EDD VIVO ENERGY - Chapitre 5 Revu - Fr.en

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Chapter 5: Preliminary study of the risks
Summarily - -
1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................ 6
2. ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND FEEDBACK......................................................................................... 7
2.1. ACCIDENTOLOGY EXTRACTED FROM BARPI7........................................................................
2.1.1 Présentation7......................................................................................................................
2.1.2 Accidentologie8..................................................................................................................
2.2. FEEDBACK INTERNE17 EXPERIENCE......................................................................................
3. RISK ANALYSIS RELATED TO PRODUCTS AND POTENTIAL DANGERS.................................21
3.1. PRODUCTS PLACED IN ŒUVRE21............................................................................................
3.1.1 Risk analysis produits21....................................................................................................
3.1.2 thermique25 decomposition..............................................................................................
3.1.3 Incompatibility of products.25...........................................................................................
3.1.3.1 Hydrocarbons and strong oxidants.......................................................................25
3.1.3.2 Flammables and air................................................................................................. 26
3.1.4 Risk Analysis Summary produits26..................................................................................
3.2. IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL DANGERS28....................................................................................
3.3. REDUCED POTENTIAL DANGERS31.........................................................................................
3.3.1 The incendie32....................................................................................................................
3.3.2 The explosion32..................................................................................................................
3.3.3 Pressurization lente33........................................................................................................
3.3.4 The boilover in mince34 layer............................................................................................
3.3.5 the pollution35....................................................................................................................
4. RELATED RISK ANALYSIS NATURAL ENVIRONMENT...............................................................37
4.1. THE RISKS CLIMATOLOGIE37....................................................................................................
4.1.1 Températures37..................................................................................................................
4.1.2 Vents37................................................................................................................................
4.1.3 Brouillard38.........................................................................................................................
4.1.4 jelly blanche38....................................................................................................................
4.2. RISKS RELATED TO FLOODS AND FLOODING MARINES38....................................................
4.3. RISKS RELATED TO THE FOUDRE39........................................................................................
4.4. RISKS SÉISMES44.......................................................................................................................
5. RELATED RISK ANALYSIS THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT...........................................................47
5.1. RISKS WAYS CIRCULATION47...................................................................................................
5.1.1 routières47 Routes.............................................................................................................
5.1.2 ferrées48 Routes.................................................................................................................
5.1.3 aériennes48 Routes............................................................................................................
751-03 / BLISE / NT / 11-02879 / CI - Janvier 2012 Page 1 / 62

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5.2. RISKS RELATED TO THE ENVIRONMENT INDUSTRIEL48.......................................................

5.3. RISKS INTRUSIONS49.................................................................................................................
6. ANALYSIS RELATED TO THE OPERATIONAL RISK....................................................................50
6.1. INTRODUCTION50.......................................................................................................................
6.2. RESULTS OF THE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF RISQUES50..................................................
7. Conclusion of the preliminary risk analysis and selection of accident scenarios..............................52

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List of annexes
---
Annex 5-1: FDS products used on site VIVO ENERGY Rades......................................................................22

Annex 5-2: Positioning of the potential dangers of the site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades............................32
Annex 5-3: Study of protection against foudre41................................................................................................
Annex 5-4: Risk Study sismique45.....................................................................................................................
Annex 5-5: Preliminary Analysis Tables Risques51............................................................................................
List of Figures
---
Figure 1: Source close - Comparing SMHV type spectra flush horizontal rock and proposé45 spectrum..........
Figure 2: Source close - Comparison of SMS type spectra flush horizontal rock and proposé46 spectrum.......
Figure 3: Source close - Comparison of SMS type spectra taking into account the conditions of the site and
proposé47 spectrum....................................................................................................................................
Figure 4: Positioning the criticality grid central dreaded events VIVO ENERGY Tunisia La Goulette52.............
List of paintings
---
Table 1: Accident representative global activities of filing VIVO ENERGY17......................................................
Table 2: Internal Site Accident VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades21.......................................................................
Table 3: Risks stored products and implemented the deposit of VIVO ENERGY Rades28................................
Table 4: Potential dangers site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades32.......................................................................
Table 5: Key risks foudre41................................................................................................................................
Table 6: neighboring industrial facilities which may present a risk to the site VIVO ENERGY Tunisie50............
Table 7: Results of the Preliminary Analysis of Risques62.................................................................................
Table 8: Actions implemented by VIVO ENERGY Tunisia following the Preliminary Analysis of Risques64.......
References- - -
[R1] Adapting to climate change and natural disasters in coastal cities of North Africa - Phase 1: Risk
assessment in current and 2030 for the city of Tunis EGIS BCEOM International / IAU-IDF / BRGM -
January 2011
[R2] Decree of 15 January 2008 on the protection against lightning of certain classified facilities - French
regulations
[R3] Ministerial Decree of 10 May 1993 fixing the seismic regulations for facilities subject to the legislation
on classified installations - French Regulation

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Glossaire- - -
APR: Preliminary Risk Analysis
ARF: Lightning Risk Assessment
ARIA: Analysis, Research and Information on Accidents
BARPI: Analysis of Risks and Office of Industrial Pollution
BLEVE: Boilin g Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion
EI: Event Initiator
ERC: Event Central Feared
LPG: Liquefied Petroleum Gas
HSE: Health, Safety, Security and Environment
LEL: Lower Explosive Limit
LSE: Upper Explosive Limit
OMMP: Office of Merchant Navy and Ports
HNS: National Company of Oil Distribution
STEG: Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas
STLR: Tunisian Company of Lubricants Rades
SCPCI: Tunisian Company for Intermediate Chemicals
TDG: Transport of dangerous goods
(U) VCE (Unconfined) Vapor Cloud Explosion

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1. INTRODUCTION
This step of the danger study allows us to identify potentially major scenarios based on the feedback, the
products on the site, study the environment and analysis of the risks exploitation.
During the preliminary risk assessment are considered successively:
 The accident that can learn from accidents on site facilities and similar facilities;
 The hazards of the products used in the surveyed facilities (flammable, explosive, reactive, unstable,
corrosive, dangerous for the environment, etc.);
 The risks to the environment: it is both the natural environment of the industrial environment;
 The risks associated with processes: this part is based on a risk analysis conducted by the working
group.
The preliminary risk assessment helps to identify accident scenarios. It also allows to study the adverse
events that could lead to the release of potential hazards, including possible causes and prevention,
detection, mitigation and protection.

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2. ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND FEEDBACK
The history of accidents recorded involving products or processes comparable to facilities studied in the
world (source: ARIA database) and the websites of the experience feedback VIVO ENERGY Tunisia were
the subject:
 From an analysis of the events (causes, consequences and compensatory measures);
 From a description of existing prevention and protection measures at the studied facilities to address
the identified risks.
These lessons help to identify initiating events to be considered in the analysis of risks associated with
operation of the site and determine the relevance of certain scenarios.
2.1. ACCIDENTOLOGY EXTRACTED BARPI
2.1.1 Presentation
BARPI (analysis of risks and pollution Industrial Office), established in 1992, under the Ministry of the
French environment. It is responsible for collecting, analyzing and disseminating data on the return of
experience in technological accidents and ensure their registration in the ARIA database (Analysis,
Research and Information on Accidents).
The ARIA database lists the incidents or accidents resulting from the activity of factories, workshops,
warehouses, construction sites, quarries, etc. under the legislation on classified installations and the
Dangerous Goods Transportation (TMD), and have, or could affect the health, public security,
agriculture, nature and the environment.
It can collect a lot of information, such as the causes, circumstances, consequences, measures in the
short or medium term as a result of an accident. To date, the ARIA database lists more than 40,000
accidents or incidents in France or abroad. The database used has, in terms of severity, very
heterogeneous accidents. It should be noted that the severity of the reported accidents is difficult to
estimate due to the vagueness of the content of the summary of the accidents.
The history of accidents reported worldwide implementing products or processes comparable to

facilities studied were the subject:
 From an analysis of the events (causes, consequences and compensatory measures);
 From a description of existing prevention and protection measures at the studied facilities to
address the identified risks.
Information on accidents French mainly comes from different state departments (Classified
Installations Inspectorate, Fire and Rescue Services, Police Water, Ministry of TMD, pressure vessels
and Service pipes, explosives Inspectorate), but also of the press and sometimes some professional
organizations. A number of international organizations also provide information on foreign accidents.

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This census of accidents and incidents, French or foreign, can not be exhaustive. However, it may be
considered sufficiently representative to warrant analysis.
Although the ARIA database identifies accidents dating from the first half of the twentieth century, the
data populating the causes, consequences and the sequence of events generally remain sketchy until
the mid 60s.
2.1.2 Accident
Accidents were referenced from various search criteria such as: the products involved, the nature of
the event, the affected equipment, the phase of the process involved or identified or suspected
causes.
The recordings of the analysis shows that the number of accidents linked to a hydrocarbon storage
activity is limited, but the consequences can be of significant importance.
The table below shows the summary of the most representative accidents with the activities of filing
VIVO ENERGY Tunisia. This table also shows, for each case, the means of protection and prevention
implemented by VIVO ENERGY Tunisia to eliminate or reduce the risk of a similar accident.
Note : Prevention and protection measures implemented by VIVO ENERGY Tunisia to reduce or
eliminate accidents are detailed in the risk analysis.

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Measures implemented by VIVO

ENERGY Tunisia to reduce or
Description of accident
eliminate the risk of a similar
accident
No. 40221 - 28/04/2011 - LUCCIANA (France)
H52.10 - Warehousing and storage - operators round
In an oil deposit a diesel resurgence is detected at the base of a tray. The operator transfers the 500 m³ of hydrocarbons remaining in the container and - Design, inspection and maintenance of
retrieves the product released into the collecting basin. No pollution was detected in many piezometers site. Inspection of the backplane with a thickness
facilities
of 6.5 mm reveals multiple corrosion points, with a concentration around the discharge system and perforation of 8 cm in diameter at the origin of the
leak. Diesel elapsed between the backplane and the waterproof layer of bituminous sand located immediately below, before reaching the surface.
- Piezometers with monthly statements
Abnormalities were noted on the tray during the ten-year inspection of 2004. Renovations were underway on another tray at the time of accident. The an
operator intends to bring the visual inspection trays funds for detecting the internal and external corrosion in the humid environment, and warm saline in
- watertight bowl (concrete), drain pan
the region. The damaged ferry is the largest deposit of gas oil capacity, the operator carries out emergency work to ensure good fuel distribution
conditions in Corsica during the following summer valve to the closed oil separator
- Stopping all movements by the

No. 39138 -28/09/2010 - Montreal (Canada)
emergency stop button
C19.20 - Petroleum Refining
In a refinery, a leak occurs to 21 h on a line connecting the facilities to a wharf; 5500 l diesel fuel flow into the SAINT-LAURENT and a web width of 10 m - booms
to 0.5 km in length is observed. At 22 am, residents alerted the emergency to report strong petroleum odor. Around 2:30, site employees install floating
dams on the river. Pending identification of the pipe to the source of the leak, the operator carries out the emptying of hydrocarbons contained in the - adsorbents Spreading
piping 4 of the web and filling them with water. The recovered products are pumped into road tankers. Local officials bemoan a lack of information to the
operator about the nature and consequences of the event. - means of intervention and organization
POI

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accident
No. 37094 - 16/09/2009 - Martigues (France)
- During filling after maintenance,
G46.71 - Wholesale of fuels and related products
commissioning procedure involving
In an oil depot, the hydrocarbon detector of the diked area of a fuel tank goes into alarm 1 level at its service following work on sprinkler crowns. Visiting
site, an operator note the presence of gas in the basin and 2 manholes have not been closed. The filling of the tray is interrupted after 8 min triggering reduced filling speed
the alarm and security service is prevented. A foam carpet spread in the bowl at its drain; 35 to 80 m³ of gasoline were spilled into the bowl of the tray
- Procedures of work, prevention plan
and the nearby bowl through the drain valve which had not been closed contrary to demand the set to meet during a rainy period. The operator recovers
the water, foam and gasoline land applied in the cuvette and stores them in the tray "slops", and then cleans the cuvettes and in cuvettes. The
- Stops all movements by the
measured explosion remained high in a radius of 5 m around the container until the closure of manholes. Unlike the corresponding procedure, the tray
return to service authorization was issued while he was visible manholes were not closed; the operator in charge of filling of the tank has open the emergency stop button
manual valve tray foot after passing manways without signal abnormality. Unlike the corresponding procedure, the tray return to service authorization
was issued while he was visible manholes were not closed; the operator in charge of filling of the tank has open the manual valve tray foot after passing - Weirs foam bowls
manways without signal abnormality. Unlike the corresponding procedure, the tray return to service authorization was issued while he was visible
manholes were not closed; the operator in charge of filling of the tank has open the manual valve tray foot after passing manways without signal - watertight bowl (concrete), drain pan
abnormality. valve to the closed oil separator

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accident
- High level detector and high level with
No. 35992 - 27/01/2009 - Vitry-sur-Seine (France) visual alarm on the control panel and
D35.11 - Electricity production audible alarm and operator actions to
In a power plant, the heating oil delivered stripping by water in a tank begins to 8 h. After confirming the continued delivery of the last 140 m³ to 11.45, stop receiving tray and bottom valves
the supervisor found around 12:15 the oil spill in the retention by the overflow of the tray. He orders radio personnel on the barge to stop the pump. He
closes the manual valve in the pump discharge of the barge and informs combustion turbine operating agents. These valves close to isolate the - Setting up an automatic gauge system
unloading of the pipe tray and the general network of water and then cut the power supply to equipment in retention, with the exception of safety valves.
to control the product inside the tank in
Employees have found no oil at the oil separator downstream retention or in gutters. The operator restarts the turbine to bring the level below the alarm
level 1. The operator informs Installations Inspectorate (IIC) who goes there in 16 hours. Around 15:30, a safety perimeter was set up around the tank real time
and a foam gun is installed protection. At 20:30, two companies specializing pump 30 m³ of fuel oil and clean retention. On 28/01, a laboratory conducts
- Control of automated gauging systems
groundwater samples. At the request of the IIC, the operator sends a press-newsletter, the municipality and local residents. On 30/01, a company cleans
and treatment retention. No environmental impact n ' is recognized as the oil remained confined in detention. The overflow of the storage tank is due to performed every 10 days VIVO
several factors: there are no servo transfer pumps between the barge and the levels of high and very high alarms storage tanks; Alarm high level has ENERGY
not triggered, the alarm level is high but is only triggered broadcast control room, place without permanent staff; mechanical slider to visualize the level
of fuel in the tank is not reliable in the high values. Moreover, given the high activity of the installation of electricity production, fuel tanks were filled to - Accounting Changes quantities during
the maximum. The inspection request to the operator: provide the incident report detailing processing of hydrocarbons When applied, the cleaning of the receiving operations
retention and management of waste generated, impacts on soil and ground water in view of monitoring; justify the compliance of the installation by
integrating the decanting operating procedure monitoring the operation by the staff; justify the compliance of the installation in explaining the character - live radio link deposit - oil Wharf
design and effectiveness proven high and very high levels; justify the relevance and performance (for traceability) of the maintenance procedure of the
gauging system, and broadband and high level detectors. impacts on soil and ground water in view of monitoring; justify the compliance of the - Stopping all movements by the
installation by integrating the decanting operating procedure monitoring the operation by the staff; justify the compliance of the installation in explaining emergency stop button
the character design and effectiveness proven high and very high levels; justify the relevance and performance (for traceability) of the maintenance
procedure of the gauging system, and broadband and high level detectors. impacts on soil and ground water in view of monitoring; justify the - watertight bowl (concrete), drain pan
compliance of the installation by integrating the decanting operating procedure monitoring the operation by the staff; justify the compliance of the
valve to the closed oil separator
installation in explaining the character design and effectiveness proven high and very high levels; justify the relevance and performance (for traceability)
of the maintenance procedure of the gauging system, and broadband and high level detectors.
- operator control level rise gradient in
the tray

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accident
- operators round
No. 34990 - 18/06/2008 - BAY MAHAULT (France)
- Inspection and maintenance of
H52.10 - Warehousing and storage
facilities
At the end of the unloading of a ship in an oil depot, the dock security officer finds oozing under the fuel line connecting the pier to the depot. It sets up a
container to catch the drippings, alert the operations manager who informs the head of the depot. Less than 5 liters of gasoline would be sold to the
- Regulatory Compliance facilities
ground. The depot manager finds the leak then decides to put the water pipe. He warned his superiors and inspection of IC which, on site the next day
noted many important areas of corrosion, especially near each of the supports along the pipeline. The pressure in the line is low during the discharge, - permanent presence of operators
the impact on the ground is negligible. The original coating of the pipe is not suitable for the corrosive action of sea air, the temperature, high relative
during loading / unloading operations
humidity, as well as friction and drip moorings of ships. Moreover, according to the operator, the maintenance schedule of the pipes has been developed
following the remarks of the specialized body that carried out the thickness controls in 2007 and indicated that corrosion was detected acceptable in light
conditions operating 10 bar. The overall reclamation was in progress, but the leak occurred before the action plan is fully realized. 19/06, an expert from
the company inspects the pipeline; observations help define operating conditions in degraded mode for future discharges. The three other pipelines emergency stop button
which connect the deposit to the pier are controlled several days later (thickness measurements at the external and internal areas of corrosion found
during the 2007 inspection by the specialized body). A work schedule is developed based on these measures: repairs to pipes and brackets, installation - Placing Booms
clamps on sensitive areas, resistance testing, sections replacements, removals of the asphalt surfacing, surfacing welding corrosion areas external
aerial parts, specific protection in the mooring lines, disbursement of the soil under the pipelines along the banks ... the operator decides to reduce the
- means of intervention and organization
pressure in the offending line 3 bars maximum and enhance the monitoring measures as normal operations are not restored. POI
- adsorbents Spreading

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accident
No. 34368 - 25/01/2008 THE JUMPER (France)
G46.71 - Wholesale of fuels and related products - operators round
In an oil deposit, 40 ml of gasoline are detected the 25/01, supernatant in a monitoring and 10 cm in a pumping well. The operator shall inform the
residents and neighbors with a well or a water catchment. From the 26/01, a company specialized pump the product in the piezometers using a portable - Inspection and maintenance of
compressor, cream separators pneumatic pumps, suction rods, antistatic cubitainers on retention for collecting the product and a double-walled tank for facilities
store. The level controls on SP98 petrol tanks and 95 does not identify the product lost, samples are taken in the web but do not allow either to identify
the origin of gasoline. A pressure test of the buried pipe SP98 to detect a leak in the line portion in the retention area of the pump station. 11/02 The - Design, inspection and maintenance of
operator interrupts loads MS 95 as a precaution. Other pressure tests on the fuel line SP95 confirm it for leaks. The analysis results of another sample facilities
of the product pumped into the web confirms that this is SP98 gasoline. The 14/02, blanking plates are placed at the outlet of two trays connected to the
offending line. It is replaced by a buried pipe formerly used for diesel and whose seal is checked before restarting. The SP95 circuit is returned to - Piezometers with monthly statements
service on 15/02. Analyzes of the water quality of the web are made (total hydrocarbons and BTEX) during three measurement campaigns in 19 points,
their results help to highlight the impact area of the leak of premium gasoline. The operator evaluates the volume lost to 15 m³. At 26/02, 1250 l of - All lines are overhead
premium gasoline are recovered by pumping in the web. The floors above the table are loaded with hydrocarbons and a first biostimulation campaign of
soil takes place on 13 and 14/02. The inspection of classified installations requires weekly monitoring of groundwater in the right site and outside. A - Product inventory census conducted
piercing pipe corrosion is suspected. Following significant pollution of groundwater in January 2006 caused by the discharge of the reserve of foam daily
concentrate,

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accident
- Stops all movements by the

visual alarm on the control panel and
audible alarm and operator actions to
stop receiving tray and bottom valves
No. 34205 - 06/11/2007 - AJACCIO (France) - Testing levels of alarm simulation every
H52.10 - Warehousing and storage year
A ship unloads cargo its SP95 gasoline in an oil deposit: the tray No. 4 is to receive 1100 m³ of product and 800 m³ remaining should then be routed to
the tray 5. Unloading is in progress when the alarm level high indicates that the first reservoir is almost full. Operators responsible for the operation - Control of automated gauging systems
valves open tray 5 and close those of No. 4 tank to cause a transfer tray to tray and thus reduce the level of No. 4 tank. They then observe that 500 l performed every 10 days VIVO
fuel overflowed via the apertures located in the upper part of the tank wall in the retention tank # 4. They then trigger the fire defense system to clean the
ENERGY Tunisia
soiled shell with water flowing in the cooling ring, hold the product on the surface of the sub-basin and lead quickly to the ESP system and the decanter.
The land of the retention tank is polluted to a thickness of 5 cm and a surface area of 200 m² at the foot of tray No. 4. In the following days, the staff - Setting up an automatic gauge system
scours the contaminated top soil, an expert taken samples to characterize and map pollution. The land will be excavated more deeply dirty. The
to control the product inside the tank in
monitoring of piezometers is strengthened to detect any impact on groundwater. The Installations Inspectorate is informed. This accident is the result of
multiple failures: safety "stop pumping" inconsequential as a result of work carried out on the pier, Timing level probes conducted by the surveyor real time
regardless gills tray, poor risk assessment by staff (1 of 2 operators should have stayed monitoring at the manifold and tray). The operator asked to
specialized companies to correct the positioning of the probe, with the support and control of the headquarters technical service and repair the link "stop - Accounting Changes quantities during
pumping." It defines the following corrective measures: revision and communication of the specific reference receive the deposit, re-sensitization of receiving operations
operators on the risk and need vigilance, setting up a complementary and direct connection between the operations office and boat by ATEX portable
phone purchases and the establishment of VHF contact of the deposit to the control room of the pumps on the ship. Moreover, the operator sends the - live radio link deposit - oil Wharf
accident experience feedback to all staff and the group to which the deposit.
- Control and volume management
available in the reservoirs

the tray
- Training / operators of Empowerment
- storages Operating Procedure

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accident
No. 33574 - 05/06/2006 - USA - RALEIGH
An explosion occurred during the installation of a connection between 2 oil storage tanks in a warehouse of a oilfields. During welding, sparks ignite
hydrocarbon vapors escaping from an open pipe nearby. Workers of a subcontractor are in charge of work on four interconnected trays: No. 4 tank
empties into the No. 3 whose overflow joined the No. 2 and Tray # 1. They remove the flap at the base of tank n ° 4 for the drain of the residues from - Prevention plan
crude oil it contains. After rinsing with water, they leave the hydrocarbon vapors to evaporate for several days. The day of the accident, the workers
inserts the torch for oxyacetylene welding in the door then in the vent the opposite side of tank No. 4 to check the absence of flammable vapor. 4 The - Working license
workers then climb ladders placed on the trays 3 and 4 to complete the work. Shortly after the start of the intervention, a fire breaks out in one end of the
pipe of the tank 3 and then propagates to the second by the overflow pipe, tanks explode generating flames of more than 15 m above. The lids of 2 - Permits work to fire
tanks are torn, one of them is found 180 meters away. 3 workers mounted on the third tank and the fourth die, attached by a harness, is seriously
injured. A witness called the local rescue and police who go there. Risk analysis reported serious breaches in safety procedures to follow when hot work - Supervision and training HSSE
despite existence of technical guides. A gas detector should have been used to determine the flammable vapor, using a welding torch being extremely
dangerous. The open pipe on the adjacent tank should be covered or insulated before work, or better, flammable vapor should have been eliminated by
cleaning bins 2 and 3. The operator plans to develop and implement procedures written to ensure safe working methods for cleaning tanks and elevated
work with hot spots.

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accident
No. 31370 - 27/01/2006 - FRANCE - 69 - LYON
H52.10 - Warehousing and storage
In a petroleum warehouse, a leak occurs on an oil pipe at the passage of a barricade between a sub-basin and the loading pump station. After detection
of the abnormality in early afternoon, the oil loadings are interrupted and the piping are isolated. The hydrocarbon leaking flows on the sealed area of
- Design, inspection and maintenance of
the pumping station connected to a decanter. The latter is then closed to collect the oil (undetermined quantity but low prior). The operator releases the
pipe the next day to locate the source of the leak, neutralized and make necessary repairs promptly. The replacement pipe and the adjacent pipes are facilities
protected from corrosion by bands "elastomers." Jobs requiring cutting the concrete wall initially ensuring the retention volume; a provisional merlon
consisting of sandbags, bound at the base by shotcrete and sealed by an impermeable membrane is constructed. The new development barricades will - operators round
consist of a concrete formwork filled with sand, the upper slab will contain access doors to control the pipelines, the passage of the pipes in the concrete
walls is sealed by a fire-resistant seal 4 h. Approximately 5 t of ground constituting the merlon, polluted with hydrocarbons, is stored on a sealed - Piezometers with monthly statements
retention then is treated by thermal desorption by a specialized company bound to the base by shotcrete and sealed by an impermeable membrane is
- watertight bowl (concreted + clay
constructed. The new development barricades will consist of a concrete formwork filled with sand, the upper slab will contain access doors to control the
pipelines, the passage of the pipes in the concrete walls is sealed by a fire-resistant seal 4 h. Approximately 5 t of ground constituting the merlon, layer), drain pan valve to the closed oil
polluted with hydrocarbons, is stored on a sealed retention then is treated by thermal desorption by a specialized company bound to the base by separator
shotcrete and sealed by an impermeable membrane is constructed. The new development barricades will consist of a concrete formwork filled with
sand, the upper slab will contain access doors to control the pipelines, the passage of the pipes in the concrete walls is sealed by a fire-resistant seal 4 - presence seal between pipe and
h. Approximately 5 t of ground constituting the merlon, polluted with hydrocarbons, is stored on a sealed retention then is treated by thermal desorption concrete wall
by a specialized company the passage of the pipes in concrete walls is sealed by a seal fireproof 4 h. Approximately 5 t of ground constituting the
merlon, polluted with hydrocarbons, is stored on a sealed retention then is treated by thermal desorption by a specialized company the passage of the
pipes in concrete walls is sealed by a seal fireproof 4 h. Approximately 5 t of ground constituting the merlon, polluted with hydrocarbons, is stored on a
sealed retention then is treated by thermal desorption by a specialized company

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accident
No. 31312 - 11/12/2005 Buncefield (United Kingdom)
the tray
Explosions and fire occur in an oil depot storing 150 000 t fuel (gasoline, diesel, kerosene). The first most important to 6:01 (2.4 on the Richter scale) is - High level detector and high level with
heard at 160 km; overpressure effects have reached 700 1 000 mbar. Two other explosions will follow at 6:27 ET 6:28. A huge black cloud containing visual alarm on the control panel and
irritating substances reached the south of England, Brittany and Normandy on 12/12, and the Southwest of France and Spain. The authorities advise
audible alarm and operator actions to
residents to stay indoors; 2000 evacuees return to their home the same evening. The M1 motorway was closed for several days. The explosion
destroyed the pumping station and fire reserve lagoons, forcing rescue supplies at 3 km from the site. The fire was contained after 60 hours of stop receiving tray and bottom valves
intervention, but vapors from a tank spared by the fire ignited the 14th in the morning. At the height of the crisis, will be mobilized 180 firefighters and 20
vehicles and 26 pumps; 786 m³ of foam concentrate and 68 000 m³ of water were used. Following the disaster, 43 people slightly injured by flying glass - Setting up an automatic gauge system
essentially are counted, the 10 employees at the site are free and 20 tanks burned. The retaining walls were damaged, the impact on water quality is to control the product inside the tank in
monitored, particularly because PFOS, toxic and persistent, used emulsifiers. 16,000 m³ of firefighting water were recovered and temporarily stored: 800 real time
m³ will be rejected by mistake in a treatment plant, then in the River COLNE and 10 000 m³ will be treated by reverse osmosis. Several days are needed
to assess any environmental consequences. The cost of the accident is expected to exceed 750 mn euros, including 37 M euros for the reconstruction - Control of automated gauging systems
of tanks and 52 mn euros for goods lost. About 20 institutions (500 people) were destroyed and sixty (3,500 employees) suffered extensive damage.
performed every 10 days VIVO
The accident due to the overflow of a floating screen filling reservoir (11/12, 3 h: static level gauge while the flow rate is constant / 5:20: the tray begins
to overflow / 5:50: supply of another tray stops and the flow to the tank reached 912 890 m³ / h / 6:01: first explosion). More than 300 tons of unleaded ENERGY Tunisia
gasoline containing 10% unstabilized butane, were then passed to the ground forming a flammable vapor cloud spread over 8 ha. According to the
- Accounting Changes quantities during
survey, the ignition point of the cloud, north west of the deposit could be at the pumping station or cabin emergency generator. None of the two alarms
related to the filling level of the tank (dipstick + high level alarm) has worked. The provision was therefore not interrupted automatically and dysfunction receiving operations
was not reported to the supplier of the system as it should be through the high level alarm. could be at the pumping station or cabin emergency
generator. None of the two alarms related to the filling level of the tank (dipstick + high level alarm) has worked. The provision was therefore not - explosimeters detectors
interrupted automatically and dysfunction was not reported to the supplier of the system as it should be through the high level alarm. could be at the
pumping station or cabin emergency generator. None of the two alarms related to the filling level of the tank (dipstick + high level alarm) has worked. - Control of ignition sources
The provision was therefore not interrupted automatically and dysfunction was not reported to the supplier of the system as it should be through the high
level alarm.
- means of intervention and organization
POI
Board 1 : Global Accident representative of filing VIVO ENERGY activities

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2.2. BACK OF HOUSE EXPERIENCE
Internal accident VIVO ENERGY is presented in the table below. These elements from the internal
accident Shell Group, former owner of the site of La Goulette. The prevention and / or protection
implemented by the company VIVO ENERGY Tunisia on its facilities are set against each of past
accidents to eliminate or reduce the risk of a similar accident.
Measures in place to eliminate or

Description of Event
reduce the identified risks
2006 - Johor - Shell Malaysia
A major flash took place at the oil terminal of Johor 28 April 2006 at - All tanks are grounded
18:05. This was caused by a lightning strike on one of 16 tanks. - Control grounded by an external company
The explosion caused the flash blew the first tank containing every 6 months
85,000 liters of oil before it spreads to a 2nd Resevoir (450 000 - Study of protection against lightning
liters of oil) and a third (containing 250 000 liters of avgas ). performed 2011-12-06
There are no deaths but some minor injuries (particularly among - foaming chamber on top of each tank,
firefighters). The fire was completely mastered by firefighters at sprinkler ring around the tanks
2:49 on April 29th.
The main causes of the accident are not known.

2005 - Lome - Togo SHELL
- All materials used comply with the
Triggering of a fire on a tank truck loading area at a product transfer
standards of the Shell group, especially
operation via a flexible and mobile diesel pump of a calibrator to a
exclusive use of ATEX equipment in
truck.
hazardous areas
Operator Death (contractor-owned) in charge of the operation.
- fire permits issued for any activity
The analysis of the accident helped to highlight:
generating a hot spot
- The diesel pump used was not in line for an operation in a
- Training of operators and all stakeholders
hazardous area,
of the contracting companies
- Failure of the work permit: no fire permit issued for this
- truck loading station tanks equipped with
operation,
portable extinguishers, and presence of
- The designated operator for the operation has not been fire hydrants and foam cannons near the
adequately briefed on the dangers involved, station
- The contractor was not involved in security aspects / -

accidental risks

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Measures in place to eliminate or

Description of Event
reduce the identified risks
2006 - Oman - SHELL
At 6:55 p.m., a fire sprang from the manhole of a tank storing the
Mogas 90. At the time of the incident, the tank was "empty" except
the "dead stock", which was being emptied via a diesel pump since
- No pump diesel / gasoline used in
the tray foot valve. The tank was emptied for spent another product.
retentions
The Supervisor, controlling the operations and the retention time of
the incident, noticed a flash from the pump, located just next to the - All equipment is included in the
reservoir, and returning through the manhole. The vapors coming maintenance plan
from the tank manhole is ignited until extinguished. - Any transaction is subject to a work permit
The fire caused no injuries or deaths, but caused damage to the and a risk analysis is routinely performed
tank. at a hot spot for job
The analysis of the accident helped to highlight: - Training of operators and all stakeholders
of the contracting companies
- The diesel pump has been used within the retention, and
the pump motor is packed because of the entry of vapor - foam chambers in retention basins and
Mogas from the manhole. Moreover, it was not included in tanks on roofs, sprinkler crowns around
the maintenance plan, tanks, fire hydrants
- The walls retentions are approximately 4 m in height, not -

allowing the dispersion of fumes,
- No safety studies have been performed for this operation,
- The staff did not follow the Group of the Security recorded
2004 - SHELL
visual alarm on the control panel and
In a plant of Shell Chemicals, overfilling occurred on an audible alarm and operator actions to stop
atmospheric tank leading to a rejection of several tons of flammable receiving tray and bottom valves
hydrocarbon on the floor. Product then spread into the storm water
- If top-level trigger, obligation to stop filling
network due to a leak in the drain valve retention. A radar gauge
and go manually check the level in the
and an independent system of high level were installed and in use
tank,
on this reservoir.
- Control of automated gauging systems
The analysis of the accident helped to highlight:
performed every 10 days VIVO ENERGY
- The gauge was not regularly checked and compared with Tunisia
manual gauging,
- Accounting Changes quantities during
- A very high level alarm was activated in the control room receiving operations
but the room operator did not alert the operators in charge
of filling and decided to continue filling.
Board 2 : Internal Accident Site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades

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Since its commercial operation, no significant incidents occurred on the site of VIVO ENERGY Tunisia
Rades, nor a fire point of view or a perspective pollution.

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3. RISK ANALYSIS RELATED TO PRODUCTS AND POTENTIAL DANGERS
3.1. PRODUCTS IMPLEMENTED
The main products present on the site today are:
 Diesel;
 Diesel fuel 50;
 The super unleaded;
 AVGAS 100LL;
 Additives, stored in drums.
These products pose risks:
 fire;
 Explosion;
 pollution of water and soil due to their toxic nature when accidentally drive by water.
3.1.1 Product Risk Analysis
A risk analysis products is presented in a table below for the main products used.
The MSDS of products on the ENERGY Tunisia VIVO site are appended.
Appendix 5-1 FDS products implemented on the site VIVO ENERGY Rades

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EXPLOSIVITÉINFLAMMABILITÉ TOXICITÉECOTOXICITÉ
PRODUCT NAME PHYSICAL DATA REACTIVITY
UNLEADED
State atmospheric pressure: extremely flammable product is stable at storage Exposure limit values:
Labeling: Liquid, pale yellow. Odor. temperatures, handling and TWA: 300 ppm (USA)
use.
F +: Extremely flammable Extremely flammable: high
T: Toxic Density (15 ° C): 720-775 kg / risk, the liquid can release a The highly concentrated
m3 at T ° = 15 ° C significant amount of steam at Incompatible with strong vapors irritate the eyes, nose,
N: Dangerous for the environment
a temperature below room oxidizing
Risk phrases: temperature, which can throat and lungs, can cause
Vapor pressure: from 30 to 90 headaches and dizziness, are
R12: Extremely flammable quickly form an ignitable
kPa at 35 ° C. The vapor Incomplete combustion and
R38: irritating to skin mixture anesthetic and may have
pressure is often set by law; it thermolysis produce toxic
R45: May cause cancer varies with the season gases such as CO, CO2, other effects on the central
R46: May cause heritable genetic damage Flash point: <-40 ° C various hydrocarbons, nervous system.
R51 / 53: Toxic to aquatic organisms, may cause long-term adverse effects in aldehydes and soot. Repeated inhalation of large
Solubility in water: sparingly
the aquatic environment, soluble due to the presence of Ignition temperature:> 250 ° C amounts of fumes causes
R63: Possible risk pregnancy of harm to the child, oxygenates exposure to benzene.
R65: Harmful: may cause lung damage if swallowed, Explosive: Repeated exposure to high
R67: Vapors may cause drowsiness and dizziness. LEL: 1% levels of benzene can cause
Safety phrases: LSE: 8% leukemia.
S2: Keep out of reach of children
S23: Do not breathe vapors, recommended extinguishing Ecotoxicity:
S24: Avoid contact with skin, agents: foam, dry powder,
carbon dioxide This product is harmful to
S29: Do not empty into drains,
aquatic organisms
S43: In case of fire, the use of alcohol resistant foam, dry powder or CO2,
S45: In case of accident or illness seek medical advice immediately (if possible
show the label)
S53: Avoid exposure, obtain special instructions before use
S61: Avoid release to the environment. Refer to special instructions / safety
data sheet
S62: If swallowed, do not induce vomiting: seek medical advice immediately
and show the container or label
DIESEL FUEL and 50 State atmospheric pressure: Not classified as flammable, product is stable at storage The repeated contact /
yellow liquid. Odor. but will burn. May illuminate temperatures, handling and prolonged can cause defatting
on surfaces at temperatures use. of the skin may cause
Labeling:
above the autoignition dermatitis and make the
Xn: Harmful Density (Diesel): 820-860 kg /
temperature. Vapors irritable skin less protected
m3 at T ° = 15 ° C Incompatible with strong
N: Dangerous for the environment accumulated above the against the penetration of
oxidizing
product in the tanks may other materials. Excessive
Density (Diesel 50): 820-845 ignite and explode at exposure accompanied by
Risk phrases:

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R40 carcinogenic effect, kg / m3 at T ° = 15 ° C temperatures above the Incomplete combustion and poor personal hygiene can
R65: Harmful: may cause lung damage if swallowed autoignition temperature thermolysis produce toxic cause irritation, acne,
when vapor concentrations gases such as CO, CO2, folliculitis and development of
R66: Repeated exposure may cause skin dryness or cracking skin.
are within the flammability various hydrocarbons, verrucosities likely to become
R51 / 53: Toxic to aquatic organisms, may cause long-term adverse effects in Vapor pressure: <1 kPa at 40 ° range. aldehydes and soot. malignant.
the aquatic environment, C
Flash point:> 55 ° C Ecotoxicity:

Safety phrases: Solubility in water: sparingly
The product is toxic to aquatic
S2: Keep out of reach of children soluble
Auto-ignition temperature:> organisms, may cause long-
S16: Keep away from flames or sources of ignition - no smoking term adverse effects in the
220 ° C
S29: Do not discharge into drains aquatic environment.
Explosive:
data sheet
LEL: 1%
and show the container or label LSE: 6%
S36 / 37: Wear suitable protective clothing and gloves
recommended extinguishing
agents: foam, dry powder,
carbon dioxide
AVGAS 100LL
State atmospheric pressure: extremely flammable product is stable at storage Exposure limit values:
Labeling: liquid and blue. Odor. temperatures, handling and TWA: 300 ppm (USA)
use.
F +: Extremely flammable Extremely flammable: high
Xn: Harmful Density (15 ° C): 690-760 kg / risk, the liquid can release a The highly concentrated
m3 at T ° = 15 ° C significant amount of steam at Incompatible with strong vapors irritate the eyes, nose,
N: Dangerous for the environment
a temperature below room oxidizing
Risk phrases: temperature, which can throat and lungs, can cause
Vapor pressure: between 38 headaches and dizziness, are
R12: Extremely flammable quickly form an ignitable
and 48.5 kPa to 37.8 ° C Incomplete combustion and
R20 / 21/22 - Harmful by inhalation, skin contact and ingestion, mixture anesthetic and may have
thermolysis produce toxic
R33 Danger of cumulative effects gases such as CO, CO2, other effects on the central
Solubility in water: sparingly
R38: irritating to skin Flash point: <-40 ° C various hydrocarbons, nervous system.
soluble
R51 / 53: Toxic to aquatic organisms, may cause long-term adverse effects in aldehydes and soot. Repeated inhalation of large
the aquatic environment, Ignition temperature:> 250 ° C amounts of fumes causes
R63: Possible risk pregnancy of harm to the child, exposure to benzene.
R65: Harmful: may cause lung damage if swallowed, Explosive: Repeated exposure to high
R67: Vapors may cause drowsiness and dizziness. LEL: 1% levels of benzene can cause
Safety phrases: LSE: 8% leukemia.
S2: Keep out of reach of children
S29: Do not empty into drains, recommended extinguishing Ecotoxicity:
agents: foam, dry powder,

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S43: In case of fire, the use of alcohol resistant foam, dry powder or CO2, carbon dioxide This product is harmful to
S45: In case of accident or illness seek medical advice immediately (if possible aquatic organisms
show the label)
S53: Avoid exposure, obtain special instructions before use
data sheet
and show the container or label

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3.1.2 thermal decomposition
A heat, temperature greater to extreme weather conditions and / or in the presence of moisture,
certain products decompose. Decomposition products depend molecules and storage characteristics.
The products affected by the activities of deposit VIVO ENERGY Tunisia are stable to temperatures.
Regarding flammable or combustible liquids under fire thermal decomposition products are "classic"
for hydrocarbons, ie mainly carbon oxides and soot.
The table products from the combustion products used on site Rades (data from safety data sheets).
products used Combustion Products

Incomplete combustion and thermolysis may produce more or less
Unleaded
toxic gases such as CO, CO2, unburned hydrocarbons, soot.
Gas oil and diesel 50 The carbon monoxide may be formed by incomplete combustion
Incomplete combustion and thermolysis may produce more or less
AVGAS 100LL
toxic gases such as CO, CO2, unburned hydrocarbons, soot.
Decomposition products may include the following materials:
additives
carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides
3.1.3 Incompatibility products
3.1.3.1 Hydrocarbons and strong oxidants
Products stored and implemented are stable under normal conditions.
However, there may be incompatibility between products accidentally implemented simultaneously

or consecutively in the storage tanks and other facilities of the deposit, and incompatibility of these
products with certain materials. These inconsistencies can cause reactions more or less rapid and
violent, such as inflammation, deflagration, detonation, film materials, as a result of a mixture of
heating or a shock.
The consequences of these incompatibilities can be:
 the loss of the product property (introduction of a flammable liquid category B in a tank
containing a flammable liquid of category C, ...);
 an exothermic reaction with fire risk (the risk is primarily to consider with strong oxidizers,
concerning flammable or combustible liquids).
No strong oxidant may react violently with these products is stored or implemented on the deposit
VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades.
3.1.3.2 Flammables and air
The risks of ignition / explosion within the deposit activities are mainly due to the presence of
flammable liquids (1st and 2nd class, B and C) that can combine with air an explosive cloud.

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In case of loss of containment and venting air, flammable gas phase products are capable of
forming with air flammable mixtures when the concentrations are within the flammability limits of
the product. It should be noted that for the mixture ignites, it must meet a hot spot that could
provide the necessary energy. The flammability limits in air at room temperature range from 1.4%
to 7.6%.
3.1.4 Product Risk Analysis Summary
The table below synthetically includes all the risks associated with stored products and / or
implemented on the deposit VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades. It also indicates the means of prevention
and protection implemented to prevent the risks associated with these products.
Risk phrases Means of prevention Means of protection
R12: Extremely flammable Flammable liquids of the same general alarm buttons distributed
(liquid) = liquid substances and class are stored in retention over the deposit
preparations having a flash point basins dedicated Internal organization through an
lower than 0 ° C and the boiling Operator training and Internal Operation of emergency
point (or the initial boiling awareness of the risks (fire, equipment and warning plan
temperature) is less than or explosion and environmental)
equal to 35 ° C Poles fire fed by a pressurized
Rules prohibiting smoking and network
using mobile phone on the fire fighting resources in fixed
workplace position (sprinkler crowns, weirs
fire permit, work permit foam, foam guns)
Prevention plan for outside mobile means of fire fighting
companies (spears, guns)
Electric Potential equalization Fire extinguishers
and grounding installations fire network
Periodic inspection of electrical
equipment
Zoning ATEX
Trays fixed roof floating screen
R20 / 21/22: Harmful by Procedure (chek list to ensure The operators handling products
inhalation, skin contact and by that security requirements are are equipped with protective
ingestion met) clothing and masks, goggles and
R33: Danger of cumulative Operator training and risk gloves
effects awareness (toxic, explosion, fire personal safety equipment
R38: Irritating to eyes and skin and environmental) (safety showers and eyewash,
Shell HSSE Management respirators) are available on the
R40 carcinogenic effect - ground floor of the control room
insufficient evidence System
(local administrative)
R45: May cause cancer Equipment for protection against
R46: May cause heritable fire
genetic damage
R63: Possible risk pregnancy of
harm to the child
R65: Harmful: may cause lung
damage if swallowed
R66: Repeated exposure may
cause skin dryness or cracking
skin
R67: Vapors may cause
drowsiness and dizziness

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Risk phrases Means of prevention Means of protection
R51 / 53: Toxic to aquatic Operator training and risk retention bins (waterproof
organisms, may cause long-term awareness (toxic, explosion, fire concrete trough)
adverse effects in the aquatic and environmental) Piezometers with monthly
environment Checking the tightness of the statements
facilities after work bowls valves to shut separator
Collecting drippings to the
separators
Board 3 : Risks stored products and implemented the deposit VIVO ENERGY Rades
It appears that VIVO ENERGY Tunisia implements prevention and protection tailored to the risks
associated with products stored and used in the activity of the deposit.

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3.2. IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL DANGERS
Potential hazards correspond to the equipment on which an adverse event, if no preventive or protective
system comes influence its development or mitigate its effects, is likely to lead to a major accident.
The identification of potential hazards is made in particular from the study of the accident, the danger of
the products used on site, amounts likely to be present and implementation conditions or storage.
The method for identification of potential danger is to identify and map the areas of the site with a
potential danger of their nature. These areas are determined independently of the source of danger (site
activity, natural, technical failure, ...).
Hazard potential is characterized by the torque produced x amount.
Each product can be examined on the following 2 criteria:
 intrinsic toxicity of the product bound to its characteristics,
 Quantity stored or implemented (fixed or mobile tanks).
The following table summarizes the main potential hazards on site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades:

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maximum combined associated

Product Phase Location
amount risk
Pipe diameter: 10 ''
Pool fire
Length: 420 m
Mooring boat and Pollution of
offloading vessel discharge rate: depends
pipeline filling reservoirs water and / or
boats pump (maximum
soil
flow rate: 1275 m3 / h)
Pool fire
Manifold in SOTRAPIL Pollution of
Receive Pipeline receiving rate: 250 to
site entry water and / or
300 m3 / h
soil
Fire Bowl
Tray Fire
Boil over thin
Diesel
layer
fuel Total capacity: 56,983
atmospheric trays fixed headspace
m3
Storage roof (R2, R5, R9, R10, Explosion
maximum capacity: 15
R14, R16, R17, R19) pressurizing
R19 tray 200 m3
slow
Pollution of
water and / or
soil
Pool fire
3 islands (6 positions) headspace
tank truck loading loading trucks Explosion
Loading trucks
station maximum truck capacity: Pollution of
31 m3 water and / or
soil
diesel 50 Pool fire
Manifold in SOTRAPIL Pollution of
site entry water and / or
300 m3 / h
soil
Storage atmospheric trays fixed Total capacity: 7256 m3 Fire Bowl
roof (R6, R7, R8) maximum capacity: R6 Tray Fire
and R7 bins of 3100 m3 Boil over thin
layer
headspace
Explosion
pressurizing
slow
Pollution of
water and / or
soil

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amount risk
Pool fire
3 islands (6 positions) headspace
tank truck loading loading trucks Explosion
Loading trucks maximum truck capacity:
station Pollution of
31 m3 water and / or
soil
Pool fire
UVCE / Flash-
Manifold in SOTRAPIL fire
site entry Pollution of
300 m3 / h
water and / or
soil
Fire Bowl
UVCE / Flash-
fire
atmospheric fixed roof Total capacity: 23,830 Tray Fire
trays with floating m3
Storage maximum capacity: R13 headspace
Unleade screen (R1, R13, R18,
R20) tray 8432 m3 Explosion
d
Pollution of
water and / or
soil
Pool fire
UVCE / Flash-
3 islands (6 positions) fire
tank truck loading loading trucks headspace
station Explosion
31 m3 Pollution of
water and / or
soil
Pipe Diameter: 6 '' Pool fire
Length: 300 m UVCE / Flash-
Mooring boat and Rate of unloading: fire
offloading vessel
pipeline filling reservoirs depends boats pumps Pollution of
(maximum flow: 475 water and / or
m3 / h) soil
Fire Bowl
AVGAS
UVCE / Flash-
100LL
fire
atmospheric fixed roof Tray Fire
Storage tank with floating screen 450 m3 headspace
(R15) Explosion
Pollution of
water and / or
soil

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amount risk
Pool fire
Maximum length of a
UVCE / Flash-
storage drums on the barrel: 200 liters
fire
shafts of the storage Number of barrels on
Pollution of
area the area: 30 to 50
water and / or
barrels
soil
Fire Bowl
1 filling station via a line UVCE / Flash-
2 '' fire
Filling barrels filling station drums Maximum length of a Pollution of
barrel: 200 liters water and / or
soil
Pool fire
UVCE / Flash-
fire
1 truck loading station
tank truck loading headspace
station Explosion
31 m3
Pollution of
water and / or
soil
Maximum length of a Pool fire
storage drums on the barrel: 200 liters Pollution of
shafts of the storage Number of barrels over water and / or
area the area 80 to 100
barrels soil
additives Storage
Maximum length of a Fire Bowl
barrels in storage at the barrel: 200 liters Pollution of
post additivation Number of barrels on water and / or
the area: 16 barrels soil
Board 4 : Potential dangers site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades
The location of potential site hazards VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades is shown in the appendix.
Appendix 5-2 : Site of potential dangers Positioning VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades
3.3. REDUCING POTENTIAL HAZARDS
Reducing potential hazards can be achieved in different ways:
 by removing or replacing the processes and substances dangerous processes or substances

presenting lower danger,
 reducing as much as possible the quantities of material involved in these installations taking into
account the supply of vehicles parking on site,

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 take an iterative approach to risk reduction, from the scenarios identified in the preliminary risk
assessment. Each scenario in which risk is reducible should be a risk reduction approach by
application of preventive or protective measures, taking into account the practices and techniques
available and their economy. The residual risk is again listed.
The following paragraphs present the solutions envisaged to reduce these potential dangers.
3.3.1 fire
The solutions to reduce this hazard potential are:
 the suppression of flammable and combustible liquids: this solution is not feasible in view of the
main activity of filing VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades corresponding storage of fuels for shipment
by road. These products are flammable liquids (first and second class, B and C);
 reduced amounts present: a maintenance of storage capacity and shipping involves

conservation of amounts present. Furthermore a reduction of the amount of oil stored would
increase supply, either by ship or by pipeline, and increased shipments by road. This would
result in increasing the risk related to the transport of dangerous goods.
Thus, at present, there is no solution to reduce this potential danger, that is techno-economically
viable. However, the filing of VIVO ENERGY Tunisia La Goulette is implementing a large number of
ways to keep the fire risk as low as reasonably achievable, namely:
 appropriate preventive measures (storage of flammable liquids in the same category in retention
basins, prevention plan for outside companies, fire permits, work permits, -interdiction rules of
smoking and using mobile phone on the site , electrical bonding and grounding, periodic
monitoring of electrical equipment, ATEX zoning);
 suitable protection means (general alarm buttons around the site, pressure fire system, sprinkler
crowns, foam chambers in the cups and on the roofs of tanks, fire hoses, fire extinguishers,
water reserve).
3.3.2 The explosion
 the removal of oil storage tanks: This solution is not feasible;
 removing hazardous environments: flammable liquids (1st and 2nd class, B and C) are present
in significant amounts in the storage tanks, it is not possible to remove these products;
 reducing explosive volumes: the volumes of storage tanks have been optimized.
viable. However, the filing of VIVO ENERGY Rades Tunisia implements a significant number of means
to maintain the explosion risk as low as reasonably achievable, namely:
 limited sources of ignition (material suitable for explosive atmospheres, check grounding
connections of materials and equipment, fire permits, work permits, rules ...);

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 equipment design: storage of unleaded AVGAS and in fixed-roof tanks with floating screen.
3.3.3 The slow pressurization
The solution to reduce the danger potential is:
 setting breathing vents instead adequately dimensioned for discharging the overpressure gas.
The VIVO ENERGY Tunisia bins conform to international regulatory standards, however it is not
possible to check whether the breathing vents are properly sized to evacuate the overpressure gas.
To reduce this potential danger, deposit VIVO ENERGY Rades Tunisia implements a number of
important means of prevention and protection (cf. 3.3.1) To maintain the fire, triggering factor of the
phenomenon of slow pressurization, to as low as technically feasible and reasonable.

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3.3.4 The boilover thin layer
To recap, the occurrence of a Boil Over thin layer on a tray industrial oil storage requires:
 prior fire;
 a duration of the order of several hours (depending on the masses involved).
Boil Over the thin layer before tripping corresponds to a domino effect delayed by a fire (fire tray and /
or cuvette of fire).
For a Boil Over thin layer occur, three conditions must be met:
 the presence of water to transform into steam;
 contacting the high product layer at a temperature above 100 ° C with a water bath and the
sudden vaporization of the water bottom resulting in an increase of its volume and acting as a
piston on the hydrocarbon;
 a sufficiently viscous hydrocarbon to the steam generated by vaporization of the water bottom
can not easily pass through the hydrocarbon from the bottom of the tank, which is the case of
diesel
Considering the fixed roof tanks VIVO ENERGY Tunisia in which are stored hydrocarbons having a
propensity to Boil Over thin layer, for a Boil Over occurs, it is necessary that the container loses its roof
and the contents of the tank is on fire.
Regarding gas oil tanks, the loss of the fixed roof of the tank and the tank fire can occur only if there
already is a fire bowl in the retention trays. Indeed, these products are stored at temperatures lower
than their flash point, and therefore at room temperature do not give off sufficient vapor to form a
flammable / explosive atmosphere.
Therefore, for fixed roof tanks containing these products on the site, only a fire of uncontrolled bowl
can create the conditions necessary for the explosion of the gas overhead:
 heating the flammable liquid contained in the tank vapor generating sufficient;
 heating flammable vapors accumulating in the gaseous headspace of the reservoir to that they
reach their autoignition temperature (> 250 ° C) and create the conditions for the blast.
Boil Over the thin film corresponds to the abrupt vaporization of a bottom of water contained in the
tank. Therefore, in the absence of control of a fire bowl and assuming that there is creation of a heat
wave and that the hydrocarbon is sufficiently viscous, it would also be necessary that the water be
present in the storage bin. This water may be due to a lack of bleeding or actions against fire bowl.
viable. However, the filing of VIVO ENERGY Rades Tunisia implements a large number of ways to
keep the fire risk to as low as technically feasible and reasonable, including:

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 network defense against fire is constantly under pressure;
 Monthly testing of network defense against fire;
 reserve 5 000 m3 fire and ability to replenish the saltwater tank;
 foam chambers in the cups and on the roofs of the tanks;
 emulsifiers several tanks available on the deposit;
 Additional resources provided by the Mutual Assistance of the oil zone of Rades.
Regarding the presence of water in the tank bottom, depositing VIVO ENERGY Rades Tunisia
implements the following means:
 regularly purge tray funds;
 decennial inspections of tanks (to verify the absence of water infiltration);
 trays flushing procedure;
 Analysis of the product before ship reception and reception of the certificate of analysis VIVO
ENERGY Tunisia and analysis the product by VIVO ENERGY Tunisia on site prior to receipt by
each pipeline.
3.3.5 Pollution
 removing hazardous to the environment, this solution is not feasible considering that some of the
oil stored in large amounts are dangerous for the environment;
 reduced amounts present: a maintenance of storage capacity and shipping involves

conservation of amounts present.
However, the filing of VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades implements means for keeping the pollution risk
to as low as technically feasible and reasonable, namely:
 retention bins (waterproof concrete bowl);
 trough the drainage system oriented towards hydrocarbon separators (three separators are
spread over the site) with drain valve of the bowl in a normally closed position with piezometers
monthly statements;
 collection gutters to the separators.

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4. RELATED RISK ANALYSIS NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
4.1. RISKS RELATED TO CLIMATOLOGY
4.1.1 temperatures
The main risk associated with weather would be the risk of a rise in temperature in the event of strong
external heat bins, which could generate sufficient vapor to create an explosive atmosphere.
Indeed, in the case of bin operating at atmospheric pressure, the operation requires a permanent
equilibrium of the stored product with the ambient air. This balance is achieved by directly contacting
the product with the atmosphere through vents example. The creation of a flammable atmosphere
within the tank is not accidental. It takes place once the product has a sufficiently low flash point, that
is to say, it is capable of generating enough steam to operating conditions to form with air flammable
mixture. However, in the case of storage tanks filing VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades, the risk is limited
due to the fixed roof to floating screens unleaded tanks and AVGAS. Indeed, well inside the bins is
devoid of air, this precaution,
For fixed roof tanks, the flash point of the hydrocarbons present (diesel and gas oil 50) is at least 55 °
C. Now we see that the absolute maximum temperature reached since 2000 is 46.6 ° C (see Chapter
2). This temperature is below the flash point of the products.
Regarding the low temperatures, the risk would be freezing of pipes carrying water. For this, the flows
are maintained permanent during working hours. Furthermore the recorded minimum temperature on
the site is -0.8 ° C in 2002 (see chapter 2); the risk of freezing in the pipes is negligible
Finally, extreme temperatures do not pose a risk to the safety of the site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia.
4.1.2 wind
The risks to the wind are:
 By stronger wind, significant efforts on structures; by cons, they contribute to a better dispersion
of flammable vapors in case of leakage of a volatile product (unleaded, AVGAS);
 For low wind, low dispersion flammable vapors which keeps in high concentrations. For the
same initial speed, explosions of flammable vapor cloud in such conditions have more serious
consequences than medium or strong wind.
The prevailing westerly winds are mostly weak winds (from 1 to 5 m / s). These wind speeds
correspond to those used for modeling scenarios (F3 and D5).
In 2003, the meteorological center of Tunis Carthage noted a maximum wind speed of 32 m / s. The
tanks have been damaged and perfectly resisted the constraints applied by these winds.
In conclusion, the winds are not a risk to the safety of the site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia.

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4.1.3 Fog
The presence of fog can:
 On the one hand impair visibility, especially when maneuvering trucks. fog days are very rare
(about 6 days per year) and is generally dispersed in the morning. In addition, the site is
illuminated and drivers are trained and familiar with the site and taxiways.
 On the other hand, generate external corrosion on pipes or other metal devices. Hydraulic
testing of pipes and thickness checks are carried out periodically and the tanks are subjected to
ten hydraulic test.
In conclusion, the fog is not a risk to the safety of the site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia.
4.1.4 hoarfrost
The presence of snow or frost on the site may hinder the activity of the site because of the difficulty of
movement of handling equipment and trucks.
Nevertheless, the white frost and especially snowfalls are very exceptional in La Goulette (less than 2
days per year).
In conclusion, the frost does not represent a risk to the safety of the site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia.
4.2. THE FLOOD RISK AND COASTAL FLOODING
Flood or marine submersion can:
 Rupture of a tank in the event of large wave. VIVO ENERGY Tunisia tanks are protected by the
walls of retention basins ..
 Rupture of a pipeline by movement of lines support structures. The sizing of lines support structures
was conducted by VIVO ENERGY Tunisia following regulations and standards.
The study referenced [R1]showed that the area of the port of Rades is not exposed to the risk of flooding,
but is concerned against the risk of coastal flooding in storm period. Flooding can be done either from the
sea or from the Lake of Tunis.
However, this flood hazard was described as low.
Moreover, it is important to note the limitations of the analysis performed, which considers "pessimistic in
terms of results," the mapping performed flooding hazard, particularly because of the lack of information
about the topography of certain sites causing interpolations can lead to errors.
In conclusion, only the marine flooding can pose a risk to the safety of the site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia.
Nevertheless VIVO ENERGY Tunisia has implemented measures to reduce this risk.

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4.3. RISKS RELATED TO LIGHTNING
Lightning is a potential source of ignition of fire either by supplying the activation energy of a combustion
either by generating a local auto-ignition temperature at the place where it falls.
As an illustration, the following table provides a simplified way the main effects of a lightning strike on an
installation:
Direct effects of lightning strike physical phenomena Consequences / Potential
Warming up following the passage of

melting effects related to the amount the energy of lightning:
of electric charges at the point of
Drilling capacity
thermal effects impact
Fire
Effects of heat joule
Ignition of an explosive atmosphere
indirect effects of lightning strike physical phenomena Consequences / Potential
Creation of potential differences
shock wave on the electrical and

electronic circuits
electric or magnetic fields radiated

different impedances (pipelines,
buildings, ...) = potential difference Ignition risk of oxygen enriched
can create: atmospheres or explosive
-Sparks Destruction of energy sources

priming effects
-the arc Risk of discontinuation of certain
security features
Power failure
Risk of destruction of sensitive
overvoltage material and controlling the process by
surge due to the shock wave or LEMP
(Lightning Electromagnetic Pulses)
Malfunctioning IT / automation
Malfunction of management safety
Passages large current risk of

deformation or breakage of
components:
electrodynamic effects Appearance forces - Downhill lightning rod
- Pipelines
- The electric cables

Board 5 : Major risks related to lightning

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The decree of 15 January 2008 [R2] requires the operator to carry out a preliminary risk analysis and
technical study to identify risks and propose practical solutions for prevention and protection.
In accordance with this order, deposit VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades commissioned a study lightning in
2011 by APSYS society. The entirety of this study is reported in the Annex and its synthesis is presented
below.
Appendix 5-3 Study of protection against lightning
Summary of the study protection against lightning
The installation in the standards of protection devices against lightning, advocated in this study, can not
ensure absolutely flawless protection of persons or property.
However, the implementation of the recommendations should significantly reduce the damage that may
be caused by lightning on protected structures and equipment and reduce the risk of loss of life up to the
value set by the EN 62305 standard -2.

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th Outdoor Installation of Lightning Protection (IEPF)
tanks
The structure of the storage tanks and grounded comply with standard EN 62305-3 [DN3] and Level II
defined in the ARF.
A ground conductor is cut on the R16 tank.
truck loading station
Breakdowns and farms in the loading station structure form a natural meshed cage mesh 5m x 5m to
prevent a discharge to the position located in hazardous areas. More pipes for anti fail ram device and the
hydrocarbon feed pipes have a thickness greater than 4mm.
These capture devices comply at III protection promoted by risk analysis.
For a protection level III, the average distance between two poles grounded is 15 meters according to
standard EN 62305-3 [DN3]. One pillar of the structure is grounded. Thus, the grounding of the structure
is not compliant with EN 62305-3 [DN3] and level III protection advocated by the risk analysis.
6 pillars of the metal structure, piping for the ram of anti blow device and the structure for supporting the
pipes must be connected to the type of earthing A or type B.
They must be connected to a joint control and earthing through a tinned copper conductors 50 mm²
minimum section.
Post additivation
The metal structure of the position of additive and grounded comply with standard EN 62305-3 [DN3] and
level IV protection advocated by the risk analysis.
Post drumming
Following the calculation of the ARF, a lightning protective device is not necessary for the position
drumming if channeling AVGAS entering the zone is grounded.
The pipes feeding the post drumming and the charging station must be earthed at the entry point of the
areas to prevent the entrance of the lightning current through these lines.
The oil pipes must be joined together by a tinned copper conductor 50 mm². The bypass will be
connected by specific welds or self-locking screws to the flanges of the pipes.
This conductor is connected to a type earthing A provided with at least two vertical electrodes of copper
diameter 15 mm and length 2.5 m in accordance with the standard EN 62305-3 [DN3].

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Rack pipes
The rack supporting the boat receiving lines is not grounded since the ground conductor is cut. The driver
must be reattached.
hydrocarbons pipes
The oil wharf is not for VIVO ENERGY Tunisia, it is managed by the OMMP Different equipment (valves,
hoses, etc.) of the boat unloading station are all connected to ground.
The boat receiving pipes and air SOTRAPIL are in part but can withstand direct lightning strike because
the thickness is greater than 4mm. All facilities are grounded.
Lighting
Lighting poles have a higher probability of receiving a lightning strike the lowest facilities. Current should
be directed to the ground as directly as possible to minimize the risk of sparking in hazardous areas. They
are connected to a grounded outlet.
Safety distances:
The safety distance is the minimum distance for which there is no dangerous spark formation.
Equipotential connections must be established between the metal frames (cable trays, power units,
lighting domes, extractors, etc.), the down-conductor and the roof elements if the safety distance
calculated for each area § 3.5 is not respected.
If this distance can not be guaranteed between the down-conductors or the roof elements and the metal
parts (cable trays, power units, lighting domes, extractors, etc.), equipotential connections should be
added to reduce the risk of sparking.
No conductive installation is present at a distance less than the safety distance in an ATEX Zone 0.
th Indoor Installation of Lightning Protection (IIPF)
Electrical lines passing along the fence are placed in metal trays.
reservoir levels detections are connected to the detection unit with shielded cables. In the retention bowls,
the cables run in metal conduits connected to ground and to the reservoir.
The hydrocarbon pipelines and fire are grounded.
The truck loading stations and additives are all equipped grounded. The equipotentialities filling plants
and trucks are made and loading is controlled with grounding clamps.
No lightning protection is installed on the site.

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Once a building is equipped with a lightning conductor, type 1 arrester must be installed on the incoming
lines in the building. Surge arresters Type 2 or Type 3 are insufficient in case of direct aggression of
lightning.
A lightning arrester type 1 must be installed on the main switchboard power to prevent any risk of
sparking. (See "4.4.1 Connecting the arrester type 1"). The line is air between the main switchboard and
the administrative building, an SPD Type 1 must be installed in the General panel of the administration
building.
The systems considered PSIS (Important Elements For Safety) and can be damaged by the effects of
lightning are the detection levels and the pump for pressurizing the fire network. They must be protected
by surge arresters type 2.
Surge arresters Type 2 should be set up in the level of alarm central power cabinet and the cabinet of the
electric pump.
The Appeals telephone link emergency services must remain permanently functional. Adequate protection
of telephone lines must be done by the establishment of a lightning protection for communication
networks in the cabinet of arrival of the telephone line.
th Verification frequency of lightning protection systems
Section 21 of the French decree of October 4, 2010 Fixed changed, whatever the level of protection, the
following intervals:
 complete audit six months after the protection of on-site installation
 visual check every year
 Full check every 2 years.
The audits must be performed by a competent body.
If registered thunderbolt, reported by Météorage or observed visually, a visual check of the safety devices
must be carried out within a maximum period of one month.
If any of these checks revealed the need for rehabilitation, it must be carried out within a maximum period
of one month.

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4.4. RISKS RELATED TO EARTHQUAKES
Appendix 5-4 : Seismic Risk Study
The response spectra on the site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia in Rades were obtained from specific elements
seismotectonics regional analysis, according to the deterministic approach advocated by France for
facilities classified by the Ministerial Decree of 10 May 1993 the French regulations [R3].
They were calculated by considering a reference earthquake Mw 6.0 (source close), brought in the most
unfavorable position, directly above the site to a depth of 10 km.
The application of spectral attenuation relationships adapted to the regional context seismotectonics
allowed to offer the spectra of SMHV and SMS to consider the site of the right ( "the horizontal rock
outcropping"). These spectra are adapted to the context seismotectonics Rades.
The spectra from the nearest source are shown in the following figures:
VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades
figure 1 : Source close - Comparing SMHV type spectra flush horizontal rock and proposed spectrum

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figure 2 : Source close - Comparison of SMS type spectra flush horizontal rock and proposed
spectrum
The spectra calculated in this report are defined "horizontal rock flush", a standard condition of soil (rock
firm).
site conditions are evaluated for a specific site (soil column representative of the site). The response
spectrum taking into account these site conditions is shown for the source close to the MSS in the
following figure.

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figure 3 : Source close - Comparison of SMS type spectra taking into account the conditions of the
site and proposed spectrum

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5. RELATED RISK ANALYSIS THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT
5.1. RISKS RELATED TO ROADS
5.1.1 roadways
Accidents involving road traffic and may affect the VIVO ENERGY facilities may be limited to the study
of the transport of hazardous materials accidents. Specifically, the transport of flammable materials
that could lead to accidents types BLEVE because the only trucks passing near the depot are those
who go in the oil zone.
The pressure levels calculated after the explosive vaporisation of LPG highlight major domino effect,
up to 35 meters around the truck (.DELTA.P> 300 mbar) to the phenomenon of BLEVE.
Regarding the heat flow from a BLEVE, its effects on structures are little known because of a very
short duration. Given the brevity of the phenomenon, it seems unlikely that the only heat flow is the
cause of major domino effect on surrounding structures.
In view of these results, a road accident hazardous material transport occurring on surrounding roads,
should not cause major domino effect on site facilities. Expect to pipe deformation and significant
deterioration of the site buildings.
In case of incident, the staff was also evacuated and went to the assembly point.
In conclusion, the transport of dangerous goods by road does not represent a security risk facilities
deposition VIVO ENERGY Tunisia.
However, pipes connecting the jetty to the deposit run along in some places the roads of the oil zone
and could be victims of a collision with a vehicle or undergo significant pressure levels rollover then
BLEVE of a truck on the roads.
Finally, road transport can pose a risk to the pipes outside the site. Nevertheless VIVO ENERGY
Tunisia has implemented a number of measures (plots of the possible lines outside lanes, turning on
porch or in the tunnel pipes, guardrails) to reduce this risk.
5.1.2 Railways
The railway passing near the deposit is the way serving the grain silos near the site. This channel is
only used for grain cargo.
However, the pipeline connecting the pier to the filing along in some places the railway and could be
the victim of a shock in the event of derailment.
This hypothesis is very unlikely especially since trains run on this path with very low speed.
Finally, rail transport is not retained as a security risk VIVO ENERGY Tunisia facilities.

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5.1.3 Airway
According to information provided by the Civil Protection, the major risks are during takeoff and
landing. Accidents in landing, approach and takeoff in fact represent 65% of all aircraft accidents. The
area accepted as being the most exposed is that which is within a rectangle bounded by:
 A distance of 3 km from either side in the axis of the runway;
 A distance of 1 km from both sides perpendicularly to the track.
The probability of occurrence of an aircraft fall outside of this area is very low. And the probability of an
aircraft crash on the deposit ENERGY VIVO is particularly low it is located 6 km from the nearest end
of the runway and there is no not located in the center of the track.
In conclusion, an aircraft crash is not a risk to the safety of the site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia.
5.2. RISKS RELATED TO THE INDUSTRIAL ENVIRONMENT
The neighboring companies to the site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia Rades which may pose a risk are detailed
in the following table:
companies Activity associated risks Orientation / VIVO

ENERGY Tunisia
BLEVE
Storage and distribution UVCE / Flash-fire Adjacent VIVO
BUTAGAZ
of LPG bottles jet ignited ENERGY Tunisia in the
Exposion East
Fire Adjacent VIVO

OIL Lybia fuel storage
Explosion ENERGY Tunisia to the
west
Manufacturing, Adjacent VIVO
STLR packaging and storage Fire ENERGY Tunisia to
of lubricants
North
Storage and marketing Adjacent VIVO

Grain Silo
of cereals Explosion ENERGY Tunisia to
North
Storage and light fuel
STEG Berth
pumping Fire oil wharf
petroleum products Fire

mundane pipes
reception oil wharf
Explosion
Board 6 : Industrial plants nearby that can pose a risk to the site VIVO ENERGY Tunisia
The analysis of risks to the industrial environment was conducted as part of the evaluation of domino
effects that could be generated by nearby industrial facilities depositing VIVO ENERGY Tunisia. This
analysis is in Chapter 6.

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5.3. THE RISKS CONNECTED WITH INTRUSION
The site of La Goulette ENERGY VIVO is completely fenced. Similarly, the oil wharf is fenced
In addition, the Guarding Service is responsible for strictly enforce the general rules of safety. The guards
control the entry and exit of persons and vehicles and ensure that it does not carry unauthorized
hazardous products or prohibited materials.
To reduce the risk of malignancy, but can not be the guarantor of its impossibility, measures of prevention
and site monitoring are implemented. These measures mainly concern all struggle against intrusion
devices (surveillance cameras, burglar alarm system)
The oil wharf is under the supervision of the OMMP: they also control the entry and exit of people and
vehicles and prior authorization is required to enter the pier.

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6. ANALYSIS RELATED TO THE OPERATIONAL RISK
6.1. INTRODUCTION
Risk analysis related to facilities and their operation can identify scenarios that may affect the
environment and highlighted in the working group, the preventive and protective measures limiting their
progress.
Risk analysis related to the operation of the studied installation is performed according to the method
APR (Preliminary Hazard Analysis).
Those involved in the working groups are:
 Mr. BEN ZINEB, head of deposit, VIVO ENERGY Tunisia;
 Z. KLOULA, assistant chief of the deposit, VIVO ENERGY Tunisia;
 MY. Bennani, HSSE and corresponding responsible for monitoring the safety reports, VIVO
ENERGY Tunisia
 S. LICHTLE, APSYS;
 P. LEFEVRE, APSYS.
The methodology for the realization of this analysis is developed in Chapter 4.
6.2. RESULTS OF THE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE RISKS
The paintings completed in the working group are available in the Appendix.
Appendix 5-5 : Preliminary Analysis Tables Risk
The central dreaded events (ERC) identified during the analysis were then positioned in the site criticality
grid, as presented in Chapter 4.
The APR has identified the feared events leading to a dangerous phenomenon and will be retained for the
detailed risk analysis (orange boxes and red boxes and hazards whose effects are supposed to leave the
limits of the site).
The positioning site initiating events is given in below.

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Consequences Probability of occurrence

AT B C D E
severity
Has already happened

People Environment several times in VIVO or
Ever heard in the Has already happened Occurs several times a
(Gp) (Ge) Heard in the oil industry ENERGY occurred once
petroleum industry in VIVO ENERGY year on the deposit
in VIVO ENERGY
Tunisia
0 No injury No effect 7.3
Small effect (without

consequences for 1.7 / 1.8 / 2.2 / 3.7 / 2.1 / 3.4 / 3.5 / 3.6 /
1 little care 7.1 / 7.2 / 8.3 / 8.4 4.1
the environment) 6.1 / 6.5 / 6.6 8.1 /
minor effect
(moderate and
2 minor injury 1.2 / 5.1 / 6.2 / 6.3 / 7.4 3.2 / 3.3 / 4.2 / 9.1
localized pollution)
localized effect
Serious injury or
(significant pollution 1.3 / 1.4 / 1.5 / 1.6 / 2.4 /
3 more minor 1.9 1.1 / 3.10 / 8.2 /
on the site) 3.1 / 5.2 / 6.4 / 7.5
injuries
significant impact
A death or more (significant pollution
4 2.6 / 8.5 2.3
serious injuries external to the site)
major effect (major

and lasting pollution
5 multiple deaths 1.10 / 2.5 / 2.7 / 3.8 / 3.9 /
external to the site)
figure 4 : Positioning in the criticality grid central dreaded events VIVO ENERGY Tunisia La Goulette

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7. CONCLUSION OF THE PRELIMINARY RISK ANALYSIS AND SELECTION OF ACCIDENT

SCENARIOS
Initially, the preliminary analysis of the risks, in working group allowed, according to the sensitivities and
experience of each to highlight the risks of each installation (depending on the dangerousness of the
products used, processes , operating practices, etc.).
This work was carried out for each section of the deposit. It initializes the detailed risk analysis of the study
of the dangers since it must result in a list of representative accident scenarios of potential risks generated
by facilities, to study in detail later development.
In practice, the following scenarios were considered representative of all major scenarios or with domino
effects that may occur in the studied plants.
The choice of these scenarios was made during a meeting held at the end of the risk analysis by the
working group. This choice has the following approach:
 Highlighting for each section studied, the main feared events and their consequences;
 Choice modeling scenarios based on their interests in working group underlined preliminary risk
analysis:
- In terms of major effects;
- In terms of significant aggravating and domino effects depending on the vulnerability

(neighboring facilities near) the place of leak chosen;
 Analysis of the representativeness and completeness of the selected scenarios.
The dangerous events Central (ERC) identified during the Preliminary Risk Analysis are presented in the
table below, are associated modeled scenarios characterizing the ERC.

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equipment
ERC Section Events initiators identified hazards
concerned
Pressure in the pipeline due to: - pumping pressure exceeds
the maximum allowable pressure filling, - closing a valve
downstream, - Impurities and sealing pipe, - Product Thermal
Expansion
Tearing of the flexible bound to a displacement of the vessel

during the reception phase Flexible
Fire nappeUVCE / Flash-fire
boat shock pier (not receiving phase)
Leaking pipes and fittings (or Piping and
flexible) boat reception at sea, receiving operations accessories
on the pier or from the pier to product Collision between a vehicle and a pipe
the entrance of the site Brides Pollution of water and / or
external attacks (due to work) soil
Vannes
external attacks (due to domino effects)
leaks accessories (valve, welding, bridle, ... °
Internal corrosion (the presence of water in the pipes)
external corrosion

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equipment
concerned
Pressure in the pipeline due to: - pumping pressure exceeds
the maximum allowable pressure filling, - closing a valve
downstream, - Impurities and sealing pipe, - Product Thermal
Expansion
external attacks (due to work)

Fire nappeUVCE / Flash
external attacks (due to domino effects) firePollution water and / or
Piping and
Leaking pipes and soil
receiving operations accessories
accessories SOTRAPIL
product leaks accessories (valve, welding, bridle, ... °
manifold and inflammation
Vannes
external corrosion
AND The presence of an ignition source - electrostatically

discharge non-compliance with procedures and instructions
security- point of presence hot- Lightning
Pressure in the pipeline due to: - Presence of impurities and Piping and
plugging pipes, - Product Thermal Expansion Fire cuvetteUVCE / Flash-
accessories
Leaking pipes and reception firePressurisation a fixed roof
receiving operations
accessories retention and tank (domino effect)
product Brides
inflammation bowl
external attacks (due to work)
Vannes

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equipment
concerned
external attacks (due to domino effects)
leaks accessories (valve, welding, bridle, ... °
external corrosion

overfilling
Fire cuvetteUVCE / Flash-
AND The presence of an ignition source - electrostatically firePressurisation a fixed roof
discharge non-compliance with procedures and instructions tank (domino effect)
Overflowing bin and receiving operations
security- point of presence hot- Lightning ferry
inflammation product
Leak dress and accessories to fuel storage ferry tray cuvetteFeu light (domino
a roof storage tank fixed Pressure in the tank: thermal expansion of hydrocarbons effect) Pressurization of a
storage phase and contained fixed roof tank (domino
inflammation external attacks (due to work) effect) Boil Over thin layer
(domino effect)

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equipment
concerned
Wear, corrosion
Leaks ferry accessories (valves, flanges, ...)
leakage after intervention dress
external hazards (due to thermal dominoes or overpressure

effects)
Open purge valve (operator error)

The presence of an ignition source - electrostatically

gaseous headspace of security- point of presence hot- Lightning
inflammation of a fixed roof fuel storage ferry Explosion
tank
Leaking dress and Pressure in the tank: thermal expansion of hydrocarbons Fire cuvetteUVCE / bin Flash
accessories of a floating panel contained fireFeu (domino effect)
fuel storage ferry
storage bin in storage phase
and inflammation external attacks (due to work)

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equipment
concerned
Wear, corrosion
Leaks ferry accessories (valves, flanges, ...)
leakage after intervention dress
external hazards (due to thermal dominoes or overpressure

effects)
Open purge valve (operator error)
Casting floating screen

heat stress Fire bacBoil Over thin layer

(domino effect)
Tray Fire fuel storage ferry
Overflow tray

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equipment
concerned
extended tray fire

Boil Over fuel storage ferry Boil Over thin layer
AND Water in the bottom of the container
gaseous sky explosion of a

High concentration of hydrocarbons at the manhole
truck citerneFeu
compartment (domino effect)
gaseous headspace of Pollution of water and / or
inflammation of the tank Loading tankers Tanker soil
compartment (dome loading)
Rupture / Leakage on loading arm -

Non-arm raised after loading and pulling (dome load) or No- Fire nappeUVCE / Flash
disconnected after loading arm and pull (load source) - firePollution water and / or
external attacks (shock works) - external influences (shocks CamionBras soil
Inflammation of a puddle on
Loading tankers with a vehicle) -
the truck loading area
Movement of the truck during loading operation (human error
or truck problem) - Mechanical wear arm

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equipment
concerned
Leak on the truck tank due to: - Overfilling (filling the wrong
compartment ...) - unloading valve open truck fuyarde-
external Assault: collision with another truck at the loading-
external assaults (shock works) - Corrosion wear tank or
equipment (line between the vessel and the unloading valve) -
external overpressure (domino effect) - external aggression
(thermal flow) - Overpressure: no opening of the front load
dome (for a loading source)


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equipment
concerned
Leakage of a pipe on the truck loading area due to: -
overpressure following the delivery of a bare-flow pump, a
thermal expansion in the line, a shot bélier- Out of internal
weld-Corrosion Coatings external-
external aggressions: shocks (construction equipment,

vehicles, ...) -
external pressure (domino effect) -
Fire cuvetteUVCE / Flash
heat stress (fire bowl, external fire ...)
firePollution water and / or
Flange Leak seals on a truck loading pipe due to: - Piping and
soil
Inflammation of a puddle in a Plugging or impurities at the filters- Poor flanges or clamping accessoiresPompe
Loading tankers
hydrocarbon pump station joint
pump leakage or pump seal caused by: - mechanical wear

(start, aging) - Heat pump: lubrication problem, operation of
the dry pump

Leaking pipe or flexible Filling AVGAS barrels and Wear, corrosion, defect sealing Piping and Fire cuvetteUVCE / Flash
drumming and inflammation storage drums accessories firePollution water and / or
soil

Site of RADES
Etude de Dangers
equipment
concerned
external aggression: shock works vehicles shock, shock
trucks
Overpressure: plugging / impurities
AND The presence of an ignition source - electrostatically Flexible

Fall of a drum due to: - failure clamp fûts- error handling
external aggressions: shocks (trucks, cars, ...)

Fire on the storage area
containment loss of a drum at
Drums of AVGAS fûtsPollution water and / or
the storage area of the drums Filling AVGAS barrels and Leaks of a barrel
and additives soil
(additive or avgas) and storage drums
(flammable)
inflammation AND The presence of an ignition source - electrostatically
Board 7 Results of the Preliminary Risk Analysis

Site of RADES
Etude de Dangers
In conclusion, the accidents considered in the remainder of the study and that could cause hazards are:
1. sheet of fire and UVCE / Flash-fire due to leakage fed unleaded gasoline to SOTRAPIL manifold
(rupture 100%), with and without regard to the check valve,
(30% leak)
(3% leak)
4. fuel fire in the bowl No. 2A,
5. fuel fire in the bowl 4,
6. bowl of fire and UVCE / Flash fire due to evaporation of a body of AVGAS in trough No. 4B,
7. slow pressurizing a fuel tank caught in a fire,
8. Tray Fire,
9. Boil Over (thin layer) of a fuel tank,
10. gaseous headspace of the explosion of a fuel tank,
11. gaseous sky explosion of a tanker truck,
12. sheet of fire and UVCE / Flash-fire due to evaporation of the sheet on the loading area tankers,
13. Fire of a sheet of fuel in a pump station,
14. sheet of fire and UVCE / Flash fire due to evaporation of a body of the post AVGAS drumming,
15. Fire on the drums storage area,
16. sheet of fire and UVCE / Flash-fire due to leakage of AVGAS fed to the pier (rupture 100% or
flexible pull-out),
17. sheet of fire and UVCE / Flash-fire due to leakage of AVGAS fed to the pier (30% leak)
18. sheet of fire and UVCE / Flash-fire due to leakage of AVGAS fed to the pier (3% leak)
The preliminary risk analysis has also highlighted a number of actions that VIVO ENERGY Tunisia is
committed to implement. The list of actions and maturity of realization is given below:
SECTION APR ACTION TIME LIMIT

Middle term
receiving operations product Strengthening of the mechanical protection of pipelines
(rails, railings ...)

Site of RADES
Etude de Dangers
SECTION APR ACTION TIME LIMIT
Setting up a high level of servo trays closing tray bottom

Middle term
valves
Establishment of an anti-return valve on the filling line

Middle term
AVGAS
Setting up of flame arresters on vents Middle term
Establishment of hydrocarbon detection in storage

fuel storage Middle term
Retention tank
Implementation of protective devices against lightning Short term
Enslave the very low level bins to trigger the alarm Immediate
Loading tankers
Installation of a sprinkler system at the unloading station Middle term
Purging tankers - -
Traffic tankers - -
product transfer operations - -
Establishment of a foam gun near the area of additives to

Immediate
avoid the risk of a domino effect on the trucks (fire truck)
additive
Setting retention flammable additives drums adjacent to
Short term
the area of additivation
Setting retention flammable additives drums and AVGAS

Filling barrels of AVGAS Middle term
on the storage area of the drums
Effluent treatment - -
Board 8 : Actions implemented by VIVO ENERGY Tunisia following the Preliminary Risk Analysis
Immediate action: less than 1 year
Short term action: between 1 and 2 years
Medium-term action: before the update of the safety report

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Site of RADES

751-03 / BLISE / NT / 11-02879 / CI - Janvier 2012 Page 1 / 62

5.2. RISKS RELATED TO THE ENVIRONMENT INDUSTRIEL48.......................................................

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Annex 5-1: FDS products used on site VIVO ENERGY Rades......................................................................22

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APR: Preliminary Risk Analysis

ARF: Lightning Risk Assessment

ARIA: Analysis, Research and Information on Accidents

BARPI: Analysis of Risks and Office of Industrial Pollution

BLEVE: Boilin g Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion

EI: Event Initiator

ERC: Event Central Feared

LPG: Liquefied Petroleum Gas

HSE: Health, Safety, Security and Environment

LEL: Lower Explosive Limit

LSE: Upper Explosive Limit

OMMP: Office of Merchant Navy and Ports

HNS: National Company of Oil Distribution

STEG: Tunisian Company of Electricity and Gas

STLR: Tunisian Company of Lubricants Rades

SCPCI: Tunisian Company for Intermediate Chemicals

TDG: Transport of dangerous goods

(U) VCE (Unconfined) Vapor Cloud Explosion

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During the preliminary risk assessment are considered successively:

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2. ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND FEEDBACK

 From an analysis of the events (causes, consequences and compensatory measures);

2.1. ACCIDENTOLOGY EXTRACTED BARPI

The history of accidents reported worldwide implementing products or processes comparable to

 From an analysis of the events (causes, consequences and compensatory measures);

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Measures implemented by VIVO

- Stopping all movements by the

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Measures implemented by VIVO

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Measures implemented by VIVO

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Measures implemented by VIVO

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Measures implemented by VIVO

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Measures implemented by VIVO

- High level detector and high level with

- operator control level rise gradient in

- Training / operators of Empowerment

- storages Operating Procedure

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Measures implemented by VIVO

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Measures implemented by VIVO

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Measures implemented by VIVO

Board 1 : Global Accident representative of filing VIVO ENERGY activities

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2.2. BACK OF HOUSE EXPERIENCE

Measures in place to eliminate or

The main causes of the accident are not known.

- The contractor was not involved in security aspects / -

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