38 L.
DEWAN
"OBIECTUM"
NOTES ON THE INVENTION
OF A WORD
l. INTRODUCTION
The importance Cor theology, at least írom the mid-thirteenth century
onwards, of the Latin word: "obieclum, -i", a substantive meaning the
object of a power, is easily shown. The case of St. Thomas Aquinas is
entirely symptomalic. The word llgures prominently in his explanation
of tho beatitude promised to man as the goal of life. And it is accordingly
used to explain the nature of Christian charity: charity is the love of
God, i.e. the !ove one has Cor God, considering God not merely as Lhe
author of natural reality but as the obieclum of supernaLural beatitude.1
( 1) F or lhe u1e of "obíeclum" in Lho doctrine ol bealitude, el . e.g., Summa lheologiae
r- 11, q. 2, a. 8, eepeclally ad 3:
• ... bonum creatum non cal minus quom bonum cuius horno esl capax ul rel
lntrlnsecae el lnbaerenlls; esl lamen mlnus quam bonum culus esl capax ut
oblectl, quod esl lnftnllum ... ,
Also, ibid., q. 3, a. 7, especially ad 3:
• ... alUngi superiorem naluram ab inferiorí contingil dupllcller. Uno modo, secun•
dum gradum polenliae parUcipantis: et sic ultima perfcclio hominls eril in hoc quod
horno altingel ad conlcmplandum sicut oogeli contemplanlur. Alio modo, eicut
oblectum alUngltur a potenlla , et lloc modo ultima perfecllo cu_!ualibet potenllae
est ut alllngot ad Id ln quo plene lnvenllur rallo sul oblecll. ,
Also ibid. , a. 8:
, ... Ad perreclam lgllur beatilud lnem requlrllur quod intellectus perllngat ad
ipsam essentiam primee causae. EL sic perfeclionem suam habebil per unionem
ad Deum sicul ad obleclum, in quo solo bealiludo hominis consist.it ... •
Por the case of charity, et. ibid., 11· 1I, q . 23, a. 4:
, ... Bonum outem divinum, inquonlum esl beoUludlnls obieclum, habet apccla•
lem ratlonem bon!. El Ideo amor carl tnlls qui esl amor hulus bonl, esl speclalla
amor. •
The word is found in general use in the writings of t heologians
contemporary with St. Thomas. 2 And it is scarcely necessary to say that
Also, el. 1-11, q. 109, a. 3, ad l.
For the sorne point as conceros all three theological virtues, el. 1-11, q. 62, a. 1,
ad 3, and a. 2.
Oo the general importance of the nollon expressed by lhe word "obiutum" lor an
understanding ol the doctrine or St. Thomas, el. L. M. Réc1s, Ep/41tmology, New York,
1959, pp. 176-7.
(2) Already In lbe Summo dt crealuri, ol SI. Albert lhe Gre.at, we flnd a rather
well-developed use ol "obltclum". Al Summa dt creaturia 11, q. 8, a. 1, ad 3 (ed. B0MNET,
París, 1896, t. 35, p. 104), we have:
• ... actu$ non sunt ejusdem rallonls In animallbus et plantls, nisi secundum genus:
cum enim operetiooes lrahantur in speciem per objecla, si operatlooes essent
ejusdem rationls, etlam objecta essent. Objectum autem est alimentum, quod
secundum subslaotiam est objectum oul,rillvae: secundum aulem quanlitatem,
augmen.Lalivae: et secundum quod est super0uum in individuo, necessarium est
speciel generatlvae. Cum lgllur nuLriens plantara sil assimilatum planlae, et
nutrieos animal sit asslmilalum anlmali, patet quod lllud quod nutrlt bine et
inde, non est in eadem specie nutl'imenti: aliter enim ex nutrimento e)usdem
epeclel aptum natum essel fieri lignum el caro, quod lalsum est. .. ,
In the very next article lo tbat Just quoted, discusslng the way in which the nutri•
Uve, augmentative, and generelive powers dilTer lrom ooe another, St. Albert formu-
lates tbe lollowlng objeclion:
• PotenUae dlstinguuntur per aetus, et aetus per ob)eeta: ergo secundum dllTe-
rentiam objectorum erit dilTerenlia actuum potenliarum. Sed objeclum ut est
necessarlum ad substantlam lndivldul, et ut eet quantum, et ut est euper0uum,
non di!Tert nisi secundum accidens. Ergo et opera et polentia non dilTenmt nisi
eecundum accidem. , (!bid., a. 2, obj. 1).
And be replles:
• ...objeclum babel substanlinlem dif!erenliam si ut objeclum con.slderatur:
potentia enim corpus non de nec-e ssitate est exislens sub majori quantitate quam
prius l lllt: et Ideo clbus secundum quod ex eo nt corpus clbatum, et clbue
secundum quod ex eo fit majus in quanlitalae, praeeipue secundum longiludinem,
quam prius habuit, habent dif!erentiam secundum substantialem lormam objecU.
Et hoc patet ex dlfferenlia finium: finis enim nutrilivae est per lncorporatlonem
aibi salvare corpus animatum: sed finis augmentativae est per incorporalionem
quanli c ibi conducere corpus ad perrectam magnitudinem secundum flguram.
Etc. , (lbld., ad 1, td. cit., p. 105).
Many other texte mlght be clted. Conceming the senses, and eepeclally vislon, el. ibid.
q. 19, a. 1 in corpore and ad 4; a. 2, atd conlro # 3; td. cit., pp. 16f>-7.
Concernlng t-he date ol the Summa de creaturi,, el. O. L0TTIN, O.S.B. , "Problémes
coneemant la 'Summa de creaturis' et le Commentaire des Sentences de saint Albert
le Grand", In R TAM 11 (1950), 319-28. Dom Lottln (326-28) puts lt belore 1243.
Al about the same time, Richard Fishacre makes use ol lhe lerm al Oxlord. CI.
lexts In G. ENOLHABDT, Die Entwicklung der dogmotischen G/auben,psychologie in der
miltelalltrllclitn Scho/a1tlk, M0nster, 1933. (Btilr(ige... , Band XXX, Helt 4·6), pp. 479,
481, 482. In discussing the analogy involved in the "good" said ol God and ereatures,
Richard Introduces as an objectlon:
• Uní potenliae unum est per se object.um commune univocum. Sed voluntas
noster vel amor est potentla. Ergo el responde\ utlque unum eommune objectum
unlvocu.m. Sed hoc non est nlsi bonum. Ergo unum esl univocum bónum In crea•
 OBIECTUM 39
subsequently it carne into heavy and exceedingly complex use. 1 However
it occurs rarely in works dated before 1240. In the first two books of
Glossa in libros Senlenliarum of Alexander of Hales, written ca 1223-27,
I have not found a single insuince of the word. In the third book I found
one insta nce.•
tura el crealore, quod esl objeclum volunlalls volenlis, omanlis crealorem el
crealuram, quia amal aliquid ídem in ulroque ... , {p. 479).
And Richard replies:
, ...objeclum per se volunlall omnl esl bonum ln0nilum el s ummum. Quod si
el crealum, in quo crealura illara summam bonilatem imilalur, sil ab allquo
volilum, hoc esl, in quantum lltam summam bonilatem imitatur... • (p. 481).
Oilaon (HCPMA, p. 364) tel11 ua that th& Commentorv on lh• S1-nleness of Rioho..rd
Fishacre was wrillen probably about 1240-43. Concerning Richard, cr. Willlam
A. H1NNBBUSCR, O.P., Tht Early EngUsh Friar, Prtacher•, Rome, 19ál, pp. 364-69.
Por an idea ot lhe complexity of the vocabulary surrounding "obieclum" by lbe
time of St. Bonaventure {whose Commtnlary on the Stntence, dales lrom 1250 to 1255,
according to Gilson, HCPMA, p. 685, n. 7), et. S. BoNAVBNTURAB, Commtnlarla In
Quafuor Libro, Senlenllarum tic., t. 111 (Quaracchi , 1887), Scbolion, p. 514, conceming
d. 24, a. 1, q. 2,
(3) cr. e.g. Jobn Duns Scolus, Ordinal/o I, disl. 3, pars 1, q. 4 {iJl Johannis Duna
Scoli, Opera Omnia, sludio el cura Commissionls ScollsUcae, t. Ill, # 261, p. 160):
• ... dico quod propter verba Augustini oporlet concedere quod verilates inlalll-
biles videnlur in regulis aeternls; ubl potesl Jy 'in' accipi obiective, et hoc quadru-
pllciter: vel sicul in obieclo proximo, vel sicut in continente obieclum proximum,
vel sicut in eo virtule cuius obiectum proximum movet, vcl sicut in obiecto
remoto.•
and tbe discussion which follows this slatemenl, pp. 160·172.
Ct. ibld., d. 36, q. unica {td. cil. , t. VI, # 47, p. 289):
, ... motio intellectus nostrl ·a quiditatibus intelligibilibus' reducitur ad ipsum
intelleclum divinum, per cuius 'esse simpllciter' illa obiecta habent esse secundum
quid, scllicet obiectivum (quod es\ esse moveos intellectum nostrum ad cognos-
cendum veritates sinceras), propter molionem earum dicilur ille inlellectus movere,
slcul el istae habenl 'suum csse secundum quid' propter simpllciter esse illius. •
Consider, further, tbe meaning o! "esse obiectivum" in Duns Scolus' pupil, Wlillam
or Alnwick: Quautione, Dl1pulatae De Eue lntelligibili, q. 2 {ed. A. LEooux, O.F.M.,
Quaraccbi, 1937, p. 63):
• ..• licet lapis ab aeterno habens esse obiectivum non sil ídem realiler cum Deo,
b 1men e.sse obiectivum ae.ternum lapldls e.al ldem realit.er Deo, quia Ulud eue
obiecllvum est eius esse representalum. Unde est advertendum quod esse oblec-
tivum non est formaliter esse obi,cti, quia obiectum secundum esse formaliler
sibi conveniens terminal cognitionem; cognltio aulem directa obiecU non termi-
natur ad esse obieclivum obiecti, quia cognitio qua actu directo intelligitur
lapis non terminalur ad csse repracsentatum lapidis, sed ad ipsam naturam
lapidis... ,
C!. also lhe distinclions made by Wlli iam concerrúng "esse in anima obieclive"
in q. 1 (td. cit. , p. 21 ).
(4) In s aying thal I have not lound a single inslance in the Orsl two books of
Alexander'a GI0Bla {Alexander o! Hale;, Glossa in Quatuor Libros Stnlenllarum Ptlrí
Lombardi, edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonavenlurae, 4 vols., Quaracchi, Florentiae, 1951-67),
I am excludlog one lext in lhe addilions ol ms.E {vol. 11, p. 227, line 22). The additions
or ms E are by an unknown lheoiogtan wrilinft sometime alter the publicat.ion ol tbe
Summa de bono or Pbilip the Cbarn:ellor; et. lbld,, p. 1· .
40 L. DEWAN
The airn of the present study is to iniliate investigation of the invention
of this word. By way of preliminary, we will look at the entries in sorne
dictionaries. Next, we will examine the two earliest texts in which we
have found the word used in a fairly elaborate way. And lastly we will
consider sorne of the background indicated by these earliest uses.
In the third book, I bave surveyed only dial. XII-XIV, on the knowledge which
Chrisl had {ed. cit., vol. nr, pp. 127-49), and dial. XXIII-XXXVI, on the vlrlues,
theological and cardinal, and lhe glfls ot the Holy Splrit (ibid., pp. 262-460). The
single inatance occurs al p. 264, line 22:
, Credere est 'Christo' tamquam efficienti, el 'Christum' tamquom obieclum,
et 'in Christum' tamquam in Jlnem. •
Slnce this text is round in ms. A, it can probably be dated es c. 1226•7 (cr. ibid.,
pp. 31 •.32• ). Unfortunately, this texl is ralher isolated lrom whal surrounds it,_a_nd
nolhing corresponds to it in ms. L {ibid., p. 276, # 22); ms. L glves a second ed1llon
ol lhe Glo81a, atill pre-1228-9 {et. ibld., p. 33•¡.-1 have aiso lound an instance of
"obieclum" in book 111, ms. L, nol lo be lound in ms. A. This is in dist. XXXV {L),
# 17b {<d. cit., vol. ll l, p. 443, Une 1), and apeaks or the "obiectum ínltlllgenllat" .
I have also surveyed lour questions in the quat81ionea di1putata, ol Alexander of
Hales ({)uaealion•• Di1pulalat 'Antequam t1sel fralu', Florentiae, 1960 (3 vols)), vlz.
qq. XVIII, XXXVI, XXXVIfl, and XXXIX. Only al one place, in q. XVIII, on
prophecy, did I Ond an inslance ol "obíectum": et. vol. I, p. 335, lines 9-18 {wilb
this lt Is essential to compare p. 334, linea 16-24). "Obieclum" here seems to mean
things themselves according to thelr tue aira, as distinguished from their preaenee
in the imaginalion.-The Quoealionu disputalae are dated 1220-36; el. vol . I, p. 36".
Concernlng the use ol "obiectum" in the so•called Summa Duaunai,, el. below,
n . 13. Concerning the laler {1233-39) Tractat.u, de divi,lone multipllcl potenliarum
animae ol John ot La Rochelle, cr. below, n. 37.
I have lound the word used In al least one discussion in tbe Summa A urea ot
Willlam or Auxerre, viz. Bk. IV, towards lhe end: " De numero sensuum splritualium",
et. Summa Aurea in quattuor libros Stnlenliarum, a subtilissimo doctore Magistro
Guillermo AIUssiodorensi edita, París, l ó00 (ediled by Philippe Plgoucbet); (pbotoeopy
published by Minerva, 1964, Fran.klurt/Main). We read: "Unicum obieetum est simplex
et invarlabile lltorum q ulnque sensuum spirilualium: scilicel decus: ergo unicus est
s ensus spiritualls in essentia: quia secundu:n obiecla dlsllnguunlur etiam sensus
corporales." {ed. cit., fol . CCCI ra, Unes 13-17); " ... ergo cum diversa sinl obieela ..."
{ibid., line 51); " ... non valet hec argumentatio: divisa sunt obiecla: ergo dlversi sunl
spirituales lntelleclus: lamen cum sil unius omnia habet sublecla. Omnla enlm poteat
cognoscere aicut patet In llde. t::st entm lides una licet multa oblecta babeat: ut inrer-
num vitam et mulla alia : et hoc eat quia una est ratio credendi omnia: simililer quia
una est ratio deleclandi in sensibili spirituali: unua eat sensus spiritualis licet mulla
obltcla babeat." (fol. CCCI rb, linea 21-29) {ilalics ours In the foregolng). lt is interes-
ling lhat thia cliscussion comes quite near lhe end or the Summa Aurea. Tbis is not lbe
voeabulary one nnds earlier, lor example, al Bk. 111, tr. 3, q. 3: td. cit., fol. CXXXII,
on the unily ot tbe virtue or faitb. This work is daled arter 1215 lor ils beginning;
et. c. •TTAVIANO, Guglielmo d'Auzerre, Rome, s.d. (1930), p. 33. Ottaviano pul 1220-
1225 tor tbe date of completion, while inclining towarda 1225 (ibid.J. índeed, be notes
(p. 13) that in Bk. 111, Pierre de Corbeil, Arcbbishop or Seos, who died In 1222, is cited
in a way whicb suggests be is airead:; dead; el. Summa Aurta, Bk. III, lr. 8, a. 4, q. 4:
td. cit., tol. CLXXXV va, bottom. Thus, the pasaages usiog "obitctum" were probably
wrilten belween 1223 and 1225.
 OBIE:CTUM 41
2. THE DrcTJONARI ES
Let us indicate more precisely the word we mean. lf we consult Lewis
and Short, A Lalin Dictionary, we do not find an ent-ry for "obiectum, -i".
The closest principal entries are "obiecius, -a, -um", a participle and
participial adjective from the verb: "obicio", and "obieclus, -us", a mas-
culine noun also deriving from "obicio". 5
"Obiectus, -us" has a rather verbal meaning, viz a casting before, a
putting before, a Iying before, e being interposed, etc. Al.so, there is a
second, transferred meaning: "that which presents itself to the sight, an
object, appearance, sight, spectacle." However, the only reference given
by Lewis and Short for this meaning is to a doubtful reading. •
Under "obicio", we find at the end of the entry a section devoted to
"obieclus, -a, -um", meaning (A) "lying before or opposite", (B) "exposed",
and (C), the word now being a neuter plural substantive: "obiecla, -orum",
"charges, accusations". These entries are as close as we can come to our
word in Lewis Short.
Blaise, in his Diclionnaire latin-(rancais des aitleurs chréliens, dedicated
to the period lrom Tertullian to the end of the Merovingians, has an
entry for "obieclum, -i", but it is lhe plural, meaning objections, that
he has in mind.7
The same author's Lexicon Lalinilalis Medii Aevi tells us that "obiec-
lum , -i" is both classical and to be found in his Dictionnaire just mentioned.
He tells us that it means "l'objet", and sends us for an instance of its use
lo St. Thomas Aquinas. However, tihe classical and early Christian word
he has in mind is clearly "obiecla, -orum", meaning accusations. 8
(5) Charlton T. L11w1s and Charles SttoRT, A Latín Dictionary, Oxlord, 1879.
In lhese words, Lewis and Short somet.imes uso uobi ... .'*, sometimes ºobj...". We have
kept "obl ..." througbout (unless quollng nn ediUon wherein "objutum" is used).
(6) Tbe relerence is to Comelius Nepos (O. ca. 65 B.C.), Líber de Excellentibu• Ducibu,
Exltrarum Genlium, XXIII ( Hannibal), &, 2. In the edition ol Anne-Marle Gulllemin
(Cornéllus Népos, <Euvre,, Paris, 1923) (Collection... Guillaume Budé), the lext is amen-
ded to read:
• Quo repentino obieclo uisu lanlum lerrorem iniecil exercitul Romanorum ut
egredi extra uallum nemo sil ausus. , (p. I 38).
This is translated by M11 • Guillemin es:
• ...ces feux qui lrapperent toul l coup leur vue, etc. (ibid., texte traduil, p. 138).
The manuscripls have: , ... oblectu viso", the reading to which Lewls and Sborl are
niterring. Tbe Utrecbt edilion ol 1542 has " .. .obleclo viso ... ", which il correct would
be an instance or "obieclum" as a subslant.ive.
(7) Cl. A. Bu1SE {avec H. Chiral), Dicl'ionnairt lalin-fran,aia de, aulturs chrllien,,
Slrasbourg, 19&4, "Le Lalin Cbrétien", ad toe.
(8) Cl. A. Bu,sg, Luicon Lalinllalis M-edii Aevi, Tumholli, 1975 (Corpus Chri.s tia-
norum. Conlinuatlo Mediaevalis), ad loe. Unlortunately, the work to wbicb we are
relcrred to see St. Tbomas Aquinas use "obiectum" is an Opu1cutum dt polenlll1 anlmae,
42 L. OEIVAN
The Revised Medieval Lalin Word-Lisl (rom Brilish and Irish Sources,
prepared by R. E. Latham, lists "obieclum" meaning objection or charge
as occurríng in texts ca 1125 and ca 1343. It also lists it with the meaning:
"object (phi!.)", with the dates 1286 and 1444. 9
The use of "obieclum, -i" to mean an ohjection is quite common by
the early thirteenth century. The use with the meaning: "lhe object of
a power" is only just being invented. It is the latter phenomenon with
which we are concerned.10
3. Two EARLY TEXTS
The word occurs severa! times in the De anima attributed to Robert
Grosseteste. This treatise was published in print by L. Baur in 1912.11
S. H. Thomson dated it, on paleographical grounds, at 1208-10.11
L. Keeler has argued its dependence on Philip the Chancellor, and his
hypothesis is that it is a reporlalio by Robert Grosseteste, as a student in
Paris in 1209 or thereabouts, of the teachings of Philip the Chancellor.18
which is not numbered among lhe authentic works ol St. Thomas. 01 course, almost
any aulhenllc work ol St. Tbomas could bave bi,en clted.
He also 1.i sts as a meaning: "ce qui possede une existence en soi, indépendanle de
la connaissance ou de l'idée que les etres pensants en peuvent avoir". For this, we are
sent to Duns Scotus, but no particular relerence is given.
(9) LATlfAM, R. E., Reuised Medieval Latín \Vord-List fram Briti,h and Iri1h Sourcts,
London, 1965 ad loe. Our Richard Fishacre lext (above, n. 2) would be a Brillsh source
ca. 1240, not to menllon Alexander ol Hales (abov,e , n. 4) who was teachlng In Parls.
(10) For instances ol 20lh-century English uee, et. e.g. Sanford, D.H. , "The
Primary Objects ol Perception", Mind vol. LXXXV (1976), pp. 189-208; SHINER,
R. A., "Classllylng Objects ol Acts and Emollons",. In Dlalogut X (1971), pp. 751-767.
(11) BAUR, L . Die Philosophischen IV<rke de, Roberl Grosstlt1le Bi1chof1 von Lincoln,
Münsler i. W., 1912 ( Beilrlige zur Geschicbte der Philosophie des Millelalters. Bd. rx¡,
pp. 242-274.
(12) Cl. TnoMsoN, S. Harrison, "The De anima ot R. Grosseteste", in The New
Scholaslicism, VII ( 1933), pp. 201-21.
I mlgbl mention here Iohannes BtuNo, Tractatu• de anima, edited by O. A. Csllus,
O.P., and R. W . Hunt, London, 1970 (Auctores Brl tannicl Medli Aevl. 11). Thls work
is dated "not later than 1204, and probably not tater tban aboul 1200" (p. x1). In
secllon VI, "De anima senslblli", par. 56 {p. 17, line 7), we read: "Quod sunt dlverse
<species > videtu.r per hoc quod guslus et tactus et visus et ollactua et auditus sunt
diverse vires et diversa babent propria obiuta." {our llallcs) Tbls is the only relerence
to the word "oblectum" In the index ol the edition. However, be it noted that the word
appears in only one ol the !bree manuscripts extant, tbe olher two readJng "seruiata".
(13) KEELER, Leo W., "The Oependance of R . Grosseteste'a De anima on the
Summa ol Philip the Chancellor", in The New Sc/r.ola11icilm, XI (1937), pp. 197-219.
We note that Mgr P. Glorieux, in the introduction to bis editlon ol tbe "Summa
Duacmli," {PQrie, 111~~ {Te~n pmlQsop!!lq11es du moyen Ag1! 11), pp, lHO, h11pliciUy
oppoaes tbls datlng and bypothesls ol Tbomaon and Keeler, reapecUvely, by aaserüng
lhat the autbor ol tbe De anima published by Baur Is dependent on tbe Summa Duacen1i1
{daled by Glorieux c. 1230).
 OBIECTUM
Even if we were t.o add ten years t.o Thomson's estímate and say "ca
1220", it would still be a very earl.y instance of the use of "obieclum" .
The next earliest extensive use we have found is in the De polenliis
animae el obieclis (anonymous) published by D. A. Callus in 1952 and
dated by him as between 1220 and 1230.14 Even if we say merely "ca
1230", it stiU constitutes the earliest direct discussion of the notions
signified by the word: "obieclum".
Let us, then, examine the employment of the word in these two works.
a) The De anima of Grosseteste:
The word occurs in this work in lhree distinct discussions. The first is
about the way the soul is present in the body. An object.or refers t.o
However, J . P. Torrell, "La 'Summa Duacensis" et Philip¡x, le Chancelier", in
Revut thomislt, t. LXXV (1975), pp. 67-94, while agreeing (al leasl as concerns the
malerials on prophecy which he has s ludied} with Mgr Glorieux t.hat the Summa
Duaunsis is earlier than and by a dilJerenl author than the Summa de bono or Phlllp,
nevertheless polnts out (p. 71, n. 24) lhat the Summa Duaunsis could be dated 12'.W
or earlier (following in lhis O. Lottin), and (p. 71, n. 2.5) could well nol be one single
work (!ollowlng c. Vansteenklste),
I have found two instances o! " obittlum" in the Summa Duacmsia, td. cit., p. 43,
line 6, and p. 49, line 23. The occurence al p. 60, llne 13 is an error: cr. p. 59, linos 22-24.
Concernlng tbe relalion o! the Summa DuactnMs wilh the anonymous Dt potentlis
anima• ti obitcli8, cf. below, n. 34.
(14) CALLUS, D. A., O.P., "The Powers, o! lhe Soul. An Earty Unpubllshed Text",
in RTAM 19 (1952), pp. 131-170.
In establishing the ltrminus ad quem dale for lhe work, Callus argues thal Philip
the Cbancellor makes use of il. Tbls puts us back to 1233. T hen he adds lhal "lhere
does not seem lo be any unmistakable sigo o! Averroes' lnOuence", and thls "brings
os lo 1230, when the Latín lranslalions o! Averroes made their flrst appearance in
un iversit.y circles in París". {p. 145) Here we are reterred lo R . de Vaux, O.P., .. La
premiére entrée d'Averroes cbez les lalins", In RSPT 22 (1933), pp. 193-245.
Then Callus adds lhal "!or lhe terminu, a quo we have no posilive dala. Al all events,
we ahould nol be very far wrong in asslgnlng lis dale lo lhe years belween 1220 and
1230." (art. cit., p. 145).
However, D. Callus also notes (p. 143) lhal both the Greek-Latin and Arabic-
Lalin translalions o! the De anima o! Arislotle are used In tbe treaUse. Also (p. 147,
in the note on lines 6-8), he points out lhal the translation ol Arislotle's Metaphy1ic,
belng used is lhat from lhe Arabic.
Now, accordlng to lbe argument o! de Vaux, In the arlicle relerred to by Callus,
the lranslalion ol Averroes and the translations o! Aristotle lrom tbe Arabic are part
o! the same evenl. Cf. R. de V ,wx, art. cit., p. 234 (with note 4).
This means that the De potenliia animae ti obiecli• has as ttrminus a quo 1230 or
1231.
Again, while it is true that the trealise does not exhibil any "unmislakable sign"
or Averroes' inOuence, one mighl wonder aboul the presenlalion o! the various modes
o!•••• o! lhe sensible form (cf. text cited below, p. 60). D. Callus provides no note on
the background o! lhis doctrine; el. lhe texls o! Averroes which we elle below, n . 53.
However, even ir the trealise is lo be dated c. 1230, il is still lhe earliest texl we
have seen wblch actually dlscusses lhe no lion o! obiectum.
43 44 L. DEWAN
statements of St. Augustine in bis De quanlilate animae to the efTect
that the bodily eye is afTected ( palitur) where it is not, seeing being a
case of being afTected by the things seen, and t he eye seeing things in
places in which it, the eye, is not located. The objector argues that one
could say the same thing with even more force concerning the soul. And
so he concludes that the mere fact that the soul is afTected in the individ-
ual members of the body does not show that the soul is present in those
members essentially. Here is the reply:
• ... Augustinus ponebat, quod videmus extra mit tentes. Unde radius
spiritualis, qui exit ab oculo, non (?) immutatur ab obieclo extra.
Ed (lege : et) quoad hoc dicit Augustinus quod oculus patitur ubi
non est. Tamen proprie non est verum, licet videat ubi non est. •16
The author is here interpreting the saying of Augustine from the
De quanli/ale animae in the light of a doctrine of corporeal vision found
elsewhere in the works of Augustine. According to that doctrine, the
eye sends forth a ray which proceeds until it strikes an impeding body:
" ...irruil radius in corpus obieclum ... ", says Augustine.18
This doctrine of vision was very much referred to in the twelfth century,
as we shall see in more detail later on in this, paper, but t he technical term
for the "corpus obieclum" (to use Augustine's expression) was not
"obieclum" but rather "obslaculum". 11
Soon after the ahove passage, we come to a discussion of the distinction
between the superior and the inferior portio ralionis : whether they are
two powers or one. Clear though unacknowledged reference is made to
Aristotle's De anima II, ch. 4: 415a19-20, a passage which as we shall
soon see Iooms Iarge in the hist.ory of our word. However, the word
(15) BAUR, p. 255, Unes 15-19. T he objecllon is al p. 253, linea 27-31. One mighl
wonder whether instead of ºobiecto" one sbould read uobstaculo". The De anima
o! Grosselesle exista only in one manuscript, vl.z. ms. Oxlord, Bodleisn Library,
Digby 140. I have seen a mlcrolllm copy, and can say that "obieclo" is the correct
readlng. F urlhermore, while the texl o! the De anima of Grossetesle ls not heavlly
abbrevialed in the manuscripl, il remains notable lhal ln every single case, the word
"obietfum" is written in tull.
(16) cr. SI. AUGUSTINE, Sermo CCLXXVII, P.L. 38, col . 1262 (cap. X, 10):
, In hoc ipso corpore, quod gestamus, invenio aliquld, cujus lnelrabllem mi.r er
celerilalem. Quid esl hoc? Radius oeull nostri, quo langimua quidquid cernimus.
Quod enlm vldes, oculi tui radio conlingis. Si velis vldere longius, et interponatur
aliquod corpus, irruit radius In corpus obJectum, et traneire non permittilur ad
Id quod videre desideras; el dicis impedienti., Exl, obstas mlhi. Columnam vis
videre, horno in medio st.at, lmpedlt aclem tuam. Radius tuus emlssus esl, sed
pervenis usque ad hominem usque ad columna m pervenlre non sinltur, etc.
In lhe De quantitate animae, Augusllne speaks, nol o! a radiua, but O! visu• itself
golng lorlb. C!. De quanlilate animat, # 41-44 !or lhe doclrlne ot vlsion; # 59-61 ,
for the argument as a wbole as regards the soul (P.L. 32, col. 1058-60 and 1068-69).
(17) cr. below, pp. 81-92.
 OBJECTUM
"obiectum" is not used in the presentation. We find rather the word
"maleria" playing the role we might have expected to see assigned to
"obieclum". 18
There are two other places where the De anima oí Grosseteste uses
"obiectum." Both are questions about appetite.
(18) Ct. B,\OR, pp. 259-260. Al p. 260, line 1, tbe words: "Aclus sunl primi potenlis-
(lege: potenliis)- ecundum ralionem" are an abrevialed cítation or Aristolle In the
translaUon of James ot Venice (see lbe text cited bclow, p. 57 and n. 41'>).
However, whereao in Arlsl.olle the doctrine was used merely to give the order or
invesligalion, operalions belore powers, bere ín our toxl il is somewhat adapted to
lhe resolulion or the question or díversíty or powers.
Also, whereas in Aristolle, lhe lhird factor in the piclure is called "the opposites",
"ta anlikeimena" , which will be lranslated in the Greco-Latin and Arable-Latín
verslons by ºoppo,ila" and "ru oppositae" respecUvely, here in this text we flnd
neither these nor, as is else-where the case, '"obiecta", but. .. mattriae".
In lhis respect, this discussion ot lhe díversily or powers and acts conslitutes a
precious tesllmony to lhe effort wblch was made to develop a vocabulary ror these
issues. "Maluia" here is not. a tronslation or Arist.oue•s "lo anlike-imtnon" but an
interprelation, indeed an interprelalíon .a lready to be found, e.g., in Themislius'
paraphrase or Aristolle (see below, p. 67 and n. 70) .
Here is the full toxt ot the argument:
• Aclus sunt primi potenlis-(lege: potentiís)- secundum ralioncm. Ergo diver-
sitas potenllarum esl secundum diversilalem acluum. Sed diversitas acluum
esl secundum diversilatem materierum- (sic)- in specic. Ergo cum diversae
maleriae in specie sunt lemporale el aelernum, diversi sunt actus et potenllae
cjrca Hla.-Sed inferior pars ralionis ci.rca lemporale versatur, superior circa
aeterna, ul dicit Auguslinus de Trinitate XII . Ergo superior et inlerior portio
ralionis sunl diversae potenliae. • BAtJR, p. 260, linea 1-7.
Here are lhe Professor's remarks concerning lhis argumenl:
• Argumentum, quo probatur, quod sunt diversae potentiae concedimus. Scien-
dum lamen, quod non ad quamlibel acluum diversitatem sequitur diversitatem
potentiarum, sed lantum ad d iversilatem lormalem et propriorum actuum.
"Slmililer inlelligendum est de diversitale habituum, qua-(quia?)-habltus
plus reclplt diversilalem a materia, circa quam est, quam polenlia. Unde in eadem
potentia sunt diversi habitus secundum habilltalem potentiae ad actum in diversis
malerüs. • (/bid., lines 28-35).
In tbe Proressor's own resolulion or the queslion, here ís how he speaks:
• Ad hoc dicendum, quod duplex est ldentilas: una secundum rem et a.Itera
secundum rationem. Et dico rem ul subiectum. Rationem autem non dlco ul
lormalem, quam consideran! logici, sed malerialem quam attendil theologus et
elhicus. Oicimus ergo, quod superior el inlerior portio rationis unum sunl secun-
dum rem, quia unum subiect.um illarum.
• Secundum rationem vero malcrialem sunt duae potentiae.
• Dicit ergo AugusUnus, quod cum disserimus de natura mentís humanae, do una
re disserimus, loquitur de re, quae est animae substantia, non quae est animae
potentia . Et verum est, quod illae duae potenlíae sunt et sunt in una potenUa et
sunt eadem essenlia bae diversae potenliae . • (/bid., Jines 17-27).
1s tbe "materialis" of uratio maleriali1" in tbe above to be understood in runclion or
the "materia circo quam"?
Concerning Ibis use or "materia", ín lhe Aristolelian Dt anima pallem, el. lbe
lollowing texts lrom Alexander ol Hales' GloS1a, 11[, dist. XXXUI. In mss. A and E
(td. el/., vol. 111, p. 382, línes 4-8):
45 46 L. DEWAN
The longer and more complex concerns tbe distinction between na tural
and deliberative appetite. The problem considered in the text arises from
the doctrine that each power of the soul has its own proper natural
inclination or appetite. This being so, is there any room for and any need
for a distinct volitive power, one power which would be lhe willing power?
The general answer given is that one may consider the powers according
to their natural movement, and one may also consider them as moved
by deliberative reason. Even reason itself may be considered in these
two ways. Thus, there is distinction among the powers, considering t hem
in relation to their proper objects, and according as t heir movement. is
tenninated at that. object. There is unity oí the powers according as they
have as their mover deliberative reason moving ali towards the goal
which is the good, the end or goal oí ali. It is according to this unity that
deliberative appetite is said to constitute one power. Let us look at the
texts in more detail. 19
The discussion begins with arguments on both sides of the question,
first three arguments on the side of unity oí willing power, then two
contra. It is in the first oí these arguments contra that we find "obiectum":
• ... vírlus dicit comparationem ad aclus el ad fines et ad materias; ideo diversifi-
canlur penes diversllatem actuum el llnium et maleriarum ... ,
In ms. L (ibid., p. 397, lines 13-18):
• ...virt.us dicit comparaUonem ad actus et materias et Unes diversos; et ideo
secundum mulUplicaUonem borum, roultíplicatur virtus.-Quod obicitur de
amore, respondeo: caritas est amor summi bo:nl secundum se, sed aliae virtutes
habent amorem actus propril supra propriam materiam et nnem propínquum;
el ideo, cum amatum sil aliud, et alius amor. •
(19) B,\UR, pp. 265-266. Here is lhe lexl pl'e$enting lhe tworold will or appetite:
• Ouplex est appelilus el duplex volunlas, scilicet nalu.ralis et delíberativus,
scilicel quod praecedlt deliberatio ralionis volunlas naluralis, sive appelilus
mulllplicabilis esl secundum multiplicationem virium, quarum esl appetilus et
quarum sunt deleclabilia.- Quaelibel enim appetit suum deleclabile naturaliter
proprie appetitu. AppeUtus vero deliberativus sive volunlalis deliberatio unius
est potentiae siva una potenlia esl... • (p. 265, llnes 30-36).
Hcre is the presenlalíon ol reason tmd its movemenl:
• Habet autem raUo duplicem molum sive appetilum: unum naluralem, secundum
quem movetur in verum sislendo ibi.-Aliua motus eive appeUtusrationis eat
deliberativus. Et secundum hoc movetur in verum propter bonum, et irascibilis
in arduum propter bonum, et concupiscibilis in bonum propler bonum. Unde
lstae tres vires uniuntur ex parle movenlís, id est ralionia ex parte llnis, propter
quem movet. El ideo una vis dicitur !acere appelitum deliberativum. • (p. 266,
llnes 4-10) .
This is the beart ot lhe doctrine. It Is accompanied by tbe lollowing commenl on
the role ot reason:
, Appetilus aulem huiusmodi aliler esl ralionls, aliter esl tríum vi.rium: Rationis
quídem est ut imperanlls, el Oncm ponenlis, virium autem orlginaliter est ut
ex quibus est. Unde et ipsa raUo imperal slbi lpsi quanlum ad motum suum.
Unde molus rationia dupllclter est ipsius ut :imperanlis et originallter. • (/bid.,
Une, 10-16).
 OBIECTUM 47
• Contra : Potentiae dillerunt secundum actus proprios, actus vero
secundum obiecla, aut secundum motiva verbi gratia rationabilis
est in verum, concupiscibilis in bonum, irascibilis in arduum .Et quia
hi dillerunt secundum rationem,. ideo et potentiae dillerunt secundum
rationem. Ergo et appetitus d.illerunt. Ergo quaelibet vis habet suum
appetitum respectu sui delectabilis. »20
This argument clearly has as one part of its background Aristotle's
De anima 11, ch. 4: 415al 7-23. There Arislolle presents the triad: powers/
operations/their oppo~ites or correlatives. In the Latín translation by
James of Venice, these are polenlia-e/aclus/opposila. But t he vocabulary
of our text, i.e. the De anima of Grosseteste, has, not "opposila", nor as
it had a little earlier: "maleria", but rather "obiecla".
Moreover, the word "obiecla" clearly stands in need of explanation.
"Motiva" is immediately added, along with a procession of examples. 11
(20) BAUR, p. 265, lines 21-26. Our iLalics.
(21) For Lhis use or "molivum", et. ALBXAN DER or HALES, Glossa 111, disl. XXVI,
in mss. A and E (td. cil., vol. 111, p. 311, lines 5-9), as tollows:
, Primae quacstiones circa spem sunt... Prima autem est, quid est spes; secunda,
in qua vi sil spes; terUa, ad quid tendit spes, scilieeL quid est proprium molivum
spei... , (al wbicb poinl ms. E adds: "sicut verum fldei et bonuro carltaUs" ).
cr. also, troro Lhe same place, disL. XXI II, rrom ms. L (ibid., p. 281 , lines 26-28):
"Caritas enlro sumroum bonum habeL pro fine el pro motivo, sive tamquam illud
in quod Lransit aetus eius, et ea diligimus summum bonum propter se . •
Perhaps to be associaled wlth Uús vocabulary is a passage in ms. E, concerning
lbe specltying or cburlty, whlch reters lo AristoUe's Ph¡¡•ics:
• Motus Lrahit speciem et genus ab eo in quod •· {lbíd., p. 323, fines 27-28.)
Tbere is anotber approach Lo an Arislot.elian background tor Litis use or "molivr,m" .
In James' or Verúce' lranslaUon or Lhe D• anima ol AristoUe, we read:
• Omnis enim color molivus est secundum actum lucidi... • 11, 7: 418b l ; p. 175,
linea 21-2;
and agaln:
• Hoc enim erat ipsi eolori cssc quod est molivum esse sccundum aclum lucidi. •
lbid., 419al0-11; p. 177, línea 3•4;
and agaln:
• Sonativum motivum est unius aeris usque ad audiLum •· 11, 8: 420-.13-4; p. 186,
line 17.
(In the above reterences, "p." and "line" reters to Pedro Hispano, Obras Filoso/leas
111, ed. P. Manuel ALONSO, S.J., Madrid, 1952, in which is conLained an edilion ol lhe
James or Venice Lranslaüon or the De a11im:a, based on six mss).
ll should be noted tbal tbe flrsL or the above passages is somelimes ciled in anoLher
form, even more suggestive from our point of view. Thus, in the De potentii, animae
ti obitcli1 (ed. CALLUS, p. 152, lines 4-5), we read:
• Color est moUvum viaus secundum acLum lucidi •·
This same formula is to be round in St. Albert, Summa de Creaturís 11, q. 21, a. l ;
ed . BoRCNET, t. 35, p. 183.
Tbe trio of powers: ralionabilis, concupiscibili1, irascibilis has one obvious source
in the pseudo-Augusline's De spírilu el anima 4 (P.L. 40, 781-2). cr. JouN or
LA RocHBLLE, Traclatu, de divi1iont multiplici potenliarum animat, ed. P. MtCHAUD~
48 L . DEWAN
The first reply of the author distinguishe:s duplex volunlas, viz volunlas
naluralis, which is multiple (each power having this), and deliberalivU$
( appelilus): this is one power.
It is immediately objected:
• Sed adhuc obicitur, quod sive sit naturalis appetitus, sive delibe-
rativus, semper remanent diversa obiecla et diversa motiva: Ergo et
diversi actus et diversae potentiae. »21
The difJerence naluralis/deliberali vus does nothing to explain why there
would be only one deliberative appetite or will. The doctrine of multi-
plication of powers through acts and objects would appear to make
multiplication prevail.
Accordingly, the author is obliged to explain the unity and diversity
in terms of the doctrine of t he obieclum:
• Ad hoc dicimus, quod appetitus naturalis est secundum convenien-
tiam proprii obiecli ad ipsam viro, cUJius est appetitus. Unde cum
diversae sint convenientiae naturales, diversi sunt appetitus singu-
lares. Sed ubi est appetitus per deliberationem, non sistit in obieclo,
quia ratio movet propter finem; finis autem bonum. Et ita movet
propter bonum. »n
Thus, two movements are envisaged in the powers, one which is, as it
were, tailored to t he power as specified by its object and terminating in
the object, t he other a general movement of reason unifying the whole
man towards the good as such, not towards mere regional appropriateness.
After further explanation of this role of reason14, we have another
objection germane to our enquiry. The natural appetite is entirely outside
t he order of merit and demerit, while it is the deliberative appetite which
has to do with merit and demerit and so with virtue. Now, according to
the author's position, t his deliberative appetite is in only one power.
This would seem to locate the entirety of virtue in one power. And
against this is the doctrine that faith is in the rational, charity in the
concupiscible, and hope in the irascible power.26
QuANTIN, Parls, 1964, Secunda Pars, XLVII I, p . 124. cr. also De 1plrilu tl anima
13 (P.L. 40, col. 789), ciled in Alexander ol Hale,s' Glossa 1, dlst. 111, 46a (td. cit.,
vol. 1, p. 64).
ll is interesting Lo compare wilh our passage in Lhe De anima ot GrossetesLe the
rollowing itero rrom Alexander or Hales' Gloua 11, dist. VI, 6 (td. cit., vol. 11, p. 52,
lin88 11-14):
, Itero tres sunt vires anlmae: rat.ionalis, concupiscibilis, irascibilis; et sunt ad
tres Hnes: verum, bonum, honorificum. Sed unumquodque lstorum l.icet propriam
vlm appetere; ergo ... , (an objeeUon, not Alexander's own teachiog).
(22) fü.UR, p. 265, lines 42-44 . Our italics,
(23) lbld., line 46, p. 266, llne 3. Our ILallcs.
(24) For Lhe text or thls explanatioo, et. above, o . 19.
(25) BAUR, p. 266, lines 16-20.
 OBIECTUM
The author replies:
• Secundum quod hae vires uniantur (?), et naturalis appetitus est
in obiecla ibi sistens, non est in eis virtus ve! vitium, sed secundum
eas, quae ratione imperantur et. in fine uniuntur. Et sic est caritas in
concupiscibili ordinata per rationem ad bonum et spes in irascibili
ordinata ad bonum. Unde lides, quae sistit in utrisque ( ?), non est
virtus, sed opin.io. •"
Here, the twofold movement previously d.istinguished, the one originating
in reason and moving ali towards the good, the other originating in
nature and moving each power towards its object, make for two views of
the diverse powers, according to which (views) virtue does or does not
pertain to them. Reason, the good, and virtue are placed in one concaten-
ation of intelligibilities; the nature of the power, its natural movement,
and the object, in another concatenation.
The objector makes one last and most interesting efTort:
«Sed obicitur : quia sic omnes vires habent finem unum, scilicet
bonum, et unum movens, scilicet rationem. Ergo non difTerunt ab
invicem. •"
This puts us once more face to face with the question of how the powers
are distinguished one from anothe·r. The objector summons both the
finis and the movens. This may be merely a reference to the role of these
two Aristotelian causes in the formulation of definitions in general.
However, from the viewpoint of a discussion of "obieclum" it is particular-
ly interesting. lt is precisely in terlJl.8 of the origin of motion and the goal
of motion that the distinction between two types of obieclum, one specify-
ing the passive power, one the active power, will eventually be made.
We will see something of this later.18
Here is our author's response:
• Ad hoc dicimus, quod difTerunt in obieclis propriis, quae circa
fidem (finem) sunt. - Rationalis est in verum propter bonum,
irascibilis in arduum propter bonum, concupiscibilis in bonum
propter bonum. Et ita patet, quod concupiscibilis et caritas idem
sunt (habent ?) pro obieclo et pro fine. Aliae vero vires et virtutes
aliud habent pro obieclo, aliud pro fine... •29
As can be seen, little is done here to express the difTerence between the
obieclum on the one hand, the finis on the other. One seemingly is supposed
to grasp the distinct intelligible roles by means of the examples.
(26) lbid., lines 21-26. Our italics. The. word "ulri$que" is a marginal addit.ion in
lhe manuscript.
(27) lbid., lines 27-28.
(28) cr. below, p. 58, •• well as n. 50.
(29) BAuR, p. 266, linea 29-33. The ms. has "{lntm", nol "/ldtm".
49 50 L . OEWAN
One might wonder whether the above objection had not originally to
do with "virlules" rather than with "vires" .. The idea would be: you have
now consigned ali the means of establishing di.stinction to the side of
the natural powers and their objects; you have put virlus along with
reason and good, in a frarnework of thoroughgoing unity: accordingly, for
your position there is only one virtue.
The sense of the reply would then be to show how it is the coupling
of the proper object of a power with the rational movernent towards the
good which constitutes gTOunds for distinguishing the virtues of faith,
hope, and charity one from the other. Only in the case of charity and the
concupiscible power is there coincidence of nature of object and goal of
rational movement. Thus, the distinction of the virtues one from another
remains intact.
From our point of view, this has the notable efTect of using the notion of
obieclum in the distinguishing of the virlues, not merely of the powers.
Still, the application is less direct than in tibe case of the powers.
The t hird and last instance of uses of "ol>ieclum" which we have found
in the De anima of Grosseteste occurs in a discussion of terms signifying
appetitive rnovements or passiones. The terms under discussion are
"deleslari", "fugere", and "nol/e". One example will suffice for our
purposes. lt concerns a wide and a strict sense of "delestari":
• Detestari quandoque sumitur large, quandoque stricte, quandoque
largius verbi gTatia detestari quandoque determinat rationis instinc-
tum et per comparationem certi obiedi, scilicet vilis, et sic stricte
sumitur et est irascibilis humanae tantum. Quandoque solum instinc-
tum rationi.s determinat et non habet comparationem ad certum
obieclum, sed sumitur respectu cuiuslibet inconvenientius, et sic
pertinet ad quamlibet vim motivam. •ªº
The general technique of analysing the specific appetitive movement
in terms of an "obieclum" is worth noting.
Of the three diflerent discussions in wh.ich "obieclum" occurs in the
De anima of Grosseteste, then, one is a mere mention in the rather peri-
pheral context of St. Augustine's views o,f corporeal vision; the other
two concern the distinguishing of various operations or rnovements of the
soul (especially appetitive movements), as well as the distinguishing of
the powers and virtues of the soul. Only in the second discussion, on the
distinction between natural and deliberative appetite, is enough said to
yield details of the doctrine signified by the word "obieclum." There,
it is taken as somewhat synonymous with "moliuum". It is seen as a prin-
cipie of knowledge of the nature of the various polenliae or vires. It is
(30) Jbid. , p. 267, llnes 40-46. Our llalics. "ObittJum" is also used nl line 47, and at
p. 268, line 11.
 OBIECTUM 51
contrasted with the inteUigibility: finis , though in sorne cases the two can
and do coincide. Though a virtus can have an obieclum (as in the passage
quoted above, at the bottom of p. 49), finis looks to be more essential to
the intelligibilit-y : virlus than does obieclum. Obieclum belongs to the
analysis of the natural as such, while virlus and finis as such seem to
have more to do with the deliberatíve and reason as such. u
The combi.nation of factora is considerable. We have the Aristotelian
sett.ing (the De anima polenlia/aclus/opposilum triad); however, the
"opposilum" member has been interpreted as a "molivum" (still related to
the De anima of Aristotle, where the term "molivum" is used of colour
vis-a-vis sight, etc."); but whereas Aristotle's examples for the opposila
were food, the sensible, and the intelligible, we have here the application
to the pseudo-August.ine's triad of vires: ralionabilis/concupiscibilis/
irascibilis; moreover, the motiva are now called "obiecla". Also, the
Christian virtues of faith, hope, and charity involve "obiectum" in their
analysis and ditTerentiation, though still somewhat indirectly.
In the same work, viz the De anima of Grosseteste, we have noted the
use of t he term "materia", against the same background of Aristotle's
De anima 11, ch. 4, in a discussion of the Augustinian distinction between
superior and inferior reason. This represents an earlier stage in the
(31) For lhe remole background of lhis disUnction belween nature and reason as
sources or motion, cf. ARl&TOTLE, Metaph. IX, c. 2, 1046a36-b24.
For tbe more proxlmate background or these lext.s, cf. P. Micbaud-Quanlin's note
in bis edition ol Jobn or La Rochelle's Tractatiu, p. 98, note J. CI. also tbe text or
John al &cunda para, ch. LV, p. 133, line. 171- p. 134, line 186 (on lwolold volunta,).
Cf. aleo O. LOTTIN, Psychologie el moral• au:e X IJ• el XII/• siicles, Louvain/Gembloux,
1942, t. 1, pp. 399 ff.
We have aleo not.ed the lollowing passages in Alexander ol Hales' Gloaaa, which
bave simllarilles witb the vocabulary and doctrines ol the De anima ol Grossetesto;
in a discuulon of original sin, within the framework or the lhree powers or lbe soul
laken lrom tbe De 1piritu el anima, we read:
• Dlcend um lamen aliter, quod esl co:ncupiscenlia generalis, quae esl in qualibel
vis respectu sui delectabllis; el hoc modo dlcilur originale peccatum concuplscentla.
El sic est pronilas respectu lalsi, apparenlis lamen veri; vel pronilas respectu
vills, apparenlis lamen ardui; vel pronilas respectu mali, apparenlis lamen boni.
Esl aulem speclalls concupiscenlia, quae est appelilus sive actus in vi concuplsci-
bili; et sic non dicitur originale peccatum concupiscentla. , In 11 Sen!., dist. xxxi,
4: td. cit., pp. 297-298.
In botb texls, each vi• has an appeliLive movcment "re,peclu 1ui deltclabili1". CI.
our p. 47, at n. 20.
Por tbo division ol volunta, inlo nalural.i1 and deliberativa, el. lbe lollowing:
• ltem, esl voluntas potentia naturalis, et sic-<nec>~ius act..us nec ipsa est
peccatum; est autem vol untas deliberativa, et sic elus actus peceatum esse potesl,
el sic ordinatur post deliberalionem ad bonum vel ad malum. Sed intellectus et
ratio ordinanlur ad verum solum; ideo oorum aclus peccata esse non possunt. •
/bid., dlst xxxix, 6, p. 379.
(32) Ct. above, n. 21.
52 L. DEWAN
development of the doctrine signified by "obieclum", as can be gathered
from the use of "materia" in this connection in authors not only in the
early thirteenth century, but also much earlier.18
b) The De polenliis animae el obieclis:
We move to the other of the two treatises mentioned earlier, the
De polenliis animae el obieclis. 3C In this work the word "obieclum" is used
almost solely in a few passages at the beginning, but in t hese we have
a direct discussion of the notion signified by the 1,erm.
The t reatise begins as follows:
e Potentia quedam habet obieclum sive materiam diversam a se,
quedam non. Et dico obieclum, ut color est visus ; materiam, ut
volitum aliquod aut concupiscibile materia voluntatis. Potentia vero
non habens obieclum diversum a se ip·sa est potentia divina : quod
enim <Deus > (adds Callus) cognoscit alia, hoc est cognoscendo
seipsum. t 35
We are here in a context of fundament als. "Obieclum" is explained
by the relation o( colour to sight. "Materia" is also illustrated. It is
notable that these two terms have each its own illustration. Of the two,
(33) CI. above, n. 18, and below, p. 90.
(34) CI. above n. 14. O. Callus suggcsls as "pure hypolhesis" (p. 146) the aulhor o!
thc Summa Duacensi., as a candidate for lhe authorship ol U1e De potentiis anima• el
obitclis.
Againsl tbis is the following passagc ol the Summa Duacen,is:
• ...dicimus quoniam est quidam inlelleclus quo est. omn1a facere; et dicilur
intelleclus agens vel teorlcus vcl practicus; et ilerum inlelleclus quo est omnia
flerl, et dicltur ab Arislolelc inlcllcctus possibílis aul materialis ...Scd intcllectus
ipsc agcns aut possibilis manet semper In sua substancia incorruptibllis et
inmixlus mat.erle ... , Ed. ell., pp. 44-45.
This uso ot the term " inteUectus ...maltri.alU" for lhe intellect.us possibilis, together
wilb thc atlribulion to AristoUe himself or Lile lcrm • intelleelu• materialis •• smacks
of A verroes. Thus, A verroos says:
• O Alexander, si hoc nomen intelletlus materia/is non signiflcasset apud Arislo-
t.elem rúsi praeparalionem tantum, quomodo raccret hanc comparalionem inter
ipsum et int.ellcctum agentem, scilicel in dando ea in quibus conveolunt et ea
in quibus diflerunU • Commentarium Magnum in Arisloleli, de Animo Libro, (cd.
F. S. CRAWFORo-Cambridge, Mass., 1953) 111, eomm. 19, linos 81-85; p. 443.
This is quite unlike the doctrine o! inlelleelus maleriali• round in the De potenlii•
anima• et obiecli8 and John of La Rochelle (el. CALLUS, pp. 141-143), where "inlellectus
malerialis" signifles somelhlng perlshable. P. Michaud-QuanUn, op. cit., p. 81, note o
is in error in coupling Averroes wilh Alexander coneeming Lhis taller use or "intelleclus
matuialisn; cf. ibid., p. 87, note-(, where-the error is not repea lcd. Thus, in t.his doctrine
ol the inlellecl,u malerialis, the aulhor ol lhe De polenlii, animae ti obiedi1 is al odds
with l.he aulbor or the Summo Duacerui1, and certainly shows no sign of the influence
or Averroes .
(35) CALLUs, p. 146, lines 1-5. Our ilalics.
 OBIECTUM 53
"obieclum" has the more obviously sensible item for an example. Or is
the contrast meant Lo be betwee.n "obieclum" as pertaining to the
apprehensive power, with its movernent from things Lowards the soul,
and "materia" as pertaining to the motive or appetitive power, with its
movement from the soul towards the thing? 38
The author says that sorne polenlia does not have an obieclum diversum
a se. Does this mean that t here is a polenlia which has no obiectum at ali?
Th.is is a doctrine taught by Jobo of La Rochelle, adopLing and adapting
the work of our author: the divine ¡powers are "sine obieclo""· Our text
could conceivably be so read, taking "diversum a se" as expressive of
something essential to the obiectum or materia as so named. However, it
(36) CI. CALLUS, p. 148, llnes 6-8; clted below, p. 58, n. 48. Notice that by the
time this latter statement is made, the author has declared blmsell to be uslng
"obiulum" In a wlde sense, as lncluding materia. Thus, it is quite possible that in bis
firat use ol tbe term "obieclum", as distlnguished lrom the term "materia", it is this
movement towarda the aoul that he sees as lhe reason lor the term "obieetum".
(37) CI. CALLUS, p. 146, note on linea 3-11. John ol La Rochelle (Summa de anima)
says:
• Nota qu od est potentia operans sine organo et sine obiecto, et bec potentla
esl proprle Dei. Unde potenlia cognoscendl In eo est sine organo et sine oblecto.
Non enim cognoscit res per ipsas res, vel per simllltudinlbus a rebus, sed cognos-
cendo seipsum. Eodem modo poten tia operandi ipsius est sine organo, nec requirit
materiam sublectam quasi obiectum. Et cst potentla que est operaos, babens
organum et obiectum, sicut potentle anime operantes per corpus, ut potentia
vislva per pupillam et obiectum colorem ut videat. E t est potenlla operaos sine
organo, non lamen sine obiecto, ut potentia intellectiva •·
I n tbe above, "materlam 1ubíeclam quasí obieclum", used wilb respect to the power
lor operating (potenlia operandi), suggests tbat the word "obiectum" is more comforta-
bly uaed lor tbe case ol knowing. Also, the reasons given lor eliminaling the obiectum
in the case o! God's knowing lndicate thal the word s uggests the acllon ol the thing
known on lbe knower, or the movement ol things towards the sou l.
lndeed, is tbe passage eoneerning God 's mode ol knowing tbings oniy accidentally
similar to lhe paasages wbicb we quote, below at n. 101, lrom William ol Conches'
Boethian gloss?
Coneernlng J obn ol La Rochelle, we ha.ve not made a special study. D. Callus has
argued bis dependence on tbe De potentíi• anima• et obieclí1. Besides the Summa de
anima, however, about wbieh D. Callua was speaklng, there is J obn's Traclalu, de
dluiaion• mullíplici polentiarum animae (el. supra, n. 21 ). Thia work, dated c. 1233-39
(el. M1CHAUD-QUANTIN, p. 23) seems earlier tban the Summa de anima (ibid., p. 20).
Nevertheless, this would still pul lt late r than the De polenlil• animae u obiuli,;
indeed, the Tratlatu, uses as source lbe Summa de bono ol Philip the Chaneellor (ibid.,
p. 23), wlúeb D. Callus says certainly (Callus, p. 146) dependa on the De potenl/11 ...
There is considerable use or the word 11 obiectum" in John•s Tractatu&, but. in a very
spotty way. Here are sorne spots I have noted: pp. 74, 81, and 82 (these passages have
to do with the senses, and resemble things said in the De polentíi, ... ); pp. 101 and 133
(tbese bave to do with the power ol the will, and have a eertaln simllarlty to things
we saw in the De anima ol Grosseteste); p. 140 (tbe theologieal virtues); pp. 174-5 (the
cardinal and lheological virlues); pp. 179-80 (bealilude).
Most remarkable is the passage al p. 180, lines 44-~9. John is speaking ol seven
dllferent dellnitions ol bealitudo. T be firat lour are "atatu, omnium bonorum congrega-
tlone ptrfutua" ( Boethius); "actu, anime ,ecundum virlulun perfectu," (ArletoUe)¡
54 L. DEWAN
can also be read taking "diversum a se" as expressive of a sort of specific
difference setting off one type or mode of obieclum from another, tbe other
type or mode being such t hat obieclum and polenlia really coincide. That
this latter interpretation is indeed what our author means seems confirmed
later when he appears to envisage the case where the distinction between
polenlia and obieclum is only "secundum ralionem". 18
Nevertheless, the text continues as follows:
e Que vero nata est ad obieclum, aut mediante organo exit in actum,
aut non mediante organo... t 89
Thus, we are clearly in the midst of a division of polenlia, and the non-
divine member of the division is described as "Que nata esl ad obieclum".
lf t he author's position is the same as that of John of La Rochelle (i.e.
that there is a polenlia sine obieclo), then "Que nata esl ad obieclum" could
be paraphrased as: " the sort of power which has an obieclum". On the
other hand, if (as the truth seems to be) our author already has it in mind
that sorne powers are identical with their obieclum, he may be using the
"ad" to express the real diversity; or else he may be stressing "nata," so
as to say that the relaLion "ad" is in tlús case "in naturis", i.e. is a real
relation-'°
..,ulflcientia omnium commodorum ,int omni índigtntía'" (Anselm); and "pu/tela tdtndl
bibendiqu• ,atleta•" (Seneca) . J obn explains tbese lour by mcans ol the tour Arlstotelian
causes: "ul forma" (the definition ol AristoUe); " ut {lni•" (that ol Anselm); "ul materia
1ive ut ,ubiulum appetitll8 creatura• ralionali," (that ol Boethlua); "ul cau,a tlflclt111"
(Seneca). (Expresslons lrom p. 179.)
Thia background makes clear the sense ol tbe two objections wbich are raised in the
lollowing passage:
, Sed queritur, cum causa materialis numquam incidat cum aliis, quomodo
bealitudo, possit difflniri ut causa materialis, eum sil forma, finls, et efflclens,
llcet dilferenter. Ad quod dlcendum quod est duplex mat;irla, ln qua et ex qua;
obitclum autem reducitur ad materiam in qua et non ad materiam ex qua. Et
eecundum boc beatitudo et Deus possunt d.ici causa materialie eive obiectum
voluntatis et ratlonis. Causa enlm materialls, lnquam, non babel opposillonem
cum alils causis, sicut pat,it in naturalibua et divinis. Beatitudo igit.ur ut forma
anime dlcitur aetus, ut llnis homlnls dicitur sufflclentia, ut oblutum voluntatis
et rationls dicitur status, ut efflciens omnis boni dicitur salletes. Sed lamen vldetur,
quod status nomioet bealltudlnem in ratlone finis, slcut aufflcientla, et non
aolum in rallone obiecli. Ad quod d.ieendum quod verum est, sed duplex est finla,
llnis intentionle et ble est proprie finia, et 0nls operis, et sic obiutum potest dici
finie vel termlnus motus. Primo modo dicltur sufflcienlla finls, secundo modo
status. • (P. 180, linea 44•59. Our !talles.)
In thls passage, then, togetber with the approachea to it (p. 179), we bave tbe same
inteUigible teature eaJled ºmateria", "1ubitctum", "materia in qua", ••obit.ctumº,
"flni8", .. ftni, operi,", and ••terminu, motu,º.
(38) CI. CALLUS, p. 147, linea 8-12. Clted below, p. 55, at n. 41. It is true lbat tbe
word "obiedum" is not used In thla paaaage.
(39) CALLUS, p. I 46, Unes 6-6. Our !talles.
(40) We take lbe exprasalon " In naturil" lrom tb e author't 1tateme11t cll.ed lmmedla•
tely below ln our text.
 OBIECTUM 55
After making a distinction between "organum" and "inslrumenlum",
which need not concern us {though the care taken to establish a technical
vocabulary is itself notable), the aulhor contínues:
« Est autem intentio potentie ¡principium transmutationis in aliud
secundum quod aliud. Sed hoc intelligitur de activa. Passiva vero
potentia recipiendi ab altero secundum quod alterum. Oportet autem
secundum quod sumitur in nat1uis, quod sit aliud secundum substan-
tiam ve! ab alio secundum substantiam; sed secundum quod pro-
portionaliter sumitur non oportet nisi alterum esse secundum ratio-
nem. Nam intellectus ab intelligibili patitur, ipse autem intellectus
aliquando intelligibile est. •u
Everything indicates that this should be read as clarification of the
previously presented doctrine of obi~c/um and polenlia. Polenlia includes
in its very intelligibility an aliud a polenlia, an allerum a polenlia, which
the polenlia transforms or by which it is transformed. Howéver, whereas
in naturis (does this mean: in the realm of those things about which the
Physics speaks?) the diversity of po./enlia and its corresponding opposite
number must be secundum subs/anliam, nevertheless if "po/enlia" be
taken, not in naluris but proporlionaliler (the sort of thing the meta-
physician discusses?), then the diversity from the "aliud" may be merely
secundum ralionem. An example of such an aliud is the intelligible. The
intellect "palilur", is transformed by the in/elligible. Thus, it is in a role
of passive power vis-a-visan aliud which is the inlelligibile. Yet, clearly,
sometimes it is the intellect itself which is the intelligible "afTecting"
the intellect. The diversity of po/enlia and aliud is only secundum ralionem.
lt seems clear enough that the "aliud" of the doctrine of potentia is
being used to express the doctrine of the obieclum, the sense of the word:
"obieclum". It means something diverse from the power, but not always
really diverse. It is in the light of this passage that we believe the author
would not be in complete agreement with J ohn of La Rochelle speaking
of a po/entia sine obieclo.
Thusfar, we have a somewhat diflerent setling for the presentation of
the "obieclum" than in the De anima of Grosseteste. Whereas there the
background was Aristotle's De anima , here the doctrine of power in
the Melaphysics of Aristotle is the obvious source. The obiectum is the
"other" in the definition of power. u
(41) CALLus, p. 147, Unes 6-12. D. CALLUS, ad loe., notes lbal tbe delln!Uons or active
and passive power are rrom the Arabic-Letin translation or AristoUeºs Mtlaphy,iu
(cr. above, n. 14).
(42) cr. ARIST0TLE, Mtlaph. IX, ch. 1, 1046a4-16 (elso, ch. 8: 1049bf>.10: tbe wider
sense or "dunami•", wh.lcb lncludes e"eo tbe sort or orlgln of cbange and mollon
called ºnature", omite from ils notion th.e ºother").
The comblnallon or lnterests sbown lo our text, as cited above, at n. 41, and
below, p. 68 at n . 48, becomes standard in an obitclum dosaier prosented by
56 L. DEWAN
However, we come now to passages wherein once more it will be
Aristotle's De anima which shows the way.
After bis introduction, which we have just seen, the author presents
the question he means to treat, viz the divi:sion of the powers of the soul,
and, more particularly, of the sensible and rational souls. Immediately
he poses a more fundamental question, that of the very principies of such
a division:
« Questio autem est si recipiat diversitatem suam essentialem ve!
secundum esse vel secundum rationem, ab organo ve! instrumento
ve! obieclo. Et sumatur obiectum communiter pro materia, cum ex
parte essentie anime in se, cuius est illa diversitas potentiarum, non
inveniatur diversitas. •º
The words: "Et sumalur obiectum communiter pro materia" look to be
an aside explaining the use of "obieclo" in the list of possible principies.
The punctuation makes it look as though the statement has sorne connect-
ion with "cum ex parle ele.", and this makes no sense.
The sense of the passage is that the essence of the soul being itself
simple or lacking diversity, if there is a diversity among the powers of
the soul, it must be explained (either as to its being or as to its being
known by us) by sorne other factor in the situation, i.e. either by the
organs and instruments, or by t he obiecla. "Obiec/um" is here used in a
wide sense, including not merely the case of e.g. colour vis-a-vis sight,
but also the case of e.g. the volilum or the concupiscibile relative to the
volunlas, i.e. what is called the "materia".
Once more, it is interesting that the sense of "obieclum" is explained,
and furthennore that the explained sense is "communiler", i.e. is a wide
sense of "obieclum" : "obiectum" looks to be more readily understood as
signifying such things as colour vis-a-vis sight. Also to be remarked is
that it is "obiectum" whích is being taken as the common term, not
''maleria''.
The query having been explained, the author begins to discuss the
problem:
St. Thomas Aquinas; cr. Summa Thtologiat 1, q. 77, a. 3; also, In JI De anima, lect.
VI (ed. A. M. PrR0TTA, O.P., 1959, # 305). The following text, from Alexander of
Hales· Glos,a 111, dist. XXXIII (ms. L) (td. cit., vol. 111, p. 397, line 36, p. 398, line 6),
bclongs to the pre-history or that doesier. "Obttctum" Is not used:
, ...cum enlm orno.is potentla vel sil activa vel pas,¡lva, et vlrtus eat perfectlo
potenllae: ergo acllvae vel pas,¡lvae. Activa autem est ad operaUonea, quae
dislinguuntur secundum terminos, ut dictum cst. Passio autem, curo sit Ulata,
dislinguitur secundum principium: et hoc esl vel int.rinsecum, et sie temperantia;
vel extrinsecum, et sic rortitudo. •
(43) C.\LLUS, p. 147, lines lf>-19. Our italics.
 OBIECTUM 57
• Et si dicatur quod ex seipsis diversificantur, non ex ipsis cognoscitur
illa diversitas, prout dicit Aristoteles quod ' actus previi sunt poten-
tiis secundum rationem, et obie.cla actibus '. •"
Here the reader should be aware that the quotation-marks around the
Aristotelian statement are slightly deceptive. To what extent is the
author quoting the letter of Aristotle's text as he has it?
The text of Aristotle, in the translation of James of Venice, runs as
follows:
• Priores enim potentiis actus et previi secundum rationem sunt.
Si autem sic est, hiis adhuc priora sunt opposita, oportet considerare
de illis primum ... "'6
As can be seen, the author has staycd with the very words of the transla-
tion, while making the word-order more intelligible for his readers: that is,
he has done so except for the word "obieclum".
Having presented this argument from the authority oí Aristotle, he
continues:
«Quod autem non per organa vel instrumenta diversificentur, aut
diversificate cognoscantur, patet per hoc quod non omnis potentia
habet organa ve! instrumenta sui proprii actus. Sed sunt obiecla
generaliter omnis potentie humane, et diversa diversarum ; ex quo
sumitur diversitas potentiarum secundum obiecla, cognosci aut esse,
et maxime cum potentie sint per suos actus ad obiecla ».0
Here we seem to have two reasons. One is that sorne powers do not have
organs for the exercise of their proper acts, while ali human powers have
obiecla, and indeed diverse obiecla for diverse powers, thus making
possible their use for the division (the question of their being principies
of being or merely of our knowledge is constantly left open).
The other reason seems to be summed up in t he word: "ad", i.e. the
powers through their acts are relative to the obiecla. This reason is des-
cribed as "maxime". It does seem to go more to the heart of the question,
but surprisingly little is said. It also moves in the direction of the original
Aristotelian conception of the opposifum. The opposilum is on ad aliquid,
a pros li. 41
(44) /bid., lines 19-21. Our llalics.
(45) Ed. ALONSO, p. 143, lines 5-7. Concerning the known t~anslatlons ol lhe De
anima ot Aristolle into Lat.in, seo below, pp. 76-78. '"Obítctum 11 occu.rs in no known
complete version prior lo the revlsion by :Moerbeke. Alonso notes thal lwo mss havo
"primiº ratber then "preuii".
(46) CA.LLUS, p. 147, Une 21 • p. 148, line 5. Our ilalics.
Does "S•d aunt obitcla g,n,raliler omní1 poltnlit humane" mean that lhe aulbor,
like John ol La Rocbelle, envisages a potenlia sine obiulo in lhe case ol divine power?
Againat this, tbere is the wbole passage clled above at p. 55, n. 41.
(47) CI. below, pp. 65-66.
58 L. DEWAN
The text continues:
• Dissimiliter tamen dicitur obieclum potentie motive et potentie
apprehensive. Respectu quidem apprehensive, ut a quo inchoatur
act us, respectu autem motive, ut in quod terminatur actus. Unus
dicitur motus ad animam, alter motus ab anima •·"
This point seems to be added to clarify the doctrine of distinction of
powers through obiecla. Perhaps the problem is that the reader might not
see that " ...sunl obiecla generaliler omnis polenlie humane... ", were the
two senses of "obieclum" not explained. 0r perhaps it is added in order
that one see two senses of powers being "ad obiecla".
In any case, this statement takes us more deeply into the meaning of
"obieclum" than anything previously seen. The word conveys a variety
oí meanings, one when used in connection with powers of apprehension,
another when used in connection with motive or appetitive49 powers.
"Obieclum", used in connection with apprehensive powers, conveys the
meaning: that whence the act originates, the "aclus" here being the very
act of apprehension. In the case of apprehension, "obieclum" expresses
movemenl from the lhing towards the soul. In the case of appetition, it
expresses movemenl from the soul towards the thing. 60
(48) CALLus, p. 148, linea 5-8. Our italics.
(49) We have used lhe term "appelillve" lo help convey the sense o! "motiva".
Por lhe author's division into "cognosciliua" an.d "motiva", et. especially Callus,
p. 159, line 6, p. 160, line 2, where lhe aulhor presenls brieOy a multl-levelled conca•
lenalion ol motive principies. He conceives ol lhe whole ol ll as movement lrom the
soul lowards lhings. Al all levels, ll lnvolves lhe dicholomy between lhe concupiscible
{lhough this term is nol used) and lhe irascible. Tbus, he says:
, Et dividilur unaqueque motiva in appelilivam el oggressivam. Appeliliva
aulem esl boni et fugitiva mall; aggressiva vero, que nomino proprio dicilur
irascibilis, esl reí magne aul ardue, et contempliva reí parve aul humilis, et
diversiOcantur secundum bonum, malum, arduum el vile; hec enim potest esse
in superloribus el lolerioribus el medils. Superiora vero voco bona divina; media
vero voco bona civilia; infer1ora vero bona vo,Iuptuos:l, que sunt in se seeundom
naluram deleclabllia •· Loe. cit., lines 32-38.
Thus, there is an appetitiva and an aggre,.siua even al lhe levcl of bona divina, i.e.
al the level ol lhe potenlia motiva called "1ynderesis" or al Jeasl al lhe level o! tbe
superior para ralioni, (el. ibid.J.
(óO) Does lhe aulhor lend lo ldenllly lhe distinclion between apprehenslve and
motive (appelilive) powers wilh lhal, previously seen, between passlve and active
powers?
For Sl. Thomas Aquinae, wriling sorne lhirly-llve years laler, lhis dlversily ol
obitcta, as principium and as ltrminu•, wlll be relaled to the dlstinction belween
active and passive power (el. Summa lheologiae, 1, q. 77, a . 3). Furtllermore, lor
St. Thomas, the appelilive powers o! lhe human soul are passive powers (ibid. , q. 80,
a. 2). Neverlheless, St. Tbomae present.s the nalure ol appeUtion as a movement lrom
the soul towards lhings (el. lbid.,q. 16, a. l; q. 27, a. 4; q. 59, a. 2; q. 82, a. 3; 1-11,
q. 22, a . Z, etc.) We menlion lheae lhlngs to bring out sorne pecuUarlties of the notion
o! appetition, so as lo call attenlion to the possible inOuencea these could have In
 OBIECTUI\I 59
This suggests that, in using the word "obieclum" concerning an
apprehensive power, one is expected to imagine something moving from
the thing apprehended to the one who apprehends: perhaps the best
illustration would be sound travelling from the gong or bell to the ear.
Colour, e.g., would be imagined as behaving somewhat similarly. The
"obieclum" would be what is hurled at and strikes the observer. To call
something an "obieclum" would be something like calling it "striking".
"a striking thing".
On the other hand, in the case of motive or appetitive powers, the
"obieclum" is "that which we go for", the target oí our pursuit, that at
which we hurl ourselves. ª1
We might add that the insistence on signification oí movement suggests
that while "obieclum" has taken on noun-force, the verbal aspect is still
very much on the scene.
At this point our author, with the words:
thought about an obieclum ol appetitlon. For the autbor ol t.he De polenflla anima•
et obiecli1, we suepect t.hat appelilion lende to be subsumed under tbe sote image ol
movément towards lblngs.
For St. Thomas, the obiectum ot (human) appetltion ls the obiectum ot a passlve
power (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 80, a. 2J. lt thus has the role ot prlncipium and cau,a
moven, (lbld., q. 77, a. 3), acllvum and molivum (ibid., q. 80, a. 2). lt is envlsaged as
requiring to be p=ented to the appetite by cognltion (lbid., especially ad 1). The act ol
appeUUon ls still envlsaged as movement towards tbings, but thls movement is a
belng drawn towards; the oblectum ls lhe attractiue (1-11, q. 22, a. 2; note especially
the ad 2, in which the active character ot appeUUon is seen as tollowing rrom its very
passivity). On the other band, tor SL. Tbomas, in tbe case ol an active power, t.he
obleclum la the termina, ol the movement, e.g. the rood havlng beeome the nourished
body (but the nuances are considerable: cr. 1- 11, q . 18, a. 2, ad 3).
One can see how, as regards the conceptions ot oblecta, there ls a source ot possible
eon!uslon ln the passivity or the appetilive powers, on the one band, and the view ot
appelition as movement lrom the soul towards things (which movement may seem
active), on the ot.her hand.
(51) The Engllsh "'objeet" seeme to relain much more ol the notion ol movement
when used in the sense ot º"object ol a game, object or pursuit, etc.'º than when used
ln the sense or "'colour, tbe object or vision". lndeed, 11 one has any sense ol movement
being conveyed in this latter use, it is perh aps only through some eort ol lmportalion
or the sen.se ot ""target'º, as il to say: "'tb,a t which I airo or gel al with my sense or
slght".
But contiderlng the etymology or obieclum, it may well be that lhe use with respect
to motive powers was !ar leas apparenUy suitable than the use wilh respect to appre-
hension. Hence, perhaps, the lendency to associate "'obieclum"' with lhe apprebensive
power (tbe way tbe author ol the De polenllla anlmae et obiecU. uses the example ol
colour and sight). CI. the Boethlan use (whieh is adjeclival and verbal), below, pp. 78-81.
On the other hand, ir "'obiectum" were co,nceived arter the pattem o! the AugusUnian
"corpua obiectum.., i.e. t.he ºobstaculum", wlth vi.sion in a rather active role, one might.
expect "oblectum'º to be more like ""matuia"', Concernlng the "'ob1taculum", cr. below,
pp. 81-92.
60 L. DEWAN
e Sed antequam dividamus per obiecla dicamus quod quedam est
potentia anime sensibilis et quedara rationalis... s61
sets out to discuss a dillerent problem, and, later, when he comes actually
to d.ivide the powers or the soul, no use is made oí the word "obieclum".
Or rather, no use is made oí it except in two places in the presentation oí
the externa) senses. To these we will now t.urn our attention.
The passages occur in the course of the presentation of the externa!
senses one by one. In the case oí each sense, there is explanation of the
various modes oí being oí the sensible form, i.e. what sort or being it has
in the sensible thing, in the medium, in the organ, etc. The word "obiec-
lum" is used in these explanations only in the cases or vision and hearing.
For vision, the passage is as follows:
« Habet autem forma visibilis alterum esse in subiecto, et alterum in
medio, et alterum in organo. Nam in subiecto habet esse materiale,
in medio autem, quod est aer, babel esse quodam modo materiale et
quodam modo non. Nam quantum est de natura lucis, que facit
immutationem, habet esse spirituale ; quantum autem de natura
aeris esse materiale. In oculo vero, cum sit humor cristallinus, est. ibi
natura transparentis et lucidi ; et quantum est ibi de natura lucidi
habet esse spirituale, licet aliquo modo fuerit materiale secundum
quod receperit figurara : oportuit enim organum habere convenien-
tiam cum medio et cum obieclo ; illud vero quod est in spiritu esse
spirituale est. •º
We should note that D. CallusH lists sorne variants which bear upon
our topic. Where, near the beginning, we read: "Nam in subieclo ...", the
(62) CALLus, p. 148, lines 9- 10. Our italics.
(53) lbid., p. 152, Unes 11-20. Our itallca.
o. Callus provides no background relerences lor theso passages on the diverse eue
or thc sensible torm. One might consider the tollowing:
, Et esse lormarum in mediis est modo medio lnler splrltuale et eorporale: forme
enlm extra animam babent esse eorporale purum, et i.n anima spirituale purum,
et in medio medium inter spirituale et corporale. Et dico medlum in hoc loco
Instrumenta sensuum et ea quae sunt extra eensum. •
This is Averroes, in his paraphrase ot the De ,en,a ti , enialo (ln Averroi, Cordubensis.
Compendia Llbrorum Arlstotefü qui Parva Natural/a vocanlur, ed. Aem. L . SHIRLDS,
H. BLUMBl!RG, Cambridge, Masa., 1949, pp. 31 -32.
cr. also:
, ... sicut color habet duplex esae, scilicet esse i n corpore colora lo (et hoc esl esse
corporale) et esse in diatrono (et hoe est esse spirituale), ita odor babel duplex
esse, scilicet esse in corpore odorabili et esse in medio; el Ulud est esse corporale
et hoc splrituale, et illud naturale et hoc extraneum. •
AVBRROBS, Commentarium Magnum in Arislolelis De anima Libro,, ed. F. S. CRAW•
FORO, Cambridge, Masa., 1953, p. 277 (Bk . II, comm. 97, linee 28-33). See also lbld.,
p. 278, and p . 2-46.
(64) Ct. Cuws, p. 152, variante ror line 12.
 OBIECTUM 61
two less dependable mss. have: "N.am in obiecto ... ", while t he best of
the three has : "Nam in subiecto ob•ieclo ... " Thus, what we have in the
edition literally reproduces no actual manuscript. " ... subieclo obieclo ..."
is neither imp-0ssible nor without interest, but we have decided to accept
D. Callus' reconstruction.
Accordingly, the word "obieclum" occurs once, indirectly, in explan-
ation of the mode of being of the visible form in the organ, and of the
mode of being of the organ itself.
What does "obieclum" signify here? Is it the same, altogether, as the
"subieclum" which is mentioned (as sorne readers appear to have judged,
if that is why the manuscripts read as they do)? This seems unlikely
in the extreme. lt looks rather as if it is the nalura Iucis, or the nalura
lucidi, which gives rise to the obieclum as such. Tbe obieclum, i.e. the
colour, is the "molivum visus secundum aclum Iucidi". To see the meaning
of t his, we must read the passage immediately preceeding the one we
have cited as containing "obieclum"; this preceeding passage explains
vision in terms of the relation between light and colour. It runs :
• Supremum autem quinta essentia est que habet posse supra corp-0ra
mawrialia, et secundum virtutem suam influentem dewrminatur
sensibile visus. Nam lux, que est in corpore luminoso, sicut est sol
vel aliquid corporum supracelestium, derelinquit in corpore trans-
parenti ellectum, lumen ; in corpore vero opaco, quemadmodum est
terra et omne corpus prebens resistentiam, splendorem ; in corpore
vero commixto, colorem. Unde sua definitio est in libro De sensibus
et sensibilibus : ' Color est extremitas perspicui in corpore determi-
nato ' ; et hec est difl1nitio data secundum substantiam. Reliqua vero
diffinitio data est in comparatione ad actum, cum dicitur : ' Color est
motivum visus secundum actum Iucidi '. Planum est hunc sensum
potiorem esse aliis in comprehendendo a remotiori propter virtutem
lucís et sui ellectus que habet potentiam fortem immutandi a remo-
tis ; hec autem est propter nobilitatem rei immutantis t. 65
Colour is an obieclum, it would see:m, inasmuch as it is motiuum visus;
this is what we have previously been told, at any ra te. And it is the
molivum visus precisely inasmuch as it is the effeclus, the very influence,
one might say, of light.
To return, then, to the interpretation of our text on the modes of being,
the statement concerning the mode of being of the visible form in the
organ means that the eye, inasmuch as it partakes of the nature of light
and the lucid, and so has esse spirituale, is in agreement with the obieclum:
for the obieclum, as such, also pertains to the domain of esse spiriluale.
(55) /bid., p. 151, line 25 - p. 152, line 8.
62 L. DEWAN
That is why we said it would be a great mistake to identify what is here
called the "obieclum" with what is here called the "subieclum". The
"subieclum" seems characterized by esse materia/e; at any rate, the
visible form is present in it according to esse maleriale. "Obieclum" here
would mean the colour considered precisely as partaking of light's
influential nature vis-a-vis the power of sight.
Another way of putting it: the visible form has esse materia/e in the
subject in which it exists independently of vision. lt is an obieclum
inasmuch as it is activated according to esse spirituale and so is able to
determine vision.
The other passage, as we have said, concerns hearing. It runs:
• Tertium vero corpus est aer, et babel virtutem rari cum denso.
In ipso enim est plus rari quam densi ; in aqua vero e contrario.
Faciens vero sonum est quedam causa intrínseca et quedam extri.n-
seca. Extrínseca motus violentus aerís qui facit ipsum moveri in
tempore breviori quam addictum sit sue nature ; intrínseca vero
causa est resistentia densi ad rarum que facit t remorem in aere et
aqua. Et est dillerentia illius sensibilis ad alía sensibilia, quod suum
esse simul ei,t cum sua mutatione ; ª1111m enim esªe e$l in medio ; non
sic autem est in aliis sensibilibus, et propter hoc non est ita diversi-
ficare esse medii et obiecli et cause, sed in obiecto habet esse soni, in
causa vero habet esse resistentie, sicut dictum est, in medio tremo-
rem indissolutum usque ad auditum. »"
The significant dillerence between sound and the ot her sensibles is
that it has its esse, its own proper entitative character, in the medium,
i.e. the air lying between the things which make the sound and the ear
which hears it. Accordingly, one cannot diversify the modes of being in
the same way as with the other types of sensible form. Nevertheless, the
author distinguishes these esse, seemingly as diverse intelligible aspects
of the one sensible reality.
He distinguishes the causa, the obieclum, and the medium. Ali of these
are identical with the air as having within it the sensible form. What is
meant by the "causa" as distinct from the "obiectum"? The author has
explained that the faciens sonum, as something intrinsic to the air, is its
elementary combination of the rare and the dense, resisting each other
under the inlluence of the outside violent movement, and so bringing
about a tremor or vibration in t he air. Thus, the intelligible feature
constituting the causa is resislenlia: " ... in causa vero habel use resis-
tentie...".
Similarly, we are told that " ... in obieclo habel esse soni ..." . What does
"esse soni" do here? l t names the ítem according to that one of its names
(66) /bid., p. 153, lineo 1•11. Our IU.lica.
 OBIECTUM
which corresponds lo the role of the word "colour" in the case of sight,
to the role of the word "odour" in the case of smell.
The distinction between causa and obieclum here seems to be along the
lines of the roles of light (which would be causa) and colour (obieclum)
previously seen. 67
To review what we have seen in the De potenliis animae el obieclis, the
word "obieclum" is introduced in close association with "materia",
perhaps lo make its use more palatable, and lhen quickly takes over
the whole field, in its wide sense doing the work which at the outset was
assigned lo "maleria". In serving to cover the whole field, it is itself seen
to break up into a variety of meanings, relative to passive and active
power, apprehensive and motive power. In the one case, it signifies
movement from things to the soul, in the other movement from the soul
to things.
The basic notion is first conveyed by means of example, the relation
of colour to sight, colour being the obieclum. Use is then made of the
Aristotelian analysis of the notion of power. This has the eflect, it seems
to us, of presenting the obieclum (now seen as the "other" intelligibly
implied by lhe notion of power), no longer as a mere "itero on the scene",
somelhing that happens inlo associaiion with powers, but as part of the
intelligiblo unity of things, corresponding to the intrinsic finality of the
sort of itero called a "power". 68 Moreover, the point is made that sorne-
times the power and its object are really diverse, sometimes they are
rather two intelligibilities required to expresa the entitative fulness of
one simple thing, e.g. the intelligence understanding itself.
In proposing the obiecla as principies of diversification of t he powers,
it is stated that every human power has an obieclum, and that the powers
are, through their operations, ordered towards their obiecta, "ad obiecta".
To see this, to get this picture of the situation, one must have in mind
the two somewhat diflerent meanings "obieclum" has, depending on
whether one is speaking of apprehensive or of motive powers.
(57) cr. ALEXANDl!:R or HALl!:S' G/os,a 11 (ed. cit., vol. 11, p. 227, lines 18-23), where
we ftnd the !ollowing addition in ms. E:
• <Anselmua > ponit similitudinem de potestate videndi, quae dependet ex
quatuor, quoad aclum scilicel videndi el visibíle et quoad med.ium el Jucem.
Licel ergo desil visibíle et medium vel lux, nihilomlnus residel potestas apud
videntem. Sed non videtur esse simile de libero arbitrio; non enim dependel ex
medio vel obiecto vel efficiente, nisi <ex> Deo tantum, qui dat el esse et moveri.,
(Our italics).
Here, the viaibile is lhe "obieclum", while lhc 111.'t seems lo be what is meant by lhe
"elflcien,...
The addltlons o! ms. E, however, are by an unknown theologlan wriling sometime
alter lhe Summa de bono o! Phlllp the Chancellor. cr. ibid., p. 7' .
(68) C!. PLATO, Republic, book V, ch. XXI: 477C-D.
63 64 L. DEIVAN
In the later discussion, on sight and hearing, "obieclum" appears as
part of a group of three factors of analysis outside the one sensing: the
causa, the obieclum, and t he medium. If our analysis is correct (the texts
are not as clear as one would wish), t he obiectum is not intelligibly
identical with the thing sensed, the subie-clum, with its esse materia/e.
The term "obieclum" signifies this same thing, but as imbued with esse
spiriluale, and so as influential.
Ir we look back now on the t.wo treatises., the De anima of Grosseteste
and the De polenliis a11imae el obieclis, we find at what must be quite
close to the first applications of the term "obiectum" an astonishing
richness and variety within a quite definite unity.
0( the two, it is the De potenliis ... which presents us with the explicit
doctrinal formulations which support and accredit the new word. We
start, seemingly, more at home in the discusaion of cognition, indeed
sense cognition, and that externa/ sensation. We then look on as the word
takes over eveu the realm o( the appetitive, where "maleria" seemed to
have prior rights.
In the De anima of Grosseteste, the texts show us the application lo
types of appetitive powér, áppetitive operation, Mtural inclination, and
to the Christian theological virtues. Al the same time, we can still see
evidence of the early eflorts to formulate the doctrine, using the term
"maleria" even in the context of Arislotle's De anima 11, ch. 4.
Especially remarkable in the De anima of Grosseteste is the at.tempt
to expresa the complex interrelation of human powers, and of reason and
nature within human conscious life, by means of the notions of obiectum
and finis, with obieclum seemingly belonging to t he analysis of things
according to their natures {even of reason itself, according to its nature.)
4. SOME BACKGROUND
a) Aristotle's De anima 11, ch. 4: 415a14-23:
From the earliest instances we have found, the word "obiectum" is
related to this passage in Aristotle's De anima, to which we can add
reference to the same work, I, ch.l: 402bl5, where the same doctrine
figures in t he posing of problems.
The question thus arises: to what extent is "obieclum" merely a device
of the t.ranslators to render a technical term already existing in the Greek?
Had the Greeks a standard word for this item, and was it merely a
question for the translators of finding the right word to substitute for
the Greek?
There can be no doubt that the Latín word "obiectum", as introduced
in the first quarter of the thirteenth century, served to express a general
 OBIE-CTUM
doctrine or doctrinal current having a definite Greek background. Anyone
at ali familiar with the thirteenth-century use of "obieclum" will recognize
forerunners of the doctrine in the Republic of Plato, 69 in passages in
book IV and book V. But what, for our purposes, it is essential to remark
is that in neitber of these discussions is what the Latins will come to caU
the "obiectum" given a proper name. In the passage in book IV, the
pronoun in the genitive is used. We are speaking of t he "of which there
is desire, etc." lt has no name as such.• 0 Similarly, in book V, it is the
preposition "epi" which indicates the relation of the power to what will
Iater be called the "obiectum". lt is "that on which the power depends"
or "that lo which the power is related". 61
When we come to Aristotle, the situation is not as simple. Let us
look at the texts already mentioned, from the De anima. The word used
to refer to that which will eventually come to be called the "obieclum" is
"lo antikeimenon" (in, as it happens, its plural form). Does this mean that
Aristotle has found a special technical term for what in Plato went
unnamed?
First of ali, in the De anima it is only in these two instances that the
word "la antikeimena" is used generally of food, the sensible, and the
inlelligible.
Moreover, if we seek lo understa.nd this usage, we see that it is one
which functions quite difTerenUy than <loes the word "obiectum" . Arislotle
in the Melaphysics lists severa( meanings of the term "la anlikeimena",
among which are the relatives, i.e. ta pros li.11 Then, in the presentation
of la pros ti, he lists as one type: "as the measurable to the measure, and
the knowable lo knowledge, and the perceptible to perception". n
(59) Cf. ibid., book IV, cf. XII-XV: 436A-441C, and book V, ch. XXI-XXII:
477C-480A.
(60) We mean, oí course, lhal lherc is no one common lcrm, in lbe way tbal h•
du,1amis (Rtp. V, xxi, 477C) Is common. There are such particular lerms as ta horomtna
(Rep. VI, xix, ú09B) and ta gigno1komtna (ibid.).
(61) Ct. especially 477D.
(62) Mtlaph., Book V, ch. 10: 1018a20-21. No cxamplo orla pro, ti is given ín lhis
passage.
(63) /bid ., ch. 15: 1020b31-J'i (Oxford transl.). Ct. ibid.: 102la26-b3. ll is of interest
lbat Ari.st.oUe díslinguishes carefully betw-een lhe relalives oí t.he lype sensible/sense
and lhe relaUves whích are based on power. The power-based rclalive, e.g. tather,
Is relalive in ítself, i.e . by vírt.ue of il it.self being said ol sometbing else. On lhe olher
hand, tbe sensible or lhe knowable is relalvve inasmuch only as sometbing else is said
or lt, l.e. it is cxpressed (when called "sensible" or "knowable") in functlon of some
act of knowledge or sensalion whlch is olher lhan itself. To speak oí il as sensible ia
not lo indicate somelhing about its own e.olilative s tatus.
We should notlce tbis because lbe obitclum is, as we have seen, closely lied in wlth
lhe notion of power. Arislot1e·s sensible &nd knowable do nol seem to be conceived
or as powers suiled lo lransrorm the knower or the one who senses.
5 nature.
65 66 L. DEWAN
This same general doctrine is lo be foundl in the Calegories. Among the
examples of la pros li are sense and the sensible, knowledge and the
knowable." Then, la ter, in the discussion of la anlikeimena, one of the
four types listed is la pros ti, and among the examples of this type of
la anlikeimena are knowledge and the knowable. Thus, here we have the
direct application of the term "la antikeimen-0" to the knowable and know-
ledge, as we had in the De anima.
This latter text of the Calegories is most interesting for our enquiry,
because, in it, it is not only the knowable which is called "lo anlikeimenon"
with respecL to knowledge: knowledge is likewise called "to anlikeimenon"
with respect to the knowable. One can see how far this use of "lo anli-
keimenon" is from the later notion of obieclum. One would never call
knowledge the "obieclum" of the knowable. 16
What is more, there is a difTerence between the doctrine of the Cale-
gories and that of the Melaphysics. In the Melaphysics, Aristotle distin-
guishes carefully between the case of relatives based on number and
power, on the one hand, and that of relatives of the type: measurable/
measure, knowable/knowledge, on the other hand. In the lormer case,
the relation is constituted by the thing itsell which is related being said
of or wilh respect to something else. In the !alter case, the measurable
or the knowable is so called not because it, by virtue of its very self, is said
of something else, but rather because something else (the measure,
knowledge) is said of it. The knowable, in its own being, is not essentially
a "knowable". 0
What this meaos is that the knowable is not, according to its own
being, a pros li, and so neither is it an aniikeimenon. 17 Thus, the trend
of this doctrine of the Metaphysics is towards the conclusion that it is
primarily the knowledge or perception which the term "lo antikeimeno,1"
fits. The knowable would be so called with less appropriateness.
From ali this, it looks as though Arislotle, when he uses the term "la
anlikeimena" for food, the sensible, and the knowable, is using a term
with a well-determined sense, but not a term tailored to that set of items
as such. It is not a technical term for those items.
Further, it is worth noting that the limes or thought suggested by
Aristotle's term are wholly unlike those which will be at work in the
(64) Cal., ch. 7: 6b3, f>, 16-17, 34 -36; 7b23-8al2.
(65) lbid., ch. 10: llbl8. Nollce parllcularly Hnes 29-30, in which tbe knowttdge
lecalled "lo anliktimonon" in rtlalion t.o \he knowable. rn \he ,Wetaphysics, lt Is only
by inference that we see the knowable and knowledge as la anliktimtna, i.e. by putling
togel.lJer lhe texu on ta antiktimena and la p= ti ..
(66) Mtlaph., book V, ch. ló: 1021a2fl.b3.
(67) We are not saying that the knowable is nol in any sense a pro, ti. That would
go against lhe Lext of Arislolle . But it is not a pro, ti according Lo its own intrinsic
68 L. D!EWAN
From ali this it is clear that Themistius prefers the images of a sub-
jected thing upon which one operates, a matter upon which one works,
to the vocabulary used in the passages by Aristotle himself. He does not
regard AristoUe's word as constituting a peculiarly appropriate technical
term for the items.
We should also note that the priority, for knowing, of la anlikeimena
over the operations and powers is interpreted by Themistius as relative
to us humans, not as priority in the very nature of the things being
considered. Moreover, while he is quite ready to concur with the doctrine
as regards food and the sensible, both of which are things sensibly evident
(unlike the operations and especially the powers), he confesses to have a
problem with this doctrine as regards the intelligible and the intellect.71
T he Commenlary on the De anima attributed to J ohn Philoponus71 gives
a more ample discussion than that of T hemistius. Philoponus stays very
carefully with Aristotle's word "to anlikeimenon". He explains that
relative opposition is meant.
ópc«6v, tj'¡ 3c cixooorncjj rrcpl -ro cixouo.,-6v, x,xl TctÜT<X C.orrep «~Cx«T«< ci).).-1¡>.ov.
x,xTi -ro rrp¼ .,-,, ff)(<X fow, civ rrpoai¡xo, -ca úrroxd¡.«vct Tcxi, t'Jtpyel<xv. rrpó .,-&,v
ivcpyu&,v 3,op,oOijvo«. TCXÜT<X y&p 00tfio•npct -1¡¡,l'v Twv ivcpy«wv. npo -ro{wv
TOÜ votiv -rl -ro vo,¡Tov i~cTCXodov, x0tl npo -coü «~civcaOcx, -r( TO «la0,¡T6v, x,xl
npo TOÜ Tp. . . TI~ -1¡ -rp~.
This Is translated by William or Moerbeke as lollows:
• Rursus igilur, quooiam opus uniuscuiusque polenliae circu aliquod obiulum
consideratur, et non omnis circa omnem materiam est operatio, sed visivae quidem
circa visibile, audiUvae autem circa au.dibile, et haec quasi opponunlur ad invicem
secundum ad aliquid, forlassis utique convenlat oblecla operalionibus ante opera-
liones terminari; haec enim manifesliora nobis quam opcrationes; ante intelligerc
igitur quid sit intclligibile exquirendum, el ante sentire quid sensibile, el ante
alere quid alimenlum. ,
Ct. TflÉMJSTIUS, Commenlairt sur le lraitt de l"dme d"Arislole. Traduclion de Guillaume
de Moerbeke, ed. G. V&RBBKB, Louvain-Paris, 1957. Líber lerlius, IV, p. 115,
lines 98-105. Our italics. The translalion was completed In 1267 (tbid., p. xu). It Is
to be noted lhat elsewhere In l he transla,t.ion William uses "'supposilum.. to render
"hupokeimenon"'; cr. the index ol the ediUon under "'supposilum•• ("obieclum" docs
not appear in Verbeke"s indices).
I n lranslaUng the passage givcn in our note 69. William does not use "obieclum" ;
the mosl signillcant parl reads:
• Et si de operalionibus, uLrum de ipsis prius veJ de h.i& quae subiciun/ur opera-
Uonibus? Evldenliores enlm in multis sunt nobis res circa quas flunt et quae
in partibus operationes, sicuL visibilia visu el audibilia audito, forle aulém et
inlelligibllia intellectu; etenlm opponuntur sicut quae ad aliquid, intelligibile
quidem ad i.n telleclum, sensibile eutem ad sensum., lbid., Li ber primus, I,
p. 11, lines 64-69. Our ilallc•.
(71) T UE>JJSTIUS, ed. Hl!INZ&, p. 49, lines 31-35.
(72) Joannis Philoponi. In Arisloleli& De Anima Libros, ed. M. I-IAY0UCK, Berlin,
1897 (Commenlaria in Arlstotelem Graeca, vol. XV).
Concerning Philoponus and this work, el. Jean Ptt1LOP01<, Commenlalre le ,ur
De Anima d' Arialole. Traduclion de Gutllaume de Moerbtke, ed. G. VBRBEKB, Louvain•
Peris, 1966, pp. Xl·XIX, esp. p. XVJU, n. 35.
OBIECTUM 67
Latín "obieclum" , since Aristotle's t.erm could be applied even more
suitably to the acts of nutrition, sensation, and knowing than to their
correlatives.
So much for the meaning of the two passages in the De anima. Aristotle
at other times uses other words to name wha t will come to be called the
"obiectum". Por example, at De anima 111, ch. 8: 43lb20-32a7, the
aislhelon and the noelon are called "la pragmata". Again, at Metaphysics
XII, ch. 9: 1074b38-75a5, the nooumenon is called "lo pragma". In short,
Aristotle does not seem to have hit u pon a ny definite way of expressing
what will later be called an "obieclum". 88
We now leave Aristotle himself to look at sorne of his commentators.
What did they make of "ta antikeimena" in the passages in the De anima?
Did they regard it as a technical term for tbat particular set of items, viz
food, the sensible, and the knowable? We will look brielly at Themistius,
Simplicius, Philoponus, and Averroes.
Themislius, in hls Paraphrase o( lhe De anima, speaking of the passage
in the first book where Aristotle uses the word "la antikeimena", substit-
utes such expressions as "la hupokeimena lais energeiais" and "ta pragmala
peri ha (the operations take place)". He then inserts an explanatory note
on Aristotle's use of the word "ta anlikeimena''. These items are opposed
after the manner of la pros ti: the knowable with respect to mind, the
sensible with respect to sense. 0
When he comes to speak of the passage in book II, Themistius says
that the operation or work of each power is considered as "peri ti hupo-
keimenon" and "peri ... hulen". Again he u ses the expression: "la hupo-
keimena lais energeiais". And once again he includes the explanation of
Aristotle's word "la antikeimena": the items are opposed, taking "opposi-
tion" in the sense of the relatives. 70
,o
(68) Perhaps tbe term .. pragma .. is used because ol lhe mode or signllying o!
such words as unotlon", "aislheton", "nooumtnon•' . They nnme t.hal which is done,
lhe producl; i.e. they signlly, wilh respecl to lbeir verbs, in a way similar lo e .g.
"to Uurmainomenon" with respect to Hthtrmaino".
(69) Cr. Tn2>11sT1us, In Libro• Arfaloleti, De Anima Paraphraais, ed. R. H rm•ze,
Berlín, 1899 (Commenlaria in Arislotelem Graeca, vol. V, par. III), Book A, ch . l ;
p. 4, linea 29-37:
xal .t 36(e« nepl Twv ¡,tpwv, n6Tepov .,-dt, oi:.a~ ctó-Twv i¡ T«; cvcpyc~ -1¡¡,iv
1tpodp,x; a,a<XXdov ; ""''l'éonp,x< Y"l' ¡,,,¡ 1TOAAWV -1¡¡,,v «l t'Jt¡>ycL«< • &-r, ¡,cv
y«p 1 «lml«v6¡,e8ct, 3,j).ov • .,-¡ 3c -1¡ cx!oO,¡a,,, ou <>«fi;. xctl el 1tepl Twv ivepy«wv,
«pct rrcpl «uTwv rrp6TCpov ;¡ rrcpl TWV Úitoxet¡,ivwv Tal'~ ivtpyclo«, ; OG<fÍOTCp«
y&¡, b:l 1<0>.>.wv -1¡¡.,.l'v T« 1tp«y¡,«Tct rrcpl & y(voVTct< ,cal «l cv -ro~ ¡,ipco<v t'Jtpyt1«<,
il>orrcp T« óp«Ti T'ij~ óp«oew; x,xl T« cixooo-cci T'ij; cixo;¡,, !ow; 3~ x,xl ..-dt vo,¡Tot
TOÜ voü • x«l Y'"i' a~lxt<-r<X< .:., -rdt np6; ..., TO ¡,cv vo,¡-rov 1tpo; -rov voüv, TO ai
ctlail'l)-rov ,rpo, -ri¡v ct(aO,¡inV.
(70) Cf. ibid., Book Gamma, ch. 4; p. 49, linea '23-30:
rr::i>.,v Tolwv, im,lll¡ 1 -ro lpyov ix&.OT'), lluva¡uw~ rupl TLúrroxd¡,evov 8to,pci..-«<,
x,xl oó 1tcio,¡~ 1tcpl &nctoOLV ú).,¡v &o-Tlv -1¡ Mpyt ""· ma tj'¡ ¡,cv Óp<XT"'ÍÍ mpl 1'0
 OBIE:CTUM 69
Moreover, he makes use of the discussion of relatives in the Calegories
to show how colour, e.g., is and is not relative, and how it thus is able to
constitute a starting-point for the series of definitions Aristotle envisages:
i.e. llrst, the visible, then the act of seeing, then the power of sight. It is
inasmuch as it is nol relative to sight that colour exists prior to sight, and
can be defined independently of sight. It is colour as something in itself
which performs this function. The implication is that it is as non-"anli-
keimenon" that the anlikeimenon performs the function assigned to it by
Aristotle.1 3
It must also be said that while Philoponus is very careful to use Aristot-
le's word, he is not very much sattislled with Aristotle's doctrine. His
discussion helps us to see how he understands the priority of la antikeime-
na. When he comes to speak about food, he notes that for the powers of
reproduction and growth there is no opposite (ti anlikeimenon) to be
found, nothing analogous to the role of food with respect to the power of
nutrition. The food is something exlernal to nutrition, whereas the power
of growth is in the thing which grows. Similarly, the generated thing is
like the generating thing: what is said of one is said of the other. Thus,
for Philoponus, the anlikeimenon, in order to be knowable by priority
with respecl lo lhe operalions and powers, musl exisl oulside of and
independently of t he operation and power, and have a distinctive nature
of its own.
Philoponus accordingly says that in the case of generation and growth
it is by the lelos, not by the anlikeimenon, that one forms the dellnition.
Indeed, he says, when one consíders t he issue precisely, even the nutritive
power is so defined."
Later on, he balks at the doctrine that the noelon is knowable by
priority to t he nous. The anlikeimenon of the nous, i.e. the noelon, is less
well known, he says.11
In sum, Philoponus does, by sheer repetition, make something of a
technical term of "lo anlikeimenon". However, by the time he has
expressed ali bis misgivings, the doctrine seems to apply fully only to the
case of sensation and the sensible. Even there, what Aristotle says applies
to the relative precisely insolar as it is nota relative. Verbally Philoponus
makes considerable use of the tenn "lo antikeimenon", but doctrinally
he almost eliminates it.
Simplicius, in bis Commenlary on lhe De anima, has definite observations
concerning Aristotle's la anlikeimena in both the first and the second
books.11
(73) CI. Pe1LOPONOS, ed. HAvoucK, (lnD• Anima 114), p. 264, llne36-p. 265, line 19.
(74) !bid., p. 265, line 21-p. 266, line 2 .
(75) cr. lbld., p. 266, lines 6•7.
(76) Concerning Simplicius, el. lhe remar ks ol A. Pattin in St>1PL1c1os, Commtnlairt
,ur tu Caligorie, d'Ari1tolt. Traduclion dt Guillaume dt Moerbekt, e(I. A. PATTtN,
O.M.!., Louvain-Paria, 1971, tome I, pp. ,x-x .
70 L. DEWAN
Commenting upon the passage in the first book, he explains the priority,
in the order of our knowledge, of the knowable, the desirable, and food
over knowing, desiring, and feeding. This is because of the operations'
slrelching lowards the knowable, the desirable, and food. Accordingly,
we do not know them apart from these "t.owards which they are said"
(pros ha legelai).
These latter are opposites (anlikeimena) according to pros li antit hesis
(anlithesin), inasmuch as, vis-a-vis the operations, they stand away,
have resistance, have a concrete existence of their own. The knowledge
of them is more manifest because the opposites are more sensible, i.e.
the sensible thing itself, the desirable thing in the sensible order, and the
intelligible thing insofar as it is found in the sensible order..,.,
Thus, Simplicius gives a rather graphic and imaginable conception of
the opposition. The things which operate stretch or tend towards the
opposites, whose "opposition" is understood in terms of sensible, physical
independence. The term "ta anlikeimena" seems taken in an almost
local sense .18
(77) SIMPLICIUS, /n Libro, Ari1loltlil Dt Anima. Commenlarla, ed. M. HAYDUCK,
Berlín, 1882 (Commenlaria in Arislolelem Graeca, vol. IX), p. 14, linea 16-24.
(78) This cnlls to mlnd the d!lference ol opinlon between F. A. Trendelenburg and
H. Bonilz concerning tbcso texls. Bonitz (Inda arislotelicLU, Oarmstadt, 1955
(Wissenschallliche Buchgesellschall reprinl ol 1870 ed.), under the words: anliktialhai,
anlikeimenon) gives as the first sense ",en,u locali", and reters us lo tbe De Cae/o,
bk 1, ch. 8: 277a23 and bk 11, ch. 2: 2a4b22. He commcnls:
ºad hunc usum v anlikeislhai rererendum videtur, quod res sensjbus obiectae
ontikeimena nominantur ... •
ond he rclora to the two De anima passages.
Trendelenburg (Aristotelis De Anima Libri Trts, Graz. 1957 (Akadcmische Oruck-
u. Verlagsanslall, reprint ol 1877 ed.), p. 168, commenting on 402bl5, relera to Metaph.
bk. V, ch. 10: 1018a20 lor the senus ol anlikeimenon. 01 these, be saya, only tbe pro,
li llls lbe text ol the De anima, and he dislinguishes his position (n. 1) lrom tbat ol
Bonitz. He explains bis own vlew:
• Nam quae pereipiunlur, quae cogitantur, ad perceplionem et cogitatlonem
duplici modo pert.inent, ut hae tum nb illis moveanlur tum ad ea regantur. •
and he goes on to cito Cat. 10: 1lb24 11. Thus, ho underatands lhe relalion, not merely
in terma ol locallon or positíon, bul in terma ot tbe percelver or knower belng moved
by and directed lowards the thing perecived or known.
Al pp. 287-8, Trendelenburg comment.s upon ta anliktimena al 415a20. He sayo
lhey are :
• eae res, quae facultatem vel movent vel ab lis movenlur, quae sensibus obiecta
sunt. Ita nulrimentum animae vegetanli, res, quae in seruius cadunt, unlientl,
quae int.elliguntur, menli quasi e regione sunt. posit.a. ,
This seems to d.islinguish belween tho moving and boing moved, on the one band,
and the belng sensibly perceptible, on tbe other. Is ít lhe sensible perceptibility that
is meanl by their being "quasi e regione ... posila'º? Or doos lhe latter expreasion bring
us back lo location?
l mmediately lollowing lhe lasl quotalion, Trendelenburg cites Mtlaph., bk. V, 9
[lege: 10]: 1018a31·35. This is ratber odd, because U is a passage which bears on la
 OBJE,CTUM 71
In the comment on the passage in the second book, Aristotle's anfikei-
mena are introduced by Simplicius as "peri ha he energeia." Simplicius
lists severa! powers and describes the relationship in each case. We know
the nutritive power and operation from food, inasmuch as this power and
operation is alteralive of food. We know the generative and the knowing
powers and operations according as the one (generative) is operative in
function oí the species, operative practically, of the generated, the other
(knowing) operative in function of the species, operative discerningly, of
the known. Hence it is about each of these: food, the generated, the known,
that there must first of ali be a gras:p.
Next, Simplicius comes to the oppositeness found in the situation.
These items: the food, the knowable, etc., are opposites, "opposite" here
clearly referring to pros ti antithesis. It is in this way that food is "oppos-
ed" to the feeding, and the knowable to knowing. As is said in the
Categories, as sensible, colour is simultaneous with sensation, but as
colour it is naturally prior to sensation.79
Simplicius dwells on this priority. Among relatives, the cause is prior
to the caused. The knowable has priority (over the knowing and the
knower), as the desirable with respect to the desiring and as the limit
with respect to the limited.
The reason why the knowable has: precedence in our investigation over
the knowing, is the same as the reason the knowing has precedence over
the power of knowing, viz that the knowable is naturally prior to the
knowing, and the knowing to the knowing power. By "natural priority",
Simplicius meaos priority in perfection. 80
enantia, l.e. contraries. ll has not lo do willl pro, ti anlilceimtna. From it, T ren<.lelenburg
concludes:
"ea igilur quae sive agenlia sive palientla inter se referuntur. ,
seemingly as lhe basic nolion of the anlikt imtna ol 415a20; and be includes a reference
once more to Cal. 10: llb24 ff.
The objeclion to a mercly local sense of " ta antlktlmena" , it seems to us, is that
local opp-0sllion ought to be rcduced to sorne sor! el contrariety, like the above and the
below. This is not exacUy the same as the pro, ti opposition.
To see the opposition in terms of power (i.e. movers and things moved) ia to enler
more inlo what Arislotle liste as pro, ti. B ut one ought not to forget tbat Ar!etoUe
himselt distinguishes tbose pro. ti which are hased on power rrom the type which is
of measured to measure: it is in this latler group that he places the sensible and sense,
the knowable and knowledge. CI. obove, p. 65, n. 63.
(79) Here, witb the explicit mention ol colour, Simpllcius Is probably comblning
t.he teaching of the Caltgorl<1, to <vhieh he relers, with Mtlaphysiu, bk V, ch. ló:
102lb2. Cf. PH1LOPONUS1 above, n. 73.
(80) cr. StMPLICIUS, td. cil., p. 109, lino 24-p. 110, line 7:
'!l; n~ -l¡µéi; y«p npóupot Tll cl3ono,oú¡u""' ...,. cl8wv, xal •~ -ro cl&ono,oú¡uvov
&no6>-étj,a....-,z; 3d TO T( ~• clwn lx&a..-ou O.c,v. illa TO •l8ono,oó¡nvov, 6..-t ¡,.t,
lvcpyoüv 6d 3c OÓl((, g;p,ov C:.; ivcpyaüv ot~ d la..-, Tc>.c,6-rtpov xal a~fonpov
y(vn,z, T/j> ytVC:,axon,. TO y«p 3uwi¡;m xotl «TC)&aupov -roü ivcpyc(c¡: xal 0G1<l!l
72 L. DEWAN
yvwp,µov, xotl ,:ij> µh XP6V<¡> np6TC.pov icp' b<<i<rrou ,:il,v y,:VT¡-rwv, -rij> 3c :>-6y<p
Ganpov, bm3-1¡ b< ,:oij n>-c(ou xal TO dn~ yv..,p,t6¡uv6v n xal tpµ')'ICU6µcvov.
el 3c o6T"'• · el 31 dno -r&,v ivepycu.ív -1¡ ,:oü ,:( i:,rnv d31Ja«; -1¡µ,v lyy(ven,, xat ~
ivcpycl4; d,m Twv -npl & -1¡ Mpynot y,VC:,axo¡uv (-1¡ µh 8pe1<Tud¡ diro T'ij, -rp"f'ii;
~ nÓTT), d>J.ol(,)Tt,d¡, -1¡ 3t Y•Wl'lT•><~ xocl -1¡ yvc,xm,d¡ ~ ><ot'tll TO d3oc; hcpyoüa,z,
-1¡ µh ,:oü y,:w..,µtvou mlt'l)TIXil,(;, -1) 3c ,:oü yvc,,~oü ,q,tTnc&,,), d.,.yxotiov ,rcpl
b<c(v..,v ,rpo3tllA!l6c,v, & l<tltl dv-rtxclµna ><otTc!: -rl¡v 1rp6, 'tt 3,¡).ot3~ dv-r(O.a,v. oG-r..,
~ d....-lxct,:at TO Tpécpov ,r~ -rl¡v 8picj,,v >COCl TO yw,>cm>v 1tpo, -rl¡v yvwcnv. C:.,
yc!:p iv Kot-n¡yopl«,, dpT)Tott, e:., µh cclc,8,¡TOv &µa tjj otlo8-/¡,m TO xpwµot, ~ 3t
l(p<";;µa 1tpónpov cpúoc,. ma TOÜTO µt, bnmcnw; &l;«>v • xdv TO~ 1tp6' .., 3c
TO ot!•nov ..-oü otl..-tcxTOÜ npónpov, C:.; xal TOÜTO iv cxclw«; cfpT)Tott. TO 3c yw,,cm>v
e:., icpo-rov icp<eµivou xal ~ 6poc; 6j,,~o¡úvou "'po-rcpcúc,. a,a 3c -ri¡v ®rl¡v al..-l«v,
a,· ~- npo Tii, 3uv<iµ•"'• -1¡ ivipyetot, xocl TO rx,><m>v 1tpo Tii, yvi:,.....,, · .,, yixp
tjj cpÓaCl 1tpónpov.
We bave translated "lo ephtlon" by "the desirable". Th.is seems to be tbe regular
tenee ot thie word as used by Arlatolellan and Neo-Platonic writers. A background
lext tor the one Just quoted is to be tound in S.impllcius' In Arilloleli• Categoriao
Commenlarium, ch. 7, ed. C. KALBFLEISCH, Berlín, 1907 (Commentarla in Aristotelem
Graeca, vol. VIII), p. 164, Unes 4-12:
b 3c cp,,.6aocpoc; :Eup,ocvo. t1J-rl¡aw;, 3,a -rt -1¡ µh ocfc,8,¡a,, 1<¡,o; TO «tc,8,¡TOv ).fyc,:a,
xal -1¡ l1<«J'IÍ)µ'I) "P°' TO lmanyr6v, -1¡ 31 l!;~ oo ""°' TO ix-róv, d)).« "P°' TOv
ll(ovtot, • ra..,_, cp'l)Q(v, brc,8~ -1¡ oc(a&,¡a«; lmi:tyna, "~ TO otlc,8,¡-rov e:., 1tpb_
lcpcTOv xal l-., µii:Uov bna'IÍ)µ'I) "P°' TO ¿,,,a-n¡-r6v, -1¡ 3c l~u; xotl -1¡ 3<d&a«; oo
d-r«Tocl "P~ Tt, ~ ou3; -1¡ Toil at:iµ«,oc, ID' «ó-rii x«8' «Üfl)v la-rtv. 1Uil 6t1
fo-rlv C:.pta¡úv<x Tll lcptTci, a,a TOÜTo T<~ TOCÜ-r« Aiynu, · TO 3c C><TOV >COCI a...8.TOv
il6¡xa-r« i<J'nv, xocl cha 'tOÜ'tO oó 1tpo; TCtÜTGt, d>J.a T<flO~ TO fxov µillov ~ C:.p,aµivov
-1¡ ll;«; xal -1¡ 3,d8ca«; >-éy,:-roc, •·
Willlam of Moerbeke translates (in the part whi-ch concerna us most):
• Syrianua ... ait: 'Forte quoniam aensus tertur ad senaibile ut ad desiderabile el
adbuc mag!s aclenUa ad acibile... Et quia sunt desiderabilia determinata, propter
hoc ad haec dicuntur... , Ed. cil. (1upra, n. 76), t. r, pp. 222-23.
We sbould note also the following stalement of Simplicius, arguing tbat sorne
relaUons musl be real (ln ...Categorlaa ... , td. cit., p. 169, llnes 16-16):
nw~ 3c ""l lcpcTOv 1tiicnv b 8to~ :>-éy,:,:a,, et µ,¡8cµtoc axfo,, ia-Tlv 1tpo; TO lcpc,:ov
,:ij> !cp<&µiV<¡> ;
Will!am translates:
• Quomodo autem et desiderabile omnibus Deus dicitur, si nulla esl babiludo
des!deranU ad desiderabile. • Ed. cit., p. 229, linea 33-34.
We are insisllng on thia because A Gruk-Engluh Luicon (H. G. L100ELL and
R. ScoTT; new ediUon by H. S. JoNe s and R. McKaNz1a, Oxford, 1940 (9th ed.),
under hpc,r-µ'1), notes tbe word "lo ephtton.,, giving es meaning "object!', and citing
two pasaages lrom Damaacius. The first text referred to is as follows:
"E-., TO yw.,cm>v !cpc-róv i~, Toil yv<,><>Ttxoil · -1¡ 11{,ot yv&x,«; m<aTpo&i¡ l= TOÜ
yw.>a'tt><OÜ "P°' TO yw.,a-r6v • miaot 3c m,~pof¾I auv«cp-/j COTt · auv«ltff• 8c TO
ot!'ttOCTOV ..e¡¡ et!,:k¡, ~ )(«TO; yv&x,cv, ~ )(«TO; ~....,•• f¡ l<ClTU TO .r..., CMÓ. Ilpo ,:;¡.
µh &poc l<tltTO; yvo>a<v fln~p"f'ii, -/¡ >COCT<l t"'')V, 1tpO 3c -rotó-n¡, -/¡ xa,:' OOal«v, T<(XI
3c TWV oG-r... 3,np'IJ(Úv<,>V c<rrlv -1¡ ol1t:>-w; C7'laTpocp-lJ ... >«d auvoccp-lJ. Kal ~ TaÓTOV
oaaot tjj ti1t>-C,• yvóxm, ~ -r6y,: ii>-'1)8ianpov, >COCI 1tpo ,:aún¡; -1¡ f,,..,cn,;. 'Emta~
l<tltl TO h np6 n voü xal tw;;, xocl oúal4; (xal ...;;, iv,et~ cpwl), bc&a't'IJ• mixc,voc
11{,ot yvwacw; -1¡ lv"'cn,; • TO c!lpot npo_ TO h frt,.,.,,pccp6µcvov o!ln C:.; yv<,>a-rt><l>v
o!ln .., "f>O'ó "fV"'O"'OV I in,~picpcT<Xt, ill' el,~ h "P°' h a,· !vóiacl!l,. d>J.' 00
3,a yvc(,ac..,, •
 OBJE,CTIJM 73
Simplicius, then, in these two passages, gives two rather distinct lines
of presentation of the anlikeimena. In the flrst passage he stresses the
independent existence of the antikeimenon as the very meaning of its
opposition. Moreover, he explains it8 priority in the order of investigation
in function of its more sensible nature.
On the other hand, in the second book, he presents the items as peri ha,
"those about which" the operations are performed, flrst showing the
fact that these figure in our conception of the operations, then referring
to the type of "opposition" involved. The correlation or opposition is
underplayed, the interest being in the priority, While as opposite, as
relative (as named from the operation), the relative is simultaneous with
its correlative, nevertheless it is, in its own reality, naturally prior. It is
the natural priority and perfeclion of the knowable which is considered.
Whether or not these doctrines are compatible, they are certainly very
dilTerent. The flrst understands Aristotle's use of the word "la anlikeimena"
in an exceedingly extrinsic way, as regards the nature o( the things being
spoken of. The word applies inasmuch as the various items are found in
the sensible order. The word is not seen as expressing the very properties
of the knowable and knowing, e.g., as such.
The second does see Aristotle's word as having this sort of appropriate-
ness to the nature of the operations and the things the operations are
about. It sees knowing, desiring, nutrition, etc., as requiring to be located
in the series of types of situation Aristotle has classifled as correlatives.
While it is true that the knowable, e.g., is a correlative in a very peculiar
way, and while it is true that it is, so to speak, as non-correlative that the
Damascii Succe88oris, Dubitallon<1 el Soluliont1 de Primi, Principii,, ed.
C. A. RoBLLB, París, 1889 (reproduced al Brussels, 1964), ch. 27 (lome 1, p. 48).
The argurnenl is alrnlng lo show lhal lbe One Is nol a knowable lhing.
The olher lexl to whlch we are relerred ls agatnsl lhe Arlslotellan conception ol
lhe 0rsl principie as rntnd knowing ilsell. Damascius says:
1 "ET, 81 vO<i>v i<nt ><atl vooóµcv~, YO'l(T6v TC x0<l vocp<>v l0<uToÜ -re x«t ~i¡), ><atl
TO <NV0<1,1cp6T&p6v i<niv ó voG,. 1 Oúxoüv -r6 -n, vocp<>v 8•h<xt -roü vo'l)TOÜ, «:1, olx•lou
icpi-rou, T6 .... YO'IJ'TOY npoo3t,TO<I TOÜ v0<poü, ,h, x«t O<ÓT0 YO,¡pov cTvott ~OÚA&T<tt,
..-6 n auvot1,1cp6T&pov ixnipou ,rpoa3ci, · e! x«t -1¡ n:ü~,, out Tf¡ iv3c(if aúwTTtv,
/1,,mcp Tf¡ G>-n ó x6o¡uY, • «Uil cpó<m ye 6µo>; x«l Mee« ~ -ri¡i v<j\ auvoua(0>TO<t,
,rpó, ..-e TO µi¡ dVO<t «p:x_i¡v ff)V xup10>..-«n¡v.
(/bid., p. 24).
In lhis earlier slalemenl lhe slres& is dearly on needing and wllling; lhe nolion
o! desire and incllnalion is present. We oolieve thal lhe olher lexl is lo be reod againal
lhlt background. CI. olso Plotinus, Ennead1, 111, 8, 11 (lhe whole, bul especlally
lines 16-26), ed. A. H . ARMSTR0N0, Cambridge, Mass./London, 1967, vol. 111,
pp. 398-400. Also ibid., 1, 6, 7, linee 1•6: td. cit., vol. 1, p. 252.
ll seema unwise to ellmlnale rnovemenl lowards lbe good, as such 1 lrorn Damascius'
use ol "tphtton". Thus, lo lranslale il sim.ply as "objecl" in lhe previously lndlcaled
pa88ages aeerns unsullable.
74 L. DEWAN
knowable or the sensible has the very priority about which Aristotle
wishes to speak, nevertheless Simplicius shows that Aristotle's use of
the word "la anlikeimtna" is anything but a haphazard expression.
Lastly, in this survey of commentators,, we come to Averroes. Here
U1ere is only one passage to examine, that in the second book. In the flrst
book, the text of Aristotle on which Averroes is working omits the word
"ta antikeimena" (or a translation of it). Accordingly, there is nothing
in the text of Averroes in explanation of such a word. Nor does he use any
such word on his own initiative in discussing the text. 81
However, the passage in the second book has the word. In the Latín
translation of Averroes' work (we are speaking of his Commenlarium
Magnum in De anima), the text of Aristotle has:
• Et si necesse est dicere unamquanque illarum que sit, v.g. intellectus
quid sit, et sentiens quid sit, et nutritivum quid sit, oportet predicere
intelligere quid sit ; actiones enim et operationes antecedunt in intel-
lectu virtutes. Et si ita sit, et considerare de aliis rebus oppositis istis
debet precedere considerationem de ist:is, oportet nos ut intendamus
ad diffiniendum illas primo propter islam causam, v.g. cibum, et
sensatum, et intellectum. , 81
Concerning this, Averroes tells us that Aristotle is proposing the path-
way of investigation which must be followed. We must start with what is
better kn0"-'11 to us and is posterior in being, and proceed to what is better
known in nature and is prior in being. This means we must know the
operations or actions before the powers. It meaos, further, that we must
know the "palienlia illas acliones" before the actions themselves.
Thus, Averroes himself first describes the food, the known, the sensed
as "patienlia ilfas acliones". He regards them as less intelligible and
posterior in entity with respect to the actions.
He then takes the reader through the words of Aristotle, and coming to
"de rebus opposilis is/is", he expands "islis" to "islis virlulibus" and
quickly adds the gloss: "el sint passiva earum". Later, speaking of the
word "cibum", he notes: "qui es/ passivum virtulis nulrilive". Averroes
thus stresses the comparison between the food, etc. ond the power, and
the sole point he makes concerns the passivity of these things .
At the very end, he adds a note on the word "opposila":
• Et vocavit ea opposita ; passivum enim et activum videntur esse
quoquo modo opposita. • 81
(81) CI. AVERROES, Commenlarium Magnum in ..•dt A nima, Book 1, texl # 10;
ed. CaAwFono, pp. 13-14.
(82) /bid., Book 11, text # 33, linos 4-13; p. 179. Our ltallce.
(83 Tbe lexl runa, ín parl:
, El cum narrsvll quod cognlllo aclionurn debel precedere cognlUonem vlrlulum,
narravil etlarn quod cognilio pallenUum Ulu acUonea debet precedere oognl-
 OBIECTUllf 75
From this it is clear that, o! ali the commentators we have considered,
Averroes makes least o! the use by A r istotle o! the word "la anlikeimena",
i.e. "opposita". His own term Cor the thiogs Aristotle is speaking of is
"passivum" or "paliens", and the passiva are less per!ect, posterior
realities in comparison with the operations and the powers. The priority
is merely Cor us, Cor the human investiga tive procedure. 8'
tionem lllarum actionum, propler illam eandem causam propter quam debet
precedere cognitio actionum cognilionem virlutum. Et dixit: Et •i ita 1il, etc.
ldest, el si ita sil, sciUcet quod debemus ire semper de eis que apud nos sunt magia
nota ad illa que apud Naturam sunl magis nota, et considerare dt rebu1 oppositis
islis virtulibu, (et sunt passiva earum) debcl precedere consideralionem in actio•
nlbus et in virtuUbus, necess.e est prescire cibum quid sil, qui est passivum
virlulia nutrlUve, et &enMlum quid sil, et intelleclum quid sil, antequam sciatur
nulriri el senlire que sunt. Et vocavit ea opposila; passivum et aclivum videntur
eue quoquo modo opI)<>sila. • (/bid., p. 180, linea 37-52.)
Thus, Averroes does not even lake lile trouble to explain lbe semalum and lhe
inlellectum in Ibis conlexl. Does he really wish to say that they are pas,iua wi lh respecl
to tbe power?
(84) In bis commentary on Book 111, text # 5, at td. cit., pp. 400-401, speaking of
the necessity of positing an inttlltctu, a.gen, and an inlellectus recipien,, Averroes
uses e vocabulary lnvolvíng two &ubiula. Both lhe thlng known and tbe knower are
called "1ubitclum" . Thus:
• Quoniam, quia formare per inlellectum, sicul dicil Aristoleles, eel sicut compre-
hendere per sensum, comprehendere aulem per sensum perflcllur per duo subiecta,
quorum unum esl subiectum per quod sensus lll verus (et est sensatum extra
animam), aliud aulem est subiectum per quod sensus esl forma existen& (ot est
prima perfeclio senlienlis), necesse esl etiam ut intellecta in actu babeant duo
subiecta, quorum unum est subieclum per quod sunt vera, sciHcet forme que sunt
ymagines vere, secundum autem est illud per quod inlellecta sunt unum onUum
in mundo, el istud est intellectus melerialis. Nulla enim dltrerentfo est in hoc
inter sensum et lntellectum, nlsi quia subleetum sensus per quod est verus est
extra animam, et subiectum inteUectus per quod est verus est. inlra animam ... •
(Ed. cit., p. 400, linea 379-393).
In the same place, Averroes calls the " mbltclum per quod tal uerus" tho "1ubltclum
quod moutt <potenliam>". Thus;
• Et isla proportionalitas magis invenitur ínter subiectum vlsus quod movet
ipsum et inler sublectum lntellectus quod movet ipsum. Quemadmodum enlm
subieclum visus movens ipsum, quod est color, non movet ipsum nisi quando
per presentiam lucia efflciturcolor in actu postquam eral in potentia, ita intentiones
ymaginate non movent lntellectum malerialem nisl quando emciunlur lntellecle
in aetu P<>Slquam erant In potenlia... • (/bid., p. 401, linea 400-407).
Tbe very awkwardness ol this vocabulary would certainly militate lor the acceptance,
il not for the invenlion, of a new word.
Avieenna, we might note, seems to have no word lor the object. In his Dt anima
(Llbu ,utu, naturalium), Part 1, ch. 4, w!here he presenta a general discussion ol lhe
aclions of the soul, he certainly mnkes use of nothing likc a general term lor the
obitclum. Describing the differonce belween "atlingere colorem" and "attingue aapo-
rem", he saya tbey dUJer "in genere". CI. Avicenna Lalinus. Llbtr de Anima BtU Sutu,
de Naturalibu.,, édition erlliquo de la traduclion latine médiévale, par S. van Riel,
Louvain/Leiden, 1972 (for 1, 11 , and 111), p. 68.
There is no lisling for "oblectum" In lhe indices ol this edition.
76 L . DEWAN
Looking back over the commentators, we see t hat ali except Averroes
mention that the opposition is pros ti. Like Averroes, Themistius has a
vocabulary o! his own for discussing Arist otle's anlikeimena; he clearly
pre!ers such descr iptions as "ta hupokeimena lais energeiais" and "la
pragmala peri ha". Philoponus uses AristoUe's word very faith!ully, but
in the end sees little use for the doctrine. I t is the Simplicius who speaks
in the commentary on t he second book who gives most weight to
Aristotle's word, seeing in th.is peculiar type o! opposite (the know•
a ble, etc.) an entitative priority with respect to its correlative, however
tenuous its (i.e., e.g., the knowable's) claim to be an opposite.
One might conclude that a doctrine such as that of Simplicius, book 11
(and Aristotle, as understood by him) provides considerable ímpet us Cor
the invention o! a proper name for the !eature o! reality they call "the
correlat ive" or "the opposite".
We have previously mentioned in passing somethlng about the Latín
t ranslations or Aristotle. Be!ore leaving the question o! the Aristotelian
background of the word "obieclum", we will resume this data.
The De anima seems to have been translated into Latín for t he first
time by James or Venice sometime in the second quarter or the twelfth
century.H He renders Aristotle's "la anlikeimena" in both passages by
"opposila" .18
The next t ranslation 87 appears to be that from the Arabic by Michael
Scot, done probably between 1227 and 1230. 88 It has a translation of
only one of the two occurrences, that in the second book. It renders it by
"res opposilae". 89
William o! Moerbeke revised the translation o! James of Veoice not
later than 1268. 9 º If we may judge !rom the version commented upon by
St. Thomas A quinas,91 in the passage in the second book William
(85) Cf. L. M1N10-PuuBLL0, "Jacobus Venellcus Canonist and Translat.or ol
AristoUe", Tradilio 8 ( 1952), pp. 265-304. esp. p. 265, n. 2, and p. 291; concerning dates,
p. 271, n. 16 and pp. 293-4 (ca. 1128-1160 is lhe range ol dales).
(86) We have quoted one ol the texts above, p . 57, n. 45, and lhe other con be
found below, n. 93. For tho edition used, cf. n. 21.
(87) CI. MINIO-PALUl!LL0, arl. Cit., p. 265, n. 2.
(88) Cl. R. DE VAUX, ar!. cit. (supra., n. 14).
(89) Cf. above, p. 74, n. 82.
(90) Cl. GRABMANN, M., / Papi del Duocento , l'Arlllolell,mo, 11. Guglielmo di
Moubekt, O.P., ...(Mi«tllanea Hlstoriae Ponliftciat, vol. XI, rase. no. 20, Rome,
1946), pp. 95-96. The year 1268 is proposed as lhe luminu., ad quem, based on lhe lacl
that the revision is used in the translalion ol Philoponus' commentary on Lhe De
anima, and that Ibis translation is known to have been completed Dec. 17, 1268.
CI. infra, D . 95.
(91) William or Moorbeke'& rovision Is used In ali three books on St. Tbomas'
commentary on tbe De anima: el. F. PELST&R, "Oie Obenetzungen der arlstoteliachen
Metapbyalk In den Werken des hl. Thomas von Aquin, 111", in Grtgorlanum 17 (1936),
pp. 377-406, eapecially p. 396, n. 38.
 OBIECTUM 77
81
retained the word "opposila", b111t in the first book he substitut.ed
"obiecla" 93 •
As far as we can see, then, the word "obieclum" is found in the translat-
ions only aft.er its invention by teachers (as distinct from translators).
Around 1268, by which date the word is already well established, William
of Moerbeke is still prone to write "opposila".
Indeed, we can observe in the work of William of Moerbeke the
pressure exerted by the development of the word "obieclum". In bis
translalion of Themistius' Commentary on lhe De anima, where Themistius,
speaking of Aristotle's antikeimena, himself substitutes "lo hupokeimenon",
William translates "lo hupokeimenon" by "obieclum". Elsewhere in the
same commentary, William regulairly translates this word by "suppo-
silum". M
Similarly, in his translation of the t hird book of Philoponus' Commenlary
on lhe De anima, William renders "to hupokeimenon gnoslon" by "obieclum
cognoscibile". 96 On the other hand, in his revision of James of Venice'
(92) The revision reads:
, Si autem sic, adhuc his priora opposila oporlcl considerare, de illis primum
ulique oportebil determinare, proplor eamdem causom, ut de alimento, el sensibili,
et intelligibili. •
CI. S. Thoma, Aqulnali,. In Arlaloltli• Llbrum de Anima Commtnlarlum, ed.
A. M. P1ROTTA, O.P., Turin, 1969 (4th ed.), p. 77 (L. 11, lecl. VI).
For tbe unlouched veraion ol James ol Venice, el. 1upra, p. 57.
One ought to nolice how different is Sl. Thomas Aquinas' handling ol this passage
from what one Onda in lhe Greek commentalors, or even in Averroes. Cf. od.
P1ROTTA, # 304-308, pp. 78-79. There is no mcnlion ol pro, 11 opposlUon. St. Thomas
slmply says:
• ... et acllbus adbuc sunt priora oppo1ila, ldul oblecla. • ( # 304).
He lhen goes on to presenl a lengthy instruction 011 tbe oature and diverae types
ol oblectum, and why they specily acts and powera. Tbe genera l pattern or tbe discus-
sion looks to have as anceslor a treatment not unlike the passage on obitclum al the
beginning ol the D• poltntll• animat ti obltcti,. Tbe difference between St. Tbomas'
approach and thal of tho Greek commentalors depends largely on the interveniog
invenüon ot lbe word ºobiectumº.
(93) The original versioo read:
, SI autem opera prius, ilerum utlque dubitabit aliquis si sibi oppossita (sic) prlus
hiis siut quereuda, ut sensibile sensitivo et intelllgiblle íntelleclivo. • CI. ed.
ALoNso, p. 91, linea 5-8. No variante are indicated lor "oppossit.a".
The revlsion has: "Si autem opera prlus, lterum uUque dubitabit aliquis si obiecta
borum príus quaerendum, sicut sensibile sensitivo, et intelligibile lntellectivo.'º Cl.ed.
PrROTTA, ( Bk. I, lect. IJ, pp. 1-2. St. Thomas' comments símply assume lhe word
"obiutum .. , and accordingly make no mention or "op()08ilum" nor any rererence t.o
pro• 11 oppositlon.
(94) CI. 1upra, n. 70.
(95) CI. ed. VERBl!KE (•upra, n. 72), p. 86, line 75. This translation was completed
Dec. 17, 1268; el. Verbeke'1 lnlroduclíon, p. u:xxvu.
78 L. DEWAN
De anima translation, he has left intact the translation of Aristotle's
expression "lo hupokeimenon aislhelon" as "subieclum sensibile".n
From ali these considerations, of Aristotle, of his commentators, of
his t ranslators, it is clear that while the introduction of the word "obiec-
tum" and its attendant doctrines takes place in an Aristotelian setting
and as an Aristotelian development, it represents a step which had not
already been taken by Aristotle. It is nota product of the mere translation
of Aristotle into Latín.
b) A Passage in Boethius' De consolatione philosophiae:
Next, we will consider brielly a text which, to the casual reader, might
very well seem an early, if unique, instance of the word "obieclum" in the
sense and type of use which we are discussing. It occurs in Boethius' De
consolalione philosophiae, and is as follows:
« Quod si in corporibus sentiendis, quamvis afficiant instrumenta
sensuum forinsecus obieclae qualitates, animique agentis vigorem
passio corporis antecedat, quae in se actum mentís provocet, excitet-
que interim quiescentes intrinsecus formas : si in sentiendis, inquam,
corporibus animus non passione insign.itur, sed ex sua vi subjectam
sibi corpori judicat passionem, quant-0 magis ea quae cunctis cor-
porum alTectionibus absoluta sunt , in discernendo non objecla
extrinsecus sequuntur, sed actum suae mentís expediunt? ••7
(96) The passagc in ArístoUe to wbich we are relerriog is De anima HI, ch. 2,
4'26b8-11. For Jame• or Venice, el. ed. ALONSO, p . '262, linea 8-11. For William of
Moerbeke, ed. PIR0TTA, p. 150, lincs 1-7.
Michael Scot's translatíon f rom tbe Arable lor this passage ol AristoUe has:
, Et unusqulsque seosuum est reí sensibilís subiecte illi, et cst existen& in suo
sentiente secundum quod cst senlíens, et iudica.t differenUaa senslbllls slbl subiecti,
v.g. vísus album et nigrum, et gustus dulce et amar um, el sic de alíis. • (Ed.
CRAWF0RD, p. 348, # 144, lines 1-5).
Averroes' vocabulary, in lhe Latín ol Míchael Scol, In spea king or the above passage,
is of inleresl:
, ldest, el manifestum est per se quod unusqulsque sensuum iudicat suum
subiectum proprium quod est el secundum guod esl illud senlíens, et íudicat
cum hoc d ifferentías proprias que sunl in illo subiecto proprio, v.g. quia vlsus
íudícal colorem, qui est subleclum proprium ei secundum quod est visus .•. •
( Ibld., pp. 348-9, lines 16-22).
(97) Cf. Book V, prose v. B0BTHJUS, Tht Coruolalion º' Phllo,oph¡¡, LaUn text
ediled by E. K. RAND, with the English translation of ' ºI.T.'' (1609) revised by
H. F. STEWART, London/New York, 1926 (T he Loeb Classical Library), pp. 392 and
394, linos 1-10. Our italics.
Sínce wriling lhis sectlon on Boethius, 1 havo noliced tbe Augustlnian background
ol lhe Boethlan expressions. Thus, usíng lhe line-enumeraUon or the Corpw Chrúlla•
norum edilíon (St. AuousTINE, De trinllale, ed. W. J. MoUNTAIN, Fr. GL0Rlll,
T urnboltl, 1968, we sbould nole XV, X II, line 13: •·•... nec in eis ulois babetur hoc quao
 OBIECTUM 79
lt is, of course, the second instance, "obiecla", to which we are referring.
The first use is clearly adjectival. But it seems to us that the second use
is adjectival as well, understanding an "ea quae sunl" before it.
lf this is true, one would never suspect it from the English translation
of " I.T." (1609 A.O.) as revised by H. F. Stewart. It reads:
"And if in sentient bodies, although the qualities of outward objecl$
do move the organs of sen.se, and the passion of the body goeth
before the vigour of the active mind, provoking her action to itself and
exciting the inward forms which before lay quiet; if, I say, in percei-
ving these corporal objecls the mind taketh not her impression from
passion, but by her own force j udgeth of the passion itself, which is
objected to the body; how much more do these powers exercise the
action of their mind and not only follow the outward objecls in their
judgment, which are free froni ali afTections of the body?" 98
Consider, on the other hand, the great care taken by Chaucer in this
matter:
"But what yif that in bodies to ben feled, lhal is lo seyn, in lhe
lakinge of knowelechinge of bodily lhinges, and al-be-it so that the
qualitees of bodies, that ben objeéle fro withouté-forth, moeven and
entalenten the instruments of the wittes ... moche more thanne tho
thinges that ben absolut and quite fro alle talents or afTeccciouns
of bodies, as god or his aungeles, ne folwen nat in discerninge thinges
object fro withoute-forth, but they accomplisshen and speden the
dede of hir thoght." 19
Not merely Chaucer's use of "thinges", in "thinges object fro withoute-
forth", to translate "obiecla exlrinsecus", but especially his use of "fro",
makes it clear that he sees the verbal and so adjectival force of "obiecla".
Indeed, bis use of "fro" in both cases, i.e. in the translation of "forin-
secus" and "ea:lrinse.c us", shows that he reads "obiecla" and "obiectae"
in tbe sense of something lhrown up againsl the "i.nstruments of the
wittes".
obiciuntur el<trinseeus.. .""; aleo, XI, 11, lines 5-6: "Deinde uisio quae non erat priu&-
quam rem illam obiectam sensui sentiremus." and ibid., linea 26-27: " Nam aensus et
ante obiectum rel aensibills..."; also, lbid., linea 164-166: " .•. aicut ex corpore obieclo
sensiblli aen•ua extrinaecu• tormabalur." and XI, III, linea 14-16: ..... quomodo !orla
corpori obiecto tormandum sensum ... "
Aleo to be noted is Augu•Une, Dt mu•ica VI, c. 5, n. 9 (P.L. 32, 1168): "Corporalia
ergo quaecumque huic corpori ingerunlur aul ob)lciunlur exlrlnsecua, non in arúma,
sed in ipso corpore aliquid taciunt .....
(98) /bid., pp. 393 and 395. Our ilalics. How much ol what we sec here is the work
or Stewarl I do not know.
(99) Cr. The Complete Worlu of Gtoffrt¡¡ Chauur, ed. Rev. Walter W. SK&AT,
Oxlord, n.d., pp. 200-1. Itelics in the ediUon.
80 L. DEWAN
However, this might be taken as merely confirming what the De
polentiis animae el obieclis says about "obieclum", used in connection with
apprehensive powers, viz that it expresses movement from the things
°
towards the soul.10 Could not Boetbius' "obiecla" be fully substantiva)?
We can say of the Boethian text that the change from the feminine
to the neuter, from "forinsecus objeclae qualilales" to "objecla exlrinsecus"
(it is essential to take "forinsecus" and "extrinsecus" as parts of the
formulae), is a move to greater independence for "obiecta", and thus
towards substantification. But particularly in view of the word "exlrin-
secus", it seems quite clear that this is not a fully substantiva! use of
"obiecla".
Nevertheless, this text from Boethius certainly conslitutes a leading
candidate for the sou.rce of inspiration for "obieclum". What one would
like to see, bowever, is sorne twelfth-century or early thirteenth-eentury
writer actually making use of this text of Boethius in connection with
the doctrine of obieclum.
Now, we do have an example of a twelfth-century author using this
passage of Boethius. But he exhibits no interest wbatever in the words
"obiecla" and "obieclae". The author is Wiilliam of Conches, who wrote,
among other things, glosses on Boethius' Consolalion and on Plato's
Timaeus. When glossing the very words of Boethius, he shows no part-
icular interest in the formulae which concern us.1 01 When he takes up
and employs the very passage from Boethius, wbile glossing Plato, he
eliminates the words wbich most interest us. 101 When be discusses the
(1 00) cr. abovo, pp. 58-59.
(101) I bave seen two manuscrlpts conlaining William·s G/o,,e, on the Coruolalio
philosophia,, víz. Ms. Heillgenkreuz 130 and Ms. Val. Lal. 5202.
In Ms. Heilígenkreuz 130, at lol. 120ro, linea 13-14, in the paraphrase ol lhe pasaage
conlaining "obitcta", we read:
, ...in discernendo non secundum obieclala extrinaecus; idesl non iudicant aecun-
dum naturam rerum, eed secundum suam nat..uram ... •
In Ms. Val. Lat. 6202, fol. 39vo, col. A, llne1 14-15:
, ...in discemendo non ludlcant aecundum rerum naturam sed aecundum naturam
suam ... •
Concernlng tbe Me. Heiligenkreuz 130, el. N. M. HlatNo, "Four Commenlaries on
lhe De Con,olationt Phi/o,ophlae In Ms. Helligenil<reuz 130", in Mtdiawal Studiu,
vol. XXXI (1969), pp. 287-316. At p. 295, we are told tbat tbe commenlary In l. 93-121
'"datea back to Williom of Conches". But lhere &NI indicalions that it doea not lully
.. coincide wllh lhe commonly known text of Wllliam'a work."
(102) Ct. GutLLAUME de C0NCBES, Glo,ae Super Plalonem, ed. E. J &AUNEAU,
Paria, 1965 (Tel<tea philoaophlquea du moyen Age, XIII), CXXII, p. 216, gloaslng
Tlrnaeua 42a:
, . .. primo quidtm 1t111um aellarl ante imaginalionem el rationem et lntellectum,
et hoc a uloltnti, ptu1ionibw quia, ut ait BoelEua, 1en1um precedlt In vivo corpore
pa88io, vel cum lux lerlt oculoa vel vox auribua inatrepit, vel calor vel frigua vel
asperltea vel lenitaa occurit manibus, vel duleedo el alli aaporea afflciunt linguam,
 OBIE:CTUM
variety of cognitive powers of the soul, making use of Boethian texts
to do so, he has no general term for what later will be called the "obieo-
lum".101
In fact, William's use of the Boethian passage serves to underscore
the fact that Boethius' words: "forinsecus objeclae qualilales" and
"objecla ulrinsecus" are intended to express a feature peculiar to external
sensation, and much more on the side of its externality than on the side
of its being sensation.
Nevertheless, it is possible t hat the Boethian text played a role in the
selection of "obieclum" to fil! out the acherna: obieclum/operalio/polenlia.
e) The Doctrine of the obslaculum:
One of the passages containing the word "obieclum", in the De anima of
Grosseteste, involved certain remarks of St. Augustine concerning
suavis vel contrarios odor tangit nares, quibus anima intus quiescena excitata
senUre lnciplt.'" (!talles in edition).
We say tbat William employa tbe very paasage o! Boethius, but Ibis Is true only to
lhc exlenl lhal wc enlarge Lbe passage lo include lhe corresponding metrical porllon.
Tbere we read:
• Praecedil ta:men excitaos
ac vires animi movena
vivo In corp.ore passlo
cum vel lux oculos ferit
vel vox auribus instrepit.
Tum mentls vigor excltus
quas intus species tenet
ad motua similes vocans
nolis applicat exleris
introrsumque reconditis
rormis mise.et imagines. •
(Boethius, Phi/os. Con,., V, m. iv, lines 30-40; ed. L. B1BL~A, Turnholt.i, 1957, p. 98-99.
(Corpus Cbristianorum Series Latina XCIV)).
The word "quiu,:en," in Wílliam's text echoes our prose passagc, but William has
prelerred tbe language or the metricai linee. I do not know wbether there i• any special
source lor the examples other than the "uo:t" and the "lu;e". In any caae, we aee well
exemplifled here lhe Boethian "qualitatu abíeclat", and we may take the verbs:
••terll.. .lnalreplt..•occuril...afllciunt...langil ...." •• so many particular lnotances ol what
it is lo be "foriruecUJJ obleclae". William repeato this doctrine al Glo,ae Super Plalonem,
CXLVI, ed. cit., p. 249.
Jeauneau (wilh great eircumspection) attributes these Platonlc glosses to Wllliam••
mature perlod; el. ed. cil., pp. 14-ló. This suggesls 1140-&0 (cf. p. 10).
(103) cr. ibld., XXXIV, ed. cit., pp. 100-101. In Ibis paasage, tbe externa! senses
are presented as lollows:
• Et est sensus vis anime qua percipit horno Oguram et colorem rei presentis.
Que vis non operalur nisi in corpore presenti illius in quo lantum est figura et
color. Hec vero babel prineipium a passionibus exlrinsocus 1!bl allall1. ,
T be last sentence (wbich Is lound in only tbree ol six manuscripts, in one of wbich Is
found "iUalia") looks like another relerence to our "obitcla utrinauUJJ" or "for iruuiu
obiulae qualilatu".
6
81 82 L . DEWAN
corporeal vision. We suggested that the word "obieclum", in that particular
passage of the De anima of Grosseteste, is a rellection of the expression:
"corpus obieclum" found in slill another passage of St. Augustine on
oorporeal vision. 104
In this latter text of Augustine, what we have is an adjectival use not
at ali in the same line of doctrine as the use of "obieclum" to mean the
object of a power. lt is rather, roughly speaking, in the lino of doctrine
associated in the twelfth century with the word "obslaculum". We will
now brielly discuss this latter line of doctrine, as providing not only a
contrast, but also sorne suggestive verbal and conceptual approaches to
a doctrine of obieclum in the thirteenth-century sense.
We will present passages first from William of Conches, secondly from
Thierry of Chartres, and tlúrdly from or related to Alan of Lille.
William of Conches presents the obslaculum in more than one place,105
but we will limit ourselves to his Glosae super Plalonem. The following
passage on vision sums up well William's position:
• Sunt igitur necessaria ad visum : interior radius et exterior et
obslaculum quia, istis concurrentibus, llt visus, aliquo istorum
deficiente, esse non potest... radius interior emissus, per oculorum
fenestras exiens admiscet se radio exteriori, acuendoque usque ad
obslaculum veniens, repercutitur et frangitur. Unde naturali mobili-
tate per superficiem obslacttli difTusus, figuram et colorem obslaculi
sibi assumit, quibus informatus et coloratus ad animam revertens
per eosdem oculos usque ad animam transit. Unde est quod aliud
visu non discernirnus quam colorem et llguram... •1 º8
William is, of course, glossing the Latin version of Plato's Timaeus, which
is the source for the twelfth century of this doctrine of vision. The relevant
passage in Plato runs:
« Itaque cum diurnum iubar applicat se visus Cusioni, tune nimirum
incurrentia semet invicem duo similia in unius corporis speciem
cohaerent, quo concurrunt oculorum acies emicantes quoque effiuen-
tis intimae fusionis acies contiguae imaginis occursu repercutitur.
Totum igitur hoc similem eandemque sortitum passionem et ob
indifTerentem similitudinem eiusdemque passionis efTectum, cum
quid aliud tangit vel ipsum ab alio tangitur, tactuum motu difTundens
(104) CI. ebove, pp. 37-44.
(105) Cl. e.g. bis Dt phi/o,ophia mundi, bk. IV, ch. XXV 1 (P.L. 172, col. 96). On
tlús work and its background, cf. P. M1cnAUD·QUANT1N, "Les puissanccs de l'Ame
au xu• siécie", Rtvue du moyen dge latin ó (1949), pp. ló-34, cspecially pp. 28-32
and 17-19.
(108) Gloiat Supu Ptalontm, cxxxvrr, ed. c.it., pp. 236-7. Our italica.
 OBJE.CTUM 83
se per omne corpus perque corpus usque ad animam porrigens
sensum efficit qui visus vocatur. »1°7
Ar, we see, the word "obslaculum"' is not found in the version of Plato,
but the expression: "contiguae imaginis occursu reperculilur" certainly
invites it as a gloss.
Here, then, in William, the doctrine of the obslaculum is essentially a
part of the theory of corporeal vision. The rays of light issuing from
the eye hit up against a body, partak.e of its colour and shape, and rebound
to the eye. U is vision imagined somewhat according to the pattern to
tactile experience, like sending out a "feeler". It is the impassibility which
makes for an obslaculum. One is rather left to wonder about the harvest
of colour and shape which the ray gathers before parting from the
obslaculum. The essential contribution of the obslaculum is the blocking
of the ray by virtue of the obstaculum's bulky character. As William says_:
• ...el quo corpore acies inlimae fusionis id est interioris radii, reper-
culilur ; et hoc occursu conligu.e imaginis, id est corpulente rei, ut
repercussus cum forma et colore rei ad animam revertatur. •1 º1
We cite this passage especially for the word "corpulenle", which William
must add preeisely to bring us from Plato's somewhat Iess corporeal
"imago" to William's own "obslaculum" .
In this regard, it may be helpfuE to compare the presentation of the
doctrine by William with that by Calcidius. Calcidius, in speaking of the
light coming from the eyes, also speaks about the outside light as bringing
forth colours from the seen bodies. He brings into the discussion Plato's
doctrine of colour as a sort of light or fire with which the surfaces of bodies
are imbued.1 º' Accordingly, here is what he says of the three essentials
for vision:
• Tribus ergo his concurrentibus visus existit trinaque est ratio
videndi : lumen caloris intimi per oculos means, quae principalis est
causa, lumen extra positum, consanguineum lumini nostro, quod
simul operatur et adiuvat, lumen quoque, quod ex corporibus visi-
bilium specierum lluit, llamma seu color, qui perinde est atque
sunt omnia sine quibus propositum opus effici non potest, ut sine
ferramentis quae sunt operi faciendo necessario ; quorum si quid
deerit, impediri visum necesse est. , 110
(107) PLATO, Tlmat,u, 45B-D, in lbe t.ran.lat.ion ol Calcidiua, ed. J . H. WASZINK
wlth P. J . JBNSEN. London/Leiden, 1962 (Plato Latinus, vol. IV), pp. 41-42.
(108) WtLLIAN or CoNcosa, G/oaat ... , CXXXIX, td. cit., pp. 239-40. Underlining
in edilion ia texl of Plalo.
(109) CI. C.<Lc101us, ed. cit. ,upra n. 107. Al CCXLrv, p. 255, Calcidius relen ua
to Plato, Tlmae,u 67C5-7. · (112) cr. N. M. HARING, S.A.C. , Commentari•• on Botthiu, b¡¡ Thiern¡ of Chartre,
(110) /bid., CCVLV (lege: CCXLV), p. 266.
84 L. DEWAN
Here, the third essential is a third lumen, the colour of the bodily
surface. This is quite a dilTerent essential role than that of the obslaculum.
Calcidius is considering visibility as such, not the mechanical aspect of
the situation.
In another passage, Calcidius uses the term "materia" where William
speaks of the obslaculum:
• Evidenter visum fleri dicit, quotiens intimi caloris lumen, quod
inolTense per oculos fluit, aliquam visibilem maleriam, quam conti-
guam imaginem appellat, incurrit ibidemque iuxta maleriae quali-
tatem formatum et coloratum sensus visusque confit ex lumine qui
contiguae imaginis occursu repercussus reditu facto ad oculorum
lores usque ad mentis secreta porrigitur... t 111
One can say, at the very least, that the obslaculum conception
constitutes a concentration of interest new to the Timaeus/Calcidius
setting.
Our second author, in this sampling of twelfth-century views on the
obalaculum, is Thierry of Chartres. First of ali, we will look at a text in
the Traclatus de se.x dierum operibus, written ca 1130-40.m Thierry is
arguing to prove that the celestial bodies, i.e. the stars, and indeed
whatever else is truly visible in the heavens, are made of water. His
argument is that only earth and water are visible by their own nature;
moreover earth cannot be borne aloft by heat: rather, this is the property
of the nature of water. The passage which concerns us is the argument that
only water and earth, not fire and air, are truly visible:
e Nam duo superiora elementa - ignem et aera - ex sua natura ita
absque omni spissitudine esse manifestum est ut nichil horum ex se
et ex sua natura nisi ex accidenti visui pervium sit... Nam quamvis
visus ex luce oculorum sumit exordium nichil tamen valet nisi ex
obsfaculo alicuius spissitudinis reperc.utiatur.
e Si vero aer iste inferior qui est ínter nos et parietem vel maceriam
vel aJiquid tale, non potest visui ad sentiendum obstare: multo minus
igitur superior qui purior est...
• Unde constat quod omne corpus visibile alicuius densationis est
que ex spissitudine aque ve! terre contingit. Nam nubes ex vapore
aquarum densate visibiles apparent. Flamme vero que in nubiloso
aere vel in aliqua materia que comburitur flunt ex vaporibus aqua-
rum substantiam habent.
• Radius quoque solis qui per fenestram decurrere videtur non aliunde
est visibilis nisi ex atomis pulveris in radio decurrentibus et ad
(111) /bid., CCXLIII (lege: CCXLVII), p. 259. Our italica.
and Hi, School, Toronlo, 1971. For the dallng, el. p. 47.
 OBfE·CTUM 85
lucem solis relucentibus. Sic in ceteris rebus subtiliter intuenti
apparebit nichil esse visibile nis:i ex obslaculo quod ex aqua vel terra
contingit. •118
Here we have a consideration of the essential role, for visibility itself,
of the ítem called the "obslaculum". It is only the dense, as such, which is
properly visible, and this is the property of two elements, earth and
water. We should notice especially the expression: " ...visui ad senliendum
obstare". Obstare, the role of the obslaculum, is a positive contribution to
being sensed. Obstacles, one might say, are no obstacle. It is only by
"getting in the way" that a thing can be seen. Light as such is invisible. m
This is certainly a somewhat difTerent emphasis than in the lumen
doctrine of Calcidius.
In another work, the Commenlum super Boethii librum De Trinitate,
written after 1148,111 we have a pr-esentation of "obstacular" cognition
in contrast to higher modes of apprehension. Thierry is explaining what
sapientia is. To do so, he speaks about the soul's conformity to the
instruments it uses, speaking flrst about the1soul's use of bodily instrum-
ents for cognition, and then about its using only itself as instrument. To
illustrate the use of bodily instruments, he begins with exterior sensibles,
and then moves on to imagination. In the passage which follows, we see
the general principie of the doctrine, and the meaning of its application
to externa! sensation:
e Anima huius nature est ut suis semper se ipsam conformet instru-
mentis. Quod sensus etiam corporeus apertissime declarat. Si quis
enim vitro rubeo vel colorís alterius vitro imposito litteras inspiciat,
rubeas quoque vel cuius colorís vitrum extiterit videbatur sibi videre
litteras. Adeo vis intima sensus corporei obstanli vitro se ipsam
conformat. t 118
That is the general principie, the conformity of the soul with its instru-
ments. And here is the application to external sensation:
e Anima vero duobus modis res conprehendit. Quandoque enim se
ipsa pro instrumento utitur. Quandoque vero corpore pro instrumento
( 113) THIBRRY of CHARTRBS, Traclatu• <lesu dierum op,rlbu,, # 11-12; ed. HXRING,
pp. 559-60, linea 39-60. Our italica.
(114) Willlam or Conchea provldee an allernalive to this teaching. Cf. Gl01a• Supu
Platontm, CXLVII; td. cit., p. 250:
, SI allqulo dlcat ignem non eese vlslbllem, cum nec aer etlam (llli apiüior eat
videri poesit, dicimus ignem esse visibilem sed, propter bebitudinem sensuum,
lpeum ab bomine non viderl. Vel dicamus ignem e88e vislbilem eed admixlum
alicui malerie episse. •
(115) Tbe Commenlum la to be found In the aame collection of ediliona (el. ,upra
n. 112) aa lhe Tractatu, d• ,.., dierum op,ribu,. Concernlng lbe date, cr. p. 24.
(11 6) Commenlum, U, 2: ed. cll., p. 68, linea 21-~6. Halica oun.
86 L DEWAN
fungitur. Fit itaque ut corporeo plerumque grosso et testeo utatur
instrumento. Quod evenit quociens visum vel ceteros sensus instru-
mentis exercet corporeis.
• Quale ergo instrumentum invenit talero se illi conformat circa id
quod eodem instrumento conprehendit ut quoniam oculus grossum
quiddam est et testeum nec aliquid oculo anima nisi grossum conpre-
hendat sed illus quidem confuse sed per obslaculum.
e Unde fit ut ex nimia aeris subtilitate oculus ipsum ínter se et
obslaculum aliquid minime conprehendat sed nec sensus aliquis nisi
forte aer tanto ímpetu moveatur ut anima ipsum per obstacu/um
motus sentiat. Patet igitur quod grossum et testeum instrumentum
subtilitatem anime quodam modo tardat. t117
The principie here is taken from the experience of seeing something
through coloured glass, or at any rate that is the means of illustration.118
The sight judges the thing seen according to the conditions of the glass.
The instrument and its qualities afJect the judgment concerning the
thing known. The result of this is that only inasmuch as there is a confor-
mily between the inslrumenl and the lhing known can the thing be known
using that instrument.
The external senses being thick or dense sorts of instrument, they are
accordingly suitable for knowing only things of such a thick or dense sort.
What is of a subUe nature cannot be sensed. It is only being or becoming
something of an obslaculum that a thing can be sensed.
In the above passage, the theory of the obslaculum is being applied,
not merely to the sense of sight, but to externa! sensation generally.
This is clear from the whole drift of the argument, from the expression:
"nec sensus aliquis", and from the case of air, which becomes sensible
inasmuch as it becomes something of an obstaculum: the air in motion
would seem to be meant as a tangible ítem, rather than a visible item, and
is called an "obslaculum".
Moreover, it is clear from the whole context that obstacularity, if we
may so speak, is a property of the lower and less perfect sort or apprehen-
dable, precisely as lower or less perfect. 11•
(117) /bid., II, 3: pp. 68-9, llnes 27-40. Jtallca oun.
(118) 1t is surely fitting that theae reflectlons concernlng coloured gla88 come
to ua from Chartrea, renowned for Ita stalned-glaaa windowa.
( 119) Concernlng Thierry•a doctrine that In the higher modea of knowlng the aoul
uses ltaelf asan lnatrumenl, el. PLATO, Th•aeletu,, 1.84B-lSSE. Plato apeake of the soul
knowlng sensible qualiUea through (dla) the bodlly organa (184CD). He then say1
that the eoul uses no ,peclal organ to vlew "what ali thlnga baire in common", but
viewa them "b¡¡ iúelr' (di 'haulu' J (185DE). Tbe uee of "dla" In the latter texta l1
akln to Tblerry aaylng tbat tbe aoul uaea ltaelf tor 11n inatrumenl. (Englilh tranalatio11
of Plato, 81 well 88 Greek text, t.aken from Plato, Th•atl<IUl/&phul, wltb an Englilb
t.ranalaUon, by H . N. FowLBn, Cambridge, Ma11./Lo11don, 1921 (1967 reprlnt) (Loeb
Clua!CI).
 87
The third twelfth-eentury writer we will sample is Alan of Lille,
whose career pertains to the last half of the century,11º and who, like
William of Conches and Thierry of Chartres, is doctrinally associable with
what is called the "School of Chartres". 111
The following short passage from the H ierarchia Alani gives us a re-
etatement of the doctrine of the Timaeus:
• ... visio corporis quodam modo composita est. Cum enim radius
visibilis ad comprehendendum corporale dirigitur et ad obslacu/um
offendilur et circa obslaculi illius partes diffunditur, obstaculique simili-
tudinem retinens, quadam repercussione ad oculum revertitur, et sic
anima excitatur ad comprehendendum sensibile, et sic talis compre-
hensio quodam modo composita est. , 112
From this passage, we should retain the use of the word "offenditur".
We will speak further of it in a moment.
In another work of Alan's, the so-called Summa "Quoniam homines",
in the context of the doctrine that God is not in place, we read as follows:
e Augustinus etiam volens ostendere quod divina essentia post diem
iudicii materialibus oculis conprehendi non poterit, inter alias ratio-
cinationes dicit quod materialis visus celebrari circa aliquid non
potest nisi radius visibilis transiens spacium ad obslaculum perveniat.
Cum ergo Deus ubique est, radius visibiJis transiens spacium Deum
non posset invenire tamquam obslaculum t. 118
This appears to be a reference to a sermon of St. Augustine, to part of
which we have already referred. 11• 1f so, however, there is a significant
difJerence between Augustine's interest and that of Alan. Augustine,
earlier in his sermon, does indeed speak of visible bodies acting as inter-
ference or obstacles when we wish to see other bodies beyond them: he
speaks of this, not in order to charaderize the thing seen as such, but in
(120) CI. M.-T. d'ALVBRNY, Alaln de Lllle, Tntu inidila, Parla, 1965 (~ludes de
philoeophie mé<liévale, LII), pp. 20-22.
(121) CI. ibid., the whole inlroduction. Concerning William ol Conches, el. JBJ,u-
N&Au, In Glo,ae ... , ed. cit., p. 9, n. 2.
(122) Ed. d'ALVER.NY, pp. 226-7. Concerning the work, Hierarchia Alanl, el. ibld.,
pp. 106-8. Our italica. Thierry ol Charl.tes selecta the verb "offendltur" to expre99
the proper operatlon ol the sense ol louch with respect to 1olid1:
e Sensus eat vis anime comprehensiva corporeorum ex qua animal aenlire dlcitur
veluti cum videmus colorata, audim.ua vocea, humecto eere odoratus tenelur,
humldo terreo guatua tangitur, solid.o lactua offendltur. ,
CI. HXR1No, Commenlarie,, p. 269 ( Glo,a auper Boelhii librum De Trinllale, 11, 4).
(123) Edition P. GL0Rrnux, "La Somme 'Quoniam homlnee' d'Alaln de Lllle" In
AHDLMA 20 (1953), pp. 111-369. The work ie dated by Glorieux c. 1160 (p. 116);
el. also d'Alvemy, op. cit. , pp. 60-61. The text we have cited is in ed. Glorieux, p. l!>S,
Jtalict ours.
(124) ct. 1upra1 n. lfl,
88 L. DEWAN
order to bring out the rapidity of movemenl of the visual ray. Subsequently,
in the same sermon, he raises the question: whether the eyes of the
glorified body will be able to see God; and, r-egarding this, he says in part:
• Hoc tantum dico, quia oculi qui per intervalla locorum vident quod
vident, id est, ut spatium sil in ter videntem, et illud quod videtur;
aliter enim isti oculi non vident: nam si ab eis aliquid multum in
longinquo removeris, ideo non vident, quia radii ad longe posita
non perveniunt; si autem ad eos aliquid propinquius admoveris, nisi
sit intervallum aliquod inter oculos videntis et corpus quod videtur,
videri omnino non potest; nam si propius admovendo oculos ipsos,
quibus aliquid videtur, contingas, perdito spatio amittitur visio :
hoc ergo dico, quoniam tales oculi, qui nonnisi per intervalla et spatia
locorum vident quidquid vident ; nec nunc possunt videre Deum, nec
tune poterunt, quia ille non est in loco. &116
Here, we still have the doctrine of the outgoing ray which musl reach
the ítem one wishes to see. However, the whole insistence is on the
essentiality of space, so as to have an interval between seer and seen.
God is not visible to an eye, be it glorified or not, because He is not in
place, .i.nd $9 is separ.i.ted from nothing by an interval.
God's not being in a place becomes in the text of Alan his being every-
where, and while Alan does speak of the rays as crossing space, his focus
is entirely on the business of arriving at the obslaculum. God cannot be
an obslaculum, because He is everywhere. Where Augustine's doctrine
concentrated on the essentiality of a certain distance in order to have
seer and thing seen, Atan concentrates on lhe obslaculum.
We move on now to another tex:t of AI:an's, this time having to do
with the intelligible as such, and coming from the same Summa "Quoniam
homines". We read:
• Ait enim Aristoteles in posterioribus analiticis : omnis intellectus
offendil in id quod est. Sed purior est intellectw; Dei quam alius.
Ergo non offendil nisi in id quod est. Sed ab eterno habuit intellectum
de rebus; ergo illa erant. Sed hoc non potest intelligi de rebus mate-
rialibus sed de earum exemplaribus. Ergo exemplaria fuerunt ab
eterno...
• Dicimus quod cum dicitur intellectum solum offendi in id quod
est, hoc intelligendum est de intellectu quo comprehenduntur forme
absque subiectis ; que vere dicuntur esse respectu subiectorum que
mutabiliter sunt. .. Hoc autem non es-t referendum ad intellectum
Dei qui non solum ea que sunt, sed ea que fuerunt et erunt intellectu
comprehendit... t111
(125) St. AUGUSTINB, &rmo CCLXXVII, # 14; P.L. 38, COI. 1265.
(126) Ed. GL0RIBUX, p. 127. Itallca ours. Gilbertol PoiUers uses the word "offendert"
to algnlty tlle intellect'a operstlon aa it attaioa t.be thing lmown: el. D, ll'initat,
 OBIE'CTUM 89
Our point in quoting this is, of course, the use of "offendo" to describe
the intellect's operation vis-a-vis the intelligible. This is the same word
we saw above, in a passage from the H ierarchia Alani, used to describe
the action of the visual ray vis-a-vis the obslaculum. Thus, t here is at
Jeast a possibility that t he obslacu/um schema of cognition extended
even to sub-divine intellectual cognition.
Lastly, in thls review of the twelfth-century doctrine of the obslaculum,
we will note a few passages in the anonymous treatise Quinque sunl
digressiones cogitalionis.117
The treatise being in commentary form, the passage we wish to note
is a comment on the following statements:
• Per sensum est in istis et secundum ista. Per ymaginationem non
est in i.stis sed secundum ista ... , 118
First, we should remark the author's introductory distinctions between
sense and imagination:
e Sunt vero sensus et ymaginatio communes omnium animantium
valitudines ex anima, quibus circa sola sensibilia anima rationalis
vel irrationalis excitatur, sed dispari Jege. Nam tune dumtaxat motus
prout sensus ex anima dum egressus sensibilium detinetur obieclu,
verum imaginatio, sensu reverso, convalescit et ex eorum sola quibus
sensus adheserat recordatione animam instruit. , 1u
Here, we have sense in general conceived along the lines of the Timaeus
vision doctrine. "Obstacu/um" is not used, but instead we have " ...sensibi-
lium detinetur obiectu ...", i.e. the outgoing "sensus" is engaged, detained,
[, 3, 21 (in Gilbert of Poillers, Tht Commtnlarit• on Botlhiiu, ed. N. M. HARIN0,
Toronlo, 1966, p. 67, Une 58). Cf. also Contra Eulicen ti Nutorium 1, ló (ed. cil.,
p. 245, line 73), where he uses it generally for the soul's or m!nd's cognitlve motlon.
And in the same treatlse, 17 (p. 245, line 8:,) and 18 (line 90), it is used for t he externa!
s,nses and the sense of sight respectlvel.y. These works ore dated 1144-1148 (et.
N. M. HARING, "The Commentary of Gilbert, Blshop of Poitiers, on Boethiu•' Contra
Eulych•n d Ne,torium", AHDLMA 30 (19:.4), p. 244).
(127) Edition d'ALVl!RNY, op. cit., pp. 31.3-7. M11 • d'Alverny (p. 181) saya the author
appears to her lo belong to the twelfth cenlury, not later, and to be doctrinully near
lo Atan and Raoul de Longchamp. Tbe text being commented u pon by the anonymou•
autbor is attrlbuted to Hugh of St. Victor. Al p. 18'2, n. 87, M11 • d'Alverny offers a
11st of expoaé• of the progression of the llve lacullies ol the soul in texts of the tweuth
century. Could tbe author's rare expreuion : "natura• lnterval/are•", to designa te the
objects to whlch sense and lmagination are limited (el. p. 182, n. Sf>, and p. 313, third
last line of text), conceivably have any eonnectlon wlth Augustlne's "intervallum"
in the text quoted above, p. 88, n. 125?
(128) Ed. d'ALVBRNY, p. 313.
(129) lbld., p. 3 15. Our llalle11.
90 L. DEWAN
by the interposition or the sensibles. The use or "obiectus" to express the
role of the sensibles is notable. uo
Coming now to the explanation of the very words of the commented
text, we read:
« In istis est, hoc est, in conspicabilibus et sensui subiectis materiis,
et recte suppositione demonstrativi pronominis annotatis cuius
demonstratio ad oculum respicit, et materiam subiecti corporis
sensibilem, in qua sensus persistit, sub sensu constituit.
« Et secundum isla est quae sensibilia sunt, hoc est, secundum
eorum presentiam, qua sublata, sensuum frustrantur preludia, ut si,
circumfusa caligine, visui subtrahantur obstacula, lux interior,
exteriore destituta, dissimilitudinis consortium refugit, et visus
evacuatur, frangitur et decidit. , 111
Though the conception of externa) sense in general is here being formed
along the lines or the Timaeus vision doctrine, nevertheless the basic
vocabulary is quite general and technical, i.e. "in sensui subieclis maleriís"
and "materiam subiecti corporis sensibilem" . We have previously seen
"visibilem maleriam" used by Calcidius,131 but these expressions might
also bring to mind James of Venice's Aristotle: "Unusquisque... sensus
subiecti sensibilis esl... et discernens subiecli sensibilis differenlias ..." 181
At the same time, the term "obslaculum" is still present, though here
quite precisely restricted to the visual.
Thus, here in the Quinque 1unt digressiones cogilationis, we have the
doctrine or sense in general conceived basically along the línes of t he
Timaeus- become-obslaculum vision t heory, the general role of the
sensible thing being expressed in the words: " ...sensibilium delinelur
obieclu". The fundamental general terms to signify the function and
relation of sensible things vis-a-vis sense are, nevertheless, "sensui
subiecta materia" and "materia sensibilis subiecti corporis",
In our survey of t he obstaculum, we have seen how at flrst one is dealing
with a particular interpretation of the Timaeus' doctrine of vision,
subsequently with ali of externa) sensation, and ultimately, perhaps, even
with ali sub-divine intellectual cognition.
We have seen, moreover, that the obslaculum is part of the analysis of
cognition on its lower, less perfect side.
,.,..,u"
(130) Notable also is the fact tbat here !t is the .. which goea forth from the
soul. rn St. AugusUne'a De quantltate animae, it is ui,u, itself, not a radi111 whicb goes
forth. Sight is like a rod one can louch thill89 wi.th. Cf. XXU[, # 43-44, P. L. 32,
col. 1060.
Of course, our author could hardly speak of a ray, when speaklng of sense In general .
(131) Ed. d'ALVBRNY, p. 315. rta11e11 on "ob,tacuta" ours.
(132) Cf. above, p. 84, n. 111.
(133) Cf. aupra, n. 96, lor reference lo the Alonso ediUon.
 OBIE:CTUM 91
These things should be considered in a study of the history of the
obieclum. In the thirteenth-century introduction of the term "obieclum",
it is possible that there are two currents, which might be represented by
a contrast between someone who would say that there is a power which
has no obieclum (the divine power) and someone who would say that
there is a power which does not have an obie.clum olher lhan ilself (the
divine power). In the former case, 0bieclum includes in its very notion a
measure of imperfection, while in the latter it is the name of a perfection
as such.1 "
These two currents we have seen present already in what Aristotle's
commentators said about la anlikeimena. Most (indeed, ali, inasmuch as
Simplicius has two doctrines) saw the doctrine as applicable only to_ the
sensible order and to the intellectual order as afJected by the sensible;
they saw la anlikeimena as Jess perfect and less intelligible (according to
the order of nature) than the powers of the soul. On the other hand,
there was the doctrine of Simplicius that ta anlikeimena have a priority
in perfection vis-a-vis the power, together with a conception of the
opposition or relativity involved as quite peculiar to the nature of know-
ing (or vital operation generally) and not, it would seem, to the mere
impérféctfon which may allach to certáin lypés óf kMwíng.
The texls of Augustine, Boethius, and the twelfth-century authors we
have looked at have ali had to do with the limils and imperfections of
types of knowledge.
It is true that Augustine was speaking of the marvellous rapidity of
the visual ray, but bis doctrine of the interval required between seer and
seen was a way of presenting the e:ssential invisibility of God: visibility
is the characteristic of beings locally circumscribable.
Boethius, in the texts which interested us, was speaking more of the
physical evenls in bodily things presupposed to cognition proper (the
soul's being excited within). lndeed, his very purpose was to show how,
if something was already true of the lower sort of cognition, it should be
ali the more true of a higher sort, in whích there are no obiecla e:drinsecus.
Coming to the twelfth-century texls, we saw how what in Calcidius
had been a doctrine of a type of light {lumen), which made ils own
special contribution to the causality of vision, became in Thierry of
Chartres a doctrine of the invisibility of fire, a theory of vision as a lower
mode of cognition akin to other types of sensation in that it is a case of
the soul using dense instruments to know dense things 136 •
(134) cr. above, pp. 47-54, and n . 37.
(135) The case or Phlloponus must be distinguisbed lrom the resl. On lhe one band,
lt la true thot he restricta tbe opplication o l AristoUe's doctrine concernlng la an/ik•i•
mena to sensible thill8", and even to sensatlon itself. On the other band, in explaining
lbe doctrine or Aristotle, as regarda lhe case ol aenaation, be abowa that lt le a priorlly
92 L. DEWAN
In Alan, there is at least a hint that even intellection, other than
God's own, has something of this schema of imperfection in its nature.
This current of doctrine, then, deserves consideration as a possible
source for one side of the history of "obiectum" (the term) and its intelli-
gibilities.
5. CONCLUSION
In this study we have done three things principally. First, we have
examined two documenls from the early thirteenth century in which
"obieclum" is used in a somewhat elaborate way. This has permitted us
to see the sort of thing which was said about and by means of the word,
very close to the oulset of its use. It h~s also provided the setting. for
many comparisons to give at least a first idea of t_he ver~al and ~octnnal
conditions in the midst of which the event (the mvent1on of th1s word)
took place.
Secondly, we have surveyed one obvious line of backgr~und. We ª1:8
under no illusion that this is the only possible line. We beheve that th1s
survey and discussion ªerved w show that there is a substantial Greek
background for the notion coveyed in the thirteenth century by the term
"obieclum", and that, nevertheless, the introduction of this word does
not belong simply to the history of translation.
Thirdly, we have surveyed the twelft~-century doct~ine of ~he obsla-
culum. To us, it remains an open questton whether th1s doctrme really
is part of the story of "obieclum". We have given reasons for thinking it
well may be.
Almost as an aside, we have looked at Boethius and bis obiecla, bis
forinsecus obiectae qualilales. Yet it seems to us most likely that th~s sort
of usage, if not this text of Boethius, is the real ancestor, at least m the
order of words, of the thirteenth-century invention.
The foregoing studies exhibit the word "obi~dum" as the result_ of
complex processes calling for much further analys1s. By way of conclus1on
we su bmit the following reílections bearing primarily on the phenomenon
of the invention of the word.
Obviously, we have not been able to assist at the very "first use", so
to speak, of the word. We have selected f~om amo~g published_documenls
from the early thirteenth century two wh1ch contam the word m elabo~ate
enough usage to "watch the word in actfon" and which are certamly
among the earliest available. At the same time, we have noted (even
accordlng to nature thol is involved, nota mere priority In tbe order of human leaming
(and he says this alao about tood in comparlson wilh taking nourishmenl). CI. ,upra,
n . 73.
 OBIECTUM 93
within the same treatise) places where the context would invite the word
and in which nevertheless one finds an earlier word.
Between the two early documenls we have featured there is this
enormous difference, viz that the De anima of Grosseteste merely uses
the word, whereas the De polenliis animae el obiectis discusses at sorne
length what is meant by "obieclum". Accordingly, even though there is
good reason to believe that the De anima or Grossetesle is the earlier of
the two, and in it the context of use is very wide, including appetition
and the virtues, nevertheless it seems possible to judge that "obieclum"
had its origin in the cognilional order, indeed even in the discussion of the
ezlernal senses.
We may conjecture, in the various thirteenth-century texts examined,
the presence of a mulliplicity of stages in the process of invention. Closer
to us, one might suggest, are texts where the word "obieclum" is used,
but is immediately bolstered by another, more familiar word. Sometimes
"molivum" serves this purpose. 1 H Sometimes "materia" is so employed. 187
Somewhat more remote from us, bearing witness to the search for a
suitable word, are such texts as use the Aristotelian De anima polenlia/
aclus/opposilum schema, but with sorne of the earlier, long-employed
vocabulary being tried out: for "opposilum", we see such words as
"maleria" 188 , "finis", and "subieclu m".119
Evidence of a still more primitive situation, we would say, are more
general settings (independent of the Aristotelian triadic schema), i.n
which such words as "finis"HO and "molivum"Ul are doing the job as
well as they can.
That there was need for a new and somewhat dislinctive word can be
seen when one considers the words being used in these attempts. The
( 136) CI. above, p. 47, al n. 20.
(137) CI. above, p. 52, al n. 35. We say "materia" Is here a supporl lor "obitclum"'
because, as lhe lrealise progresscs, il will give way lo "obieetum". CI. above, p. 66,
al n. 43.
(138) Ct. above, n. 18, 01'$l passage ciled.
(139) Cf. ibid., lexts from Alexander or Hales al end ol note.
For "1ubltclam" In whal seems ralher cle.arly tho Arislotelian triadlc schema,
el. lhe lollowing use laken from mo. L ol Alexander's G/oa,a 111, dial. XXIII (td. cit.,
vol. 111, p. 274, lineo 6-7):
• . .. Et primo de 0de, eo quod est prima el lundamenlum aliarum, quia elus aetus
prior propter ,ubieclum quod eal verum, quod esl in vla ante bonum. , (our
ilalics).
The correspondJng passage in ms. A has:
• Inter omnea virlulea theologicas prima esl \'irlus 0dei, quoniam prius eat vorum
quam bonum. Unde, cum fideo sil reapectu veri, el apea el caritas respeclu boni,
merito praecedil alias. , (/bid., p. 262, lines 18•2I ).
(140) CI. above, n. 21, lexl cited al veTy end.
(141) CI. ibid., 61'$l two texls ciled.
94 L. DEWAN
problem of "subieclum" is at its most obvious in the Latin translation of
Averroes, where it must play a double role.Ha "Materia" also was a hard-
worked word at the time. Still, both these words will continue to be used
in limited roles in this line, even after "obieclum" has become well
established (e.g. "subieclum scienliae" 1º and "materia" in the analysis of
moral action10); nevertheless, the desirability of a distinctive word was
surely evident. Again, "moliuum" was already doing at least double duty,
being used not only as somewhat synonymous with "obieclum", but also
in connection with polenlia motiva as distinguished from apprehemiva. 10
In sorne ways, "finis" least of all could be made to do the job. Many of
the things we have seen suggest that a key topic for a true history of the
notion of obiectum would be the process of its distinction from and co-
ordinalion with the notion of finis. Philoponus, among the commentators
of Aristotle, favoured the lelos over the anlikeimenon for the role of
principie of knowledge of operations and powers.10 According to Simpli-
cius, the character of ephelon is closely linked to what Aristotle (in the
De anima triad) called "la anlikeimena". 1" The obieclum is presented in
the De anima of Grosseteste as the terminus of natural appetites.10
The word "finis" was actually sometimes used, where later on one
would say "obieclum", ánd óné might Wéll wonder whether the distinclion
made by John of La Rochelle between two meanings of "fini," tells the
whole story behind this usage.10
Moreover, the very need to make certain comparisons would preclude
the use of certain words. Thus, the comparisons between obieclum and
finis help show the unsuitability of "finis".:UO Similarly, the set of terms
for the discussion of externa) sensation, "causa (or: efficiem)", "obiectum",
and "medium", helps to explain the unsuitability of "molivum" or
"tfficiens" or "causa". 161
One might raise the question: why was Aristotle's word, in its Latín
translation, not accepted? "Opposilum", like "anlikeimenon", perhaps
had too much reciprocity in its meaning to do the job.10 The doctrine of
the obieclum is one in which the one-way structure of certain relations
(142) CI. above, n. 84.
(143) CI. Sl. TH0MAS AQUINAS, Summa Theo/oglae l, q. 1, a. 7.
(144) cr. ibid., l•Il, q. 18, a . 2, obJ. 2 and ad 2; 11-11, q . 58, aa. 8, 10, 11; q. 69,
a. 1, ele.
(14óJ cr. above, n. 49.
(146) cr. above, n. 74.
(147) cr. above, n. 80.
(148) CI. above, pp. 48, al n. '23, and 49, al n. 26.
(149) CI. above, n. 37, lasl lexl quoled, near end ol lexl.
(160) CI. above, p. 49, al n. 29.
(151) cr. above, texl cited p. 62, and n. 57.
(ló2) cr. above, n. 65.
 OBJE,CTUM 95 96 L. DEWAN

is paramounL.1 º Of course, there is also the sheer generality of the t.erm to (avour t he Aristotelian view of the passivity o( sense-apprehension,
"opposilum". l t could lead to as mu,ch or more confusion as merely using it flt much bett.er with that doctrine than such words as "materia",
e.g. the word "causa" for what carne to be called t he "obiectum". 164 "subieclum", "obstaculum", etc.
Lastly, we might ask what attract.ion was to be found in the word Still, perhaps one should not limit the conception of the t.erm "obiec-
"obieclum"? There was one obvious drawback. l ts equivoca! double was lum" to its being a derivative o( tbe Boetbian schema (conceived as
already in use to mean an objecti.on. Still, this is a much less grave "movement towards the soul"). Perhaps the obslaculum schema also
difficulty than with the other wor ds mentioned above. The reason is played a part. Thus, tbe obieclum would be the thing as encount.ered, hit
that in the case of "obieclum", the double or equivoca( pertains to the up against. There is at least one text wbich would suggest that this
discussion of discourse itself, rather than being a word to signify an aspect element is present at the beginning. 161
of things in their own intrinsic entit y. In fact, one is rarely in doubt as Indeed, perhaps a multiple suggestiveness was parto( tbe success-story
to which of the two "obieclum" equivocals one is dealing with. of "obieclum". After ali, it did eventually take over the appetitive as
As for posit.ive att raction, we have already said what we take the word well as the cognit.ive flelds, movement from the soul to things as well as
to be. Its origin seems to be in the cognitional as distinct from the appeti- from t hings to the soul.1 '"
tive use.u& Furthermore, the schema in play appears to be that o( the Lawrence D EWAN, O.P.
Boethian forinsecus obieclae qualilales, rather than the obslaculum or
corpus obieclum schema. "Obieclum''', taken in t he way we suggest, fits (158) Ct. above, p. 44, at n. 15.
in with the doctrine o( cognition as movement from things to the soul;158 (159) J obannes LoHMANN, "Saint Thomas et les Arabes" (Structures linguiatiques
in one case, on tbe otber hand, where we saw the obslaculum schema et formes do pensée), in Revut philo,ophique dt Louvain t. 74 (1976), pp. 30-44, makea
applied to tbe whole o( sense, sense was described as a movement out- relerence to our subject al pp. 37-39. Hls remarks are aweeplng, and include the
ward.m Perhaps, while the Boethian schema certainly was not intended development ol the modero conceplion ol the object.
Abbrevlation, ustd:
HCPMA Gilson, E., Hlltorg of Chrlallan Phlloaoph¡¡ In lht Mlddlt Agea, New York,
(153) CI. above, SOlPLICIUS in n. 80, Orst t.ext quoteo; ARISTOTLB, in n. 63. 1955: Random House.
(154) In the loW'lh century, St. Hilary ol Poiliers uses "causa" where a later P.L. Migne, Patrologiat ... Striu Latina.
wrlt.er mlght have spoken ol tbe obietlum ol the sense: RSPT Rtvut du scltneu philoaophlquu ti tMologiquu.
• ... Ut enim natura hu.mani corporistt ce,ssantibus offl-cii sui causis, erit. otiosa; RT AM Rtchtrchu dt lhlologit ancitnnt ti mtditi,alt.
nam oeulia, nisi lumen aut dles sil, nullue mlnislerii erit usus; ut aures, nial vox (I n the reproouclion ol Latin text.s, we have for the moal port changed "u" to
sonusve reddatur, munus euum non recognoscent; ut nares, nlsi odor tragraverit, ºv" where modem ortbography would expect thls; e.g. uuíru" becomes "viru" .)
in quo ofllcio erunt nescient; quod non his dcflciet natura per causam, sed usus
habelur ex causa; ila et animus humanus, nisl per lldem oonum Spiritus bauserlt,
habeblt quidem naturam Deum intelligendi, sed Jumen scientiae non habebit. ,
(Dt lrinilalt, book 11, ch. 35: P.I, . 10, col. 74-5).
(155) CI. the lext cit.ed above, p. ó2, at n. 35.
(156) CI. the t.ext cit.ed above, p. 58, al n. 48.
(157) CI. the text ciled above, p. 89, at n. 129.
As I complete this paper, 1 have jusi lor the flrsl lime seen the remarkable treatise
published by N. M. HARING, "The Treali.se 'Inulsibilia deí' In Ms.Atras, Bibl. mun.
981 (399)", in Rtchercht1 dt thtotogit onciennt ti médiévolt, l . XL (1973), pp. 104-46.
On the one hand, man is spoken ol as going out, by means ol lhe senses, to visible
thlnga:
• ... egrederel.ur ad visibilia per sensum, ingrcderelur ad invisibilia per inlelleclum.
2. Per sensum loras egreditur... , (p. :U6, # 1-2).
On lhe olher hano, we bave the lollowing accounl ol sense-perception:
, Sensus !laque est vis quedam anime que videt audit ollacil gustat tangit. Huius
est offlcium percipere Oguram rei in subiecta i.e. in presenti maltria i.e . rem
perclpere presentem. Et habet princJplum ab illls passionlbus que llunt circa
instrumenta corporalia ut dum lux oculos leril et vox auribus perstrepit. Quae
paslone& usque ad sedem anime transeunt et eam provocanL ad vldendum et
aud.iendum el de visis et audilis iudicandum . • (Pp . 116-7, # 4. Our ilalics) .
CI. above, nn. 102, 103, 122. Tbe t.reatlse wes written by a dlsciple or Gilbert ol Poitiers
(H.1'.RING, p. 106) about lhe middle º' the twclllh century (p. 116).