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Chapter Twelve

The Pratyabhijna and the
Logical-Epistemological School of Buddhism

Raffaele Torella

Perhaps no other doctrines in the history of Indian thought
have made suc h a gen eral— overw helming and sub tl e— im pac t on
contemporary philosophical schools as those of Dignäga, Dharma-
kï rt i, a nd con ti n u ers— at l eas t one of wh om , D h arm ottara, deserves
to be m ention ed .1 And thi s was not confi ned o nl y to contem po rar y
on es, as t he w ork of t hese tw o m asters comp el led the opposi ng
schools to carry out a general task of revision and rethinking, that
w as al so t o bear fruit m uch later— thi nk for exam ple o f t he devel op
ment of the Navya Nyäya from the Nyäya, through Udayana.
N on e— M lmäm sakas, Naiyä yi kas, V edän ti ns, Jai na s— co ul d or
w anted to avoi d this chall en ge, for so i t app ears t o be from D h arm a-
k lr ti 's b it terl y hau gh ty to n e.2 T h e case of the P ratyabh ij nä school,
w hic h co nstit uted the h ighest poi nt of phil osophic al sel f-aw aren ess
re ached by non du al is ti c K ashm ir Saivism ,3 start ing from Som ânan da
(c. 875-925 a .D.), then especially Utpaladeva (c. 900-950 A.D.), and
later Abhinavagupta (c.950-1020 a .D.), is one of the most typical,
though perhaps one of the least investigated.4
Som ânand a defi nit el y k new D harm aklrt i's w ork s— at leas t one
verse of the PV is clearly recognizable in the Sivaiirsti 5— bu t it i s on ly
from Utpaladeva onward that the masters of Buddhist logic rise to
the rol e o f pri nci pal interlocu tors.6 T he y are opp on ents, of c ou rse,
but they are evoked so constantly and always with such profound
respect, part ic ularl y D h arm ak lrt i, 7 that the n ature o f t heir rel ation 
ship i s not im m ediatel y eviden t. M ore ov er, i t w as i nev it able t hat
a school that first established itself in tenth-eleventh century
Kashmir sooner or later should accept a confrontation with Bud
dhism, in a country where Saivism was deeply rooted, but that
also was impregnated with Buddhist culture. The Nllamatapuräna
and the Räjataranginl tell of Buddhism in Kashmir from very early

3 28 RitualandSp eculation

ti m es8 and the C h ines e pil grims gi ve us detai le d in form ation on
the spre ad o f t he d if feren t Budd his t s chools. I n the com m en tari es
on the Éivasütra an echo rem ai ns of a cert ain a gg ressiveness that
Buddhist proselytism, around the ninth century, must have
assum ed.QFu rt herm ore, a s t he R âj atar an ginï (IV .5. 498) inform s us ,
o ne o f the great n am es of Buddhis t l ogi c, Dh arm ottar a (c . 75 0-8 10
a.d.), had settl ed in K ash m ir at the invitat ion o f the king, Jayâpï da
(c. 775-806 .);10
a .d D ha rm ott ara' s w orks i n eff ect are w el l- know n
and frequently quoted and criticized by the Pratyabhijhä masters.
Areata (c. 730-790 .),11
a .d the author of the Hetubindutlkä and
Ä nand avardhana, bes ides the fam ous D hvany äl oka, al so the autho r
of a vast com m entary, now lost , on D h arm ottara' s Pram änavini s-
cay atïkâ1 2 w ere natives o f K ashm ir . Sahkarän and a or San ka ra-
nandana (ninth -t en th century), t he M ahäbrähm ana of the Tibetan s,
deserves a speci al m ention. He w as a n in teresti n g and enigm ati c
fi gu re halfw ay betw een the logical -epist em olog ical Bu dd his t
tradition, of which he is both an exponent and critic, and perhaps
the em ergi ng êai va g no seo logy .13
The Buddhist logicians and Pratyabhijhä start from presuppo
sitions that appear, and are, absolutely irreconcilable: an impersonal
world of events, on the one hand, and, on the other, a world
permeated and vivified even in its seemingly most inert crannies
by the dynam is m of the I (êi va or Co n sciousn ess). D espite t his,
an undoubted fascination is exerted by the rigor of the Buddhist
logici ans' arg u m en tation and th eir da un tl ess cri ti cal capacit y that
uses it s sharp an d ori ginal i n strum en ts on the d octri nes o f the
m ost diver se opp onents. T h e v ery ai r o f sup eri ori ty that som eti m es
may be glimpsed in their opposition to all others, though it does
not fail occasionally to provoke a note of sarcasm in the êaiva
m as ters,1 4 ends up b y fu rthe r enhan ci ng their im age. T his con
tributes to causing them to be adopted by the Pratyabhijhä authors,
partly, so to speak, as a touchstone to test the soundness of their
theses and part ly as a w h etston e to sharpen their di al ect ic ar m s.
Buddhist logic, in its struggle against realism (particularly of
the Nyäya) constantly is concerned with showing the fundamental

importance
w ho, w it hof the
the mind
ai m inofstructuring reality,
un derl ining theini contrast to those
ndep end ent nature of the
external reality confronted by human experience, move in the
opp osi te directi on — reduci ng the cr eati ve and f orm ati ve rol e of
kno w ledge as far as po ssi ble and m aking i t i nto a m ere m irror that
records ready-made realities outside itself, resulting in an unending
entification even of relations, qualities, and so forth. This reference
to the cen tral it y o f the mind m ust have been fel t b y t he P ratyabh ij hä

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but. already had entered common usage from Prasastapäda onward. like the previously mentioned kriyä sambandha sämänya (dravya dik käla . how the Pratyabhijnä has appropriated the ty pic al term inolog y o f Bud dh is t l ogi c. as a preliminary step. svalaksana) may designate realities that do not com plet el y coi ncide w it h those m eant by the Bud dhist l ogi ci ans or that are valued differently ( arthakriyä ). for example. vol .1) but it does so only after Buddhist criticism has rendered them untenable. arthak riyäsam artha .. in Buddhist terms to a certain extent prefigures their development and reduces possible alternative as regard solution.g. and s o on. on e m ay be surpris ed by statem en ts li ke that found in I PV . I am not referring to expressions such as the one encountered. tädät m ya. sometimes are expressly .17 Through this subtle play of a declared basic disag reem en t w it h the do ctri ne s of Bud dh is t l ogicians. thou gh they are an ti theti cal. to svalaksan a. It accepts many concep ts that the Buddhist logicians refute and that the Nyäya upholds. II. Bearing this in mind. a li m it ed acceptance and purel y instrum en tal ( or thou gh t to be s o) us e of them . Thus two atti tud es essen ti all y em erge. Raffaele Torella 329 m asters to be a strong elem ent o f af fi nity. see IPK. as we know. m ore or l ess unwittingly. tad ut pat ti . Som e of these terms (e. like those con nected with the inferential process. To trace the features of this complex relationship in the filigree of the terse li nes of the IPK and its com m en tari es.2. The Praty abhijnä seems to reject neither the Buddhist position nor the naiyäyika on e.16 In oth ers . recuperating them in a bound. 1. käryahetu. Th at m any p robl em s are pose d.16 which. even thoug h it w as destined to have divergent developments. In doing so. The architecture of the Pratyabhijnä feels the effec t of thi s. p. In certai n cases po si ti ons p ert aining to t he Bu dd his ts are acce pted but to show that they becom e adm is sibl e i n al l the ir im plicati on s on ly if t he y are pla ced i n a êaiv a fram e o f re fe re n ce . to a m arkedly g rea ter ex ten t than the other schools. Bud dh is t cri ti cism is accept ed to show that realities which on close examination prove to be irremediably contradictory and yet are demanded by vyavahära become acceptable in a Ôaiva context. others. sv abhäv a- hetu. f irs t a nd f orem ost on e m ust try to reco n struct the term s of at least som e o f the var ious disputes to be found in it that deal with the principal topoi of logical- epistemological speculation. the various types of anupalabdhi. the m ast ers of t he Pratyabhij nä end up b y be ing som ehow drawn into their orbit. 43— naiyäyikakramasyaiva mäyäpade päram ärthikat vam iti gran thakä räbh i- p räy a h " kriy äsatn b an d h asäm än y a'' il y âd is u udd esesu p r a k a t ib h a v is y a t i 15— which seem to have broader significance and refer not only to the more or less effective articulation of the p a râ rth â n u m â n a . p a r ä r th ä n u m ä n a . one cannot fail to note.

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th ere i s no d if feren  tiation between the means of knowledge and its result ( pram än a— p ra m ä o r p r a m iti). et c.22 And up to this point the âaivas and Bu dd his ts are m ai nly i n agreem ent. A t the beginning of Ä hnika II I of the K ri yad hikâra2 0 we com e across this definition of pram än a: idam etädrg ity evam yadvasäd vyavatisthate / vastu pramänam tat so 'pi sväbhäso 'bhinavodayah // so 'ntas tathävimarsätmä desakälädyabhedini / ekäbhidhänavisaye m it ir v as tuny abädhitä // T h e m eans of know le dge i s that than ks to w hich the ob ject is situated in its own confines ( vyavatisthate ): “this thing. because this would require an actual difference between the tw o term s. T S 13 43 -60 . Vyäpära is completely denied by the Buddhists. ). above all. A proof of this i s that A bhinavagu pta. o r apadäna. Th e di st incti on betw een p ram än a and p ra m ä. the impossibility . who consider every distinction on this basis purely imaginary ( utpreksita). the two po si ti ons di ff er on the concept of the "function. co rrelat ed to a su bject. T h e tw o t erm s thus foregroun ded can no t in any case represen t a rel ati on ship of cause and effect. o r karana. N BJ pp .33 0 R itualandSp eculation attributed to the Buddhists but more often are used freely in the cou rse o f t h eir ow n arg u m en tation . activity" ( vyäpära) carried out by the elem ents occu rri ng in c og nit ion.19 Bu t. 308 : tadvasät tadvyavasthänät. A ccor ding to the Pratyab h ij nä . Th is l ight. as regards the object without spatio-temporal limitations etc. w hich in it self i s on e. whose essence is the inner reflective awareness of that w hic h is thu s m anifest ed.8 b -ll an d vrtti. O n the con tr ary. it is the actual use of this terminology that indicates impregnation. for example.24 But. becom es.2 3 w hich devel ops U tpaladeva' s barel y sketc hed posit ion. qu otes part of a verse by D h arm ak lr ti (PV II I. w it h these ch arac teristi cs. all equal ly legit im ate. att ributing to the bow the fu nction ( vyäpära) eit he r of kartr. with a division of roles within the same reality. knowledge (miti) [provided it is] non invalidated. there fore. w h atever the case. the Bud dh ist s say. so much so that. i s onl y the ou tcom e of t he analyti c con  si d erati on o f a reali ty.301-319. an act such as piercing with an arrow may be analyzed in various ways. PV II I. as al so t he B ud dh is ts— but no t only th ey 21— m ai ntai n (s ee for examp le PS I . 79-86 ." T his m eans of know ledge i s an ev er fresh ly arisi ng li gh t. but at the m ost a rel ati on o f vyavasthäpya-vyavasthäpana. i n concl uding hi s argu m en tat ion in the tw o co m m en taries. and expressed by a single name.

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” w hic h is the ver y essen ce of light.2 ” U tpaladeva de fi n it ely has this form ulation in mind i n t he verse that open s Ähn ika VI of the Jnänädhikära : ahampratyavamarso yah prakäsätmäpi vägvapuh / näsa u vikalpah sa hy ukt o dvayäksepi vi nisca yah / / [vrtti] prakäsasyätmany aham iti parävägrüpatvät säbhiläpo 'pi svabhävabhütah pratyavamarso na vikalpa ity ucyate. only "appears” to be endowed with a function ( savyâpâram iväbhäti). to view this complex pl ay of att raction an d d etachm en t that ch aracterizes the posit ions of the Pratyabhijnä. Abhinavagupta continues. hinges the nondifferentiation of p ram än a and p r a m â : v y âp â ra is not a different reality from the subject that acts and from the ins tru m en t tha t i s set i n actio n . The reflective awareness concerning the self. which follows p ra m itih in Utpaladeva's vrtti. although it is informed by the word. is not a vikalpa. wh ich i n t urn depends on PS I. w hich introdu ces the elem en t of p o ten tiali ty. For a vikalpa is an act o f de term ination w hich i m pli es two alternatives. according to the êaivas. just before had quoted with approval the third p äd a of the same verse). yet again. therefore.27 Vyâpâra. Raffaele Torella 33 1 o f vyäpära is the di rec t c onsequ ence of the doctri ne o f m om en tari  ness. in the p ram än a is turned toward the external object. the refl ecti on aw aren ess “I .5. contracted due to the influence of the object assumed in it. which is the essential nature of both. abhiläpasamsarga yogyapratibhäsä prati ti h kalpanä. i n t he sub tl er and m ore com  prehensive definition in NB 1. T h e refl ecti ve aw areness "I. if not absolutely is f u rthe ridentical. But. having the word as its essence. 8c d: savyäpärapratitatvät pramänam eva sa/26 (Abhinavagupta. Both Dignäga and Dharmaklrti substantially agree that vikalpa-kalpanä and sabda are very closely related.” w hic h co ns ti tutes the ow n natu re . as we have seen. that does not mean that p ram än a and p r a m ä are simply two ways of saying the same thing ( p a r y ä y a tv a m ). el aboratedTheby definition D harm inaklrt PS i 1.25 Cognition. whereas in the p ra m ä i t i s t urned inw ar d as pure de term inate aw are ness. the cognitive light. Abhinavagupta's reply refers implicitly to this statem en t by Dh arm ak lr ti . Abhinavagupta says. not only exists but constitutes the very essence of p ra m ä and on this.3d. It i s preci sel y the inseparable con nec ti on betw een know ledge and the word that forms one of the nerve centers of both schools and a vantage point from which. nämajätyädiyojanä. sa hi pratiyoginisedhapürvo niscayo na cätra pratiyogisambhavah.28 All tha t al ready had been ess en tiall y contained in the laconic p r am ä trv y ä p ä ra h .

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it is w orth d w ell ing on how this is conceived and valued in the two schools. as regards pure light. strictly excluded it. and expressed by a si ng le n am e" (desakälädyabhedini / ekäbhidhänavisaye [ . Let us return to the passage of the Kriyädhikära quoted earlier. unitary and unrepeatable being. Indeed. What the éaivas conceive as a secondary product they view as the supremely real and efficient.33 fr om w hic h the B ud dh ist logici ans. o n the contrary. A group of äbhäsas. ] vastuny). all its qualities are . w hic h b ei ng disc on nected from space and tim e i s a sàmânya (cf. can no t be cal le d 'vikalpa' even if it is essentially associated with a “discourse" ( abhilâpa ). direct perception grasps it in its totality (cf. PV 1. . because it constitutes the crux of the whole question. it is placed at the very h eart o f r eali ty as the su prem ely un if ying elem en t. where one reads among other things: “as regards the object without spatio-temporal li m it ations etc. ti m e. since the word tha t inform s i t is the sup rem e wo rd. h ow ever. according to the Pratyabhijnä. there is no possibil it y o f t he e xisten ce o f som ething that i s its opposite. the vrtti sâmânyarüpe ).43: ekasyârthasvabhâvasya p raty aksa sy a sa t ah sv ay am / ko 'n yo na drs to b h ä g ah sy äd y ah p r a m ä n a ih p arik sy a te / / 'W hen the un it ary specif ic na ture o f an ob ject i s percei ved. For this purpose the field must be extended to a consideration of the respective positions regarding the nature of the object of the p r am ân a. nikaya).332 Ritual and Speculation of the li gh t. the ob ject of the p ra m ân a is the single âbhâsa. i s not l im it ed to pervadi ng the sphere of disc ursi ve tho u gh t. it is the object of a single word. Bhartrhari. the vikalpa is a determination ( niscaya) acquired through the negation of the opposite.32 It therefore also inform s sen sation . w it h w hic h we are con fron ted in everyday ex p erience . the svalaksana. when an object is perceived. Thus.45: tasmäd drstasya bhävasya drsta eväkhilo gunah / 'Therefore. 31 Fol low ing the teaching o f that o the r great figure who conditioned the Pratyabhijnä. Direct perception is followed by the moment of determination ( adhyavasäya. and. i t is the essence of all knowledge and sentience itself. . The Buddhists make a sharp distinction between the objects of the two pram än as: the object of knowledge that appears to the senses is the svalaksana.34 If we then pass on to the respective position of the Buddhist logicians we find a diametrically opposed picture. including those of space.30 T h e w ord. what other part that is not perceived can there be that may be investigated by [other] means of knowledge?'and the first hemistich of the samgrahasloka 1. a nd fo rm — endow ed w it h a spec ial i ndivi duali zi ng fo rce — is composed in the apparent unity of the individual thing.

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Th e niscaya cannot capture the particular in its totality but only enucleate one featu re of it . p . bheda ).50-51: yävanto 'msasamäropäs lanniräse viniscayäh / tävanta eva sabdäs ca l ena te bhinn agocaräh / / any athaikena sabdena v yäpt a ekatra vas tuni / buddhyä vä nänyavisaya iti paryäyatä bhavet //.3 6 bu t at the p ri ce o f t he de com po si ti on of it s un it y and the ' co ve ring ' (samvrti) of t he p ecul ia r f orm of the ob ject w it h the form o f the cognition. though strictly speaking unreal are not arbitrary acts. R affaeleT o rella 333 au tom atical ly percei ved ') 35 H ow ever. wh ich th erefo re den otes a cert ain sämänya or rather the negation of what is other than that feature (PV 1. This division into many dharmas. vari ou s factors. different niscayas may stem from this single perceptual content. each of them captures a (unreal but not unfounded) part of it a nd con n ects it w it h a word. p. P V S V .37 These constructs do not so much mirror the thing in i ts real ity as com m un icat e the know ing m ind's intention s. it may not be associated with words (unlike kalpanä). it m ay be the o bject o f determ inate know ledge— w hi ch al one renders i t com m unicabl e and place s i t w it hin the sp h ere of hu m an a cti v it ies a nd co n v en ti o n s. previ ous experiences. 43: taddharmatäm eväv atar anto vikalpä nän aikadharmav yatirekän sam darsayanti / na c a le niräsrayäs tadbhedadarsanäsrayatvät / nävastudharmatä lalsvabhävasyaiva talhä khyäteh). adhyavasäya). p. each p ram än a . perception grasps it in its entirety but it also is inexpressible and uncommunicable. such as m ental acu tenes s. however. 28: tadviveka eva cànyàpohah / lasmàd tad api lanmàlràpohagocaram / na vastusvabhävanis- cayätmakam)39 For the Pratyabhijnä (Utpaladeva). For the Buddhist logicians (D ha rm ak ïrt i). each o f w hich is grasped by a si ng le act of de term ination ( niscaya. 32: yady apy amsarahilah sarvato bhinna- svabh ävo bhâvo nubhütas tat häpi na sarvabhede su tävatä nis cay o bhava ti / käranäntaräpeksatvät / anubhavo hi yathävikalpäbhyäsam niscayapratyayäh ja n a y a li / y ath ä rü p ad arsan ä v is ese 'pi k u n a p a k ä m in ib h a k sy a v ik a lp ä h / taira bu ddhipäfavam tadv äsanäb hyäsah pr akaran am ity ädayo 'nubhaväd bheda- niscayotpattisahakärinah36). like the attribution of diverse multiple and unrepeatable entities to a single class or the division into particular and universal. and so forth determine which of the many possible features (although the thing has in actual fact no parts) is grasped at different times (PVSV. t he star ti n g point i s the parti cu lar ( svalaksana. The unity of the svalaksana shatters into a myriad of dharmas. because they still d eri ve from the p erception o f a d eterm ina te indivi dual reali ty a nd in a sense are a prop erty o f the thing itself. T h e tw o concep ti on s differ grea tl y bu t have a ki nd of cross correspo nd enc e that m akes on e think that the difference li es in the approach rather than in the content. only a thing th at po ssesses such a svabhäva may be grasped in this way (PVSV.

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J B ecau se i t i s the cau se of a si ng le refl ective aw aren ess. depending on a d eterm inate refl ecti ve aw aren ess4 0 (vrtti ad IPK 11. . I PK II. individual realities also appear as . In the o b ject— thou gh it i s un it ary.3. Two themes peculiar to Dharmaklrti's thought are here clearly discernible. which app ears s ev eral ti m es i n the PV . vari ou s m an if estati on s ( äbhäsa ) may be distinguished according to the inclinations.3 and the relative vrtti read as follows: yalhäruci yathärthitvam yathävyutpatti bhidyate / äbhäso 'py artha ekas minn an usam dhän asädhite // ekasminn eva caikapratyavamarsasämärthyopapädite vastuni svecchävasäd arthitvänurodhäd vä naipunavasäd vävabhäsa- bhedah In an ob ject. 109 of the Svärthänumänapariccheda and svavrtti :42 ekapratyavamarsasya hetutväd dhir abhedini / ekadhihetubhävena vyaktinäm apy abhinnatä // [ .5: ekaikas câsàv äbhäsa ekaikena sabdena vyavahärärtham tattanniyatärthakriyä- rthibhir abhidhiyate) or grasps—in the perception itself and not in a later act—a group of äbhäsas coordinated by the Lord's power of necessity according to sämänädhikaranya (blue lotus).2: vimarsabhedänusäryekaikasabdaväcye. I already have dwelt on the first. In various passages of the IPK. practical re qu irem en ts and speci fi c experi enc e o f t he sub ject. in this case the p ra m ä n a i s oriented to the do m inant äbhäsa and t he p ercept ion rem ai ns unitary. tho u gh it s unity is establi she d by the u nifyi ng pow er of mind.. Utpaladeva is concerned with safeguarding the unity of the thing that the division into multiple äbhäsas seem s irr em ediably to break up . cognition appears as undifferentiated. .. practi cal requ irem en ts and experience of the subject. vrtti ad IPK II. having bee n assumed as such on the strength of a single reflective aw arene ss— there are d if ferent m anifes tat ions that ar e dep end ent on th e wi ll.3. J tad api pratidravyam bhidyamänam api prakrtyaika- p raty a v a m a rsa sy ä b h ed ä v a sk a n d in o hetu r b h a v ad a b h in n am khyäti / tathäbhütapratyavamarsahetor abhedävabhäsino jhä- näder arthasya hetutväd vyaktayo 'pi samsrstäkäram svabhäva- bhedaparamärtham svabhävata ekam pratyayam janayanti [.3. Because they cause a single cognition.334 Ritual and Speculation grasps an individual äbhäsa (which is a sämänya). expressed by a d eterm inate w ord. i s t hu s form ulated in v.41 The second.

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despit e th e fact tha t they ar e differentiated. . T h e singl e parti cular re ali ti es becom e com posed in an apparent unity through the same reflective awareness that by nature they are able to determine. produce by their very n ature a si ngle. the d eterm inate purpose that m ay be achi eved th ank s to this. I . . . because they are the cause of a reality that is manifested as undifferentiated (cognition etc. building a house etc. or a different efficiency—depending on the orientation of the cognition—such as burning. . 1evam simsapâdayo ‘pi bhedâh parasparànanvaye 'pi p ra k rty a iv a ik am ek ä k ä ra m p ra iy ab b ij riä n a m jan a y a n ti an y äm vä yathäpratyayam dahanagrhädikätn kästhasädhyäm artha- kriyäm [. . Dharmakïrti concludes that it the refo re is onl y the fact t hat they p roduce t he sam e effects that constitutes the unity of things that are (in fact) differentiated (itasmâd ekakäryataiva bhävänäm abhedah). such as a single reflective awareness or a single object cognition. . carried out by wood. t he c og niti on tha t t he thing because of its nature is able to give rise to. despite the fact that they are not connected w it h o ne an oth er.4 5 As . . fi rst. t h erefo re.) and is the cause of such a reflective awareness. . cannot be reduced to anything but th em sel ves. . owing to their very nature a lso pr odu ce a si ng le cog niti on in wh ic h the form s m erge. being by its very nature the cause of a single reflective awareness that establishes the nondifferentiation. T h u s. strictly speaking. That cognition. Individual things. uniform recognition. d iffere n t p articular en titi es . Raffaele Torella 3 35 undifferentiated. are determined by their very nature to bring into being a single reality.. such as simsapä trees etc. although it differs for each individual object.73 and svavrtti:44 ekapratyavamarsärthajnänädyekärthasädhane / bhede 'pi niyatäh kecit svabhävenendriyädivat // [ . appears as undifferentiated. T h e sam e effects are. 1 So m e indivi dual entiti es. . second. and. though in the absolute sense there is a differentiation o f th eir ow n n at u re s. . J43 D harm akïrt i uses thi s argum ent to account for t he form at ion o f the idea of cl ass and u niversal tha t em brace s a plurali ty of d iscret e realities which. . This theme already had been expressed and developed in a clear and rigorous way in PV III.

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336 Ritual and Speculation Kam al asl la sa ys l ater i n hi s com m entary on T S ." "clo th . s uch as a certain sh ape. the vrtti furnishes an indispensable explicitation of it. T h e individual rays o f l ight in a torch app ear as an undifferentiated whole and the same holds for the currents of rivers in the notion of the sea and for the various flavours in the p än a k a . However.3. con tai ning w ater) t hu s co n stru cting the un it y of a 't h ing ' (e. everyday experience groups tog ether com ple te ly heteroge neo us and separat e data . p rth a g d ip a p ra kä sä n ä m srola sä m sâg a re y ath ä / aviruddhävabhäsänäm ekakäryä tathaikyadhih // bhinnä pradipaprabhä avibhägenävabhäsante nadipravähäs ca sindhubuddhau pänake ca te te rasäh tathäsauklyamahatvapata- tvädyavabhäsäh parasparänupravesaksamäh na tu nilapltädy- avabhäsäh tattadekakäryaikadravyäbhäsabhävena kalpanie p raty aksa ev a / tad etat sämänädhikaranyam. D h arm ak ïr ti 's argu m en tati on . a jar). color. Sim ilarl y. As in the case of the distinct rays of light in a torch and of the cu rren ts i n the sea. on the basis of the ir com bining to p erf orm a s ingle fun cti on (e. g.4 *1 IPK II .. It concludes as follows: siddham tävat parasamvedyatävyäpakedantäsvabhävajadatävirud- dhähamprakäsavyäptatvam svasamvidrüpatvasya / tena jhäne vyä- p ak a v iru d d h a v y äp tä y ä h p arasam v ed y atä y ä n is ed h ah . thus in m an if estati on s t hat are not in contrast with each other the notion of unity is produced by their appearing as unitary entities." The context is different from that of Dharmakïrti's argument and very cl ose to K am alasl la' s: h ere th e purp ose i s t o explai n how we m ay arri ve at perce iving the apparen t un ity o f the o bject fr om a multiplicity of äbhäsas.7 echo es. m an if estati on s such as "w h ite. In a long fragm en t of U tpal adeva's l ost IP Vivrti — that I have recen tl y edit ed and tran slated — a section is devoted to the self- revealing nature of cognition." and s o on." "b ig . al so in i ts form ulati on .. capabl e a s they are of interpenetrating. g. Th is i s w hat w e c al l "having the s am e substrat um . on o f t he T h is does not happen w it h oth er seri es s uch as "b lu e. and so forth . t he unitary m an if estati effect. lend themselves in the direct exp eri enc various unitary e itself things having ato single." etc." "ye ll ow . Utpaladeva's conclusion (tad etat sämän ädhikara nyam ) and D ha rm akïrt i's (ta smäd ekakäryataiva bhävänäm abhedah) are strictly homologous.

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In f act. they don't go in for finesse. for it s part. pp. Thus it is possible to deny that cog nit ion is know able by oth ers. 2.4 9 an d unti l now w as t ho ug ht to have first appeared in the relati ve ly l ate D h arm o tt arap rad lpa 50 by Durvekamisra (late tenth-early eleventh centuries). I am referring particularly to the well-known stanzas of the beg inning (1. here in the form of vyäpakaviruddhavyäpiopalabdhi. see Tucci 1971.*» More over. On the influence of the founder Dignaga. " wh ich pervades the property of being knowable by others. only f ou nd in M iyasaka's edit ion) of the PV: p rä y a h p rä k r ta s a k tir a p r a ii b a la p r a jh o ja n a h k ev a la m n ân arth y ev a sub häsiiaih parigaio vidv esi y apïrsyâm alaih / tenäy am na paropakâr a it i na s ciniipi ceias ciram süktifbhyäsavivardhitavyasanam ity airänubaddhasprham // 'Mankind are mostly addicted to platitudes. 2) and the end (IV . H etubi nd u. who includes it i n a classifi cation com prisi ng fou rteen or sixteen fo rm s. it may be noted that this type is not found in any of the classifications of the anupalabdhi given by D h arm ak ïrt i ( in the PV . has the n ature o f “th is. it is no t presen t i n D ha rm ottara. Not enough that they do not care at all for deep sayings. it i s not quoted by the K ashm ir ian au tho rs Jayan ta (84 0-9 00 ) and B häsa rvajna (86 0 -9 2 0 ). However. wh ic h is opposed t o insen ti en ce— and i nse ntience. he re w e are f ace d w it h an argu m en tat ion (and a ter m inology ) pecul iar to the Buddhist logicians: the anupalabdhi as the hetu of a negative inference. my heart has . because thi s property is pervaded by another that is in opposition to the pervading one ( vyâpakaviruddhavyâpiâyâh ). Pram ânav ini scaya. they are fi lled w it h h atr ed and w it h the fi lt h o f envy. 191-192. T h ere fo re neither do I care to write for their benefit. althou gh it i s no t li m it ed strictl y to the m )— but the proc edu re U tpal adeva has used to d em o n strate i t. N B).286 .47 W hat I w is h to un derl ine h ere i s no t the con tent o f t his statem en t— w hich would need t o be deal t w it h separately (cognit ion as svasamvedana in fact is a well-known doctrine of the Buddhist logicians. Ra ff aele T orell a 337 It has there fore been proved tha t bei ng conscious of itself [on th e p art o f cog n iti on ] i s pervaded by the li gh t o f the I. Notes 1.5 1 T h e fact that the Pratyabhijnä constitutes a source of information on the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism contributes an additional interest to an examination of it from this point of view.

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p . and perish in. does not exhaust the whole of the Pratyabhijnâ teaching. pp. pp. wh o con sti tutes one of the Pratyabhijnä's points of reference. p. had accepted the le gacy of B h artrha ri ( cf . even they cannot perceive its highest truth' (tr an s. I 40 -41. 11-12). 203-204. p. i n Stch erba tsky 19 30 -32 . 4. though it is very tempting to speculate. my own person. on its collocation within the Kaula tradition. 10. Cf. forthcom ing A. 3. 147. ju s t a s a r iv e r [w h ic h is a b s o r b e d a n d lo st] in t h e o c e a n . pp. On the doctrines of the Pratyabhijnâ. 5.. 22). even they can no t fat ho m its dept h! T h ose w ho ar e e ndow ed w it h excepti onal intrepidity of thought. dealt with in this chapter. M oksâk aragu pta add res ses hi m w it h the ep it he t nyäyaparamesvara 'Supreme Lord of Lo gic' (K aji yam a 1 96 6. 149. on the same page. s ee T orella. 9. M ass on and Patw ardhan 1 969. 1. 7. see Pandey 1963. from Utpaladeva onward. pp . See Gnoli 1960. It will be absorbed by. H erzb erger 198 6. Pandey 1963. The verse of the ôivadrsfi is 1. because through it my love for profound and long meditation over [every] well spoken word has been gratified'. 290-460. pp. 6. We simply do not know anything definite on this problem at all. 147-150. p.45 drsyante ' tra tadicc hâto bhä vä bhityädiyogata h / taira m ithyâsvarü pam cet sthâpyâgre salyatedrsâm // (cf . Stcherb atsky 19 30 -32 . unlike Dignâga. see also SivasütravimarsinI. Ibid. T h e pri vi leged relat ionship w it h D ha rm aklrt i m ight be explained by the fact that he.3 38 Ritual and Speculation found satisfaction in this [my work). is Abhi- nava's debt to Buddhism. anadhyavasitâvagâhanam analpadhlsaktinäpy adrstapara- märthasäram adhikäbhiyogair api / matam mama jagaty alabdhasadrsaprati- g r ä h a k a m p r ay äsy ati p ayon id h eh p ay a iv a svad eh e ja r ä m // 'M y w ork wil l fi nd no on e i n this w orl d w ho w ould be adequ ate easi ly t o grasp i ts deep sayings. though it is rich in possibilities. note 1. vol . G n oli 1 95 7. pp. . T h o s e w h o are endowed with no inconsiderable force of reason. xxiii-xxvi. I am aware that the purely speculative aspect. 34: "A n o ther questi on that must go unanswered. Frauw al lner 196 1." See also.282 kâmasokabhayonmâdacaurasvapnâdyupaplulâh / abhülän api pasyanli purato 'vasthitän iva //. On the central role of Utpaladeva in the elaboration of Pratyab hij nâ phil osophy. p . 125 ). It is PV III. see also U tpaladeva 's vrtti: kâmasokabhayâdiyogâc ca te te bhäväh purah sphuranto drsyante. see the observations of Sanderson 1985. C f. 8. I. p. 35 -36).

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12. vol. p. 344-345. . p . IPV V . C f. 2.. ' 13. 2. except that he inscribes it in the sphere of the Lord's power of necessity (ibid. 23 . e. I PV . 15. 43.. 19. See note 15 . 3. 16. als o S tch erb atsk y . Fra u w allner. 214: na bhävasya kimcit nijam nityam anityam vä vapuh / ìsvaras tu svasam vinm ukure vi svam äbhäs ayan ksanikatäm api äbhäsayatiti nah paksah). p. T h e quo tat ion s f rom the I PK and vrtti are drawn from my forthcom ing (B) edit ion and tr an slat ion. 82: na cätra janyajanakabhävanibandhanah sädhyasädhana- bhä vah.. . Stch erba tsky identi fi es a “C ash m ere or phil o sophi ca l s chool of com m entators [of D harm aklrt i's w orks]. vol. 2. p. pp . NBT. 371 (on bädhyabädhakabhäva). 7 3 -7 5 . A cco rdi ng to A bhinavagupta' s test im on y (Stcherbatsky 19 30 -32 . e. vol . ibi d.. vol. 14 8. Raffaele Torella 339 11. 18. 42 and B üh ne m an n 19 80. vol. 14. C f. 21. p. vol . IPVV. 14 0: p arä rth ä n u m ä n a m h i sästra m / ta tra ca p ra m ä n ä d i- sodasapadä rtha tat tvamayatvam ev a param ärthah. xxi ii ff. Se e.g . . 3. 20. 3. 30 8 (on apoha ). 205 (on käryakäranasiddhi). pp . IPV . 17 4: p rä m ä n ik a la ra m m an y aih [b a u d d h a ih ] tädätmyatadutpatti niyamanidànam upagate. 1 . pp . p. 32: ekänekarüpasya kriyädeh bähyaväde viruddhadhar m ädhyäsa dü$anena anupapadyamSnasyäpy avas yam samarthaniyam vapuh. see al so IPV V . ib id. IPVV. Bandyopadhyay 1979. I p. Cf. vol. 7 1 -72 . p. pp. A bhinavagu pta accepts t he B ud dhist concep ti on en bloc . ibid. cf . See also the description that Abhinavagupta gives of the anumäna in IP V . 182 . He does t he sam e els ew here w it h the Bud dhis t do ct ri ne of impermanence (IPVV. 3. 84 .g. On the figure and work of êartkarananda. IPV vol. vol. I pp . 17. vol . see Gnoli 1960. p. p. 22. 276-277 (on sabdakalpanä ). etc. pp. 2. wh ic h a Bud dh is t would ag ree w it h: anumänajä tu pratltih äbhäsäntarät käryarüpät svabhävarüpät vä äbhäsäntare p ratip attih . IPVV. 2. p. 2. 2. p. 41 -42 ). p. vol. . vol.: vastvantarasya ca tena säkam käryakäranabhävaniyamah säm änäd hikaran yan iyam as ca isvaraniyati saktyupajfvana ev a avad häry o bhav ati na anyathä). yenaikas min vast uni virodhah s yät / ap i tu vyavasthäpyavyavasthäpan a- bhävena / tad ekasya vastunah kimcid rüpam pramänam kimcit pramänaphalam na virudhyate. fo r ins tan ce.

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T h e w hole verse r eads as fol low s: savyäpäram iväbhäti v yäpäre na svakarm ani / tad vas ât tadvyava sthänäd akàrak am api svay am / /. Cf. 28. 28. 30. . vividhatvam ca vahnäv anagnisambhävanäsamäropaniräse sati bhavat. H att ori 1968 . p. CF. p. IPK 1.3 40 Ritual and Speculation 24. 29. Cf. refers explicitly (following the tïkâ) to the definition of the N B a nd al so quo te s two pass ages f rom D h arm ottara. 2. p. pp. f or w hic h I have foun d on ly a sum m ary correspo nd ence in t he edi te d text of the N BT . 108 ff. 75: ki m ca vyâpârar üpam eva phalam vyäp ärasca vyäpri yamänät vyäpäryamän ät vä anan yâkâra ev a sidd ha it i abhedah pram âna- p h ala y oh . TS 1346: ata utpreksito bhedo vidyate dhanurädivat / utpädyoi- p äd akatv en a vyavasth ey am tu nes yate // and the relative p an cik ä. also PV III. M oo kerjee and Nagasaki 1964.] // niscayäropamanasor bäd hyabä dhakabh ävatah / samäropaviv eke sya pravrlti r iti gam yate // [sva vrtti ] ( . See t he discuss ion i n T S 121 3 ff . voi . pp. niscaya) as based on the exclusion of what is other.5. 1.). Up to this point. w hich at fi rst see m ed o nly to con cern the inferen ti al process. vol. 26.6. dvayam vahnyavahnirüpam samäksipati. . al so i s ext ended to deter m ina te cognit ion ( niscayajhäna) that follows perception: kvac id d rs te 'p i ya j j hänam sämän yärtham vikal pakam / asam äropi- täny ämse tanm âtrâpo hagocar am / / — [svavrtti] yad rüpädidarsanänantaram alingam niscayajhänam bhavati. A bhinavag up ta. in com m enting on thi s verse i n IPV V . IPV. see also IPK 1. 31.2-3. the P ratyab h ij nâ and Bud dh is t logic agree. w here the apoha. 2. p. pp. C f. tat katham asati samärope bhavad vyavaccheda- visayam bhavati. ] tadviveka eva cänyäpohah / tasmäd ta d api tanm âtrâ pohagocaram / na vastusv abhä vaniscay ätm akam / tathä hi kasyacin nisca ye ' py any äsyä prati- p attid arsan ät / ta tsv ab h äv an is ca y e ca ta sy äy og ät (c f. in fact. 1. pp . 27. A no ther el em ent w orthy of considerat ion in t he stanza and in the vrtti i s t he con cepti on of the determ inate cogn it ion ( vikalpa. abhil äpätm akatvät a dhya- vasäyasya iti). 276-278. 1. 83 -85 . 48-49) . H att ori 196 8. IPV. vol.123: praty aksam ka lp an äp od h a m p raty aksen aiv a s id h y ati / p raty ätm av ed y ah sarvesäm v ika lp o n äm a sam sra y a h / / . 25. 266: bauddhair api adhyavasäyäpeksam prakäsasya prä- mänyam vadadbhi h upagata präyah eva ayam arthah . Cf. IPV. and the relative p an cik ä. samäropavisaye iasyäbhävät (. 13: ci ti h pratyavam arsätm ä paräv äk svarasodi tä / svätantryam . and the m asters of the Pratyab hij nâ are wel l aw are of thi s (cf. It reminds one o f a n im po rt ant pass age of the PV (1. vol. vol. TSP. 488: ksanikatvena nirvyäpäratvät sarvadharmänäm. 303-304: vividhä kalpanä vividha- tvena ca sankitasya kalpo ‘nyavyavacchedanam vikalpah. 32 ... C f.

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46 and svavrtti). p. 41. 34. if they w ere thou gh t of as bei ng devoi d of determ inate aw are n es s?'. 1. 33 . The vimarsa pla ys the rol e o f "sy stem atize r" (vyavasthäpaka) of reality that is strictly analogous to the role the Buddhists assign to niscaya-adhyavasäya. 37. Vetter 1964. Cf. p. 2 93 : süksmena pratyavamarsena samvartita- sabdabhävanämayena bhâvyam eva. 58 : p raty aksen a g r h ite 'pi visese 'msavivarjite / yadvisesävasäye 'sii praiyayah sa pratiyate //. 35.5. its being hot. . vol.68-69: p ara rü p am sv arü pen a y ay ä sam v riy ate d h iy ä / ekärthapratibhäsi nyä bhävän äsri tya bhedi nah / / ta yä sam vrtanänärthäh sa m- . cf . Indee d i t i s precisel y de term ina te kn ow ledge. 38. wh ich i s no t itself a p r am ä n a . See also PV 1. 190. Cf. 84: tasmäd adhyavasäyam kurvad eva praty- aksam pramänam bhavali). 3. T h e pass age com m ents on PV 1. 39." a single means of knowledge knows what the effect or cause of it is. 19: säksätkarane 'py asti vimarsah katham anyathä / dhävanädy upapadyeta pratisamdhänavarjitam // 'Even at the moment o f the direc t percepti on there is a d eterm inate refl ective aw arene ss. pp. 43. Vetter 1964. for the other it is partless ( niramsasvalaksanaväda ). 198. above p. IPK II. Ste ink ellne r 19 71 . p. 199. 36. p. Raffaele Torella 341 et an mukhyam tad ais varyam param ätman ah / /. How otherwise could one account for such actions as running and so on. vol. 1. . its being denoted by this or that word and so on. that renders the perception for all intents and purposes a p r am än a (N B T p . 333 and note 38. ) akrte tv adhyavasäye nilabodharüpatvenävyavasthäpitam bhavati vijnänam). Cf. C f. Steinkellner 1971. Abhinavagupta refers explicitly (IPVV. 84: nisc ayapratyayenävyavasthäpitam sad api nilabodharüp am vij nänam asaikalpam eva [ . 201) to two different positions as regards the nature of the svalaksana. 40. 56. PV 1. For the one (which is also accepted by the Pratyabhijfia) it is formed by a collection of äbhäsas ( äbhäsanikurumbätmakasvalaksanaväda ). 42. therefore also for the anumäna (cf. p. IPK 1. p. vol./ tatt acchabdärt hatädyätmä pram änäd ekalo matah // 'Regarding a nonspecific manifestation of “fire. IPV . T h is is val id for eve ry p r am ä n a. 3.' See also IPVV. 48-49.8 echoes this conception: taträvisiste vahnyädau käryakäranatosnatä. Cf. notwithstanding the different valuation (N B T p .

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85) and by Vidyâkaraéânti (c. 1 = Svärthänumäna . 4 = Parärthänumäna) PVSV Pramânavârttikasvavrlti TS Tattvasamgraha TSP Tattvasamgrahapahcikä WZKSO Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd. 4 7 . The Nyäyamanjari (vol. 1100) in the Tarkasopina (Tucci 1956. 1. 3 = Pratyakça . The vyäpakaviruddhavyäptopalabdhi later is referred to by Moksäkaragupta (between 1050 and 1202) in the Tarkabhäsä (Kaji yama 1966. vo l. deri ved from the N B. p. 48. p. A ft er U tpal adeva . Rome IPK isvarapratyabhijiiäkärikä IPV Uvarapratyabhijnävimarsini IPVV Isvarapratyabhijfiavivrtivimarsini JIP Jo u rn al o f In dia n P h il osop h y. p. 28. Vienna . 291). Torella 1988. Katsura 1984. C f. p. 50. Abhinavagupta al so m akes f requ ent use of thi s t ype of argum en tat ion. 53.und Ostasiens. 288) refer to t he classi fi cati on in el even form s. PV. 44. p. 140. Dordrecht NB Nyâyabindu NBT Nyäyabindutikä PS Pramänasamuccaya PV Pramänavärttika (P V . Bibliography Abbreviations EW East and West. It is a question o f what have been called p ratin iy a ta sak ti and scimänyasakti (Mikogami 1979. TSP. p. 46.34 2 Ritual and Speculation vrt yâ bhedinah sva yam / abhedina iväbh änti bhävä rüpe na kena ci t / / . Dharmoltarapradlpa. 49. p. pp . 151 ff . V etter 1964 . 51. PV vol. vol. pp. 53) and the Nyäyabhüsana (p. 45. 1. 80 ff. 2 = Pra- mänasiddhi. Kaji yam a 1 96 6. p. C f.. vol. 218). PV. 59: ta eva rüpädayah salilädidhäranärthakriyä - kärina h sam udäyo ghata it i vyapa dis yante . vol.

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