G.R. No.
L-37733 September 30, 1982 performance of this particular duty, he is supposed to exercise care and prudence,
ALMARIO T. SALTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE JESUS DE VEYRA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the CFI
of Manila, Branch XIV and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.
G.R. No. L-38035 September 30, 1982
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMANTE P. PURISIMA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VII and ALMARIO SALTA, respondents.
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for petitioner.
Nestor L. Kalaw, Edgardo M. Magtalas and Juan C. Gatmaitan for respondents,
DE CASTRO, J.:
In these two cases, the only issue to be resolved is whether a decision of acquittal in
a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of the
same facts as alleged in the criminal case, which is for violation of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The petitioner, Almario T. Salta, in G.R. No. L-37733, takes the affirmative stand on
the issue as above indicated, as he made manifest in his motion to dismiss Civil Case
No. 79583, of the CFI of Manila, Branch XIV, which was, however, denied by Hon.
Jesus de Veyra, presiding. In a similar motion, aforementioned petitioner sought to
dismiss another civil case (Civil Case No. 88343), pending before Branch VII of the
same CFI of Manila, presided over by Hon. Amante Purisima who granted the motion
to dismiss.
We have, therefore, the unedifying spectacle of two cases involving the same issue
disposed of by two judges in a manner directly in opposition of each other. For a
uniform ruling that would authoritatively settle this regrettable conflict of opinion, the
two cases have been consolidated for a single decision. For purposes of
convenience, however, although the petitioner in G.R. No. L-37733, Almario T. Salta,
is the private respondent in the other case, G.R. No. L-38035, in which the petitioner
is the Philippine National Bank, We shall refer in this decision to Salta as "petitioner,"
and the PNB, as respondent bank."
Petitioner was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos' branch.
As such, his duty was, among others, to himself grant loans, or only to recommend
the granting of loans, depending on the amount of the loan applied for. In the
and with utmost diligence, observe the policies, rules and regulations of the bank.
In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent bank,
petitioner indiscriminately granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by
PNB, in a manner characterized by negligence, fraud and manifest partiality, and
upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. This is how the
respondent bank found petitioner to have discharged his duties as branch manager of
the bank, and so it filed a civil action in the CFI of Manila (Civil Case No. 79583,
Branch XIV) on April 22, 1970, and another case (Civil Case No. 88343, Branch VII)
on September 23, 1972, to recover losses the bank suffered. At the same time the
bank caused to be filed, based on the same acts, a criminal case with the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Fifth Judicial District at San Fernando, Pampanga, Criminal
Case No. CCCV-668, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In the criminal case, the Court, on motion to dismiss filed by the defense, after the
prosecution has rested, granted the motion in a 64-page Resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, therefore, the
Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer) to Evidence) should be as it is hereby
granted and accused ALMARIO T. SALTA ACQUITTED of the
offense charged in the Information the prosecution having failed to
prove the essential ingredience and/or elements of the crime
charged,. with costs de oficio. 1
With his acquittal in the criminal case, petitioner filed Motions to Dismiss in each of
the two civil cases, based on Section 3(c), Rule I I I of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides:
(c) extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
... 2
It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that Judges de Veyra and Purisima of
the CFI of Manila took diametrically opposing views, the former denying the motion,
the latter granting it.
We sustain the order denying the motion to dismiss as issued by Judge de Veyra,
which, for its brevity, but clear and convincing, We quote as follows:
Having been acquitted by the Circuit Court of the charges of
violation of the Anti-Graft Law, Defendant now seeks the dismissal
of the civil case which arose from the same set of facts. The motion
to dismiss must be denied for the reason that acquittal in the
criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper
unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even
civilly the accused would not be liable-there is no such a finding.
 Apart from this, Plaintiff in this present civil case bases its case
either on fraud or negligence-evidence that only requires a
preponderance, unlike beyond reasonable doubt which is the
requisite in criminal cases.
The motion to dismiss is, therefore, denied for lack of merit. 3
To begin with, the filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action
is fully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. 4 The
criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud,
one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. Based on the same
acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud
and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints.
It needs hardly any showing to demonstrate this fact, which petitioner disputes,
particularly as to the sufficiency of the allegation of fraud in the civil complaints.
Definitely, We hold that the following allegation in the complaints unmistakably shows
that the complaints do contain sufficient averment of fraud:
13. That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting
the aforesaid loans which rendered him liable for his acts, which
fraud is positively and easily Identifiable in the manner and scheme
aforementioned. 5
That there is allegation of negligence is also unmistakably shown when the complaint
states that "the defendant as manager of Malolos Branch, in gross violation of the
bank rules and regulations, and without exercising necessary prudence, ... extended
a number of credit accommodations . . ." 6 On this allegation of negligence alone, the
civil case may be maintained as an entirely independent action from the criminal
case. Consequently, Section 3(c), Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court has no
application thereto.
The ruling in the case of PNB vs. Bagamaspad, 7 involving the same respondent
herein, and also against its branch manager, unherringly charts the course to be
followed in the final resolution of these cases. Thus -
The trial court based in the civil liability the appellants herein on the
provisions of Article 1718 and 1719 of the Civil Code, defining and
enumerating the duties and obligations of an agent and his liability
for failure to comply with such duty.. . . A careful study and
consideration of the record, however, convinces us and we agree
with the trial court that the defendants-appellants have not only
violated instructions of the plaintiff Bank, including things which the
bank wanted done or not done, all of which were fully understood
by them but they (appellants) also violated standing regulations
regarding the granting of loans; and what is more, thru their
carelessness, laxity and negligence, they allowed bans to be
granted to persons who were not entitled to secure loans. 8
If petitioner's civil liability is, as alleged in the complaint, based on negligence, apart
from the averment of fraud, then on the strength of the aforesaid ruling, the civil action
can be maintained regardless of the outcome of the criminal action.
The opinion of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Dionisio vs. Alvendia 9 is not only
enlightening, but authoritative. Thus —
. . . in the case of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code,
the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction,
would be entirety irrelevant to the civil action. This seems to be the
spirit of the law when it decided to make these actions 'entirely
separate and distinct' from the criminal action (Articles 22, 33, 34
and 2177). Hence in these cases, I think Rule 107 Sec. l(d) does
not apply. 10
It is significant to note that under Article 31 11 of the New Civil Code, it is made clear
that the civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the criminal action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of
the latter." It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions mentioned
in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed separately from the criminal
case, may proceed similarly regardless of the result of the criminal case.
Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be filed
separately and to proceed independently even during the pendency of the latter case,
the intention is patent to make the court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect
whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be so because the offenses
specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned, that
they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct
separability of their respective juridical cause or basis of action. This is clearly
illustrated in the case of swindling, a specie of an offense committed by means of
fraud, where the civil case may be filed separately and proceed independently of the
criminal case, regardless of the result of the latter.
The wisdom of the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code is to be found in the
fact that when the civil action is reserved to be filed separately, the criminal case is
prosecuted by the prosecuting officer alone without intervention from a private
counsel representing the interest of the offended party. It is but just that when, as in
the present instance, the prosecution of the criminal case is left to the government
prosecutor to undertake, any mistake or mishanding of the case committed by the
latter should not work to the prejudice of the offended party whose interest would thus
be protected by the measure contemplated by Article 33 and Article 2177 12 of the
New Civil Code.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it should be stated with emphasis, for its decisive
effect on how the issue raised in this case should be disposed of, that in no manner
may the resolution of the Circuit Criminal Court be read as positively stating that the
fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist, as required in the provision
relied upon by petitioner, Section 3(c), Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court. As
Judge de Veyra put it, "acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the
civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a finding that even
civilly, the accused would not be liable-there is no such finding." There, indeed, could
not be such finding because the criminal court, aware that the civil case is not before
it, would be acting in excess of jurisdiction if it were to make any pronouncement in
effect disposing of a case pending before another court, over which it had not
acquired jurisdiction. Even if this were authorized by the Rules of Court, the validity of
such rule would be open to serious doubt as it would be affecting a matter of
jurisdiction, which is substantive in character, considering the constitutional limitation
of the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, that said rules should not increase or
diminish substantive rights.

WHEREFORE, the order denying the motion to dismiss issued in Civil Case No.
79583 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (G. R. No. L-37733) is affirmed, while
the order granting a similar motion in Civil Case No. 88343 of the same court (G. R.
No. L-38035) is reversed. Let the records of these two (2) cases be remanded to their
respective courts of origin for proper further proceedings. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO
LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution [1] dated
December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution [2] dated
August 24, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for brevity)
and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by
petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity), figured in an accident. As a
result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of
Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other
hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the
civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal
case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the
civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil
case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case.
The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7,
1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, [3] assailing
the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal
issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper
remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil
action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared
that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error
is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC
denied the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and
believe that the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party,
believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless
imprudence against the second party. On the other hand, the second party, together
with his operator, believing themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn
to file a civil case for quasi-delict against the first party who is the very private
complainant in the criminal case.[4]
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for
reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil
action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
The Courts Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC
dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal
case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a
counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a
separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is
different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an
accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the
same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that
Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-
delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the
criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not
state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo
forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the
proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved
as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute
for a lapsed appeal.
 In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal
question of whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the
independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-
shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not
state in its order of dismissal[5] that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the
complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with prejudice. [6] Absent
a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without
prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without
prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action without
prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil
action under Rule 65.Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or
final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for
certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure
a favorable judgment.[8] Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought. [9] However, there
is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow
the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the
civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two
actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The
criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code
while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177
of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by
preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or
negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate
civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the
private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in
the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim
in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such
separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for
brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently
of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil
action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before the presentation of
the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act or omission
were deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to
the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and
the recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on
Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the
1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring
such action.Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code,
and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and
now provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the
criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-
delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted
independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make
a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.The prescriptive
period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run
even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles
of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action deemed
instituted in the criminal action.[10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a
separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the
criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party
is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the
criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but
its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal
action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising
from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if
reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered
in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before the commencement
of the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of
the criminal action until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule
applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did
not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this
procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been
instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found
before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is
rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be
consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed
automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the
criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated
criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of
the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate
civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action.Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after
commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-
delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the
offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended
party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offendedparty. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules,
expressly allows the offended party to bring an independent civil action under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111,
this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence.In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an
independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present
Rule 111 expressly states that the offended party may bring such an action but the
offended party may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged
in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the
criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs.
Cantos[12] where the Court held that the accused therein could validly institute a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal
case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim
for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules
governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary
consequences and implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court
should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim
for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case
against the offended party after the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance
with the new Rules which may be promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-claim,
counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily
complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000
Rules precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the
accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the
criminal case. However, the same provision states that any cause of action which could
have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may
be litigated in a separate civil action. The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to
file his counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed independently of the
criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal
action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action
but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the
independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime,
if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating
the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action
will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In
most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some
instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case
against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph
6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the
accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two
reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil
aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced
to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does
not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since
the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article
2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy
which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the
criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and
Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the
ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in
the criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil
action. This possibility has always been recognized ever since the Civil Code
introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides
that the independent civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. In Azucena vs.
Potenciano,[13] the Court declared:
x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the
civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution
whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept
of a civil action separate and independent from the criminal action although arising from
the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and
the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable
decisions may be more apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies
under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on
December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28,
1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
must be given retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that -

x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent.[14]

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The

Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No.
17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.