Connecticut Attorney Disciplinary Authorities Charged in Federal Lawsuit With Racial Discrimination

Case 3:17-cv-01429-MPS Document 20 Filed 12/10/17 Page 1 of 48
UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT
DISTRICT OF
CONNECTICUT
REBECCA L. JOHNSON, 3:17CV1429

(MPS)
JOSEPHINE SMALLS MILLER
Plaintiffs
V.
KARYL CARRASQUILLA (I/O CAPACITY),

MICHAEL BOWLER (I/O CAPACITY)
Defendants
MOTION TO AMEND
COMPLAINT
In accordance with the parties’ approved 26 (f) report, Plaintiff’s Rebeca
Johnson and Josephine Miller file this motion to amend the complaint to add
factual statements in paragraphs 132-149..
THE PLAINTIFFS
BY: _/s/Josephine S. Miller
Josephine S. Miller, Fed Bar #
ct27039
152 Deer Hill Avenue, Suite 302
Danbury, CT 06810
Tel: (203) 512-2795
Fax: (203) 702-5188
Email: jmillerlaw@sbcglobal.net
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT
DISTRICT OF
CONNECTICUT
REBECCA L. JOHNSON, 3:17CV1429 (MPS)

JOSEPHINE SMALLS MILLER
Plaintiffs
V.
KARYL CARRASQUILLA (I/O CAPACITY),

MICHAEL BOWLER (I/O CAPACITY)
Defendants
PROPOSED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
I. JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to Title 28 U. S. C.
§§1331, 1343 (a) (3) and (a) (4), 2201. Jurisdiction of this court is further invoked
pursuant to Title 42 U. S. C. §1983, 1981 and 1988.
II. VENUE
Venue is proper in this court inasmuch as the acts alleged herein occurred
within the State of Connecticut.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Plaintiff Rebecca L. Johnson (hereafter referred to as “Johnson”), is a
citizen of the State of Connecticut. Johnson is an African-American.
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2. Plaintiff is Josephine Smalls Miller (hereafter referred to as “Miller”), a
citizen of the State of Connecticut, with an office and place of business at 152
Deer Hill Avenue, Suite 302, Danbury, CT 06810. Miller is an African-American.
3. Karyl Carrasquilla, sued in her individual and official capacity, is Chief
Disciplinary Counsel, State of Connecticut, Office of the Chief Disciplinary
Counsel (hereafter referred to as “Carrasquilla”). At all times material herein,
Carrasquilla was acting under color of law.
(a) The OCDC is an administrative agency of the State of Connecticut that
is charged with, inter alia, enforcing the state statutes regarding attorney practice
of law, investigating and monitoring attorney conduct. It has an office and place of
business located at 100 Washington Street, Hartford, CT 06103.
4. Michael Bowler, sued in his individual and official capacity, is Bar Counsel
for the Statewide Grievance Committee. At all times material herein, Bowler was
responsible for managing the process of attorney discipline procedures.
(a) The Statewide Grievance Committee (hereafter referred to as “SGC”)
is an administrative agency of the State of Connecticut that is charged with, inter
alia, enforcing the state statutes regarding attorney practice of law, investigating
and monitoring attorney conduct. It has an office and place of business located at
287 Main Street, East Hartford.
5. 5. Plaintiff, Rebecca Johnson, (hereinafter referred to as “Johnson”) is an
African American woman, licensed to practice law in the State of Connecticut
commencing in January of 1994 and subsequently in the Second Circuit.
6. 6. Johnson practiced law in Connecticut’s state courts from January of 1994,
through September of 2002, and in the Second Circuit until January of 2003, with
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a focus on civil rights related claims.
7. 7. On or about July 9, 2002, the superior court, Skolnick J., issued an order in
the Statewide Grievance Committee (hereinafter referred to as “SGC”) disciplinary
matter, relating to docket number CV01-378603, suspending Johnson from the
practice of law, for a period of one year beginning September 1, 2002. The
underlying allegations of misconduct on the part of Johnson, was a wrongful
termination lawsuit that had been filed by Johnson on behalf of a former client, [Gail
Dunn]. The allegations of misconduct, by Johnson related to Dunn’s complaint that
was dismissed from the superior court dormancy calendar after Johnson was no
longer representing Dunn. The dismissal had occurred at a time when a second
attorney, with whom Johnson had previously practiced law, had filed an
appearance in the case to represent Dunn. It was in fact substantial misconduct
on the part of the second attorney/law firm that lead directly to the dismissal of
Dunn’s lawsuit, yet Johnson was inexplicably, and solely singled out for
investigation, and eventually discipline. Both Bar counsel and Judge Skolnick were
aware of the second attorney’s involvement, yet both would not require the second
attorney to account for his misconduct.
8. 8. This first period of suspension, commencing on September 1, 2002, is
hereafter referred to as “Suspension I.”
9. 9. On or about November 1, 2004, the superior court, Robaina J., issued an
order in the SGC disciplinary matter, relating to docket number CV05-4012328S,
suspending Johnson from the practice of law, for a period of two years, beginning
on or about November 1, 2004. The client who filed the underlying grievance, Mr.
William Hazel, had been represented by Johnson and another attorney, in a

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wrongful termination claim. On the eve of settlement of his claim, Hazel decided
that he would not honor the retainer agreement that had been negotiated in his
case between himself, Johnson and the second attorney. The retainer agreement
had been forwarded to Hazel, however, neither Johnson nor the second attorney
noted that Hazel had failed to execute and return his copy to them. Hazel
complained when Johnson and the second attorney retained 25% of the settlement
proceeds as attorneys’ fees. The 25% fee was divided between Johnson and the
second attorney. Johnson was held responsible to reimburse the client security
fund for the entire amount, notwithstanding that legal services had actually been
performed and despite the fact that the second attorney had been permitted to
retain his portion of the settlement proceeds. The allegations of misconduct on the
part of Johnson, involved the exact same charges of misconduct on the part of a
second attorney/law firm, yet Johnson was inexplicably, and solely, singled out for
investigation, and eventually discipline. Both Bar counsel and Judge Robaina were
aware of the second attorney’s involvement, yet both failed to require the second
attorney to account for his alleged misconduct.
9. This second period of suspension, commencing on November 1, 2004, is
hereafter referred to as “Suspension II.”
10. On or about November 1, 2006, the superior court, Lagar J., issued an order
in the SGC disciplinary matter, relating to docket number CV05- 40123285,
suspending Johnson from the practice of law, for a period of eighteen months,
beginning on or about November 1, 2006.
10. 11. This third period of suspension, commencing on November 1, 2006, is
hereafter referred to as “Suspension III.” In the underlying grievance, Anthony

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Amabile, was represented by Johnson (prior to being suspended) in a wrongful
termination matter which was being investigated by the EEOC. A second attorney,
had resumed representing Amabile after Johnson was suspended. Amabile had a
disagreement with the second attorney because he desired the second attorney to
file a complaint in federal court, on a contingency basis. The second attorney would
not agree to a contingency arrangement. Amabile allowed the statute of limitations
to toll and subsequently filed a complaint with the SGC falsely claiming that
Johnson had not made him aware that her license was under suspension and
further claimed that she allowed the statute of limitations to toll. The allegation of
misconduct on the part of Johnson, involved the exact same charges of alleged
misconduct on the part of the second attorney/law firm, yet Johnson was
inexplicably, and solely, singled out for investigation and eventually discipline. The
second attorney involved in the Amabile grievance was also the attorney involved
in the Hazel grievance. Both Bar counsel and Judge Lagar were aware of the
second attorney’s involvement, yet both failed to require the second attorney to
account for his misconduct.
12. During the trial immediately preceding Suspension III, Johnson attempted to
offer testimony regarding factual allegations of racially discriminatory treatment of
her leading the SGC to pursue charges of misconduct against her in the three (3)
disciplinary matters.
13. Johnson was repeatedly interrupted by the judge at the presentment hearing
when she tried to introduce evidence of racial disparity in attorney discipline.
Johnson was repeatedly questioned about the relevance of the testimony or

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instructed to “move along”.
14. In support of Johnson’s claim that Suspensions I, II and III were racially
motivated, she offered testimony concerning the racially discriminatory matter in
which complaints against Caucasian attorneys are handled (much more to their
favor) who had committed offenses that were serious violations of state law as
compared to Johnson.
15. Johnson testified, for example, about a grievance complaint that had been
filed in the fall of 2002 against Attorney Anthony Lucci, a Caucasian attorney
licensed to practice law in Connecticut. Johnson’s sister, an African American
woman, wanted to purchase a home in West Haven. Lucci, representing the seller,
received the complainant’s down payment, which pursuant to state law, was
supposed to be deposited in Lucci’s escrow account. The transaction did not take
place due to the fact that the seller’s property was found by the insurance carrier to
be uninsurable. There was extensive damage to the roof, along with other problems
with the house in question. When the complainant made a timely demand for the
return of her down payment, Lucci did not do so, having purloined the money. When
a grievance complaint was filed, the SGC sent a letter to the complainant informing
her that the complaint would be set aside so that Lucci would have time to find a
way to repay her the money. These facts were actually stated in the written
response to the complainant’s complaint. The complainant likewise filed a complaint
with the State of Connecticut’s Real Estate Commission. The Real Estate
Commission followed suit, refused to process the complaint and refused to respond
to inquiries regarding why the complaint was not being processed or addressed.
Johnson’s sister filed suit in superior court (Docket no.CV 030473174) in January of
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2003. After five months of litigation, Johnson’s sister’s money was returned to her
in May of 2003. Lucci notified the SGC when he returned the money and the SGC
immediately dismissed the complaint, without taking disciplinary action against
Lucci.
16. Johnson was disciplined for the same “offenses” committed by other
attorneys who worked side-by-side with her and had appearances in the cases in
question. However, these other attorneys were not disciplined. Although the SGC
staff and the courts acknowledged the necessity of the presence of these other
attorneys, they were never required to answer for their portion of responsibility for
the underlying complaints.
(a) Johnson specifically claimed racial discrimination in her brief to the
judge who presided over the presentment hearing that resulted in Suspension III.
(b) The SGC never responded to Johnson’s claims of racial
discrimination.
c) In the memorandum of decision on the presentment, the judge refused
to acknowledge or respond to Johnson’s claims of racial discrimination in attorney
discipline.
17. Johnson applied for reinstatement on or about February 19, 2004, however
the application was denied due to the pendency of the underlying complaint relating
to Docket number CV04-4000920S.
18. Johnson again applied for reinstatement on or about March 27, 2009, and a
three (3) judge panel denied said application.
19. The conditions for reinstatement that Johnson had been made aware of was
that she (1) complete a CLE course on professional responsibility, (2) take and pass
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the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination and (3) pay back a fine of
approximately $14,900.00.
20. Johnson had complied with the first two orders. As to payment of the
$14,900.00 fine, as of the date the filing of her second petition, Johnson had paid
$9,000.00. The $14,000 that Johnson was required to re-pay included the portion
of the fees that went to her as well as the portion of the fees that went to the second
attorney. Johnson had been unable to pay the balance prior to filing her application
due to an inability to maintain full time, gainful permanent employment since August
of 2009. Johnson, through her counsel had reached an agreement with the Client
Security Fund to make installment payments upon her return to work.
21. In its decision, the three judge panel accused Johnson of being unfit to return
to practice without specifying why she was unfit and found that she had intentionally
failed to meet to requirements for reinstatement.
22. The panel’s judgment even chastised Johnson for choosing Attorney
Josephine Miller, African-American female attorney, as her counsel and/or mentor.
Without a factual basis, the panel questioned Miller’s ability to act as mentor for
Johnson even though Miller had no disciplinary history at the time.
23. Upon information and belief, the decision to continue its discipline of Johnson
after seven (7) years of suspension was because of race and color, and because
both Johnson and her Attorney were aggressive litigators who have chosen to focus
their respective practices on civil rights litigation.
24. After refiling her petition in December of 2013, Johnson was introduced by
former Chief Disciplinary Counsel Mark DuBois to Attorney Beth Griffin of Lawyers
Concerned for Other Lawyers in April of 2014. Johnson, sought advice from Griffin
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on how to approach her reinstatement efforts.
25. Griffin offered to seek out information regarding the “judicial climate” that
Johnson would face by speaking to members of the judiciary.
26. Upon meeting with Griffin in April 2014, she told Johnson that (1) she should
not wear her “power to the people t- shirt” while in court presenting to the judges;
(2) upon being reinstated Johnson should avoid practicing civil rights litigation as
that choice would not be received well by certain judges and to consider engaging
in bankruptcy or real estate practice; and (3) Griffin stated that Johnson should
“definitely” not have Attorney Miller represent her because Miller was seen by
certain judges to be offensive. When Johnson commented that Miller has an
impressive and successful track record of litigating civil rights cases and that she
preferred having Attorney Miller’s services, Griffin continued to strongly urge
Johnson to seek someone else to represent her.
27. Upon information and belief Johnson and Miller have been targeted by the
attorney discipline authorities in a racially discriminatory manner, and in part
because of their civil rights litigation practice.
28. Johnson remains under suspension despite the passage of fourteen (14)
years.
29. At all times material herein, Miller has been a practicing attorney, licensed to
practice in the State of Connecticut and subject to state statutes regarding attorney
conduct.
30. Miller has at various times over the past thirty-five years been admitted to
practice in the State of Michigan, the State of Georgia and the State of Connecticut.
She has been admitted to practice in Connecticut since 2004. Miller is admitted to
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practice before the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the
Northern District of Georgia, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court.
31. During most of her thirty-five years of practice Miller has specialized in
employment discrimination/civil rights law. However she has practice areas in family
law, criminal and general litigation.
32. Miller has filed complaints in U. S. District Court for the District of Connecticut
against the Bridgeport Police Department, the Bridgeport Board of Education, and
others, alleging inter alia, race discrimination, conspiracy, and tortious interference
with contract. [Miller v. Bridgeport Police Department; 3:14-cv-00689-JAM; Miller v.
Bridgeport Board of Education, 3:12-cv-1287 (JAM)]; Miller v. Chief Disciplinary
Counsel, 3:15cv1111; and in various state court cases alleging racial discrimination
against her as an African-American attorney and civil rights practitioner. [Miller v.
Bridgeport Police Department, FBT CV10-6010380; Miller v. Bridgeport Board of
Education, FBT CV10-6011406; Miller v. Bridgeport Board of Education, DBD CV15-
6017320; Miller v. Bridgeport Board of Education, DBD CV12-6010257; and in state
administrative agency cases [Miller v. Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities, HHB-CV16- 6035626; Miller v. Commission on Human Rights &
Opportunities, HHB-CV17-6036669]
33. The intent of each of these lawsuits has been to highlight the racial
discrimination in payment of attorney fees, attorney discipline and other matters.
34. Miller has presented evidence of racially discriminatory treatment including:
(a) Refusal to pay attorney fees to her for legal services performed while
paying such fees to Caucasian attorneys.

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1. Caucasian male attorney, Matthew Hirsch, was paid by the City
of Bridgeport Board of Education for three years for his representation of Bridgeport
School Principal Andrew Cimmino during the time period 2007 through 2009.When
Cimmino retained Miller to represent him in the same matter in lieu of Hirsch, the
City of Bridgeport refused to pay Miller’s attorney fees as it had done for Hirsch. The
matter of Miller’s attorney’s fees was at issue in Superior Court Docket No.s FBT-
CV10-6011406; DBD-CV12-6010257; DBD-CV15-6017320; and U S District Court
Docket No. 3:12-cv-01287 (JAM). It was through Miller’s provision of legal services
that the complaint against Cimmino was finally dismissed her motion for summary
judgment in Docket No.FBT-CV13-6035941.
2. Defendant City of Bridgeport Police Department refused to
compensate Miller for legal services performed by her on behalf of two Bridgeport
police employees [Docket No. FBT-CV09-6005032S; UWY-CV10-6006798].
Through Miller’s provision of legal services, the complaint against her client in
Docket No. FBT-CV09-6005032S was voluntarily withdrawn dismissed by the
plaintiff. Under similar circumstances the City of Bridgeport paid the legal fees for a
Caucasian attorney, Matthew Hirsch.
3. On or about October 22, 2013 Miller was informed by Assistant City
Attorney Errol Skyers regarding a civil action that was about to be tried in the Judicial District
of Fairfield at Bridgeport in the matter of Powell v. Bridgeport Board of Education [DOCKET
NO. FBT-CV-09-5021654S] that her name was on a “no pay” list as regards the
Bridgeport Office of the City Attorney. Attorney Skyers stated that this “no pay” list meant
that Miller was an attorney with whom the Office of the City Attorney would not settle any
case.
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4. On or about October 7, 2013 a current client of Miller
telephoned her to inform her that he had just had a conversation with Assistant City
Attorney Russell Liskov. The client had contacted Attorney Liskov at the suggestion
of Miller because the client had been named as an individual defendant along with
the City of Bridgeport in a civil action. Attorney Liskov then stated to Miller’s client
that he should not utilize her services to represent him. He informed Miller’s client
that she won big verdicts but that she was often reversed on those decisions.
Attorney Liskov then stated to Miller’s client that he should utilize the services of
Attorney Thomas Bucci (Caucasian male) to handle the federal lawsuit that he was
planning to file. Attorney Liskov further informed Miller’s client that there were some
attorneys with whom the city did not settle cases and that Miller was one of those
attorneys.
5. In the matter of Cimmino v. Marcoccia, et al. Docket No. FBT-
CV09-5023251-S Miller obtained a jury verdict in favor of her client, Cimmino, for
$125,000 plus punitive damages. Under the statutory claim of C.G.S. § 31-51q, the
punitive damages were to have been awarded based upon Miller’s reasonable
attorney’s fees. Miller made a claim for attorney fees in the amount of $350,000 (as
against the two defendants). The trial judge refused to award Miller any attorney
fees and thereafter reversed her decision denying defendants’ motion to set aside
verdict nine (9) days after Miller filed her appeal of the denial of her motion for
attorney fees. On July 29, 2013 the trial court denied defendants’ motion to set side
verdict in favor of Miller’s client after eight (8) months of consideration, but then
reversed and set aside the verdict that had been obtained by Miller for her client
nine (9) days after Miller’s appeal of her refusal to grant attorney fees. The
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Connecticut Appellate Court dismissed the appeal in the Cimmino matter on
December 9, 2014 and thereafter, upon information and belief, Attorney Thomas
Cotter (Caucasian male) was then able to recover attorney fees to be paid to him on
behalf of his clients (the losing parties).
6. In the matter of Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport Board of
Education, SC 18401, the Connecticut Supreme Court set aside a $2 million jury
verdict that had been obtained in favor of Miller’s client, after four (4) years and on
direct appeal to the Supreme Court, based upon an alleged lack of sufficient
evidence for the jury to have reached a verdict on the claim of racial discrimination,
retaliation under C.G.S. § 31-51q and Intentional infliction of emotional distress, all
claims that the jury had found in favor of Miller’s client.
7. In the matter of Miller v. Maurer, Docket No. DBD-CV17-
6021872, an interpleader action, the trial court found that Attorney Elizabeth Maurer
(Caucasian female) had “diligently and professionally Rodriguez in her claims
against all defendants in that action”, that the Maurer law firm added good value to
Rodriguez’ claims”, and “finds no evidence of misconduct or professional negligence
by anyone in the Maurer law firm or in its initial handling of the initial action”. Attorney
Maurer had represented Miller’s client in a federal court action, prior to being
terminated.
(a) In response to a Motion to Dismiss in the federal court action,
Attorney Maurer had stated: “these inadequacies are not completely due to the fault
of counsel or fault of the Plaintiff herself; instead, they are shared. Embarrassingly,
counsel concedes that it is to blame for much of the late disclosures and production
of documents in this case,” “It is shameful and contrary to Plaintiff's practice to have
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necessitated the Court's intervention on so many occasions and to now be in the
position of pleading for its forgiveness”; “Plaintiff's counsel and Ms. Rodriguez which
has caused numerous oversights by counsel and ultimately resulted in the
unprofessional and sloppy piecemeal production which lands us here today., “The
Court has already issued an extreme sanction in ruling to preclude all evidence of
emotional distress. Additionally, Plaintiff's issues for trial have been seriously limited
to whether Plaintiff was sexually harassed and whether that harassment led to a
medical event in January 2007, effectively dismissing the Plaintiff's alternate causes
of action,” “Plaintiff cannot, in good faith, make a straight-faced argument to this
Court that any of the delays were "substantially justified," “counsel has heard the
Court's wake-up call as is evidenced by this objection which forces counsel to put
its tail between its legs and cower toward the tribunal in embarrassment,” “The Court
has indeed warned Plaintiff on numerous occasions of dismissal of her case for
discovery non-compliance, “ “Plaintiff's counsel does not need a deterrent to
behaving in a disrespectful manner towards the Court; counsel has already been
deterred by the sheer embarrassment and tenor of this objection.”
(b) Attorney Maurer also admitted in email correspondence to
Rodriguez, admitted into evidence at the interpleader action, that “this (court
sanctions) is a major blow to your case which will take most of the value out of the
case” and “after I get the judge’s rulings on discovery and the sanctions I’ll be better
able to tell if there is anything left worth pursuing., ”” I am having a very hard
time seeing any way to present a case with a chance of succeeding,” “I
am not optimistic that your case will survive with the number of sanctions
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and inconsistencies in the case”. After assuming the representation of
Rodriguez, Miller was able to obtain a settlement of $128,000.
(c) Rodriguez also testified at the hearing on the interpleader
action that she had been instructed by a principal in the Maurer law firm to destroy
a personal notebook that had been requested by the defendant during discovery in
the underling federal court action.
(d) Rodriguez testified at the hearing on the interpleader action that
no attorney from the Maurer law firm was permitted to be present at the deposition
of her principle treating mental health witness because the attorney who had been
sent was not admitted to practice before the federal district court. That attorney did
admit during the interpleader hearing that he had not been admitted to practice
before the federal court at the time of the deposition. No continuance of the
deposition occurred and the deposition took place without the presence of any
attorney for the witness.
(e) The federal court complaint in the underlying Rodriguez matter
had been filed on February 8, 2007. As of the time of a ruling on a motion to compel
on October 7, 2011 the court noted that “after over twenty-seven months of
waiting, the [defendants] have not received a single document related to treatment
by Drs. Graham, Khalid, Mahajan or Astoria Park.” Moreover the court noted that
medical records from Rodriguez’s primary care doctor and primary mental health
treater were not provided until after Defendants filed their motion to compel
production of documents on July 29, 2011 in response to Requests for Production
dated May 20, 2009. (f) No sanctions were ever
issued against Attorney Maurer or any member of her firm by the state or federal
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court, nor was any referral made for investigation by Connecticut disciplinary
authorities of her conduct by any state or federal court judge, upon information and
belief.
(g) Attorney Maurer was awarded full attorney fees and costs in the
interpleader action.
; (b) Pursuit of discipline including presentments against African-American
lawyers when such actions are not pursued against Caucasian lawyers; On
September 1, 2015 Plaintiff presented substantial evidence to Attorney Carrasquilla
regarding multiple instances of Caucasian attorneys who engaged in the same or
substantially similar conduct as that alleged against Miller but with no disciplinary
action against them. By further example, on August 17, 2015 Miller filed a complaint
with Attorney Michael Bowler of the SGC regarding multiple false statements of
material fact by an Assistant Attorney General in pleadings in a matter pending in
state superior court (i.e. Gilbert v. Department of Correction). Neither Carrasquilla
nor Bowler took any action to investigate these claims of professional misconduct
by Caucasian attorneys.
(c) Investigation of African-American lawyers for possible professional
misconduct when Caucasian lawyers are not. Carrasquilla and Bowler caused an
investigation to be made of at least two of Miller’s race discrimination/civil rights
cases while refusing to perform investigation of Caucasian attorneys.
(d) In Grievance No. 15-0652 Carrasquilla determined at the end of the
probable cause hearing that she would recommend Miller for a presentment
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because she deemed Miller’s “attitude” to be improper; Miller had stated throughout
the hearing her belief that the grievance authorities were engaged in a witch hunt
against her; upon information and belief other attorneys who protest their belief that
the grievance process was being used as a witch hunt were not recommended for
discipline on that basis.
(e) Carrasquilla and counsel in the OCDC sought to have Miller agree to
a voluntary suspension of her right to practice law based upon the sole claim of a
pleading violation as sanctioned by Judge Meyer. They compared Miller to a
Caucasian attorney who had been reprimanded, gone to presentment five times,
and suspended three times.
(d). On November 3, 2015, the SGC acting through bar counsel Bowler,
filed a complaint against Miller based upon a referral by the Danbury Local panel,
finding probable cause for, inter alia, the alleged filing of false, unmeritorious,
frivolous complaints or allegations of racial discrimination that cannot be supported
in the matters of Igidi v. Connecticut Department of Correction (Federal District
Court) and Eaddy v. Connecticut Department of Children & Families (Connecticut
Superior Court). Both the Igidi and Eaddy complaints alleged racial discrimination
claims on behalf of two of Miller’s clients.
35. Upon information and belief, Bowler acted in concert with Carrasquilla,
members of the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, and others within the
Connecticut Judicial Branch to interfere with Miller’s pursuit of racial discrimination
complaints on behalf of her clients.
36. Upon information and belief Bowler and the SGC singled out only racial
discrimination complaints rather than other types of civil rights complaints being
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pursued by Plaintiff on behalf of clients.
37. Upon information and belief Bowler and SGC singled out racial discrimination
complaints filed against agencies of the State of Connecticut in an unlawful attempt
to subvert legitimate causes of actions.
38. On August 17, 2015 Miller filed a grievance alleging that Attorney Betsy
Ingraham had orally made multiple false statements on the record before federal
court Judge Jeffrey Meyer at a June 30, 2015 oral argument.
39. Upon information and belief Bowler and members of the SGC, through its
Fairfield Judicial District Grievance Panel, sought to foreclose Miller from responding
to the answer filed on behalf of Attorney Ingraham by stating that no response could
be filed by any party.
Fairfield Judicial District Grievance Panel, sought to insulate Attorney Ingraham from
any consequence for her false statements.
Fairfield Judicial District Grievance Panel, sought to insulate Attorney Ingraham from
any consequence for her misconduct because she is Caucasian.
42. On October 29, 2015 Bowler and the SGC, through its Fairfield Judicial
District Grievance Panel, found no probable cause to proceed on Miller’s complaint
of misconduct against Attorney Betsy Ingraham.
43. On August 17, 2015 Miller filed a grievance with Bowler and the SGC alleging
that Assistant Attorney General Nancy Brouilett had made multiple false statements
in written pleadings in the matter of Gilbert v. Connecticut Department of Correction
44. On September 2, 2015 Bowler and the SGC refused to process the grievance
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filed by Miller against Attorney Brouilett.
45. On September 2, 2015 Miller insisted that the grievance and all supporting
documents be processed.
46. On December 16, 2015 Bowler and the SGC, through its Hartford Judicial
Grievance Panel, found no probable cause to proceed on Miller’s complaint of
misconduct against Attorney Brouilett.
Hartford Judicial District Grievance Panel, sought to insulate Attorney Brouilett from
any consequence for her false and misleading pleadings.
Hartford Judicial District Grievance Panel, sought to insulate Attorney Brouilett from
any consequence for her misconduct because she is Caucasian.
49. Bowler and the SGC has engaged in application of the attorney discipline
rules and regulations in a manner that discriminates against African-American
attorneys while insulating Caucasian attorneys, particularly when the grievance is
made by an African-American against said Caucasian attorneys.
(a) Bowler and Carrasquilla refused to consider the claims against
Caucasian attorneys made by Miller and not by local grievance panels and/or
judges. These claims included:
1. Joseph Jordano, (Caucasian male) Assistant Attorney General, at
the time assigned to provide advice and counsel to the Commission on Human
Rights & Opportunities (CHRO), defended a federal civil rights lawsuit filed by Femi
Bogle-Assegai (Case 3:08CV564(VLB). Plaintiff in that case alleged that Jordano
had claimed in pleadings filed with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that no work-
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sharing agreement was in existence at the time Plaintiff dually filed her complaint of
employment discrimination with the CHRO and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). Jordano again made this assertion in response to a petition
for writ of certiorari before the United States Supreme Court. By virtue of a
subsequent Freedom of Information request, Plaintiff learned for the first time that
the defensive pleadings made by Jordano were knowingly falsely (i.e. that during
the time period when it had been alleged that the work sharing agreement had
expired, CHRO continued to accept and process complaints and forward them to
the EEOC with the specific notation that they were doing so “pursuant to the work
sharing agreement.” The knowingly false statements of Jordano were made for
the purpose of defeating Plaintiff’s claims resulting in a dismissal on statute of
limitations grounds. Less than two months after the complaint was filed, and before
any responsive pleading was filed, the trial judge, based upon a telephone status
conference, issued a dismissal sua sponte. The matter was appealed to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals which refused to even allow perfecting of the record to
include the documentary evidence that established Jordano’s clearly false
statements. Neither the trial judge nor the appellate court judges had any concern
for the knowingly false statements of Attorney Jordano, no sanctions were ordered
against him, and no referral was made of him to the grievance committee or
disciplinary counsel.
2. On or about February 15, 2011, during the trial of the matter of Dos
Santos v. Janos, FBT-CV09-5028019, defense attorney Frederick Trotta,
(Caucasian male) introduced computer generated evidence that purportedly

21
claimed that Plaintiff had been present at a physical fitness gym on a specific date
and time. The evidence was clearly false because the date and time of the alleged
trip to the gym occurred when Plaintiff was present in the courthouse for jury
selection in the case. Defense counsel never retracted the false document or the
testimonial evidence given in support of it. A Plaintiff’s verdict was entered. At no
time did the trial judge issue any sanctions against Attorney Trotta for this clearly
false presentation of evidence, and no referral was made of him to the grievance
committee or disciplinary counsel.
3. On or about December 2013, during the course of an educational
neglect case in Superior Court for Juvenile Matters (In Re Hodge) it was learned
that prior defense counsel for Tiara Harrison had not notified her that a default
judgment had entered against her. The mother had been defaulted for alleged non-
appearance in court at a time when she was actually present but her defense
counsel had not informed her to come into the courtroom. It was only after Miller
assumed defense of the matter, after prior counsel was dismissed, that Harrison
became aware of the default. A motion was then filed seeking to vacate the default
upon the ground that Harrison’s rights were violated by the action of prior defense
counsel. The Assistant Attorney General in the case sought to have Miller drop her
claim that Harrison’s rights had been violated by her prior attorney. While the court
vacated the default, there was no sanction of Attorney Frank Johnson (Caucasian
male), no referral to the grievance committee or the disciplinary counsel. If the trial
judge accepted the validity of Harrison’s affidavit, attached to the motion to vacate,
then the misconduct of Attorney Johnson, as alleged must have been obvious.
22
4. On or about October 2012 defendant attorney Thomas Cotter,
(Caucasian male) made multiple representations both in court and in chambers in
the matter of Cimmino v. Marcoccia, et al. (FBT-CV09-5022351) contending that his
client, Maria Marcoccia had pled guilty to certain criminal conduct pursuant to the
Alford doctrine in a matter related to the allegations of the complaint then before the
court for jury trial. Attorney Cotter persisted in this claim for approximately eight
days during which time he claimed that he was attempting to obtain documentation
that such a plea had in fact been entered. Miller insisted upon proof of Attorney
Cotter’s claims because of proof that was in her possession that Marcoccia had not
in fact entered such a plea. Attorney Cotter knew that his assertion was false and
ultimately was required to drop his claim after multiple representations to the court
and after multiple days. Attorney Cotter was never reprimanded after he dropped
his false claim, nor was there ever a referral of him to disciplinary or grievance
authorities.
5. Attorney Maureen Duggan, (Caucasian female) admitted to
constructing a false claim of sexual harassment against the Executive Director of
the Office of State Ethics, where she was then employed, for the purpose of causing
an investigation to be made of him. The Executive Director was terminated from his
employment before Attorney Duggan’s false complaint was discovered. She was
disciplined only by payment of a $1,000 fine to the agency, a reprimand, and the
requirement that she take a 9 hour ethics course over a three year period. Attorney
Duggan has been employed as attorney for the Department of Children & Families
23
since leaving the Office of State Ethics.
6. First Assistant Chief Disciplinary Counsel Suzanne Sutton
(Caucasian female ) represented to Miller, in response to a direct inquiry on May 31,
2015, that there was no other documentation in the possession of the Office of Chief
Disciplinary Counsel upon which her office was relying in pursuing a grievance. A
request was made by Miller for any communications regarding her, broader
discovery than simply what was in the “the file”. Attorney Sutton categorically denied
having any other documentation. However on June 22, 2015 Attorney Sutton
forwarded a memo to Michael Bowler, Bar Counsel, containing some six inches of
documents including an alleged referral on April 9, 2015 by Superior Court Judge
Barbara Bellis. This six inch stack of documents was for possible referral to a local
grievance panel. Either Attorney Sutton has falsely claimed as of May 31 that there
were no documents or there was no referral by Judge Bellis as of April 9 as is
claimed. These are false representations made during the course of a litigation
matter, deliberately misleading Miller. The request for discovery regarding a matter
this is proceeding to a hearing is vitally important to the defense of charges. Attorney
Sutton knowingly made a false statement of fact no less serious than the alleged
false statement claimed to have been made by Miller.
7. In the federal court civil rights case of Bryant v. Meriden, ( Civil Action
No. 3:13CV449 (SRU) Attorney James Tallberg (Caucasian male) filed a disclosure
of two expert witnesses and an expert report on the last day of discovery (August
29, 2014) . In response to a motion to preclude experts, Tallberg initially contended

24
that he had discovered the expert reports within the week of his filing of the
disclosure. Upon further discovery, it was learned that the expert report, containing
the two expert’s names had been in his clients’ possession since June 19, 2013.
Attorney Tallberg, was on notice of Plaintiff’s discovery requests regarding any such
expert reports since a December 16, 2013 discovery request. The information was
in the possession of Tallberg’s clients for more than a year prior to their disclosure
on the last day of discovery. On January 28, 2015 Attorney Tallberg admitted
that they had the expert report since a month prior to the disclosure. Even this
belated admission was belied by the evidence that the document was in defendants’
possession for a year prior to its disclosure. Miller filed a motion to preclude expert
testimony and report and for sanctions. Miller was required to file a second motion,
(after a two month delay) regarding the late disclosure before receiving any
response from the court. Attorney Tallberg was never sanctioned, never
reprimanded and never referred to the Disciplinary Counsel or Statewide Grievance
Committee for investigation or discipline.
8. In the matter of Coble v. City of Bridgeport (Civil Action No.
3:13cv1538 (MPS) Attorney John Bohannon (Caucasian male) made repeated
representations to Miller, and to the court regarding his ability to secure documents
responsive to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. He represented that the discovery
responses were voluminous, had to be sent out for copying, and that the documents
would need to be delivered to Miller’s office. However email communications
showed that as early as February 2015 Attorney Bohannon had represented that
25
the documents had already been copied so that there should have been no reason
to delay their production to Plaintiff.
(b) Connecticut Practice Book Rule 8.3 Reporting Professional
Misconduct states that (a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed
a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question
as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects,
shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
(c) By failing and refusing to investigate the matters of Caucasian attorney
conduct made known to them by Miller, Bowler and Carrasquilla violated a rule of
attorney discipline.
50. On November 3, 2015 Bowler and the SGC filed a complaint against Miller
based, inter alia, upon a referral by Judge Barbara Bellis which claimed that she had
engaged in misconduct.
(a) Connecticut Practice Book Rule 8.3 Reporting Professional
Misconduct states that (b) A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a
violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as
to the judge’s fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.
(b) By failing and refusing to investigate referrals made by judicial authorities
when they knew or should have known that such referrals were biased, harassing
or otherwise brought for improper purposes, Bowler and Carrasquilla violated the
spirit if not the letter of Rule 8.3 which contemplates that judicial conduct may be the
subject of scrutiny.
. (c) The referral by Judge Bellis included a claim that Miller had refused to
26
make a client available for a deposition and misuse of a case flow request in the
matter of Mazzo v. Town of Fairfield (Connecticut Superior Court).
(d) The referral by Judge Bellis contended that Miller had waited until day
119 before filing a motion to open judgment in a case when the Practice Book rules
permitted 120 days to file. Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known that
the referred conduct was not a violation of any ethical rule yet they permitted the
matter to proceed to a local grievance panel, permitted a probable cause hearing to
be held on this claim, inter alia, before being dismissed by a reviewing panel.
(e) Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known that Judge Bellis’
referral of Miller came only after Miller had alleged racial disparity by the judge in
her brief before the Connecticut Supreme Court in the Writ of Error on June 5, 2015.
(f) Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known that the judicial
referral came after Judge Bellis had forced Miller to leave a court-ordered deposition
of her client, that was then in progress, in a federal case (Perez-Dickson v.
Bridgeport Board of Education) in order to appear at a Superior Court hearing on
January 25, 2015; they knew or should have known that Miller was instructed by the
judge that she should report herself to the grievance committee, presumably
because she could not be in two places at the same time; they knew or should have
known that there was no ethical or professional basis for a suggestion that she self-
report to the grievance committee.
51. Bowler, the SGC, and Carrasquilla had irrefutable documentary evidence that
the attorney implicated in the documents used in support of Judge Bellis’ referral for
the matters stated in paragraph 56 above was not Miller but rather another attorney
(Caucasian male) in the case.

27
52. Despite Bowler’s knowledge that the referral on these matters was based
upon false evidence, the local grievance panel nevertheless found probable cause
to discipline Miller.
53. Upon information and belief, Bowler has taken no action to discipline the
Caucasian attorney who was actually the subject of the conduct referred to by Judge
Bellis.
54. Upon information and belief, Bowler and the SGC, acting through its Hartford
Judicial District Grievance Panel, refused to find probable cause when a grievance
was filed against Attorney Thomas Rome.
55. A grievance was filed against Attorney Rome by one of Miller’s clients,
Isabella Mensah, claiming that approximately $29,000 in funds that were to be held
in escrow had not been accounted for despite an order of the Connecticut Appellate
Court to return such funds with interest to the account of the client and her ex-
husband.
56. Upon information and belief, Attorney Rome was not required by Bowler and
the SGC or its agent the Hartford Judicial District Grievance Panel to provide the
client with any evidence that the funds were held by Attorney Rome.
Hartford Judicial District Grievance Panel, sought to insulate Attorney Rome from
any consequence for his misconduct because he is Caucasian.
58. Carrasquilla, and Bowler have refused to investigate complaints of
misconduct by multiple other Caucasian attorneys who have been brought to their
attention by Miller.
59. Upon information and belief, Bowler and the SGC, acting in concert with the
28
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel and others within the Connecticut Judicial
Branch, have found probable cause and pursued disciplinary proceedings against
Miller when Caucasian attorneys have not been disciplined or referred for discipline.
By doing so they have engaged in racial discrimination.
60. By finding probable cause, and pursuing disciplinary proceedings against
Miller when Caucasian attorneys have not been so disciplined, Bowler and the SGC
have interfered with Miller’s right to make a claim of racial discrimination, utilizing
the federal district courts, and 42 U. S. C. § 1983.
61. On December 1, 2016 Carrasquilla and Bowler caused a hearing to be held
regarding allegations of professional misconduct that had been raised by members
of the Connecticut Judicial Branch.
62. On June 23, 2017 the reviewing panel issued a decision that ordered a
presentment be commenced against Miller.
63. The memorandum of decision made specific reference to evidence that had
never been made a part of the record in the probable cause hearing.
64. Specifically, the reviewing panel had access to, and considered a purported
transcript of a court hearing that was claimed to have taken place on April 10, 2015
in which a superior court judge purported to reprimand Plaintiff and advise the
conditions under which the case would be dismissed.
65. Connecticut Practice Book § 2-35 (i). “The reviewing committee’s record in
the case shall consist of a copy of all evidence it received or considered, including
a transcript of any evidence heard by it, and its decision.”
66. The reviewing panel violated Practice Book § 2-35 (i) when it examined,
reviewed, considered and relied upon evidence outside the record.

29
67. The transcript relied upon the by the reviewing panel has never been made
a part of the official record of the underlying Superior Court Case [i.e. Stone v.
Bridgeport BOE, Docket Number CV13-6032345]
68. Miller was never advised at any time by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel that
the transcript was existent nor that it would be reviewed or considered by the
reviewing panel.
69. Miller was never advised at any time by the Statewide Grievance Committee
Bar Counsel that the transcript was existent nor that it would be reviewed or
considered by the reviewing panel.
70. Miller was never advised in pre-hearing Rule 7 Disclosures that the transcript
was existent nor that it would be reviewed or considered by the reviewing panel.
71. Miller had specifically obtained access to all files maintained on the SGC prior
to the December 1, 2016 probable cause hearing. Access had been obtained by a
review of the files at the offices of SGC in East Hartford.
72. In its decision, the reviewing panel specifically referred to “aggravating
factors” the fact that [Plaintiff} “has been suspended before the Appellate Court and
has failed to complete the ordered conditions and apply for reinstatement.”
73. One basis for the probable cause hearing was a referral on December 9,
2014 by the Connecticut Appellate Court.
74. Part of the December 9, 2014 Order of the Appellate Court was that, after a
six month period of suspension, Miller would be required to seek re-admission to the
Appellate Court and set forth conditions for such re-admission.
75. The reviewing panel found in its decision that Miller had refused to apply for
re-admission.
30
76. Any information regarding whether Miller has applied for reinstatement of
practice before the Appellate Court is nowhere to be found in the record of the
December 1, 2016 hearing.
77. An examination of the judicial website with regard to the cases that resulted
in the Appellate Court referral will demonstrate that there is no evidence of the
alleged “refusal” of Miller to seek reinstatement.
78. On or about June 19, 2017 Miller had a discussion with Chief Disciplinary
Counsel regarding her choice not to seek reinstatement at this time to the
Connecticut Appellate Court.
79. Miller specifically stated her belief that the Connecticut Appellate Court was
not amenable to her reinstatement because they wished to see her come in with her
“head bowed” and “feet shuffling”.
80. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel is the only person with contact with the SGC
with whom Miller has communicated regarding her beliefs about reinstatement to
practice before the Appellate Court.
81. Upon information and belief, Miller’s “refusal” to seek reinstatement was
communicated to the reviewing panel by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.
82. As the “prosecuting” authority in the attorney discipline process, there should
be no ex parte communications with members of the reviewing panel.
83. Any evidence obtained by the reviewing committee regarding whether Miller
has failed to apply for reinstatement was “extra-judicial”, outside the record, and
should not have been considered by the panel.
84. Miller was not required to apply for reinstatement if she chose not to; many
lawyers who are licensed to practice in Connecticut do not perform any appellate
31
work.
85. If it was prejudicial to the administration of justice for Miller to have conducted
herself in a manner that caused the Connecticut Appellate Court to suspend her, it
should be likewise prejudicial to the administration of justice for Miller to seek
reinstatement.
86. Upon information and belief, the reviewing panel has engaged, along with
other disciplinary authorities, in efforts to find any basis, no matter how spurious, to
reach negative conclusions by Miller.
87. Although attorney disciplinary proceedings are sui generis, there are
elements of criminal and civil law in such proceedings.
89. A criminal defendant cannot be compelled to testify against herself. If a
criminal defendant does choose to testify, she cannot be compelled to admit guilt.
Likewise, an attorney may not be required to admit guilt.
90. By its conclusion in the memorandum of decision that Miller did not
“acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct”, the reviewing panel has imposed
an unconstitutional requirement upon her.
91. In its memorandum of decision, the reviewing panel refused to address
Miller’s claim of racial discrimination and retaliation.
92. Miller specifically sought to introduce evidence of racial disparity in the
attorney discipline process at the time of the December 1, 2016 probable cause
hearing.
93. Miller had subpoenaed two staff counsel for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
who were involved in the investigation of claims against her and other attorneys who
were similarly situated to her.

32
94. The reviewing panel vacated the subpoenas and instructed the two attorneys
that they could leave the hearing.
95. Miller was not permitted by the reviewing panel to elicit testimony that would
have established the racial disparity in attorney discipline.
96. Miller was not permitted to call client witnesses that were prepared to testify
in support of her.
97. On or about January 2017 a client of Miller contacted the Hartford Superior
Court for the purpose of obtaining information regarding the status of her case.
98. The client did not ask for any information regarding the status of Miller.
99. However, the superior court clerk who assisted her instructed her that she
should file a grievance against Miller because she was “suspended and about to be
disbarred”.
100. The superior court clerk then instructed Miller’s client that she should file a
grievance against Miller, and provided her with the telephone number for the SGC.
101. Miller’s client then communicated by telephone with the SGC, advising them
as she had been instructed by the superior court clerk. A staff member of the
grievance committee informed Miller’s client that Miller was suspended and that she
was about to be disbarred.
102. A staff member of the grievance committee also informed Miller’s client that
she could file a complaint with the Client Security Fund and that she could definitely
receive a repayment of the $2,000 retainer that had been paid to Miller.
103. The staff member of the SGC with whom Miller’s client spoke repeatedly
stated that she should “hurry up” and file a grievance before Miller was disbarred so
that she would more likely receive a repayment of her money.

33
104. The following day, Miller’s client went to the office of the SGC and met with
two staff. To the client they appeared welcoming and very happy to see that she
had come in to file a grievance against Miller. They supplied her with forms and
assisted her with completing and copying the grievance complaint and client security
fund complaint against Miller.
105. Although no probable cause was found as regards the essence of the client’s
complaint, Miller was found not to have executed a retainer agreement soon enough
with the client.
106. On or about December 1, 2014 Miller raised the claim of racial discrimination
in a hearing on an Order to Show Cause before the Connecticut Appellate Court.
107. The Connecticut Appellate Court did not address in any way the claim of
racial discrimination in their decision and order dated December 9, 2014.
108. Miller filed a timely writ of error with the Connecticut Supreme Court with
regard to the discipline that had been meted out to her by the Connecticut Appellate
Court.
109. On or about November 13, 2015 Miller again raised the issue of racial
discrimination in the context of her writ of error to the Connecticut Supreme Court.
110. On April 5, 2016 the Connecticut Supreme Court issued a decision in the
matter of Miller’s writ of error.
111. While the decision acknowledged that Miller had alleged race discrimination,
the Supreme Court refused to make any finding with regard to the claim of race
discrimination.
112. In its decision regarding the writ of error the Supreme Court sought to provide
justification for the acts of discriminatory investigation by disciplinary authorities of

34
Miller at the request of the Connecticut Appellate Court.
113. The Order of the Connecticut Appellate Court that referred Miller for further
investigation by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel made no mention of investigation
of any of Miller’s cases other than the four cases that were then on appeal.
(a) The decision of the Connecticut Appellate Court to issue an Order to
Show Cause Hearing appears to have been unprecedented in that no other instance
was found of an en banc hearing on an attorney discipline matter particularly where
the alleged misconduct involved: (a) a claim that Miller had failed to file a hearing
transcript when the transcript had in fact been filed five months earlier but under a
different docket number of the same case; (b) a claim that Miller had not properly
filed an electronic notice of certification in a matter in a newly installed e-filing
system; (c ) a claim that an appellant’s brief was not timely filed (after Miller learned
that the multi-day trial transcript was incomplete ); and (d) a claim that Miller filed a
frivolous appeal (when the underlying issue involved a dismissal of her client’s case
when a trial court judge had dismissed a case during the pendency of a hearing in
the matter before the assigned judge.[The case has been removed from the judicial
website]
(b) Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known that these
matters did not rise to the level of misconduct or a violation of any ethical rules,
notwithstanding the referral by judicial authorities; they knew or should have known
that Caucasian attorneys were not being referred for investigation and or discipline
for such matters; they knew or should have known that a referral on such bases was
for the purpose of creating a paper trail of alleged “misconduct” by Miller.
(c ) Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known of cases such as

35
Jackson v. Jackson [AC 38858] where appellant was (1) permitted to continue his
appeal even though he was almost five months late in filing in the appellate court,
(2) did not file the appropriate pleadings even after filing in the appellate court, (3)
failed to ever order the trial transcript despite the fact that there was a full day
evidentiary hearing, (4) was given an extension of time within which to file his brief,
(5) issued a rule nisi to file his brief but still failed to file; (6) the case was not
dismissed until some two months after the passage of the rule nisi order date.
114. The Connecticut Supreme Court added language to the Order that gave post
hoc justification for the investigation by Sutton and Carrasquilla of any and all of
Miller’s cases.
115. The Connecticut Supreme Court violated its own rules of construction
regarding the Appellate Court order, broadening the scope of what the order
permitted and allowing a sweeping and wholesale investigation of Miller’s cases,
when the original order had referred only to the four matters on appeal before the
Appellate Court.
116. At the December 1, 2016 probable cause hearing Carrasquilla and the
reviewing panel permitted evidence of the SGC investigation of Miller’s federal court
cases despite the fact that no federal court cases were inquired about at the
December 6, 2014 Show Cause hearing before the Appellate Court, and despite the
fact that the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court in the writ of error never
mentioned federal court cases.
(a) Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known that the Connecticut
Supreme Court, according to one of the justices, in LaPointe v. Commissioner of
Correction (Conn 2016) has said” the majority begins with the conviction that the
36
petitioner is innocent, and only constructs its analysis after it has arrived at that
conclusion,…” ; “if a finding is problematic, simply pretend it is not there….”; “the
majority should not even try to convince itself that the reader will be fooled by its
shell game….; “ “decision could be viewed as illustrating precisely the type of ‘‘subtle
[distortion] of prejudice and bias’’ of which Rawls warned, thus giving rise to a risk
of the appearance of impropriety.”
117. Joseph Elder is an African-American attorney who has been licensed to
practice in Connecticut for thirty-three (33) years.
118. On July 4, 2016 Miller filed a motion for permission to file an amicus curiae
brief in the matter of Disciplinary Counsel v. Joseph Elder, SC 19698, and Supreme
Court of Connecticut. Miller addressed the disparity in attorney discipline based
upon race and other prohibited factors. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied the
motion to appear as an amicus however, the full brief and the assertions therein
were filed with the court attached to the motion so that the court was fully aware of
its content.
119. Elder was referred for presentment regarding a grievance matter with
underlying events that were some eleven (11) years old despite the fact that the
attorney discipline rules contained a six (6) statute of limitations for grievances.
120. Elder was suspended from practice for a one year period of time.
122. Elder sought, but was denied, a stay of execution of the one year suspension
while he appealed his discipline to the Connecticut Supreme Court.

37
123. Elder was suspended for a period from September 1, 2015 through May 2,
2017 when the Supreme Court reversed the decision below, during which time he
has been effectively been unable to practice his profession.
124. Caucasian attorneys have been permitted a stay of execution of their
suspensions while the discipline was being appealed.
125. Caucasian attorney Kristen Peters-Hamlin was suspended for seven (7)
years by the New York State and Federal Court, disbarred in Maryland state court
but has never been reprimanded by Connecticut state or federal courts except for a
retroactive suspension.
126. The misconduct that led to Peters-Hamlin’s suspension included that she
“while serving as lead counsel for a plaintiff in a trade secrets infringement suit in
New York, instructed a first-year associate to “mark-up” deposition transcripts and
claim them as attorney work product; knowingly made false statements to mislead
the court as to these events; and made copies and ordered additional copies of
deposition transcripts for use in another matter, in contravention of court
confidentiality orders…. engaged in conduct involving repeated intentional
dishonesty, misrepresentations, and deceit.” Attorney Grievance Commission of
Maryland v. Kristan Peters-Hamlin, Misc. Docket AG No. 30, September Term,
2015. Opinion by Hotten, M.
127. Peters-Hamlin has never been suspended by the Connecticut courts, nor has
she ever been reprimanded, nor lost a single day of legal practice. Unlike Elder,
she has never been required by the disciplinary authorities to serve an actual
suspension of her ability to practice law in Connecticut during the time period that
her seven years of appeal was being pursued.

38
128. Caucasian attorney Robert Serafinowicz was suspended from the practice of
law for four months because he gave an interview to the media on the steps of the
Derby courthouse in which he made false statements disparaging a judge by
questioning his abilities, competency and impartiality in violation of Rules 8.2(a) and
8.4(4). Disciplinary Counsel v. Serafinowicz, Docket Number UWY-CV-13-6018974,
Judicial District of Waterbury at Waterbury, aff'd, 160 Conn. App. 92 (2015).
129. Serafinowicz was permitted a stay of execution of the four month suspension
during the time of his appeal.
130. Like Plaintiffs Johnson and Miller, Elder raised the issue of racial disparity of
treatment in his defense of the suspension meted out against him.
131. The Connecticut Supreme Court refused to acknowledge or respond to
Elder’s complaint of racial discrimination when it issued the decision in his case on
May 2, 2017.
132. Connecticut Practice Book § 2-34A (b) is very specific as to a Disciplinary
Counsel’s prosecutorial powers and does not include criminal prosecutorial powers.
133. Disciplinary Counsel had no authority to make a finding of probable cause for
criminal conduct against Miller.
134. The Disciplinary Counsel are creatures of the judicial branch of government.
P.B. § 2 34A (a) and are appointed by the judges of the Superior Court pursuant to
their inherent
powers and assigned to the Chief Court Administrator.
135. By contrast, State’s Attorneys draw their authority directly from the
constitution and are assigned to the executive branch:
136. Prior to 1984 the division of criminal justice was within the judicial department.
39
P.A. 84-406, § 2 amended C.G.S. § 51-276 by substituting “executive” for “judicial”.
After passage of amendment twenty-three in 1984 [See P.A. 84-406, § 13] the
legislature created the division [of criminal justice] as an agency within the executive
branch to be responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all criminal cases
in Connecticut. See General Statute § 51-276.
137. Article forth of the Connecticut constitution was amended by article twenty-
three of the amendments (amendment twenty-three) to make the division a part of
the executive branch and to provide for the establishment of a commission to
oversee the appointment of prosecutors.
138. Former State Attorney General Joseph I. Lieberman [stated] that “the power
to appoint state prosecutors should not be vested in the same judges before whom
those prosecutors practice. That system has created the appearance of a conflict of
interest.” Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 2, 1984 Sess., p.
362.
139. Former State Representative Richard D. Tulisano, [who at the time was] the
co-chair of the judiciary committee stated that “[i]t is wrong that both the prosecution
and adjudication of crime should be in one branch of government.” 27 H.R.Proc., Pt.
12, 1984 Sess., p. 4313.
140. After the state Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn.
560, 570, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), the legislature substantially changed
the organization of the office of the public prosecutor…. The legislative history of the
statute and the [subsequent] constitutional amendment [creating the Division of
Criminal Justice] reflects the intent to separate the executive power to appoint a
prosecutor from the judicial power to adjudicate a case and to avoid the appearance
40
of conflicts and favoritism in the appointment of prosecutors. Conn. Joint Standing
Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 2, 1984, Sess., pp. 383-84, remarks of chief
state’s attorney Austin McGuigan; 27 H.R.Proc., Pt. 12, 1984 Sess., pp. 431113,
remarks of Representative Richard D. Tulisano.
141. The people of this state created a system of cross-branch checks and
balances in criminal prosecutions by separating prosecutorial power from
adjudicatory power.
142. Unlike for State’s Attorneys, there are still no cross-branch checks and
balances built into the judiciary’s attorney regulatory system.
143. Disciplinary Counsel has not been provided by the judiciary with any of the
institutionalized protections from political interference that we have now come to
expect for
State’s Attorneys.
144. The judges of the Superior Court appoint Disciplinary Counsel for just one
year at a time leaving them with no meaningful tenure. P.B. 2-34A (a).
145. By contrast, State’s Attorneys are appointed for a term of eight years. C.G.S.
§ 51-278(5) insuring that prosecutorial decisions in criminal prosecutions are now
carefully protected from interference:
146. In 1991, the legislature approved a collective bargaining agreement, which
superseded § 51-278b (b) and (c) and delegated the commission’s powers under
General Statutes § 51-278b to discipline and remove a prosecutor to the chief state's
attorney and other applicable state’s attorneys.
147. Connecticut State’s Attorneys are answerable to the Criminal Justice
Commission, a commission composed of members from all three branches of
government. C.G.S. §§ 51-275a, 51-278.
41
148. By contrast the Disciplinary Counsel are assigned directly to the Chief Court
Administrator. P.B. § 2-34A (a).
149. There is conflict of interest created by the judicial branch’s direct participation
in the prosecution and adjudication of attorney discipline matters.
COUNT ONE: PURSUANT TO THE U. S. CONSITUTION, FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT (As to Carrasquilla, Bowler)
1. – 131. Complaint Paragraphs 1 through 149 are incorporated herein b y
reference and made paragraphs 1 through 149 of this Count One.
150 The acts of defendants alleged in paragraphs 5 – 149 violate Johnson and
Miller’s rights under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U. S. Constitution, in one or more of the following ways;
(a) Refusing to allow the calling of witnesses chosen by them in support
of their defenses at the time of probable cause hearings;
(b) Vacating subpoenas lawfully issued to witnesses that would have
supported the defense at probable cause hearings
(c ) Refusing to permit access to all records, documents or other materials
to which the reviewing panel has access at the time of probable cause hearings;
(d) Claiming attorney client privilege, work product privilege or other
privileges in avoidance of providing full access to records, documents or other
material to which the reviewing panel has access at the time of probable cause
hearings;
(e) Bringing multiple prosecutions of probable cause hearings instead of
consolidation of complaint;
42
151. Application of the state statutes regarding attorney regulation, as applied to
Johnson and Miller under the circumstances alleged herein, is unconstitutional.
152. Johnson and Miller have been and will be damaged thereby.
COUNT TWO: PURSUANT TO THE U. S. CONSITUTION, FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENT (As to Carrasquilla, Bowler)
1. – 149. Complaint Paragraphs 1 through 149 are incorporated herein by
reference and made paragraphs 1 through 149 of this Count Two.
150. The acts of defendants alleged in paragraphs 5 – 149 violate Johnson and
Miller’s rights under the equal protection clause under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U. S. Constitution to be free of racial discrimination, in one or more of the
following ways:
(a) Investigation of African-American attorneys under circumstances
where similarly situated Caucasian attorneys were not investigated;
(b) Investigating African-American attorneys at the insistence of judicial
authorities under circumstances when they knew or should have known that those
judicial complaints were made for biased, harassing and unwarranted reasons.
(c ) Bowler and Carrasquilla knew or should have known of the propensity of
Connecticut court system authorities to engage in a shadow process such as found
disturbing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Garcia v. Hebert, 352 F.App’x 602,
603 (2d Cir, 2009). ln that Connecticut case, Plaintiff was not arraigned at the
Connecticut Superior Court in Bantam, CT; a not guilty plea was entered on his
43
behalf without his presence or the presence of his counsel and court records falsely
indicated that he had personally appeared and was instructed to appear at a
subsequent hearing, The Connecticut the Attorney General was ordered to provide
the court with a detailed report discussing what steps had been taken to ensure
constitutionally sound practices.
151. Application of the state statute regarding attorney regulation, as applied to
Johnson and Miller under the circumstances alleged herein, is unconstitutional.
152. Carrasquilla and Bowler were personally involved in the conduct of which
Johnson and Miller complain.
153. Johnson and Miller have been and will continue to be damaged thereby.
COUNT THREE: PURSUANT TO 42 U. S. C. § 1983. (As Carrasquilla and

Bowler)
1. – 149. Complaint Paragraphs 1 through 149 are incorporated herein by
reference and made paragraphs 1 through 149 of this Count Three.
150. By, inter alia, finding professional misconduct in the circumstances as
alleged herein, Carrasquilla and Bowler have interfered with Johnson and Miller’s
rights under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, the right to make a claim of racial discrimination,
utilizing the federal district courts.
151. Carrasquilla and Bowler were personally involved in the constitutional and
statutory violations against Johnson and Miller and are not entitled to qualified
immunity.
152. Johnson and Miller’s rights under the fourteenth amendment and 42 U. S.
44
C. § 1983 are well established.
COUNT FOUR: PURSUANT TO 42 U. S. C. § 1983. (As to Bowler, In his

Individual Capacity)
1. – 149. Complaint Paragraphs 1 through149 are incorporated herein by
reference and made paragraphs 1 through 149 of this Count Four.
150. Upon information and belief, Carrasquilla and Bowler have acted in concert
with each other in the investigation of and presentation of grievances against Miller
and Johnson that will result in further grievance hearings.
151. By, inter alia, finding professional misconduct in the bringing of claims of
racial discrimination against Johnson and Miller, Carrasquilla and Bowler have
maintained a policy and practice of interfering with the rights of African-American
attorneys under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, to make claims of racial discrimination.
152. By the acts and conduct alleged in paragraphs 5 through 149 the defendants
have engaged in a continuous practice and policy of racially discriminatory
enforcement of its attorney discipline processes, beginning at least since January
2002 and continuing through the present.
153. The discriminatory acts and conduct alleged in paragraphs 5 through 149
against African-American attorneys such as Johnson and Miller, have remained un-
remedied for so long as to amount to a racially discriminatory policy and practice.
154. Carrasquilla and Bowler were personally involved in the constitutional and
statutory violations against Plaintiffs and are not entitled to qualified immunity.
155. Johnson and Miller’s rights under the fourteenth amendment and 42 U. S.
C. § 1983 are well established.

45
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray judgment against Defendants and each of

them, as follows:
1. Compensatory damages;
2. Declaratory relief;
3. Costs of suit herein incurred;
4. Attorney’s Fees; and
5. For such other and further relief as the court deems proper.
THE PLAINTIFFS
BY: _/s/Josephine S. Miller
Josephine S. Miller, Fed Bar #
ct27039
152 Deer Hill Avenue, Suite 302
Danbury, CT 06810
Tel: (203) 512-2795
Fax: (203) 702-5188
Email: jmillerlaw@sbcglobal.net
46
47
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that on December 9, 2017 a copy of the foregoing Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend
Complaint was filed electronically. Notice of this filing was sent by e-mail to all parties by operation
of the Court’s electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing through the Court’s system.
/s/Josephine S. Miller
Josephine S. Miller
48

Connecticut Attorney Disciplinary Authorities Charged in Federal Lawsuit With Racial Discrimination

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Connecticut Attorney Disciplinary Authorities Charged in Federal Lawsuit With Racial Discrimination

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Case 3:17-cv-01429-MPS Document 20 Filed 12/10/17 Page 1 of 48

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

REBECCA L. JOHNSON, 3:17CV1429

KARYL CARRASQUILLA (I/O CAPACITY),

In accordance with the parties’ approved 26 (f) report, Plaintiff’s Rebeca

factual statements in paragraphs 132-149..

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

REBECCA L. JOHNSON, 3:17CV1429 (MPS)

KARYL CARRASQUILLA (I/O CAPACITY),

PROPOSED SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

pursuant to Title 42 U. S. C. §1983, 1981 and 1988.

within the State of Connecticut.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Plaintiff Rebecca L. Johnson (hereafter referred to as “Johnson”), is a

citizen of the State of Connecticut. Johnson is an African-American.

2. Plaintiff is Josephine Smalls Miller (hereafter referred to as “Miller”), a

Deer Hill Avenue, Suite 302, Danbury, CT 06810. Miller is an African-American.

3. Karyl Carrasquilla, sued in her individual and official capacity, is Chief

Disciplinary Counsel, State of Connecticut, Office of the Chief Disciplinary

Counsel (hereafter referred to as “Carrasquilla”). At all times material herein,

Carrasquilla was acting under color of law.

(a) The OCDC is an administrative agency of the State of Connecticut that

business located at 100 Washington Street, Hartford, CT 06103.

responsible for managing the process of attorney discipline procedures.

(a) The Statewide Grievance Committee (hereafter referred to as “SGC”)

is an administrative agency of the State of Connecticut that is charged with, inter

287 Main Street, East Hartford.

5. 5. Plaintiff, Rebecca Johnson, (hereinafter referred to as “Johnson”) is an

African American woman, licensed to practice law in the State of Connecticut

commencing in January of 1994 and subsequently in the Second Circuit.

6. 6. Johnson practiced law in Connecticut’s state courts from January of 1994,

a focus on civil rights related claims.

the Statewide Grievance Committee (hereinafter referred to as “SGC”) disciplinary

matter, relating to docket number CV01-378603, suspending Johnson from the

underlying allegations of misconduct on the part of Johnson, was a wrongful

Dunn]. The allegations of misconduct, by Johnson related to Dunn’s complaint that

appearance in the case to represent Dunn. It was in fact substantial misconduct

attorney to account for his misconduct.

8. 8. This first period of suspension, commencing on September 1, 2002, is

hereafter referred to as “Suspension I.”

9. 9. On or about November 1, 2004, the superior court, Robaina J., issued an

order in the SGC disciplinary matter, relating to docket number CV05-4012328S,

William Hazel, had been represented by Johnson and another attorney, in a

attorney to account for his alleged misconduct.

9. This second period of suspension, commencing on November 1, 2004, is

hereafter referred to as “Suspension II.”

in the SGC disciplinary matter, relating to docket number CV05- 40123285,

beginning on or about November 1, 2006.

10. 11. This third period of suspension, commencing on November 1, 2006, is

hereafter referred to as “Suspension III.” In the underlying grievance, Anthony

Amabile, was represented by Johnson (prior to being suspended) in a wrongful

not agree to a contingency arrangement. Amabile allowed the statute of limitations

account for his misconduct.

offer testimony regarding factual allegations of racially discriminatory treatment of

when she tried to introduce evidence of racial disparity in attorney discipline.

Johnson was repeatedly questioned about the relevance of the testimony or

instructed to “move along”.

motivated, she offered testimony concerning the racially discriminatory matter in

licensed to practice law in Connecticut. Johnson’s sister, an African American

response to the complainant’s complaint. The complainant likewise filed a complaint

immediately dismissed the complaint, without taking disciplinary action against

the underlying complaints.

(a) Johnson specifically claimed racial discrimination in her brief to the