Heirs of Alberto Suguitan vs.

City of Mandaluyong
G.R. No. 135087
March 14, 2000

Facts:

On October 13, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong City issued

Resolution No. 396, S-1994 authorizing Mayor Benjamin B. Abalos to institute expropriation
proceedings over the property of Alberto Suguitan for the purpose of the expansion of the
Mandaluyong Medical Center. Because of Suguitan’s refusal to sell his property, the City of
Mandaluyong filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC of Pasig City. Suguitan filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint but was denied by the trial court. On July 28, 1998, the court
granted the assailed order of expropriation. Petitioners assert that the City of Mandaluyong may
only exercise its delegated power of eminent domain by means of an ordinance as required by
Section 19 of RA No. 7160, and not means of a mere resolution. Respondent contends, however,
that it validly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain pursuant to Art. 36, Rule VI of
the IRR of RA No. 7160, a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the filing of expropriation
proceedings with the RTC. Respondent’s position was upheld by the trial court.

Issue:

WON the City of Mandaluyong may validly and legally exercise its power of eminent
domain by implementing a resolution pursuant to Art. 36, Rule VI of the IRR of RA No. 7160.

Ruling:

The Court held that the City of Mandaluyong may enact the necessary ordinance and
institute expropriation proceedings for as long as it has complied with all other legal
requirements. The basis for the exercise power of eminent domain by local government unit is
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. Despite the existence of legislative grant, it is still the duty of the
courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with
the delegating law. The courts have the obligation to determine whether the expropriation
proceedings is over a particular private property, is exercised for public use, there is payment of
just compensation and there was a valid offer made to the owner of the property but was not
accepted. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the exercise of the
power of eminent domain. An ordinance is necessary to authorize the filing of a complaint with
the proper court. Rule 67 of the Rules of Court states that although the award of just
compensation is indispensable, it is the last stage of the expropriation proceedings. It cannot be
arrived without an initial finding by the court that there is a lawful right to take the property
sought to be expropriated for public use. The reliance of the respondents to Article 36 (a), Rule
VI of the IRR, which requires only a resolution to authorize the exercise the power of eminent
domain, is untenable. Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule. It is
unquestionable that the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule.