet charge."
if

And

another French writer very justly remarks that
this

one

wished to condense and express mathematical formula, one

idea in the form of a
that
it

might

s.iy

is,

"

Mass
the

multiplied by the speed, squared," which
true strength of the attack, not

results

in

however forgetting that the
quantity which on the
in

two mechanical factors are
quantity,
field
i.e.,

in this case parts of a variable

of that great
is

unknown
present

of

battle
:

ever

the

hearts

of

the

combatants *

the moral factor.

fr

*
to

^

^
the
:

^
essential

if,

According

the

Germans,

phases

of

decisive action are put
(a)

down

as three

(b)

The moral and material preparation of the breach. The assault of the breach by driving home the
attack.

(c)

The occupation
the breach.

of

and expulsion of the enemy from

To

these three

correspond the three parts into which
units,
in

modern
'J'hus,

infantry battle formations are usually divided.
in

incorporate
the

the

company

fights in

one
in

line

or

step,

battalion

two,

and the regiment

three.

The

I

St

step,

composed of the companies
ist

in

the

first

line,

corresponding to the
step,

phase.

The 2nd

consisting

of the reserve companies of

battalions, corresponding to the

2nd phase.

112

DEVELOPMENT OF
3rd step, consisting of the reserve battalions of the
regiments, support
for

The

the

first

two

hnes, and

have

their

special

mission

the

occupation

of the

breach.

Having estabhshed this relationship between the phases of battle and the formations usually adopted, it is as well to point out that another point has cropped up which that a new modifies the general mechanism of the attack principle will in future regulate the working and the duties
;

of the machine.

Thus the
itself

special

mission
the
first

of

the
in

3rd
their
it

step

reduces

to

protecting

two

advance and
also
it

establishing itself in the
itself

breach, but
or

must

merge
if

in
is

the

second

even
carry out

substitute
its

the
its
:

latter

unable by

itself to

task, or
first

has in

turn been obliged to merge

itself in

the

and so on
its

each step and

unit, large or small,

having for

first

duty

to support or take the place of that immediately preceding
it.

A
reap

moderate success, from which one may be unable to full benefit owing to the reserves having been already
is

used up,
"

indeed better than an actual
the sword

failure,

through not

having, in time, thrown the very last

Once

is

drawn," says

man into the scale. Von Scherff, " it must
merge themselves
has
things,

be plunged
their

to the hilt, or

broken

in the attempt."

The tendency
in

of the various lines to
is

immediate predecessor
rise to

a necessity which

been brought about by the new order of
even given
Action
curious a special
:

and has

in

depth
;

name action in depth. may be described as a somewhat
a line of skirmishers which in the

phenomenon
is

beginning
the

but an expedient for gaining ground with
loss, is really

minimum

an embryonic state of the

last

INFANTR V TA CTICS
into itself all the succeeding lines

i

r^

phase, and which in the end, in one way or another, absorbs

and eventually blossoms
-X-

into the full-grown attack.

*

*
the
fire

-X-

-X-

Hr

*

When
and

of the ist line

is

insufficient to prepare
in,

the breach, the

companies of the second are thrown
first.

act as troops of the

It is this

very close connection and intimate relationship
first

of the functions of the two

"steps" of the attack, which

has led to their being composed of units belonging to the

same

batallions.
"

In like manner the second " step
in strength to the
first,

must be about equal

for

it

will

frequently have to assist

or complete the latter's mission.

The

distance between the

first

and second
fire

lines varies

from 300-500 metres,
the

this distance

being arrived at through
directed at

working out the probable zone beaten by
first line,

which zone
metres

it

is

reckoned would extend 250
Theoretically,
therefore, a
lines

metres in rear
distance

of the latter.

of 300

between

the ist and 2nd

should be sufficient to place the
fire

latter

out of danger of the

directed at the former.

As

should be adopted, the

ist line

which must consist of a dense
to the formations

line of skirmishers, with at first a proportion of supporting

fractions,

which

will

however soon be absorbed

;

the

2nd

line will

be

in line of small

columns

at intervals, in

"fours"

or other
" double
eights.

"deep"
colmuns

order;
"

and the 3rd

line

should be in
file,

or " line of columns " in

fours or

The

ist line

must of course endeavour
to

to get over
fire at

the ground as quickly as possible so as to open
shorter
ranges.
etc.,

the

According
fire

circumstances, nature

of

ground,

they open
fire.

by

volleys, independent, rapid

and magazine

8

i

14

IDE VELOPMENT
the
latter

OP
line,

When

commences, the 2nd

which has

gradually closed up to the ist, hurls itself to the assault, and must resolutely cover the ground in front of the enemy's position and carry along with it the remnants of the ist or

skirmishing

line.
first

The

3rd line supports the
itself in

two and must be
if

at

once

prepared to instal

the position,

taken, or to cover

the retreat of the assaulting troops in case they are unable
to dislodge the

enemy.

The

necessity to keep

all costs,

once commenced,

up and hasten the movement at is the supreme and fundamental
tw^o

duty of every component part of the attack. The first two lines, which are entrusted with the

most arduous phases of the

attack,

must invariably be

composed of troops belonging to the same units. Just as a company cannot be divided between two separate lines, so battalions must not be divided into three.
It

would weaken them, besides increasing the

difficulties

of control.
It is sufficient that the

3rd line should consist of units

belonging to the same regiments, as it will guarantee proper cohesion, unity of effort, and proper control from front to
rear.
It
is

possible

to

condense into a few words infantry
:

action in battle by saying

the

company can only

carry out

the ist phase, the battalion the ist and 2nd, and a whole regiment is th'^refore, strictly speaking, the smallest unit

which can
battalions
strenc^th
in

fully carry

out the three phases of the attack.
constitutes

The regiment
in

therefore

three

lines

;

two

alongside
the
ist

each other,

each

having half their

or skirmishing line

and the other half

the

2nd

line,

the 3rd l^atallion

of the regiment being

in the

3rd line (see Fig. V.)

INFANTRY TACTlCS
It is a

ti^

simple commonsense formation, which has already
in various regulations.

been adopted
It

was the order of the chief phases of the attack which
it

led to the adoption of the three lines or "steps";

was

the relative importance of the special mission of each of
these lines which led (at
their being
all

events at the beginning) to
in

made about

equal

strength
first

;

it

was the close which led

relationship of the missions of the
to the battalion
it

two

lines
;

being divided between them

and

lastly,

was the

necessity

and advantage of keeping up the

impulse from the rear which led to the placing of the 3rd
battalions of regiments in rear of the other two.

The two
in the
line.

lines

composed of the most advanced troops
first

general battle formation constitute the

tactical

The

troops in the 3rd line,

nd the general

reserve,

(when

dealing with the higher units) form the second tactical line.

The 2nd

tactical

line, i.e.^

one battalion per regiment,
enabled by this

constitutes a reserve at the disposal of the brigadier.

The

officer

commanding

a regiment

is

formation to devote his whole attention to keeping up the

energy of the attack, and pay prompt
mistake which
firing line,

attention to

any

may
to

occur, to any apparent weakness in the

and

looking out for a favourable

moment

at

which

to

push home the attack.

The

battle formation in
to rear is
is

which

all

units are self-supporting

from front

nowadays
the

practically universal.

The regiment
" foundation "
units.

unit which

constitutes

it

or the

of

the

formation

adoi)ted

by the higher

" Under all circumstances," says the (German regulations, "each infantry regiment will receive definite instructions.

The

brigadier will issue orders direct to his colonels."

6

i 1

T)E VEL OP
This
is

ME NT OP
so
to

the fundamental principle which,

speak,
for the

sums up the regulations adopted by the Germans
tactical control of

masses of infantry.
to render

In action the different regiments in a brigade should not,
as a rule, get

mixed up
in

mutual support.
each regiment by
its

The
efforts,

action must be kept

up

in

own
be

and only
after the

extreme cases should support

demanded
It

of an adjacent unit.

was

campaign of 1866

that formations of the

higher units by contiguous regiments began to be employed.

In the course of that campaign the drawback of placing
a different regiment in each line of the battle formation was
clearly recognised.

In their turn, the French regulations of 1904 agree that
the

regiment

is

" par

excellence "

the

battle

unit,

as

it

possesses sufficient strength in

itself to

keep up an action

through

all its

phases and to

make

a prolonged effort.

^
its

Whilst the battalion, as a
front,

rule, fights

only straight to

the regiment or the brigade

will

usually have to

manoeuvre.

Battle Formations

in

the Attack.
to

As

the regiment
in
it

is

acknowledged
within the

be the smallest unit
phases
of

capable
attack,

itself
is

of executing

the three

the

obviously

regiment and equally

obviously in the battalion that we must study formations. As we have shown, the regiments composing the first tactical line are disposed in two " steps"; we will consider
the
the
first
first,

two leading battalions of a regiment as constituting

and the 3rd batallion

as the

second

step.

Let

us

now proceed

to

examine the formations and
in the first

methods adopted by one of the battalions
also

and
will

those of the battalion in

the second,

and

this


INFANTRY TACTICS
enable
us
to 117

get a grasp

of the general

mechanism of
consider
their

modern

infantry fighting.

To
I St.

further
:

simplify

the

case

we

will

procedure

2nd.

When under Artillery fire. When under Infantry fire.
ist

Under Artillery

Fire.

In every well organised army, notably in the German, a

tendency has arisen to diminish the length of columns

on the march, by increasing

their frontages as

much

as

possible, and to get as near as possible on the march to

the formations which must be adopted in action.

They aim
will

at formations in the

enable the various units to
possible,
a

marche cfapproche, which deploy as easily and rapidly
at

as

and consequently
narrow
front.

the abolition

of long

columns on
Anything

like

"dribbling" into the

line of battle
at the

must
zone

be carefully avoided, and troops must arrive
beaten by the enemy's
fire in

battle formation.

At about 3,500 metres from the enemy's position, that is when the enemy's artillery fire conmiences to be felt, the
battalions
in

the

first

line will

usually adopt

some such
considerable

formation as " open
intervals
in
file,

double column," with

and distance between the units, which will march This would appear to be a suitable fours or eights.
one can
easily

formation.

From
the
fire

it

change to a "chess" formation,

which saves the rear companies as much as possible from
which
is

directed at those in front, but passes over

their heads.

(Fig. X).

In

this

formation the intervals and distances need only

usually be kept at about

150 metres, so as to avoid the

"3

-^

§

3^

o

n

f

•i.

9
2


INFANTR Y TA CTICS
fire
1

19

directed against one

column taking

effect

on that next

to

it.

The
two

" chess "

formation

may

also

lead

the

enemy's

artillery into

errors of range, for seen

from a distance the

lines will present the
will

appearance of only one.

Each
and
in

column
its

move

with greater freedom through having at

disposal a double space in which to advance,
it

which
In

can avail

itself

of any natural cover.
in

its

turn, the battalion
in rear,

the second line, following
a like formation,
first

some 400-500 metres

would adopt

and go on shortening the distance from the they get nearer the enemy.

line as

The

battalions

in

the

first

line

throw out groups

of

skirmishers,

who go on

clearing

and reconnoitring the
their

ground and the enemy's position,

to the best of their ability,

and thus

facilitate the

advance of

own

troops on the

battlefield.

The zone beaten by
rapidly crossed, regulate their so
fire.

the enemy's artillery
the guns

fire

should be
able
to

that

may

not be

2nd

The Advance under Infantry

Fire.

Great care must be taken to get the various units into
position in the direct line
objectives,

of advance to their respective
well defined
all

and

to

give them

and distant points
in

to

march on, so
and avoid

as to ensure their
their overlapping

advancing on parallel
each other's

lines

and getting

way.

At

a distance of 1,200-1,500 metres

from the enemy, one

enters

the

zone of his infantry
(if

fire.

At

this

stage

the

leading battalions

they have not already done so) must

divide into the two front lines of battle.

The two

leading

companies

in their turn also get into their

proper formation,

I20

DEVELOPMENT OF
two platoons
in

i.e.,

open column of sections

in file or fours,

followed at 200-300 metres by the third platoon.

The

other

two

companies (battalions reserve) follow
in

300-500 metres behind, also
in fours,

open columns of platoons
safety adopt the

who may

for greater

"chess"

formation (by platoons).

The
in

battalions in the second line follow 300-400 metres

in rear, also in the formations just described

(Open columns
1200 metres of

"chess" formation).

On

arriving within

the enemy, the advanced platoons

squad columns," and these
metres of the position.
brisk
fire

may get into " lines of extend when they get within 1000 The scouts will usually open a
800 metres.
rank
to single
fire.

when they

get to a range of about

The advanced companies must then extend
and
;

join the fighting line, covered by the scouts'

The whole line would now open fire and the forward movement continue, by alternate companies, the advance
of one covered by the
fire

of the

next.

Casualties

are

replaced by small fractions from the supports as required.

The

reserve companies follow, gradually lessening

the
of

distance between themselves and the firing line.

One

these companies (per battalion) should gradually get

some

100 metres ahead

of the other.

At the commencement of the movement, that is, at 1,500 metres the frontage alloted to each company would be
150 metres as the attack progresses the frontage,
is,

however,

gradually reduced, so that on arriving at about 400 metres
it is

reduced

to

about 100 metres.

At

this distance the in-

tensity of the fire

must be increased, and from
to
its

this

onwards

the action

must be hastened

final

phase by the

reserve companies.

Fractions from the leading reserve
fighting line,

company

reinforce the

helping to keep up the forward impulse.

The

INFANTRY TACTICS
rushes will necessarily
followed by

i2t

become

shorter
fire.

and shorter and

more

violent bursts of

The

reinforcements thrown in by the reserve companies
line

must carry the
reserve

up

to within

200 metres of the

position,

where magazine

fire

must be opened.

Now

the other

company

closes

up

to the fighting line.

2nd line must have already got into a more compact formation, z>., "line of columns," which has substituted the old-fashioned
this stage of the attack the battalion in the

At

"

column of attack." At this critical moment of the
in

battle the Artillery should
fire

have succeeded
ing a heavy

obtaining a superiority of

over the

enemy's batteries, and must prepare the assault by concentratfire

on the point selected

for the decisive attack.

and presses forward to about 50 metres; the " charge" must be sounded, and the whole line hurl itself to the assault driven forward by the
fighting line fixes bayonets

The

impulse

imparted

by the

last

reserve
line.

company,

or

if

necessary by the battalion of the 2nd

The

latter

must

endeavour
as

to gain a footing in the breach, re-establish order
itself in

soon as possible, and place

the best position to
in a

harass the retreating

enemy by pouring
to

heavy

fire.

Once

a footing has been gained on the enemy's position,

every care must

be taken
its

prevent

the

troops

from
to

advancing beyond

rear edge,

and immediately prepare

meet a counter-stroke.

The

active pursuit will be undertaken by the troops in

reserve, if

any be available, or by any units which have been

able to preserve perfect order up to the last

moment.

Should the attack prove unsuccessful, the retirement must be covered by the battalion in the 2nd line or by any
reserve troops

who have
managed

not yet

been called upon, and

who have

still

to retain perfect order.


122

DEVELOPMENT OF

(D).

— Action

of the Various Arms, and Battle For-

mations OF THE Higher Units.

A General
" Preparatory "

Outline of Battle.
in its

Let us proceed to study Battle

two great phases

:

and

" Executive."

ist

The Preparatory
them
is

Phase.

In both cases, either when both sides are on the move,
or

when one
it is

of

already

occupying a prepared'

position,

reasonable to suppose that under normal con-

ditions a general action will be preceded by skirmishes,

by

small engagements between the Cavalry screens, by contact

of the " covering detachments," and by the engagement of
the advanced guards,

action for the information of the supreme

who must commence the preparatory commander.
Cavalry
screens,

At
to

this

stage of the proceedings the
to this

which up
the

have been covering the army, have cleared

flanks,

where they remain on the look-out

for

opportunities to once

more

join in the argument.

The
sides,

scouts and infantry patrols, pushed forward by both

ought now to get into touch and must embark upon
such as folds of the ground,

small engagements, fight determinedly, making every possible

use of natural conditions,

clumps

of trees, isolated houses, etc.
still

In rear of these, the advanced guards, who
to conceal the

endeavour

movements

of their respective

main bodies,
little

gradually go on advancing and reinforcing
these small parties, forming the
batants.
first

by

little

slender line of com-

Contact
to

is

established,

and the two

firing lines

commence

assume

definite outlines, enabling a better estimate of the
sides.

opposing

INFANTRY TACTICS
When
the scouts and the
first

123

thin Hnes

become

the target

of the enemy's stronger bodies of infantry, which usually

happens as soon as they have forced the last advanced covering parties, which would usually be occupying some
hedgerow, line of
etc.,

trees, the

edges of thickets, or crest

line,

the advanced guard must not at once expose other
fire.

troops to the enemy's view or

This
the
total
fire

initial

stage of the struggle will only be kept

up by

of the scouts and small advanced patrols.

The
of

deployment of each company should be retarded as
as possible
If

much

on account of the increased

difficulties

control.

the

enemy

offers really strong opposition at

any particular point, then the true preparatory action will commence at that point. If on the other hand, he is easily
driven back, and
if

a

superiority of
line,

fire

can be quickly
its

obtained, the advanced

notwithstanding

slenderness,

must go on gaining ground, judiciously making use of every obstacle and cover in its advance. The advanced guard will follow suit, adapting itself as much as possible to the ground, for modern explosives no
longer

hide

smoke which were sufficient to They must by oblique or zig-zag advances conceal their movements, and some units, owing to the necessity for not encroaching upon

make those clouds

of

the

combatants from each other.

the ground of their next door neighbours, will find themselves obliged
to

cross

open

ground, which

they

must

accomplish

in

small bodies at the double.

The

necessity

for these rushes will

During the course of

become more and more frequent. this intermittent movement and of
little

the halts of longer or shorter duration, various

assaults

may become
These

neces.sary against a house, a thicket,

hedge-

row, or other perhaps

more important

point.
for they

partial attacks are far

from easy,

must be

124

DEVELOPMENT OF

carried out without having to concentrate into too great a

mass the small groups scattered around the objectives of
these miniature assaults.
these groups
target
lies in

The

real art in the

conduct of

never offering more than a very limited

to the enemy's artillery, and when strong action becomes imperative one must endeavour to escape the opposing batteries, vigilance by rapidly bringing together a

few of the nearest groups,
as their object
is

who must

again scatter as soon

attained.

The main body
advanced
It will
line,

of the advanced guard must endeavour

likewise to conceal itself as

much

as possible in rear of the

and keep out of the enemy's artillery fire. reinforce the advanced line at those points where and
in

the enemy's resistance causes real preparatory engagements
to occur,

which the advanced guard's

artillery

would

come
of the

into action.
all this

During

time the troops making up the main body^
their concentration

army complete

on the

battlefield.

The

artillery is

massed, and should be ready to

come

into

action.

To complete
home
the

his

reconnaissance of the enemy's forces
to select

and dispositions and
attack,

the point at which to push

the

commander

now

proceeds

to

gradually extend along the whole front the troops entrusted

with the general preparatory action.

tain

Employing the minimum number, he must oppose, conand threaten the enemy at every point where he

appears, and keep him everywhere uncertain as to where

he has to expect a serious onslaught.

The advanced guard must endeavour
positions from which to cover the

to seize suitable

deployment of the main

body;

it

must

establish itself in

and

prepare them

for

defence, so as to be able to beat off an attack,

and thus

Infantry tactics
give the
all

125

marshal

supreme commander the time and space the means at his disposal into proper order.
cleared

to

The

points

up by the advanced guard may

perhaps supplement previous information.
troops of the main

Some

of the

body get on to the line indicated by the points d'appui seized by the advanced guard, and prolong it if possible, and endeavour to gain possession of other
supporting
limits
till
;

points

beyond the advanced guards'
checks their further progress.

lateral

they continue their advance, from point to point,
fire

the enemy's

They must then

enter upon a prolonged engagement
fire,

and

keep up a well directed

usually in " rafales " or bursts,

which are calculated

to little

by

little

go on demoralising the

enemy and prepare the way The artillery comes into
the enemy.

for the decisive attack.

action to assist the infantry's

advance, to support their local attacks and frustrate those of

The extreme range
effective
is

at

which modern
;

artillery

fire

is

reckoned as 4,000 metres this ought therefore to be the extreme distance separating opposing batteries.
In several of the
late wars,

however, this distance has been

exceeded.

The minimum
This was arrived

at

distance has been fixed at 1,800 metres. on the principle that at 1,200 metres,
artillery,

and under, the position of
critical

can be rendered very

by infantry
is

fire.

This

escorting
is

also why infantry, entrusted with the duty of and protecting artillery from hostile infantry fire,

usually
;

posted about

600 metres

in

advance of the

batteries

and

as

the

infantry lines

must be 600 metres

from each other, (that being their decisive range) it follows that the distance between opposing batteries must be at
least 1,800 metres.

1^6

.

DEVELOPMENT OF
the latter will at once
It

Therefore as soon as a suitable position has been chosen
for the artillery,

commence
but
use

a series
to

of duels with the opposing batteries.
silence

must endeavour
only

them

as

quickly

as

possible,

the

absolutely indispensoble means of doing so.
success, there should be

In case of
taking
it

no undue haste
they

in

for

granted that the
action.

enemy's batteries are definitely out of
contrary,

On

the

must

continue

to

be

very closely watched.
Artillery's obligation

to

renew

their

action even under

unequal conditions
the infantry.

is

absolute,

when

it is

necessary to assist

Therefore

the side

(artillery)
fire

which

first

succeeds

in

obtaining a superiority of
batteries,

must not allow the opposing
necessary

although apparently subdued, to get out of their

clutches,

but
fire

should

even

if

continue

a

desuoltry
all

upon them, with

a certain

number

of guns at
to

events,

to

oblige their remaining

personnel

keep
their

under cover, whilst the remainder of the guns turn
attention to helping on the infantry.

In most cases the preparatory action
necessitate hard fighting
;

will

be lengthy and

it

may

last

many

hours, even days

the action being even

and pass through various offensive and defensive phases, fed by the advent of fresh troops,
the

although

general

reserves
in

as

well

as

the

forces

destined to

be thrown

when

the

moment

arrives for the

decisive attack will be kept back.

As soon

as the attacking artillery has succeeded in estabfire,

lishing a superiority of

the infantry must at once
in

com-

mence an energetic and resolute advance
manner,
z".r.,

the recognised

dense

lines of skirmishers

supported by their
lulls

own

supports and reserves,

who

take advantage of the

forced upon the enemy's artillery to steadily gain ground.


INFANTRY TACTICS
There
is

127

always a period of either long or short duration,
artillery

during which the

which manages to get the upper
battlefield,

hand
must

will

be absolute mistress of the

and which

radically affect the situation.

to have by this good grasp of the situation from the general development of the action, from the

The supreme commander, who ought

stage succeeded in getting a

various

episodes

of

the

artillery

duels,

and
in

from

his

adversary's attitude, must
his

now be prompt

making up

mind and

issuing his
is,

detailed orders for the playing
striking the decisive blow.
will

of his trump card, that

As the preparatory action
able time,
at
it

usually take a considerto concentrate

will

give the

commander time
to

the right point the

troops destined

carry out

the

decisive attack.

This final act must be carried out without delay the blow must be struck before the enemy has had time to
;

re-establish order, or his re-organised batteries

had time

to

come once more
2nd

into action.

The Executive Phase or

Decisive Attack.

or

As soon as the defenders' artillery has been absolutely, anyway partially silenced, the bulk of the fire must be

directed on the point selected by the
decisive attack.
It
is

commander

for the

at

this

point

that

the

enemy's formation
definite

must
in
fine

be
the

broken through,
the
great

by

the

establishment

breach of the assaulting troops.
in

These three
usually

scenes

drama-battle

are

of

short

and must succeed each other rapidly. The infantry in the advanced line must co-operate with the artillery in concentrating their fire on the same point. Any heavy artillery a\ailal)]c would now also lend its
duration,

1

28

DEVELOPMENT OF
Its

valuable assistance.

moral

effect

is

very great.

Its chief

object would be to endeavour to blind the

enemy

with the

dense smoke caused by

its

projectiles, which,

by temporarily

enveloping them, would

facilitate

the sudden onslaught of

the assaulting troops, and also perhaps the approach of the
cavalry,

accompanied

if

possible

by horse

artillery,

and

thus help to overcome the enemy's final

efforts.

The

troops which carry out the decisive attack must be

sufficiently

numerous

to

ensure a superiority in numbers

over the enemy at the selected point, so as to there
that great

make

and concentrated
in

effort

which must crush the
absolutely

adversary's defence.

Formation

depth of the assaulting troops

is

necessary, so as to insure an incessant forward impulse.

"At

the

end of a hard-fought, long and sanguinary
Widdern, " the forward movement of the

struggle," says

troops destined to drive
action, a factor

home

the decisive attack

is

a moral
rules,

which cannot be governed by fixed

be they what they may."

The

dispositions for attack

must conform
it

as

much

as

possible to the ground over which

takes place, and

necessary, one must not hesitate to sacrifice
rigid

when symmetry or

forms to the exigencies of the terrain. " Thus," says Le vegleinent de r infanterie francais^
the skirmishing line

" after

and
or

its

rapid

fire,

after

the

supports
thin
lines

and

reserves

in

successive

(lines

of

section

and comparatively company columns with
fix

intervals),

come

the real assaulting columns, which drive

the whole machine forward;

the whole must

bayonets

and charge
It is

the enemy's position."

therefore a formation of

columns
reversion

in

depth which

we

find
in

favoured
reality

nowadays
constitutes

in

the decisive attack, and
to

which

a

Napoleonic

INFANTRY TACTICS
methods, and which
in

129

spite of the adverse criticisms

of

" the advocates of the
still

New

Tactics"

(chiefly British),

who

maintain that they see in these methods only a sacrifice with complete of human lives, but which was crowned
success at Plevna, and also in the late titanic struggle in push the Far East, where the Japanese did not hesitate to

forward in masses upon masses to wrest from the valiant and stubborn Slav, hard-earned but complete victory.

So long
entail

as

there are wars, so long will there be the
if

necessity for acts of brutal force, so to speak, even

they

heavy

sacrifices

which

in

most

cases,

it

will

be found,

do not exceed the useless losses suffered by the defence. The decision and rapidity with which the blows are
struck
will,

however,

probably

reduce the

loss

of

life

necessitated in a decisive attack.

Luzeux, " time

and solemn moment," says General is blood, and success depends above all on the commander's resolution, on the courage of the troops, and the energy with which the whole affair is pushed To-day, more than ever, does the secret of forward. victory lie in the hearts and spirit of the combatants." a wellJust as in olden times, or even more so, says

"At

this

critical

known French
failure,

writer

:

" a

Behind the

first

assault, in case of

must

follow

second or

third,

until

the

point

attacked be absolutely

overwhelmed by these successive
this

human waves." The Epilogue

to

sanguinary

drama

battle

is

performed by the cavalry appearing once more on the scene to reap the fruits of victory, or to sacrifice themselves in case of failure

by covering the retirement of the

attacking columns.

LIST OF FOREIGN AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO
Ardant du
Boeck.
Picq.
'Etudes sur
:

le

combat.

1903.

Deutschland

das Heer (In Heere und Flotten der

Gegenwart).

1903.

Bonnal, Gen.

L'art

nouveau en
899.

tactique.
1

1904.

L'Esprit de la guerre moderne.
Froeschwiller.
1

903-1905

Sadovva.

1901.
d' actualite.

Questions militaires

1906- 1909.

Bugeaud.
Folard.

Apercus sur quelque

details

de

la guerre.

1831.

Clausewitz, Carl von.
miiitaire par

Military works.
.

1858-1889.

Histoire de Polybe

.

.

avec un corps de science

M. de

F.

1727-1730.

Frederick Charles, Prince.
schrift.

Eine militarische Denk(Ueber die Kampfweise der Franzosen). i860.
1872.
1901.

The

Military Memorial.

Goltz, Gen. Col mar.

Kriegfiibrang.
1899.

k

The conduct of war. The nation in arms.

1887.

Guibert, Jacques Antoine Hippolyte de.
militaires.

CEuvres

1803.
L'artillerie

Langlois, Gen.
les autres

de campagne en liaison avec

armes.

1900.

Enseignements de deux guerres recentes. 1903. L'Armee anglaise dans un conflit European. 1910.

Lebrun, Gen.

D.

Louis Joseph.

Guerre de 1870.
1895.

1884.

Souvenir miiitaire, 1866- 1890.

LIST OF FOREIGN A UTHORITIES REFERRED TO
IVIesnil-Durand.
1755.
Projet d'lin ordre frangais en tactique.

Negrier, Gen.
Neil,

Lessons of the Russo-Japanese war.
Siege de Sebastopol.
1858.
1883.

1906.

Marshal.
tions

Journal des opera-

du genie.

Sherff, von. \'on der Kriegfobrung. Der SchlachtenangrifF. 1898.

Schlichting, von.
der gegenwart.

Taktische und strategische grundsatge
1897-1899.
,

2.
^

'

Steinmetz, Marshal von.
under Steinmetz,
1

Operations
1873.

of

the

army

870-1 871.

Stoffel,

Baron Celeste.
les

Rapports

militaires,

1866-70.

1871.

Rapports sur
1870.

forces militaires de la Prusse,

1868-

1871.

Suvaroff, Field-Marshal.
des Zweiten armee.

Military works,

c.

1779.

Verdy du Vernois, Julius von,
1866, 1890.
1

Im Haupf
'

quartier

c

/

Studien iiber den Krieg.

870-1 871.

1900.

/

W. JOLLY

&

SONS, PRINTHRS, AliERDEKN

A SELECTION OF STANDARD
SERIES

AND PUBLICATIONS

BY MESSRS. GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN, LTD., RUSKIN HOUSE,
40

MUSEUM

ST.,

LONDON

W.C.

The

Pocket Edition of

Ruskin
This Edition contains the Author's
Indices.
latest

Additions, Notes and

Fcap.Svo, Cloth Limp, Leather Limp,

is.

2s,

6d. net per 6d. net per

Volume | Gilt Tops, Gilt Back, Volume Autograph on Side.
j

Cloth Boxes to hold Six Volumes,

is.

each.
14 Illustrations.

THE SEVEN LAMPS OF ARCHITECTURE.

With

MODERN

PAINTERS.

Vols.

I., II.,

III., IV., V.,

[70^/1 Thousand and VI. (Index). With

315 Illustrations.

THE STONES OF VENICE,
trations.

Vols.

I., II.,

and

III.

With 173

Illustrations.
Illus-

lS2nd Thousand

LECTURES ON ARCHITECTURE AND PAINTING.

With 23
[ 1 2th

Thousand Thousand

THE HARBOURS OF ENGLAND.
SESAME AND
LILIES.

14 Illustrations. llith Three Lectures and Long Preface.

With

Ii2gth Thousand

THE CROWN OF WILD OLIVE.
the Future of England.

Essays on Work,

Traffic,

War,

an'd

[loSth Thousand

THE TWO PATHS. On Decoration and Manufacture. [23rd Thousand [60th Thousand TIME AND TIDE. On Laws of Work. A JOY FOR EVER. On the Political Economy of Art. [62nd Thousand THE OUEEN OF THE AIR. A Study of Greek Myths.
[^Sth Thousand

THE ETHICS OF THE DUST. On THE ELEMENTS OF DRAWING.

the Elements of Crystallisation. [sgth Thousand With 50 Woodcuts.
[2'jth

Thousand

THE EAGLE'S

NEST.

On

MUNERA PULVERIS. On
UNTO THIS
LAST.

the Relation of Natural Science to Art. l20th Thousand the Elements of Political Economy. [20th Thousand

On

the First Principles of Political

Economy.
lio6th Thousand
[24^^ Thousand

LECTURES ON ART. Delivered at Oxford in 1870. SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS OF RUSKIN.
With
Portraits.

Vols.

I.

&

II.

THE STONES OF VENICE.
MORNINGS
ST.

Selections for Travellers.

2 Vols. [2Sth Thousand

IN FLORENCE.

Studies of Christian Art.

MARK'S REST. History of Venice. FRONDES AGRESTES. Readings in " Modern

[27^^ Thousand [itth Thousand
Painters."
[6o//f

THE RUSKIN READER.

[9^^

Thousand Thousand

The Pocket

Edition of Ruskiii (continued)
IN

THE BIBLE REFERENCES

THE WORKS OF RUSKIN.
[ith Thousand [loth Edition

ELEMENTS OF PERSPECTIVE. THE POETRY OF ARCHITECTURE. GIOTTO AND HIS WORKS IN PADUA.
ARATRA PENTELICI. On
page
Illustrations.

With 29 Illustrations. With 56 Illustrations.
[7th Thousand

the Elements of Sculpture.

With 22
[9^/1

Full-

Thousand

ARIADNE FLORENTINA. On Wood
Full-page Illustrations.

and Metal Engraving.

With 16 [loth Thousand

VAL D'ARNO. On
Literature, etc.

Art of 13th Century in Pisa and Florence. With 13 Full-page Illustrations. [nth Thousand
Miscellaneous Articles and Essays on Art and In three vols.
the Illustrations.
Letters
I.

ON THE OLD ROAD.
four vols.

FORS CLAVIGERA. With
PRiETERITA.
graphy.

to

XCVI.

In

Scenes and Thoughts
Illustrations.

in

my

Past Life.
of

With the

In three vols.

An Autobio[i6th Thousand
With 5 [nth Thousand
[14th Thousand

OUR FATHERS HAVE TOLD
Illustrations.

US.

The Bible

Amiens.

THE ART AND PLEASURES OF ENGLAND.
of 1883

The Oxford Lectures
[gth
is.

and

1884.

LOVE'S MEINIE.

On Greek and

English Birds.

Thousand

Cloth Boxes to hold Six Volumes,

each.

Ruskin Treasuries
A
Series of Little

Books on

LIFE, ART,
Demy

LITERATURE, ECONOMY,
etc.,

etc.
t-,
1
• •

32mo, cloth, 6d. net each) n* li Leather gilt, 15. net eachP"^^^" ^ ^^^^^^ °" C^^^"^' Calf gilt, cover design, yapp edge, is. 6d. net.
«-.

Cloth Boxes to hold the Set, 8^. each.

WEALTH. ECONOMY. WOMEN AND DRESS. GIRLHOOD. LIBERTY AND GOVERNMENT, OF VULGARITY.

EDUCATION AND YOUTH. THE DIGNITY OF MAN.
ART.

ARCHITECTURE.
RELIGION. MAXIMS.

The
Cloth,
IS.

Popular Ruskin
Pott 8vo,
is.

COPYRIGHT EDITION.
net
;

gilt top,
6rf.

Monogram on
volume.

sid«.

Leather,

net per

Complete with the

Illustrations

and the Author's latest Revisions Additions.

and

LECTURES ON ART, THE QUEEN OF THE AIR. A Study of THE ETHICS OF THE DUST. On the

[S^st Thousand Greek Myths, [^'jth Thousand Elements of Crystallisation. 164th Thousand

MUNERA PULVERIS. On
UNTO THIS
LAST,

the Elements of Political
of

Economy.
[igfA Thousand [sSth Thousand

TIME AND TIDE. On Laws
On

Work.

the First Principles of Political

Economy.
[ii6^/j

Thousand
Thousand

FRONDES AGRESTES.
Two
Vols,

Readings

in "

Modern

Painters."

With Preface.
[65fft

THE STONES OF VENICE.
SELECTIONS.

Vol. I. [35^^ Thousand 1862 Edition, and Portrait. SELECTIONS, Vol, II. i860 to 1888, Art, Education, Ethics, Economy, (Consisting almost entirely of copyright Religion. With Portrait.

Selected Descriptive Chapters for Travellers [30th Thousand 1843 to i860, Reprint with Additions of the

THE RUSKIN READER.

{22nd Thousand Passages from "Modern Painters," "The Stones of Venice," and " The Seven Lamps of Architecture." [14/ A Thousand HORTUS INCLUSUS. Messages from the Wood to the Garden. (Ruskin's Letters to the Misses Beever of the Thwaite, Coniston.) With Preface by RusKiN and Facsimile of his Last Letter.

matter

)

[^iith

Thousand

THE ELEMENTS OF PERSPECTIVE AND THE CONVERGENCE Thousand

MODERN

PAINTERS. Vols. I., II., III., IV., V., and Index Vol, With copyright matter (over 21,000 words) including Introduction, Preface, 219 Notes, and Epilogues to Vols. II. and V. With the 315 Illustrations (three being copyright). THE STONES OF VENICE. Vols. I., II., and III. With copyright matter (over 9,000 words) including Chapter added in 1886, and the
.

OF PERPENDICULARS.

[lo^^t

THE SEVEN LAMPS OF ARCHITECTURE.

173 Illustrations.

With

14

Illustrations,

and copyright matter including new Preface, 55 new Notes, and 33 [65'^ Thousand Aphorisms. LECTURES ON ARCHITECTURE AND PAINTING. With the 23 [20^/1 Thousand Illustrations. THE ELEMENTS OF DRAWING. With the 50 Illustrations. [26^/1 Thousand THE HARBOURS OF ENGLAND. With the 14 Illustrations. Thousand [i8^/t SESAME AND LILIES. Two Lectures. With Preface. l2iith Thousand and the THE CROWN OF WILD OLIVE. On Work, Traffic, War, Thousand [i2Sih Future of England, With additional matter. all the THE TWO PATHS. On Decoration and Manufacture. WithThousand [64^/1 Illustrations. FOR EVER. On the Political Economy of Art. [65f/t Thousand A

JOY

Works by
Maurice Maeterlinck
Translated by
A.

ALFRED SUTRO

and

TEIXEIRA DE MATTOS
[59M Thousand
{^lyd Thousand {^zndThousand [\^th Thousand [\::,th Thousana [i\th Thousand
neteach.

ESSAYS THE BEE THE THE TREASURE OF THE HUMBLE WISDOM AND DESTINY THE BURIED TEMPLE THE DOUBLE GARDEN LIFE AND FLOWERS
LIFE OF
Crown
SvOj 5/. net each.
:

Leather

3/. 6d. net each,

Pocket Edition Cloth is. 6d. Tapp 5/. net each.

PLAYS

MONNA VANNA

[6/i Thousand

AGLAVAINE AND SELYSETTE JOYZELLE SISTER BEATRICE, AND ARDIANE AND BARBE BLEUE
Translated by Bernard Miall Translated by Laurence

[7M Thousand [5M Thousand
{^th Thousand

PELLEAS AND MELISANDA, AND THE SIGHTLESS
Alma Tadema
:

Pocket Edition Cloth is. 6d. Glohe %vo, y. 6d. net each. net each. Leather 3/. 6^. net each, Tapp 5/. net each.

OLD-FASHIONED FLOWERS.
G. S. Elgood. Crown %vo. is.
Pott \to.
6d. net,
3/,

Illustrated in
6d.
net.

Colour by
Edition,

New

MY DOG.
Pott ^to.

Illustrated in
3/. 6d. net.

Colour by Cecil Aldin.
Translated

THE MASSACRE OF THE INNOCENTS.
by A. R. Allinson.
gravure of Maeterlinck,

Crown
is.

%z>o.
;

Cloth.

With Photonet.

net

Paper 6d.

THE LIFE OF THE BEE) HOURS OF GLADNESS
Illustrated in

Editions de Luxe.

j

Demy
J.

\to.

Colour by E. *

us. net Detmold.

each.

Edward
4/. 6d,
7iet.

Carpenter's
Pocket Edition,
3/. dd. net,

Works
is. Gd.

TOWARDS DEMOCRACY.
ENGLAND'S IDEAL.
and
IS. net.

Library Edition.

Fourth Edition,

CIVILIZATION
Essays on

:

ITS

CAUSE AND CURE.
Twelfth Edition.
2/.

Modern

Science.

6d.

and

IS. net,

LOVE'S

COMING OF AGE
Fourth Edition.
:

:

on the Relations

of the Sexes.

31. 6a. net.

ANGELS' WINGS
Illustrated.

Essays on Art and Life.
Sketches

4/. 6d. net.

ADAM'S PEAK TO ELEPHANTA
in

:

Ceylon and India.
:

New

Edition.

4/. 6d.

lOLAUS
net.

an Anthology of Friendship.
a

2s. 6d.

CHANTS OF LABOUR
Self

:

Songbook

for the
i s.

People, with frontispiece and cover by

Walter Crane,

THE ART OF CREATION
and
its

:

Essays on the

Powers.

3;.

6d. net.

DAYS WITH

WALT WHITMAN,
SEX:
and

y.

6d. net,

THE INTERMEDIATE
some Transitional Types of
net.

Men

a Study of Women. 3/. 6d.

THE DRAMA OF LOVE AND DEATH
a Study of

:

Human

Evolution and Transfiguration.

5/. net.

INTERMEDIATE TYPES AMONG PRIMITIVE FOLK
:

a

Study in Social Evolution,

^s. 6a. net.

THE

SIMPLIFICATION OF LIFE.

2^. net.

Social Science Series
Cloth, 2s. 6d.

Double Volumes

31.

6 J.
Ij.

••
•2.

Also in Limp Cloth Paper Covers

is. net,

CIVILISATION: ITS CAUSE

AND CURE.

EDWARD Carpbntbr.
Dr. Schafflb.

•3.
4.

QUINTESSENCE OF SOCIALISM.

D. G. Ritchie, M.A. (Oxon.). New Edition, with two additional Essays on Human Evolution. *5. RELIGION OF SOCIALISM. E. Belfort Bax. E. Belfort Bax. 6L ETHICS OF SOCIALISM.
7.
8.

DARWINISM AND POLITICS.

THE DRINK QUESTION. PROMOTION OF GENERAL HAPPINESS.
ENGLAND'S IDEAL, &c. SOCIALISM IN ENGLAND.
Out ofprint, Out ofprint.

Dr.

Kate Mitchell.
M. Macmillan.

Prof.

*9.

Edward Carpenter.
Sidney Webb, LL.B.

10.

11. 12.

*13.
14.

15.
16.

THE STORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. E. Belfort Bax. THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH. Laurence Gronlund. ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES. Bernard Bosanqukt, M.A. (Oxon.). CHARITY ORGANISATION.
C. S. Loch, Secretary to Charity Organisation Society.

17.
18.

THOREAU'S ANTI-SLAVERY AND REFORM PAPERS.
SELF-HELP A HUNDRED YEARS AGO.
INCREMENT.
Edited by H. S. Salt. G. J. Holyoake.

19. 20. Out of print. 21. THE UNEARNED

W. H. Dawson.

22, 23.

Out ofprint.

•24.

•*2o.
26.
27.

•28.

Emilk de Laveleye. Dean Stubbs. THE LAND AND THE LABOURERS. Paul Lafargue. THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY. W. Douglas Morrison. CRIME AND ITS CAUSES. PRINCIPLES OF STATE INTERFERENCE. D. G. Ritchif^ M.ALUXURY.
Out of print.

29, 30. 31.

ORIGIN OF PROPERTY IN LAND.
Prof.

Fustel de Coulanges.

Edited, with an Introductory Chapter on the English Manor, by

W.

J.

Ashley, M.A.

32.

Out of print.

33. 34.
35.

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT.
Out of print.

Beatrice Potter.
J.

MODERN HUMANISTS.
OUTLOOKS FROM THE NEW STANDPOINT.
DISTRIBUTING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES.
Dr. LuiGi Pizzamiglio.

**36.
37.
38.

E.

M. Rorrrtson. Belfort Bax.
J.

Edited by F.

Snell.

Out of print.

39.

THE LONDON PROGRAMME. THE STUDENT'S MARX.
Out ofprint.

Sidney Webb, LL.B.

40.

Out of print. 42. Out of print.

•43.
44.

Edward Aveling,

D.Sc.

SOCIAL SCIENCE SERIES— {Continued)
45.

POVERTY

:

ITS GENESIS

AND EXODUS.

J.

G. GODAED.

46, 47.

Out ofprint.
;
;

48

49.

50.

51.
62.

53.

•54.
**55.

BRITAIN. Arnold White Montague Crackanthorpe, Q.C; W. A. M'Arthur, M.P. W. H. WiLKINS, &c. ILLEGITIMACY AND THE INFLUENCE OF SEASONS ON Albert Leffingwell, M.D. CONDUCT. COMMERCIAL CRISES OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. H. M. Hyndman. THE STATE AND PENSIONS IN OLD AGE. and Arthur Acland, M.P. J. A. Spender John M. Robertson. THE FALLACY OF SAVING. Anon. THE IRISH PEASANT. THE EFFECTS OF MACHINERY ON WAGES.

THE DESTITUTE ALIEN IN GREAT

Prof. J. S.

Nicholson, D.Sc.

Anon. THE SOCIAL HORIZON. Frederick Engels. 56. SOCIALISM, UTOPIAN AND SCIENTIFIC. A. R. Wallace. 57. LAND NATIONALISATION. Rev. W. Blissard. 58. THE ETHIC OF USURY AND INTEREST. Adele Crepaz. •59. THE EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN. John M. Robertson. 60*. THE EIGHT HOURS' QUESTION. George R. Wilson, M.B. 61*. DRUNKENNESS. Ramsden Balmforth. 62. THE NEW REFORMATION. T. E. Kebbel. * 63. THE AGRICULTURAL LABOURER.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68*.

ENGLAND'S FOREIGN TRADE IN XIXTH CENTURY.

Out of print.

A. L. Bowley.
Dr. SCHAFFLE.

THEORY AND POLICY OF LABOUR PROTECTION.
HISTORY OF ROCHDALE PIONEERS. RIGHTS OF WOMEN. DWELLINGS OF THE PEOPLE.
BRITISH FREEWOMEN.
G.

69.

J. Holyoake. M. Ostragorski. Locke Worthington.

70-75. Out of print.
76.

C»M. Stopes.

77,78. Out of print.
79.
80.

THREE MONTHS

IN

A WORKSHOP.
P.

Gohre, with

Preface by Prof. Ely.

81.
82.

83.
84.

DARWINISM AND RACE PROGRESS. LOCAL TAXATION AND FINANCE. PERILS TO BRITISH TRADE. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT.
J. J.

Prof. J. B.

Haycraft.

G. H. Blunden. E. Burgis.

Rousseau.

85.

86.

LABOUR UPON THE LAND. MORAL PATHOLOGY. PARASITISM, ORGANIC AND

^.. \ v tt t aEdited by H. J. Tozer. Edited by J. A. Hobson, M.A. Arthur E. Giles, M.D., B.Sc.

SOCIAL.

*87.

ALLOTMENTS AND SMALL HOLDINGS.

Massart and Vanderveldb* J. L. Green.

SOCIAL SCIENCE SERIES— {Continued)
•88.
89.

90.
91.

02.

93.
94.

95.
96.

L. L. Pricb. ITS RELATIONS TO PRICES. F. A. Mackenzib. SOBER BY ACT OF PARLIAMENT. F. W. Galton. WORKERS ON THEIR INDUSTRIES. Karl Marx. REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION. K. Rodbertus. OVER-PRODUCTION AND CRISES. S. J. Chapman. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND STATE AID. VILLAGE COMMUNITIES IN INDIA. B. H. Baden- Powell, M.A., CLE. S. J. Chapma.n. ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADE.

MONEY AND

Out of print.

97. 98.

COKMERCLAL FEDERATION & COLONIAL TRADE POLICY.
J.

99.

100.
101. 102. 103.

SELECTIONS FROM FOURIER. PUBLIC-HOUSE REFORM. THE VILLAGE PROBLEM.

C.

Davidson, M.A., Phil.D. GiDB and J. Franklin.
A. N. Gumming. G. F. Millin.
L. H. Berens.

TOWARD THE
Out of print.

LIGHT.
A. V.

CHRISTIAN SOCIALISM IN ENGLAND.

Woodworth.

104.
105.

THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CORN LAWS.
Prof. J. S.

Nicholson, M.A.

Out of print.

•106.

RATES AND TAXES AS AFFECTING AGRICULTURE.
Prof. J. S.

Nicholson, M.A.

107.
108.

A PRACTICAL PROGRAMME FOR WORKING MEN.
Chas. Cestre, JOHN THELWALL. RENT, WAGES AND PROFITS IN AGRICULTURE.
Prof. J. S.

Anon.
Litt.D.

•109.
110.
111.

Nicholson.

ECONOMIC PREJUDICES.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS.

Yves Guyot. Achtlle Loria.

•112.

WHO PAYS? THE REAL

INCIDENCE OF TAXATION. Robert Henry.
38. 6d.

DOUBLE VOLUMES,
1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.
7.

8.

Lloyd Jones. LIFE OF ROBERT OWEN. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY a Second Part Dr. A. Schaffls. of '* The Quintessence of Socialism." CONDITION OF THE WORKING CLASS IN ENGLAND IN 1844. Frederick Eng.sls. Yvks Guyot. THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ECONOMY. SOCIAL PEACE. G. von Schultze-Gaevernitz. W. D. P. Bliss. A HANDBOOK OF SOCIALISM. SOCIALISM ITS GROWTH AND OUTCOME. W. Morris and E. B. Bax. A. Loria. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY.
: ;

Library of Philosophy
General Editor: Professor J. H.

MUIRHEAD,
Two
Vols.

LL.D.
21s. net.

ANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY. By

G. F. STOUT.
F. H.

APPEARANCE AND REALITY. By
ATTENTION. By
Prof.

BRADLEY.

12s. net.

W.

B.

PiLLSBURY.
Prof. G. ViLLA.

los. 6d. net.

CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY. By
HISTORY OF .(ESTHETIC, By
Dr. B.

los. 6d. net.

Bosanquet.
Prof. E. Albee.

ios. 6d. net.

HISTORY OF ENGLISH UTILITARIANISM. By
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. By
Vol.
I.

ios. 6d. net.

Dr.

J.

E.

Erdmaxn.
15s
15s.

Ancient and Medieval.

Third Edition.

Vol. II.

Vol. III.

Modern. Fifth Edition. Since Hegel. Third Edition.
Patristic.

12s.

HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY: Ancient and
M.A.

By

G.

S.

Brett,

IOS. 6d. net.

MATTER AND MEMORY. By Henri
and W.
S.

Bergson.

Translated by N. M.

Paul

Palmer.
D. G. Ritchie.
Dr.
J.

ios. 6d. net.

NATURAL RIGHTS. By Prof.

ios. 6d. net.

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY. By
RATIONAL THEOLOGY SINCE KANT. By

Bonar.

ios. 6d.

net

Prof. O.

Pfleiderer.

ios. 6rf.

net

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND.
J.

By G. W.

F.

Hegel.

Translated by
21s. net.

B. Baillie.

Two Vols.
OR,

THOUGHT AND THINGS;
Vol.
I.

GENETIC LOGIC.

By

Prof.

M. Baldwin.
)

VoL II. VoL III.

Functional Logic. Experimental Logic. Real Logic (I., Genetic Epistemology).
Bergson.

V
J

ios.6d.net fer vol.

TIME AND FREE WILL. By Henri

Translated by F. L. Pogson.
IOS. 6d. net.

VALUATION: THE THEORY OF VALUE.

By
LIFE.

Prof.

W.

M.

Urban.

IOS, 6d. net.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE RELIGIOUS
THE GREAT PROBLEMS.
Prof. R. C.

By

G. M. Stratton.
IOS. 6d. net..

By

Prof.

Bernardino Varisco.

Translated by
ios.

Lodge.

6d. net.

KNOW

THYSELF. By Prof. Guglielmo Salvadori.

BERNARDINO VaRISCO.

Translated

by

Dr.

ios. 6d. net^

The Schopenhauer
Crown
1.

Series
2s.

8vo, Cloth.
-^^

6d. each.

2.

THE WISDOM OF LIFE. COUNSELS AND MAXIMS.
RELIGION, A

By A.
Schopenhauer.

3. 4.
5.

6.

DIALOGUE, Etc. THE ART OF LITERATURE. T Bailey^ STUDIES IN PESSIMISM. Saunders. J OUTLINES OF A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.
(

By H. LoTZE.

7.

THE PROBLEM OF REALITY. By

Edited by F. C. Conybeare. E. Belfort Bax.

[Out of print.
8.

9.

10.

FIRST STEPS IN PHILOSOPHY. By W. M. Salter. RELIGION. By S. de Molinari. [Out of print. THE SEXES COMPARED. By E. von Hartmann.
Translated by A. Venner.

11.

THE ART OF CONTROVERSY,
By
A. Schopenhauer.
A.

Etc.^
Translated by T. Bailey

12.

ON HUMAN NATURE.
By
Schopenhauer.

Saunders.

Ethical

Library
By W.
cloth.

Edited by J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Birmingham.

AN ETHICAL SUNDAY SCHOOL.
Crown Svo, doth. CIVILIZATION OF CHRISTENDOM, By Dr. B. Bosanquet. Crown Svo,

L.

Sheldon.
35.

AND OTHER STUDIES.
4s.

6d.
3s,

DARWIN AND THE
Baldwin.

HUMANITIES.
By
Prof.

By
J.

Prof.
S.

Crown

J.

Mark
45.

Svo, cloth.

LECTURES ON HUMANISM.
Crown Crown
Crown
Svo, cloth.

Mackenzie.
(,ci.

PRACTICAL ETHICS.
Svo, cloth.

By

Prof. H.

Sidgwick.
45. 6rf.

SHORT STUDIES
Svo, cloth.

IN

CHARACTER.

By

Dr.

S.

Bryant.
4s.

6d.

SOCIAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES. By Sir Leslie Stephen. Two Vols. Crown Svo, cloth. 9s. STUDIES IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ETHICS. By Prof.
D. G. Ritchie.

Crown

Svo, cloth.

4s.

THE TEACHING OF MORALITY.
Crown
Svo, cloth.

6d.
35.

By

Dr.

S.

Bryant.

THE WILL TO DOUBT.
Crown
Svo, cloth.

By

A. H. Lloyd.
4s.

6d.

The
A
Series of

Athenian Drama
for English Readers

Verse Translations of the Greek Dramatic Poets, with Commentaries and Explanatory Notes.
illustrated

Each Volume

from Antique Sculpture and Vase-painting.

7s. 6d. net each. Crown 8vo, Cloth, gilt top. AESCHYLUS The Orestean Trilogy. By Professor George With an Introduction on "The Rise of Greek C. W. Warr.
:

Tragedy

"
;

and
J.

12 Illustrations.

SOPHOCLES: CEdipusTyrannus and Coloneus, and
By
"

Professor

S.

Sophocles
:

and

Antigone. With an Introduction on Phillimore. and 16 his Treatment of Tragedy "
; ;

Illustrations.

EURIPIDES

HiPPOLYTUS

Bacch^

;

ARISTOPHANES
;

:

Frogs. By Professor Gilbert Murray. With an Appendix on " The Lost Tragedies of Euripides," and an Introduction on "The Significance of the Bacchae in Athenian History" and
12 Illustrations.
IFifth Edition.

A New
Crown
8vo, Cloth,
is.

Classical
6d. net each
;

Library
Translated

Leather, 2s. 6d. net each.

PLATO'S

THE^TETUS AND PHILEBUS.

by

H. F. Carlill, M.A.

PLUTARCH'S LIVES
Paulus).

(Alexander, Pericles, Caius Caesar, ^Emilius Translated by W. R. Frazer.
(Aristides,

PLUTARCH'S LIVES
Cicero, Lycurgus,

Numa).

Translated by

Marcus Cato, Demosthenes, W. R. Frazer.

PLUTARCH'S LIVES
Galba, Otho).

(Sertorius,

Eumenes, Demetrius, Antonius,
VI.
Translated

W. R. Frazer. THE ANNALS OF TACITUS— Books I to
Translated by

by Aubrey V. Symonds, B.A.

AN ABRIDGED EDITION OF SEYFFERT'S DICTIONARY OF ANTIQUITIES. By Dr. Emil Reich. AN ALPHABETICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INSTITUTIONS, PERSONS, EVENTS, Etc., OF ANCIENT HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY. By Dr. Emil Reich. HERODOTUS—Books to III. Translated by G. W. Harris, M.A. „ HERODOTUS—Books IV to VI. „ „ HERODOTUS—Books VII to IX. „ „ „
I

" "

The

A

Scotsman. translations are able and scholarly." Library worth having." Yorkshire Post.

The

Plays of Euripides
Rhyming
Verse, with Commentaries

Translated into English

and Explanatory Notes

By gilbert

MURRAY,

LL.D., D.Litt.

Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford.
Crozvn
%z>o.

Cloth, 2S. net each.

Paper,

is.

net each

;

or in two vols. \s. net each.

hippolytus BACCHAE THE TROJAN ELECTRA

MEDEA
IPHIGENIA IN TAURIS

WOMEN

RHESUS
ALCESTIS

OEDIPUS, KING OF THEBES By SOPHOCLES

THE FROGS OF ARISTOPHANES
EURIPIDES
By
Prof.
:

Hippolytus

;

Bacchae

;

Aristophanes'

"

Frogs.''

Gilbert Murray.

With an Appendix on
Athenian History, and 12
[Fourth Edition

7he Lost Tragedies of Euripides, an Introduction on The
Significance of the

Bacchae

in

Illustrations from Ancient Sculptures.

Crown

%vo.

Cloth, gilt top, js. 6d. net

ANDROMACHE
Crown

:

An

Original Play in Three Acts
Paper,
\s.

%vo.

Cloth, 2/. net.

net

CARLYON

SAHIB: An Original Play
Crown
'ivo.

in

Three Acts
Paper,
\s.

Revised Edition.

Cloth, zs. net.

net

The Standard Authors

Series
net.

LIBRARY EDITION OF ENGLISH CLASSICS
Each Volume demy 8vo. Cloth. LIFE OF JOHNSON. By James Boswell. Three Vols. 12s. BUCCANEERS OF AMERICA. By Capt. Burney. 4s. 6^/. LETTERS. By Lord Chesterfield. Three Vols. 12s. FLOWERS AND FLOWER-LORE. By Rev. H. Friend.

net. net.

Two

Vols.
II.

8s. net.

MEMOIRS OF THE COURT OF CHARLES
Grammont.

By Count
45.
'^6<i.

net.

DUTCH REPUBLIC. By J. L. Motley. DIARY AND CORRESPONDENCE. By
Three Vols.

4s. 6d. net.
S.

Pepys.

Four Vols.
i6s. net.

RELIQUES OF ANCIENT POETRY. By

Bishop Percy.
125. net.

CONQUEST OF MEXICO. By W. H. Prescott. 4s. net. CONQUEST OF PERU. By W. H. Prescott. 4s. net. FERDINAND AND ISABELLA. By W. H. Prescott. 45. net. MEMOIRS OF REIGN OF LOUIS XIV. By Due Saint-Simon.
Three Vols.
12s. net.

SAMUEL PEPYS AND THE WORLD HE LIVED
By
H. B.

SELBORNE.

Wheatley. By Gilbert White.

IN. 4s. bd. net,
4s. bd, net.

The "
Crown i6mo,
Portrait of Joubert.

Pensees " Series
Designed Cover,
edges,
2s.

cloth, gilt tops,

25.

net each.

Leather, round corners,

gilt

6d. net each.

the pensees of JOUBERT.
CARLYLE pen portraits.

Selected and Translated by Professor Attwell. [Fourth Edition. Concise Descriptions of Persons encountered or

imagined by Thomas Carlyle, selected from his Works, by R. Brimley [Fourth Thousand. Johnson. With Portrait.

THE APHORISMS OF LANDOR. Selected by R. B. JOHNSON. With Portrait. PANSIES FROM FRENCH GARDENS. Selected and Translated by Professor
Attwell, from the Works of Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyere, and [Second Edition. Vauvenargues. With Portrait of La Bruyere.

THOUGHTS FROM KEATS.
GLEAMS FROM GOETHE.
Chosen and Translated by
by
S.

Gertrude Girdlestone. With
Prof.

Selected, by Permission, from his Letters. a Sonnet by A. C. Benson, and Portrait.

By

Sliort Passages from his

Writings
Portrait.

and

Conversations.

[Third Thousand. Preface [Second Edition. by Professor ATTWELL. THOUGHTS FROM [Tenth Thcnisand. With a Short Biography and Portrait. PEN PICTURES FROM RUSKIN. Selected by CAROLINE H. WURTZBURG. With Portrait. 1856. I. Men and Women, Animals, Trees, and Plants.

Attwell.

With

A SYMPOSIUM

ON FRIENDSHIP.

Selectedby

MARY DONALD. With

R. Crockett, and Portrait of Cicero. RUSKIN. Selected and Arranged

[Sixth
II.

Thousand

Places, Nature Studies,

and Things

in General.

With

Portrait, 1882.

[Fourth Thousand.

Dictionaries
ENGLISH QUOTATIONS. By
Cheap Edition,
3S. 6rf. «<;/.

and Reference
H. DalbiaC.
^^^^^y ^vo cloth
i-

Books
Col. P.
JJ.6rf.
'

CLASSICAL QUOTATIONS. By
and T.
B.

T. B.

Harbottle.

Demy

8vo,
^^^^^^>Jj-^^:^^^^^

CONTINENTAL QUOTATIONS (Frenxh and
Hakbottle.

Italian).

By

Col. P. H.

Dalbiac
^'•
'JM. net.

Demy

8vo, cloth.

Crown 8vo, cloth. ITALIAN QUOTATIONS. Crown 8vo, cloth. GERMAN QUOTATIONS. By L. DalbiaC. Demy

FRENCH QUOTATIONS.
Cheap
Edition,

35-

3S- orf. net.

8vo.
B.

75-

6d.

crown

8vo,

3s.

6d. net.

SPANISH QUOTATIONS. By Major M. HUME and T. Demy 8vo, cloth.
L.4TIN QUOT.\TIONS.
Large crown Svo.

HARBOTTLE.
Svo. cloth.

By

T. B.

H arbottle. Crown

3s.ba.neT.

/ ^^
'

'

ORIENTAL QUOTATIONS

(ARABIC AND Persian).

By Claud Field.
(ENGLISH).

DICTIONARY OF CONTEMPORARY QUOTATIONS Helena Swan
Authors and Subjects Indexes.

^

^
,^r-t.il

^

With

By y. bd. net. Crown 8vo Edition. OF WHAT GREAT MEN HAVE SAID ABOUT GRE.^ MEN: A DICTIONARY oa. is. cloth. QUOTATIONS. By WILLIAM Wale. Demy Svo, By T. B. HARBmTLF DICTIONARY OF Hli^^il^AjTTlZu^NS. Demy Svo. cloth, 7s. 6d. Crown Svo, cloth. !t ^i Svo. cloth.^s. 6d. DICTIONARY OF BATTLES. By T. B. HARBOTTLE. Demy

SmaU Demy

8vo. cloth.

7s.

6d.

,

^

AND ALLUSIONS. DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL PHRASESSmall Demy Svo.

Cheap

Edition,

crown

Svo.

f"'

By HUGH
is.

'

"

MONTGOMERY and PHILIP G. Cambray. ROGERS. A DICTIONARY OF ABBREVIATIONS. By W. T. Crown Svo, cloth. ^ ABBREVIATIONS. By W. T. ROGERS. DICTIONARY OF LEGAL
Large Crown Svo,
cloth.

6d

^

^

of more nirriONARY OF INDIAN BIOGRAPHY. Short Biographical NoticesA.d. 1750 (European and Native) from t^an 2 o?o persons connected with India 6d.

downwTdr^y
Cheap
Edition,

A COLLECTION OF HISTORICAL FAMOUS SAYINGS AND THEIR AUTHORS: GREEK. ITALIAN AN^ LATIN. SAYINGS IN ENGLISH. FRENCH. GERMAN. Second EdUton. Wth Autiors and Subjects Indexes. By E. Latham.

crown

C. E. Buckland, CLE. Svo, 35. td. net.

SmaU Demy

Svo, cloth.

7s.

6d. Small Demy Svo. cloth, is. 6d. Colonial Edition, 35. of the Study THF BROWNING CYCLOPAEDIA. A Guide to Notes and of the Works a 1 "^^ Kefererices on Ro?fr? BrownPng'' With Copious Explanatory Si.xtli tauton, Edward Berdoe. Revised. By difficult passages

SmaU

Svo, cloth, los. 6d.

Colonial Edition, cloth,

3s.

6d.

Books by Henry Grey, F.Z.S.
All

Crown

Svo, Cloth.
2S.

TJwusand. A KEY TO THE WAVERLEY NOVELS. Eighth KNOWLEDGE.^^^^ A POCKET ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF USEFUL .^^

6d.

Thousand.

is. Sixth Thousand. A BIRDS-EYE VIEW OF ENGLISH LITERATURE. Architecture, Sculpture, TROWEL, CHISEL. AND BRUSH. A Concise Manual of

THE

FOR THE MILLION. Nineteenth Thousand. PLA^S. PLOTS OF SOME OF THE MOST FAMOUS OLD ENGLISH
CLASSICS

and Painting.

Fourth Thousand.

'

SS.ba 2S.6d.

Memorials of the Counties of England
Each
Illustrated
text.

with about 35 Plates and

many

Illustrations in the
15s. net

Demy

8vo, cloth extra, gilt top.

each.

General Editor

:

Rev. P. H.

DITCHFIELD,

M.A., F.S.A., F.R.L.S., F.R.Hist.S.

OLD CHESHIRE.
and Rev.
P.

Edited by the Ven. the ARCHDEACON OF CHESTER H. DiTCHFlELD, M.A., F.S.A. OLD DERBYSHIRE. Edited by Rev. J. CHARLES COX, LL.D., F.S.A. OLD DEVONSHIRE. Edited by F. J. Snell, M.A. OLD DORSET. Edited by Rev, THOMAS PERKINS, M.A., and Rev. Herbert Pentin, M.A. OLD DURHAM. Edited by HENRY R. Leighton, F.R.Hist.S. OLD ESSEX. Edited by A. CLIFTON Kelway, F.R.Hist.S. OLD GLOUCESTERSHIRE. Edited by Rev. P. H. DiTCHFlELD, M.A.,
F.S.A.

OLD OLD OLD OLD

HAMPSHIRE. Edited by Rev. G. E Jeans, M.A., F.S.A. HEREFORDSHIRE. Edited by Rev. COMPTON Reade, M.A. HERTFORDSHIRE. Edited by PERCY CROSS STANDING.
F.S.A, and
F.S.A.,

KENT. Edited by Rev. P. H. DiTCHFlELD, M.A., George Clinch, F.G.S. OLD LANCASHIRE. Edited by Lieut.-Colonel FiSHWiCK,

and

Rev. P. H. DiTCHFlELD, M.A., F.S.A. Two Vols., 21s. net. OLD LEICESTERSHIRE. Edited by ALICE Dryden. OLD LINCOLNSHIRE. Edited by E. Mansel Sympson, M.A., M.D. OLD LONDON. Edited by Rev. P. H. Ditchfield, M.A., F.S.A. Two
Vols., 2 IS. net.

OLD MIDDLESEX. Edited by J. TavenOR- PERRY. OLD NORFOLK Edited by Rev. H. J. Dukinfield
LittD., F.R.Hist.S.

Astley, M.A.,

OLD OLD OLD OLD OLD OLD OLD OLD OLD OLD OLD OLD

NORTH WALES.

Edited by E.

ALFRED JONES.

NOTTINGHAMSHIRE. Edited by EvERARD L. GuiLFORD. OXFORDSHIRE. Edited by Rev. P. H. DiTCHFlELD, M.A., F.S.A. SHROPSHIRE. Edited by Rev. THOMAS AUDEN, M.A., F.S.A. SOMERSET. Edited by F. J. SNELL, M.A. STAFFORDSHIRE. Edited by Rev. W. BeresfoRD.
Edited by VINCENT B. REDSTONE, F.R.HistS. Edited by Rev. J. CHARLES COX, LL.D., F.S.A. WARWICKSHIRE. Edited by ALICE Dryden. WILTSHIRE. Edited by ALICE DRYDEN. WORCESTERSHIRE. Edited by F. B. ANDREWS, F.R.I. B.A. YORKSHIRE. Edited by T. M. FALLOW, M.A, F.SA.

SUFFOLK. SURREY.

County Churches
General Editor
Each Volume
:

Rev.

J.

CHARLES COX,
and Line

LL.D., F.S.A.
Illustrations.

Illustrated with Half-tone

A

Series of

Handy Guides

to the

Old Parish Churches
25.

in the Counties of England.
Foolscap 8vo, cloth.
6d. per vol. net.

The special or main architectural features of each fabric are named and reference made to Fonts, Pulpits, Screens, Stalls and Benches, Sedilia, Lecterns, Chests, etc. Mention is also made of old EfSgies in Brass and Stone and of other Monuments of distinction. The initial date of the Registers is also given, as to which so many blunders are often made in Directories. The introductory chapters contain summaries of the leading
;

characteristics of the

Churches

of the particular

County.

" This admirable series. We know no better book to awaken an interest and create a desire to visit these shrines," Church Times.

CAMBRIDGESHIRE AND THE ISLE OF ELY.
page
plates.

24

Full-

By

C. H,

Evelyn-White, F.S.A.

CORNWALL.
F.S.A.

27 Illustrations.

By

J.

Charles Cox, LL.D.

CUMBERLAND AND WESTMORLAND.
Cox, LL.D., F.S.A.

By

J.

Charles

ISLE OF WIGHT.
LL.D., F.S.A.

21

Illustrations.

By

J.

Charles Cox,

KENT.

(Two Volumes sold separately.) Francis Grayling.
20 Illustrations.

47 Illustrations.

By

NOTTINGHAMSHIRE.
LL.D., F.S.A.

By

J.

Charles Cox,
Illustrations.

NORFOLK. (Two Volumes

sold

Second Edition, Revised and Extended. LL.D., F.S.A.

separately.) i3y

43
J.

Charles Cox,

SUFFOLK
Bryant.

(Two Volumes.)
18 Full-page plates.

50 Illustrations.

By

T.

Hugh

SURREY.

By

J.

E. Morris, B.A.

— ——

Historical and
For Performance
in

Other Plavs

Country and other Places

By amice
With
Under

MACDONELL

Illustrations by the Author

the Patronage of the

League of
;

the

Empire

Crown

8vo,

Paper Covers, 6d. net each

First

and Second Series

also in Cloth, 3s. net each.

ALFRED THE GREAT. THE ARMADA.

x
I

First

MAGNA CARTA. j^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^ ^ uuK. EDWARD III. ST. GEORGE, AND BEOWULF. THE WAY OF THE HEART.
)

ROBIN HOOD. Series. THE ENTERPRISE OF THE "MAYFLOWER.") SAXON AND NORMAN. CAEDMON. In One THE BURGHERS OF CALAIS. Book. THE GOOD QUEEN. Second THE CRUSADERS. Series.
I

\

^

^

^

)

Third Series.

j

"These

may
"

fine historical plays well repay any extra labour which be involved in teaching history in this manner." Practical

Teacher.

series of plays."

Admirably suited to their purpose The Times.

.

.

.

this

happily conceived

"

They are

perfectly adapted for children's use,

and should be

popular."

Teacher.

CHAUCER REDIVIVUS. By W.
8vo. "

[Uniform with the above.)
play for boys and
girls,

Scott Durrant, M.A. Crown Paper Covers. 6d. net.
or even older amateurs."
School Guardian.

A good

SEEKING Eleven
:

Plays for Children.

By

E. Richardson.
2s. bd.

Crown
" This

8vo, cloth.
of simple plays will

charming selection

be welcomed by

all teachers."

Schoolmistress.

Standard Plays
For Performance
in Girls' Schools

and Elsewhere

Arranged, Edited, and Annotated by

ELSIE

FOGERTY
BONUS
;

With Illustrations of Costumes designed by ISABEL
and Stage Plans,
Cloth, 2S. 6d. net each
;

etc.
Illustrations,

Paper Covers, without
6^.
7ict

each.
IT."

SHAKESPEARE'S "AS YOU LIKE

TWELFTH NIGHT." " LOVES LABOUR LOST."
"

TENNYSON'S

"

PRINCESS."

EURIPIDES' "ALKESTIS."

SCENES FROM THE GRE.'\T NOVELISTS. SOPHOCLES' "ANTIGONE."
"

ELECTRA."
only.

"THE QUEEN'S JEST" and Two other Plays. THE HARRYING OF THE DOVE. 6d. Edition
"

An

taste,

of all

excellent idea. It is all done with great freshness, practicality, and and should be invaluable in the preparation of that most delightful educational amusements a school play." Academy.

UNIFORM WITH THE ABOVE MILTON'S MASQUE " COMUS." Arranged by LuCY CHATER. "DANTE AND BEATRICE." By Emily Uxderdowx. With Music
specially arranged

by Rutland Boughton.
25. 6d. ltd

Costume Edition,
Paper Edition,

cloth, 6d. net.
I.

DRAMATIC SCENES FROM GREAT NOVELISTS.
Patry, Author of "

By ROSE

Crown

8vo, in

two

First Notes on Elocution." parts, cloth, 15. net each paper, 6d. net each.
;

THREE PLAYS FOR DRAWING-ROOM ACTING :" CINDERELLA," "THE LADY HELP," "THE STORY OF THE STARS."
By Florenxe L. Henderson'. Paper, 6^/. net. A DRAMATIC VERSION OF CHARLES KINGSLEY'S BABIES." By LuCY Chater.
Crown
8vo, cloth,
is.

"WATER
6d. net.

net

;

paper,

"THE SNOW QUEEN."
LOVEMAN.
A.

Adapted from Hans ANDERSEN by LEONORA Crown 8vo, cloth, is. net paper covers, 6d. net.
;

SCENES FROM THE "PILGRIMS PROGRESS."
RUDD, with Music by Dr.
J.

Arranged by Emily
is.

C. BRIDGE.

Cloth,

net

;

paper,
6d. net'

The "

Special

Campaign "
55. net

lOCriCS
The Ainericaji THE WAR OF SECESSION,
Major G.

each.

War
1861-2.

of Secession, 1861-4 BULL RUN TO MALVERN HiLL.
By Major
G.

By

W. Redway. FREDERICKSBURG. A STUDY

IN

WAR.

W. Redway.

CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG. By Colonel P. H. Dalbiac, C.B. CEDAR RUN, MANASSAS, AND SHARPSBURG. By E. W. Sheppard, GRANTS CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA. THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. By
Captain Vaughan-Sawyer.

Franco-German War, 1870 FROM SAARBRUCK TO PARIS. By Lieut.-Colonel SissoN

PRATT,

late R.A.

Treats fully all the operations from the outbreak of hostilities in July 1870 to the appearance of the Germans before Paris in September.

Russo-Turkish

War
Lieut.-Colonel F. Maurice,
p.s.c.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN,
(The Sherwood Foresters).

1877.

By

THE CAMPAIGN
R.F.A.

Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5 IN MANCHURIA (Vol. I.) DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF
Captain F. R. Sedgwick, R.F.A.
(Vol.
II.,

LIAO YANG. By

THE DECISIVE BATTLES

los. net).

By Captain

F. R.

SEDGWICK,

Austrian and Prussian War, 1866 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA, 1866. By Lieut.-Colonel Gluxicke.
Franco- Austrian War, 1859 THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO.
Harold Wylly,
C.B.

1859.

By

Colonel

Napoleon's Campaigtts

THE JENA CAMPAIGN. By Colonel F. N. Maude, C.B. THE ULM CAMPAIGN. By Colonel F. N. Maude, C.B. THE LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN, 1813. By Colonel F. N. MAUDE, C.B. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. By Lieut.-Colonel SiSSON PRATT, late R.A. FROM BOULOGNE TO AUSTERLITZ. By Colonel R. G. Burton. THE CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY, 1796-7 AND 1800. By Colonel R. G. BURTON.
NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF RUSSIA.
By
Colonel R. G. Burton.

THE INVASION OF FRANCE,

1814.

By

Captain F.

W.

O. Maycock, D.S.O.

War

MARLBOROUGH'S CAMPAIGNS.

of the Spanish Succession By Captain F. W. O. Maycock,

D.S.O.

General

THE FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGY.

By Captain H.

E.

JOHNSTONE, R.E.

Young
Bath.

Collector
Crown
8vo,

Series
Cloth.
15.

Fully Illustrated,

Limp

each.

ANTS, BEES, WASPS,
BIRDS.

AND DRAGON
Macpherson.

FLIES.

By W. H.

By

Rev. H. A.

BOOK COLLECTING. By J. H. Slater. BUTTERFLIES, MOTHS, AND BEETLES. By W.
F.L.S., F.E.S.

F. Kirby,

CHESS PROBLEMS. By E. W. Rayner. COPPER COINS OF EUROPE. By F. C.
COINS AND TOKENS
F.S.A.

Higgins.

(English).

By Llewellyn Jewitt,

COLONIAL COINS. By D. F. Howorth, F.S.A. CRUSTACEANS AND SPIDERS. By F. A. Skuse.
By E. J. Lowe, F.R.S., FOSSILS. By J. W. Williams.
FUNGI, LICHENS, Etc.

FERNS.

F.L.S.

By Peter Gray,

A.B.S.

GRASSES.

LAND AND

By W. Hutchinson. FRESH WATER SHELLS.

By

J.

W. Williams.

MOSSES. By J. E. Bagnall, A.L.S. POND-LIFE (Insects). By E. A. Butler,

F.Z.S.

POND-LIFE (Alg^, POSTAGE-STAMPS.
REPTILES.
B. B.

Diatoms, Etc.).

By

T. S. Smithson.

By W.

T. Ogilvie.

By

C. C.

Hopley.

SEAWEEDS, SHELLS, AND FOSSILS.
Woodward. SILKWORMS. By E.
A. Butler, F.Z.S.

By

P.

Gray and

THE TELESCOPE. By J. W. Williams. WILD FLOWERS (Spring). Rev. H. Wood. WILD FLOWERS (Summer). Rev. H. Wood.
"We
concise,

have seen nothing better than this and practical." Salurday Review.

series.

It

is

cheap,

*'Just the

kind and amount of information required."

Knowledge.

Text-Books
INSANITY AND OTHER MENTAL DISEASES. By Charles
Arthur Mercier, M.D.,
Edition, enlarged

F.R.C.P.,

and

entirely re-written.

Second F.R.C.S., etc. Crown 8vo. "js. 6d. net.
whole
British
in

"

The most comprehensive, well-reasoned, and
.

instructive review of the

subject of insanity

.

.

that has yet been

produced

any country."

Medical Journal.

PETROLOGY.

Igneous Rocks. By F. H. Hatch, Vol. I A.M.I.C.E. Seventh Edition Revised. Crown 8vo. Illustrated.
:

Js.

6d. net.

PETROLOGY.
Hatch and

Vol. II The R. H. Rastall.
:

Sedimentary Rocks. By Crown 8vo. Illustrated.
ys.

F. H.

6d. net.

ORGANIC CHEMISTRY. By
vised.
Illustrated.

J.

Wade.

Second Edition Re8s.

Crown

8vo.

6d. net.

ELEMENTARY BIOLOGY.
Second Edition.

By
8vo.

Dr. H.

J.

Campbell.

Illustrated.
6s.

Crown

PHYSIOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY.
Edited by Dr. O. Beyer and C. C. Fourth Edition. Crown 8vo.

By Prof. Th. Ziehen. Van Liew. With Diagrams.
6s.

EMBRYOLOGY OF MAN AND MAMMALS.
Hertwig.
Edition.

By

Dr.

O.
2is.

Edited by Prof. E. L. Mark.

Illustrated.

Third

Demy

8vo.

COMPARATIVE GEOLOGY. By
Phillip Lake.
Illustrated.

Prof. E. Kaysar. Edited by Second Edition. Demy 8vo.
los.

6d.

ZOOLOGY. By Prof. Adam Volumes. Demy 8vo.

Sedgwick.

Illustrated.
15s.

Three
net each.

PRACTICAL BOTANY. By Prof. E. Strasburger. Edited by Prof. W. Hillhouse, M.X. Illustrated. New and Enlarged (Sixth) Edition. Demy 8vo. los. 6d.
STUDENT'S BOTANY. By Prof. Fourth Edition. Demy 8vo.
S.

H.

Vines.

Illustrated.
15s.

ELEMENTARY BOTANY.
Demy
8vo.

By

Prof. S.

H. Vines.

Illustrated.
9s.

ELEMENTARY ENTOMOLOGY.
Illustrated.

By W.

F. Kirby.
los. 6d.

Large 8vo.

Kindergarten Manuals
Crown
8vo, cloth.
3s.

each.

KINDERGARTEN ESSAYS. Bv the Froebel Society. HOW GERTRUDE TEACHES." By J. H. Pestalozzi. GEOMETRY FOR THE KINDERGARTEN. By A. Pullar. THE KINDERGARTEN. By E. A. Shirreff. is. Ad. CHILD AND CHILD NATURE. By Baroness M. BiJLOW. HANDWORK AND HEADWORK. By Baroness M. BtJLOW. AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF F. FROEBEL.

School Authors Series
CICERO
Imperial i6mo, cloth.
is. 6(i.

each.

AD ATTICUM. Book IV. Edited by J. Brown, B.A. PRO LEGE MANILIA. By Rev. J. Hunter Smith, M.A. PRO MILONE. By Rev. W. Yorke Fausset, M.A.

ARCHENHOLTZ
By
Prof. F.

imperial i6mo, cloth.

2s.

6d.
^

GERMAN CHRONICLES OF WAR.
Lange.

With Maps.

SHORT STORIES. Illustrated. By J. Colville. Imperial i6mo, cloth. is. dd. RIEHL, W. H. DIE VIERZEHN NOTHELFER. By R. E. Macnaghten. Imperial i6mo, cloth. is. td. STORM, T.
IMMENSEE*.

REINICK,

R.

Imperial i6mo, cloth.

2s.

By

Dr.

J.

G. Robertson.

Examination Manuals
Intended for the use of Candidates for Competitive, Qualifying, and other Examinations. Crown 8vo, Limp Cloth. 2s. bd. each.

ESSAY WRITING, PRACTICAL. By
Fourth Edition.

A.

W. Holmes-Forbes.
is.

dd.

FRENCH HISTORY. By J. A. Joerg. FRENCH LITERATURE. By J. A. Joerg. FRENCH CONVERSATION WITH THE EXAMINER.
C A
IVTtispravp

By

GERMAN HISTORY. By C. A. Musgrave. GERMAN LITERATURE. By J. A. Joerg. GERMAN TEST PAPERS. Seventy Pieces
tion,

THE REIGN OF GEORGE THE REIGN OF GEORGE

for Prose Composiand Questions on Grammar and Idioms. By J. A. Joerg. ENGLISH HISTORY QUESTIONS. With 4,900 References to Standard Works. By " OxoN."
II.

By "Oxon." By " Oxon." PSYCHOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, AND ETHICS, QUESTIONS ON. By F. Ryland, M.A. 3s. dd.
III.

THE SESAME LIBRARY
Fcap, 8vo
T. P.'s

Weekly.
.

Cloth
'*

1/- net
this

We

can heartily recommend

dainty

Series

.

.

which has taken us by pleasurable

surprise."

1.

Goldsmith's Comedies
With 24
Full-page Drawings by Chris

Hammond,

2.

Pride and
With 100

Prejudice
Hugh Thomson.

Illustrations and 6i Initial Letters by

3

&4. Hans
and Stones.
With

Andersen's Tales
Translated by H. Oskar Arthur J. Gaskin.

Sommer

over 100 Illustrations by

5.

Nelson and his Companions
in

Arms.
8 portraits,

By

Sir

John Knox Laughton, R.N.

With

^ U.
7.

Tr^'HIPQ lUlllLcl.

^^ William Cory. With Biography ^^^ Notes by Arthur C. Benson.

Birds and Beasts.
Lemonnier.

By camille

Translated by A. R. Allinson.

8.

Erasmus' In Praise of Folly
With Holbein's
Designs.

9.

Life's

Pilgrimage

:

An
Edited

Anthology of Prose and Verse.
by Edwin H. Eland.

10.
.'.

Sesame and

Lilies

^R^s^r
and

The Complete Copyright

Edition., zvith all three lectures

latest ?iotes,fQr the first time available at this price,

11.

Crown of Wild
By John Ruskin. Other Works

Olive

in preparation.

m

7
aj^^^i,

^

YB 48

1

1

333799
V^
.'ex,^

Ui^fsy
-i.'

UNIVERSITY OF CAUFORNIA LIBRARY

^

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful

Master Your Semester with Scribd & The New York Times

Special offer for students: Only $4.99/month.

Master Your Semester with a Special Offer from Scribd & The New York Times

Cancel anytime.