Caltex v. Palomar [GR L-19650, 29 September 1966] PERTINENT LAWS SECTION 1954. Absolutely non-mailable matter.

— No matter belonging to any of the following classes, whether sealed as first-class matter or not, shall be imported into the Philippines through the mails, or to be deposited in or carried by the mails of the Philippines, or be delivered to its addressee by any officer or employee of the Bureau of Posts: Written or printed matter in any form advertising, describing, or in any manner pertaining to, or conveying or purporting to convey any information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. "SECTION 1982. Fraud orders.—Upon satisfactory evidence that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, the Director of Posts may instruct any postmaster or other officer or employee of the Bureau to return to the person, depositing the same in the mails, with the word "fraudulent" plainly written or stamped upon the outside cover thereof, any mail matter of whatever class mailed by or addressed to such person or company or the representative or agent of such person or company. SECTION 1983. Deprivation of use of money order system and telegraphic transfer service.—The Director of Posts may, upon evidence satisfactory to him that any person or company is engaged in conducting any lottery, gift enterprise or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind, or that any person or company is conducting any scheme, device, or enterprise for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise, forbid the issue or payment by any postmaster of any postal money order or telegraphic transfer to said person or company or to the agent of any such person or company, whether such agent is acting as an individual or as a firm, bank, corporation, or association of any kind, and may provide by regulation for the return to the remitters of the sums named in money orders or telegraphic transfers drawn in favor of such person or company or its agent. Conditions sine qua non for declaratory relief Conditions sine qua non: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. In the case at bar, all the

conditions are present. Caltex’s insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and consequent denial by Palomar of the privilege demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. There is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning a real question or issue. The contenders are as real as their interest are substantial. To Caltex, the uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business. To Palomar, the suppression of Caltex’s proposed contest believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an unavoidable duty. With Caltex’s bent to hold the contest and the Palomar’s threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a tranquilizing declaration. 3. Definition of Statutory Construction Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black). In the case at bar, whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the intended meaning of the words used therein. 4, Judicial duty to look into substance of law The Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies which the law is seeking to prevent. 5. Case not an advisory opinion nor premature; Rules of Court liberally construed Even if there has been no breach of the Postal Law yet, there is propriety or necessity of setting the dispute at rest before it accumulates the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion and violence of a full-blown battle which looms ahead. Denial of declaratory relief would force it to choose between undesirable alternatives: that of being a self-appointed censor, or that to be at risk of a fraud order. Considering the alternatives in one equation and in the spirit of liberality with which the Rules of Court are to be interpreted in order to promote their object (Section 1, Rule 1, Revised Rules of Court), i.e. to settle, and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to, rights and duties under a law; there is no imposition upon the Court’s jurisdiction or any futility or prematurity in our intervention. 6. Judicial decision interpreting or applying a law forms part of legal system Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form a part of the legal system”(Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). In effect, judicial decision assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce obedience thereto. The jurisdiction of the Court, nor

prize. any merchandise be bought. 903) 7. raffles at fairs. the appellant will be bound. v. chance (El Debate v. In some cases. 82 A. prize concerts. Cardas. 207. Lottery and gift enterprise defined. In pari material. if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance. Inc. the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance. 28 P. Neither is there is a sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser for the scheme to be deemed a gift enterprise. 124. 44 Phil 278. gift exhibitions. such as policy playing. there appears to be a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement each purchaser is given a chance to win a prize. any service be rendered.. Caltex contest not a lottery nor gift enterprise The term ‘lottery’ extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance. 19 NJ 399. 17 App. cannot be underrated not to have the final and pacifying function that a declaratory judgment is calculated to subserve. The scheme is merely a gratuitous distribution of property by chance. 2d. Perspective properly oriented. 2d. 2d. Conway. the necessity for the element of . Zeitlin v. Precedent are abundant to support the conclusion that the Court has reached (Liberty Calendar Co. 15 NJ Super. in others. for the scheme to be deemed a lottery. but does condemn as criminal schemes in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. citing various jurisprudence). v. While an all-embracing concept of the term “gift enterprise” is yet to be spelled out in explicit words. 117 A 2d 487. 435. a gift enterprise comes within the prohibitive statutes only if it exhibits the tripartite elements of prize. is prohibited. second. consideration. Topacio. there is no requirement in the rules that any fee be paid. App. 99. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First. the standpoint of the contestant is all that matters. even in default of the element of consideration necessary to constitute a lottery. At the very least. Conflicting viewpoints on gift enterprise warrants resolution on caseto-case basis The apparent conflict of opinions (for one: holding that a gift enterprise involving an award by chance. or the other: like a lottery. 1922. Cohen. not that of the sponsor (People vs. and third. 137 Cal.. 788) 9. or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. also: Bunis v. and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something of value in return for the distribution of the prize.its ruling’s force and binding effect. In the case at bar. Thrillo. chance and consideration) is explained by the fact that the specific statutory provisions relied upon are not identical. and various forms of gambling. Consideration does not consist of benefit derived by sponsor of the contest The required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the proponent of the contest. supra. Scott. The true test is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance. Div. the terms “lottery” and “gift enterprise” are used interchangeably. etc. With respect to the last element of consideration. (Supp). 8. 234 NYS 2d. Arnebergh.

must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. from the party receiving the chance. resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. gift enterprises and similar schemes. This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by the law. Mail fraud orders. are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are declared non-mailable. gambling spirit not being cultivated or stimulated thereby. like lotteries. Noscitur a sociis Consonant to the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics noscitur a sociis. there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the “gift enterprise” therein included. Thus. Every case. directly or indirectly. thus. .consideration or chance has been specifically eliminated by statute. it is axiomatic. if it is not resorted to as a device to evade the law and no consideration is derived. gift enterprises and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if. Hence. the term under construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. they involve the element of consideration. justification lies in the recognized necessity to suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals. 10. if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration. As applied to lotteries. Significantly. Gratuitous distribution of property by lot or chance does not constitute ‘lottery’. so also must the term “gift enterprise” be so construed.

4. 217 (1) The original wording of Article 217 of the Labor Code vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction (applied in Garcia v.. Such employees. 31 January 1984] En Banc. Fernando (p): 9 concur. Jurisdiction of case belong to labor arbiters and not CFI.. 1 took no part. 1 concur with hope that Article 217 does not undergo repeated amendments. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers. On 3 May 1982. yes. including the 90 ballots (79. 1 on leave FACTS: On 5 March 1982. Eima [GR L-61236. or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned. Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and members of the union. president of the said local union. and enjoined the Judge. Labor Relations Division. All other claims arising from employer-employee relations. the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment. alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca. a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the Zamboanga Wood Products. separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement." 1. It granted the writ of prohibition. for damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. Inciong). Martinez and in Bengzon v. The motion to dismiss was denied. and 5. except for the purpose of dismissing it. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari. overtime compensation. unfair labor practice. and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the respondent Judge. PERTINENT LAWS Article 217. Hence the petition for certiorari. except claims for employees' compensation. from taking any further action on Civil Case 716 (2751). The strike began on 23 May 1982. Zamboanga City. 3 no). On 9 July 1982. Zamboanga City. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. whether agricultural or non-agricultural: . All money claims of workers. It was followed by the union submitting the minutes of the declaration of strike. History of amendments to Art. there was a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners. medicare and maternity benefits. the union issued a notice of strike against the firm. 6 days later. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao. Inc. social security. including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages. 3. It also made permanent the TRO issued on 5 August 1982. on 17 April 1982 charged the firm before the same office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances. nonpayment of living allowances. and “employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. Cases involving household services.National Federation of Labor v. (2) On 1 . unless expressly excluded by this Code.

medicare and maternity benefits. all other claims arising from employeremployee relations unless expressly excluded by the Code. overtime compensation. Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. Any deviation from the express terms of the law cannot therefore be tolerated.May 1978. hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment. certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages. 1913). PD 1691 was issued. amending Article 217. v. Ebon v. amending Article 217. not a court of justice. and Aguda v. social security. (3) On 1 May 1980. paragraph (a) was worded as “(2) those that involve wages. arising from picketing that accompanied a strike. Inc. in our judgment.” replacing the former phraseology: “(2) unresolved issue in collective bargaining. PD 1367 was issued. it can only mean. when applied The first and fundamental duty of courts. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. however. In both cases. Further. except claims for employees compensation. Yap Tico. Statutory Construction. is to apply the law. enabling them to decide all money claims of workers. separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement. Jurisdiction of exercise of compulsory arbitration and claims for damages under Article 217 belong to the Ministry of Labor No valid distinction can be made between the exercise of compulsory arbitration vested in the Ministry of Labor and the jurisdiction of a labor arbiter to pass over claims for damages in the light of the express provision of the Labor Code as set forth in Article 217. that a court of first instance judge then. Management & Supervisors Association of the Philippine-American Management & Financing Co. that is vested by law with competence to act on the matter. it is the Ministry. unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally. De Guzman. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them (Lizarraga Hermanos v. including those that involve wages. The ordinary courts were thus vested with jurisdiction to award actual and moral damages in the case of illegal dismissal of employees. It means. a regional trial court judge now. hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment. . Vallejos). that possesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim for damages arising from picketing or a strike (Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. The plain command of the law that it is a labor arbiter. 3. Subparagraph 2. not a court.” BP 130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations.. further amending Article 217. 2. Martinez. returning the original jurisdiction to the labor arbiters.). v. and provided that the Regional Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain claims for moral and other forms of damages. including those based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages. trend shows that the choice should fall on an administrative agency (Philippine American Management & Financing Co. (4) On 21 August 1981 BP 130.. Inc.

CA [GR 111107. REVIEW — All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review. 8. Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court. A petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the CA which sustained the trial court’s order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question. Pending resolution however of the appeal. 1.Haystack: Paat v. reversed and set aside the 16 October decision and 14 July 1992 resolution of the CA. by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said decision. with prayer for TRO and/or preliminary injunction was filed by the petitioners on 9 September 1993. and directed the DENR secretary to resolve the controversy with utmost dispatch. The Supreme Court granted the petition. 19. which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. Torres Jr. Victoria de Guzman’s truck was seized by DENR personnel in Aritao. Baggao. De Guzman failed to submit the required explanation. De Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration dated 28 June 1989. Aritao CENRO’s Jovito Layugan issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15 days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. (p): 4 concur. On 22 June 1989. Nueva Vizcaya while on its ways to Bulacan from san Jose. Cagayan because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. the petition. which was denied in a subsequent order of 12 July 1989. CA [GR 111107. By virtue of the Resolution dated 27 September 1993. motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby. it is a pre-condition . was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the RTC Cagayan (Branch 2). FACTS: On 19 May 1989. Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied. On 23 May 1989. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss by the petititoners in an order dated 28 December 1989. docketed as Civil Case 4031. 10 January 1997] Second Division. made permanent the restraining order promulgated on 27 September 1993. 10 January 1997] Paat v. unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. PERTINENT LAWS: Sec. Series of 1966. The case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR. Hence. the prayer for the issuance of TRO of petitioners was granted by the Supreme Court. a suit for replevin. Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained Layugan’s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.

speedy and adequate remedy. (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim. By the very nature of its function. 3. 4. without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. seek court’s intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings. Thus. (5) when there is irreparable injury. It is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process. or as applied to administrative proceedings. Due process is opportunity or right to be heard. not solely by verbal presentation but also. through pleadings. an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 2. In the case at bar. Principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies not absolute The doctrine is relative and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action. (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter. and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument. the respondents cannot. The assumption by the trial court of the replevin suit constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative. (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings. Further. (10) when the rule does not provide a plain. (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable. If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain . A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned. rules and regulations and the protection. (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question. and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. not necessarily requiring a hearing Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. the enforcement of forestry laws. in the case at bar. (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Doctrine of primary jurisdiction The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard.

“To dispose of the same” includes conveyance In the construction of statutes. or attachment. the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under PD 705. as actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing. Rules liberal in administrative proceedings In administrative proceedings. there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law. Statutes construed to give effect to purposes projected in statute. (Navarro v. it is indispensable in replevin proceeding that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property. that it is exempt from such seizure. and the actual value of the property. In the case at bar. 6. When statute is clear. regulations or policies on the matter. that the same has not been taken for tax assessment. Damasco) 5. alleging the cause of detention. suppress the mischief. collecting.” 7. and secure the benefits intended. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed. that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant.” meant that the act of cutting. technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. and they should be given such construction as will advance the object. In the case at bar. or seized under execution.their side of the controversy at hand. it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. or if so seized. . Suit of replevin as relief A suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. the language of EO277 when it eliminated the phrase “shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code ” and inserted the words ” shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar. 8. the phrase “to dispose of the same” is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. gathering. removing. court cannot rationalize the law When the statute is clear and explicit. administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. It lies to recover possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. The only limitation is that it should be made “in accordance with pertinent laws. Under the Rules of Court.

Reliance in the decision in People v. the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. the Philippines Constabulary. the conviction must stand. On 27 November 1963. this. Fernando (p): 9 concur FACTS: Mario M. municipal treasurers. . sailors or marines. or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms. without any pretense of authority or right. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law. or an exercise or claim of dominion over it. parts of firearms.” and it has been held that there is tortious taking whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property. therefore. Mapa GR L-22301. It may be note that in People v. 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164) En Banc. and the case no longer speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. As the appeal involves a question of law. a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879. The law cannot be any clearer. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. Issue: Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm Held: The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm. Thus. as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code. without manual seizing of the property is sufficient. provincial governors. or ammunition except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties. detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor. it was elevated to the Supreme Court. “To detain” defined “To detain” is defined as to mean “to hold or keep in custody. as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. People v.9. Macarandang. lieutenant governors. provincial treasurers. municipal police. soldiers. there being no provision made for a secret agent. municipal mayors. in the present case. Macarandang is misplaced. guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons.

335 of the Civil Code. 7 Besides. in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines. stated otherwise. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and. in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt. however. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas (GR L-34568. the petitioners herein. which was once in force in the Philippines. The pertinent provision of law reads. 335 of the Civil Code. Proc. the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction. 3 On 22 April 1971. the spouses Antero and . or children by legal fiction. the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang. filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for adoption. The following cannot adopt: (1) Those who have legitimate. claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy. 28 March 1988) On 23 March 1971. 37. and which served as the pattern for the Civil Code of the Philippines. as follows: Art. We find. assisted by their father and guardian ad litem. The Civil Code of Spain. are clear and unambiguous. oppositors' mother. in its Article 174. legitimated. acknowledged natural children. The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the office of the Solicitor General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES.The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment. entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy. 335. The case. Art. that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. Ilocos Norte. 4 The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1). seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. petitioners". was docketed therein as Spec. as pointed out by the respondent judge. Under this article. disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas. and therefore. 335 of the Civil Code. No. are disqualified to adopt. said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. Daoang v. with editorial offices in Laoag City. it appears that the legislator. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. who died on 1 March 1971. a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte. obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes of children. do not include grandchildren.

After conducting a summary hearing. At least 29. the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. Paras thereafter filed a reply. Comelec resolved to approve the petition.) The present tendency. however. Acting on the petition for recall. To prevent the holding of the recall election. petitioner filed before the RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction (SP Civil Action 2254AF). the Court issued a TRO and required the OSG.30% of the registered voters signed the petition. Aranzanso. and set the recall election on 13 November 1995. 28. 123 Phil. Comelec [GR 123169. deferred the recall election in view of petitioner’s opposition. re-scheduled the recall election on 13 January 1996. Resolution En Banc. . the Comelec.( Child and Welfare Code. is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life.(Santos vs.) WHEREFORE. Art. In view of the OSG’s manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the Comelec. (In re Adoption of Resaba. the latter through its law department filed the required comment. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one. 95 Phil. In a resolution dated 5 January 1996. But. with the trial court issuing a TRO. to comment on the petition. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. in behalf of Comelec. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula. On 12 January 1996. is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt. dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without Comelec approval. 244. scheduled the petition signing on 14 October 1995. the word "descendants" was changed to "children". when the Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted. 4 November 1996] Paras v.Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren. or children by legal fiction. legitimated. hence. the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. the Comelec set anew the recall election. the trial court lifted the restraining order. having legitimate. 160) Under the law now in force. Comelec [GR 123169. by creating through legal fiction. and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective. Cabanatuan City who won during the 1994 barangay election. The Comelec. Paras v. the petition is DENIED. acknowledged natural children. well above the 25% requirement provided by law. On 6 December 1995. for the third time. this time on 16 December 1995. Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. the petitioners herein. in paragraph (1) of Article 335. Francisco (p): 14 concur FACTS: Danilo E. however. 4 November 1996].

be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated. was made permanent. 1. The TRO issued on 12 January 1996. destroyed. enjoining the recall election. Paragraph (b) of Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election. initiative. In the case at bar. if possible. inoperative or nugatory. That intention is usually found not in ‘the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth’. and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. rather than the letter of a law determines its construction. i. 4. explained away. A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. i. should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall. . Assumption that Legislature intended to enact an effective law In the interpretation of a statute. Statute interpreted in harmony with the Constitution It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. hence.. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. during the second year of his term of office. the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. Intent of law paramount. Every part of statute must be interpreted with reference to the context of the whole enactment It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. emasculated. nullified. 3. The too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance. meaningless. as the next regular elections are 7 months away. too literal interpretation discouraged The spirit. 74. a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. specifically paragraph (b) thereof. SK elections cannot be considered a regular election as this would render inutile the recall provision of the LGC. or as otherwise expressed. or rendered insignificant.e. that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts. and referendum.The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for having become moot and academic. repealed.e. Limitations on Recall. 2. An interpretation should. the interpretation of Section 74 of the LGC. In the case at bar. PERTINENT LAW: The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides: Sec.

involving the issue whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is exclusive. Thereafter. moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees. contend that the CFI has jurisdiction. Intent of the law in prohibiting recall elections for one year immediately preceding a regular election Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses. be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. therefore.5. The heirs decided to file a complaint for damages before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. (2: Selective) whether an injured employee or his heirs have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual. Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was based on an industrial accident which is covered under the WCA and. or (3: Cumulative) whether an injured employee or his heirs may avail cumulatively of both actions. 30 April 1985) FACTS: Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining Corporations’ mine sites. . therefore.e. the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case. The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It would. as their complaint is not based on the WCA but on the Civil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence. a special committee report indicated that the company failed to provide the miners with adequate safety protection. (1: Exclusive) whether an injured employee or his heirs’ action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Amici curiae submitted their respective memoranda. however. The electorate could choose the official’s replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. Digest: Floresca v. The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme Court. and that the WCA covers work-connected accidents even if the employer was negligent as the WCA under Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation in the event that the employer is negligent. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. Philex Mining (GR L-30642. selective or cumulative. i. The heirs of the miners were able to recover under the Workman’s Compensation Act (WCA). The heirs. Philex argues that the work connected injuries are compensable exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA. hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. pursuant to the resolution of 26 November 1976.

as the choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact. which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. the Court argues that the Court can legislate. it reiterated its ruling in People vs. the court “do and must legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law. is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply. that the injured worker or his heirs have the choice of remedies. like all human beings. pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. HELD: The Court. i. in determining the action to be selective. The opinions of the amici curiae are diverse. but that they cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and balance the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen’s Compensation Act as against an ordinary action. such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court. The Court in this same decision agreed with the argument that the action is selective. . and as implemented by Articles 2176. 2177. 7.” Thus. as amended. 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.e. is guilty of judicial legislation. pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code. 2216. It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.. the payments made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. but that upon the success of such bids before the lower court. and later by Sections 6. which provides that “No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence. because the mind of the legislator. Yet.e. 2178. 2201. Licera: that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself. 1173. and 9 of Article II of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the 1973 Constitution.i. through its majority. ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court. It further held that the petitioners who had received the benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. defended itself by holding that the Court does not legislate but merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution. collect the limited compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts. Further. even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances. obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. but appears to be more of a “difficulty. The couple are separated-in-fact for more than three years. observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them. tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage. and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union. and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. In March 1987. where said conduct. 13 February 1997) FACTS Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila. In the present case.Digest: Republic v. a social worker. his or her personal relationship with the other spouse. Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. juridical antecedence. Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital . as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. from his dependency from his parents. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals. On 16 August 1990. CA and Molina (GR 108763. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. and incurability. and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony. observed and considered as a whole. existing at the time the marriage is celebrated. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity. where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage. Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. the present recourse. Hence. On 14 May 1991. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. warrants the dissolution of the marriage. and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986. ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity HELD: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights. that of two of her friends.

The Court. and reversed and set aside the assailed decision.obligations. in this case. sufficiently proven by expert. and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State. (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified. The Supreme Court granted the petition. alleged in the complaint. removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff. concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church. and clearly explained in the decision. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife. . (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable. (5) such illness must be grave enough. (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage. promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children.

as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189. On 20 December 1974. the Office of the Solicitor General. while the second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section. The appellate court’s ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error. clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions. was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew. de Castro (p): 5 concur. Hence. her husband. Rodolfo’s wife. For reason unexplained. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy. the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500. CA (GR L-39419. a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros. Rodolfo. Rodolfo. submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. 12 April 1982) Posted by Berne Guerrero under (a) oas . and at that time. The particular words. In the present case. with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970. On 2 August 1971. but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation.Digest: Aisporna v. Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the Insurance Act Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner. 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459) First Division. through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna. representing the Court of Appeals. CA GR L-39419. Isidro. 1 took no part Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969. as clerk. an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew. for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent. the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). digests Aisporna v. she naturally helped him in his work. which is “any person . or acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent. the present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974. On appeal and on 14 August 1974.

received from the insurance policy or contract. Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. . with costs de oficio.who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section. directly or indirectly. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused of the crime charged.” Without proof of compensation.

and. In the comment filed on 20 December 1974. was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew. third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. and at that time. Rodolfo. an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna. the appellate court ruled that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first . for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. haystacks Aisporna v. Aisporna submitted his Brief while the Solicitor General filed a manifestation in lieu of a Brief on 3 May 1975 reiterating his stand that Aisporna has not violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Definition of Insurance Agent The first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent. Rodolfo. and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew. 12 April 1982] First Division. with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970. the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR) finding the Aisporna guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. 1.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. representing the CA. Hence. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent. through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna. For reason unexplained. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused of the crime charged. Scope of the law. de Castro (p): 5 concur. submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. In its 28 October 1974 resolution the Court resolved. to require the respondent to comment on the aforesaid petition. 1 took no part Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969. On appeal and on 14 August 1974. On 2 August 1971. Isidro. her husband. the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500. Rodolfo’s wife. second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of this section.Haystack: Aisporna v. the OSG. she naturally helped him in his work. 12 April 1982] Posted by Berne Guerrero under (a) oas . or acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. without giving due course to this instant petition. as clerk. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy. CA [GR L-39419. On 3 April 1975. with costs de oficio. In the case at bar. CA [GR L-39419. a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros. the present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974.

The doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings. it must be borne in mind. Ortega (J) GR L-34964. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The meaning of the law. clauses or sentences but from a general consideration or view of the act as a whole. The trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period. Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against B & B Forest Development Corporation and Mariano Bautista for the collection of sum of money. failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either directly or indirectly. 3. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. 2 took no part Facts: On 17 December 1968. the information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance contract by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated. a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions.paragraph. This means that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts. In the case at bar. every element of the crime must be alleged and proved. This allegation is essential. Doctrine of Noscitur a Sociis Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. portion or section or from isolated words and phrases. Makalintal (p): 7 concur. to wit “Any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section. Digest: China Bank v. Ortega (GR L-34964. This was a reversible error as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189. an information. The particular words. 31 January 1973) Posted by Berne Guerrero under (a) oas . . To warrant conviction. Every element of the crime must be alleged and proved to warrant conviction A law making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent. not separately and independently.” 2. digests China Bank v. and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. is not to be extracted from any single part. charges no offense. and having been omitted. 31 January 1973 (49 SCRA 355) Second Division. and rendered its decision on 20 January 1970.

[3] or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials. Acaban sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Bank. and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a judgment. On 4 March 1972. to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from the Court. and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed. Importantly. Petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2 ([1] upon written permission of the depositor. the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. and if there is. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it. Issue: Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor. with costs against the petitioners. Resisting the 2 orders. otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered. Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down. Indeed. the lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation. In the same order he was directed to comply with the order of the Court. the position of the petitioners is that bank deposit of judgment debtor B and B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforementioned provisions of law. Tan Kim Liong. Specifically referring to the case. Held: From the discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. the China Bank and Tan Kim Liong instituted the petition. In the present case. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court dated 4 and 27 March 1972. the bank’s cashier. [2] or in cases of impeachment. by invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405. which prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. as contemplated in the law. Tan Kim Lion was ordered to inform the Court if there is a deposit by B & B Forest Development in the China Bank. However. disallowed the same invoking the provisions of Republic Act 1405. . so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.To satisfy the judgment. [4] or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation). there is no real inquiry in such a case.

1955. however. which he claims he is entitled to. 22 February 1982 (112 SRCA 59) First Division. from July 1955. up to 1968 when his pension was finally approved. the Board of Administrators found out that his disability was 100% thus he was awarded the full benefits of section 9 of Republic Act 65. after due investigation and processing. Gasilao was able to complete his supporting papers and. an award of pension benefits should commence from the date of approval of the application. Bautista GR L-37867. he was rendered disabled. more funds were released to implement fully Republic Act 5753 and allow payment in full of the benefits thereunder from said date. formerly the Philippine Veterans Board. Guerrero (p): 5 concurring Facts: Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the last World War that took active participation in the liberation drive against the enemy. alleging that he was suffering from Pulmonary Tuberculosis (PTB). Held: As it is generally known. increased only on 15 January 1971. Gasilao’s monthly pension was. and the amount so released was only sufficient to pay only 25% of the increase. On 15 January 1972. due to the fact that it was only on said date that funds were released for the purpose.Digest: Board of Administrators of the PVA v. the purpose of Congress in granting veteran pensions is to compensate a class of men who suffered in the service for the . however. The Philippine Veterans Administration. when he first filed his application for pension. that since the section impliedly requires that the application filed should first be approved by the Board of Administrators before the claimant could receive his pension. and by 25% of the increases provided by law. his claim was disapproved by the Board on 18 December 1955. and due to his military service. (now Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) is an agency of the Government charged with the administration of different laws giving various benefits in favor of veterans and their orphans/or widows and parents. based on Section 15 of Republic Act 65. Gasilao filed a claim for disability pension under Section 9 of Republic Act 65. Issue: Whether Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955 instead of from 1968. which he incurred in line of duty. Gasilao filed an action against the Board to recover the pension. Due to Gasilao’s failure to complete his supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service-connected illness. Later on. 22 February 1982) Posted by Berne Guerrero under digests Board of Administrators of the PVA v. with the Philippine Veterans Board. Republic Act 5753 was approved on 22 June 1969. Bautista (GR L-37867. The Board contends. providing for an increase in the basic pension and additional pension for the wife and each of the unmarried minor children. On 8 August 1968. On July 23. therefore. In 1973.

Such stand. privileges.hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered.00 per month plus P10. it is the general rule that a liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those entitled to pension. and more particularly.00 per month for each of his then unmarried minor children below 18. Republic Act 65 is a veteran pension law which must be accorded a liberal construction and interpretation in order to favor those entitled to rights. in consonance with the spirit and intent of the law. and hospitalization and medical benefits. The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo. In the present case. a life pension for the incapacited. the privilege to take promotion examinations. those who have become incapacitated for work owing to sickness. or simply is not. especially during times of war or revolution. educational benefits. .00 from 22 June 1957 to 7 August 1968. therefore. among which are the right to resume old positions in government. and benefits granted thereunder. by extending to them regular monetary aid. but such constructional preference is to be considered with other guides to interpretation. disease or injuries sustained while in line of duty. his wife and his unmarried minor children below 18 are entitled for the period from 22 June 1969 to 14 January 1972 by virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the availability of Government funds appropriated for the purpose. ordering the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration (now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilao’s pension effective 18 December 1955 at the rate of P50. A veteran pension law is. and a construction of pension laws must depend on its own particular language. therefore does not appear to be. Upholding the Board that the pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application. Courts tend to favor the pensioner. and declaring the differentials in pension to which said Gasilao. For this reason. pension for widow and children. and the former amount increased to P100. this would be dependent upon the discretion of the Board which had been abused in this case through inaction extending for 12 years. a governmental expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered service for the country. Gasilao’s claim was sustained.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful