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Masikip v.

City of Pasig

G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006

- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be expressly provided for by


Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City of Pasig
sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the “sports development and recreational activities” of
the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.

On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged
purpose that it was “in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.”

Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The
Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was
genuine necessity to expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which
dismissed petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property


Eminent domain is “the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to the
public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of
providing a reasonably compensation therefor.” It is the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and
inherent in government.

This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to
the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional
limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when
expressly authorized by statute.

Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.

(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;

(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value of
the property based on the current tax declaration; and

(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property

There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest
Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no “genuine necessity” to justify the expropriation. The
records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the
basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the
intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowner’s Association, a private, non-
profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan.

Source: Scire Licet, Masikip vs. City of Pasig,

city-of-pasig.html (last accessed Dec. 18, 2012)

[46 Phil 126; G.R. No. L-22008; 3 Nov 1924]


Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco factory. She was granteda
vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy, which commenced on the 16th of July
1923.According to Fajardo, during that time, she was not given the salary due her in violation of
theprovisions of Act No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on Section 13 and 15 of
saidAct against the manager of the tobacco Factory, Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on
theother hand, claims that the facts in the complaint did not constitute an offense and further
allegesthat the aforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13, Act
No.3071 provides that, “Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop
or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as
laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after
confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just
cause,under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two
monthscounting from the day of her discharge.” Section 15 of the same Act provides for the
penalty of any violation of section 13. The latter was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of
itssupposed Police Power with the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women
laborersin "factory, shop or place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a
certain extent,reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The
trial courtrendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of
fifty pesos andin case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. Hence, the case was
raised to the Courtof Appeals which affirmed the former decision.


Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.

Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid exercise of

Held: The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be unconstitutional for being
violative or restrictive of the right of the people to freely enter into contracts for their affairs. It
has been decided several times, that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty
of the individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. The
contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem
advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy. The police power of the
state is a very broad and expanding power. The police power may encompass every law for the
restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the public peace, health, and morals.
But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate
the express inhibition of the constitution. The Police Power issubject to and is controlled by the
paramount authority of the constitution of the state, and will notbe permitted to violate rights
secured or guaranteed by the latter.

Source: P. Perez, Introduction to Constitutional Law 2, (last accessed Dec.
18, 2012)
City Government of QC vs Judge
Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino
FACTS: Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall
be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC justified
the law by invoking police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no
reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the
city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

Source: UberDigests, City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino,
(last accessed Dec. 18, 2012)


The National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of parcels of
landcovering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of
petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 squaremeters
and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the
NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial
assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in
expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA
deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representingthe "total
market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to PresidentialDecree No.
1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing
upon payment of just compensation."

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the
possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied.

Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing theconstitutionality
of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended.

ISSUE: Whether socialized housing constitutes “public use” for purposes of expropriation.


YES. This Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within the confines of "public use".
As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into
play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determineswhat is
public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resaleat cost to
individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
private enterprise to the government. is accurate to state then that at presentwhatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public useIn the case
at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets therequisites of
"public use". The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for theexpansion of
Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salariedgovernment

Source: Sean, Case Compilation,

(last accessed Dec. 18, 2012)

FACTS: Sometime in 1933, respondent PLDT contracted an agreement with the American
company, RCA Communications Inc., connecting calls coming and going from RCA to the
Philippines and vice versa. Later, this agreement extended to radio and telephone messages to
andfrom European and Asiatic countries. In 1956, PLDT, complying with their 24-month notice
agreement, made known its termination of the agreement, which came to pass in 1958.Created in
1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up a Government telephone System by renting
trunk lines from PLDT. In doing so, the Bureau has agreed to abide by the rules and regulations
of PLDT, which includes the prohibition for public use that which was furnished for private use.
In 1948, the Bureau extended service to the general public. In 1958, the Bureau entered into an
agreement with RCA for a joint overseas telephone service. PLDT then complained that the
Bureau was violating their agreement as the latter was using PLDT’s trunk lines for public use
and not just private. PLDT then gave notice that if these activities continued, they would
disconnect service. When no reply was received, OLDT pulled the plug on the Bureau, causing
an isolation of the RP from the rest of the world, except the US.The Bureau proposed an
interconnecting agreement, but as negotiations wore on, neither party could come to a
compromise. Petitioner Bureau of Telecommunications is prayed for a judgment commanding
PLDT to execute an agreement, allowing the Bureau to use PLDT’s facilities, as well as a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain respondent from severing existing connections as well as
restoring those already severed. While the lower court directed respondent to reconnect the
severed lines and refrain from disconnecting more, as well as to accept incoming international
calls, PLDT filed its answer denying any obligation it has to the Bureau, as well as assailing the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. PLDT also claimed that the Bureau was engaging in
commercial telephone operations, which was in excess of its authority. The court then said that it
could not compel the parties to enter into agreement, that under EO 94, establishing the Bureau,
said Bureau is not limited to government services, nor was it guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of
PLDT’s poles, as well as declared the injunction permanent. The complaint and counterclaims,
however, were dismissed. Hence this appeal.


1)Whether or not the trial court can coerce the parties to enter into agreement.

2)Whether the court of first instance had jurisdiction.

3)Whether the Bureau of Telecommunications is empowered to engage in commercialtelephone


4)Whether these commercial services created unfair competition, and the Bureau issubsequently
guilty of fraud and abuse.

5)Whether PLDT has a right to compensation for the use of the Bureau of PLDT’s poles.

1)No the trial court may not.

2)Yes, the trial court had jurisdiction over the case.

3)Yes, the Bureau is empowered to engage in commercial telephone business.

4)No, these services did not create any unfair competition.

5)No, PLDT has no right to compensation.

The court here stated that contracts and agreements must be made freely and not tainted by
violence, intimidation, or undue influence.

Source: Sean, Case Compilation,

(last accessed Dec. 18, 2012)



The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing “on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc., in Ormoc City amunicipal
tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to USA and other foreign countries.”(Section 1) Payments
for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Co, Inc (OSCI) totalingP12,087.50.

OSCI filed a complaint in the CFI of Leyte alleging:1.the ordinance is unconstitutional for being
violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of is an export tax
forbidden under Sec. 2887 of the Revised Administrative Code(RAC)3.the tax is neither a
production nor a license tax which Ormoc City is authorized toimpose under Sec. 15-kk of its
charter and under Sec 2 of RA 2264 (Local AutonomyAct)4.the tax amounts to a customs duty,
fee or charge in violation of par. 1 of Sec 2 of RA2264 because the tax is on both the sale and
export of sugar.

CFI upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant
chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other formsof taxes, licenses
or fees not excluded in its charter. Thus, this appeal.

ISSUES:1) WON defendant Municipal Board has authority to levy such an export tax
2) WON constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal protectionclause
and rule of uniformity of taxation were infringed.

HELD: CFI decision REVERSED. Ordinance declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Defendants

ordered to refund the P12,087.50 paid.

Source: Sean, Case Compilation,

(last accessed Dec. 18, 2012)
Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao, and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon vs. Hon.
Jose L. Atienza, jr., in his capacity as Mayor of Manila

G.R. No. 156052

March 7, 2007

Facts: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.
Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr. approved the said ordinance on November 28, 2001. and it became effective on
December 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial
to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies
Caltex, Petron and Shell.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a
memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that :scaling down of
Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. Under the memorandum of
understanding, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to
continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint
operations and the scale down program.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in Resolution No. 97. In that
resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the memorandum of understanding was effective only for a
period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted
Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor
Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for
a reassessment of the ordinance.

Issue: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order
the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. And Whether or not the June 26, 2002 memorandum of
understanding and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor of Manila, to
enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it
has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts.

On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding were contradictory with
Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly
gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the
city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

Source: A. Yaun, Social Justice Society vs. Hon. Lito Atienza, Jr. Mayor of Manila G.R. No.
156052 Digest,
lito_08.html (last accessed Dec. 28, 2012)
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. PBM

(51 SCRA 189)

Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass

demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of
the Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, PhilippineBlooming Mills Inc., called for a
meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against
the company but was in factan exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom
of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of
their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the
possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers
may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves
to participate , otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the
rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the
‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found
guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by
the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.

Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well
as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost
as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights
can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil
liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority
"gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in
relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”

Source: Coffeeafficionado.blogspot, Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs.

PBM, 51 SCRA 189,
employees.html (last accessed Dec. 28, 2012)

MMDA vs Garin
GR No. 130230
April 15, 2005
FACTS: Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver’s license
was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
requesting the return of his license and expressed his preference for his case to be file in Court.
Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing
among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited
fines and penalties. RTC rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the
authority to desist from confiscating driver’s license without first giving the driver the
opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. Thus this petition.
ISSUE:Whether of not Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend
or revoke driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional?
The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local
government unit of a public corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to
enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to
make, ordain, establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances
either with penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for
good and welfare of the commonwealth and for subjects of the same.
There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to “enact ordinance,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila.” It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
the various national government agencies, People’s Organizations, NGOs and private sector for
the efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are administrative in nature.
Source:, MMDa vs. Garin,
case-digest (last accessed Dec. 28, 2012)
G.R. No. L-24693
Police Power – Due Process Clause

On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Boardenacted Ord 4760 and the same was
approvedb y t h e n a c t i n g m a y o r A s t o r g a . O r d 4 7 6 0 s o u g h t t o r e g u
l a t e h o t e l s a n d m o t e l s . I t classified them into 1st class (taxed at
6k/yr)a n d 2 n d c l a s s ( t a x e d a t 4 . 5 k / y r ) . I t a l s o c o m p e l l e
d h o t e l s / m o t e l s t o g e t t h e demographics of anyone w
h o c h e c k s i n t o t h e i r r o o m s . I t c o m p e l l e d h o t e l s / m o t e l s t o have wide
open spaces so as not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-
M a l a t e impugned the validity of the law averring thatsuch is oppressive, arbitrary and
against due p r o c e s s . T h e l o w e r c o u r t a s w e l l a s t h e appellate
court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against thedue process clause.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There

i s a p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e l a w s e n a c t e d b y Congress (in this case Mun Board)
is valid. Without a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in
this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such
cannotp r e v a i l o v e r t h e p r e s u m p t i o n . F u r t h e r , t h e ordinance is a valid
exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance
was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals.
Thisi s t o m i n i m i z e p r o s t i t u t i o n . T h e i n c r e a s e i n t a x e s n o t o n l y d i s c o u r a g e s
h o t e l s / m o t e l s i n doing any business other than legal but alsoincreases the revenue
of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well. The due
process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact definition but has reason as a
standard. In this case, the precise reason why the ordinance was enacted was to curb down
prostitution in the city which is reason enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling
out of the provisions of the said ordinance alleged to be vague

Source:, Constitutional Law II cases,

Digest-Bill-of-Rights (last accessed Dec. 28, 2012)
Lozano Vs. Martinez
146 Scra 323 G.R. No.L-63419
18 Dec 1986

Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made,
contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was
denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief.
The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the
Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it
justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a properexercise of police power of the


Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that
is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which
the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.

The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but anoffense against public order.
The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently
wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can
be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in
the exerciseof its police power.

Source: Coffeeholic Writes, Lozano vs. Martinez,

martinez-146-scra-323-nol_09.html (last accessed Dec. 28, 2012)
Del Rosario vs. Bengzon
December 21, 1989

Facts: Philippine Medical Association is the national organization of medical doctors in the
Philippines. They assail the constitutionality of some of the provisions of Generics Act of 1988
(Rep. Act 6675) and the implementation of Administrative Order No. 62.

The law specifically provides that “All government health agencies shall use generic terminology
or generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing, and
administering of drugs and medicines. It also includes medical, dental and veterinary, private
practitioners shall write prescriptions using the generic name.

The petitioner’s main argument is the alleged unequal treatment ofgovernment practitioners and
those on the private practice. It is because the former are required to use only generic
terminology in the prescription while the latter may write the brand name of the drug below the
generic name. It is allegedly a specie of invalid classlegislation.

In addition, the petitioners gave a distorted interpretation on RA 6675 and Admin Order No. 62
saying that the salesgirl and or druggist have the discretion to substitute the doctor’s prescription.
The court says that the salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer, but does
not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and their

Issue: Whether or not the Generics Act is constitutional as to the exercise of police power by
the government.

Held: Petition Dismissed.

The court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It implements
the constitutional mandate for the State “to protect and promote the right to health of the people”
and “to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost”.

The alleged unequal treatment of government physicians, dentistsand veterinarians on one hand
and those in the private practice in the other, is a misinterpretation of the law.

The salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer of all available products, but
does not determine all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name and
their corresponding process.

The penal sanction in violation of the law is indispensable because they are the teeth of the law.
Without them, the law would be toothless.
The Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of the Secretary of Health are

The purpose of the Generics Act is to “promote and require the use of generic drug products that
are therapeutically equivalent to their brand name counterparts”. The effect of the drug does not
depend on its brand but on the active ingredients which it contains.

Source: Scribbles of A Lunatic Mind, Del Rosario vs. Bengzon, (last
accessed Dec. 28, 2012)
Tablarin vs. Gutierrez
G.R. No. 78164
July 31, 1987

Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine. However the
petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT). Republic Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical
Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of Medical Education (BME) whose functions
include "to determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine" (Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of the same Act requires from applicants to present a certificate
of eligibility for entrance (cea) to medical school from the BME. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, established a uniform admission
test called National Medical Admission Test as additional requirement for issuance of a
certificate of eligibility.

Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a
prayer Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Sec. of
educ, BME from enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 and from
requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as condition for securing (cea).

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 violate the
constitution as they prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement

Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state.

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on
the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other
hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the
practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to
practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations
requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical
board examinationshave long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power.
Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educationalrequirements-i.e., the completion
of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical profession,
has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we
have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement
of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by
selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and
eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current
state of our social and economic development, are widely known.

The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe anadmission test like the NMAT
as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."

Source: Scribbles of A Lunatic Mind, Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, (last
accessed Dec. 28, 2012)
Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD,
526 SCRA 130
Facts: Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in
the Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257, otherwise
known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003.” Section 4(a) of RA 9257 grants twenty
percent (20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is
unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of private property.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional

Held: Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the
power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.

Accordingly, it has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It is the power vested in the legislature
by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights
must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare.

Source: Scribbles of A Lunatic Mind, Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs.

DSWD, (last
accessed Dec. 28, 2012)


Being the principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of their other adverse effects
on the community, the respondents passed Ordinance No. 84 which may be cited as the Prohibition and
Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan which says that operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls
shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the municipality and no
license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer for
employment in any of the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition in the issuance of
licenses/permits to said persons and operators of said establishments shall include prohibition in the
renewal thereof.

Petitioners allege that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated
as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

The lower court dismissed the cases of prohibition with preliminary injuction and upheld the
constitutionality of the Ordinance in question. Hence, the petition for certiorari by way of appeal.

Issue: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents, can
prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation

Held: No


Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power of
council to enact ordinances and make regulations. - The municipal council shall enact such ordinances
and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper
to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein."

It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation,
and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity.

The case is different from Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators v. City Mayor because what
was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit.

The writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court reversed, set aside, and
nullified. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and

Source: J. Oria, Cruz vs. Paras, (last

accessed Dec. 28, 2012)

Facts: The petitioners filed a declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on
Ordinance No.4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation
of property of their meansof livelihood without due process of law.The assailed ordinance is
worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shopto conduct the business of
massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of saidbarber shop, or in
any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as longas the
operator of the barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person."The
lower court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the assailed ordinance. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4964 is unconstitutional

Held: NO

Ratio: It is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able
to imposepayment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under
Ordinance No. 3659 asamended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the
ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible
immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage
of customers."The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general
welfare clausebecause it "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality; this
clause has been given wideapplication by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the
particular circumstances of the case beenliberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to
really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence."The judgment of the lower court is

Source: J. Oria, Velasco vs. Villegas,

Digest (last accessed Dec. 29, 2012)
Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in
1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations
to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was
swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January
4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court
of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their
challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and
issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among
others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games
of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement
that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by
P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere
ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to
enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these
ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra
vires and void.

Source: Tobi, Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties,

vs-pryce-properties.html (last accessed Dec. 28, 2012)
City of Manila vs. Laguio
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005

 Due Process
 Equal Protection
 Requisites of a Valid Exercise of Police Power by LGU


The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodgin houses. It built and opened Victoria Court
in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain
forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and
conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it
included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional
for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial
of equal protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.


W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power

W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the law


The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a valid exercise of police power
are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the
social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills fo
prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless
and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors,massage parlors, karaoke bars, night
clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. These are lawful
pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.

Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent places.... Every house,
building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that matter will not be exempt from the prohibition.
Simply because there are no "pure" places where there are impure men.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the
Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it
because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men.

The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires. The
Local Government Code merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the
establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights adn impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council unde the Code had no power to
enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires null and void.

Source: Scire Licet, City of Manila vs. Laguio,

manila-vs-laguio.html (last accessed Dec. 29, 2012)
Mirasol v. DPWHGR No. 1587938 June 2006

F a c t s : I n 1 9 5 7 , R A 2 0 0 0 ( L i m i t e d H i g h w a ys A c t ) w a s e n a c t e d . S u b s e
q u e n t l y , D P W H A d m i n i s t r a t i v e O r d e r 1 (prohibiting motorc
y c l e s o n l i m i t e d a c c e s s h i g h w a y s ) , D P W H D e p a r t m e n t O r d e r 7 4 (declari
ng certain portions of the N L E X a n d S L E X a s l i m i t e d
a c c e s s f a c i l i t i e s ) , a n d D P W H Department Order 215 (declaring Coastal Road as a
limited access facility) were issued.
J a m e s M i r a s o l , R i c h a r d S a n t i a g o , a n d t h e L u z o n Motorcyclis
ts Federation, Inc.s o u g h t t o h a v e t h e D P W H i s s u a n c e s i n v a l i d a t e d
for v i o l a t i n g R A 2 0 0 0 . Consequently, the Toll
R e g u l a t o r y B o a r d i s s u e d Department Order 123, which allowed motorcycles
with engine displacements of 400cc inside limited access
facilities.T h e t r i a l c o u r t d i s m i s s e d t h e p e t i t i o n b u t d e c l a r e d D O 1 2 3 invalid.

Issue: W/N Administrative Order 1 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection

Held: NO. It is neither warranted nor reasonable to say that the

only justifiable classification amongm o d e s o f t r a n s p o r t i s t h e m o t o r i z e d
a g a i n s t t h e n o n - m o t o r i z e d . N o t a l l m o t o r i z e d vehicles are created equal.
Real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport
sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll
ways. The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle
is lesss t a b l e a n d m o r e e a s i l y overturned than a four-
wheeledv e h i c l e . P u b l i c i n t e r e s t a n d safety require the imposition
of certain restrictions on tollways t h a t d o n o t a p p l y t o o r d i n a r y roads. As a special
kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it.

Doctrine: C l a s s i f i c a t i o n b y i t s e l f i s n o t prohibited. It can only be assailed if it is

deemed invidious, that is, if it is not based on substantial differences. A police power
measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly violates constitutional limitations
l i k e d u e p r o c e s s a n d e q u a l protection of the law.

Source: S. Macapagal, Mirasol vs. DPWH,

Law-Case-Digest-Matrix-Set-2 (last accessed Nov. 29, 2012)
Chavez vs. Romulo

G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004

 A mere license is always revocable


This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to deter the
rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property.


 Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional

 Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right


Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or
property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain
privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that “a
license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or
a property right, nor does it create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in
Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:

“Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or aproperty right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.”

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident
from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of
Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may
impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence.” Following the American
doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under
our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It
does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions,
and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such
conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that
it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation
of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these
words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: “The
correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere
license by the State is always revocable.”

Source: Scire Licet, Chavez vs. Romulo,

(last accessed Nov. 29, 2012)
Moday vs Court of Appeals
FACTS:Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan
passed a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of
Moday’s land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasiumand other public buildings. The mayor approved
the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
which disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are
other lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with
the expropriation nonetheless.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of

a municipal resolution which was disapprovedby the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

HELD: Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case,
is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is government’s right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domainmay be validly
delegated to local governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private
property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just
compensation. The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is “beyond the powers conferred
upon the council or president making the same.” This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP
merely stated that there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to
declare the SB resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

Source: Uberdigest, Moday vs. Court of Appeals,

vs-court-of-appeals/ (last accessed on Dec. 29, 2012)