Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The label that the Court “relaxed” the rules is most likely derived from
the Court’s statement that the rules set forth in Molina are rigid. This is
bolstered by the apparent expression of regret, also reiterated
in Kalaw, that “in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the
Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving
all cases of psychological incapacity.” In my opinion, and as discussed
below, the term “rigid” should not be understood along the lines of
“relaxed” as an antonym.
Incidentally, in one of our cases, the judge noted that it is for the court
— not the psychologist — to conclude that one or both parties is/are
psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the existence of psychological
incapacity is a legal conclusion, which is within the exclusive province
of the court, but this does not preclude the expert witness from
expressing a similar “opinion,” pointing to the exact condition or
personality disorder of the spouse/s.
The usual objection raised against the testimony of the expert witness,
especially when the services of the expert witness has been obtained
by the petitioner-spouse and there is a conclusion that the respondent-
spouse is psychologically incapacitated, is the usual inability of the
psychologist to examine or interview the respondent spouse. In Kalaw,
the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that “the lack of personal
examination and interview of the person diagnosed with personality
disorder…did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts.” There
is no “relaxation” of the rules in this respect.
The opinion of the expert opinion should not be lightly brushed aside
in the presence of the “totality of evidence” in the case. This is the
reason why, in the cases we are handling, we require the client to
present other witnesses to corroborate the client’s testimony on the
facts which constitute the basis for the finding of the personality
disorder and, ultimately, psychological incapacity. While clients initially
complain about the presentation of other witnesses, we make it a point
to carefully explain that this is needed to avoid an outright denial of the
petition.
It has been said that the Philippines is the only country in the whole
world that does not have divorce. This, of course, did not deter the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to make, in the language of the
Supreme Court, an “exaggeration” in Molina that Article 36 is the “most
liberal divorce procedure in the world.” In Kalaw, the Supreme Court
noted that it was sensitive to the “exaggeration” of the OSG when it
enunciated the “rigid” rules in Molina. “The unintended consequences
of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their
families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by
the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has
annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said
individuals.”
The first guideline under Molina provides that “any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.” Marriage is protected under the
Constitution and existing laws. In case of DOUBT in petitions for nullity
cases, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
In other words, the petition must be examined strictly in favor of the
validity of marriage. If the issue can be resolved both ways — for or
against declaration of nullity — the issue must be resolved in favor of
marriage, which means that petition must be dismissed.
Here’s the dilemma that I see: the determination whether the marriage
is void (in which case it loses any protection under the Constitution) is
done at the latter part of the trial (the decision), while the application of
the presumption of the validity of marriage (as well as the strict
interpretation in favor of validity) exists at the time of filing of the very
same petition.
However, the Family Code has not defined the term psychological
incapacity. The committee that drafted the Family Code decided to
adopt a provision “with less specificity than expected” in order to have
the law “allow some resiliency in its application.” The intent of the
commitee is to give courts sufficient leeway to “interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of
church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision
itself having been taken from the Canon Law.”
In the original Kalaw case, the Supreme Court concluded that there is
“no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity…The
trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations, testimonies,
and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess
the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and
the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings
which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of psychological
incapacity.
Without a divorce law, and with the perceived “relaxation” of the rules
on petitions for declaration of nullity, it’s normal to be apprehensive
about the deluge of cases that will choke court dockets. This possible
onslaught might also be interpreted as an attack on the institution of
marriage.
What the Supreme Court again pointed out in Kalaw is the need to
emphasize “other perspectives” that should guide courts in dealing with
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
What are the “other perspectives”? The Supreme Court noted that
Article 36 cases should not be decided based on “a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations” and emphasized that “courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.”
Cases that don’t fall squarely under the Molina guidelines should not
be dismissed outright. A “rigid” interpretation of Molina means that
petitions must be strictly construed in favor of the validity of marriage
and any deviation from the guidelines, no matter how reasonable, must
lead to the dismissal of the petition. But it should be remembered that
a void marriage enjoys no protection and not entitled to any
presumption of regularity, which means that even if a particular case
does not fall squarely under the Molina principles, the court must still
examine the “totality of evidence” and must apply “other perspectives.”
This way, “diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like” will not be allowed to “continuously debase
and pervert the sanctity of marriage.