You are on page 1of 9

THE “RELAXATION” OF RULES IN DECLARATION OF

NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BASED ON PSYCHOLOGICAL


INCAPACITY
By: Atty.Fred | March 10, 2015 in Annulment and Legal Separation
14 Replies | Related posts at the bottom of article

“SC relaxes rules on psychological incapacity as ground to annul


marriages,” says the news title in a popular newspaper. While the news
article does not mention the title of the case, it’s clearly abundant that
it refers to the 2015 case of Valerio E. Kalaw vs. Ma. Elena
Fernandez (G.R. No. 166357, 14 January 2015). Did the Supreme
Court, in the case of Kalaw, “relax” the rules on petitions for declaration
of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity? Let’s
discuss this question and, at the same time, highlight ten matters that
may be of interest to those seeking answers.

1. The rules provided in Molina remain valid

Practitioners refer to the guidelines for the interpretation and


application of Article 36 as the Molina Doctrine, considering that the
set of guidelines were first compiled in the 1997 case of Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina (G.R. No. 108763).
There are eight guidelines: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity; (2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the
decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time
of the celebration” of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The essential
marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children; (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts;
and, (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

In Kalaw, the Supreme Court reiterated its categorical statement,


made in a 2009 case, that “we are not suggesting the abandonment
of Molina in this case.” The set of guidelines in Molina, therefore, stays.

The pronouncement in Kalaw that is closest to “relaxation” of the


guidelines is its reiteration that the “foregoing guidelines have turned
out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically
condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain
rejection.” There is no doubt that the Molina Doctrine is strict, but there
is also no doubt that countless petitions have been granted pursuant
to its guidelines.

The Court did not “relax” the rules when it reconsidered


the Kalaw ruling. On the contrary, the ruling falls under the ambit of
the Molina guidelines. The first time the Supreme Court
decided Kalaw in 2011, with Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo as the
ponente, the Court dismissed the petition for insufficiency of evidence.
There was no sufficient evidence to prove the alleged acts of the
respondent wife — “constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children.”
While it was shown that the respondent-wife played mahjong (bringing
the kids with her), the petitioner-husband failed to show the
FREQUENCY of the mahjong sessions. There is no proof that the
“mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her
family.” In other words, the “allegations, which served as the bases or
underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually
proven.”

In 2015, with Justice Lucas Bersamin as ponente, the Supreme Court


reconsidered its earlier decision. The Supreme Court, “lest it be
misunderstood,” explicitly stated that it’s not abandoning Molina. The
Court, bound by the same set of proven facts, clarified that the failure
to show the frequency of mahjong sessions does not preclude a finding
of psychological incapacity. It’s not the FREQUENCY of the mahjong
sessions; it’s the fact that the respondent-wife should “have known that
bringing her children along her children of very tender ages to her
mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and
other vices that would erode their moral fiber.” This, based on the
totality of facts in the case, supports the finding of psychological
incapacity. This ruling is very much consistent with the Molina
Doctrine. There is no “relaxation” of the rules in this respect.

The label that the Court “relaxed” the rules is most likely derived from
the Court’s statement that the rules set forth in Molina are rigid. This is
bolstered by the apparent expression of regret, also reiterated
in Kalaw, that “in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the
Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving
all cases of psychological incapacity.” In my opinion, and as discussed
below, the term “rigid” should not be understood along the lines of
“relaxed” as an antonym.

2. Expert testimony is decisive


If there’s anything in Kalaw that can be construed as a “relaxation” or
departure from the Molina Doctrine, it’s the rule on expert witnesses.
Guideline No. 2 in Molina provides that the “root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly
explained in the decision.” However, it has been established in
previous cases that expert testimony is not a requisite in psychological
incapacity cases. In other words, the absence of an expert witness
does not automatically result to a denial of the petition. In a number of
cases, including the case of Mendoza vs. Republic (G.R. No. 157649,
12 November 2012), the Supreme Court had the occasion to state that
“the expert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non
in the granting of petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,”
although the Court added that “the actual medical examination…was
to be dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was
enough to support a finding of his psychological incapacity.” The
requirement of the “totality of evidence” is also not new, having been
discussed in similar cases prior to Kalaw.

Going back to the value of expert testimonies, the Supreme Court


in Kalaw restated the rule that “in the task of ascertaining the presence
of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the
courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order
to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to
arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment.” There is no “relaxation”
of the rules in this respect.

Incidentally, in one of our cases, the judge noted that it is for the court
— not the psychologist — to conclude that one or both parties is/are
psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the existence of psychological
incapacity is a legal conclusion, which is within the exclusive province
of the court, but this does not preclude the expert witness from
expressing a similar “opinion,” pointing to the exact condition or
personality disorder of the spouse/s.

3. The psychologist need not personally examine the


incapacitated spouse

The usual objection raised against the testimony of the expert witness,
especially when the services of the expert witness has been obtained
by the petitioner-spouse and there is a conclusion that the respondent-
spouse is psychologically incapacitated, is the usual inability of the
psychologist to examine or interview the respondent spouse. In Kalaw,
the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that “the lack of personal
examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality
disorder…did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts.” There
is no “relaxation” of the rules in this respect.
The opinion of the expert opinion should not be lightly brushed aside
in the presence of the “totality of evidence” in the case. This is the
reason why, in the cases we are handling, we require the client to
present other witnesses to corroborate the client’s testimony on the
facts which constitute the basis for the finding of the personality
disorder and, ultimately, psychological incapacity. While clients initially
complain about the presentation of other witnesses, we make it a point
to carefully explain that this is needed to avoid an outright denial of the
petition.

4. Article 36 is patterned after Church doctrines

It has been said that the Philippines is the only country in the whole
world that does not have divorce. This, of course, did not deter the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to make, in the language of the
Supreme Court, an “exaggeration” in Molina that Article 36 is the “most
liberal divorce procedure in the world.” In Kalaw, the Supreme Court
noted that it was sensitive to the “exaggeration” of the OSG when it
enunciated the “rigid” rules in Molina. “The unintended consequences
of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by
the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.”

Article 36 is patterned after Church rules. As noted in Molina: “Since


the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands
to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally —
subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.”

5. Article 36 protects the family

The first guideline under Molina provides that “any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.” Marriage is protected under the
Constitution and existing laws. In case of DOUBT in petitions for nullity
cases, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
In other words, the petition must be examined strictly in favor of the
validity of marriage. If the issue can be resolved both ways — for or
against declaration of nullity — the issue must be resolved in favor of
marriage, which means that petition must be dismissed.

This Constitutional protection of marriage, however, does not apply to


void marriages. As reiterated by the Supreme Court in Kalaw, Article
36 protects the institution of marriage — “the fulfillment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No
protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void ab initio,
because such a marriage has no legal existence.”

“Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages


contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of
marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as
the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of
the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend
against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio
marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among
persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated
to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.”

Here’s the dilemma that I see: the determination whether the marriage
is void (in which case it loses any protection under the Constitution) is
done at the latter part of the trial (the decision), while the application of
the presumption of the validity of marriage (as well as the strict
interpretation in favor of validity) exists at the time of filing of the very
same petition.

In my opinion, there is no inconsistency, and there is no “relaxation” of


the rules. A presumption can always be overturned by contrary
evidence. Once contrary evidence is admitted and the marriage is
declared void, then the presumption loses any value and the marriage
cease to be constitutionally protected. Under this scenario, it does not
help to be saddled with presumptions (or assumptions, predilections or
generalizations) at the start of the petition. The task is to examine the
evidence and look at the “totality of the case.” In the words of the
Supreme Court, “we reiterate once more the principle that each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations but according to its own facts.” There should be no
rigid application of Molina and “Article 36 of the Family Code must not
be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of less
specificity obviously to enable some resiliency in its application.”

6. Article 36 has no definition


Psychological incapacity is characterized as “as a ground for the nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of
the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was
about to assume.”

However, the Family Code has not defined the term psychological
incapacity. The committee that drafted the Family Code decided to
adopt a provision “with less specificity than expected” in order to have
the law “allow some resiliency in its application.” The intent of the
commitee is to give courts sufficient leeway to “interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of
church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision
itself having been taken from the Canon Law.”

The intended resiliency of Article 36 “had, somehow, been rendered


ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,” yet
the Supreme Court still maintains that it is not abandoning Molina.

7. One or both spouses can be psychologically incapacitated

In the Kalaw case, the petitioner-husband alleges that the respondent-


wife is psychologically incapacitated. The wife, in her answer, denies
her psychological incapacity and alleges that the husband is the one
psychologically incapacitated. Both spouses presented expert
witnesses to support each other’s allegation that the other spouse is
psychologically incapacitated.

In the original Kalaw case, the Court focused solely on the


psychological incapacity of the wife, concluding that there was
insufficient evidence; the Court did not discuss the incapacity of the
husband. This appears to be consistent with the first guideline
in Molina — the “burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff.”

In the reconsidered Kalaw case, the Court declared BOTH spouses as


psychologically incapacitated. While it can be argued that this is a
deviation, or “relaxation,” of the rule that was followed in the
original Kalaw case, there is no basis for such argument.

As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of psychological


incapacity is with the petitioner. This is based on the basic rule that he
who alleges must prove the allegation. This basic rule, stated in
another manner, simply means that the person who alleges
psychological incapacity must prove such psychological incapacity.
Under the circumstances, the court has three options: (a) declare the
WIFE as psychologically incapacitated; (b) declare the HUSBAND as
psychologically incapacitated; or (c) declare BOTH spouses as
psychologically incapacitated. It doesn’t matter who raised the
allegation of psychological incapacity. In the words of the Supreme
Court in the reconsidered decision: “The courts are justified in
declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code
regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes
the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is
fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may
exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological
incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be
deemed null and void.”

As far as remarriage is concerned, it doesn’t really matter who between


the spouses is psychologically incapacitated — there is absolutely no
prohibition for the psychologically incapacitated spouse to marry again.

Let’s consider a number of scenarios. What if, in another case, the


husband alleges that the wife is psychologically incapacitated and the
wife simply denies such allegation, without replying that the husband
is the one psychologically incapacitated? What if the husband alleges
that wife is psychologically incapacitated and the wife fails to answer?
If, for one reason or another, evidence shows that there is no basis for
finding that the wife is psychologically incapacitated, but sufficient
evidence exists to support a finding of psychological incapacity on the
part of the husband, can the court still declare the existence of the
psychological incapacity, albeit on the part of the husband?

8. Trial court decision is binding

In the original Kalaw case, the Supreme Court concluded that there is
“no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity…The
trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies,
and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess
the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and
the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings
which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological
incapacity.

In reconsidering its earlier decision in Kalaw, the Supreme Court cited


the general rule that “findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the
existence or non-existence of a party’s psychological incapacity should
be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the
testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be
clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every situation where the findings
of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence
presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from
substituting its own judgment.”

9. There are sufficient safeguards to protect marriage

Without a divorce law, and with the perceived “relaxation” of the rules
on petitions for declaration of nullity, it’s normal to be apprehensive
about the deluge of cases that will choke court dockets. This possible
onslaught might also be interpreted as an attack on the institution of
marriage.

In EACH and EVERY petition for annulment or declaration of nullity,


the State (through the OSG and the public prosecutors) is mandated
by law to participate and ensure that the institution of marriage is amply
protected. According to the Supreme Court, it “need not worry about
the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are
ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the
intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous
rape.”

10. Other perspectives for Article 36

The Supreme Court took pains to stress in Kalaw, again pointing to an


earlier case, that it is “not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in
this case.” It is not accurate to say that the Supreme Court “relaxed”
the psychological incapacity guidelines in Kalaw. Matters that can be
interpreted in Kalaw as a “relaxation” of the rules have been taken up
in previous cases. Kalaw simply reiterates those principles.

What the Supreme Court again pointed out in Kalaw is the need to
emphasize “other perspectives” that should guide courts in dealing with
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

What are the “other perspectives”? The Supreme Court noted that
Article 36 cases should not be decided based on “a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations” and emphasized that “courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.”

This, in my opinion, means that “other perspectives” can run parallel to


the Molina guidelines. In other words, the Molina Doctrine is not the
be-all and end-all of Article 36 interpretation. The intention not to define
Article 36 simply means that the provision should not be static; it is
intended to be a “living” provision, with courts “guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.”

Cases that don’t fall squarely under the Molina guidelines should not
be dismissed outright. A “rigid” interpretation of Molina means that
petitions must be strictly construed in favor of the validity of marriage
and any deviation from the guidelines, no matter how reasonable, must
lead to the dismissal of the petition. But it should be remembered that
a void marriage enjoys no protection and not entitled to any
presumption of regularity, which means that even if a particular case
does not fall squarely under the Molina principles, the court must still
examine the “totality of evidence” and must apply “other perspectives.”
This way, “diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like” will not be allowed to “continuously debase
and pervert the sanctity of marriage.

You might also like