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14.462 Advanced Maroeconomics

Spring 2004

Problem Set 5

(due April 12)

Problem 1

There is a measure-one continuum of agents, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each agent can choose

between two actions. The action of agent i is denoted as ki ∈ {0, 1}, where ki = 0 represents

“not invest” and ki = 1 represents “invest”. All agents move simultaneously. The utility

of agent i is given by

ui = U (ki , K, θ) = eθ ki (1 + K γ ) − cki

�

where θ reﬂects “fundamentals” and K = ki di denotes the mass of agents investing.

1. Suppose that θ is commonly known by all agents. What is the best response g(K, θ)

(agents are assumed not invest in case of indiﬀerence)? Derive the thresholds θ and

θ̄ such that: (i) all agents not investing is the unique equilibrium for θ < θ; (ii) all

agents investing is the unique equilibrium for θ ≥ θ¯ and (iii) for intermediate values

¯ there are multiple equilibria.

θ ∈ [θ, θ)

xi = θ + ξi

with ξi ∼ N (0, σx2 ). All agents also observes an exogenous public signal

z =θ+ε

where ε ∼ N (0, σz2 ). Let αx = σx−2 and αz = σz−2 . Agents have a common prior about θ,

which is uniform over the entire real line. Equilibrium is deﬁned as follows: a strategy k(·)

and an aggregate investment K(·) constitute an equilibrium if

k

�

√ √

K(θ, z) = k(x, z) αx φ( αx [x − θ])dx.

The remainder of the exercise asks you to numerically compute monotone equilibria, that

is, equilibria in which k(x, z) is monotone in x. In a monotone equilibrium, for any real

ization of z, there is a threshold x∗ (z) such that an agent invests if and only if x ≥ x∗ (z).

Throughout, set γ = 0.8 and c = 2.

1

https://www.economicshomeworkhelper.com

¯ plot

2. Set αx = 10 and αz = 1. Over a range of values for z (somewhat wider than [θ, θ])

the equilibrium thresholds x∗ (z). Are there values of z for which there are multiple

equilibrium thresholds?

3. Repeat part 2. for the values αx = 1 and αz = 10. Compute the range [z, z̄) of values

of z for which there is multiplicity.

4. Fix αx at one. What happens to the range [z, z̄) as αz becomes large?

Problem 2

Consider the following two stage version of Morris-Shin. The utility of agent i is given by

Here a1,i ∈ {0, 1} is the action of agent i in the ﬁrst stage and a2,i ∈ {0, 1} is the action of

agent i in the second stage. For both actions, a value of one represents “attack” while a

value of zero represents “not attack”. The regime outcome is denoted as R, where R = 0

represents survival of the status quo and R = 1 represents collapse. The decision to attack

�

is irreversible: a1,i = 1 implies a2,i = 1. Let A1 = a1,i di be mass of agents attacking in

�

the ﬁrst stage. Let A2 = a2,i (1 − a1,i )di be the mass of agents that did not attack in the

ﬁrst stage but join the attack in the second stage. The timing is as follows. First agent

i observes a private signal xi = θ + ξi where ξi ∼ N (0, σx2 ) and αx = σx−2 . Then agents

simultaneously choose their ﬁrst stage actions a1,i . Then agents observe the public signal

z = Φ−1 (A1 ) + v where v ∼ N (0, σz2 ) and αz = σz−2 . The status quo collapses (R = 1) if

A1 + A2 ≥ θ. The goal is to characterize the monotone equilibria of this model.

1. First note that agent i will attack in the ﬁrst period if xi ≤ x∗1 for some threshold x∗1 .

What is the mass of agents choosing to attack in the ﬁrst period as a function of θ,

denoted as A1 (θ)? Plug the function A1 (θ) into the expression for the public signal

z. What are the properties of z as a signal about θ?

2. Given a ﬁrst period threshold x∗1 , characterize the second stage equilibrium thresholds

x∗2 (z). Under what condition on αz and αx is their multiplicity?

3. Now move back to the ﬁrst stage and analyze the monotone equilibria of the model.

Discuss multiplicity and how it is related to the precision parameters αz and αx and

the discount rate β.

Spring 2004

Problem 1

�

1 θ ≥ log(c) − log(1 + K γ )

g(K, θ) =

0 θ < log(c) − log(1 + K γ )

� �

We have θ = log 2c and θ¯ = log(c). If θ < θ, then it is best not to invest even if

¯ then it is optimal to invest even if nobody else does.

everybody else does. If θ ≥ θ,

In a monotone equilibrium for each value of z there is a threshold x∗ (z) such that an

agent invests if and only if x ≥ x∗ (z). For a given value of θ and z, the fraction of

agents investing is then given by

√

K(θ, z) = Φ ( αx (θ − x∗ (z))) .

Let

� √ γ �

H(x∗ , x, z) = E eθ (1 + Φ ( αx (θ − x∗ )) ) − c|x, z

be the expected utility from investing conditional on having observed signals x and z

if the threshold of other agents for investing is x∗ . To be an equilibrium, x∗ (z) must

satisfy H(x∗ (z), x∗ (z), z) = 0. Since

αx

where δ = αx +αz

and α = αx + αz we can write this condition as

� ∞

�

θ √ ∗ γ α − 1 α(θ−δx∗ (z)−(1−δ)z)2

e (1 + Φ ( αx (θ − x (z))) ) e 2 dθ = c

−∞ 2π

This condition can be used to solve numerically for equilibrium values of x∗ (z). With

αx = 10 and αz = 1 the equilibrium is unique. The function x∗ (z) is plotted in Figure

1.

In the case αx = 1 and αz = 10 we have multiplicity for a range of values (z , z̄). The

solid line in Figure 2 plots the correspondence x∗ (z) for this case.

1

Figure 1: x∗ (z) for αx = 10 and αz = 1

0.2

0.18

0.16

0.14

x*(z)

0.12

0.1

0.08

0.06

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7

_

z

2. θ

_ θ

80

60

40

20

x*(z)

−20

−40

−60

−80

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7

_

z

3. θ

_ θ

4. The dotted line in Figure 2 is for the case αx = 1 and αz = 100. One can see that

¯ as αz increases.

the multiplicity region (z, z̄) approaches (θ, θ)

Problem 2

√

A1 (θ) = Φ[ αx (x∗1 − θ)].

√

z = Φ−1 (A1 (θ)) + v = αx (x∗1 − θ) + v.

1 v

z̃ = − √ z + x∗1 = θ − √ = θ + ṽ

αx αx

� �

where v˜ = − √vαx 1

is distributed N 0, αzαx . Thus the signal z˜ has precision αz̃ =

αz αx .

2. Now we’re looking for monotone equilibria of the second stage. This problem is almost

the problem considered in class with one complication: agents that have decided to

attack in the ﬁrst stage cannot reverse their decision. There are now two situations

that can occur in the second stage. Either some agents joint the attack, in which case

all agents with private signal below some threshold x∗I (z̃) participate in the attack and

the agent with signal x∗I (z̃) is indiﬀerent. Or nobody joins the attack, so everybody

below x∗1 participates in the attack but an agent with signal x∗1 is not indiﬀerent but

would rather not attack but cannot reverse his decision. In either case there is a

threshold x∗p (˜

z) below which agents participate in the attack. Then the overall size

of the attack is given by

√

A(θ, z̃) = Φ( αx (x∗p (z) − θ)).

√

θ ≤ Φ( αx (x∗p (z) − θ))

√

⇐⇒ Φ−1 (θ) ≤ αx (x∗p (z) − θ)

1

⇐⇒ θ + √ Φ−1 (θ) ≤ x∗p (z)

αx

⇐⇒ X(θ) ≤ x∗p (z)

3

where

1

X(θ) ≡ θ + √ Φ−1 (θ).

αx

The function X is strictly increasing. Let θp∗ (˜

z) be the level of fundamentals at which

the inequality above holds with equality, that is X(θp∗ (˜ z)) = x∗p (˜

z). Then regime

∗ −1

change occurs if and only if θ ≤ θp (˜ z). Let’s write Θ = X , then we can write

∗ ∗

θp (˜ z)). That is, for a given participation threshold x∗p (˜

z) = Θ(xp (˜ z), the function Θ

will give us the threshold of fundamentals below which regime change occurs.

Now let H(x∗p (˜

z), x, z̃) be the expected utility from attacking of an agent conditional

on having observed a private signal x and a public signal z̃ if all other agents below

the participation threshold x∗p (˜z) participate in the attack. So

H(x∗p (˜

z), x, z̃) ≡ bP [θ ≤ Θ(x∗p (˜

z))|x, z̃] − c.

In the standard Morris-Shin model the set of equilibria is given by the solutions to

the equation

H(x, x, z̃) = 0

Here things are a bit more involved due to irreversibility. First suppose there is a

unique solution to this equation. Here the condition that insures uniqueness for all

√ √ √

values of z˜ is √ααz˜x ≤ 2π, which can be written as αz αx ≤ 2π. Notice that a more

precise private signal now also helps to generate multiplicity, because this means that

the public signal is more precise. If this condition fails there is a range of values [z, z̄]

for z̃ over which there is multiplicity. For now we have assumed that we’re outside of

this multiplicity range. Denote the unique solution as x∗U (˜ z) . If x∗U (˜

z ) ≥ x∗1 we have

which turn out to be the the same in this case. First there is the threshold below

which agents participate in the attack, denoted as x∗p (˜ z) which is equal to x∗U (˜ z) in

this case. Second there is the threshold at which an agent is indiﬀerent, denoted as

x∗I (˜

z) and also equal to x∗U (˜

z) in this case. The two thresholds are no longer the same

∗

if xU (˜ z ) = x∗1 : nobody joins the attack

∗

but those with signal below x∗1 are stuck with their earlier decision. Notice that due to

uniqueness and the fact that x∗U (˜ z ) < x∗1 we must have H(x∗1 , x∗1 , z̃) < 0, so an agent

with private signal x∗1 would like to reverse his decision but cannot due so. Thus the

indiﬀerence threshold which is determined by the condition H(x∗1 , x∗I (z̃), z̃) = 0 must

satisfy x∗I (˜z ) < x∗1 .1 Why is it important to determine the indiﬀerence threshold?

After all, in equilibrium everybody below x∗1 has already decided to attack. The

answer is that when deciding on whether to attack in the ﬁrst stage, agents must

1

One can easily solve for this number explicitly, the condition is

bP [θ ≤ Θ(x∗1 )|x∗I (˜

z), z̃] − c = 0.

contemplate in what situations they would like to attack in the second stage given

Now suppose we are in the case of multiplicity. We will focus on the typical case with

three solutions to the equation H(x, x, z̃) = 0, the extension to the borderline cases

with two equilibria is straightforward. Denote the three solutions as x∗L (z̃) < x∗M (z̃) <

x

∗H (z̃). We have several cases to consider:

(a) x∗1 ≤ x∗L (z̃): all three values x∗L (z̃), x∗M (z̃) and x∗H (z̃) are equilibria (with identical

participation and indiﬀerence threshold). Of course as usual the intermediate

equilibrium is unstable and thus of little interest.

(b) x

∗L (z̃) < x∗1 < x

∗M (z̃): now the value x∗L (z̃) no longer constitutes an equilibrium.

Since x∗1 is larger than x∗L (z̃) but still below x∗M (z̃) we have H(x∗1 , x∗1 , z̃) < 0,

x

∗P (z̃) = x∗1 and indif

ference threshold x∗I (z̃) < x∗1 solving H(x

∗1 , x

∗I (z̃), z̃) = 0. The other two values

x∗M (z̃) and x∗H (z̃) still give equilibria with identical participation and indiﬀerence

threshold.

(c) x∗M (z̃) < x∗1 < x∗H (z̃): now the intermediate value no longer gives an equilibrium.

Moreover, since x∗1 is now between the intermediate and the large value, we have

H(x∗1 , x

∗1 , z̃) > 0. This means that given a participation threshold x∗1 , agents with

signal x∗1 are happy to attack in the second stage. So there is no equilibrium

with participation threshold x∗1 and indiﬀerence threshold x

∗I (z̃) < x∗1 . We are

only left with the equilibrium x∗H (z̃) with identical participation and indiﬀerence

threshold.

(d) x

∗H (z̃) < x∗1 : now even the large value no longer gives an equilibrium. Once

again we have H(x∗1 , x

∗1 , z̃) < 0, so we have an equilibrium with participation

threshold x∗P (z̃) = x∗1 and indiﬀerence threshold x

∗I (z̃) < x∗1

3. Suppose from solving the second stage we have the equilibrium participation threshold

x

∗P (z̃, x∗1 ) and indiﬀerence threshold x∗I (z̃, x∗1 ). Here we have made the dependence of

the second stage equilibrium on x∗1 explicit. Of course in the case of multiplicity

we can choose among the diﬀerent second stage equilibria, which will translate into

multiplicity in the overall game.

First let’s ﬁgure out the posterior distribution that an agent has over the public signal

z̃ after observing his private signal x. As θ = x − ξ we have z˜ = θ + v˜ = x − ξ + v˜ we

αx 1

As usual let α = αx + αz˜ = αx (1 + αz ) and δ = αx +αz˜ = 1+αz Then we get the condition

� �

� √ ∗

� ∗ 1 1 −1 � c� ∗

b 1 − Φ( α(δx + (1 − δ)˜

z − Θ(x1 )) = c ⇐⇒ xI (˜

z) = √ Φ 1− − (1 − δ)˜

z + Θ(x1 )

δ α b

have

v |x] = x

1 1 1 + αz

Var[˜

z |x] = Var[ξ |x] + Var[˜

v |x] = + = .

αx αx αz αx αz

� �

1 + αz

z̃ |x ∼ N x, ,

αx αz

so the density is �

αx αz 1 αx αz 2

f (˜|x)

z = e− 2 1+αz (˜z−x)

(1 + αz )2π

As usual we have

√

P [θ ≤ Θ(x∗P (˜

z, x∗1 ))|x, z̃] = 1 − Φ( α(δx + (1 − δ)˜

z − Θ(x∗P (˜

z, x∗1 ))))

�

(1 + β)[bP [θ ≤ Θ(x∗P (˜

z, x∗1 ))|x, z̃] − c]f (˜

z |x)dz̃

�

β[bP [θ ≤ Θ(x∗P (˜

z, x∗1 ))|x, z̃] − c]I[x ≤ x∗I (˜

z, x∗1 )]f (˜

z |x)d˜

z.

Notice that to compute the value of waiting we need to know the indiﬀerence threshold

x∗I (˜

z, x∗1 ): in the ﬁrst agent can choose a value diﬀerent from x∗1 . In order to compute

the utility of choosing a value below x∗1 we need to know when the agent would be

willing to invest in the second stage.

The equilibrium thresholds x∗1 must satisfy the condition

�

[(1 + β) − βI[x∗1 ≤ x∗I (˜

z, x∗1 )]] [bP [θ ≤ θp∗ (˜

z, x∗1 )|x∗1 , z̃] − c]f (˜

z |x∗1 )dz̃ = 0

We have determined all the pieces in this equation and can now compute equilibria

Never attempted to prove whether the solution for x∗1 is unique for a

numerically. I haven’t

given selection of second stage equilibria, but in my numerical examples it is.

First ,I compute some equilibria for the parameter values αx = 1, αz = 3 (so the

condition for multiplicity is satisﬁed), β = 0.8, b = 1 and c = 0.5. I Ccompute two

equilibria. In the ﬁrst, I select the lowest second stage equilibrium for all values of z̃,

in the second, I always select the highest second stage equilibrium. Figures 3 and 4

show the functions x∗I (˜

z) and x∗P (˜

z) for the ﬁrst equilibrium. Let’s ﬁrst discuss ﬁgure

3. The two vertical dashed lines are z and z̄, the values of the public signal z̃ for

6

Figure 3: Low second stage equilibrium, function x∗I (˜

z)

2.5

1.5

xI*(z)

0.5

0

0.47 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.53

z

z)

2.5

1.5

xP*(z)

0.5

0

0.47 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.53

z

which we would have multiplicity in the standard Morris-Shin model. The horizontal

∗1 . The solid discontinuous line

is x

∗I (z̃). The dotted continuation of the left part of x∗I (z̃) indicates the not selected

high second stage equilibrium. Notice that we do not have multiplicity over the entire

range [z, z̄]. Over that range we are in case (c): the lowest solution of H(x, x, z̃) = 0

∗1 , x

∗1 , z̃) > 0, so with a participation threshold x

∗1

more agents would like to joint the attack; as a consequence, only the high equilibrium

∗1 , z̃) falls and the discontinuity occurs at the point

when H(x∗1 , x∗1 , z̃) = 0. From now on we have a low equilibrium with participation

threshold x∗1 (this is shown in ﬁgure 4) and a indiﬀerence threshold x∗I (z̃) (which is

shown in ﬁgure 3).

Figures 5 and 6 shows the same graphs when the high second stage equilibrium

is selected. Selecting the high second stage equilibrium is associated with a slightly

higher (imperceptible in the ﬁgures) value of the ﬁrst stage threshold x

∗1 .

Figures 7 and 8 show the eﬀect on the functions x∗I (z̃) and x∗P (z̃) of a reduction in β to

0.5. Consider the more interesting case in which the low second stage equilibrium is

selected. A lower discount rate makes it more attractive to attack in the ﬁrst stage,

so x

∗1 increases (the old value is given by the dashed horizontal line, the new one

by the dash-dotted line). Figure 7 shows the eﬀect on the x∗I (z̃) schedule. The old

schedule is solid, the new one dotted. The increase in β has of course no eﬀect on the

location of the high solution to H(x, x, z̃) = 0. But the point of discontinuity shifts

to the right and the indiﬀerence threshold shifts up: since now in the low second

stage equilibrium more people are stuck with having attacked (as shown in ﬁgure 8),

people would be more willing to join the attack in the second stage.

z)

2.5

1.5

xI*(z)

0.5

0

0.47 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.53

z

z)

2.5

1.5

xP*(z)

0.5

0

0.47 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.53

z

z)

2.5

1.5

xI*(z)

0.5

0

0.47 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.53

z

z)

2.5

1.5

xP*(z)

0.5

0

0.47 0.48 0.49 0.5 0.51 0.52 0.53

z

10

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