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- Security and Cryptography
- Cryptanalysis of Rsa Using Algebraic and Lattice Methods
- ASP Interview Question
- Sample Questions P ADMSEC 731 (2)
- ENCHANCED PRIVACY PRESERVING FOR PUBLIC AUDITING WITH SHARED DATA IN THE CLOUD
- Elliptic curves El-Gamal and Diffie-Hellman
- SSL Certificates HOWTO
- Analytical Study of Modified RSA Algorithms for Digital Signature
- Security Attacks
- An Efficient Key Pre-distribution Scheme for Multiple Attacks
- Mobile Agent Security and Key Management Technique
- Crypto Presentation
- Different Attacks on Selective Encryption in RSA based Singular Cubic Curve with AVK and Their Possible Solutions
- White Paper - Key Management Compliance
- Password Cracking With l0phtcrack 3-0-957
- Negative Impacts of Technology in Banking Sector
- RSA.ppt
- Secure Privacy Preserving Using Multilevel Trust For Cloud Storage
- Key Management
- Public Key Infrastructure

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Techniques

Public-key cryptosystems

One key for encryption and a different, but related key for decryption

Important characteristic

◦ It is computationally infeasible to determine the decryption key given the

cryptographic algorithm and the encryption key.

◦ Some algorithms, such as RSA uses either of the two related keys for

encryption, with the other used for decryption.

Public-key encryption

(with public key)

6 components

Plaintext

Encryption algorithm

Public and private keys:

One is used for encryption,

the other is used for

decryption

Ciphertext

Decryption algorithm

Public-key encryption

(with private key)

Essential steps:

Each user generates a pair of keys to be used

for the encryption and decryption of

messages.

Each user places one of the two keys in a

public register or other accessible file. (

public key). The companion key is kept

private (private key).

Each user maintains a collection of public

keys obtained from others.

If Bob wishes to send a confidential message

to Alice, Bob encrypts the message using

Alice’s public key.

When Alice receives the message, she

decrypts it using her private key.

No other recipient can decrypt the

message because only Alice knows Alice’s

private key.

Public-key Encryption :

Confidentiality

Public-Key Cryptosystem:

Authentication

Public-Key Cryptosystem:

Authentication and secrecy

Requirements of public-key cryptography

It is computationally easy for a party B to generate a key pair

It is computationally easy for a sender A, knowing the public key and the

message to be encrypted, M, to generate the corresponding ciphertext

It is computationally easy for the receiver B to decrypt the resulting

ciphertext using the private key to recover the original message

It is computationally infeasible for an adversary, knowing the public key,

PUb,to determine the private key, PRb

It is computationally infeasible for an adversary, knowing the public key,

PUb, and a ciphertext, C, to recover the original message, M

The two keys can be applied in either order

Foundation :One-way function

A one-way function is one that maps a domain into a range such that every function

value has a unique inverse, with the condition that the calculation of the function is easy,

whereas the calculation of the inverse is infeasible:

Y = f(X) is easy (algorithms are said to belong to the class P)

X = f -1(Y) is infeasible (effort to solve it grows faster than polynomial time as a

function of input size)

A trap-door one-way function : It is easy to calculate in one direction and infeasible to

calculate in the other direction unless certain additional information is known. With the

additional information the inverse can be calculated in polynomial time.

A trapdoor one-way function is a family of invertible functions fk, such that

Y = fk(X) easy, if k and X are known

X = fk-1(Y) easy, if k and Y are known

X = fk-1(Y) infeasible, if Y is known but k is not known

Cryptanalysis of Public-key

Brute-force attack

◦ Countermeasure: Large key size vs. computation complexity

Computing private key given public key

Probable-message attack

RSA

RSA

Developed in 1977 by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman at

MIT

The most widely accepted and implemented general-purpose

approach to public-key encryption

The RSA Algorithm

RSA makes use of an expression with exponentials.

Plaintext is encrypted in blocks, with the block size must be less than or equal to log2(n) + 1 for

some number n; in practice, the block size is i bits, where 2i < n <= 2i+1.

Encryption and decryption are of the following form, for some plaintext block M and ciphertext

block C.

C = Me mod n

M = Cd mod n = (Me)d mod n = Med mod n

Both sender and receiver must know the value of n.

Public key, PU = {e, n} and a private key, PR = {d, n}.

This algorithm must meet the following requirements:

1. It is possible to find values of e, d, and n such that Med mod n = M for all M < n.

2. It is relatively easy to calculate Me mod n and Cd mod n for all values of M < n.

3. It is infeasible to determine d given e and n.

DR. ALEKHA KUMAR MISHRA 13

The RSA Algorithm

The relationship Med mod n = M holds true if e and d are

multiplicative inverses modulo φ(n), where φ(n) is the Euler totient

function.

for p, q prime, φ(pq) = (p - 1)(q - 1). The relationship between e and

d can be expressed as ed mod f(n) =1

This is equivalent to saying

ed ≡ 1 mod φ(n)

d ≡ e-1 mod φ(n)

RSA Key generation

Select p, q, two prime numbers (private)

Calculate n = pq (public)

Calculate φ(n) = p-1 × q-1 (private)

Select e, with gcd(φ(n), e) = 1; 1 < e < φ(n) (public)

Calculate d ≡ e-1 (mod φ(n)) (private)

Public key PU = {e, n}

Private key PR = {d, n}

RSA Encryption & Decryption

If Bob want to send secret message to Alice then, he must have

public key of Alice {e,n}

Plain Text: M<n

Cipher Text: C = Me mod n

Alice uses private key to decrypt Bob’s message

Cipher Text: C

Decrypted Plain Text: M = Cd mod n

RSA: An Example

Select two prime numbers, p = 17 and q = 11. Let M = 88.

Calculate n = pq = 17 * 11 = 187. For encryption, we need to calculate

Calculate φ(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1) = 16 * 10 = 160. C = 887 mod 187

Select e such that e is relatively prime to f(n) = ≡ 11 mod 187 (using modular arithmetic).

160 and less than φ(n); we choose e = 7.

For decryption, we calculate

Determine d such that de ≡ 1 (mod 160) and d

< 160. The correct value is M = 1123 mod 187

can be calculated using the extended Euclid’s

algorithm

The resulting keys are public key PU = {7,

187} and private key PR = {23, 187}.

DR. ALEKHA KUMAR MISHRA 17

RSA Multiple

block processing

RSA Multiple

block

processing

:Example

Computations in RSA

Exponentiation in modular

arithmetic using

[(a mod n) × (b mod n)] mod n = (a × b) mod n

find the value ab mod n, where b

as a binary number bkbk-1…b0,

then we have b = 𝑏𝑖≠0 2𝑖

Computations in RSA

A specific choice of e is usually made to speed up the operation of

the RSA algorithm.

The most common choice is 65537 (216 + 1); two other popular

choices are 3 and 17. Each of these choices has only two 1 bits, so the

number of multiplications required to perform exponentiation is

minimized

However, with a very small public key, such as e = 3, RSA becomes

vulnerable to a simple attack

Computations in RSA

A small value of d is vulnerable to a brute-force attack and to other forms

of cryptanalysis

However, we can speed up computation using the Chinese Remainder

Theorem.

To compute M = Cd mod n, Define the intermediate results: Vp = Cd mod

p, Vq = Cd mod q

Following the Chinese Remaining Theorem, define the quantities Xp = q ×

(q-1 mod p) Xq = p × (p-1 mod q)

Then, M = (VpXp + VqXq) mod n

We can also simplify the calculation of Vp and Vq using Fermat’s theorem,

(ap-1 ≡ 1 (mod p) if p and a are relatively prime

DR. ALEKHA KUMAR MISHRA 22

Computations in RSA : Key generation

Determining two prime numbers, p and q.

Selecting either e or d and calculating the other

The procedure for picking a prime number is as follows.

1. Pick an odd integer n at random (e.g., using a pseudorandom number

generator).

2. Pick an integer a < n at random.

3. Perform the probabilistic primality test, such as Miller–Rabin, with a as a

parameter. If n fails the test, reject the value n and go to step 1.

4. If n has passed a sufficient number of tests, accept n; otherwise, go to

step 2.

Attacks on RSA

Brute force

Mathematical attacks

Timing attacks

Hardware fault-based attack

Chosen ciphertext attack

Attacks on RSA : Mathematical attacks

Three approaches to attacking RSA mathematically.

Factor n into its two prime factors. This enables calculation of φ(n) =

(p - 1) * (q - 1), which enables determination of d.

Determine φ(n) directly, without first determining p and q. Again,

this enables determination of d. (Determining φ(n) given n is

equivalent to factoring n)

Determine d directly, without first determining φ(n).

Attacks on RSA : Countermeasurs for

Mathematical attacks

N size of 1024-bits

p and q should differ in length by only a few digits. Thus, for a 1024-

bit key (309 decimal digits), both p and q should be on the order of

magnitude of 1075 to 10100.

Both (p - 1) and (q - 1) should contain a large prime factor.

gcd(p - 1, q - 1) should be small.

Attacks on RSA : Timing attacks

Paul Kocher, demonstrated that a snooper can determine a private key by

keeping track of how long a computer takes to decipher messages.

Applicable to RSA and other public-key cryptography systems.

This attack is serious because: It comes from a completely unexpected direction,

and it is a ciphertext only attack.

A timing attack is somewhat analogous to a burglar guessing the combination of

a safe by observing how long it takes for someone to turn the dial from number to

number

Countermeasures:

◦ Constant exponentiation time: Ensure that all exponentiations take the same amount of time

before returning a result.

◦ Random delay: Better performance could be achieved by adding a random delay to the

exponentiation algorithm to confuse the timing attack.

◦ Blinding: Multiply the ciphertext by a random number before performing exponentiation.

Attacks on RSA : Fault-based attacks

An attack on a processor that is generating RSA digital signatures.

The attack induces faults in the signature computation by reducing

the power to the processor.

The faults cause the software to produce invalid signatures, which

can then be analyzed by the attacker to recover the private key.

It is shown that a 1024-bit private RSA key is extracted in

approximately 100 hours, using a commercially available

microprocessor.

Attacks on RSA : Chosen Ciphertext attacks

CCA is defined as an attack in which the adversary chooses a number of

ciphertexts and is then given the corresponding plaintexts, decrypted with the

target’s private key.

Example

◦ The RSA property : E(PU, M1) * E(PU, M2) = E(PU, [M1 × M2])

◦ We can decrypt C = Me mod n using a CCA as follows.

◦ Compute X = (C * 2e) mod n.

◦ Submit X as a chosen ciphertext and receive back Y = Xd mod n.

◦ Now note that

◦ X = (C mod n) * (2e mod n) = (Me mod n) * (2e mod n) = (2M)e mod n

◦ This implies Y = 2M mod n

To overcome thissimple attack, practical RSA-based cryptosystems randomly

pad the plaintext prior to encryption.

Optimal asymmetric encryption padding (OAEP).

DR. ALEKHA KUMAR MISHRA 29

Diffie–Hellman key

exchange

Diffie–Hellman key exchange

The algorithm to enable two users to securely exchange a key that

can then be used for subsequent symmetric encryption of messages.

The algorithm itself is limited to the exchange of secret values.

Depends for its effectiveness on the difficulty of computing discrete

logarithms.

The Algorithm

Validity of the secret key generation

𝑋𝐴

K = (YB) mod q

𝑋𝐵 𝑋𝐴

= (α mod q) mod q

𝑋𝐵 𝑋𝐴

= (α ) mod q by the rules of modular arithmetic

𝑋𝐵 𝑋𝐴

= α mod q

𝑋𝐴 𝑋𝐵

= (α ) mod q

𝑋𝐴 𝑋𝐵

= (α mod q) mod q

𝑋𝐵

= (YA) mod q

Strength of the algorithm

An adversary who wishes to determine the secret key K an adversary

only has q, a, YA, and YB the following to work

Because (XA and XB are private),.

To determine the private key of user B, an adversary must compute

XB = dloga,q(YB)

𝑋𝐵

The adversary can then calculate the key K = (YA) mod q

It is very difficult to calculate discrete logarithms. For large primes,

the latter task is considered infeasible.

Example

The prime number q = 353 and a primitive root of 353, a = 3.

A and B select private keys

XA = 97 and XB = 233, respectively.

A computes YA = 397 mod 353 = 40.

B computes YB = 3233 mod 353 = 248.

After the exchange of public keys,

A computes K = 24897 mod 353 = 160.

B computes K = 40233 mod 353 = 160.

DR. ALEKHA KUMAR MISHRA 35

Man-in-the-

middle attack

Darth prepares for the attack by

generating two random private

keys XD1 and XD2

Then computing the

corresponding public keys YD1

and YD2.

Darth can simply eavesdrop the

communication or may modify

the message.

Countermeasure

◦ Authentication by digital signature

◦ Public-key certificate

Elgamal Cyptosystem

Elgamal Cyptosystem

A public-key scheme based on discrete logarithms

Closely related to the Diffie–Hellman technique

The global elements of Elgamal are a prime number q and α, which

is a primitive root of q.

User A generates a private/public key pair as follows:

1. Generate a random integer XA, such that 1 < XA < q - 1.

𝑋𝐴

2. Compute YA = α mod q.

3. A’s private key is XA and A’s public key is {q, a, YA}.

Elgamal Cyptosystem

Any user B that has access to A’s public key can encrypt a message

as follows:

1. Represent the message as an integer M in the range 0 … M … q - 1.

2. Longer messages are sent as a sequence of blocks

3. Choose a random integer k such that 1 … k … q - 1.

4. Compute a one-time key K = (YA)k mod q.

5. Encrypt M as the pair of integers (C1, C2) where C1 = αk mod q; C2 = KM

mod q

User A recovers the plaintext as follows:

1. Recover the key by computing K = (C1)XA mod q.

2. Compute M = (C2K-1) mod q.

Elgamal Cyptosystem : Example

prime field GF(19); that is, q = 19. It has primitive roots {2, 3, 10,

13, 14, 15}, We choose α = 10.

Alice generates a key pair as follows:

1. Alice chooses XA = 5.

𝑋𝐴

2. Then YA = α mod q = α5 mod 19 = 3

Alice’s private key is 5 and Alice’s public key is {q, α, YA} = {19,

10, 3}.

Elgamal Cyptosystem : Example

Suppose Bob wants to send the message with the value M = 17. Then: Bob

chooses k = 6.

Then K = (YA)k mod q = 36 mod 19 = 729 mod 19 = 7.

So C1 = α6 mod 19 = 11

C2 = KM mod q = 7 * 17 mod 19 = 119 mod 19 = 5

4. Bob sends the ciphertext (11, 5).

For decryption:

Alice calculates K = (C1)XA mod q = 115 mod 19 = 161051 mod 19 = 7.

Then K-1 in GF(19) is 7-1 mod 19 = 11.

Finally, M = (C2K-1) mod q = 5 * 11 mod 19 = 55 mod 19 = 17.

ECC

Elliptive Curve

An elliptic curve is defined by an equation in two variables with coefficients.

For cryptography, the variables and coefficients are restricted to elements in a finite

field, which results in the definition of a finite abelian group.

Elliptic curves are not ellipses

In general, cubic equations for elliptic curves known as a Weierstrass equation:

y2 + axy + by = x3 + cx2 + dx + e

where a, b, c, d, e are real numbers and x and y take on values in the real numbers.

Elliptive curve over real number uses a specific form: y2 = x3 + ax + b

A single element denoted O and called the point at infinity or the zero point

To plot such a curve, we need to compute: y = x3 + ax + b

Each curve is symmetric about y = 0.

Elliptive Curve

Set of points E(a, b) consisting of all of the points (x, y) that satisfy

y2 = x3 + ax + b together with the element O.

Different value of the pair (a, b) results in a different set E(a, b)

A group can be defined based on the set E(a, b) for given a and b,

provided 4a3 + 27b2 ≠ 0 holds true

The operation for this group is addition (+)

Elliptive Curve : Examples

DR. ALEKHA KUMAR MISHRA 45

Geometric description of addition

If three points on an elliptic curve lie on a straight line, their sum is O.

O serves as the additive identity.

◦ Thus O = -O;

◦ for any point P on the elliptic curve, P + O = P. assume P ≠ O and Q ≠ O

To add two points P and Q with different x coordinates

◦ Draw a straight line between them

◦ Find the third point of intersection R.

◦ There is a unique point R (unless the line is tangent to the curve at either P or Q)

◦ To form a group structure, we need to addthree points: P + Q = -R.

◦ P + Q is defined to be the mirror image of the third point of intersection

For two points, P and -P, with the same x coordinate. The points are joined by a vertical line, which can be

viewed as also intersecting the curve at the infinity point

To double a point Q, draw the tangent line and find the other point of intersection S. Then Q + Q = 2Q = -S.

With the above list of rules, The set E(a, b) is an abelian group.

Algebraic description of addition

For two distinct points, P = (xP, yP) and Q = (xQ, yQ), that are not negatives of

each other, the slope of the line l that joins them is

Δ = (yQ - yP)/(xQ - xP).

There is exactly one other point where l intersects the elliptic curve, and that is

the negative of the sum of P and Q.

After some algebraic manipulation, we can express the sum R = P + Q as

xR = Δ 2 - xP - xQ

yR = -yP + Δ(xP - xR)

For R = P+P

xR = ((3x2𝑃 + a )/ 2yp)2

yR = ((3x2𝑃 + a )/ 2yp) (xP - xR)- yP

Elliptic curves for cryptography

Elliptic curves in which the variables and coefficients are all

restricted to elements of a finite field

◦ Prime curves over Zp and

◦ Binary curves over GF(2m)

For elliptic curves over Zp

The variables and coefficients take on values in the set of integers from 0 through p - 1 and all

calculations are performed modulo p.

The elliptive curve equation of the form

y2 mod p = (x3 + ax + b) mod p

The set Ep(a, b) consisting of all pairs of integers (x, y) that satisfy the above equation

For example, for a = 1, b = 1, and p = 23, the equation is given by

y2 mod 23 = (x3 + x + 1) mod 23

P( 9, 7) a point satisfies this equation

For the set E23(1, 1), we are only interested in the nonnegative integers ((0,0) - (p-1,p-1))

Abelian group can be defined based on the set Ep(a, b) provided (4a2+27b2) mod p ≠ 0 mod p

In a finite group Ep(a, b) number of points in the curve is bounded by p+1-2√p ≤ N ≤ p+1+2√p

E23(1,1) set

Addition rule over Ep(a, b)

1) P+O=P

2) If P= (xP , yP) then -P = (xP , -yP)

Ex. in E23(1, 1) if P= (13,7) , the -P=(13,-7 mod 23) = (13,16)

3) If P= (xP , yP) and Q= (xQ , yQ) with P ≠ Q, the R = P+Q = (xR , yR), with

xR = (λ2 – xP - xQ ) mod p

yR = (λ(xP - xR) - yR ) mod p

Where,

yQ−yP

λ = if P ≠ Q

xQ−xP

3x2𝑃 +𝑎

= if P = Q

2𝑦𝑃

4) Multiplication is defined as repeated addition: 4P = P+P+P+P

An example

In E23(1, 1). let P = (3, 10) and Q = (9, 7)

Then λ = (7 – 10)/(9 – 3) mod 23 = -3/6 mod 23 = -1/2 mod 23 = 11

xR = (112 - 3 - 9) mod 23 = 109 mod 23 = 17

yR = (11(3 - 17) - 10) mod 23 = -164 mod 23 = 20, So P + Q = (17, 20).

To compute 2P, λ = (3(32) + 1 )/ (2 * 10) mod 23 = 5/20 mod 23 = ¼

mod 23 = 6

xR = (62 - 3 - 3) mod 23 = 30 mod 23 = 7

yR = (6(3 - 7) - 10) mod 23 = (-34) mod 23 = 12

So, 2P = (7, 12).

Elliptive curve over m

GF(2 )

It uses a cubic equation in which variable and coefficient take value in GF(2m).

The cubic equation of the curve is

y2+xy=x3+ax2+b

If P,Q are points in E2𝑚 (a,b), then

P+O=P

If P= (xP , yP), then –P = (xP , xP + yP)

If P= (xP , yP) and Q= (xQ , yQ) , P ≠ -Q , and P ≠ Q, then R=P+Q = (xR , yR), where

xR = (λ2 + λ + xP + xQ +a)

yR = (λ(xP+ xR) + xR + yP) , where λ = (yQ+ yP)/(xQ+ xP)

R=2P=(xR , yR), where

xR = (λ2 + λ + a)

yR = (xP2 +(λ+ 1)xR ,where λ = xP+(yP/xP)

Elliptive curve cryptography

KEY GENERATION

Select a large integer q, (either a prime p or an integer 2m ), and parameters a and b for for the

curve.

Select a base point G = (x1, y1) in Eq(a, b) of order a large value n. The order n of a point G on an

elliptic curve is the smallest positive integer n such that nG = 0

Eq(a,b) and the point G(x1,y1) are public

Let and A and B are two users where A wish to send some secret message to B

A selects private key, an integer nA < n.

A then generates a public key PA = nA × G; a point in Eq(a, b).

B similarly selects a private key nB and computes a public key PB.

On exchanging PA, and PB ,A generates the secret key k = nA × PB and B generates the secret key

k = nB × PA.

These two step results in same key because nA × PB = nA × (nB * G) = nB × (nA × G) = nB × PA

Example : key generation

p = 211; Ep(0, -4), which is equivalent to the curve

y2 = x3 - 4; and G = (2, 2). One can calculate that 240G = O. A’s

private key

is nA = 121, so A’s public key is PA = 121(2, 2) = (115, 48). B’s

private key is

nB = 203, so B’s public key is 203(2, 3) = (130, 203). The shared

secret key is

121(130, 203) = 203(115, 48) = (161, 69).

Elliptive curve cryptography

ENCRYPTION

Encode the plaintext message m to be sent as an (x, y) point Pm

A chooses a random positive integer k

Produces the ciphertext Cm as a pair of points: Cm = {kG, Pm + kPB}

DECRYPTION

B multiplies the first point in Cm by B’s private key and subtracts the

result from the second point:

Pm + kPB - nB(kG) = Pm + k(nBG) - nB(kG) = Pm

ECC Analysis

A added kPB to Pm and A only knows the value of k

Even though PB is a public key, nobody can remove the mask k from

kPB.

If one knows the private key nB then it can be removed.

For an attacker to recover the message, the attacker would have to

compute k given G and kG, which is assumed to be hard.

Example

The global public elements are q = 257; Eq(a, b) = E257(0, -4), (y2 = x3 – 4); and

G = (2, 2).

Bob’s private key is nB = 101, and his public key is PB = nBG = 101(2, 2) = (197,

167).

Alice wishes to send a message to Bob that is encoded in the elliptic point Pm =

(112, 26).

Alice chooses random integer k = 41 and computes kG = 41(2, 2) = (136, 128),

kPB = 41(197, 167) = (68, 84) and Pm + kPB = (112, 26) + (68, 84) = (246, 174).

Alice sends the ciphertext Cm = (C1, C2) = {(136, 128), (246, 174)}

Bob receives the ciphertext and computes

C2 - nBC1 = (246, 174) -101(136, 128) = (246, 174) - (68, 84) = (112, 26).

Comparable Key Sizes in Terms of

Computational Effort for Cryptanalysis

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