Rule 92 General Guardians and Guardianship Alamayri then argued that the Pabale siblings should be bound by the

decision declaring Nave incompetent and since Nave was already judicially
[135] ALAMAYRI v. PABALE determined to be an incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she
subsequently entered into should be declared null and void, including the
FACTS:
Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, which she executed over the
A Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Sesinando M. subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings. Also, she pointed out that
Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation against Nelly S. the RTC explicitly named in its orders Jose Pabale (father of Pabale
Nave, owner of a parcel of land located in Calamba, Laguna alleging that in siblings) as among those present during the hearings held on 30 October
1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was 1987 and 19 November 1987 in SP. PROC.
entered into by and between him and Nave involving said parcel of land.
As such, it is Alamayri’s position that given the final and executory
However, the latter reneged on their agreement when the she refused to
Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C
accept the partial down payment he tendered to her as previously agreed
finding Nave incompetent since 1980, then the same fact may no longer
because she did not want to sell her property to him
be re-litigated in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, based on the doctrine of res
anymore.Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion to Intervene
judicata, more particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
alleging that they are now the land owners of the subject property
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Nave and the siblings in ISSUE
1984.
Whether or not the Pabale siblings are bound by the decision declaring
On the other hand, Nave and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo (co-defendant/ Nave incompetent
husband) raised in their counter-claim that she is incapacited to contract
for being mentally deficient based on the psychological evaluation report. RULING:
This being a decisive factor to determine once and for all whether the
contract entered into by [Nave] with respect to the subject property is null NO. Res Judicata not applicable.
and void.
Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree
The proceedings in this case was suspended in view of the filing of a rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of
Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with the RTCby Atty. Gesmundo. In competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
1986, the RTC then found her to be incompetent within the purview of conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or
Rule 92 of the Revised Rules of Court, a person who, by reason of age, suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on
disease, weak mind and deteriorating mental processes cannot without the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
outside aid take care of herself and manage her properties, becoming
a. No identity of parties - SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with
thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation, said condition having
the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian over the
become severe since the year 1980. She and her estate were placed under
person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence. (Pabale
guardianship of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her regular guardian.
Siblings are not parties to the case)
In the meantime, Nave died. Atty. Gesmundo (sole heir) filed a motion for
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a
the dismissal of the instant case and for the issuance of a writ of execution
minor or an incompetent, the latter being described as a person "suffering
of the Decision dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition for
the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals,
guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo on February 14, 1996
deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of
with the court a quo. A motion for substitution was filed by Lolita R.
unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not
Alamayri alleging that since the subject property was sold to her by Atty.
being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
Gesmundo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, she should be
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
substituted in his stead.
and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and
CFI: Declared the handwritten Contract to Sell executed by Nelly S. Nave exploitation."
and Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no force and effect;declared
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without
the Deed of Absolute Sale by Nelly S. Nave in favor of the [Pabale siblings]
the usual parties, i.e., petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil
similarly null and void and of no force and effect
case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears the title: In re:
CA: Reversed the decision of CFI
Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y
Banayo, petitioner, with no named respondent/s.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian
under Rule 93 of the Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a
person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no capacity to care
for himself and/or his properties; and, second, who is most qualified to be
appointed as his guardian. The rules reasonably assume that the people
who best could help the trial court settle such issues would be those who
are closest to and most familiar with the supposed minor or incompetent,
namely, his relatives living within the same province and/or the persons
caring for him.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice
and actually took part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Nave’s
relatives, nor are they the ones caring for her. Although the rules allow the
RTC to direct the giving of other general or special notices of the hearings
on the petition for appointment of a guardian, it was not established that
the RTC actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
b. No identity of issues - Neither is there identity of issues between SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C that may bar the latter,
by conclusiveness of judgment, from ruling on Nave’s competency in 1984,
when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor the
Pabale siblings.
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was whether Nave was
incompetent at the time of filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus,
requiring the appointment of a guardian over her person and estate.
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo against the Pabale siblings
in Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an
incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale of the subject property in
favor of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering the
said sale void.
While both cases involve a determination of Nave’s incompetency, it must
be established at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986.
A finding that she was incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean
that she was so in 1984.
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously
been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so
long as the contrary be not proved.
All told, there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in
the former on Nave’s incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by
conclusiveness of judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave still had
capacity and was competent when she executed the Deed of Sale over the
subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings in 1984.
[136] OROPESA v OROPESA (2012)
FACTS:
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque City, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be
appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent)
Cirilo Oropesa.In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the
(respondent) has been afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly
for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke on April 1, 2003
and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired and
such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his
stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and
judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that
due to his age and medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid,
manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his
girlfriend.
The Trial Court dismissed the case considering that the petitioner has
failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O.
Oropesa is incompetent to run his personal affairs and to administer his
properties.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied by
the Court of Appeals
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals should be set
aside as it allegedly committed grave and reversible error when it affirmed
the erroneous decision of the trial court which purportedly disregarded the
overwhelming evidence presented by him showing respondent’s
incompetence.
HELD:
No. The SC affirmed the decision of CA and held that the petitioner’s
contention is without merit.
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which
one person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom
the law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship
is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is
intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any
assistance that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that
while custody involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates
not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if
the prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons
who, though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or
other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their
property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship.
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent
should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence." We
consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied
in the case at bar.
Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited
petitioner’s lack of material evidence to support his claims. Respondent
points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner to
prove his incompetence proves that he is indeed competent to run his
personal affairs and administer his properties instead. Portions of the said
document, entitled "Report of Neuropsychological Screening,"were quoted
by respondent in his Memorandum to illustrate that said report in fact
favored respondent’s claim of competence, to wit:
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed
and participated meaningfully in conversations and could be quite
elaborate in his responses on many of the test items. He spoke in
a clear voice and his articulation was generally comprehensible. x
xx.
General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of the
domains that were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental
calculations and keep track of number sequences on a task of
attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional tasks where he had
to copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he was able to
render and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x xx.
x xx Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to
suggest effective solutions to problem situations.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the
proposed ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the
sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that]
the observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the
person’s state of mental sanity will suffice."
Thus, it is significant that in its Order which denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration on the trial court’s unfavorable ruling, the trial court
highlighted the fatal role that petitioner’s own documentary evidence
played in disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court made known its
own observation of respondent’s physical and mental state, to wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert
which states that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental,
emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On the
contrary, Oppositor’s evidence includes a Neuropsychological
Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on
the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is
capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to
problem situations. The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa
possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired
abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the
observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert
and able.
RULE 93: APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
[137] BONIFACIA P. VANCIL vs. HELEN G. BELMES
FACTS:
The RTC appointed BonifaciaVancil, an American citizen, as legal and
judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent, the
children of her deceased son Reeder. Helen Belmes, the natural mother of
the minor children, instituted a motion for removal of Guardianship and
Appointment of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural mother in custody
of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors. Trial court
rejected Belmes'petition. The CA reversed the RTC order. Since Valerie had
reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the SC, the Court
resolves to determine who between the mother and grandmother of minor
Vincent should be his guardian.
ISSUE: Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent.
RULING:
Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to
be his guardian. Art. 211 of the FC states: "The father and the mother
shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental
authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Belmes.
Considering that Belmes is still alive and has exercised continuously
parental authority over Vincent, Vancil has to prove Belmes'unsuitability.
Assuming that Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. She admitted in her petition that an
expatriate like her will find difficulty of discharging the duties of a
guardian. As the Court held in Guerrero vsTeran, the courts should not
appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of the
courts as they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
[138] Goyena v Ledesma
Facts:
Julieta Ledesma - subject of this case
Petitioner Goyena- best friend, companion for more than 60 years of
Julieta
Respondent Amparo Ledesma- sister of Julieta
Petitioner Goyena question the appointment of herein respondent Amparo
Ledesma Gustilo as guardian over the person and property of her sister
Julieta Ledesma. Pilar Y. Goyena, Julieta’s close friend and companion of
more than 60 years, comes to this Court on petition for review on
certiorari alleging that Respondent Ledesma is not fit to be appointed as
the guardian of Julieta Ledesma since their interests are antagonistic. A
perusal of the records shows that petitioner (Amparo) is 72 years of age,
the youngest sister of Julieta. Admittedly, the Oppositor Pilar Goyena, 90
years of age has been the close friend and companion of Julieta for 61
years. Julieta was with Oppositor when she suffered her first stroke in
Makati in 1991 which was the reason why Julieta had to give up the
management of their hacienda in Bacolod. It is also not disputed that
Julieta was with Pilar when she had her second stroke in the U.S. In short,
the special bond of friendship existing between Julieta and the Oppositor
cannot be denied. Now that Julieta is unable to manage her personal life
and business concerns due to senility and “vascular dementia,” the
oppositor wants to be appointed her guardian or else Bart Lacson,
FelyMontelibano and Jose T. Revilla.The RTC and CA found that petitioner
is not unsuitable for appointment as guardian of the person and properties
of Julieta.
Issue: Whether the appointment of Amparo Ledesma is valid due to the
alleged antagonistic interest between her and Julieta
Ruling:
In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge
who deals directly with the parties. As a rule, when it appears that the
judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has
given due consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are
urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed unless it
is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.At any rate, while
it is correct to say that no person should be appointed guardian if his
interest conflict with those of the ward (Guerrero vs. Teran, 13 Phil. 212).
No inference as to the existence of antagonistic interests between
respondent and Julieta can thus be made because this Court notes two
undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit: 1) Petitioner opposed the
petition for the appointment of respondent as guardian before the trial
court because, among other reasons, she felt she was disliked by
respondent, a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable
forappointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner concealed the deteriorating
state of mind of Julieta before the trial court, which is reflective of a lack of
good faith.
Rule 94 Bonds of Guardians
[139] Cabales, et. al. vs. CA
FACTS:
(Si Saturnina, mother siyani petitioner Rito; and grandmother namansiyani
petitioner Nelson)
RufinoCabales died and left a parcel of land located in Southern Leyte to
his surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco,
Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.
On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto
sold the subject property to Dr. CayetanoCorrompido for P2,000.00, with
right to repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided
the proceeds of the sale among themselves, each getting a share of
P666.66.The following month, Alberto secured a note (vale) from Dr.
Corrompido in the amount of P300.00.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.
Within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino tendered
their payment of P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido
only released the document of sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina
paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including his vale of
P300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino,
Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-
spouses Jesus and AnunciacionFeliano for P8,000.00.The Deed of Sale
provided in its last paragraph, thus: “It is hereby declared and understood
that the amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX PESOS
(P2,286.00) corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of Alberto Cabales
and to RitoCabales who are still minors upon the execution of this
instrument are held in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered
only to them upon reaching the age of 21.”
As a result, the Register of Deeds issued OCT over the purchased land in
the names of respondents-spouses.
On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an
affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount
of P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21
considering that Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation
of petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share in the
redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well as his vale of P300.00.
On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner RitoCabales acknowledged receipt
of the sum of P1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the
formers share in the proceeds of the sale of subject property.
Two years after, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson went back to his father’s
hometown wherein he learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito of the sale of
subject property. In 1993, he signified his intention to redeem the subject
land during a barangay conciliation process that he initiated.
In 1995, contending that they could not have sold their respective shares
in subject property when they were minors, petitioners filed before the
RTC, a complaint for redemption of the subject land plus damages.
In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were
estopped from claiming any right over subject property considering that
(1) petitioner Rito had already received the amount corresponding to his
share of the proceeds of the sale of subject property, and (2) that
petitioner Nelson failed to consign to the court the total amount of the
redemption price necessary for legal redemption. They prayed for the
dismissal of the case on the grounds of laches and prescription.
The RTC ruled against the petitioners. It held that (1) Alberto or, by his
death, any of his heirs including petitioner Nelson lost their right to subject
land when not one of them repurchased it from Dr. Corrompido; (2)
Saturnina was effectively subrogated to the rights and interests of Alberto
when she paid for Alberto’s share as well as his obligation to Dr.
Corrompido; and (3) petitioner Rito had no more right to redeem his share
to subject property as the sale by Saturnina, his legal guardian pursuant
to Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, was perfectly valid; and it was
shown that he received his share of the proceeds of the sale on July 24,
1986, when he was 24 years old.
The CA modified the lower court’s ruling wherein it held that the sale by
Saturnina of petitioner Rito’s undivided share to the property was
unenforceable for lack of authority or legal representation but that the
contract was effectively ratified by petitioner Ritos receipt of the proceeds
on July 24, 1986. The appellate court also ruled that petitioner Nelson is
co-owner to the extent of one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as
Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos rights when she repurchased his
share to the property.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale by Saturnina of the minor’s share to the estate when
they were still minors was valid.
RULING:
NO.UNENFORCEABLE for Rito (but later on ratified, so naging VALID); and
VOID for Nelson.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers and
co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to their pro-
indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his
share, his rights and obligations were transferred to and assumed by his
heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show
that it was Saturnina, Albertos mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased
for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not
subrogated to Alberto’s or his heirs rights to the property when she
repurchased the share.
Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject property was resold to
respondents-spouses by the co-owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were
then minors and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the
proceeds were held in trust by respondents-spouses to be paid and
delivered to them upon reaching the age of majority.
RITO’s share:
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly
held by the Court of Appeals. The Civil Code provides that the father, or, in
his absence, the mother, is considered legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under his or her parental authority without need of
giving a bond in case the amount of the property of the child does not
exceed two thousand pesos. Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the
Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to this case, automatically
designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of any
judicial appointment in case the latter’s property does not exceed two
thousand pesos.
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Rito’s legal guardian without necessity of
court appointment considering that the amount of his property or one-
seventh of subject property was P1,143.00, which is less than two
thousand pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 1 provides thatthe legal guardian
only has the plenary power of administration of the minor’s property. It
does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority.
Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s
pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to
do so.
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner
Rito was unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the
proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it.
This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.
NELSON’s share:
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale
was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all
the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to
alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal
guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his
undivided share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina
and the others sold the subject property in its entirety to respondents-
spouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares
and not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother.
Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over
their undivided share of subject property.
If asked: May Petitioners redeem the subject land from respondents-
spouses? NO for both.
As demonstrated, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Rito
became valid and binding upon his ratification on July 24, 1986. As a
result, he lost his right to redeem subject property.
For Nelson and his mother, they may redeem the property provided that
they must do so within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by
their co-owners vendors. In the instant case, the right of redemption was
invoked not days but years after the sale was made in 1978. We are not
unmindful of the fact that petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was
perfected. Nevertheless, the records show that in 1988, petitioner Nelson,
then of majority age, was informed of the sale of subject property.
Moreover, it was noted by the appellate court that petitioner Nelson was
likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his intention to redeem
subject property during a barangay conciliation process. But he only filed
the complaint for legal redemption and damages on January 12, 1995,
certainly more than thirty days from learning about the sale. Hence, they
may not redeem the property from respondents-spouses; however, he and
his mother remain co-owners thereof. Accordingly, title to the subject
property must include them
Rule 96 General Powers and Duties of Guardians
[140] Abad vs Biason
Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the
person and properties of Maura B. Abad with the (RTC) of Dagupan City.
In support thereof, Abad alleged that he maintains residence at No. 14 B
St. Paul Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City and that he is Maura’s
nephew. He averred that Maura, who is single, more than (90) years old
and a resident of Rizal Street, Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in dire
need of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due to
her advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to
take care of herself and her properties unassisted thus becoming an easy
prey of deceit and exploitation.
Respondent Biason filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to
the Petition and attached therewith his Opposition to the Appointment of
Abad as Guardian of the Person and Properties of Maura B. Abad.
Specifically, Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he
was not notified of the pendency of the petition for the appointment of the
latter’s guardian. He vehemently opposed the appointment of Abad as
Maura’s guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he
resides in Quezon City while Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan,
Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed as Maura’s guardian since
he was previously granted by the latter with a power of attorney to
manage her properties. RTC denied the petition of Eduardo due to
incompetency, and the court finds Biason fit to be the Guardian and
requires him to issue a bond amounting to Php 500,000.00.
Eduardo filed his motion for reconsideration in the RTC but the
latter denied the same. Moreover he appealed before the CA and argued
that he was not a resident of Mangaldan, Pangasinan should not be a
ground for his disqualification as he had actively and efficiently managed
the affairs and properties of his aunt even if he is residing in Metro Manila.
Moreover, he was expressly chosen by Maura to be her guardian, but the
CA affirms the RTC’s decision.
Unfortunately, pending the resolution of the instant petition,
Biason died.Maura averred that Biason’s death rendered moot and
academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed that the
petition be dismissed and the guardianship be terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the death of Biason terminates the guardian and
ward relationship?
Ruling: YES.
The court said that with Biason’s demise, it has become impractical
and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-
established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward.The
supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the
propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and
Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its
disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any
substantial relief
Rule 103 Change of Name
[141] REPUBLIC VS. CA
Facts:
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala,
Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but two and a half years old
and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was
then nine years old, they were, with the consent of their natural
parents and by order of the court in Special Case No. 593, adopted by
spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized
Filipinos.They decided to adopt the children as they remained childless
after fifteen years of marriage. The couples showered their adopted
children with parental love and reared them as their own children.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then
married and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University,
Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It
was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated
him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese
ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a
Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of
alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname,
thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother
does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
The matter was resolved in favor of private respondent, the trial court
decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied
with, petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo Wong to
Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted. On appeal to respondent court, and over
the opposition of petitioner Republic through the Solicitor General, the
decision of the court below was affirmed in full, hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Issue:
WON the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of
name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said
petition.
Ruling:
YES. The Court disagreed with the assertion of the Solicitor General that
private respondent's allegation of ridicule and embarrassment due to the
use of his present surname is unsubstantiated
A change of name is a special proceeding to establish the status of a
person involving his relation with others, that is, his legal position in, or
with regard to, the rest of the community. It is a proceeding in rem and,
as such, strict compliance with all jurisdictional requirements, particularly
on publication, is essential in order to vest the court with jurisdiction
thereover. For this purpose, the only name that may be changed is the
true or official name recorded in the civil register.
It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for change of name,
petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor
but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
(a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence,
as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is
to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter,
it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of
the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption
proceedings.
A petition for change of name is a remedy allowed under our law only by
way of exception to the mandatory provisions of the Civil Code on the use
of surnames. The law fixes the surname that may be used by a person, at
least inceptively, and it may be changed only upon judicial permission
granted in the exercise of sound discretion. Section 1 of Rule 103, in
specifying the parties who may avail of said remedy, uses the generic term
"persons" to signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate
person may, under certain judicially accepted exceptional circumstances,
petition the court for a change of name, we do not see any legal basis or
logic in discriminating against the availment of such a remedy by an
adopted child. In other words, Article 365 is not an exception, much less
can it bar resort, to Rule 103.
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court has its primordial purpose which (State) is
to give a person in opportunity to improve his personality and provide his
best interest. In the instant case, the court a quo found the petition of
Maximo Wong for change of name justifiable after due hearing, thus its
factual findings and appreciation of testimonies count heavily and need not
be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court
is in a better position to examine real evidence as well as to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case
Additionally, herein respondent is already of age and as such he can
decide what is best for him. His experience with regards his social and
business dealings is personal and it is only him who can attest to the
same. Finding his predicament's proper remedy is solely through legal
process, herein respondent accordingly filed a petition pursuant to Rule
103 of the Rules of Court which was granted by the Court a quo.
It is not fair to construe the desired reversion of private respondent to the
use of the name of his parents by nature as cross ingratitude. To go by the
Solicitor General's suggestion that private respondent should have his
adoption revoked if he wants to use the surname of his natural father
would be to exact too clear a toll for making use of an appropriate and
valid remedy available under the law.
[142] SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Facts:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a biological
male who feels trapped in a male body. Being that, he sought gender re-
assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was successful – he (she)
now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition in RTC
Manila for the change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex
(male to female) in his birth certificate. He wanted to make these changes,
among others, so that he can marry his American fiancé.
The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be
granted based on equity; that Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped in a
man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken
against him; that there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG
did not make any basis for opposition at this point); that no harm, injury
or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fiancé and the
realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate
may be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no
support in existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR
MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A
CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF
FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A
JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed. This law provides that it should be the local
civil registrar that has jurisdiction in petitions for the change of first names
and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio insofar as his
first name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the
petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground
upon which it is based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those
provided for by the law. Under the law, a change of name may only be
grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name
or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Silverio’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex
he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a
change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048
does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first
name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the
civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege,
any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name.
Issue on the change of sex
It cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a
petition for the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no
law to support it. And not with the civil registry because there is no clerical
error involved
By virtue of RA 9048, Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes
and corrections in entries in the civil register, excluding the clerical or
typographical error. Section 2 of RA 9048 provides expressly that no
correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of
the petitioner.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code (tignan na lang yung codal, medj mahaba). The
acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
All entries, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were
all correct. No correction is necessary because there is no mistake. Silverio
was born a male hence it was just but right that the entry written in his
birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant.
The court also ruled that change of sex would alter legal status of a
person.
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate,
or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such
matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have
rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes
even succession
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is
a part of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. But there is no such
special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects
As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the
changes sought by Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man
with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply
particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and
the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in
relation to women which could be substantially affected if Silverio’s
petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name
and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that
privilege
[143] PEOPLE VS. CAGANDAHAN
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate. In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but
while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) where persons
thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She then
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to
male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition because it was medically proven
that petitioner’s body produces male hormones, his action and feelings are
that of a male. He has chosen to be maleand wants to be acknowledged
and identified as a male.
ISSUE:
Whether the ground of her medical condition known as CAH under Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court is valid?
RULING:
Yes. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate
is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. Article 412 of the
Civil Code provides:ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed
or corrected without a judicial order. This provision was amended by
Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involvedcan now be made through administrative proceedings. Rule 108
now applies only to substantial changes. Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a
correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition
of the various degrees of intersex which should not be subject to outright
denial. In the instant case, if we determine, based on medical testimony,
then a change in thesubject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would
be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in
cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and
lifestyle preferences. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice
of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
"incompetent" and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of the Court affirms as
valid and justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of
being a male.As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this
Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced.
[144] REPUBLIC v. AQUINO
FACTS:
John Li Kan Wa filed a petition for change of his name to John Sotto,
alleging (a) change of his status from Chinese to Filipino as a result of his
election of Filipino Citizenship; and (b) the previous confusion resulting
from being registered as John Li Kan Wa and using a different name since
childhood which is John Sotto. CFI of Nueva Ecija found the petition issued
an order giving notice to all interested parties and and directed that the
order be published in the Monday Post. The Republic opposed the petition.
However, only the name Li Kan Wa was given in the title, and the name
John Sotto was not mentioned. (Both in the petition and in the publication)
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge had acquired jurisdiction to hear the
petition filed by John Li Kan Wa.
RULING:
NO. The failure to include the name sought to be adopted in the title of the
petition, and consequently in the notices published in newspapers is a
substantial jurisdictional infirmity.To inform, the publication should recite,
among others, the following facts: (a) the name or names of applicant; (b)
the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (c) the new name
asked for.
The rationale of the requirement to include in the title of the petition the
name sought to be adopted was that the reader as is to be expected,
merely glances at the title of the petition. It is only after he has satisfied
himself that the title interests him that he proceeds to read down further.
DOCTRINE:
Omission in the title of the petition of the name asked for and
consequently in the notices published in newspapers is fatal, and the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. Non-compliance with the rules
did not vest the court with authority to act on the petition and therefore,
the questioned decision is null and void.
[145] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v MARCOS (1990)
FACTS:
On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by private respondent
Pang Cha Quen alleging that she is a citizen of Nationalist China, married
to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen; that she had resided in Baguio City
since her birth on January 29, 1930; that by a previous marriage to
SiaBian alias Huang TzehLik, a citizen of Nationalist China, she gave birth
to a daughter, May Sia alias Manman Huang on January 28, 1958 in the
City of Manila; that on January 12, 1959, she caused her daughter to be
registered as an alien under the name of Mary Pang, i.e., using the
maternal surname, because the child's father had abandoned them; that
her daughter has always used the name Mary Pang at home and in the
Baguio Chinese Patriotic School where she studies; that on August 16,
1966, petitioner Pang Cha Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz; that as her
daughter has grown to love and recognize her stepfather, Alfredo De la
Cruz, as her own father, she desires to adopt and use his surname "De la
Cruz" in addition to her name "Mary Pang" so that her full name shall be
Mary Pang De la Cruz; that Alfredo De la Cruz gave his conformity to the
petition by signing at the bottom of the pleading; that the petition was not
made for the purpose of concealing a crime as her ten-year old daughter
has not committed any, nor to evade the execution of a judgment as she
has never been sued in court, and the petition is not intended to cause
damage or prejudice to any third person. She prayed that her daughter be
allowed to change her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to Mary
Pang De la Cruz.
Finding the petition meritorious, respondent Judge issued an order on
February 12, 1969 authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias
Manman Huang, also known as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang De
la Cruz.
The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the Supreme
Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary to law.
ISSUES:(Raised by the petitioner)
1) Whether or not respondent Judge had acquired jurisdiction over the
case; and
2) Whether respondent Judge erred in granting the petition although
private respondent Pang Cha Quen failed to adduce proper and reasonable
cause for changing the name of the minor "May Sia" alias Manman Huang.
HELD:
1) No, the Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
On the first issue, the Government pointed out that the captions of the
petition and of the published order of the court did not include the name
"Mary Pang" as one of the names that the minor has allegedly been using,
hence, the petition and the published order contain a fatal jurisdictional
defect.
The Government's contention is well-taken. Thus did we rule in the case
of Jesus Ng Yao Siong vs. Republic, 16 SCRA 483, 487-88:
We accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a
change of name to be valid, the title thereof should include, first,
his real name, and second, his aliases, if any
In Republic vs. Zosa, G.R. No. 48762, September 12, 1988, this Court
explained the reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the name
sought to be adopted and the other names or aliases of the applicant in
the title of the petition, or in the caption of the published order. It is that
the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of the published
order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding for a change of
name. Only if the caption or the title strikes him because one or all of the
names mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to read the
contents of the order. The probability is great that he will not notice the
other names or aliases of the applicant if they are mentioned only in the
body of the order or petition.
In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition dated March
30,1968, and the published order of the trial court dated April 4, 1968
read, thus:
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY SIA
ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG CHA
QUEN, Petitioner. (P. 15, Rollo.)
The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the
court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication. In
view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject of the proceedings.
2) Yes, the respondent Judge erred in granting the petition.
The second ground for the Government's appeal is the failure of the
petitioner below, Pang Cha Quen, to state a proper and reasonable cause
for changing the name/names of her daughter.
The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of
name:
1) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
2) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation;
3) When the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs. Republic, L-
21194, April 29,1966; Chill Hap Chin vs. Republic, L-20018, April
30, 1966; Republic vs. Tanada, et al., L-31563, November 29,
1971; Alfon vs. Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980);
4) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina AngChay
vs. Republic, L-28507, July 31, 1980); or
5) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs.
Republic, L-22712, November 29, 1965).
As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons
offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her
daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la
Cruz as her own father" (p. 23, Rollo); (2) to afford her daughter a feeling
of security (pp. 23-24, Rollo); and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to
this petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this pleading"
(p. 24, Rollo).
Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general rule
is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a false
impression of family relationship to another where none actually exists
(Laperal vs. Republic, L-18008, October 30, 1962; Johnson vs. Republic,
L-18284, April 30, 1963; Moore vs. Republic, L-18407, June 26, 1963).
Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name is
that it was not filed by the proper party.
The petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to
change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other
person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was filed by Pang
Cha Quen not by May Sia.
Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when
she shall have reached the age of majority, may file the petition to change
her name. The decision to change her name, the reason for the change,
and the choice of a new name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It
must be her personal decision. No one else may make it for her. The
reason is obvious. When she grows up to adulthood, she may not want to
use her stepfather's surname, nor any of the aliases chosen for her by her
mother.
RA: 9255 An Act allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname
of their Father.
[146] IN RE: Petition of Julian Wang
FACTS:
The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized
illegitimate child contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.

Before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in
his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable
cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change.
Otherwise, the request should be denied.
That the continued use of a middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from
one's registered complete name.
Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa
Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other.
When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they
executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was
changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study
together with a sister who was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file
a petition in the Regional Trial Court seeking to drop his middle name and
have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of
name sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated against
when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in
Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not
carried in a person's name.
After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not
fall within the grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the
State has an interest in the name of a person it cannot just be changed to
suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and
the mother, and there is no reason why this right should be taken from
Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he reaches majority age
he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle
name, added the RTC.
Issues: Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?
Held:
Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a
person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the
same given name and surname as he has. When an illegitimate child is
legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the
father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then
bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's
surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate,
legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a
middle name and a surname.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities
for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and
not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name
given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show
proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify
such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only
some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds
for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b)
when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is
no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping
his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name
would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient
is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name
would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation
on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the
matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when
he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet
understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and
granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights
under our laws
[147] Republic v Capote
Facts:
Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon
P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9, 1982 prior
to the effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his mother used the
surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage between
them; and [Giovanni] has been known by that name since birth [as per his
birth certificate registered at the Local Civil Register of San Juan, Southern
Leyte];
The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time [Giovanni] was born and
up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters
of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns.
[Giovanni's] mother might eventually petition [him] to join her in the
United States and [his] continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the
surname of his natural father, may complicate [his] status as natural child;
Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of minor Giovanni N.
Gallamaso by virtue of a court order in Special [Proc.] No. R-459, dated
[August 18, 1998] xxx xxx authorizing her to file in court a petition for
change of name of said minor in accordance with the desire of his mother
[who is residing and working abroad];
Issue: Whether or not minor Giovanni may change his name.
Ruling:
Yes.
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for change of
name. Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule 103, a separate
and distinct proceeding from Rule 108
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni's petition. Giovanni
availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court
affirmed) that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni's
petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code,
Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his
father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change
of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his
father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother's
intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will
not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
[148]Batbatan vs Office of the Local Civil Registrar
FACTS:
Petitioner EligiaBatbatan is the mother of two children whose names were
registered in the office of the local civil registrar of Pagadian, Zamboanga
del Sur as JORGE BatbatanAng and Delia BatbatanLuy.
The surnames of the two children were taken from the name and the alias
of their father, AngKiuChuy, alias SiomaLuy. EligiaBatbatan and
AngKiuChuy lived in a common-law relationship and were never married at
least up to the time the former testified in court. According to the
petitioner, Mr. Ang was married to another woman at the times their
children were born.
EligiaBatbatan filed this petition for the correction of entries as regards the
names of the two children who were still minors. The mother wanted the
"Ang" and the "Luy" surnames dropped from her children's names such
that their corrected names would be Jorge Batbatan and Delia Batbatan,
respectively.
RTC denied the petition. The records show that it was the petitioner who
supplied the information in the entries of the certificate of birth of her son.
Entries in the records of birth in the Office of the local civil registrar are
allowed only to correct clerical errors. Corrections are not allowed when
the effect is to change status, citizenship, or any substantial alterations,
which should be decided in an appropriate proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether the correction sought in the petition is allowable.
RULING:
YES.
We agree with the petitioner that the lower court committed a reversible
error. The corrections sought in the petition would not change the status,
citizenship, genealogical relationship or filiation of the children nor effect
any substantial change or alteration which should be threshed out in a
proper action. The certificate of live birth of Jorge BatbatanAng clearly
identifies him as an illegitimate child. In fact, his parents executed the
"Affidavit To Be Accomplished In Case of An Illegitimate Child" at the back
of the printed certificate filed with the local civil registrar. The certificate of
live birth of Delia BatbatanLuy identifies her as illegitimate because "Item
23. Legitimate" is answered "No".
In Guevarra Lim vs. Republic (G.R. No. L-8932, May 13, 1957) we ruled
that a clerical error implies mistakes by the clerk in copying or 'writing, the
making of wrong entries in the public records contrary to existing facts. In
De Castro v. Republic (7 SCRA 967), we stated that an error is not clerical
and does not fall under the summary procedure contemplated in Article
412 of the Civil Code if it affects substantial matters, if its correction will
bring about a substantial change.
We have tended to be strict in the application of Rule 108 on cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry to avoid this summary
procedure from being unlawfully utilized as a shortcut method to bring
about a change of citizenship, paternity, status, other substantial attribute
or qualification. However, where justice and equity, dictate it and where no
such change is contemplated we have also readily, sustained its use.
Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China
of a young girl named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to
his family as their new housemaid but far from becoming their housemaid,
Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek Shengs mistress. As a result of
their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners.

The corrections sought in this petition do not go so far as to affect Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time
citizenship or status. The error committed by the clerk has resulted in Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common father, Lee
entries contrary to law. The changes sought, if granted, would bring about Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by
making it appear that petitioners mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
a compliance with article 363 of the Civil Code, which provides:
"Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surnames of
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal
the mother." Since the petitioner children were born of a married man with care and guidance to the petitioners. They all lived in the same compound
a woman not his legitimate spouse and are thus "spurious or adulterous", Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in. All was well,
they should bear the petitioners or mother surnames pursuant to the therefore, before private respondents discovery of the dishonesty and
above provisions. The petitioner prayer to strike out the surnames not fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
sanctions by the Civil Code should have been granted by the lower court.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Chengs demise. Lee Tek Sheng
Separate Opinion: Vasquez., J., concurring. insisted that the names of all his children, including those of petitioners,
be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Chengs death that was to
I believe that the proper proceeding should have been for a change of
be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that
name under Rule 103, instead of a correction of entry under Rule 108. piqued private respondents curiosity, if not suspicion.
[149] Lee vs Court of Appeals
Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation into the
Facts:
matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the
prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the
same man but begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private
records of birth of petitioners. Such NBI report prompted private
respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife,
respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of
Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly
entries in petitioners records of birth with the lower courts.
children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan. Private
respondents filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/or
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitionson the grounds
correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners. On December 2,
that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to
1992, the petition against all petitioners, with the exception of Emma Lee,
assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is
was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. A similar petition
essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely; and (3)
against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan.
the action to impugn has already prescribed. RTC dismiss the motion and
allows the petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries. CA affirms
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and
the decision of RTC.
erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting
and/or canceling therein the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as their mother,
Issue/s: 1. Whether or not Rule 108 is inappropriate for impugning the
and by substituting the same with the name Tiu Chuan, who is allegedly
legitimacy and filiation of children?
the petitioners true birth mother.
2. Whether or not the private respondents have no cause of action
to bring the cases below as Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs
The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial
of the father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his children
courts that they are the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and
only after his death?
Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in
1931. Except for Rita K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private
respondents herein were all born and raised in the Philippines.
Ruling:
1. No, it is appropriate.
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one
outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions
filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the
petitioners records of birth were intended to establish that for
physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok
Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as
shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners contention
that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to
impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to
establish that the former are not the latters children. There is
nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh
Shiok Cheng and petitioners.
In Republic vs. Valencia where the court affirmed the
decision of Branch XI of the then CFI of Cebu City ordering the
correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioners minor
children as stated in their records of birth from Chinese to Filipino,
and legitimate to illegitimate, respectively. Although recognizing
that the changes or corrections sought to be effected are not mere
clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, Court, sitting en
banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the
parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversary proceeding. In the said case, court
laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to
be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of
an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 are complied with.
A special proceeding is not always summary. One only has
to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that
what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se.
Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e.,
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks(Sec. 4). The Rule
also requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any
interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction
(Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any person in interest are also
required to file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice (Sec. 5).Last, but not the least, although the court
may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing
that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the same (Sec. 7).
As provided by RA 9048, Clerical or typographical errors in entries
of the civil register are now to be corrected and changed without
need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar
or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit
of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of
the civil register.Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of
Rule 108 are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the
civil register.
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress
response to the confusion wrought by the failure to delineate as to what
exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections
of a harmless or innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate
adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a substantial
kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to
an appropriate adversary proceeding, we have failed to categorically
state just what that procedure is.Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies
that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary
proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar cannot be decided on the
basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application. Hence,
the necessity for the preceding treatise.
2. No, because a close reading of Article 171 of Family Code shows
that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the
legitimacy of his wifes child. The provision, however, presupposes
that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The
present case alleges and shows that Keh Shiok Cheng (mother of
private respondents) did not give birth to petitioners. In other
words, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioner is an
illegitimate child ofKeh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the
former is not the latters child at all.
[150] REPUBLIC VS. KHO
Facts:
Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before
the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries in the
civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth
certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children,
Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth
certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the following:
(a) correction in his birth certificate of the citizenship of his mother to
"Filipino" instead of "Chinese"
(b) Carlito’s second name of "John" be deleted from his record of birth;
(c) delete the "married" status of their parents from their respective birth
certificates
(d) the name and citizenship of Carlito’s father in his (Carlito’s) marriage
certificate be corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to
"Chinese,"
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that:
(a) the date of his and his wife’s marriage be corrected from April 27,
1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
(b) an additional correction in the birth certificates of Carlito’s children was
requested to the effect that the first name of their mother be rectified from
"Maribel" to "Marivel."
The petition was published for three consecutive weeks in Mindanao Daily
Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation, after which it was set
for hearing.
The trial court granted the request of the petitioner and directed the local
civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the respected
documents involved.
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the
CA. The CA denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought
by respondents were substantial in nature, they could only be granted
through an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as
Marivel and respondents’ parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
Issue:
WON Kho‘s request for change in the details of their birth certificates
requires an adversarial proceeding
Ruling:
NO. It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change
the citizenship of Carlito’s mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and
delete the "married" status of Carlito’s parents in his and his siblings’
respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of
Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a
harmless and innocuous nature.Rather, the changes entail substantial and
controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlito’s mother as reflected in
his birth certificate is a grave and important matter that has a bearing and
effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of
the offspring.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito’s and his siblings’ parents
were "married" alters their filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate," with
significant implications on their successional and other rights.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary
proceeding.
In Republic v. Valencia, however, the Court ruled, and has since
repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the
correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one
involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well
as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding
summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be
enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy
is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in
a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided
the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines adversary proceeding as “one having
opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application,
one of which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.”
The enactment in March 2001 of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known
as "An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul
General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or
Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of
Judicial Order," has been considered to lend legislative affirmation to the
judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of
persons recorded in the civil registry may be effected through the filing of
a petition under Rule 108.
Thus, the Court observed that the obvious effect of Republic Act No. 9048
is to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or
typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the
civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in
the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed,
the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial
corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a
thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only
the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world
that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be
minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole
world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear
and decide it.
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether Marivel
or respondents’ parents should have been impleaded as parties to the
proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention, however, that during the
hearing, the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG
did not raise any objection to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s
parents as parties to the proceeding.
The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
[151] KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
EDUARDO R. ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG
Facts:
May 2007, respondent Executive Secretary announced an appointment in
favor o Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up
the vacancy because of the retirement of Associate Justice Romeo Callejo
Sr. It was published the next day. In the following day, major daily
publications reported that the appointment was recalled by Malacañang
because of the citizenship in question of Gregory S. Ong. However, there is
no indication that the appointment was cancelled by the office of the
president. Executive Secretary then stated that the appointment is “still
there except that the validation of the issue is being done by the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC)
Petitioners contend that the appointment is unconstitutional, arbitrary,
whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners claim that Ong is a Chinese citizen as indicated in
his birth certificate. It revealed that his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng and
mother, Dy Guiok Santos were Chinese citizens. Petitioner’s asserts that -
NO person shall be appointed as Member of the Supreme Court unless he
is a natural born citizen in accordance with the constitution. Petitioners
also invoke that even though the respondent’s father was granted
naturalization, it would not make respondent a natural born citizen.
Petitioners further argue that respondent Ong’s birth certificate speaks for
itself and it states his nationality as "Chinese" at birth. They invoke the
Civil Code:
Article 410 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]he books making up the civil
register and all documents relating thereto x x x shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained." Therefore, the entry in Ong’s birth
certificate indicating his nationality as Chinese is prima facie evidence of
the fact that Ong’s citizenship at birth is Chinese.
Article 412 of the Civil Code also provides that "[N]o entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order." Thus, as
long as Ong’s birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, the
Judicial & Bar Council, as well as the whole world, is bound by what is
stated in his birth certificate.2
That the birth certificate, prevails over Ong’s new Identification certificate
issued by the Bureau of Immigration stating that he is a natural born
Filipino. They also assert that the DOJ does not have the power to alter
entries in a birth certificate; that the old ID of Ong did not indicate that he
is a natural born citizen and that the respondents action is to correct his
citizenship as it appears in his birth certificate.
Respondent Exec. Secretary filed his Comment, stating that the
appointment of Ong was made by the president pursuant to the powers
vested in her by Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution. Resp also said
that the President just selected from the list of nominees who were
screened by the JBC.
Ong submitted his comment maintaining that he is a natural born citizen
and that the issue should be addressed to he JBC as the body mandated to
screen the nominees for judicial posts.(may facts about sa ancestral line ni
Ong na mag prove na natural born sya, di ko na sinama since di naman
important).
Issue:
Whether Gregory Ong is qualified to be appointed as a Supreme Court
Justice
Ruling:
NO (NOT YET pala)
This case is of primordial importance. The court is the proper forum for
resolving this issue even if the JBC has the initial competence to do so.
As to the principle issue on whether or not Ong is a natural born citizen,
the court took notice of the records of Ong when he was admitted to the
bar. In Ong’s petition, he alleged that he is qualified to enter the bar
because he is a Filipino citizen and his parents are naturalized Filipino
citizens. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, he submitted
his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. His birth
certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth and his father,
Eugenio Ong Han Seng was also a Chinese citizen.
It was based on the evidence that was submitted by Ong that this court
allowed him to be part of the bar and take oath as a lawyer.
It is clear therefore that in the records of this court, respondent Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his
natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot
amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and
his mother were naturalized along with his father.
Furthermore, as petitioners correctly submit, no substantial change or
correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial
order, and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial
change.
Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are
substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action
depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all
the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented
and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and
proof to the contrary admitted.
Respondent Gregory S. Ong, who is hereby enjoined from accepting an
appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or
assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he
shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the
appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-
born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship
Rule 108 Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registrar
[152] REPUBLIC VS.BELMONTE
FACTS:
Anita Po filed a Petition for the change of name from Anita Po to Veronica
Pao.S he also sought court permission to have her birth records corrected
that her father's name appearing as PO YU be corrected to PAO YU and her
mother's name recorded as PAKIAT CHAN be changed to HELEN CHAN. At
the time the litigation was commenced, the petitioner was a 16-year old
minor. Thus, she was assisted in the case by her mother.
The petitioner alleged before the trial court that the maiden name of her
mother is Helen Chan and that the given name Pakiat written on her birth
certificate is actually the given name of her maternal grandmother. The
petitioner also asserted that the name of her father is Pao Yu and not Po
Yu as erroneously written in her birth certificate and as such her real
surname is Pao. She assigns these alleged errors to the common
misunderstanding of Chinese names. The petitioner also averred that she
had been baptized by a Catholic priest and that she was christened as
Veronica Pao, the first being her Christian given name and the latter being
the correct spelling of her surname; that since her childhood up to the
present, she had always been known and referred to as Veronica Pao and
not Anita Po. The trial court, with respondent Judge Belmonte ruled in
favor of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a change of name and the correction
of certain entries in the civil registry be joined in the same proceeding.
RULING:
No. Until the name of her father is shown to have been registered in her
birth certificate erroneously, there is no justification for allowing the
petitioner to use the surname Pao. The corrections sought by the
petitioner involve the very Identity of her parents. Surely, the propriety of
such corrections should first be determined in a different proceeding more
adversary in character than the summary case instituted by the petitioner
with the trial court. This she may not do through a summary proceeding.
The summary procedure for correction of the civil register under Rule 108
is confined to innocuous or clerical errors and not to a material change in
the spelling of a surname as prayed for by the petitioner.
Moreover, under Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest should be made parties to the proceeding.
An inspection of all the pleadings filed by the petitioner with the trial court
shows that the local civil registrar concerned was never made a party to
the proceeding. Said civil registrar being an indispensable party, a final
determination of the case cannot be made.
The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule
108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other
for the sole purpose of expediency
[153] TAN v. CIVIL REGISTRAR
FACTS:
Hubert Tan Co and his sister Arlene Tan Co filed a petition under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court for correction of entries in their certificates of birth.
They alleged that:
a. They were born in the Philippines and the legitimate children of CO
BOON PENG;
b.Co Boon Peng, who is formerly a citizen of China, applied for Philippine
citizenship under LOI No. 270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship by
naturalization under Presidential Decree No. 1055 and had taken his oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in 1977.
c. At the time of birth of the petitioners, their father CO BOON PENG was
still a Chinese citizen that is why entry in their respective birth certificates
as to their fathers citizenship was Chinese;
d. Upon granting of Philippine citizenship by naturalization to Co Boon
Peng in 1977, the petitioners who were born in the Philippines and still
minors at that time became Filipino citizens through the derivative mode
of naturalization.
The Solicitor General asserts that the petitioners contention that the
naturalization of their father is an event affecting and concerning their civil
status envisaged in Article 407 of the Civil Code has no legal basis. The
correction sought and allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court must
be one that reflects a fact existing before or at the time of birth.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners recourse to Rule 108 is appropriate
RULING:
YES.
[154] MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and
JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA vTHE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
HIMAMAYLAN CITY (2009)
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo SicadBraza, Jr.
(Pablo), also known as "PablitoSicadBraza," were married on January 4,
1978. Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung,
West Java, Indonesia.During the wake following the repatriation of his
remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began
introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as
her and Pablo's son.
Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained
Patrick's birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental with the following entries:

Under Article 412 of the New Civil Code, no entry in a civil register shall be Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR
changed or corrected without a judicial order. The law does not provide for
a specific procedure of law to be followed. But the Court approved Rule Date of Birth : 01 January 1996
108 of the Rules of Court to provide for a procedure to implement the law.
Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular
Specific matters covered by Article 407 and 408 include not only status but
also nationality.The acts, events or factual errors envisaged in Article 407 Father : Pablito S. Braza
of the New Civil Code include even those that occur after the birth of the
Date Received at the January 13, 1997
petitioner. However, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth
Local Civil Registrar :
will not be corrected or changed. The decision of the court granting the
petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of Annotation : "Late Registration"
the civil register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar.
Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father
Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not qualify as to the kind of entry to PablitoBraza on January 13, 1997"
be changed or corrected or distinguished on the basis of the effect that the
correction or change may be. Such entries include not only those clerical in Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent
nature but also substantial errors. After all, the role of the Court under marriage of parents on April 22,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about the facts 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child
recorded therein. shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular
Braza (Emphasis and underscoring
In this case, the petitioners alleged in their petition that they are the
supplied)
legitimate children of Co Boon Peng, who was naturalized as a Filipino
citizen, but that their certificates of birth still indicate that he is a Chinese Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that
national. In view of their fathers naturalization, they pray that the entries Pablo and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-
in their certificates of birth relating to the citizenship of their father be petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of
changed from Chinese to Filipino. Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the
birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil Register.
Thus, the petitioners recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is appropriate. Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on
account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and
Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's
birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and
his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive
to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and
filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as
stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
The trial court dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a
special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as
a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to
annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick,
and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy
should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of
marriage and questions on legitimacy even in an action to correct entries
in the civil registrar. They contend that even substantial errors, such as
those sought to be corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a
petition under Rule 108.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s contention is meritorious.
HELD:
No, petitioner’s contention is without merit.
In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and
filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts
the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or
corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used
only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a
mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of
name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of
the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and
due process is properly observed.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the
correction of Patrick’s birth records and that the rest of the prayers are
merely incidental thereto.
Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek
the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous
and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not
by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15,
2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition
should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack
such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
[155] GERBERT CORPUZ vs STO. TOMAS 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner GerbertCorpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship married respondent DaisilynSto. Tomas, a Filipina, in
Pasig City. Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. When he
returned to the Philippines and discovered that his wife was having an
affair with another man, he filed a petition for divorce before the Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada which granted the petition for
divorce.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree.
Gerbert also filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisylyn did not
file any responsive pleading and offered no opposition to the petition.
The RTC denied the petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the
proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only
the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks
for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision
applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse.
ISSUE: Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
RULING:
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of
the Filipino spouse.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law “to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.”
The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying
his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the
alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was
correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can
claim no right under this provision.
Remedy Available to Alien Spouse
The availability under Art 26(2) of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip the alien spouse of legal interest to petition the RTC for
the recognition of his foreign divorce decree
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with
the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence in favor of the alien spouse,
pursuant to Sec. 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgment (Rules of Court,Sec. 48, Rule 39 and Sec.
24 Rule 132)
In this case, the SC considered the recording of the divorce decree on
Corpuz and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate as legally improper. No
judicial order yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree, thus, the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree of Corpuz
and Sto. Tomas' marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Corpuz
RULE 102: Habeas Corpus
[156] Gonzales v Viola (1935)
Facts:
On January 18, 1935, at about 11:30 a.m., appellant was placed under
arrest by order of the appellees and detained in the municipal jail of San
Miguel, Province of Bulacan; that a few hours later a criminal complaint
was filed by the appellee Maniquis against the appellant in the justice of
the peace court of the aforesaid municipality; and that on the same day,
at about 8 p.m., he was released on bail. When the hearing on the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus was had in the court below the appellant was
already out on bail.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for writ of
habeas corpus of herein appellant
Ruling:
In passing upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a court of judge
must first inquire whether the petitioner is restrained of his liberty. If he is
not, the writ will be refused. Only where such restraint obtains is the court
required to inquire into the cause of the detention, and if the alleged cause
is found to be unlawful then the writ should be granted and the petitioner
discharged. (Code of Civil Procedure, sections 525, 541; Wales vs.
Whitney, 114 U.S., 564; 29 Law. ed., 277.)
The law is well settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained of his
liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. The restraint of liberty
which would justify the issuance of the writ must be more than a mere
moral restraint; it must be actual or physical. "There is no very
satisfactory definition to be found in the adjudged cases, of the character
of the restraint or imprisonment suffered by a party applying for the writ
of habeas corpus, which is necessary to sustain the writ. This can hardly
be expected from the variety of restraints for which it is used to give relief.
Confinement under civil and criminal process may be so relieved. Wives
restrained by husbands, children withheld from the proper parent or
guardian, persons held under arbitrary custody by private individuals, as in
a mad-house, as well as those under military control, may all become
proper subjects of relief by the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously, the
extent and character of the restraint which justifies the writ must vary
according to the nature of the control which is asserted over the party in
whose behalf the writ is prayed. ... Something more than moral restraint is
necessary to make a case for habeas corpus. There must be actual
confinement or the present means of enforcing it." (Wales vs. Whitney,
supra.)Under the circumstances of the present case, the court below would
have been justified in refusing the writ solely on the ground that the
appellant was not, within the meaning of section 525 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, deprived or restrained of his liberty; and upon that very ground
the order appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
[157] In Re: Reynaldo de Villa
FACTS:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule
102 of the Rules of Court.
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v.
Reynaldo de Villa, we found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen
Mendoza, his niece by affinity. As summarized in our Decision, Aileen
Mendoza charged petitioner Reynaldo de Villa with rape in an information
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
During the trial, the prosecution established that at about 10:00 in the
morning, Aileen woke up in her family’s rented room to find petitioner on
top of her. Aileen was then aged 12 years and 10 months. She was unable
to shout for help because petitioner covered her mouth with pillow and
threatened to kill her. Petitioner succeeded in inserting his penis inside her
vagina and ejaculated afterwards. This encounter allegedly resulted in
Aileen’s pregnancy. Aileen parents then brought her to the police station
and lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner.
In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he
was already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had rendered him
incapable of having an erection. He further averred that Aileen’s family
had been holding a grudge against him, which accounted for the criminal
charges. Finally, he interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that at the
time of the incident, he was in his hometown of San Luis, Batangas.
The RTC found the petitioner guilty for the crime of qualified rape. Upon
automatic review, the lower court’s decision was affirmed.
Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more
faced with the question of Reynaldo de Villas guilt or innocence.
Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He
alleges that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a
scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the
father of the victims child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed
during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioner’s case that DNA
testing could resolve the issue of paternity.
Thus, petitioner’s brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood
type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child
allegedly conceived as a result of the rape. This relief was implicitly denied
in our Decision of February 21, 2001.On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once
more prayed that DNA tests be conducted. The Motion was denied with
finality in a Resolution dated November 20, 2001. Hence, the Decision
became final and executory on January 16, 2002.
Having been informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be
extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a
grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask
Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup.Leahlyn readily agreed and did so.
Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to the petitioner-relator, who
immediately labeled the cup as Container A.
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of
Reynaldo de Villa. These samples were placed in separate containers with
distinguishing labels and temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to
transport to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research
Institute (NSRI). During transport, the containers containing the saliva
samples were kept on ice.
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the
sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of
Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The
identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by
Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March
21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of
the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match
between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioners sample and those of
any of the other samples, including Leahlyn’s.
Hence, the instant petition for habeas corpus on the ground that: DNA
ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT PETITIONER DE
VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN MENDOZA; HIS CONVICTION FOR
RAPE, BASED ON THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS SIRED AS A RESULT OF
THE ALLEGED RAPE, CANNOT STAND AND MUST BE SET ASIDE.
ISSUE:
Whether the issuerose by petitioner-relator necessitates the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus
RULING:
NO.
In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to
collaterally attack the 2001 Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for
new trial is resorted to solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged
to be newly-discovered evidence. This Court is thus tasked to determine,
first, the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an
individual already convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a final and
executory judgment; and second, the propriety of granting a new trial
under the same factual scenario.
Discussion re Writ of Habeas Corpus:
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief for
those seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial of freedom of
movement. Very broadly, the writ applies to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which a person has been deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person has been withheld
from the person entitled thereto. Issuance of the writ necessitates that a
person be illegally deprived of his liberty. In the celebrated case of
Villavicencio v. Lukban, we stated that [a]ny restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of
movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s
liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot
be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or
tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or
ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the
proceedings.
Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the
writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a post-conviction
remedy. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that
review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such as when,
as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an
excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such
excess.
In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a
final judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a legal ground
on which to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the
deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court
imposing the sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed
upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek
the review of findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This relief is
far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings.
This Court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a
writ of error, and should not be thus used. The writ of habeas corpus,
whereas permitting a collateral challenge of the jurisdiction of the court or
tribunal issuing the process or judgment by which an individual is deprived
of his liberty, cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere errors
of trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction.
A habeas corpus petition reaches the body, but not the record of the case.
A record must be allowed to remain extant, and cannot be revised,
modified, altered or amended by the simple expedient of resort to habeas
corpus proceedings.
Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of
depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of
the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus; if at all, these errors must be corrected on certiorari or
on appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by law. In the past, this
Court has disallowed the review of a courts appreciation of the evidence in
a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, as this is not the
function of said writ.
We have been categorical in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas
corpus is not to be used as a substitute for another, more proper remedy.
Resort to the writ of habeas corpus is available only in the limited
instances when a court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction rendered a
judgment.
In the recent case ofCalvan v. Court of Appeals, we summarized the scope
of review allowable in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. We ruled that the writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to
interrupt the orderly administration of justice, can be invoked by the
attendance of a special circumstance that requires immediate action. In
such situations, the inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus would be
addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to
the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under which a person
has been restrained is a complete nullity. The probe may thus proceed to
check on the power and authority, itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction,
of the court or the judge to render the order that so serves as the basis of
imprisonment or detention. It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of
conviction, which makes it susceptible to collateral attack through the
filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Application to the case:
Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of People v. de
Villa, we find that the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
First, the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner.
A careful scrutiny of the records does not reveal any constitutional right of
which the petitioner was unduly deprived.
In this instance, we note that the record is replete with errors committed
by counsel, and it can be alleged that the petitioner was, at trial, denied
the effective aid of counsel. The United States Supreme Court requires a
defendant alleging incompetent counsel to show that the attorney’s
performance was deficient under a reasonable standard, and additionally
to show that the outcome of the trial would have been different with
competent counsel. The purpose of the right to effective assistance of
counsel is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.
In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal, the
petitioners counsel of record, a certain Atty. Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly
and inexplicably withdrew his appearance as counsel, giving the sole
explanation that he was leaving for the United States for an indefinite
period of time by virtue of a petition filed in his favor. In the face of this
abandonment, petitioner made an impassioned plea that his lawyer be
prevented from this withdrawal. Petitioner alleged that his counsel’s
withdrawal is an untimely and heartbreaking event, considering that he
had placed all [his] trust and confidence on [his counsels] unquestionable
integrity and dignity.
While we are sympathetic to petitioners plight, we do not, however, find
that there was such negligence committed by his earlier counsel so as to
amount to a denial of a constitutional right. There is likewise no showing
that the proceedings were tainted with any other jurisdictional defect.
In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus to seek a re-examination of the records of People v. de
Villa, without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all intents and
purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his
conviction. We are being asked to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of
the evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA
evidence that the petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This relief is
outside the scope of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas
corpus must, therefore, fail.
[158] Angeles vs Director of New Bilibid Prison
Facts:
In People v. Angeles,this Court affirmed the trial court's decision
convicting accused Rolando Angeles y Bombita of the offense he was
charged with, sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as
"shabu," punishable under Section 15, Article III, of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
Angeles has lodged a petition for habeas corpus, invoking Republic
Act No. 7659, which has reduced the penalties prescribed under the
original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the recent ruling of
this Court in People vs. Martin Simon y Sunga,which has confirmed the
retroactive application of the above-numbered amendatory law.
Petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, selling and
delivering 0.13 grams of shabu. Conformably with the second paragraph of
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 7659 and as construed and applied in People v. Simon,
the newly prescribed penalty for his offense would now only be prison
correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of
indeterminate penalty on petitioner, modified accordingly, should thereby
be from six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years
of prision correccional as maximum.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be granted?
Ruling: No due to being premature.
Angeles' petition for habeas corpus cannot be granted. Petitioner,
it appears, has only served the minimum of his sentence.
While the instant petition for habeas corpus should be DISMISSED
for its prematurity, the Court, nonetheless, expresses its concern over the
plight of persons convicted for drug-related offenses prior to the
enactment and effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 who, like herein
petitioner, could be entitled to parole for having served their minimum
sentences, or who, indeed, may due for release from confinement after
having served their maximum sentences conformably with the applicable
penalties newly prescribed by republic Act No. 7659 and our decision,
construing this law, in the Simon case. Aware of the need to have this
matter attended to with great dispatch, the Court sees it fit to take the
opportunity, by way of extraordinary measures, to pronounce thusly:
“All courts of competent jurisdiction must entertain petitions for habeas
corpus to consider the release of prisoners convicted for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act who have served the maximum of the applicable
penalties newly prescribed by Republic Act No. 7659. In this regard, the
formalities required for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed
liberally, and such petitions, although deficient in form (e.g. in letter-
petition forms), may be entertained so long as they are sufficient in
substance. In the negative, the courts to which the petitions are filed may
refer the matter to the Commission on Human Rights or to the Public
Attorney's Office for possible assistance to the prisoners concerned.”
[159] TIJING VS. CA
Facts:
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of
midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila.
Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent
Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to
fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to
do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She
also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita
as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was
doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr.,
were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo,
Manila, but did not find them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that
her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later.
She returned to Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that
Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida and her husband looked
for their missing son but they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas
Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains
were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.Bienvenida lost no time in going to
Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the
first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to
her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already
named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to
her the boy despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial
court in order to recover their son. For her part, Angelita claimed that she
is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave
birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife
ZosimaPanganiban in Singalong, Manila. She said the birth of John Thomas
was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local
civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.
The trial court concluded that Edgardo Tijing, Jr. and John Thomas Lopez
are one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners. The
trial court granted the petition for Habeas Corpus. The Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The
appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.
Issue/s:
(1) WON Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the
same person and is the son of petitioners
(2) WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy
Ruling:
(1) YES. A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the
evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John
Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
 There is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children.
From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her second
child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970,
before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage
in 1974.
 There is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez
is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in
court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident
and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only
an adopted son.
 It is unusual that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was
filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4,
1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the
law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth
should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the
physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child.
The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within
thirty days after the birth.
 The trial court observed several times that when the child and
Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in
their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance
between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material
evidence to establish parentage. Needless to stress, the trial
court's conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the
opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and
petitioner concerned.
 Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving
birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private
respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log
book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.
All these considered, the Court is constrained to rule that subject minor is
indeed the son of petitioners.
(2) YES.The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said
child.In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the
propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first whether the
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same
minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her
offspring.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases
involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty
is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy.
Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody
over a child.It must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the
question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual
presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
[160] IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING,
Facts:
Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal
Security Act. He was then turned over to the PNP-IG and Task Force
Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the RTC of Isabela
City, Basilan. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for
Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with said RTC.
Petitioner was flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp
Crame for booking and custodial investigation. Atty. Danipog, Jr. informed
the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the
custody of the PNP-IG. He requested for Kunting’s temporary detention
due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the issuance of a
corresponding commitment order which was granted.
Consequently, Director Lomibao wrote a letter to DOJ, requesting for
transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City,for
possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG(Abu Sayaf Gropd) if
he will be detained in Basilan.
Meanwhile, RTC rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-accused in the
consolidated Criminal Cases but denied his Motion to Set Case for
Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned him. The trial
court reiterated its Order, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief,
Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.
Subsequently, Police Chief Superintendent Rafanan reiterated the request
to DOJ to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kunting’s case.
Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus stating that he has been restrained of his liberty. He stated that
since no action was taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he filed this
petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the records as
"for safekeeping purposes only."
Issue:
Whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.
Ruling:
NO
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not
allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in
the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued
by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of
arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City,
Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
was thus authorized by the trial court. Moreover, Kunting was charged
with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention in
Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165.
In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot
be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged
with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals holds that "once the
person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
[161] VELASCO VS. CA
FACTS: A warrant of arrest was against accused Lawrence Larkins in
violations of B.P. Blg. 22.On 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea filed before
(NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape thus, they
arrested the latter, who was positively identified by Alinea as her rapist.
Larkins posted his bail4,000.00, Judge Padolina forthwith issued an order
setting aside the warrant of arrest. Investigators Resurreccion and Erum
refused to release Larkins because he was still detained for the crime of
rape for which he would be held for inquest.
Larkins, through his counsel Mauricio C. Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for
Bailwherein he alleged, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is
not strong; that he is entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that he has
no intention of going out of the country or hiding away from the
law.Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty. Te, filed an Urgent Omnibus
Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release,
principally based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. The trial
court denied the motions. Larkins' common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag,
filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus with
certiorari. Impleaded as respondents were the herein petitioners and
Judge Caballes.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for Habeas Corpus will prosper?
RULING: No. SC ordered the immediate release of Larkins from his
present confinement on the ground that the complaint presented to the
NBI by complainant Desiree Alinea on the basis of which Larkins was
detained without a warrant of arrest for rape did not meet the legal
requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Concededly, the private respondent has the personality to institute the
habeas corpus case on behalf of her common-law spouse, Lawrence
Larkins, as she falls within the purview of the term "some person" under
Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, which means any person who
has a legally justified interest in the freedom of the person whose liberty is
restrained or who shows some authorization to make the application. She
is not, however, the real party in interest in the certiorari aspect of the
petition. Only Larkins could institute a petition for certiorari to set aside
the order denying his motions for bail and for the dismissal of the
complaint against him.
It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an
application for a writ of habeas corpus will absolutely be barred. While
ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when there is an
adequate remedy by writ of error or appeal it may, nevertheless, be
available in exceptional cases.
[W]e hold that petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and
their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a
process issued by a competent court of justice. The rule is, that if a person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of
habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of
Court,providing that:Sec. 4. . . . Nor shall anything in this rule be held
to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering from imprisonment under
lawful judgment.28
Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the
reason that no probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the
defendant waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and
giving bond.While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days
after the filing of the Urgent Motion for Bail, Larkins, thru a new counsel,
filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for
Immediate Release based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest,
the said motion was a mere afterthought which came too late in the day.
By then, the trial court had firmly acquired jurisdiction over his
person.Moreover, the trial court's order of 5 January 1995 denying the
urgent motion for bail was an unequivocal assertion of its authority to
keep in custody the person of Larkins.
Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus will not prosper because his detention has
become legal by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the complaint
against him and by the issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.
[162]CABALLES v. PEOPLE
FACT: Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of a minor. The
prosecution declared that one of their witnesses will be Dr. Jose Arnel
Marquez, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory, who had conducted a medico-legal examination of the
private complainant, but stated that he had not been subpoenad. The
prosecution prayed for the cancellation of the trial scheduled on April 21,
2003 to give the prosecution time to secure and cause the service of
a subpoena duces tecum on him.
A petition for bail was filed by Caballes. Due to numerous resetting of
hearing, Caballes filed a motion to dismiss alleging violation of his right to
speedy trial.
Thereafter, the court the denied the petition for bail and the said motion.
(Judge Laurea filed issued an order inhibiting himself from hearing the
case to avoid being misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for probity
and objectivity and to live up to the ideal impartial administration of
justice.)
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition
for Habeas Corpus assailing the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion
to dismiss the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the
voluntary inhibition of Judge Laurea. The CA issued a Resolution requiring
the petitioner to inform the court of his choice of remedy within five (5)
days from notice thereof. In compliance therewith, the petitioner filed a
manifestation with the appellate court that he had chosen his petition to
be treated as a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice to the
concomitant application of certiorari if the court considered the same
necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ of habeas corpus.CA:
dismiss the petition for improper remedy
ISSUEWhether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas
corpus is correct and proper remedy
RULING: No. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a
special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as
substitute for the trial courts function. It cannot take the place of appeal,
certiorari or writ of error.
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus is a remedy different from the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the processes, orders,
or judgment of the trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack of said
processes, orders, or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A
writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors. It has no other use,
except to bring before the court a record material to be considered in
exercising jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches the record. On the other
hand, a writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also
reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record. However,
when jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to
bring the body of the person whose liberty is involved into court, and if it
is necessary, to provide the record upon which the detention is based, that
may be accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as an ancillary
proceeding, i.e., it is subordinate to or in aid of the primary action for the
purpose of impeaching the record. When a writ of certiorari is issued as
the foundation of jurisdiction to bring it and direct upon the validity of a
judicial determination by anybody or officer, jurisdictional questions only
are reached, and such questions pertaining to the detention made by the
officer or body particularly complained of.
Thus, the petition for habeas corpuswas not the proper remedy to review
and examine the proceedings before the trial court and as a relief from the
petitioners perceived oppressive situation in the trial court.
[163] IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO v ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER,
SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES (2001)
FACTS:
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly
inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the
Court of Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in
consortium.
Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live
with her in consortium and that Potenciano's mental state was not an
issue. However, the very root cause of the entire petition is her desire to
have her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she
wanted PotencianoIlusorio to live with her.
One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was
that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining
PotencianoIlusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of
pure greed. She claimed that her two children were using their sick and
frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies
controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired
as director and officer of Baguio Country Club and Philippine Oversees
Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control.
Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.15
The Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition. The
fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court
of Appeals on March 23, 1999.Potenciano himself declared that he was not
prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that he had no
objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the fact of illegal restraint has
not been proved during the hearing.
HELD:
No, the CA did not err. The SC deniedErlinda's motion for reconsideration.
At any rate, the case has been rendered moot by the death of subjecton
June 28, 2001.
The SC were not convinced that PotencianoIlusorio was mentally
incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a
question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals.
As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation,
these are matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding,
irrelevant in habeas corpus.
Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely
on the facts found by the Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts
mentioned in the decision were erroneous and incomplete. We see no
reason why the High Court of the land need go to such length. The
hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower courts are
conclusive on the Supreme Court. We emphasize, it is not for the Court to
weigh evidence all over again. Although there are exceptions to the
rule, Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance.
Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and
69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses, they
(Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each
other. We agree. The law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.20 The
sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband
and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce
consortium.21
However, obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses
Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972.
We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife
experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
[164] FERIA VS CA
Facts: After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy
of the judgment, was lost or destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the SC against the Jail Warden of
the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court
of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from
confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid
judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the
records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor
authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would
be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the
court which rendered the decision.
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy
of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered by the trial court and
Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the
contents of such judgment.
In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than
sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioner’s continued
incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized.
Issue: WON there is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction
or loss of his criminal records.
Held: Yes.
The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. It secures to a
prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and
determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to
whether he is held under lawful authority.
Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of
a judicial proceeding,
(a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
restraint of a person,
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or
(c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to
such excess.
Petitioner’s claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims,
that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid
judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due
process.
Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is
sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of
petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent
rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where
the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process
which on its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is
incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to
invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the
prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered
prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has
the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.
When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who
is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral
attack by habeas corpus.
A.M. 7-9-12-SC Rules on the Writ of Amparo
[166] Secretary of Defense vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October
7, 2008
Facts:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men
belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and
supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the
brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction,
and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents
from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While
the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on
October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and
omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the
writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the
Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all
official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody,
confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials
involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo
brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense
and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse
and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA.
Issue: Whether the grant of Writ of Amparo is proper
Ruling:
Yes.
First, as to the Writ’s origin and nature, the Court said: “The writ of
amparo originated in Mexico.
‘Amparo’ literally means ‘protection’ in Spanish.” Amparo “combines the
principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on
judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in
Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting
individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this
power to make law for the entire nation.” Through time, adoption and
adaptations in some other places, it has also begun to assume different
forms for different purposes – (1) amparo libertad for the protection of
personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo
contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3)
amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality
of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the judicial review of
administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the protection of
peasants’ rights derived from the agrarian reform process.
In the Philippines, before the adoption of the Amparo Rules, we had the
constitutional guarantee of right to life, liberty and security under the Due
Process Clause and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
(Art. II, §§1 and 2), enforceable by means of the writ of habeas corpus
(Art. III, §15) as well as the Grave Abuse Clause46 (Art. VIII, §1, ¶2). On
the Grave Abuse Clause, the Court said:
“The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended
by the amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion, and amparo administrativo.
Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in
several provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Clause is an offspring of
the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in
the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.”
But the means then available were obviously inadequate remedy to
pressing problems of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
which cried out for better solutions. Thus, the writ of amparo. “While
constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause
through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102, these remedies
may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required
to resolve a petition for a writ of amparo through summary proceedings
and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the
Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions –
borne out of the Latin
American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses – offers a
better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and
threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require
full and exhaustive proceedings.”
In fine, amparo writ serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. The Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances.”
Its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof.
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand,
enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics:
an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the
fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection
of law.
The writ of amparo is available to those whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation.
So what does the right entail?
“The right to security or the right to securityof person finds a textual
hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.” This guarantees
immunity of one’s person, including the extensions of his/her person –
houses, papers, and effects – against government intrusion. And while the
right to life guarantees essentially the right to be alive– upon which the
enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned – the right to security of
person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life. So, what in more
concrete terms are included within the right to security? The Court spoke
of the permutations of the right to security. The first would be freedom
from fear. “In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, ‘freedom from
fear’ is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security
is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a
stimulus, a cause of action. . . . Thus, in the amparo context, it is more
correct to say that the ‘right to security’ is actually the ‘freedom from
threat.’” Viewed in this light, the “threatened with violation” Clause in the
latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the
right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.” The
second is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security. “Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of
the body.”
Also, “[p]hysical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of
bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the
victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes
an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the
human person includes the exercise of free will.” The third is a guarantee
of protection of one’s rights by the government. “The right to
security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the
State ‘guarantees full respect for human rights’ under Article II, Section 11
of the 1987 Constitution. . . .
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings
or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice.” And, must there be a prior
deprivation of liberty? No. “[T]here need not necessarily be a deprivation
of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.”
How fares the petition in the instant case? On the aspect about “freedom
from threat” the Court held: “[T]he circumstances of respondents’
abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion
that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured,
and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.” With
regard to the right to Government protection, the Court observed:
“Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to
respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and
torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation
of respondents’ abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation
report of petitioners’ own witness, . . . The one-day investigation
conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided.”
Further, “almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner
Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not
been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek
through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.” The Court concluded:
“Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the
conclusion that there is a violation of respondents’ right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government.” In other words,
“respondents’ right to security as ‘freedom from threat’ is violated by the
apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to
security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise
violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the
military.”
So what reliefs are available?
One would be the production by the responsible officials and persons of
all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, all medical reports, records and charts,
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed,
if any, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and
civilian) who attended to the brothers while in detention. And, in this
regard, the Court clarified the nature of an amparo production order. “The
production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a
search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people
from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the
government from the demand of the people such as respondents. Instead,
the amparo production order may be likened to the production of
documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.”
Another relief is the disclosure of the present places of official
assignments of identified military personnel who might have had
something to do with the abduction, detention and torture of the amparo
petitioners. “The disclosure of the present places of assignment of [two
military men] whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators
behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of
respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such
disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served
with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action
for violation of the respondents’ rights.”
[167] Canlas v Napico
FACTS:
The present petition seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo on the ground
that petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to
shelter enshrined and embodied in our Constitution, as the result of these
nefarious activities of both the private and public respondents.
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated
in Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have either
been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be
demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein petitioners, by way of the
said prayer for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled
Land Officials be summoned to answer their participation in the issuances
of these fraudulent and spurious titles, NOW, in the hands of the private
respondents.
What the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Courts dismissal
of petitions in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038; hence, there’s
a prior case which the Court dismissed against herein petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the Writ of Amparo prayed for shall be granted.
RULING
No. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final
judgment of the court is not included among the enumeration of
rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the
remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to
their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final
and executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute
right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal
basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the
land in question is not alleged in the petition at all. No writ of
amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the
supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be
protected.
The court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition, only
if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in
this case, the writ will not be issued and the petition will be
dismissed outright.
This new remedy of writ of amparo, which is made available by
this Court, is intended for the protection of the highest possible
rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and
security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part
in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the
Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters
not covered by the writ.
[168] Tapuz vs Hon. Del Rosario
Facts: The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes
T. Sanson filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-
Malay, Aklan a complaint dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against the petitioners and other John Does numbering about
120.The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are
the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of
land (disputed land); (2) they were the disputed lands prior possessors
when the petitioners armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms
and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the
disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents
permission and against the objections of the private respondents security
men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
The petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. They
essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of
the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the
intruders; and (3) the private respondents certificate of title to the
disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the
complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC made a decisionin the private respondents favor. It found prior
possession the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private
respondents favor. The private respondents were in actual physical
possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted
by the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the
Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with view
of inhabiting the same and building structures therein prompting plaintiff
Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack
L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapao. As a result of their
confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex D, Complaint p.
20) wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in
question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of
January 4, 2005 when the private respondents posted security guards,
however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the
petitioners some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain
firearms with other John Does numbering about 120 persons by force and
intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road and built
a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex E, Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in
question which incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities as
shown by plaintiffs Certification (Annex F, Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in
the police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a
complaint with the Office of
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island,
Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate
to File Action (Annex G, Complaint, p. 13).
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC, Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge NiovadyM.
Marin (Judge Marin).
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order
dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private
respondents posting of a bond. The writauthorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision was actually issued by respondent
Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the respondent Judge) on 12 March 2007 after
the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The
petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private
respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of
Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for Review (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order
of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to
Vacate and for Demolition on 19 March 2008.
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present
petition last 29 April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three
remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo under
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Issue: Whether or not the Writ of Amparo filed herein is proper?
Ruling: No. It is not proper.
Writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary
rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to
the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a
writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its
issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of
the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
***
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent,
and how such threat or violation is committed with
the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;
 (d) The investigation conducted, if any,
specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
***.
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat
to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party was or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the
factual allegations heretofore quoted,that are essentially repeated in
paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the
following documents:
(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena
B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez
and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of
the petitioners, id., petitioners prior possession, private
respondents intrusion and the illegal acts committed by
the private respondents and their security guards on 19
April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz,
alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.) committed by
a security guard against minors descendants of
Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao,
essentially corroborating Nemias affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police
Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of petitioners
intrusion into the disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police
Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation between
the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private
respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting
incident involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R.
Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by Josiel Tapuz,
Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente,
was accidentally burned by a fire.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn
and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of property issues as the
petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property
disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life
or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the
occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the
other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments
implied from the presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged
pointing and firing of weapons.Notably, none of the supporting
affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life,
liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them the
statements of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically
identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on
the other hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one
Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of two
residential houses was accidental.
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its
decision in the forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners factual
claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they
were made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and
evaluation of the contending parties positions, evidence and arguments
and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the
backdrop of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence
or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC;
subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still
much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results;
and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the
issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate,
may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with
the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the
issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a
continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents
alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the
disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in
the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings,
as our action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the
MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place,
but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though
unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of
justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not
intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider
too at this point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners
present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere
subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and
failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an
improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners
misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of forum
shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of
the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from
forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the
ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the
use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that
of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a
curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when
applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it
will inordinately interfere with these processes the situation obtaining in
the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of separate actions, for the
effect of earlier-filed criminal actions, and for the consolidation of petitions
for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and
civil action. These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for
dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the
parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly
with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and
harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through
a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the
right to life, liberty or security the personal concern that the writ is
intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an
application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a
pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions
on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
[169] SALCEDO vs. BOLLOZOS
NOTE: Yung ruling kasing Court naka-focus talagasa issues na
yanperosa syllabus yung case ay under SEC.2 about “Standing” so
itolangyungnasa OCA Recommendation:
“Nowhere in the records of the instant complaint that the issuance of the writ of
amparo was attended by irregularities. The detainees sister who filed the petition is allowed
under Section 2(b) of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (SC A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC). “
Kung applicable langyung writ of amparosa present case, may standing mag-file
yung sister n’yadahils’ya“Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved
party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.”
Facts:
The complaint arose from a verified handwritten petition for the Writ
of Habeas Corpus and the Writ of Amparo (the petition) filed by Jose
Tanmalack, Jr. against the Police Officers of Police Precinct No. 3, Agora,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, and Inspector WylenRojo. The complainant
alleged that he is a co-owner of a parcel of land (disputed property)
registered in the name of Patricio Salcedo.
On January 23, 2008 at around 2:30 p.m., while the complainant was
supervising an on-going construction over the disputed property,
Tanmalack and heavily armed men arrived and forced themselves inside
the fenced premises of the disputed property. The complainant averred
that Tanmalack and his companions harassed and threatened to kill and to
harm him and his workers.The complainant reported the incident to the
nearby police station. The police promptly responded and arrested
Tanmalack and brought him in for questioning. That same afternoon at
around 4:45 p.m., Tanmalack, represented by his sister, Jocelyn
Tanmalack Tan, filed the petitionon his behalf while Tanmalack was
detained by the police for employing self-help in preventing squatters from
putting up improvements in their titled property.
Based on the petition and answers to the clarificatory questions
propounded to Tanmalack’s representative and counsel, the respondent
judge immediately issued a Writ of Amparo dated January 23,
2008, directing the police officers to release immediately upon receipt of
the writ but not later than 6:00 P.M. today, petitioner Jose Tanmalack, Jr.,
to the custody of Atty. Francis V. Ku.
The complainant questions the issuance of the Writ of Amparo which he
claims had been unusually issued with haste and that the handwritten
petition did not give any ground to warrant the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo; that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion, bias, and obvious partiality, and in grave disregard of the Rules
and the rule of law when he acted upon and granted the letter-petition for
the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The complainant also alleges that the
respondent judge accommodated the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo because he and Atty. Francis Ku (Tanmalack’s counsel) are
members of the Masonic fraternity.
The respondent judge in his defense that alleged that; (a) when he
received the petition he had no option but to exercise his judicial duty
without any bias or partiality, nor did he consider that the petitioners
counsel is a fraternal brother (Mason); (b) The person who filed the
petition is the sister of Mr. Tanmalack who was detained and that the
issuance of the writ was a matter of great urgency because the alleged
illegal deprivation of liberty was made in the late afternoon of January 23,
2008, which was a Friday, and that if the Court would not act on the
petition, the detainee would certainly spend the night in jail; (c) the
petition, although in handwritten form, is not improper because Section 5
of the SC Circular (on the Writ of Amparo) only requires that the same be
signed and verified; that he found the petition sufficient in form and in
substance; (d) although the Amparo rules mandate that a judge shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue,
he propounded clarificatory questions on the petitioners representative
and their counsel and; (e) in the exercise of his judicial function, found
that the same warranted the issuance of the writ; the arrest of Mr.
Tanmalack was unlawful because Rojo was not present in the area where
the alleged incident happened, so that the statements of the complainants
would be hearsay.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the
administrative complaint against the respondent judge be dismissed for
lack of merit.
Issue/s:
(1) WON the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo
(2) WON the respondent judge couldbe held administratively liable in the
present case
Ruling:
(1) YES, the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ
of Amparo in Tanmalack’s favor. Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge would have realized
that the writ, in its present form, only applies to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The present case involves
concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature concerns that
we have previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo.
To start off with the basics, the Writ of Amparo was originally conceived as
a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective
remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as
an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under
the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it
is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous
and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in
line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the
issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to
wit:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the
respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or,
if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may
be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the
names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the
manner and conduct of the investigation, together with
any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat,
act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
In the present case, the Writ of Amparo ought not to have been issued by
the respondent judge since Tanmalack’s petition is fatally defective in
substance and content, as it does not allege that he is a victim of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or the threats thereof. The
petition merely states that he is under threat of deprivation of liberty with
the police stating that he is not arrested but merely in custody.
 (2) NO,the respondent judge could not be held administratively
liable for the error he committed in the present case.
Plainly, the errors attributed to respondent judge pertain to the exercise
of his adjudicative functions. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty, and corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability civil,
criminal, or administrative for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted
with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to
do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that
errors committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions
cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should
instead be assailed through judicial remedies.
In the present case, the propriety of the issuance of the Writ
of Amparo cannot be raised as an issue in the present administrative
case. The proper recourse for the complainant should have been to file an
appeal, from the final judgment or order of the respondent judge, to this
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to Section 19 of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The Court finds that the respondent judge’s error does not rise to
the level of gross ignorance of the law that is defined by jurisprudence. We
take judicial notice of the fact that at the time he issued the Writ
of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been
effective for barely three months (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became
effective on October 24, 2007). At that time, the respondent judge cannot
be said to have been fully educated and informed on the novel aspects of
the Writ of Amparo. Simply stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that
time cannot be said to be a simple, elementary, and well-known rule that
its patent disregard would constitute gross ignorance of the law.
[170] Razon, et. al., vs. Tagitis, et. al., G.R. No. 182498, February
16, 2010
P.S 2010 case yung na sa syllabus, pero sinama ko yung 2009 case
for context
2009 case
FACTS:
Engr. Morced N. Tagitis is a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior
Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Programme. He was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Kunnong and Muhammad
Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow
student counselor at the IDB reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo
Police Station.
More than a month later , the Mary B. Tagitis (Tagitis), Engr. Tagitis's wife,
filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the Court of Appeals
(CA). The petition was directed against certain members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP):
The petition avers that:
Soon after the Tagitis left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension
house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly
men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him. When
Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of
another IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police agency.
Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in
trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the
matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready
answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf
group;
Information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified
stated that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men; and
according to reliable information received by Tagitis, subject Engr. Tagitis
is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the
CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest
attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different
terrorist groups.
Tagitis filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in
Cotobato, in Jolo abd in PNP Headquarters in Camp Crame QC, seeking
their help to find her husband, but Tagitis's request and pleadings failed to
produce any positive results.
The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the petitioners to Tagitis's
request for help and failure and refusal of the petitioners to extend the
needed help, support and assistance in locating the whereabouts of Engr.
Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which is
almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are
actually in physical possession and custody of Engr. Tagitis.
Petitioners appealed the decision of the CA to the Supreme Court. Hence,
this petition
Issues:
1. Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the
ultimate facts, i.e. complete in every detail in stating the threatened or
actual violation of a victim’s rights, is indispensable in an amparo petition.
2. Whether or not the presentation of substantial evidence by the
petitioner to prove her allegations is sufficient for the court to grant the
privilege of the writ.
3. Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint
criminal culpability for the alleged enforced disappearance of the subject of
the petition for the writ.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. No.
REQUIREMENTS IN AN AMPARO PETITION
The requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts
must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which
addresses a situation of uncertainty – The framers of the Amparo Rule
never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory
pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting
the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo
petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and
purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the
petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim
exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him
or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may
purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity,
detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the
Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for
violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read
the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique
Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine
whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of
the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private
party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than
in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required
elements – namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and
the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security –
are present.
2. Yes
EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AN AMPARO PETITION
Burden of proof of Amparo petitioner – [T]he Amparo petitioner
needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements
of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations
by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the
standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show
that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a
violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and
the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately
respond.
Substantial evidence required in amparo proceedings – The
[characteristics of amparo proceedings] – namely, of being summary and
the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast
to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt
in court proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the framers of the
Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit
judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of
diligence required – the duty of public officials and employees to observe
extraordinary diligence – point, too, to the extraordinary measures
expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent
handling and investigation of extra- judicial killings and enforced
disappearance cases. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner
needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements
of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations
by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the
standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show
that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a
violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and
the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately
respond. The landmark case of AngTibay v. Court of Industrial Relations
provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence
required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To
directly quote AngTibay: Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The statute provides that ‘the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the
mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial
proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go
so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force.
Minor inconsistencies in the testimony should not affect the
credibility of the witness – As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these
indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to strengthen
their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses
dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that
the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well
thought of and prefabricated story.
Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence rule,
we must observe flexibility in considering the evidence we shall
take into account. The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to
consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to
consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual
rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most
basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the
issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it
satisfies this basic minimum test.
3. No
ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES in relation to THE WRIT OF AMPARO
The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance, rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability , for the enforced
disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies
to address the disappearance – [The writ of amparo is] a protective
remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life,
liberty and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive to
police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the
disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It
does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing
the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility
refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in
an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall
craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil
cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability,
on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating
to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these
cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our
primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of
the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its
directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and
jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may
promulgate – [T]he unique situations that call for the issuance of
the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to
address these situations, may not at all be the same as the
standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and
proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
(Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule
should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and
finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and
through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.
The concept of “enforced disappearances” is neither defined nor
penalized in this jurisdiction – The Amparo Rule expressly provides that
the “writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.” We note that although the writ specifically covers
“enforced disappearances,” this concept is neither defined nor penalized in
this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the
Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule
initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of
enforced disappearance: x xx In the end, the Committee took cognizance
of several bills filed in the House of Representatives and in the Senate on
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do
away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The
Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within
its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor,
mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing
legislative efforts. As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized
separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these
killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the
Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the
Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts
are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should
carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the
power to enact under the country’s constitutional scheme and power
structure. Source of the power of the Supreme Court to act on
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances – Even without the
benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to
act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate “rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts,” since extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private
party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and
security. Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such
does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal
protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the
procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the
procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to
act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the
obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference – even if only
procedurally – in a situation when the very same investigating public
authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of
constitutional rights.

DISPOSITIVE: P.s bali ito yung relief na binigay ng court kay
Tagitis - wife
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 7, 2008 under the following terms:
1. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an
enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
2. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and
responsibility, declaring the government (through the PNP and the PNP-
CIDG) and Colonel JulasirimAhadinKasim accountable for the enforced
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
3. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals
issued;
4. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its
Chief, directly responsible for the disclosure of material facts
known to the government and to their offices regarding the
disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct
of proper investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the
obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this Court;
5. Ordering Colonel JulasirimAhadinKasim impleaded in this case and
holding him accountable with the obligation to disclose
information known to him and to his “assets” in relation with the
enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
6. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG
investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the PNP
and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a plan of
action for further investigation, periodically reporting their results to the
Court of Appeals for consideration and action;
7. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report
with its recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-
CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at
the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
8. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake
their investigations; the Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the
consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the
finality of this Decision;
The abovementioned directives and those of the Court of Appeals’
made pursuant to this Decision were given to, and were directly
enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the
Philippine National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group, under pain of contempt from the Supreme Court when the
initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than
the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the
circumstances of this case demand.
2010 M/R case
Facts/Issue:
In relation to dispositive no. 5 Col. Kasim, died during a confrontation with
abu sayaf
p.s Si Col. Kasim was Tagiris unofficial source of the military intelligence
information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of
the CIDG
The other petitioners filed an M/R raising the ff. issue
1. That there was no sufficient evidence to conclude that Col. Kasims
disclosure unequivocally points to some government complicity in the
disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, the petitioners contend that this
Court erred in unduly relying on the raw information given to Col. Kasim
by a personal intelligence asset without any other evidence to support it
2. That Col. Kasims death renders impossible compliance with the Courts
directive in its December 3, 2009 decision that Col. Kasim be impleaded in
the present case and held accountable with the obligation to disclose
information known to him and to his assets on the enforced disappearance
of Tagitis.
Ruling:
1. Other pieces of evidence point the way towards the decision of SC,
particularly the unfounded and consistent denials by government
authorities of any complicity in the disappearance; the dismissive
approach of the police to the report of the disappearance; and the
haphazard handling of the investigation that did not produce any
meaningful results. In cruder but more understandable language, the run-
around given to the respondent and the government responses to the
request for meaningful investigation, considered in the light of the Kasim
evidence, pointed to the conclusion that the Tagitis affair carried a foul
smell indicative of government complicity or, at the very least, an attempt
at cover-up and concealment. This is the situation that the Writ of Amparo
specifically seeks to address.
2. Undisputably, this directive can no longer be enforced, and has been
rendered moot and academic, given Col. Kasim's demise. His intervening
death, however, does not necessarily signify the loss of the information
Col. Kasim may have left behind, particularly the network of assets he
utilized while he was in the service. Intelligence gathering is not an activity
conducted in isolation, and involves an interwoven network of informants
existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships with the police and the
military. It is not farfetched that a resourceful investigator, utilizing the
extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires, can
still access or reconstruct the information Col. Kasim received from his
asset or network of assets during his lifetime.
The extinction of Col. Kasims personal accountability and obligation to
disclose material information, known to him and his assets, does not also
erase the burden of disclosure and investigation that rests with the PNP
and the CIDG. Lest this Court be misunderstood, we reiterate that our
holding in our December 3, 2009 Decision that the PNP -- through the
incumbent PNP Chief; and the PNP-CIDG, through its incumbent Chief --
are directly responsible[14] for the disclosure of material facts known to
the government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of
Tagitis; and that the conduct of proper investigation using extraordinary
diligence still subsists. These are continuing obligations that will not truly
be terminated until the enforced disappearance of the victim, Engr. Morced
N. Tagitis, is fully addressed by the responsible or accountable parties, as
we directed in our Decision.
[171] Yano vs. Sanchez
FACTS:
CleofasSanchez and MarcianaMedina alleged that on September 17, 2006
at around 8:00 p.m., their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez and Heherson
Medina were catching frogs outside their home, at around 1:00 a.m. of the
next day, Nicolas wives Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, heard gunshots and
saw armed men in soldiers uniforms, at around 4:00 a.m. of the same
day, Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on Nicolas and Heherson but
only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for catching frogs, as well as
bloodstains.
Respondents alleged that Josephine Galanginformed them that she had
seen two men inside Camp Aquino of the (Nolcom) in Tarlac City on
September 21, whom she later identified as Nicolas and Hehersonafter
respondents shown her their photographs; and she saw the victims again
on September 24 and November 1, at Camp of the Armys 71 st IB inside
Hacienda Luisita, where she had occasion to talk to Lt. Sumangil and Sgt.
Villalobos.
Contending that the victims life, liberty and security had been and
continued to be violated on account of their forced disappearance,
respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of Amparo.
The military officers denied having custody of the victims. They posited
that the proper remedy of respondents was to file a petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus, since the petitions ultimate objective
was the production of the bodies of the victims, as they were allegedly
abducted and illegally detained by military personnel.
Gen. Esperon asserted that, in compliance with the Defense Secretarys
directive in relation to cases of Writ of Amparo against the AFP, he issued
directives to the Nolcom Commander to investigate. Maj. Gen.
Gomez likewise denied having custody or knowledge of the whereabouts of
the victims and that he was away on official business. Lt. Sumangil denied
having spoken to Josephine inside the camp on September 24 and
concluded that Josephine lied. He instead recounted that on September 24
he spoke only at the gate of the camp, with a person who identified herself
as AntoninaGalang, who informed him about the disappearance of
the. Warning him that these men were members of the (NPA), she advised
him not to entertain any queries or complaints relative to their alleged
disappearance.Sgt. Villalobos echoed Sumangils disclaimer. Lt. Gen.
Yano stated that upon his return from his official functions overseas, he
immediately inquired on the actions taken on the case. He averred that he
had never participated directly or indirectly; or consented, permitted or
sanctioned any illegal or illegitimate military operations.
Appellate court absolved Gen. Esperon, Lt. Gen. Yano, Maj. Gen. Gomez,
and Lt. Col. Bayani for lack of evidence but issued the following reliefs:
1. Inspections of the camps 2. Thorough and Impartial Investigation
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in not categorically denying the
privilege of the writ of amparo pursuant to section 18 of the rule on the
writ of amparodespite its finding that respondents failed to prove their
allegations in their petition for amparo by substantial evidence.
RULING:
Yes.
In sum, We are not inclined to give credence to the claims ofGalang that
she saw the two missing persons. Galang never did see the faces of the
two but were known to her through photographs. Certainly, there may be
a difference between photographs and the faces in person. Even the two
wives of Nicolas did not make an express attestation that they saw Nicolas
and Heherson in the company of those armed men.
The requisite standard of proof substantial evidence - speaks of the
clear intent of the Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative
proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in resolving amparo petitions.To
the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to
measure up to that standard substantial evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Since respondents did
not avail of any remedy against the adverse judgment, the appellate
courts decision is, insofar as it concerns them, now beyond the ambit of
review.
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary
diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant
of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from
establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or
inaction on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for
the petitioner to move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs
such as (a) Temporary Protection Order(b) Inspection Order(c) Production
Order.
For the appellate court to still order the inspection of the military camps
and order the army units to conduct an investigation afterit absolved
petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by the appellate court
to respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners could not be
held accountable for the disappearance of the victims. Thus, Resolution of
the Court of Appeals, insofar as it grants the assailed earlier-quoted reliefs
are SET ASIDE.
[172] BURGOS v. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS:
A case of consolidated petitions for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparofiled by
petitioner Edita T. Burgos on behalf of her son Jonas Joseph T. Burgos (a
farmer advocate and a member of KilusangMagbubukidsaBulacan), who
was forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four men and by a woman
from the extension portion of HapagKainan Restaurant in Ever Gotesco
Mall, QC.
On his way out of the restaurant, Jonas told the manager,
Maamaktibistalangpoako! When a security guard tried to intervene, after
he noticed that the group was forcibly dragging a male person out of the
restaurant, he was told, Pare, pulis! The guard then backed off. Jonas
was forced into the rear portion of Isuzu vehicle.
Upon subsequent police investigation and LTO verification, it was
discovered that the vehicle was impounded in the 56 th IB headquarters
whose commanding officer at that time was Lt. Col. Noel Clement.
On direct examination, the petitioner testified before the CA that the police
was able to generate cartographic sketches of two (one male and one
female) of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of
eyewitnesses. The State Prosecutor then gave her five names who were
allegedly involved in the abduction of Jonas (namely T/Sgt. Jason Roxas,
Cpl. Joana Francisco, M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo, and 1st Lt. Jaime Mendaros);
However, nothing came out of the information given by State Prosecutor
Velasco because he was pulled out from the investigation by the DOJ
Secretary, and that the police, particularly P/Supt. Jonnel C. Estomo, failed
to investigate and act upon these leads.
P/Supt. Estomo (the lead investigator in the investigation conducted by
the [PNP-CIDG]) testified before the CA that he did not investigate or look
into the identities of the cartographic sketches of the two abductors
provided by the PNP Criminal Investigation Unit, Quezon City. P/Supt.
Estomo testified further that he showed the photos 2 officers to witness
Larry Marquez for identification but failed to show any photos of the other
officers and men of the 56th IB. Finally, P/Supt. Estomo also testified that
he did not propound any clarificatory questions regarding the
disappearance of Jonas Burgos to Lt. Cols. Feliciano, Clement, and Caga of
the 56th IB who merely voluntarily submitted their statements.
PNP-CIDG obtained new information from EmeritoLipio who claimed to
have seen Jonas being abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO
of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG, and on Marlon Manuel, who corroborated
Lipios statements.
The CA held that since the petitioner has established that the vehicle used
in the abduction was linked to a vehicle (with license plate number TAB
194) impounded at the headquarters of the 56 th IB, it became the burden
of the AFP to exercise extraordinary diligence to determine the why and
the wherefore of the loss of the license plate in their custody and its
appearance in a vehicle (a maroon Toyota Revo) used in Jonas abduction.
On the PNP-CIDGs new information from Lipio who claimed to have seen
Jonas being abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO of the
CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG, and on Marlon Manuel, who corroborated Lipios
statements, the CA held that steps should be taken by the PNP-CIDG to
verify the veracity of these statements.
CA concluded that the PNP must exert extraordinary diligence in following
all possible leads to resolve the crime committed against Jonas. (no case
has been referred by the PNP to the DOJ for preliminary investigation in
relation to the abduction and disappearance of Jonas.)
ISSUE (related to Sec. 17) W/N the AFP and PNP have overcome their
burden to prove that they exercise extraordinary diligence in conducting
the investigation
RULING: NO. The PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an
exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas
Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of
their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires.
From the records, there are very significant lapses in the handling of the
investigation - among them are:
1. PNP-CIDGs failure to identify the cartographic sketches of the five
abductors of Jonas based on their interview of eyewitnesses to the
abduction.
2. No search and certification were ever made on whether these persons
were AFP personnel or in other branches of the service, such as the
Philippine Air Force.
3. As testified to by the petitioner, no significant follow through was also
made by the PNP-CIDG in ascertaining the identities of the cartographic
sketches of two of the abductors despite the evidentiary leads provided by
State Prosecutor Velasco of the DOJ.
4. No independent investigation appeared to have been made by the PNP-
CIDG to inquire into the veracity of Lipioand Manuel’s claims that Jonas
was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the
CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG. The records do not indicate whether the PNP-
CIDG conducted a follow-up investigation to determine the identities and
whereabouts of @KA Dante and @KA ENSO. These omissions were
aggravated by the CA finding that the PNP has yet to refer any case for
preliminary investigation to the DOJ despite its representation before the
CA that it had forwarded all pertinent and relevant documents to the DOJ
for the filing of appropriate charges against @KA DANTE and @KA ENSO.
Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the lead investigating agency in the present
case, did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the
case. Because of these investigative shortcomings, the court did not rule
on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary
diligence, is undertaken.
[173] BOAC, ET. AL. v CADAPAN (2011)
FACTS:
At 2:00 a.m. of June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan
(Sherlyn), Karen Empeño (Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino) from a
house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded onto a
jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed
location. Having thereafter heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino,
their respective families scoured nearby police precincts and military
camps in the hope of finding them but the same yielded nothing.
On July 17, 2006, spouses Asher and ErlindaCadapan and Concepcion
Empeño filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court and by
Resolution of July 19, 2006, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus,
returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.
The trial ensued at the appellate court. The latter dismissed the petition
for habeas corpus there being no strong evidence that the missing persons
are in the custody of the respondents.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed and during its pendency,
ErlindaCadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed before this Court a Petition
for Writ of Amparowith Prayers for Inspection of Place and Production of
Documents. The petition impleaded the same respondents in the habeas
corpus petition, with the addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff
HermogenesEsperon Jr., then Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief Gen.
AvelinoRazon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado) and
Donald Caigas.Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as
respondent in light of her immunity from suit while in office.
By Resolution of October 25, 2007, the Court issued a writ of amparo
returnable to the Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court,
and ordered the consolidation of the amparo petition with the pending
habeas corpus petition.
Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, the then battalion commander of the 24th Infantry
Battalion based in Balanga City, Bataan, denied any involvement in the
abduction. While the 24th Infantry Battalion detachment was reported to
be a detention site of the missing persons, Lt. Col. Anotado claimed that
he found no untoward incident when he visited said detachment. He also
claimed that there was no report of the death of Merino per his inquiry
with the local police
On the other hand, in addition to the witnesses already presented in the
habeas corpus case, petitioners called on Raymond Manalo to testify
during the trial.
Raymond Manalo (Manalo) claimed that he met the three abducted
persons when he was illegally detained by military men in Camp Tecson in
San Miguel, Bulacan. His group was later taken to a camp in Limay,
Bataan. He recalled that Lt. Col. Anotado was the one who interrogated
him while in detention.
With the additional testimony of Raymond Manalo, the petitioners have
been able to convincingly prove the fact of their detention by some
elements in the military. His testimony is a first hand account that military
and civilian personnel under the 7th Infantry Division were responsible for
the abduction of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino. He
also confirmed the claim of Oscar Leuterio that the latter was detained in
Fort Magsaysay. It was there where he (Leuterio) saw Manuel Merino.
His testimony that Leuterio saw Manuel Merino in Fort Magsaysay may be
hearsay but not with respect to his meeting with, and talking to, the three
desaparecidos. His testimony on those points was no hearsay. Raymond
Manalo saw the three with his very own eyes as they were detained and
tortured together. In fact, he claimed to be a witness to the burning of
Manuel Merino. In the absence of confirmatory proof, however, the Court
will presume that he is still alive.
The testimony of Raymond Manalo can no longer be ignored and brushed
aside. His narration and those of the earlier witnesses, taken together,
constitute more than substantial evidence warranting an order that the
three be released from detention if they are not being held for a lawful
cause. They may be moved from place to place but still they are
considered under detention and custody of the respondents.
Accordingly,in the Habeas Corpus case and in Amparo case, the CA,
relying heavily on the testimony of MANALO, ordered the respondents
(petitioners herein) to immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from
detention the persons of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel
Merino.
Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, et al. challenged before this Court, via petition for
review, the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court.
Meanwhile, ErlindaCadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed before the
appellate court a Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court for
failure of the respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus cases to
comply with the directive of the appellate court to immediately release the
three missing persons. By Resolution of March 5, 2009, the appellate court
denied the motion.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the CA grossly misappreciated the value of the
testimony of Manalo.
2) Whether or not the parents of Sherlyn and Karen have the
standing to file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino.
3) Whether or not a military commander may be held liable for the
acts of his subordinates in an amparo proceeding.
4) Whether or not a motion for execution to cause the release of the
aggrieved parties is necessary.
HELD:
1) No. The SC found that the testimony of Manalo is credible and affirmed
the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent
Raymond Manalo’s affidavit and testimony, viz:
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond
Manalo’s statements were not corroborated by other independent
and credible pieces of evidence. Raymond’s affidavit and testimony
were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo.
The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist
Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries
inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents’ accounts of
the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond
Manalo’s familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the
"DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez
to be the "Division Training Unit," firms up respondents’ story that
they were detained for some time in said military facility.
Moreover, the SC took judicial notice of its Decision in the just cited
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo which assessed the account of
Manalo to be a candid and forthright narrative of his and his brother
Reynaldo’s abduction by the military in 2006; and of the corroborative
testimonies, in the same case, of Manalo’s brother Reynaldo and a forensic
specialist, as well as Manalo’s graphic description of the detention area.
There is thus no compelling reason for the Court, in the present case, to
disturb its appreciation in Manalo’s testimony. The outright denial of
petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus crumbles
2) No. The parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have a standing tofile the
Amparo petition in behalf of Merino.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person
or entity in the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse,
children and parents of the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution,
if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative of
the aggrieved party.
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were
no known members of the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The
exclusive and successive order mandated by the above-quoted provision
must be followed. The order of priority is not without reason—"to prevent
the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo which may
even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party."
The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the
petition for habeas corpus on Merino’s behalf. No objection was raised
therein for, in a habeas corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the
writ on behalf of the aggrieved party.
It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of
Sherlyn and Karen are precluded from filing the application on Merino’s
behalf as they are not authorized parties under the Rule.
3) No, the military commander cannot be held liable for the acts of his
subordinates in an amparo case. HOWEVER command responsibility
can be applied limitedly in an amparo case in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement
whatever processes an amparo court would issue.
As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of
individual criminal liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for
crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). It bears stressing that
command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus
a substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability.
An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it
ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved.
Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a
remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action to
government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty
and security of aggrieved individuals.
An amparo proceeding does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings];
it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance…for purposes of imposing the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance.
Rubrico (jurisprudence cited by the SC), categorically denies the
application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine
criminal liability.The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement
as far as amparo cases are concerned. It, however, recognizes a
preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo
cases to instances of determining the responsible or accountable
individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on
the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo
cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the
power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would
issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the
best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
The SC found that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically
name the respondents that it found to be responsible for the abduction
and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the
records, it appears that the responsible and accountable individuals are Lt.
Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez
and Donald Caigas. They should thus be made to comply with the
September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court to IMMEDIATELY
RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
4) No. There is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or
habeas corpus decision.
Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a
motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the
right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings
should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be
expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may
jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect.
The Solicitor General’s argument that the Rules of Court supplement the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find
suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen,
rather than weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule
dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion
for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious
remedy being offered by an amparo proceeding.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC Rules on the Writ of Habeas Data
[174] P/Supt. Felixberto Castillo vs. Dr. Amanda T. Cruz,
G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009
Facts:
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband
Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at
Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property,
despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the
Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.
Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the
property. The pertinent case among the filed cases was the issuance by
the MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents
filed a motion for TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the
demolition was already implemented before the TRO issuance.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo
et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a
memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to
“protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,” entered the
property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property,
however. Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined
the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the
latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault,
trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Issue:
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,
WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case
already filed.
Held:
On the 1st issue:
Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that
the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty
and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats of
unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule
was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and
“enforced disappearances.” Tapuz v. Del Rosario also teaches: “What it is
not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds.”
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet
the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the
present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial
Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the
acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and
security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into
the property.
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual
violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security.
Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the
remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was
present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a
day after their arrest.
On the 2nd issue:
Respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data
should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had
commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded
against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense
that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition
for writs of amparo and habeas data.
[175] Roxas vs. Macapagal-Arroyo 630 SCRA 210 (2010)
Facts:
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent. She went to the
Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of
America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member to immerse herself on in
conducting an initial health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical
mission.[7]
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet
with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera
with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.
After doing survey work, petitioner and her companions decided to
rest suddenly fifteen (15) heavily armed men went to the house,
blindfolded and taped at their mouths and carried them.
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with
torture. The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to
abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to the fold. The
torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and
suffocating the petitioner.
Petitioner was then finally released and returned to her uncles house in
Quezon City. Before being released, however, the abductors gave
petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM] card, a slip of paper containing an
e-mail address with password, a plastic bag containing biscuits and books,
the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. Petitioner was
also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or
something untoward will happen to her and her family.
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from
RC via the cellular phone given to her.[37] Out of apprehension that she
was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family,
petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the
suppression of any existing government files or records linking her to the
communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo
and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009.[38] Petitioner
impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military
and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government
agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: XXX
(3) Respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any
report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence
report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special
Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its
subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and
referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence
and appropriate action.
The appellate court granted the privilege of the writ of habeas
data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the
public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioners alleged ties
with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.
Issue:
Whether the CA is correct in granting the privilege of the writ of Habeas
Data
Ruling:
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents
from distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in
whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to the
petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her
abduction and torture. Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this
Court is constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the
Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting
the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals
in granting the privilege of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder
the relevant portion[125] of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all
the records, intelligence reports and reports on the
investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa
Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the
records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the
Governments Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya
which listed political opponents against whom false
criminal charges were filed based on made up and perjured
information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before
Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general
Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor
Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and
Democracy party-list held a press conference where
they revealed that they received an information from
a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the
organization, that Petitioner was a communist
rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached
them thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding
firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of
the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioners
denial that she was the person in said video, there
were records of other investigations on Melissa C.
Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to
privacy.Without a doubt, reports of such nature have
reasonable connections, one way or another, to petitioners
abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to
cruelties and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her
life precisely due to allegation of her alleged membership
in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to
be continuously made available to the public, Petitioners
security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being
violated or transgressed by persons who have strong
sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The
unregulated dissemination of said unverified video CD or
reports of Petitioners alleged ties with the CPP-NPA
indiscriminately made available for public consumption
without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly
violates Petitioners right to privacy which must be
protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to
grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data.
(Emphasis supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational
privacy of individuals.[126] The writ operates to protect a persons right to
control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where
such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.

Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the
writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of
an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim.[127] This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed
to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that
there is actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public
respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the
petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public
respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of
the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports
about the petitioners ties with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately
provenconsidering that the origin of such records were virtually
unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court
from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and
Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that
any of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of
Appeals enjoining the public respondents fromdistributing or causing the
distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers relative to the petitioners alleged ties with the
CPP-NPA, appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents
cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first
place, it was not proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were
found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of the
petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in
violation of the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and
premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime,
strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
[176] Meralco vs. Lim, 632 SCRA 195 (2010)
FACTS:
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an
administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the
Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel,
Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent.
The letter reads:
Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG
MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG
BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL
NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA
LOOB….
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen.
Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the
Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.
By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto directed the transfer of
respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa in light of the
receipt of "… reports that there were accusations and threats directed
against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly
compromise [her] safety and security."
Respondent, by letter, addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula appealed
her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns
and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive" nature of the
transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel
from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation
of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her
security in this wise:
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have
intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations and
threats so that at least I could have found out if these are
credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from
unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it
appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to
be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if
they existed at all. Assuming for the sake of argument only,
that the alleged threats exist as the management apparently
believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and
environment which will make me a "sitting duck" so to speak,
seems to betray the real intent of management which is
contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . .
. Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale for
management’s initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears
to me that instead of the management supposedly extending
favor to me, the net result and effect of management action
would be a punitive one.
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation
of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before
the RTC of Bulacan.
By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’ unlawful act and omission
consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details
or information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly
received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a
violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by
habeas data.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to
the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
By Order, the RTC granted respondent’s application for TRO.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on
the grounds that resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in
order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly
belongs to the NLRC.
The RTC granted the application for the Writ or Habeas Data on the ground
that recourse to a writ of habeas data should extend not only to victims of
extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like
respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners’
refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to
her person.
Hence, the present petition for review alleging that 1) the RTC lacked
jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s prerogative as
employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the
issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
directs the issuance of the writ only against public officials or employees,
or private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person,
family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged
in such activities.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court erred in issuing the Writ of Habeas Data.
RULING:
YES. Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with
MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang
Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in
possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of
habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of
judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the
constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security
against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to
the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those
provided under prevailing Rules.
The writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support
of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.16 Employment constitutes
a property right under the context of the due process clause of the
Constitution.17 It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real
reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and
conditions of one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the
extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is
inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security.
To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports
allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a
violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact
trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her
earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious,
doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all."Her posture
unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
Rule 109 Appeals in Special Proceedings
[177] TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA MANUEL Vda. DE BIASCAN, vs.
BIASCAN
Facts:
On June 3, 1975, private respondent Rosalina J. Biascan filed a petitionat
the then Court of First Instance, Branch 4, Manila praying for her
appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Florencio Biascan
and Timotea Zulueta. In an Order dated August 13, 1975, private
respondent was appointed as regular administratrix of the estates.
Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the legal wife of Florencio Biascan entered
her appearance as Oppositor-Movant. Simultaneous with her appearance,
she filed a pleading containing several motions including a motion for
intervention, a motion for the setting aside of private respondents
appointment as special administratrix and administratrix, and a motion for
her appointment as administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan. Judge
Cuevas granted Marias intervention and set for trial the motion to set
aside the Orders appointing respondent as administratrix. The trial court
issued an Order resolving that: (1) Maria is the lawful wife of Florencio;
(2) respondent and her brother are the acknowledged natural children of
Florencio; (3) all three are the legal heirs of Florencio who are entitled to
participate in the settlement proceedings; (4) the motion to set aside the
order appointing private respondent as administratrix is denied; and (5)
the motion to approve inventory and appraisal of private respondent be
deferred.
Fifty-eight (58) days after he receipt of the April 2, 1981 Order, Maria filed
her motion for reconsideration, which private respondent opposed.
On November 15, 1981, the fourth floor of the City Hall of Manila was
completely gutted by fire. The records of the settlement proceedings were
among those lost in the fire. Thus, on January 2, 1985, private respondent
filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the said records.
Due to the delay caused by the fire and the reconstitution of the records, it
was only on April 30, 1985 that the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
4 issued an Order denying Marias June 6, 1981 Motion for Reconsideration.
Sometime thereafter, Maria died and her testate estate also became the
subject of settlement proceedings. Atty. Marcial F. Lopez was appointed as
interim special administrator and engaged the services of the Siguion
Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Offices on Behalf of the estate.
The law firm was allegedly made aware of and given notice of the April 30,
1985 Order when its associate visited Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila to inquire about the status of the case. The associate checked
the records if there was proof of service of the April 30, 1985 Order to the
former counsel of Maria, Atty. Marcial F. Lopez, but he discovered that
there was none. He was able to secure a certification from the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 4 which stated that
there was no proof of service of the Order dated April 30, 1985 contained
in the records.
Petitioner from the Orders dated April 2, 1981 and April 30, 1985 of the
trial court filed a Notice of Appeal dated April 22, 1996. While the said
notice of appeal was dated April 22, 1996, the stamp of the trial court on
the first page of the notice clearly indicated that the trial court received
the same on September 20, 1996.
On October 22, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners
appeal on the ground that the appeal was filed out of time. The trial court
ruled that the April 2, 1981 Order which was the subject of the appeal
already became final as the Motion for Reconsideration thereof was filed
sixty-five (65) days after petitioner received the same. In addition, the
court ruled that the notice of appeal itself was filed manifestly late as the
same was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the June 11, 1985
Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The trial court in an
Order dated February 12, 1997 likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 13, 1996 of petitioner. Petition before
the CA was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the appeal was filed out of time?
Ruling: Yes.
Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the orders and
judgments in special proceedings, which may be the subject of an appeal.
Thus:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. An
interested person may appeal in a special proceeding from an order or
judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court or a Juvenile and domestic
Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the
distributive shares of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows, or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of
a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset
to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing,
except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the
substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or
denying a motion for new trial or for reconsideration.
An appeal is allowed in these aforesaid cases as these orders, decrees or
judgments issued by a court in a special proceeding constitute a final
determination of the rights of the parties so appealing. In contrast,
interlocutory orders are not appealable as these are merely incidental to
judicial proceedings. In these cases, the court issuing such orders retains
control over the same and may thus modify, rescind, or revoke the same
on sufficient grounds at any time before the final judgment.
In the instant case, the Order dated April 2, 1981 of the trial court
decreed, among others, that Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the lawful wife
of the deceased Florencio Biascan, private respondent Rosalina Biascan
and her brother, German Biascan, are entitled to participate in the
settlement proceedings. Moreover, the said Order likewise denied Marias
motion to set aside the order appointing private respondent as regular
administratrix of the estate. These rulings of the trial court were precisely
questioned by Maria in her Motion for Reconsideration dated June 6, 1981.
The ruling of the trial court that Maria, private respondent Rosalina
Biascan and German Biascan were entitled to participate in the settlement
proceedings falls squarely under paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court as a proper subject of appeal. By so ruling, the trial court
has effectively determined that the three persons are the lawful heirs of
the deceased. As such, the same may be the proper subject of an appeal.
Similarly, the ruling of the trial court denying petitioners motion to set
aside the order appointing private respondent as the regular administratrix
of the estate of Florencio Bisacan is likewise a proper subject of an appeal.
We have previously held that an order of the trial court appointing a
regular administrator of a deceased persons estate is a final determination
of the rights of the parties thereunder, and is thus, appealable. This is in
contrast with an order appointing a special administrator who is appointed
only for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Because of the
temporary character and special character of this appointment, the Rules
deem it not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary
appointment. Considering however that private respondent has already
been appointed as regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan,
her appointment as such may be questioned before the appellate court by
way of appeal.
It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may be the proper
subject of an appeal in a special proceeding. In special proceedings, such
as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of appeal
from any decision or final order rendered therein is thirty (30) days, a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. The appeal period
may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal or a
motion for reconsideration or new trial being perfected, the decision or
order becomes final.
With respect to the Order dated April 2, 1981 issued by the trial court,
petitioner admits that Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, its predecessor-in-
interest, received a copy of the same of April 9, 1981. Applying these
rules, Maria or her counsel had thirty (30) days or until May 9 within which
to file a notice of appeal with record on appeal. She may also file a motion
for reconsideration, in which case the appeal period is deemed interrupted.
Considering that it was only June 6, 1981, or a full fifty-eight (58) days
after receipt of the order, that a motion for reconsideration was filed, it is
clear that the same was filed out of time. As such, when the said motion
for reconsideration was filed, there was no more appeal period to interrupt
as the Order had already become final.
At this point, we note with disapproval petitioners attempt to pass off its
Notice of Appeal as having been filed on August 22, 1996. In all its
pleadings before this Court and the Court of Appeals, petitioner insists that
its Notice of Appeal was filed the day after it secured the August 21, 1996
Certification from the trial court. While the Notice of Appeal was ostensibly
dated August 22, 1996, it is clear from the stamp[31] of the trial court
that the same was received only on September 20, 1996. Moreover, in the
Order dated October 22, 1996 of the trial court denying petitioners appeal,
the court clearly stated that the Notice of Appeal with accompanying
Record on Appeal was filed on September 20, 1996.
Considering that it is clear from the records that petitioners notice of
appeal was filed on September 20, 1996, the same was clearly filed out of
time as it only had until August 22, 1996 within which to file the said
pleading. And while the rules on special proceedings recognize that a
motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal and record of
appeal may be granted.
[178] REPUBLIC vs. NISHINA
Facts:
NisaidaSumeraNishina (respondent), represented by her mother
ZenaidaSumera Watanabe (Zenaida), filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth record
and change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos, Bulacan, docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 106-M-2007.In her petition, respondent alleged
the following:
 She was born on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her
Filipino mother Zenaida and Japanese father Koichi Nishina who
were married on February 18, 1987. Her father later died and in
1989 her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada.
 As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil
registry, respondent’s mother caused the late registration of her
birth in 1993 under the surname of her mother’s second
husband, Hakamada. Her mother and Hakamada eventually
divorced.
 In 1996, her mother married another Japanese, Takayuki
Watanabe, who later adopted her by a decreeissued by the Tokyo
Family Court of Japan on January 25, 2001. The adoption decree
was filed and recorded in the civil registry of Manila in 2006.
 In 2007, it surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered
at the Malolos Civil Registry under the
NisaidaSumera Nishina,hence, her filing before the RTC of her
petition praying that her second birth certificate bearing the
surname Hakamada, issued through late registration in 1993, be
cancelled; and that in light of the decree of adoption, her
surname Nishina in the original birth certificate be changed
to Watanabe.
After hearing the petition, the RTC, by Order of October 8,
2007, granted respondents petition and directed the Local Civil Registry
of Malolos to cancel the second birth record of NisaidaSumeraHakamada
issued in 1993 and to change particularly the surname of respondent
from NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE.
A copy of the October 8, 2007 Order was received on December 13, 2007
by the OSG which filed, on behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal.
Before the CA, respondent filed a motion to dismissthe appeal, alleging
that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file
a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 (appeal
from the RTCs) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.
(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal
shall be required except in special proceedings and
other cases of multiple or separate appeals where
the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like
manner.
Opposing the motion, OSG countered that a record on appeal is required
only in proceedings where multiple appeals may arise, a situation not
obtaining in the present case.
CA RULING : dismissed petitioner’s appeal, holding that since
respondents petition before the RTC is classified as a special proceeding,
petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within 30 days from receipt of the October 8, 2007 Order granting
respondents petition, and by not filing a record on appeal, petitioner never
perfected its appeal.
Issue:
WON the filing of record on appeal is necessary for the perfection of
petitioner’s appeal
name
Ruling:
NO.Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the
orders or judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an
appeal, viz:
SECTION 1. Orders or judgments from which
appeals may be taken. An interested person may appeal in
special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered
by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a
deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to
which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any
claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any
 claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim
against it;

(d) Settles the account of an executor,

administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the

settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the
administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the
appointment of a special administrator; and

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the

case, and affects the substantial rights of the person
appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a
motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.

The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the

pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal in addition to the
notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the original records of the
case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to
proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said
court and held to be final.

In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal

was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and
determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting
respondents petition for cancellation of birth record and change of
surname in the civil registry.

The petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions

are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appeal of petitioners before the
appellate court is REINSTATED.