SIDE BY SIDE A COMPARISON OF STATE OF THE ART RAIL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ERTMS AND CBTC SIDE BY SIDE A COMPARISON OF STATE OF THE ART RAIL TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
The current needs of railway operators for
higher traffic capacity, shorter headways ALTHOUGH THE NECESSARY and improved customer services, without FUNCTIONALITIES TO ACHIEVE THIS affecting safety, have been growing GOAL ARE ALREADY DEVELOPED AND exponentially in the last years. This IMPLEMENTED IN SEVERAL situation provides manufacturers with the NETWORKS AROUND THE WORLD, opportunity to explore the advantages of THEY ARE NOT BEING USED ALL evolved communication systems, like TOGETHER IN A SINGLE SYSTEM. GSM and similar, in the context of safety-critical applications in train control systems. There is a well-defined separation The ultimate goals of railway operations between the systems that are being used can be summed-up as: in Mass Transit networks and the ones • Achieve the minimum headways of being used for Mainline. However, each of Mass Transit in the Mainline; these systems has the necessary maturity to step forward to an integrated • Achieve the interoperability, already solution that comprises the best of both standardized in the Mainline, for Mass worlds: European Rail Traffic Management Transit. System (ERTMS) and Communications- Based Train Control (CBTC) system. As a relevant case study, these two ALL THIS BY PROVIDING A GREATER systems already coexist in some NUMBER OF SERVICES WITH A networks, such as the Marmaray project HIGHER LEVEL OF QUALITY TO in Istambul, which extends for, CUSTOMERS AND ENSURING THE approximately, 77 kilometers and is NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY. equipped with CBTC for passenger THEREFORE, ALL OPERATORS CAN services and ERTMS level 1 for freight HAVE THEIR REQUIREMENTS MET, transportation. Although both systems WITHOUT BEING DEPENDENT ON A are being used in the same project, they SINGLE SUPPLIER. will be installed in different lines. This leads to rolling stock constraints, which must be equipped with two different onboard systems or they would otherwise be unable to run in some sections of the network. Converging these two technologies will also tackle the current problem of lacking a system that covers the operational requirements of suburban lines.
Figure 1: Optimised safety distance between trains -
CBTC VERSUS ERTMS Each of these two systems can be divided Some attempts at requirements into four main components. When looking standardization are already being at them in a generic way they are actually pursued, like the EURO Interlocking fairly similar. initiative from the International Union of Railways (UIC).
CBTC Train integrity - Ensuring the train
Communication-Based Train Control integrity is one of the challenges facing effective usage of ERTMS Level 3. This is Onboard Control and Communication Trackside mandatory for the system being able to Command System Equipment Centre Spread Spectrum Equipment support moving block operations, while being able to reach the headways already available in CBTC systems. Figure 2: CBTC System’s components.
ERTMS THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF
European Railway Traffic Management System COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS: WHAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHEN ETCS Wayside Traffic Management Communication Sytem Signalling CHOOSING THE RIGHT ONE? + System System GSM-R Onboard The communication system is the basis for providing a safe and optimized Figure 3: ERTMS’ components. operation and, ultimately, for guaranteeing customer satisfaction by WHAT ARE THE MAIN DIFFERENCES? improving services available on-board and adding new ones in the same line. Interoperability - Strongest point of ERTMS. Not yet available for CBTC The goal when choosing the appropriate systems. communication system should be to ensure that it has the ability to manage, Flexibility - ERTMS allows for a smoother in real-time and simultaneously, a large migration from conventional systems amount of vital and non-vital information, without disrupting the operational ensuring high levels of safety, reliability services. and availability. Automatic Train Operation (ATO) - Since communication technologies are Available in CBTC systems. It is still in always evolving, it is very important to development for ERTMS. prepare the networks to support future Moving block principle - Available in upgrades. This would allow operators to CBTC systems. It allows for shorter take advantage of new and improved headways and, consequently, increasing services and technologies without having the capacity. It is still in development for a major impact on their current ERTMS (Level 3). infrastructure and their normal network operation. It is also important that the choice between systems does not restrict WHAT ARE THE BLOCKING ISSUES THAT the operator to a single supplier of train ARE PREVENTING THESE TWO SYSTEMS control systems. The interoperability FROM CONVERGING? principle is being pursued very actively Operational requirements - Each nowadays and it is part of any operator costumer/network has specific specification for new lines, or for the operational requirements, different modernisation of existing lines. infrastructures and may use different THE WAY FORWARD communication technologies. The system There is still a long way to go before the full being developed must be flexible enough integration of these two systems becomes to support these differences without possible, but its gradual approach is a compromising the features already reality, as they already coexist in some achieved by each of the individual networks. systems (ERTMS & CBTC). The simultaneous usage of these two systems will bridge the current lack of In the future everything will converge specifications for suburban areas, where the towards the standardization of the operational requirements turn out to be a operational requirements for train control mixture of current target scenarios where ERTMS and CBTC systems are applied. systems. However, this goal will be The interoperability between different difficult to achieve due to the big number systems will also lead to a reality where of stakeholders involved. situations such as transhipment and rolling stock constraints (different on-board systems for different facilities) will no Figure 4: Train communication network. longer exist.
CRITICAL SOFTWARE’S CAPABILITIES ABOUT CRITICAL SOFTWARE
principle necessary for railway certification: system development or independent
developed capabilities to deliver high validation and RAMS. integrity systems for safety and mission critical oriented solutions. These SAFETY-CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT SAFETY-CRITICAL VALIDATION capabilities were built following demanding international standards and SERVICES SERVICES providing services for customers in areas The safety-critical development area We have a solid track record acting as an related with Aeronautics, Space, Defence comprises expertise in the development Independent Verification & Validation and, most recently, in Railway markets. (IVV) and RAMS service provider. We have Having the opportunity to work on applications in different domains, all with systems, particularly when real-time an engineering area dedicated to high levels of dependability, allowed us to and/or safety and dependability issues supporting our customers in performing leverage knowledge and experience across are concerned. This expertise area holds a validation to their systems, with different markets, something that is body of knowledge in specific standards experience in regulation for different kinds recognised by our customers as a strong such as EN 50126, EN 50128, EN 50129, of applications, namely: competitive advantage. Our capabilities originated from on both safety-critical IEC 61508, DO-178B, ECSS, Galileo SW • Railway systems: EN 50126, EN development and safety-critical validation Standard and MISRA, among others. 50128 and EN 50129; projects. We have vast experience in developing • Transports system: ISO/IEC 61508 or In recent years we have worked at system level in system analysis, design, validation ISO 26262; and certification support, acting as an cycle phases, from system requirements • Airborne systems: DO-178B, DO-254 independent safety, RAM and validation and ARP4761; team. competencies include: • On-board systems: ECSS Q-40 and • Model Driven Development through NASA STD-8719.13; SCADE and Simulink; DO-178B, ISO 61508 and EN 50128. development (Ada, C and C++); Our IVV methodologies go far beyond “traditional” Verification & Validation development; techniques applied by development • RTOS development (RTEMS, LynxOS, teams. While development teams aim to Integrity and VxWorks); against the nominal requirements, our IVV development; team is focused on non-functional • MIL-BUS-1553, CAN, CANOpen, J1939 requirements such as robustness & and Link16. reliability and on conditions that can lead We are used to adapting our engineering capabilities to what is required and to Our experience in RAMS (Reliability, what is used by our customers. Our tool Availability, Maintainability and Safety) chain includes experience with different comprises a set of techniques and commercial and open source tools. analytical tools to assess the safety and dependability of a system. We have know-how in applying different techniques depending on several aspects of the system (criticality, system requirements, etc.).