You are on page 1of 33

J. C. B.



Professor of Political Science, Yale University
You have invited me to present to you my views
regarding the study of international relations and its
different methods of approach. That means that you wish
me to acquaint you with the results of a philosophic
inquiry. Our topic today is philosophy, and in
particular the field of epistemology, logic and
methodology. There is no need to say anything about
logic or the study of valid inference and the paper
itself is a study in methodology and will have to tell
its own story, but I must state briefly the particular
epistemology on which it is based. My theory of
knowledge is a particular form of Neo-Kanteanism which
I would like to characterize as functional relativism.
Knowledge, according to this theory, results from
definite attitudes and definite procedures of dealing
with empirical reality. It derives from the
observations of empirical reality by means of specific
categories of knowledge. It becomes necessary,
therefore, to distinguish at the outset two worlds—the
world of empirical reality and the world of ideas, of
concepts and values. The thinking of an idea and the
attributing of value may be viewed as psychological
occurrences in individual minds and, as such, as part
of empirical reality, but the idea and the value also
belong to a different realm in which they are subject
to study by means of logical methods, but not by means
of scientific or historical methods. It is by means of
the ideal—the conceptual—that we master the real.
Although the rational is only a small part of the world,
there is no other way to master the world. The totality
of empirical reality is as such incomprehensible. It
permits the beholder an attitude of mysticism, but not
intelligent comprehension. Any effort to comprehend
means a renunciation of the totality of reality and a
focussing on a specialized aspect. To comprehend
requires an analysis of the reality in different
aspects by means of guiding concepts and categories,
and abstracting of these aspects from that reality.
My philosophy is relativistic in that I do not
accept an absolute c priori fixity for those
categories of cognition. The ways of looking at the
world are historical. They are subject to evolution,
and what is a priori in one form

of inquiry may be the result of empirical knowledge

acquired in another field. None the less it is to
be remembered that these categories are fundamental
and o priori in each specific inquiry, in the sense
that they define both the subject-matter and the
nature of the inquiry. The subject-matter results
from a particular creative abstraction of certain
aspects of reality on the basis of such categories,
and the nature of the inquiry results from the
nature of the question asked Organized knowledge
about specific aspects of reality is not reality
itself. It is only part of reafity with evervthinc
out that would spoil the picture, The scientific truth; the historical truth, the
metaphysical truth are not descriptions of the totality of real- . ity, but
only statements about certain selected aspects. The validity and significance of
these systems of knowledge—their truth— is therefore not to be judged by their
correspondence to reality, but by the degree in thev satisfy the needs that gave rise
to them.
The question you have addressed to me is in regard to methods of approach to
the study of international relations. It .rnust then, of necessity 9 be first task
to define our subject-matter. That means to indicate by means of what concept I
abstract frorn the totality of empirical reality those phenomena that deserve the
name international relations.
Nature of Social Relations. The concept d ' international relations"
demands the definition of the two terms relation " and '(international.' What
is a relation? The social behavior of two or more individuals seen as a unit.
Let us illustrate with the simple case of the meeting of John and Mary in the
park. Observable is the behavior of john and the behavior of Mary. Part of
their behavior is social, in that it is related to or influenced by the behavior
of the other; part is purely personal. 'The breathing, sneezinge coughing, itch-
scratching, is personal behavior. The smiling, growling, hat-lifting,
handshaking, or nose-punching and eye-scratching is social behavior. The
relation between John and Mary is therefore the social behavior of john and
the social behavior of Mary seen as a unit. Nothing but the behavior has
empirical reality.
We cannot say the relation is the result of these two behavior processes. It is
not something that follows from them or is caused by them. The relation
consists_ of or consists in these two behavior processes; the relation is these
behavior processes viewed from the point of reciprocal conditioning.
Depending on vvhich type of behavior predominates, we call the relation formal
a friendly, amorous or bellicose, If you can turn your eye for a moment frorn
Ethe interesting spectacle and obsenre the policemamwalking up and down
k%ehind the bush, you have all the ingredients for an encyclopedia of the social
sciences. This social behavior is the subject-rnatter for social studies.
That does not mean that other behavior aspects or other parts of empirical
reality are of no interest. They are, but they are not the aspects about. which
questions are asked. It would be a legitimate study to inquire into the effect
of sneezing on love-making p or of indigestion on fisticuffs, but it is love-
making and fisticuffs that are the subject-matter about which questions are
asked, not colds and indigestion. Some of these relations are of short
duration 9 some persist in constant repetition p some remain as simple
sponta.m neous processes, some become and institutionalized in
special structures. Society is the sum total of these social relations at any
given time.
•rE.ACl l i•-' R.S OF RN

[t should be noted here that the word " socäa[ is a purely for Inal concept and
gives no indication as to content or as to peace or struggle. A struggle is a more
intimate relation than a peaceful walk, and society contains both con ßict and
coöperation. Order and anarchy do not connote presence or absence of society 7
but presence or absence of government. Disorderly relations are still relations and
disorderly conduct is essentially social conduct Robinson Crusoe was never
arrested for disorderly conduct? not only because there was no one to arrest hir•n
before the arrival of Friday; but because it takes two to make a fight.
ft follows from this that "society" is a purely quantitative concept- A given
society is the total of social relations, the total of observable social behavior. A
society is simple or complex, depending on the multiplicity and manifoldness of
the consisting social relations. The total asbect of that part of empirical reality
called society, social behavior, or of any section of it, is again subject to further
analysis and differentiation on the basis of so-called content. It is this distinction
that will give us studies of marriage institutions, of economic organization, and
of forms of government.
These three viewpoints focussing on certain fundamental needs and the activities
which spring from them, have given rise to specialized social studies, but they do
not exhaust the possible ways from which social empirical reality can be
International Relations. International relations are relations between
individuals belonging to different states, or in other terms, international
behavior is the social behavior of individuals or groups aimed, directed at, or
influenced by the existence or behavior of individuals or groups belonging to
a different state.
I proposed several years ago that we use the term inter-state relations. There
is little likelihood of its acceptance—and perhaps more 13,701.11d be lost than
gained. I Shall therefore accept the term " international 2 ' under the clear
understanding that it means belonging to different states, and not to
which I propose the term inter-ethnic. ft may be that
any given relationship is either or both; but the fact that they are not identical
forces us to make distinctions in terminology.
International relations is therefore a political concept. It makes the die
tinction between national and international relations on the basis of a difference in
legal and political conditioning. Those relations that function in their totality
within one system of territorial organization are called national, those in which the
participants are members of different terri torial organizations are called
JezLernotionaJ Society, What holds for the concept of society must of
course hold for international society. It is a formal and purely relative and
quantitative concept, International society is more or less complex at
difierent periods—meaning there are more and varying international

a logical point ot vieu•, the question u•hethcr or not there exists alt international
society has no nieaning. There is a valid historical question as to how much international
society at any given period, and a valid question as to whether you like it or not, but we
should again be careful not to think of society as a unity and confuse social relations with
orderly relations. Anarchy and order do not connote absence or presence. of international
society. but absence or presence of govern Inent. In passing, let us note chac also Ill the
realm of international relations struggle is a illore in(irnatc relation than peace. have
never been so intimately related to the Gerrnan,s as during the War. I am not referring to
those of lil_v generation who had the privilege of being disemboweled by them, but to
the whole civilian population whose most varied thoughts and activities carne to be
influenced by the e.xistence and actions of our Teuton enemies.
It is also true that the word international stands for a purely for Inal
concept: it applies to an international wedding, to a white slave cartel, as
well as to the of 1812. In ternational relations are as varied in their content
as are social relations—and international society, as well as national
societ_v. provides the subject-matter for the social disciplines. In the
international realm also certain types of relationships have been given more
attention than others, and the economic and political have perhaps been
•more carefully studied, but it is enough to refer to the studies of the
ethnologist in the_diffusion of culture to realize that international society
contains much than merely economic or political relations.
International society is the general subject-matter of our studies and,
depending on our particular interestt cultural, economic, legal, or political,
we will obtain our specialized subject-matter on the basis of a further
abstraction in terms of special categories-
International Political Relations. I am a political scientist and I am in terested
in political behavior. The concept of political behavior which guides me in my
abstracting from the total empirical social reality makes me search for
thö&ehavior that is directed or the aspect of behavior Ivhich aims at the
establishment, preservation, modification and use of leadership and social control,
or in other words, that behavior that has reference to the struggle for power and
the establishment and functioning of government.
The ultimate unit of political behavior both in the national and in the
international sphere is the individual. But in the international sphere the
struggle for pmver and the participation in international government takes
place through a particular type of corporate organization called a state, and
so the state becomes the immediate unit of political behavior. My study is
the political behavior of states and the resulting international government.
About international goverument and politics I ask all the questions that
have been asked about nation?l government and politics—or, for that
matter, which have been asked abou! the governrnent and politics of
churches, labor

unions, and ladies' aid societies—including the functioning of pofitical

parties, lobbies. and the mysteries of graft.
This does not mean that other aspects of international behavior or of na
tional behavior do not interest me? it merely means that rny main interest is the
international political aspect. Those other aspects
function in my inquiry as the sneezing in the
sociological study of love-making- They come into my
answers, not into my questions.
Methods of Approach. The previous consideration has defined for us the
concept by means of which we abstract from empirical
reality that part which is our general subject-matter—
international society—and my rnore specialized field of
international politics.
The nature of our subject-matter, however, does
not define the nature of our study or the method
of approach. Those derive from the way in which we
envisage our subject-matter, from our attitudes toward it and from the
questions we ask about it. The same material can
•be approached from different points of view, and be
studied for the sake of answers to very different
questions. Each of these points of view means a
special abstraction from the totality and a special
shaping of the data of experience. The human being
surrounded by a chaotic world is driven by pragtical
needs to do something about it and by intellectual
needs to create some kind of order out of the chaos.
From these needs and. the accompanying emotions and
intellectual attitudes have resulted science and
history, religion and metaphysics, esthetics and
ethics. And each of the attitudes indicated by the
enumeration of these descriptions is possible in
regard to all aspects of empirical reality and
therefore also in regard to international society.
Scietzceø Man's practical need to do something
about his environment, and his instinct to
manipulate, produced the acts out of which evolved
the sciences. The first knowledge was empirical
knowledge resulting from experimental manipulation
7 and the advanced form of experimental
manipulation, the controlled experiment, is still
the essence of scientific rnethod in the most
advanced disciplines.
Successful manipulation presupposes a knowledge of
the situation to be manipulated, a knowledge of how
the things in it work, and a knowledge of how to
influence their behavior. Each of these aspects
gives rise to a separate inquiry. the first
historical, the second scientific, and the third
applied science or engineering.
The problem of science is to find out how things
work. The first criterion of the scientific
question is: Can it be answered by correct inference
from observable data? If it cannot be answered in
that manner it is not a scientific question o
Scientific rnethod implies observation and
verification preferably by controlled experiment second
criterion of the scientific statement is that it
appears in the form of a concept of relationship
that has general validity. Therein lies

The so-called " social sciences ' are not based on so-called distinctions of
content, as is clear from the fact that a study of the currency system of Poly nesia
is called ethnology, and of the lack of currency system of the United States is
called economics. It is not my task here to propose a more adequate and scientific
terminology for the studies dealing with social phenomena, and therefore I
propOse to call social science any study that aims to answer scientific questions
regarding social behavior.
Specific Probl.elns in the Social Sciences. There arise in the study of social
behavior, certain difficulties that rnust be mentioned briefly. The first results
from the apparent di fliculty of preserving the scientific non-evaluative
attitude—in regard to human behavior. The student must learn to restrain his
tendency to react in terms of approval and disapproval, and to separate his value
judgments and his existential judgments.
The evaluative tendency enters into our problem in another manner.
Human behavior, observed in so far as it is not simple reflex action, is not
behavior in response to a neutral external environment, but to an
environment transformed by an evaluative attitude on the part of the
behaving person. This creates the problem not only of difference in
environment between different actors, but between actors and observers-
The second difficulty results from the apparent individual and historic-al
uniqueness of individual behavior- In part this difficu)ty is not due to the nature of
the behavior process, but to our habit of looking at it. Most of the observations have
been made from the individualizing historical point of view, and not from the
generalizing scientific point of view. If Newton had focussed all his attention on the
fact that the apple was green and the moon was yellow, and that the one fell in a
straight line and the other ran around in circles, he would never have discovered
the law of gravitation.
The fact that human behavior shows different responses to different en
vironments creates, of course, no problem. So do the units of behavior studied
in the other molecules, cells, cell s structures. What creates
the problem is that because of our inability to isolate single factors in internal
conditioning, single factors in the behavior complex, and single factors in the
environment, it seems as though human behavior must bf provisionally
accepted as showing the possibility of different responses to identical
environment. This naturally affects the predictability of individual behavior
and for the time being we will have to be satisfied with statistical prediction of
quantities of units, a condition. not so different from the biological sciences.
Understanding. Another problem resulting from the nature of the observer
is the problem of understanding. Understanding social behavior, that is,
human behavior, raises a problem which does not exist in understanding the
behavior of atomic structures or of living cells- It arises from the identity of
the nature of the behavior observed with the behavior we our-

the difference between a scientific statement and an

hist.orical statement. What is true of one apple only
is an historical truth ; what is true of apples in
general is a scientific truth. The historical interest
lies in the unique quality of the individual apple, the
scientific interest, in the qualities which it has in
common with all other apples.
The two interests result, therefore, in two modes
of abstracting frc)in the empirical reality. 'l'he
scientific abstraction leads away from the
individual uniqueness, and in its trend toward so-
called more fundamental laws it airns at statements
of wider applicability, and therefore decreasing
content. For the scientist it is of interest that
the famous apple fell with a certain acceleration,
but whether it did or did not hit Newton's head,
was green or ripe, with or without worms, does not
in terest him. That might in terest the historian.
And if the scientist really gets into his stride
he will make staternents regarding the influence
of changes of temperature on the behavior of
atorns, with the most sublime indifference as to
whether these atoms are found in the gas containers
in his laboratory, or in the Emperor's toe-nails.
Social Sciences. 'l'he social sciences also had
their origin in experimentation. Man manipulated his
fellow men. He tried force, barter, gifts and persuasion,
and developed a rough technique of social engiveering. Success involved a
correct analysis of the given situation and a
knowledge 9f how humans behave and how they can be
influenced. Beyond the stage of mere empiricism, the
study of social behavior becomes the work of the
social sciences. It is their task to establish
behavior types and their varieties under varying
conditions. If they aim to find correlations of wider
applicability they will naturally have to find their
data in different places and in different periods.
That means they will have to use the material provided
both by the ethnologist and the historian. Much of
that material will not be ideally suited for
scientific inquiry, especially the material coflected
by the historian, because it will probably have been
collected in terms of its uniqueness rather than in
terms of its universality.
Social bellavior being a purely formal concept,
there is no social behavior, as such, to be studied.
It is always a certain kind of behavior, or behavior
viewed from a definite aspect that is studied—sex
behavior, economic behavior, political behavior.
These differences are sometimes called difTerences
in content, but I doubt the helpfulness of that
phraseology. They do not correspond to objectively
distinguishable behavior types, and it is doubtful
if controlled experiment will ever allow us to
separate them.
Social behavior being always in response to a very
complex environment, it is usually influenced by a
great many considerations. In order to make the
difficulty clear, I ask you to assume for a moment
that John and Mary, whom we observed meeting-in the
park, are the alderman and his stenographer, who
is at the same -time his mistress. Is their relation

selves indulge in. In the natural sciences we do not

ask for Inore than a causal understanding. If we recognize an
occurrence or a process as an illustration of the working of a
natural law, we consider it understood. But the
recognition of social behavior as an illustration of
a statistical regularity is not considered enough.
Aware that solne of our behavior is purposeful.
results from a selection of means to ends, and
assuming, quite erroneously, that most of it is
purposeful ancl rational, we wish to understand the
behavior of others also in terms of means to ends.
i•lence, the teleological element in the social
sciences, and the insistence on an answer not n)erely
to the question how people act under certain
conditions, l)Ltt why they act as they do.
Political Science. a political scientist, I am
interested in governrnent and in the political
behavior of individuals, that is, the political
behavior of the governors and of the governees. In
the international field that Ineans international
governinent and the behavior of the units in the
international community, the states.
My background for the study of international
government will be rny knowledge of government in
general, and the questions I am interested in are
the questions I ask about all government and its
My background for the study of the foreign policy of
stages is my knowledge of the political behavior of
individuals and of other types of corporate bodies. That
knowledge about the foreign policy of states can be eithe?
the empirical knowledge obtained from diplomatic
experience, or scientific knowledge obtained from
research. If my study is to produce scientific results
instead of historical or philosophic results, the nature
of my questions must be scientific, that is, they must ask
not for what is individual and unique in the behavior of
a given state, but for what is general in the l)ehavior of
all states. The prototype of my study lies in the
sociological inquiries which approach their behavior
problems from the situational point of view.
This particular species of corporate body, the
state, seems to have a repertory of possil:Ae actions
and attitudes aggressive and submissive, and definite
aims and objectives—security, power, wealth—toward
which its activities are directed. The particular
policy followed in a specific historical situa tion
will disclose a particular form of adjustment
States function through their governments, and
those governments are conditioned by an external
environment, the international world, and by an
internal environment. The individual behavior
equivalent wrould be the social situation and the
infernal conditioning of the individual, whether
he had a cold or indigestion. The foreign policy
of a state, like the behavior of an individual, is
a function of two variables and doubly conditioned—
internally and externally.
The importance of external situations must be
measured by studying similarly internally conditioned
responses to different environments. The

internal conditioning must be measured by observing changes of policy in

a similar environment under changed internal
conditioning. This type of research, alternating
the study of changes of environment with constant
internal conditioning and constant external
environment with changed internal conditioning, is
the only substitute we have for the controlled
experiment which is possible in some of the natural
It will be obvious that the material for my study
lies in the foreign policy of states at all times and
in all places, and that in the light of what was
previously said, I must search not merely for
statistical regularity of correlation, but must
understand foreign policy as a means to an end.
History. It was noted that the historical
interest is an interest in the uniqueness of a
given situation or action, as distinguished from
the scientific in terest in what is common in a
great many different situations or actions—in the
law. The fundamental historical question is what
is the situation now and here, or what was the
situation then and there.
Let us observe at the outset that the word history
has several meanings. It is used to indicate that
an event occurred or a situation existed in the
past, but it is also used to indicate the study
necessary to answer the question whether they did
or not, and the answer given to it. The word
history has, therefore, three meanings—it refers
to a fact, to a method of ascertaining the fact,
and to a statement of the fact.
To find out what situation existed or what event
occurred at a given time and place is the job of
the historian. They teach it in every newspaper
office in the country and call it reporting- The
only difference is that the corpse may still be
warm when the reporter gets there, but is usually
quite cold when the historian begins to describe
the murder.
The fundamental task of historical research is to
give a description of part of empirical reality at a
given time or place. Reality cannot be deduced from
abstract principles, and therefore not from sciences.
All scientists, therefore, indulge in historical
inquiry. To establish the historical fact that A is,
is an historical inquiry; science can only say that A
existing, such and such qualities apply to it. It can
establish the properties of human organism—it cannot
deduce from those properties that I should be here on
this platform at this time.
It should be noted, then, that the historical
question is a question regarding an aspect of
empirical reality in regard to a four dimensional
system of reference: Did, or did not, Queen Anne
have two eggs for breakfast in the blue room on
Tuesday morning before her death?
This raises the question of historical evidence.
History occupies itself with empirical reality, but
often with an empirical reality that was and is no
more. The historical fact is not observed, but
deduced or inferred from documents or archeological
remains. Most of the evidence is hear-say evidence
by interested parties, which would not be admitted
in court, and a

History of International Relations. The realm of

international relations offers a wide field for
historical studies and it is the historian who has
first explored it. To the student of diplomatic
history we still owe today most of our material.
Their studies were usually studies of the foreign
policy of one state or of the relations between two
or more states, such as Anglo-American or Latin-
American relations. Some of these studies follow
the old fashioned approach applicable to the time
when the relations between states was a relation
between monarchs, most have been influenced by the
newer approach followed in the national histories,
which stresses social changes.
But historical studies are no longer limited to
political relations, there are appearing studies of
the history of trade and commerce and cultural
interchange and even the political relations can be
studied from a new angle. There is a growing interest
in the historical development of international
government and its specialized functions and
institutions, such as arbitration and legislation. And
surely our subject-matter is as suited for the purpose
of illustrating metaphysical speculation as any other
aspect of human experience. It ought to be possible
for those who wish to insult God to write a history of
international relations indicating a gui<ing hand or
the divine purpose—and perhaps we may some day look
forward to the companion volume to Beard's great book
to be entitled The Economic Interpretation of the
Religion. From the practical and intellectual
interest of man in his immediate environment
developed the sciences and history. But man wanted
to comprehend not only his immediate environment
but his universe. The oldest answer to man's quest
for a universe that shall have both meaning and
order—is religion. Unable to live in the chaos of
empirical reality, unable to accept the
limitations, the hardships and frustrations of
experience, he had to construct himself a home-made
universe which would serve as a sublimation and
compensation, and so externalize and objectify his
He il*erpreted the wider universe in terms of his
immediate world of experien'ce. In that world
things happen because he makes them happen, and
things have meaning and significance in relation to
his wishes. Transferred to the wider realm he
created the picture of a universe which derives its
order and its meaning at first from the wills of
gods, and finally from the will of God. In his
relation to his gods or God, man repeated the
relations pf immediate social epvironment, and thus
gave expression to the emotions

and affections of love, devotion, fear. He

displayed attitudes of obedience or defiance, and
tried to influence his gods or God by the old
established methods of prayer, barter, flattery and
A religious conception of the universe like the
social pattern on which it is based, brings both
benefits and obligations. It brings rest,
particularly in its modern monotheistic ,Gristian
form, because it depicts an orderly uni-

considerable part of the historian's worry is therefore

worry over the reliability of his evidence.
But the historian has other worries. He does not only ascertain historical
facts, he describes them, and in addition he
practices a kind of journalism known officially as
historiography. It is well to remember that the
prototype of all history writing is the bed-time
story. The answer to the question, Father, what
did you do in the great war between the Hopi and
the Navajo?" is the example for all of them frorn
Homer through Gibbons to J. Truslow Adams.
Now the historian, whether he describes to you
what existed or occurred at a given time, or writes
the history of Patagonia, has an interesting
problem—what to put in, what to leave out. Shall
he, in describing Queen Anne's breakfast, put in
the color of her nighty and the presence or absence
of paper curls? Well, it is up to him. There are
no guild rules. That means there are as many
histories as there are historians.
If you consider that royal love affairs are the
most important thing in the world, your history of
France will be one story; if you are interested in
the discontent of the business man, or in the
poverty of the farmer, you get a different story.
Each history is, therefore, written from a very
definite point of view, and that point of view will
determine what goes into the history.
The same applies to the description of an
historical situation—what goes into that is also
determined by what the historian thinks is
significant. That means that the description of the
historical situation and the historical narrative
are fundamentally artistic creations. They result
from a judicious selection of material and its
integration in significant pictures or stories.
The hi%torian, in the writing of his narrative,
is faced with the problem of historical causality.
His narrative is not merely a series of pictures
of different periods, it pretends to indicate how
each successive one evolved out of the previous
one. That means he answers presumably why each
event occurred and how each situation came to be
as it was. It will be obvious that theyoblem of
historical causality, entirely different from the
problem of cauéality in the sciences, involves two
problems, one of selection and one of inference.
The historian is not interested in the whole of
a concrete historical situation, but only in that
part of it which he deems significant. That is the
first selection. The part thus selected is
determined by an infinite number

of factors. How many of these shall be mentioned?

Second selection. Each of these factors is itself
historically determined. How far shall the
historical regression be followed? Third selection.
Each of these selections is made on the basis of
value judgments and subjective presuppositions.
These selections are, highly individual and
subjective, and as such are not open to questions.
They are as individual as the composition of a work
of art.

But once the selection as to what is important or

significant, has beengranted, the attribution of
causality to the factors selected is open to ques_
tions. This is a problem of the validity of inference.
What is the validity of the inference that the
historical fact A was caused or brought about by the
contemporaneous or antecedent historical fact B?
Surely this validity must rest on an established
general correlation of A and B, •that is, on an
empirical or scientific knowledge of psychology and an
empirical dr scientific knowledge of social behavior.
That historic week-end on the Nile of Cleopatra and
Mark Antony becomes intelligible only in terms of our
empirical or scientific knowledge of the ways of a
maid with a man, or, if you prefer, of a beautiful
maid with a soldier. In the same manner, attributing the
French revolution to a given factor as cause will find
acceptance only if that factor was operative in other
revolutions or can be explained teleologica)ly in
terms of human psychology.
What shall be subject-matter of investigation, and
how far causal regression shall be followed—whether to
Adam or to the mqnkeys—depends on value judgments, but
the validity of each causal inference depends on its
scientific accuracy.
The historical narrative can take the form not
only of thrilling human drama with explanations in
terms of human volition and speculations as to
motives, it can also take the less exciting form
of an account of growth and development. Those are
the studies of the evolution of institutions. In
such studies the fact that institutions are
behavior patterns and therefore nothing but
behaving individuals, is minimized. Motive and
volition are left out of the picture, and the
institution is treated as if it were an organism,
having a life of its own and following a life cycle.
Such accounts are not histories but philosophies
of history based on biological thought forms.
But there are other forms of historical inquiry
in which the metaphysical basis is ,more clearly
evident. They are the philosophies of history in
which the selection of historical material is made
to illustrate a metaphysical purpose in history.
History then serves to illustrate the will of God,
the unfoldment of the moral idea, or the Marxian
History, whether in the form of a narrative or in
the form of historical laws, builds out of that
which is given of the historical reality a
theoretic structure on the basis of categories
which have no place in an investigation which aims
at exact knowledge. But these spring from
fully autonomous needs of organizatiop and create
a self-sufficient picture of the historical
actuality. That this picture is not a pure
reproduction of the actuality is not a shortcoming,
but its essence. It has dimensions and a style of
its own which bear no relation to the requirements
{or a scientific picture of the empirical

resentation symbolizing its creator's interpretation of reality. It is the most

perfect fitting together of the varied phases of life
that the philosopher can attain with his best
knowledge and insight.' *
It v.trill be obvious that this picture of the world
which must answer the metaphysical need for an ordered universe is
not constructed according to categories which apply to
historical or scientific studies. The metaphysical
picture results from a composition of those carefully
selected aspects of empirical reality which can be
combined in a logically coherent system. What cannot
be so combined—what does not fit the picture—is left
out. That picture may be called idealism or realism or
dualism or naturalism, and it may be true in and for
itself; it remains a picture and satisfies a desire
for a type of knowledge which is different from that
produced by history or science.
International society is subject-matter to the
philosopher as any other aspect of empirical
reality. He will ask philosophical questions about
it, but it is well to remember that his answers are
metaphysics in the form of social philosophy, not
science or history. Such questions will be asked
in the postulated assumption of its unity and the
answer will be that the international society is
the perfect life, the embodiment of the moral idea,
or a contract or a phase in the historical dialectic, dependii-fge on whether
one is Platonic, Hegelian, Lockian or Marxian.
But the philosopher deals not only with questions
regarding the essence and basic reality, he deals
also with questions regarding meaning and value.
Is international society the goal and purpose of
individual existence or a means for the enrichment
of individual life? Is it, perhaps, instead of
being a means, aa obstruction to the realization
of individual perfection? Is the value of
international society to be found in its functional
life, in its opportunity for coöperation or for
strife, • in the formation of an objective spirit,
or in the ethical qualities which it calls forth
in the individual?
These- questions cannot be answered by means of
ascertaining facts. They aih*at valuation of
observed facts and at the construction of an
inclusive view out of the unrelated fragments of
knowledge of the social actuality. They involve
interpretations of a philosophical nature and may
therefore be answered in many different ways. They
may be based on either idealistic or realistic,
intellectualistic or volitional, absolutistic or
relativistic systems of philosophy, and this will
largely determine their form.
Esthetics. There is another attitude toward
empirical reality—the esthetic, most clearly seen when
guiding the creation of a work of art. The work of art
results from the selection and transformation of
natural materials and their composition into
structures that objectify imagined form. The artist
transforms reality.- according to a dream. Art
consists in concrete Raymond F. Piper and Paul W.
Ward, The Fields and Methods of Knowledge, pp. 369—70.

forms, not in general formula, and the work of art

is. a self-sufficient unit. Out of the infinite
possibilities of a block of marble or a canvas and
six tubes of paint there is created the specific
work of art. Its function is not to depict reality,
but the artist's conception of the significant and
beautiful. The beholder obtains esthetic experience
through the contemplation of the work of art and
esthetic judgment by comparison of the work Of art
by his own imagined esthetic form as a standard.
But esthetic judgment is not limited to works of
art. Any aspect of empirical reality can be
compared with imagined esthetic norms. This holds
not only for objects of nature, but for human
relations as well.
In America, the primary tests of our attitudes in
human relations are pragmatiC and ethical. Among
Europeans, especially the Latins, this is not the
case. Their human relations are judged in factors
other than the purely ethical. Distinctions are
drawn between duels and street fighting, and
between gracious and boorish infidelity, which are
not simply ethical judgments, but considerations
that approach esthetic judgments. The same applies
to international society. A preference of order
over chaos may be a preference not because of human
values, but because of artistic form: Similarly,
there are objections to war, not because of the
loss of life, but because it is a bloody mess.
Ethics. It was pointed out that all religions
contained an ethics as well as a metaphysics, and
this might even be said of most metaphysical
systems, whether religious or not. Every theory
regarding the meaning of life has implications that
are value-judgments of human conduct, but such
valuejudgments do not derive solely from
metaphysics, they also derive from immediate social
experience. Man as a social animal is both the
subject and the object of social behavior in terms
of values. He has opinions regarding what is done
to him, and he asks the question how he shall
conduct himself in relation to others. This latter
question may be merely in terms of the efficacy of
means to desired ends, a so-called practical
question, or it may be in terms of standards of
moral value, in which case it is an ethical
question. The answer can be obtained by considering
the action as an end in itself, and therefore
directly good or bad, or as a means to an .end. But
it should be remembered that in both cases the
fundamental judgment is a value judgment, an
expression of like or dislike, not an existential
judgment or an expression of fact. If the ethical
judgment is to be made about behavior as a means to
an end, the answer is obtained by a dramatic
g.ehearsal in imagination of the consequences of
alternative courses of action. If the action is seen
to lead to the desired result, it is considered
good; if it does not lead to the desired end it is
considered bad or indifferent*
In a simple society under stable conditions the
individual has no ethical problems. There are fixed
ethical principles, and their application is simple
because the individual can foretell the result of
all his actions; the road

verse beyond the chaos of experience. It brings hope

because it suggests the possibility Of enlisting
divine forces in the pursuit of one's aspirations; but
it also brings obligations, the believer has duties as
well as privileges. Religion is, therefore, not merely
a specific body of knowledge, a specific way pf looking
at the universe, of ordering the universe; it is an
attitude of the whole personality involving emotions
and aspirations. All phases of man's personality share
and blend in the religious attitude.
Every religion contains a metaphysics and an
ethics. The metaphysics
is the particular vision of the universe as made
orderly through God's will and expressing his
divine purpose. The most varying aspect of
empirical reality can be related in terms of
meaning and significance to this will of God and
so depicted in a unified composition. But every
religious view of the world has, implied or
explicit, a system of ethics. If the metaphysics
has made clear the meaning of life in terms of
God's will, then the believer has the task of
obeying and struggling for the Kingdom of Goa.
International society and international
government, like any other part of empirical
reality, can be the subject-matter for a religiou#
approach. It can be viewed from a Christian,
Buddhist, Mohammedan or Hindu point of view, or
from any other specialized sectarian point of view.
Each will try to find how the divine will expresses
itself in an international society and each will
derive from its view an international ethics. If-
one's God is a God of war, it behooves the believer
to contribute his utmost tö fomenting bigger and
better wars; if one's God demands the preservatiou
of human life, the believer shall contribute his
share in the building of an orderly international
Metaphysics. But the search for a coherent
interpretation of the universe can find
satisfaction in other answers than that of the
believer. All meta physics is not necessarily
religious. It is possible to obtain a reasoned
conception of the universe and an answer to the
question regarding the meaning •and purpose of life
without postulating a will of God. But both types
of metaphysics have in common their interest in a
synthetic picture.
The conception that the world is a unitary and
coherent totality, and as such intelligible, is the
vital postulate of all metaphysics. It implies a sort
of organic conception of the universe in which the
whole reveals itself in the Darts and the parts can be
understood only in their relation to the whole. "
Metaphysics and art have a close kinship ; each is a
source of understanding for the other. As an artistic
work is an ordered product of the imagination
expressing some significant impression, vision or
emotiön of the artist, so a metaphysics results from
an effort of the mind to achieve a harmonious picture
of the cosmos. The philosopher endeavors to esplain or
overcome the disharmonies of experience and to
construct a consistent and satisfying view of the
world in whatever terms seem to him most true and
adequate, . A philosophy, then, is like a work of art
in that it is an orderly rep-
from the empirical reality only that which he thinks is significant. By means
of what concept of the significant can we abstract from empirical social
reality the social analysis that can serve as a basis for action?
The answer can be suggested by the analogy of the function of diagnosis
in medicine, provided it is understood that the analogy does not refer to the
nature of the processes studied, but to the modes of thinking involved, and
provided also it does not imply that any social situation can be assumed to
be an organism. The successful treatment of illness depends on several
factors, the adequacy of the medical knowledge of the doctor, the adequacy
of the diagnosis, and the willingness of the patients to do as they are told,
or _ perhaps on the ability of the doctor to make them.
What is medicine? It is an applied science, an engineering technique, an art,
if you prefer it, based on a great many different sciences: physics, chemistry,
biochemistry, physiology, biology, histology, bacteriology, psychology, etc. But
medicine is not applied in general; it is applied to specific cases, to concrete
historical situations, to the patient at 10:20. In order to know what the specific case
is, the doctor makes his diagnosis. The diagnosis is not an exhaustive description
of the historical situation, but only of so much as the doctor considers relevant in
the light of his medical knowledge. He may note that Miss Patient parts her hair in
the middle, has blue eyes, a birth-mark above her left elbow and pretty ankläs, but
these facts are not recorded in the case history which he dictates to his secretary.
The same holds good for the social diagnosis. It describes of the total
social situation only what it considers significant in the light of the existing
stage of development of the social sciences. Adequate medical diagnosis
presupposes adequate medicine, and adequate social diagnosis presupposes
adequate social science. It should be noted here that adequate sociä
diagnosis is never in terms of economics alone or of politics alone, but in
terms of all relevant factors. Assume for a moment that I diagnose my
present interoational situation as locomotor ataxia or international anarchy
resulting frotmfaulty distribution of authority between the individual State
governmenfs and the confederate governmegt, and mention as specific
symptoms the central government's inability to coerce, and the continuation
of the individual states' reliance on self-help.
Let us once more return to the patient for purposes of comparison. The
diagnosis has been made. The doctor knows the historical situation A, and

he also knows the new situation B which he wishes to bring about. The new
situation is called health. Sometimes that is impossible, but let us assume in
our given case that it is possible. The new situation B conceived by the
doctor as desirable is called health. But does the concept " health " function
only in connection with the formulation of the desired state? Obviously not;
it functions also asa basic concept in the diagnosis itself. The diagnosis
results from an analysis in terms of the component sciences of medicine 73
through means to ends can be seen in its entirety. But under unstable
conditions, or in a highly complex society, there arise ethical problems. Under
such conditions the difficulty of evaluating means derives from the fact that a
given action not only leads to the end desired, but to a great many other
consequences. Some of these other consequences may be highly undesirable
and a course of action pursued without reference to its by-products may
therefore bring about a total situation which is worse instead of better t although
it contains the specific end desired.
It is one of the tragedies of complex modern society that the individual
actions have the most far-reaching social consequences not apparent to the
actor. It is therefore impossible for him to have ethically valid judgments
about his own actions. Most social behavior is ethically blind. To help the
poor individual is the task of social ethics, but it does so only if it is based
on adequate social science.
The field of ethics covers therefore a general theory of value and an
investigation into the various fields of value, such as health, wealth and
happiness, power, fame and justice. But it also contains as social ethics the
application of ethical judgments to concrete cases of social behavior and to
specific institutions and, in more general form, the' conceptual construction
of ideal societies.
Social Theory. Social ethics usually takes the form of a specialized sthics
parading as a social science. We do not observe social behavior as such, but
usually a particular kind of social behavior, such as economic behavior or
political behavior. It is in this specialized aspect that social behavior has
been most sysCematically studied, and it is in this specialized aspect that our
ethics appears in the form of economic theory or political theory. Such
theories contain a peculiar mixture of ethics and science, and are usually
based on an impfied or explicit metaphysics. They contain a set of basic
value judgments as to the kind of society desired, and in so far as they
advocate aeion, their recommendation of means to be used to reach the ends
desired muåt be based on knowledge of the functioning of means—that is,
Social theory, then, is a series of recommendations based on a factual
knowledge of social behavior in terms of means. The efficacy of the means
recommended can be challenged as based on insufficient or faulty
knowledge, but the basic value judgments cannot be challenged. The radical,
liberal and conservative social theories can never be reconciled because they
start from different premises.
The political theorist of international society starts with a series of basic
assumptions regarding the kind of international society he would like. That
basic assumption may be that war is a jolly pastime, or that the destruction
of human life is evil. Or it may be the idea that a system made up of
sovereign autonomous states is an inadequate piece of political machinery
his disposal. If he can't lock her up or fine her, maybe he can shame her by
calling her names, or by trying laughter or satire. If that does not work— he
can tell her to go to hell! The technique of manipulating cells and organs . is
not enough. There is needed the additional technique of manipulating
It is positively delightful to be a technical engineer or an architect. Bricks
and girders don't even talk back. It is pleasant to be a doctor; patients like the
lady who do not wish to be cured are rare. But it is positively disheartening
to be a social engineer. Let us draw the parallel of this exceptional experience
of the doctor in the social and the international field and we shall see that it
is merely the ordinary experience of the social engineer.
It has already been noted that on the social plane the concept of health has
no equivalent. The job of convincing the patient or patients that they ought
to like the particular brand of health which we recommend becomes therefore
an important aspect of social control. Theoretically this is not part of the
engineering technique, but in practice it is always mixed up with it on the
social plane,
The first difference between the doctor and the social engineer is that what is
indirect means for the doctor becomes direct means fof the social engineer.
Influencing individual behavior is the indirect means to the influencing of organic
behavior in order to obtain organic results. Influencing social behavior is for the
social engineer the direct means to obtain desired social l' results. The
technical engineer and the doctor do not go into action until someone gives
him a job or somebody wants to be cured. In that case the desired endis settled
and the job is a purely technical job. Such occasions arise in the social plane
only rarely. They are represented by the work of the technical experts of the
But it is not only the government expert who applies the processes of applied
science. Mr. and Mrs. Ordinary Citizen use similar thought processes, hoWever
poorly, when they exercise their divine right to be politically active alid urge
legislative measures. When they do so they must have a notion of what the social
situation is, of the kind of social situation they would like, and a belief that the
proposed legislation would bring the desired results.
International Relations. Applied science in international relations is the
work of the experts of the national governments, of the experts of the
international organization, splendidly represented by the Secretariat of the
League, and of Mr. and Mrs. Ordinary Citizen in so far as they are engaged
in trying to influence foreign policy.
The most spectacular of this kind of activity is the work of the diplomat
and statesman. He has the task of influencing the behavior of one or more
states in a direction thaq. suits his own state, whether because of material

for dealing with problems of economic interdependence. He may start from

a preference for anarchy, or a desire for order. But its start is a value
judgment. Having made his choice, the next task of the theorist is to make
a conceptual structure of the kind of international government that would
embody his particular values. Then, if the existing international
government is not to his liking, he can make recommendations as to how it
should be changed.
The task of the political theorist of international society is the same as the
task of every other political theorist from Plato to Coolidge—to build the
conceptual structure of his ideal government- That ideal international
government must result either from conquest, or from a process of
confederation of autonomous states. There have been innumerable
historical illustrations of this process, the most outstanding ones being the
creation of the Swiss, the Dutch, and the American republics. It is in the
political literature of these countries during and following the formation of
the new government that we find political theory that has an immediate
bearing on the problem of international government. It will depend on our
temperament and our fundamental values which of the two -types of theory
regarding confederation is most sympathetic to us. of you will undoubtedly
find yourselves on the side of the states-right doctrine. I myself feel more
at home among the Federalists.
But states' rights versus federalism is not the only issue that has been
argued, and any question asked with regard to national government may
have to be answered some day for international . government. Shall we
prefer dictatorship to democracy, efficiency to liberty? Shall we organize on
a functional or on a territorial basis? Is the international government to be
presidential or parliamentary, and shall it be empowered to prevent the
international cartels from action in restraint of trade?
All these questions are ethical questions. The answers must rest on the
science of government and of the behavior of states, but they remain none
the less applied value judgments, and as such belong to the philosophic
Applied Sci-ewe. The previous consideration of the scientific, the
historical and the ethical questions has prepared us for a consideration of
applied science which involves all three. A problem of applied science
emerges when

a given situation A is to be changed into a desired situation B. The

determination of the situation B is a problem in ethics. The changing of the
situation A into the situation B is an engineering problem, the problem of
the means, the applied science problem in the narrow sense. To ascertain
what the situation A is, is the historical problem. The first question to be
answered is the historical question: What is the nature of the situation which
is to be changed? It will be remembered that the historian does not describe
the whole of an historical situation, but abstracts

against a background conception of health. In other words, the concept of

the desired situation B functions already in the selections to be made to
describe the situation A,
What about the social situation? Here there is no equivalent for the health
norm of the doctor. -l'he situation B is not a norm concept generally
accepted like the concept of heal th, but a purely individual, concept
depending on the individual's ethical system or, to be more precise, on the
individual's social or political theory. Is he a states-rights man or a
It was mentioned that the health concept played a röle in the medical
diagnosis. In the same v„ray the-specific conception of the situation desired
will play a röle in the social diagnosis. Doctors have been known to diagnose
cases differently and we need, therefore, not be surprised that social
scientists should diagnose social situations differently; but it will be helpful
to understand the additional reason for the divergence. It results from the
difference in presupposition about the desirable. That difference will show
itself in the amount of the empirical reality which will be included in the
description. Whether what has been described in the diagnosis is true or
not can be settled by check-up- This is a question of historical fact. On that
score agreement is therefore possible. But how much is to included, what
facts must be included as symptoms, depends on subjective
presuppositions, and is therefore beyond settlement in case of dispute.
Now if we can realize this, we can avoid a lot of entirely useless argument,
if we will only state the nature of our presuppositions. Doctors'
consultations sometimes bring results and agreements on diagnoses, but
only because they start from the common assumption that health is the end
desired. If the lung specialist started on the assumption that health is
desirable, and the heart specialist on the assumption that his job was to get
the patient killed, they would be talking at cross-purposes.
So far we have, in characteristic medical fashion, considered the patient
as an object of study and manipulation, and the doctor as a technical
engineerJn order to obtain all the values of the comparison, ye shall let the
patient emerge as a person with ideas and a will of her own. The doctor
has made his diagnosis and prescribed his medicine and the régime to be
followed. The lovely lady looks at him in dismay. " But, doctor," she says,
don't know that I want to be healthy—it is so vulgar, so bad for the soul.
Besides, I don't like your medicine, and what you tell me to do is
preposterous. I like bathtub gin, and I refuse to give it up.'
What next? The doctor's best bedside manner: He commands; it does not
work. He persuades in terms of interests—you. would feel so much better;
in terms of morality—her obligation to her children. They don't work. He
tries rewards. He can't bribe her with money, but perhaps with praise or
flattery. " Madame, think of how your looks-would improve. ' If that does
not work he can try the method of punishment in so far as it is at

interest or because of a desire for a different international order. In both

cases his activity rests on ethical judgment as to values and practical
judg.ment of means to ends. It may be the practical judgment that a lower
French tariff would mean more American exports or that disarmament will
reduce the chances of war.
The immediate unit of behavior to be influenced is the state, a corporate
body. What is to be changed in its foreign policy? 'lhere is at present no
superstate organization in a position to coerce, and therefore no solution of
the problem in appeal to a higher authority. If the foreign policy of a state
is to be changed. it must be influenced directly. That implies understanding
its foreign policy, and raises the question as to the forces that shape this
foreign policy. The good old days of absolute monarchy are no more.
Influencing states can no longer be done by the simple procedure of
flattering the king and sending a case of old burgundy to his father confessor
and a pearl necklace to his mistress. The industrial revolutiÖn and the
resulting democracy have made an end to that.
The fundamental of coercion, barter, briberyt and persuasion
have not changed very much, but the people that have to be persuaded or
bartered with or bribed are no longer the simple trio of king, confessor and
mistress, but all the groups that influence policy. What foreign policy is and
what the groups are, is the study of the science of international relations;
what they are in any given case is the study of history and what they are in
any given case will define the technique to be applied.
Jurisprudence. So far no reference has been made to international law. That is
not because it is not important; it is not even the revenge on the part of the
recalcitrant offspring of what seems to be considered here as the mother
discipline. It is because the problems of jurisprudence are similar to the problems
of all other social disciplines, and can be easily pointed out on the basis of the
preceding analysis. The difference between the legal and the non-legal approach
to social behavior lies in the special functions of the norm concept.
The behavior of John and Mary in the park can be described, but it can
also be evaluated. That seems so natural a tendency that usually the
judgment enters into the description, although it is imperative to separate the
two. We may evaluate according to esthetic norms, and call it unseemly,
unbecoming or inelegant, or in terms of moral standards and call it cowardly
or courageous, or in terms of legal standards, and try to guide it by official
action. The policeman walking up and down behind thé bush has probably
quickly judged whether it could be considered to fall in any of the
recognized categories of assault, rape or disturbing the peace. : That means
he has judged the observed behavior in terms of value judgment as
legal norms. The word law is therefore used, in the first place, as a particular
kind of value judgment or norm, distinguished from other kinds of value
judgment and norms. It stands for the legal rule which, at least in municipal law, is the rule which
the government authority will occasionally enforce.
The study of law from this point of view becomes the study of the
cornmands and prohibitions called legal rules, in their historical and logical
relations. But the word law has a wider connotation. It is sometimes used for
a special social process, aimed at influencing human behavior. In that case
the word stands not merely for a body of legal rules, but for technique of
guiding human conduct. That conception of the law as a method of governing
makes the study of the law a part of the study of political science. It involves
the study of the relations between officials and laymen, as influenced by legal
rules. In this realistic approach to jurisprudence, the emphasis is on behavior,
not on the rules; but the behavior is viewed as conditioned by rules.
The concept of the legal rule functions in the study, therefore, in several
ways. It distinguishes law as a technique of governing from the technique of
education and propaganda. It gives a basis for distinguishing- between the
laymen and the official, and for partly distinguishing the official behavior of
the official from his private behavior. It also serves to formulate the basic
question in how far the behavior of laymen and öfficialg is conditioned by
It is to be observed here that the study of social behavior as conditioned
by legal rules is not an exclusive prerogative of the student of law. It is the
function of the student of all social behavior, in so far as that social behavior
is in any given society conditioned by legal norms, as is evident from the
studies of the economist, as well as the political scientist. In regard to law,
both as rtde and as process, the same questions can be asked that may be
formulated for other aspects of social life: scientific questions, historical
questions, philosophic and ethical questions and applied science questions.
The answer to each of these questions will involve a different method and
perhaps-a different technique.
What' is the effect of the law in society? What is the effect (Bf a change
in criminal law on crime? That is a scientific question. It involves the study
of a change in individual behavior observed after variation in one factor in
the conditioning environment.
The historical question appears in many forms: To the judge, when he asks
about the facts in the case. To the student and the judge, when they ask what
is the rule of international law, or of municipal law, or the by-law of W.C.T.U.
at a given time, or inquire how the court decided in any given•case. This is an
historical question and involves an historical method. Another historical
question is: How did the rule of law come to be accepted or to be applied at
the given timer The answer will be in terms of historical ity, and the
student of law, has all the problems of historical method. He must decide on
signific#ce, relevance and determine when to stop his

historical regression. Student A •wrill answer in terms of economic and

political factors; student B in terms of prevailing religious factors, and
student C will answer in terms of a psycho-analysis of Chief Justice
There is in addition thé imposing field of study called the philosophy of
law. What is the essence and inner significance, the. transcendental
meaning of law? Shall the legal system be based on the principle of rights
or on the principle of function, and if we select one or the other how can
we build a logically coherent system?
The most prevalent and consistent activity in the legal process is the
making of legal judgments, that is, the application of legal ethics. The
judicial decision results from an exercise in applied ethics; it implies an
evaluation of the results of alternate modes of action. That the legislative
process is an applied ethics is of course quite obvious; it means the
designing of means for desired ends.
Because the legal process is largely an applied ethics, it obviously also involves
considerations of applied science. The judicial decision results not merely from a
decision on desired ends, but also from t a judgment of means, the probable
consequences of. applying a definite rule. The process of legislation, designing
means to desired ends, is a problem of applied science and therefore of social
engineering, an observation not in the least invalidated by the fact that most
legislation is usually bad engineering, because it represents a selection of means
by the process of compromise between people with opposing ends. Bad
engineering is engineering none the less, and the design of many a public building
has been inspired not so much by the function it was to serve as by the desire to
offer a possibility of compromise between the friendly contractors in competing
International Law. The previous observations in jurisprudence apply of
course to the study of international law as well as to the study of municipal
law. It can be conceived as a study of rules and norms, or as a study of a
process and technique of international government, in which case it will
bear a close resemblance to the studies of the political scientist who \devotes
himself to international relations.
All the problems enumerated, scientific, historical, metaphysical, ethical and
applied science problems will be met in the study, and the judicial and the
legislative process will deserve as much attention as they receive in municipal
Conclusion. My task is now completed. I have analyzed the different
methods of approach to the _study of international relations and tried to
indicate the fundamental concepts and categories of knowledge that are used
in each of these methods of approach. It Has been a long and complicated
procedure, and even so I cannot claim to have solved all problems or to have
answered all questions about our methodology. But I hope to have provided
enough material for discussion so that by an exchange of ideas we

may progress toward that gradual clarification of the nature of our activities,
which is so essential a prerequisite of work of high quality.
Ckairman GARNER. We now have a report on " Seminar and Essay Topice
and Methods" by Professor Charles E. Hill, of George Washington University.


ProfesSor of Political Science, Georgc Wash.ington University
A tabular grouping of theses in international law at German and Austrian universities, 1919—
From H. J. Schlocha•uer's article in Zeitschrift fir Välkcrrcchl, 16 Band, Heft 3, Breslau,


Berlin, Triepel . . 12
Bonn, Thoma . . 3 35
Breslau, Heilborn.... 3 25
Erlangen, Köhler 31
7 4
Frankfurt a. M. , Strupp - . 10
Freibure i. Br. v. Rohland . 4 1
Giessen, Heyland . 4 10 4 27
Göttingen, Kraus . 6
2 4 23
Greifswald, Hubrich 7 35
Halle, Fleischman .
4 24
Hamburg, Perels . . 2 31
Heidelberg, v. Kirchenheim . 2 30
Jena; 2 6 5 23
Kieh hücking Köln, 29
Ebers . .
8 19
Königsberg, Wolgast . . 51
Leipzig, Simons . 2 .35 49
Marburg, Bredt. . . 4 11
1 35 2 27
München, Neumeyer. . 4 30 32 1 274
Münster, Lucas. . 2 19
Rostock, Haff . 9 26 6 12
Tübingen, v. Pohl . 39
Würzburg, Meurer
Innsbruck, Lamp .
Graz, Lenz - . 17 23 127 83 109 75 29 15 142 110 1 850
WIen, Strisower