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Knoeber, 2001,
Anup Agrawal and Sahiba Chadha, 2005, Becher and Frye, 2011, Belo et al.,
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Chaney et al., 2011, Chen et al., 2014, Chow et al., 2012, Claessens et al., 2008,
Cooper et al., 2010, Correia, 2014, Dinç, 2005, Ding et al., 2015, Dyck et al.,
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please adjust as following style

Almeida, H., Lmeida, MEIDA, H. & CAMPELLO, M. 2007. Financial Constraints, Asset
Tangibility, and Corporate Investment. The Review of Financial Studies, 20,
1429-1460.

1.for the first letter of name is capitalized , the other letters of name are lowcase. ex.
Almeida.
2. use the formal word of "and" instead of all &.
3. 2007-->(2007),
4.add symbol of " " on the title, i.g. "Financial constraints, asset tangibility, and
corporate Investment,"
5. except the first letter of title is capitalized , the other letters of title are lowcase. ex.
"Financial constraints, asset tangibility, and corporate Investment,"

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