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Persons and

Family
Relation
Compliled Case Digest
Bautista, Bryan, Bautista, Paulo, Bilas, Gelliane Christine, Bogbog, Aleli, Bolide, Rouelli Gift,
Corres, Kaiser John, De Guzman, Mageryl Shay, Diaz, Charina, Donggayao, Bryan Christopher
Gironella, Jsa Noble, Mabitazan, Tedd, Macarimpas, Raihanah Sarah, Narag, Janro, Reyes,
Jareed, Rosario, Keouh, Savellano, Michael Niño Jesus, Solda, Ace Aries
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Persons and Family Relation
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Persons and Family Relation
S.y 2013 -2014

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Persons and Family Relation
Case Title G.R./SCRA No.
EFFECTIVITY
Lara v. Del Rosario 94 Phil 778
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY
Tanada v. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27
G.R.
Philippines International Trading Corp. v. Angeles 108461
No.
G.R.
National Electrification Administration v. Gonzaga 158761
No.
G.R.
Basa v. Mercado L-42226
No.
Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives Inc. v. Energy G.R.
192717
Regulatory Commission No.
COMPUTATION OF TIME
G.R.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown 162155
No.
G.R.
People v. Del Rosario L-7234
No.
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW
G.R.
D.M. Consunji Inc v. Court of Appeals 137873
No.
G.R.
People v. Gasacao 168445
No.
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION
G.R.
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales L-55960
No.
G.R.
Laureno v. Court of Appeals 114776
No.
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee v. V.P. Eusebio G.R.
140047
Construction Inc. No.
PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS
G.R.
Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals 112193
No.
G.R.
Bernabe v. Alejo 140500
No.
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Stockholders of Intercity G.R.
181556
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. No.
G.R.
Montanez v. Cipriano 181089
No.
Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice G.R. 188056

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Persons and Family Relation
No.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
G.R.
Guy v. Court of Appeals 163707
No.
G.R.
F.F. Cruz & Co.., Inc. v. HR Construction Corp. 187521
No.
G.R.
People v. Morial 129295
No.
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL
G.R.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown 1622155
No.
G.R.
Magkalas v. National Housing Authority 138823
No.
EFFECT OF REPEAL OF REPEALING LAW
G.R.
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan 165835
No.
STARE DECISIS
G.R.
Ting v. Velez-Ting 166562
No.
G.R.
Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals 110398
No.
LAW OF THE CASE
G.R.
Fulgencio v. National Labor Relations 141600
No.
OBITER DICTUM
G.R.
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals 142947
No.
G.R.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals 146486
No.
G.R.
Ayala Corporation v. Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation 134284
No.
DURA LEX SED LEX
People v. Veneracion 249 SCRA 251
CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS
G.R.
Yao Kee v. Sy Gonzales L-55960
No.
EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW
G.R.
Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp. L-30642
No.
G.R.
Ursua v. Court of Appeals 112170
No.
APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, EXCEPTIONS

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Persons and Family Relation
G.R.
Asaali v. Commissioner of Customs L-24170
No.
NATIONALITY/ CITIZENSHIP THEORY
G.R.
Llorente v. Court of Appeals 124371
No.
INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION
G.R.
Miciano v. Brimo L-22595
No.
RENVOI
G.R.
Aznar v. Garcia L-16749
No.
G.R.
Bellis v. Bellis L-23768
No.
G.R.
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin L-27860
No.
FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, WILLS
G.R.
Van Dorn v. Romillo L-68470
No.
G.R.
Bank of America NT and SA v. American Realty Co. 133876
No.
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
G.R.
University of the East v. Jader 13234417
No.
G.R.
G.F. Equity Inc. v. Valenzona 156841
No.
G.R.
Go. V. Cordero 164703
No.
G.R.
Villanueva v. Rosqueta 180764
No.
G.R.
Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp. 184315
No.
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA
G.R.
Custodio v. Court of Appeals 116100
No.
G.R.
Equitable Banking Corporation v. Calderon 156168
No.
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
G.R.
Hotel Nikko v. Reyes 154259
No.
LIABILITY OF EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO
G.R.
Manuel v. People of the Philippines 165842
No.

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Persons and Family Relation
G.R.
Romero v. People of the Philippines 167546
No.
ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES
G.R.
Pe v. Pe L-17396
No.
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY
G.R.
Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals L-14628
No.
G.R.
Galang v. Court of Appeals L-17248
No.
G.R.
Gasheem Shookagt Baksh v. Court of Appeals 97336
No.
G.R.
Wassmer v. Velez L-20089
No.
G.R.
Natividad v. Tunac 143130
No.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
G.R.
Shinryo Company Inc. v. RRN Inc. 172525
No.
G.R.
Car Cool Philippines v. USHIO Realty and Development Corporation 138088
No.
G.R.
Elegir v. Philippine Airlines 181995
No.
PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE
G.R.
Valenzuala v. Court of Appeals L-56168
No.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
G.R.
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals 120706
No.
G.R.
Padalhin v. Lavina 183026
No.
NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE
G.R.
Philex Mining Corp. v. Commisioner of Internal Revenue 125704
No.
ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON CRIME
G.R.
Manantan v. Court of Appeals 107152
No.
G.R.
Nuguid v. Nicdao 150758
No.
G.R.
People v. Agacer 177751
No.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (OTHER SOURCES OF

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Persons and Family Relation
OBLIGATIONS)
G.R.
People v. Bayotas 102007
No.
G.R.
Cancio, Jr. v. Isip 133978
No.
G.R.
Heirs of Guaring v. Court of Appeals 108395
No.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION, FRAUD,
PHYSICAL INJURIES)
G.R.
Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists, Inc. 150256
No.
G.R.
International Flavors and Fragrance (Phils.) Inc. v. Argos 130362
No.
G.R.
Ruiz v. Ucol L-45404
No.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)
G.R.
Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corp. 141309
No.
G.R.
Cojuanco v. Court of Appeals 119398
No.
G.R.
Manila Electric Company v. Castillocase 182976
No.
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)
G.R.
Barredo v. Garcia 48006
No.
G.R.
Safeguard Security Agency v. Tangco 165732
No.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
G.R.
City of Pasig v. COMELEC 165732
No.
G.R.
Beltran v. People 125646
No.
G.R.
Merced v. Diez L-15315
No.
G.R.
Donato v. Luna L-53642
No.
G.R.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals 150758
No.
PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY
Geluz v. Court of Appeals 2 SCRA 801
RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT

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Persons and Family Relation
G.R.
Catalan v. Basa 159657
No.
G.R.
Domingo v. Court of Appeals 127540
No.
G.R.
Mendezona v. Ozamis 143370
No.
G.R.
Oposa v. Factoran Jr. 101083
No.
KINDS OF DOMICILE
G.R.
Marcos v. COMELEC 119976
No.
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
G.R.
Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals 112193
No.
G.R.
Bernabe v. Alejo 140500
No.
DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE
G.R.
Ancheta v. Ancheta 145370
No.
Adm. MTJ-92-
Abadilla v. Tabiliran
No. 716
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF
MARRIAGE
G.R.
Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia vda. De Damian' 155733
No.
G.R.
Eugenio v. Velez 85140
No.
G.R.
Balogbog v. Court of Appeals 83598
No.
LEGAL CAPACITY
G.R.
Silverio v. Republic 174689
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Cagandahan 166676
No.
AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER
A.M. MTJ-99-
Beso v. Judge Daguman
No. 1211
A.M. MTJ-02-
Aranes v. Occiano
No. 1390
MARRIAGE LICENSE
G.R.
Alcantara v. Alcantara 167746
No.

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Persons and Family Relation
Republic v. Court of Appeals 477 SCRA 277
G.R.
Carino v. Carino 132529
No.
Sy v. Court of Appeals 330 SCRA 550
G.R.
Sevilla v. Cardenas 167684
No.
G.R.
Abbas v. Abbas 183896
No.
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE
REQUIREMENT
A.M. MTJ-00-
Manzano v. Sanchez
No. 1329
G.R.
Ninal v. Badayog 133778
No.
A.M. MTJ-92-
Cosca v.Palaypayon
No. 721
MARRIAGE CEREMONY
G.R.
Morigo v. People 145226
No.
THREE-FOLD LIABILITY
A.M. MTJ-94-
Moreno v. Bernabe
No. 963
A.M. MTJ-96-
Navarro v. Domagtoy
No. 963
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE
G.R.
Vda. De Jacob v. Court of Appeals 135216
No.
FOREIGN DIVORCE
G.R.
Republic v. Iyoy 152577
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Obrecido III 154380
No.
G.R.
Van Dorn v. Romillo L-68470
No.
G.R.
San Luis v. San Luis 133743
No.
G.R.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas 186571
No.
G.R.
Garcia-Recio v. Recio 138322
No.
NO MARRIAGE LICENSE
Atienza v. Brillantes A.M. MTJ-

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Persons and Family Relation
No. 92706
BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES
G.R.
Enriquez Vda. De Catalan v. Catalan Lee 183622
No.
G.R.
Quita v. Court of Appeals 124862
No.
G.R.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals 150758
No.
G.R.
Jarillo v. People of the Philipppines 164435
No.
A.C.
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo 6148
No.
G.R.
Weigel v. Sempio Dy L-53703
No.
G.R.
Montanez v. Cipriano 181089
No.
VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES
G.R.
Republic v. Nolasco 94053
No.
Republic v. Court of Appeals 477 SCRA 277
G.R.
Bienvenido v. Court of Appeals 111717
No.
G.R.
Manuel v. People of the Philippines 165842
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Bermudes 160258
No.
G.R.
Calisterio v. Calisterio 136467
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Granada 187512
No.
MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ART. 40 FC
G.R.
Domingo v. Court of Appeals 1084818
No.
A.M. MTJ-
Atienza v. Brillantes
No. 92706
CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
G.R.
Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals and Lao 119190
No.
G.R.
Santos v. Court of Appeals 112019
No.
G.R.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals 126010
No.

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Persons and Family Relation
G.R.
Yambao v. Republic of the Philippines 184063
No.
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
G.R.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina 108763
No.
G.R.
Barcelona v. Court of Appeals 130087
No.
G.R.
Tongol v. Tongol 157610
No.
G.R.
Marcos v. Marcos 136490
No.
G.R.
Te v. Te 161793
No.
G.R.
Agraviador v. Agraviador 170729
No.
G.R.
Marable v. Marable 178741
No.
G.R.
Aurelio v. Aurelio 175367
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Court of Appeals 159594
No.
OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
G.R.
Republic v. Encelan 170022
No.
G.R.
Mendoza v. Republic 157649
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Galang 168796
No.
G.R.
Ochosa v. Alano 167459
No.
G.R.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes 185286
No.
G.R.
Toring v. Toring 165321
No.
G.R.
Ligeralde v. Patilunghug 168796
No.
G.R.
Suazo v. Suazo 164493
No.
G.R.
Aspillaga v. Aspillaga 170925
No.
G.R.
Alcazar v. Alcazar 174451
No.
Najera v. Najera G.R. 164817

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Persons and Family Relation
No.
G.R.
Halili v. Santos-Halili 165424
No.
G.R.
Paras v. Paras 147824
No.
G.R.
Zamora v. Court of Appeals 141917
No.
G.R.
Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris 162368
No.
G.R.
Antonio v. Reyes 155800
No.
G.R.
Carating v.-Siayngco v. Siayngco 158896
No.
G.R.
Villalon v. Villalon 167206
No.
G.R.
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals 127358
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano 149498
No.
G.R.
Dedel v. Court of Appeals 151867
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Dagdag 109975
No.
G.R.
Pesca v. Pesca 136921
No.
ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE,
GROUNDS
G.R.
Mallion v. Alcantara 141528
No.
PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE
G.R.
Leonor v. Court of Appeals 112597
No.
PARTIES
G.R.
Juliajvo-Llave v. Republic 169766
No.
G.R.
Enrico v. Heirs of Medinaceli 173614
No.
G.R.
Catalan v. Court of Appeals 167109
No.
G.R.
Ninal v. Badayog 133778
No.
G.R.
Carlos v. Sandoval 179922
No.

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Persons and Family Relation
G.R.
Ablaza v. Republic 158298
No.
APPEARANCE OF THE STATE
G.R.
Maquilan v. Maquilan 155409
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Cuison-Melgar 139676
No.
G.R.
Malcampo-Sin v. Sin 137590
No.
G.R.
Tuason v. Court of Appeals 116607
No.
A.M. RTJ-04-
Corpus v. Ochotorena
No. 1861
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
G.R.
Pacete v. Carriaga L-53880
No.
FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS
G.R.
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis 138509
No.
G.R.
Ty v. Court of Appeals 127406
No.
EFFECTS
G.R.
Valdes v. RTC and Valdes 122749
No.
G.R.
Dino v. Dino 178044
No.
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES, CONCEALMENT
G.R.
Villaneva v. Court of Appeals 132955
No.
G.R.
Anaya v. Palaroan L-27930
No.
G.R.
Buccat v. Buccat-Mangonon 47101
No.
FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE
G.R.
Villaneva v. Court of Appeals 132955
No.
A.C.
Macarrubo v. Macarrubo 6148
No.
G.R.
Reyes v. Zaballero L-3561
No.
DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION
Alcazar v. Alcazar G.R. 174451

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Persons and Family Relation
No.
G.R.
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals 132955
No.
G.R.
Jimenez v. Canizares L-12790
No.
LEGAL SEPARATION, GROUNDS
G.R.
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong 15320
No.
G.R.
Gaudioncio v. Penaranda 79284
No.
G.R.
Prima Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals 82606
No.
DEFENSES, CONDONATION/ PARDON
G.R.
Arroyo v. Court of Appeals 96602
No.
G.R.
Ginez v. Bugayong L-10033
No.
G.R.
People v. Zapata L-3047
No.
G.R.
De Ocampo v. Florenciano L-13553
No.
DEFENSES, CONSENT
G.R.
Matubis v. Praxedes L-11766
No.
G.R.
People v. Schneckenburger 48183
No.
G.R.
People v. Sensano 37720
No.
DEFENSES, MUTUAL GUILT
G.R.
Benedicto v. De La Rama 1056
No.
DEFENSES, COLLUSION
G.R.
De Ocampo v. Florenciano L-13553
No.
DEFENSES, PRESCRIPTION
G.R.
Brown v. Yambao L-10699
No.
G.R.
De Ocampo v. Florenciano L-13553
No.
G.R.
Contreras v. Macaraig L-29138
No.
ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION, PROCEDURE

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Persons and Family Relation
G.R.
Banez v. Banez 132592
No.
G.R.
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio L-30977
No.
MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD
G.R.
Araneta c. Concepcion L-9667
No.
G.R.
Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta Jr. L-34132
No.
G.R.
Pacete v. Carriaga L-53880
No.
NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE
G.R.
Pacete v. Carriaga L-53880
No.
LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE
G.R.
Sabalones v. Court of Appeals 106169
No.
G.R.
Espiritu and Layug v. Court of Appeals 115640
No.
G.R.
Lapuz Sy v. Eufemio L-30977
No.
DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
G.R.
Laperal v. Republic L-18008
No.
G.R.
Siochi v. Gozon 169900
No.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES
G.R.
Pelayo v. Lauron 129295
No.
G.R.
Go v. Court of Appeals 114791
No.
G.R.
Arroyo v. Vasquez-Arroyo 17014
No.
G.R.
Illusorio v. Bildner-Illusorio 139789
No.
G.R.
Goitia v. Campos Rueda 11263
No.
G.R.
Cuenca v. Cuenca L-7231
No.
PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH OTHER
G.R.
Arcaba v. Vda De Batocael 146683
No.

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Persons and Family Relation
G.R.
Matabuena v. Cervantes L-28771
No.
G.R.
Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Company 12707
No.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, COMPONENTS
G.R.
Navarro v. Escobido 153788
No.
G.R.
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals 143286
No.
G.R.
Imani v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. 187023
No.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, EXCLUDED PROPERTY
G.R.
Ching v. Court of Appeals 124642
No.
G.R.
Tan v. Court of Appeals 120594
No.
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY, DISSOLUTION
G.R.
In Re Muller v. Muller 149615
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, COMPONENTS
G.R.
Dela Pena v. Avila 187490
No.
G.R.
Titan Construction Co. v. David 169584
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, LIABILITIES
G.R.
Ayala Investment & Development Co. v. Court of Appeals 188305
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISPOSITION
G.R.
Heirs of Go, Sr. v. Servavio 157537
No.
G.R.
Ros v. Philippine National Bank 170166
No.
G.R.
Siochi v. Gozon 169900
No.
G.R.
Aggabao v. Parulan 165803
No.
G.R.
Fuentes v. Roca 178902
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, DISSOLUTION
G.R.
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v Pascual 163744
No.
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, LIQUIDATION

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Persons and Family Relation
G.R.
Quiao v. Quiao 176556
No.
VOID MARRIAGES OR LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIPS
G.R.
Dino v. Dino 178044
No.
G.R.
Maxey v. Court of Appeals L-45870
No.
G.R.
Carino v. Carino 132529
No.
G.R.
Valdes v. RTC and Valdes 122749
No.
G.R.
Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals 127358
No.
G.R.
Maquilan vs. Maquilan 155409
No.
G.R.
Gonzales vs. Gonzales 159521
No.
G.R.
Mercado-Fehr vs. Fehr 152716
No.
BIGAMOUS, ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIPS
G.R.
Carino v. Carino 132529
No.
G.R.
Tumlos v. Fernandez 137650
No.
G.R.
Francisco v. Master Iron Works 151967
No.
G.R.
Joaquino v. Reyes 154645
No.
G.R.
Saguid vs. Court of Appeals 150611
No.
G.R. L-50127-
Juaniza v. Jose
No. 28
G.R.
Adriano v. Court of Appeals 124118
No.
COVERAGE OF FAMILY RELATIONS
Guerrero v. Regional Trial Court 229 SCRA 274
SUITS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY
Hiyas v. Acuna 500 SCRA 514
Hontiveros v. Regional Trial Court 309 SCRA 340
G.R.
Vda. De Manalo v. Court of Appeals 129242
No.
Santos v. Court of Appeals 475 SCRA 1

19
Persons and Family Relation
PROHIBITED COMPROMISE
Mendoza v. Court of Appeals 19 SCRA 756
FAMILY HOME
G.R.
Trinidad-Ramos v. Pangilinan 185920
No.
G.R.
Modequillo v. Breva 86355
No.
G.R.
Josef v. Santos 165060
No.
G.R.
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Product, Inc. 172263
No.
G.R.
Gomez v. Sta. Ines 132537
No.
G.R.
Manacop v. Court of Appeals 97898
No.
G.R.
Taneo v. Court of Appeals 108532
No.
G.R.
Fortaleza v. Lapitan 178288
No.
KINDS/ STATUS OF CHILDREN
G.R.
De Asis v. Court of Appeals 108532
No.
G.R.
Fernandez v. Fernandez 143256
No.
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY, GROUNDS
G.R.
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals 123450
No.
G.R.
Angeles v. Maglaya 153798
No.
G.R.
Jao v. Court of Appeals L-49162
No.
G.R.
Babiera v. Catotal 138493
No.
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY
G.R.
Liyao, Jr.v. Tanhoti-Liyao 138961
No.
G.R.
De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon 142877
No.
ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY
G.R.
Tijing v. Court of Appeals 125901
No.
VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION

20
Persons and Family Relation
G.R.
Cabatania v. Court of Appeals 124814
No.
G.R.
Eceta v. Eceta 157037
No.
G.R.
Alberto v. Court of Appeals 86639
No.
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
G.R.
Rivero v. Court of Appeals 141273
No.
G.R.
People v. Bayani 120894
No.
G.R.
People vs. Manahan 128157
No.
PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY
G.R.
Nepomuceno v. Lopez 181258
No.
Rivera vs. Heirs of Villanueva 496 SCRA 135
G.R.
Cruz v. Cristobal 140422
No.
G.R.
Perla v. Baring 172471
No.
PROBATIVE VALUE OF DNA TESTS IN PATERNITY CASES
G.R.
Tijing v. Court of Appeals 125901
No.
Agustin v. Court of Appeals 460 SCRA 315
Herrera v. Alba 460 SCRA 197
G.R.
People v. Vallejo 144656
No.
G.R.
Estate of Ong v. Diaz 171713
No.
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
G.R.
Guy v. Court of Appeals 163707
No.
G.R.
Marquino v. Itermediate Appelaye Court 72078
No.
G.R.
Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor 174680
No.
RIGHTS OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
G.R.
Briones v. Miguel 156343
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Abadilla 133054
No.

21
Persons and Family Relation
G.R.
Verceles v. Posada 159785
No.
G.R.
People v. Glabo 129248
No.
G.R.
Tonog v. Court of Appeals 122906
No.
G.R.
Mossesgeld v. Court of Appeals 111455
No.
G.R.
Silva v. Court of Appeals 114742
No.
G.R.
David v. Court of Appeals 111180
No.
RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
G.R.
De Santos v. Angeles 105619
No.
Abadilla v. Tabiliran 249 SCRA 448
WHO MAY ADOPT
G.R.
Republic v. Court of Appeals 100835
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Toledano 94147
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Alarcon-Vergara 95551
No.
REQUIREMENTS FOR ADOPTION
G.R.
In re: adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim 168992
No.
G.R.
Landingin v. Republic 164948
No.
G.R.
Cang v. Court of Appeals 105308
No.
A.M. RTJ-96-
Department of Social Welfare and Development v. Belen
No. 1362
NATURE AND EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
G.R.
Republic v. Hernandez 117209
No.
G.R.
Republic v. Court of Appeals 103695
No.
G.R.
In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia 148311
No.
G.R.
Teotico v. Del Val L-18753
No.
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION

22
Persons and Family Relation
G.R.
Lahom v. Sibulo 143989
No.
SUPPORT
G.R.
Lam v. Chua 131286
No.
WHO IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT
G.R.
Briones v. Miguel 156343
No.
G.R.
Quimiging v. Icao L-26795
No.
G.R.
Francisco v. Zandueta 43794
No.
G.R.
Santero v. Court of Appeals L-61700
No.
G.R.
Gotardo v. Buling 165166
No.
WHEN DEMANDABLE
G.R.
Lacson v Lacson 150644
No.
WHO MUST PAY SUPPORT
G.R.
Lim v. Lim 163209
No.
G.R.
Verceles v. Posada 159785
No.
G.R.
Mangonon v. Court of Appeals 125041
No.
G.R.
De Guzman v. Perez 156013
No.
RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS WHO PAY
G.R.
Lacson v. Lacson 150644
No.
SUPPORT PENDENT LITE
G.R.
Estate of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals
No. 118671
SUPPORT DURING PROCEEDINGS
G.R.
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
No. L-48219
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
G.R.
Silva v. Court of Appeals
No. 114742
WHO EXERCISES PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND CUSTODY
Tonog v. Court of Appeals G.R. 122906

23
Persons and Family Relation
No.
G.R.
Vancil v. Belmes
No. 133323
G.R.
Bondagjy v. Fouzi Ali Bondagjy
No. 140817
G.R.
Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals 116773
No.
G.R.
Sombong v. Court of Appeals
No. 111876
TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE
G.R.
Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals
No. 174485
G.R.
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto
No. 154994
G.R.
Santos v. Court of Appeals 113054
No.
G.R.
Golangco v. Court of Appeals 124724
No.
G.R.
David v. Court of Appeals
No. 111180
G.R.
Espiritu v. Court of Appeals
No. 115640
G.R.
Perez v. Court of Appeals
No. 118870
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
G.R.
Libi v. Intermediate Appellate Court
No. 70890
G.R.
Tamargo v. Court of Appeals
No. 85044
SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY
G.R.
Aquinas School v. Inton
No. 184202
G.R.
St. Joseph's College v. Miranda
No. 182353
G.R.
St. Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos
No. 143363
G.R.
Amadora v. Court of Appeals
No. L-47745
G.R.
Salvosa v. Intermediate Appellate Court
No. L-70458
G.R.
Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of Appeals
No. 84698

24
Persons and Family Relation
USE OF SURNAME BY WOMEN
G.R.
Remo v. Scretary of Foreign Affairs
No. 169202
G.R.
Yasin v. Judge Shari's District Court
No. 94986
USE OF SURNAME BY CHILDREN
G.R.
In re: adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
No. 148311
G.R.
In re Julian Lim Wang
No. 159966
G.R.
In re Change of name of Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
No. L-51201
USE OF DIFFERENT NAME
G.R.
People v. Estrada
No. 164368
G.R.
Ursua v. Court of Appeals
No. 112170
AMMENDMENTS/ CORRECTIONS OF ENTRIES
G.R.
Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo
No. 189476
G.R.
Lee v. Court of Appeals
No. 118387
G.R.
In re change of name of Julian Wang
No. 159966
G.R.
Silverio v. Republic
No. 174689
G.R.
Republic v. Cagandahan
No. 166676
G.R.
Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himalayan City
No. 181174

EFFECTIVITY

LARA vs. DEL ROSARIO


G.R. No. L-6339 April 20, 1954

Facts:

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Persons and Family Relation
In 1950 defendant Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs or cars,
operated a taxi business under the name of “Waval Taxi.” He employed among others three
mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to 37
months. On September 4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days advance
notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation company, as a result of
which, according to the mechanics and chauffeurs above-mentioned they lost their jobs because the
La Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment. They brought this action against Del
Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond eight hours and on Sundays
and legal holidays, and one month salary (mesada) provided for in article 302 of the Code of
Commerce because the failure of their former employer to give them one month notices.
Subsequently, the three mechanics unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers
remained as plaintiffs.

Issue:
Whether or not the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime compensation under the
Eight-Hour Labor Law is valid.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of
Commerce, article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) appears to have repealed said
Article 302 when it repealed the provisions of the Code of Commerce governing Agency. This
repeal took place on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year
after its publication in the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of services of the plaintiffs by
the defendant took place according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the
repeal of Article 302 which they invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce,
assuming that it were still in force speaks of “salary corresponding to said month.” commonly
known as “mesada.” If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the day, week, or month,
then computation of the month’s salary payable would be impossible. Article 302 refers to
employees receiving a fixed salary.

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY

26
Persons and Family Relation
LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

Facts:
Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed that this case has no legal
personality or standing. Further, they argued that the publication in the Official Gazette in necessary
for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates.

Issue:
Whether or not the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to
the date they are to take effect still need to be published in the Official Gazette.

Ruling:
Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does
not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining the
date of the effectivity which must be 15 days following the completion of its publication, but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes to effect. Article 2 does not prevent the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability
is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

27
Persons and Family Relation
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION vs.HON. PRESIDING


JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES
G.R. No. 108641 October 21, 1996

Facts:
PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications to the
PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and
confirmed export program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from
importing products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the
requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and
void for being unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and approve
applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has
already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari
seeking the reversal of the said decision.

Issue:
Whether or not PITC’s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said
AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs
Tuvera which states that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be
published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity since it is punitive in character.

28
Persons and Family Relation
DATE OF EFFECTIVITY

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION vs. VICTORIANO B.


GONZAGA
G.R. No. 158761 December 4, 2007

Facts:

On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his Certificate of


Candidacy for membership in the Board of Directors of Zamboanga Del Sur II Electric
Cooperative, Inc., District II (ZAMSURECO). Later that day, the screening committee resolved to
disqualify respondent because his spouse was an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Diplahan, Zamboanga del Sur. Based on the Electric Cooperative Election Code (ECEC),
promulgated by petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA), a candidate whose spouse
occupies an elective government position higher than Barangay Captain is prohibited to run as
director of an electric cooperative. ZAMSURECO’s by-laws, however, do not provide for such
ground for disqualification. Respondent averred that the ECEC was null and void because it had not
been published. NEA, on the other hand, failed to prove whether the ECEC was indeed published
in a newspaper of general circulation as required by the New Civil Code and the Administrative
Code of 1987.

Issue:

Whether or not Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void for not complying
with the publication requirement.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that Electric Cooperative Election Code was null and void for not
complying with the publication requirement. It observed that while ZAMSURECO complied with
the requirements of filing the code with the University of the Philippines Law Center, it offered no
proof of publication neither in the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of general circulation.
Without compliance with the requirement of publication, the rules and regulations contained in the
ECEC cannot be enforced and implemented. Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws

29
Persons and Family Relation
shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere internal memorandum,
interpretative regulation, or instruction to subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the
requirements of the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987.

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY

JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., vs. ATILANO G. MERCADO


G.R. No. L-42226 July 26, 1935

Facts:
Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and
testament of Ines Basa, decedent. The same judge also approved the account of the administrator of
the estate, declared him the only heir, and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa, et al.,
filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because there
was failure to comply with the requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing.

They contended that the hearing took place only twenty-one days after the date of first
publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, the Ing Katipunan where the notice was published
was not a newspaper of general circulation as contemplated by law.

Issues:
a) Whether or not there was compliance with the publication requirement
b) Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation

Ruling:
The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the
notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the
hearing of the will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days
before the day appointed for the hearing.

The records show that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the
fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a
bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the

30
Persons and Family Relation
trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a newspaper
of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.

DATE OF EFFECTIVITY

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs.


ENERGY REGULATROY COMMISSION
G.R. No. 192117 September 18, 2012

Facts:

Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc., Quezon I Electric Cooperative, Inc.,


Quezon II Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Pampanga Rural Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. are
rural electric cooperatives established under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 269 or the National
Electrification Administration Decree. BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and QUEZELCO II are
members of the Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, Inc. PRESCO is a member
of the Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. Petitioners are engaged in the
distribution of . On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 was enacted. The law imposed a limit on the
recoverable rate of system lossthat may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to their consumers.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832 required every rural electric cooperative
to file with the Energy Regulatory Board on or before 30 September 1995, an application for
approval of an amended PPA Clause incorporating the cap on the recoverable rate of system loss to
be included in its schedule of rates. On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001 was enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the
Energy Regulatory Commission. The powers and functions of the ERB not inconsistent with the
provisions of the EPIRA were transferred to the ERC, together with the applicable funds and
appropriations, records, equipment, property and personnel of the ERB. All electric cooperatives

31
Persons and Family Relation
were directed to implement the PPA in the manner the then Energy Regulatory Board had
prescribed. Subsequently, the ERC issued policy guidelines on the treatment of discounts extended
by power suppliers. Petitioners attack the validity of the 22 March 2006 Order, 16 February 2007
Order, 7 December 2005 Order, and 27 March 2006 Order of the ERC directing the refund of over-
recoveries for having been issued pursuant to ineffective and invalid policy guidelines. Petitioners
assert that the policy guidelines on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are
ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and their
retroactive application.

Issue:

Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by
power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of publication, non-submission to the University
of the Philippines (U.P.) Law Center, and their retroactive application.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that publication is a basic postulate of procedural due process.
Article 2 of the Civil Code, as amended by Section 1 of Executive Order No. 200, states that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided."
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
However, there are several exceptions to the requirement of publication such as an interpretative
regulation. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the general
public. The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers
are interpretative regulations. The policy guidelines merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 and it’s IRR,
particularly on the computation of the cost of purchased power. The policy guidelines did not
modify, amend, or supplant the IRR. Hence, it is exempt from the publication requirement.

32
Persons and Family Relation
COMPUTATION OF TIME

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP,


INC.
G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007

Facts:
On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property Group. Inc. filed its final adjusted return. On March
11, 1999 Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown Property Group. Inc., filed for the refund or tax
credit of income tax paid in 1997. However, it was not acted upon. Thus Primetown filed a petition
for review but the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed it claiming that it was filed beyond the two-year
reglementary period provided by section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The Court of
Tax Appeals further argued that in National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson the Supreme Court ruled
that a year is equal to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.

Issue:

33
Persons and Family Relation
Whether or not the respondent’s petition was filed within the two-year reglementary period.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the petition was filed within the two-year reglementary period
because Article 13 of the New Civil Code that provides that a year is composed of 365 years is
repealed by Executive Order 292 or the Administrative Code of the Philippines. Under Executive
Order 292, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.

COMPUTATION OF TIME

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO


G.R. No. L-7234 May 21, 1955

Facts:
On May 28, 1953, Paz M. Del Rosario committed slight physical injuries. The information
was filed on July 27, 1953. Thereupon, the accused filed a motion to quash the information to
ground that the offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with Article 90 and 91 of the
Revised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed the case. Thus, this
appeal of dismissal is made directly to the court.

34
Persons and Family Relation
Issue:
Whether or not the offense charged to the plaintiff-appellant had already prescribed.

Ruling:
The offense have not yet prescribed because the provision in the Revised Penal Code does
not provide the computation of month therefore it must be supplied by Article 13 of the Civil Code
which provides for the computation of years, months, days and nights. According to Article 13 of
the Civil Code a month is a 30-day month not the solar or civil month. Further, the Supreme Court
held that the case took effect on May 28, 1953 after the New Civil Code take effect so the new
provisions should apply.

PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO


G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2010

Facts:

35
Persons and Family Relation
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, to his death. Jose Juego’s widow then filed a petition for damages in the
Regional Trial Court against the deceased employer. The employer raised the defense that Maria
Juego already availed of the benefits provided by the State Insurance Fund. Considering the ruling in
Pacarra vs. Cebu Autobus Company, an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the
employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tort fees for higher damages but he cannot pursue both actions
simultaneously. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.
On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering damages under the Civil Code.

Ruling:
No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the Civil Code although she
has already availed the benefits of the State Insurance Fund. The respondent’s case is an exception
because private respondent was not aware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not only ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as
well. The decision of the court is affirmed.

PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS

36
Persons and Family Relation
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO GASACAO
G.R. No. 168445 November 11, 2005

Facts:
Capt. Florencio O. Gasacao was the crewing manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency,
Inc., which company was headed by his nephew. On August 4, 2000 appellant and Jose Gasacao
were charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment. The appellant was arrested while his nephew
remained at large. The lower court found Capt. Gasacao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large
scale illegal recruitment. The Court of Appeals also affirmed the decision. Hence, Capt. Gasacao
appealed to the Supreme Court claiming that he can’t be held liable for illegal recruitment because
he was just a mere employee of the manning agency. He also claimed that he was not aware of the
law against prohibition on bonds and deposits under section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and
Regulations implementing R.A. 8042.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal
recruitment.

Ruling:
There is no merit in appellant’s contention that he was just a mere employee of the manning
agency because he was the company’s crewing manager. As testified by the witnesses, the accused
appellant actively participated in the recruitment process from receiving job applications,
interviewing the applicants, and informing them of the agency’s requirement of payment of
performance or cash bond prior to the deployment. The Supreme Court held further that appellants
defense of ignorance is not commendable as provided for by Article 3 of the Civil Code which states
that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. The defense of goodwill is
neither unavailable because the appellant failed to deploy the complainants without valid reasons.

37
Persons and Family Relation
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION

YAO KEE vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES


G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese National died on January 17, 1977, leaving behind real and personal
properties here in the Philippines worth more or less Php 300,000. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition alleging that they are the children of
the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. However, Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on
Jan. 19, 1981 through a Chinese marriage with Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Chun Yen as their
children. Petitioners provided that fact of marriage through evidences like Yao Kee’s and Gan
Ching’s testimony, Sy Kiat’s Master Card of Registration stating his marriage with Yao Kee, and the
certificate by the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China affirming the fact of the marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was valid.

Ruling:
Under Article 71 of the Civil Code to establish the validity of foreign marriages the existence
of the foreign law as a question of fact must be proven and the alleged foreign marriage must be
proven by convincing evidence. The petitioners have provided the fact of marriage however the
same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage with Chinese Law or custom. In such
absence of foreign law, the doctrine of processual presumption must be applied. The Supreme Court
then held that in the absence of a foreign law it must be presumed as the same as ours. In the
Philippine Laws, a marriage cannot be valid without the presence of a solemnizing officer; therefore
the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was null and void.

38
Persons and Family Relation
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION

LAUREANO vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 114776 February 2, 2000

Facts:
Menandro Laureano was employed with the Singapore Airlines Limited on 1979. However
because of the recession that hit the Airline Industry sometime in 1982, Defendant Company
initiated cost-cutting measures such as terminating its A-300 pilots including the plaintiff.
Subsequently, plaintiff filed a case of illegal dismissal against defendant. Laureano then cited
Singapore Laws to his case since he was employed in the Singapore Airlines Ltd.

Issue:
a) Whether or not Singaporean Laws shall be applied in this case.
b) Whether or not there was illegal dismissal on the part of Singapore Airlines Ltd.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that foreign laws must be proved as fact in order to employ them.
The plaintiff was not able to prove the applicability of the laws of Singapore that he cited to his case.
Under the principle of processual presumption, if foreign laws are not proved as facts it will be
presumed as the same as ours. Hence, Philippine Laws should apply. Further, under Article 291 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines, the petitioner’s action for damages due to illegal dismissal has
already prescribed having been filed on January 8, 1987, or more than four (4) years after the
effective date has prescribed.

39
Persons and Family Relation
PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION

PHILIPPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION vs.


V.P. EUSEBIO CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. No. 140047 July 13, 2004

Facts:
On November 8, 1980, State Organization of Buildings, Ministry of Housing, and
Construction, Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy–Medical
Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq, to Ajyal Trading and Contracting Company, a firm
duly licensed with the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce.

On March 7, 1981, in behalf of Spouses Eduardo and Iluminada Santos, 3-Plex


International, Inc a local contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a joint venture
agreement with Ajyal. However since it was not accredited under the Philippine Overseas
Construction Board, it had to assign and transfer all its right to VPECI and entered into an
agreement that the execution of the project will be under their joint management. To comply with
the requirements of performance bond, 3-Plex and VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee
with Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified
Filipino contractors to secure the performance of approved service contracts abroad. Subsequently,
letters of guarantee were issued by Philguarantee to the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad. Al Ahli Bank of
Kuwait was engaged to provide a counter-guarantee to Rafidain Bank, but it required a similar
counter-guarantee in its favor from the Philguarantee. The Surety Bond was later amended to
increase the amount of coverage and to change the bank in whose favor the petitioner's guarantee
was issued, from Rafidain Bank to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait. SOB and the joint venture VPECI and
Ajyal executed the service contract for the construction of the project. However, they were not able
to start the project on schedule because of that surety bond was also extended and the Advance
Payment Guarantee was extended three times more until it was cancelled for reimbursement.

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Persons and Family Relation
On 26 October 1986, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the petitioner demanding
full payment of its performance bond counter-guarantee. VPECI advised the Philguarantee not to
pay Al Ahli Bank because efforts were being exerted for the amicable settlement of the Project.
VPECI received another telex message from Al Ahli Bank stating that it had already paid to Rafidain
Bank but VPEIC insisted on not paying however Central Bank authorized the remittance to Al Ahli
Bank. Philguarantee informed VPECI that it would remit payment to Al Ahli Bank, and reiterated
the joint and solidary obligation of the respondents to reimburse the Philguarantee for the advances
made on its counter-guarantee but they failed to pay so a case was filed.

Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine laws or Iraq’s laws should be applied in determining VPECI's
failure to pay in the performance of its obligations under the service contract.

Ruling:
Yes. In this case, the laws of Iraq bear important link to the contract, since one of the parties
is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Consequently, the problem of
whether respondent VPECI evaded its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq. However,
those foreign laws of Iraq were not properly alleged and prove. Under the doctrine of processual
presumption, where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption
is that foreign law is the same as ours. Further, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner guarantor
should have waited for the natural course of guaranty. Petitioner as a guarantor cannot be compelled
to pay the creditor SOB unless the property of the debtor VPECI has been exhausted and all
legal remedies against the said debtor have been resorted to by the creditor. It could also set up
compensation as regards what the creditor SOB may owe the principal debtor VPECI. In this case,
however, the petitioner has clearly waived these rights and remedies by making the payment of an
obligation that was yet to be shown to be rightfully due the creditor and demandable of the principal
debtor.

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Persons and Family Relation
PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 112193 March 31, 1996

Facts:
In 1959, Jose M. Aruego Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M.
Fabian until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonio Aruego and
Evelyn F. Aruego. On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights was filed by the minors, Antonia and Evelyn. However, Jose Aruego Jr., and the
petitioners also filed a complaint to declare the private respondents as illegitimate children of their
defunct father. The lower court decided that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate daughter or Jose
Aruego Sr., and Luz M. Fabian and that she is entitled to a share of equal to one-half portion of
share of the legitimate. So the petitioners filed a motion for partial reconsideration alleging loss of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of E.O. 209 or
the Family Code of the Philippines. It was denied, hence this petition for review.

Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of the Family Code be applied retroactively.

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Persons and Family Relation
Ruling:
Private respondent’s action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought
under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on Persons under Art. 285 thereby stating that the
recognition of natural children is brought only the lifetime of the presumed parents except when the
parents die during the minority of the child. Petitioners, on the other hand submit that with the New
Family Code on August 31, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction on the ground of prescription.
Further, the Family Code provides that it shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not impair
the vested right of others. The Supreme Court held that the present law which is the Family Code
cannot be applied retroactively because its application will impair the vested right of the respondent
to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code which has vested to her by the fact that
she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code.

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

BERNABE vs. ALEJO


G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002

Facts:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary, Carolina Alejo. The son
was born on September 18, 1981and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe died as
well as his legitimate wife, leaving Ernestina Bernabe the sole surviving heir.

Carolina, in behalf of her son, filed a complaint praying that Adrian be declared an
acknowledged child of the deceased and also be given the share of Bernabe’s estate. Regional Trial
Court dismissed the complaint and said that the death of the putative father had barred the action.
Further, under the law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within

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Persons and Family Relation
the lifetime of the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s
filiation.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the
Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4 years after the child has
attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away his
right.

Issue:
Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.

Ruling:
The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the
latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim,
considering that “illegitimate children” are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimate family being aware of their existence. Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the
acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children. Hence,
the petition was denied and assailed decision was affirmed.

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. STOCKHOLDERS OF


INTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 181556 December 14, 2009

Facts:
The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as BangkoSentralngPilipinas, filed on June
17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation

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of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that said bank was already
insolvent and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and
the general public. The trial court gave it due course.Petitioner Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. In the
meantime, Republic Act No. 9302 which provides that “After the payment of all liabilities and
claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate of
interest, from date of takeover to date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank
in accordance with legal priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank”. Relying
on Republic Act No. 9302 PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for Approval of the Final
Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings

Issue:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle
Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation,
they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal
maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future, the judge for the past,
which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: “Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.” The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust
and oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior
transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed therein authorizes its
retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear legislative intent to the contrary,
Section 28. Effectivity Clause. “This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion
of its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation”.

PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTANEZ vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO


G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012

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Persons and Family Relation
Facts:
On April 8, 1976, Lourdes Tajolosa married Socrates Flores. On January 4, 1983 Lourdes re-
married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment in the Regional
Trial Court in the ground of psychological incapacity as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code.
On July 8, 2003, the marriage was declared null and void. On May 14, 2004, Silverio’s daughter filed
a complaint of bigamy against Lourdes under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Lourdes then
contended that sine her two marriages were contracted prior to the Family Code, Article 40 cannot
be retroactive effect because it will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that the existing law at
the time of the second marriage do not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a
condition precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage. The complainant then filed a motion for
reconsideration but the decision rendered was again in favor of the respondent. Hence, this petition
was filed.

Issue:
Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code is a
valid defense for the crime of bigamy.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already
been consummated. The Supreme Court ruled further that what is required for a crime of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Even
the accused eventually secured a declaration that his first marriage is a void ab initio, the first and
second marriage was subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Also, Art. 40 should be
applied retroactively because it does not prejudice or impair the right of anyone. The petition is
thereby granted.

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Persons and Family Relation
PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF LAWS

DACUDAO vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE


G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013

Facts:
Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in
the Legacy Group of Companies allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back
agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their written demands for
the return of their investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges for syndicated
estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on
February 6, 2009.

On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice (DOJ) Order No.
182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the
DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action. Thereafter, the petitioners directly went to the
Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to respondent
Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DOES No 182. They further argued that
DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with
retroactive effect.

Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of DOJ Order No. 182 should cover only future cases against
Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being investigated.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect.
However, exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The
reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not
create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the
confirmation of already existing rights.A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All
procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right
generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws. Therefore DOJ Order No. 182 can be applied
retroactively in the cases the petitioners filed against Delos Angeles.

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Persons and Family Relation
WAIVER OF RIGHTS

MICHAEL C. GUY vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

Facts:
On October 29, 1992, Sima Wei died in Makati City leaving an estate valued 10 million more
or less. His known heirs are his spouse Shirley Guy with their children five children. On June 13,
1997, private respondents Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei represented by their mother
Remedios filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court alleging that
they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei. However, petitioner and co-heirs
alleged that private respondent’s claim had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished
by Remedios’ June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial
and educational support received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the
estate of Sima Wei and any and all liabilities.

The petition was denied in the lower court and the motion for reconsidered dismissed in the
Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition was made.

Issue:
Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim bar respondents from claiming successional
rights.

Ruling:
The Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar respondents from claiming successional
rights because it does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
Remedios received Php 300,000 and an educational plan for her daughters. The document does not
specifically mention private respondents’ hereditary rights, hence it can’t be construed as a waiver of
successional rights. The Supreme Court held that under Art. 1044 of the Civil Code any inheritance
left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parent or guardian. Parents may
repudiate the inheritance only by judicial authorization. Not having been judicially approved, the
release and waiver claim is null and void. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

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Persons and Family Relation
WAIVER OF RIGHTS

F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC. vs. HR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION


G.R. No. 187521 March 14, 2012

Facts:

Sometime in 2004, FFCCI entered into a contract with the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) for the construction of the Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower Agusan
Development Project. On August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement
with HR Construction Corporation (HRCC) for the supply of materials, labor, equipment, tools and
supervision for the construction of a portion of the said project called the East Bank Levee and Cut-
Off Channel in accordance with the specifications of the main contract. Pursuant to the Subcontract
Agreement, HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly progress billing which the latter would then
pay, subject to stipulated deductions, within 30 days from receipt thereof.

The parties agreed that the requests of HRCC for payment should include progress
accomplishment of its completed works as approved by FFCCI. Additionally, they agreed to
conduct a joint measurement of the completed works of HRCC together with the representative of
DPWH and consultants to arrive at a common quantity. Thereafter, HRCC commenced the
construction of the works pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement. However, before the project was
completed, HRCC pursuant to the arbitration clause in the subcontract agreement filed with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission a complaint praying that FFCI pay the overdue
application plus legal interests they have not paid. FFCCI maintained that HRCC failed to comply
with the condition stated under the Subcontract Agreement for the payment of the latter’s progress
billings, i.e. joint measurement of the completed works, and, hence, it was justified in not paying the
amount stated in HRCC’s progress billings.

Issue:
Whether or not FFCCI is already barred from contesting HRCC’s valuation of the
completed works having waived its right to demand the joint measurement requirement.

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Persons and Family Relation
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that FFCCI had waived its right to demand for a joint
measurement of HRCC’s completed works under the Subcontract Agreement. Further, on account
of its failure to demand the joint measurement of HRCC’s completed works, had effectively waived
its right to ask for the conduct of the same as a condition sine qua non to HRCC’s submission of its
monthly progress billings. Basically, the instant issue calls for a determination as to which of the
parties’ respective valuation of accomplished works should be given credence. FFCCI claims that its
valuation should be upheld since the same was the result of a measurement of the completed works
conducted by it and the DPWH.

On the other hand, HRCC maintains that its valuation should be upheld on account of
FFCCI’s failure to observe the joint measurement requirement in ascertaining the extent of its
completed works. FFCCI admits that in all three instances where it paid HRCC for its progress
billings, it never required compliance with the aforequoted contractual provision of a prior joint
quantification. Such repeated omission may reasonably be construed as a waiver by FFCCI of its
contractual right to require compliance of said condition and it is now too late in the day to so
impose it. Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “rights may be waived unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs”. The tribunal cannot
see any such violation in this case.

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Persons and Family Relation
WAIVER OF RIGHTS

PEOPLE vs. MORIAL


G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001

Facts:
Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abinon were convicted of Robbery with
Homicide. During the custodial investigation, Leonardo Morial made an extrajudicial confession
admitting to the crime. However, later on, he recanted his confession saying that the police tortured
him into admitting the crime. On appeal, Morial moved to quash the extrajudicial confession
claiming that such confession was made without the assistance of counsel given him by the police
was not present during the whole interrogation. He left to attend some personal matters while the
interrogation of Morial was still going on. However, said attorney claimed that he was present when
Morial signed the admission.

Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession can be used as evidence against the accused.

Ruling:
The extrajudicial confession cannot be used against the accused. An excused under custodial
interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start until the
termination of such investigation. An effective and vigilant counsel “necessarily and logically

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requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession.” Section 2A of RA No 7438 requires that “any person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. In the absence of any lawyer,
no custodial investigation shall be conducted”. Additionally, there was an invalid waiver of the right
to counsel since this right cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in the presence
of counsel. No such written and counseled waiver of these rights was offered in evidence.

EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN


G. R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007

Facts:
On April 14, 2000, the Taxpayer filed its petition for review claiming refund based on its
final adjusted return filed on April 14, 1998, Counting 365 days a year pursuant to Article 13 of the
Civil Code, the CTA found that the petition was filed beyond the two year respective period
equivalent to 730 days for filing the claim under Section 229 of the NIRC, ruling that the petition
was filed 731 days after the filing of the return.On Appeal, the CA reversed the CTA and ruled that
Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the CTA.

Ruling:

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The SC affirmed the CA's reversal but ruled that the basis for the reversal is EO 292 of the
Administrative Code of 1987, a more recent law, which provides that a year is composed of 12
calendar months.

Section 31 provides that a “year” shall be understood to be 12 calendar months. Both article
13 of the Civil Code and Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject
matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days
whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year
is composed of 12 calendar months and the number of days is irrelevant. There obviously exists a
manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, the Supreme Court held that Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods.

Using this, the petition was filed on the last day of the 24th month from the day the
taxpayer filed its final adjusted return.

EXPRESS AND IMPLIED REPEAL

MAGKALAS vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY


G.R. No. 138823 September 17, 2008

Facts:
Plaintiff and her predecessors-in-interest have been occupying a lot designated as TAG-77-
0063, Block 1, Barangay 132, located at the corner of 109 Gen. Concepcion and Adelfa Streets,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for the past 39 years.

On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 was issued expropriating certain lots at Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In the same Decree, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was named

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Persons and Family Relation
Administrator of the Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project with the former to take possession, control
(sic) and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. During the
Census survey of the area, the structure built by the plaintiff was assigned TAG No. 0063. After
conducting studies of the area, the NHA determined that the area where plaintiff’s structure is
located should be classified as an area center (open space). The Area Center was determined in
compliance with the requirement to reserve 30% open space in all types of residential development.
Plaintiff, together with Mr.& Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr.& Mrs. Rey Pangilinan, through
counsel, filed an appeal from the decision to designate the area where the plaintiff and the two other
spouses have erected structures, as an Area Center. The said appeal was denied by the NHA. In a
letter, dated August 6, 1985, the NHA sent a Notice of Lot Assignment to plaintiff recognizing the
latter as a Censused Owner of a structure with TAG No. 0063-04 which was identified for
relocation.

On August 23, 1985, plaintiff filed a Complaint for Damages with prayer for the issuance of
a restraining order and writ of Preliminary Injunction against the NHA with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City.

The Order denying plaintiff’s prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was
appealed, by way of Petition for Certiorari, to the Court of Appeals (docketed therein as CA-G.R.
No. 33833). On March 10, 1999, the trial court promulgated its assailed decision dismissing
petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by
the trial court in its Order dated May 14, 1999. Hence, this petition for review of the said decision
and order of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the demolition or relocation of the petitioner’s structure will violate the
vested rights of the petitioner over the acquired property under the social justice clause of the
constitution.

Ruling:
Petitioner maintains that she had acquired a vested right over the property subject of this
case on the ground that she had been in possession of it for forty (40) years already. Thus, to order
her relocation and the demolition of her house will infringe the social justice clause guaranteed
under the Constitution.

Petitioner’s contentions must necessarily fail. The NHA’s authority to order the relocation of
petitioner and the demolition of her property is mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1315.
Under this Decree, the entire Bagong Barrio in Caloocan City was identified as a blighted area and
was thereby declared expropriated. The properties covered under P.D. No. 1315 included
petitioner’s property. The NHA, as the decree’s designated administrator for the national
government, was empowered to take possession, control and disposition of the expropriated
properties with the power of demolition of their improvements.

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P.D. No. 1315 explicitly vests the NHA the power to immediately take possession, control
and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. Clearly, the NHA, by
force of law, has the authority to order the relocation of petitioner, and the demolition of her
structure in case of her refusal as this is the only way through which the NHA can effectively carry
out the implementation of P.D. No. 1315.

Inasmuch as petitioner’s property was located in the area identified as an open space by the
NHA, her continued refusal to vacate has rendered illegal her occupancy thereat. Thus, in
accordance with P.D. No. 1472, petitioner could lawfully be ejected even without a judicial order.
Neither can it be successfully argued that petitioner had already acquired a vested right over the
subject property when the NHA recognized her as the census owner by assigning to her a tag
number (TAG No. 77-0063).

EFFECT OF REPEALING LAW ON LAW FIRST REPEALED

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GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 165835 June 22, 2005

Facts:
This is a petition filed by Clarita Garcia, wife or retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia, with
application for injunctive relief in order issued by the Fourth Division of Sandiganbayan denying the
motion to quash or dismiss Civil Case No. 0193. This is a suit for the forfeiture commenced by the
Republic against petitioner and her immediate family.

The forfeiture suit was to recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties that the Garcias
allegedly acquires and amassed. Then Republic then filed the Sandiganbayan through the OMB a
petition for forfeiture of those alleged unlawfully acquires properties of the Garcias. The case was
docketed as civil case 0193(forfeiture I) and subsequently another case of forfeiture involving the
same parties was filed docketed as Civil Case 0196(forfeiture II). Thus the two cases were
consolidated for convenience and clarity. Before the filing of Forfeiture II but subsequent to the
filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged the Garcias with violation of RA 7080(plunder) and the case
raffled to the second division of SB. The plunder charge covered substantially the same properties
identified in both Forfeiture I and II.

Petitioner now contends, after denying there motion to dismiss the Forfeiture I case, that the
plunder case and the Forfeiture I case should be consolidated in the second division of SB pursuan
to R 8249. On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the
forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
criminal case of plunder.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA
1379.

Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over forfeiture proceedings pursuant to RA 1379.
Forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and civil in nature. It is a divestiture of property without
compensation in consequence of an offense.

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STARE DECISIS

TING vs. VELEZ-TING


G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009

Facts:
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while
their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu
City for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Onate’s findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

On October 19, 2000, the petitioner appealed to the CA, reversing the trial court’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code
has been realized

Ruling:
No. By the very nature of case involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understood to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the
psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedent,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly
advisable, are not conditions in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best,
courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits
of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and
expert opinion of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged

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psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and according, be weighed
by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.

The petition for review on certiorari is granted.

STARE DECISIS

NEGROS NAVIGATION CO. vs COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997

Facts:
In April of 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from the Negros
Navigation Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets (#74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414) for his wife,
daughter, son and niece who were going to Bacolod City to attend a family reunion. The tickets were
for Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April 22, 1980. The
ship sailed from the port of Manila on schedule.

At about 10:30 in the evening of April 22, 1980, the Don Juan collided off the Tablas Strait
in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). As a result,
the M/V Don Juan sank. Several of her passengers perished in the sea tragedy. The bodies of some
of the victims were found and brought to shore, but the four members of private respondents’
families were never found.

Private respondents filed a complaint on July 16, 1980 in the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 34, against the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), and the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking damages for the death of Ardita
de la Victoria Miranda, 48, Rosario V. Miranda, 19, Ramon V. Miranda, Jr., 16, and Elfreda de la
Victoria, 26. In its answer, petitioner admitted that private respondents purchased ticket numbers
74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414; that the ticket numbers were listed in the passenger manifest; and
that the Don Juan left Pier 2, North Harbor, Manila on April 22, 1980 and sank that night after
being rammed by the oil tanker M/T Tacloban City, and that, as a result of the collision, some of the
passengers of the M/V Don Juan died. Petitioner, however, denied that the four relatives of private
respondents actually boarded the vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never
recovered. Petitioner further averred that the Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full and
competent crew, and that the collision was entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T Tacloban
City.

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On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and petitioner Negros Navigation Co., Inc. entered into a
compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full responsibility for the payment and
satisfaction of all claims arising out of or in connection with the collision and releasing the PNOC
and the PNOC/STC from any liability to it. The agreement was subsequently held by the trial court
to be binding upon petitioner, PNOC and PNOC/STC. Private respondents did not join in the
agreement.

Issues:
a) Whether the members of private respondents’ families were actually passengers of the Don
Juan;
b) Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of Appeals, finding the crew members of petitioner
to be grossly negligent in the performance of their duties, is binding in this case;
c) Whether the total loss of the M/V Don Juan extinguished petitioner’s liability; and
d) Whether the damages awarded by the appellate court are excessive, unreasonable and
unwarranted.

Ruling:
First. The trial court held that the fact that the victims were passengers of the M/V Don
Juan was sufficiently proven by private respondent Ramon Miranda, who testified that he purchased
tickets numbered 74411, 74412, 74413, and 74414 at P131.30 each from the Makati office of
petitioner for Voyage No. 47-A of the M/V Don Juan, which was leaving Manila on April 22,
1980. This was corroborated by the passenger manifest (Exh. E) On which the numbers of the
tickets and the names of Ardita Miranda and her children and Elfreda de la Victoria appear.
Second. In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary
diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate court
relied on the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was
brought for the death of other passengers. In that case it was found that although the proximate
cause of the mishap was the negligence of the crew of the M/T Tacloban City, the crew of the Don
Juan was equally negligent as it found that the latter’s master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing
mahjong at the time of collision, and the officer on watch, Senior Third Mate Rogelio De Vera,
admitted that he failed to call the attention of Santisteban to the imminent danger facing them. This
Court found that Capt. Santisteban and the crew of the M/V Don Juan failed to take steps to
prevent the collision or at least delay the sinking of the ship and supervise the abandoning of the
ship.
Third. The next issue is whether petitioner is liable to pay damages notwithstanding the total
loss of its ship. The issue is not one of first impression. The rule is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence that a ship-owner may be held liable for injuries to passengers notwithstanding the
exclusively real and hypothetic nature of maritime law if fault can be attributed to the ship-owner.
Fourth. Petitioner contends that, assuming that the Mecenas case applies, private
respondents should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14 each as moral damages because in the
Mecenas case, the amount of P307,500.00 was awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas

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couple. Under petitioner’s formula, Ramon Miranda should receive P43, 857.14, while the De la
Victoria spouses should receive P97, 714.28.

LAW OF THE CASE

FULGENCIO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION


G.R. No. 141600 September 12, 2003

Facts:
Petitioners failed to indicate in their petition with the CA the dates showing when they
received notice of the NLRC’s June 16, 1998 Decision, and the date when they filed a motion for
reconsideration therefrom, in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended. Petitioners also failed to include in their petition the required explanation under Section
11, Rule 13 of the same Rules as to why personal service upon the respondents was not resorted to;
hence, the dismissal thereof by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not strict adherence to technicalities in the application of the provisions of the
Rules of Court impede the cause of justice.
Ruling:
Rules of procedure applied in a very rigid, technical sense override substantial justice. It is a
far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse the parties a
review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of
cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.

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OBITER DICTUM

VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 142947 March 19, 2002

Facts:
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November
1992, Orly filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to
marry Lilia. He said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired
the service of a certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he was
defrauded by Lilia by claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises that he
never impregnated Lilia prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orly’s allegations and
she said that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows
Orly’s affection and care towards her.

Issue:
Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.

Ruling:

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The SC ruled that Orly’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is
obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed
bigamy case to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orly’s allegation of fear was not concretely
established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well-grounded reason for fear
to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by Lilia and her party.
Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so described
done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud cannot be
raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual
intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly
to attack the marriage. It took him 4 and half years to file an action which brings merit to Lilia’s
contention that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage.

OBITER DICTUM

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 146486 March 4, 2005

Facts:
The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The
Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Thus, only the Ombudsman, not his
deputies, is impeachable.

On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas, herein private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual harassment against

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Rayvi Padua- Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees: James Alueta and Eden
Kiamco and (3) oppression against all employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in benefits of OMB-
Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for release. Fact-finding investigation was
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and the report was referred by the Ombudsman to a
constituted Committee of Peers which initially recommended that the investigation be converted
into one solely for purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the
Office of the Ombudsman and following the stand of the Office of the Ombudsman that the
Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable through impeachment. On 18
December 2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojica's term of office, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision on the grounds of public interest. CA ruled that
the Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer. Thus, OMB's appeal.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the Ombudsman’s Deputies are impeachable.
b) Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or administratively
liable.

Ruling:
Order of the CA is reversed and set aside. The complaints in Criminal Case No.OMB-0-00-
0616 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 is reinstated and the Office of the
Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation relative to the above cases. The Deputy
Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that
“The President, the Vice- President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be
removed from Office as provided by law, but not by impeachment”.

Records of the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of leading commentators


in Constitutional Law reveal that the term Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution refer to the rank in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not including his
Deputies. Leading legal luminaries on the Constitution are one in their opinion as to whether or not
the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree that the enumeration impeachable
officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution, are exclusive. In their belief, only the
Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor
presented to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in the
previous case is not stare decisis of the question presented.

Criminal and Administrative Liability of Deputy Ombudsman As to whether or not the


private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held criminally and/or
administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of the petitioner. The rule that an
impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds
for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in

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office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his
criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from
proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the former’s
retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

OBITER DICTUM

AYALA CORPORATION vs. ROSA-DIANA REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT


CORPORATION

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G.R. No. 134284 December 1, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alfaro
Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. On April 20, 1976, Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to
Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa Chan. The Deed of Sale executed between Ayala and
the buyers contained Special Conditions of Sale and Deed Restrictions. Among the Special
Conditions of Sale were: a) the vendees shall build on the lot and submit the building plans to the
vendor before September 30, 1976 for the latter’s approval b) the construction of the building shall
start on or before March 30, 1977 and completed before 1979. Before such completion, neither
the deed of sale shall be registered nor the title released even if the purchase price shall have been
fully paid and c) there shall be no resale of the property.

Issue:
Whether or not the deed of restriction can be enforced by Ayala Corporation.

Ruling:
Contractual obligations between parties have the force of law between them and absent
any allegation that the same are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy, they must be complied with in good faith. The party guilty of violating the deed of
restrictions may only be held alternatively liable for substitute performance of its obligation, that is,
for the payment of damages.

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DURA LEX SED LEX

PEOPLE vs. VENERACION


G.R. No. 119987-88 October 12, 1995

Facts:
On August 2, 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide of a seven year old girl in the RTC presided by Judge Lorenzo P. Veneracion. Respondent
judge however, refused to impose the corresponding penalty of death and he rather imposed
reclusion perpetua to each of the accused. The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration
praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused. The respondent judge refused
to act.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge can impose penalty lower than that prescribed by law.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose
the proper penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral
beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the
rule laid down in the Civil Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

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CONCEPT OF CUSTOMS

YAO KEE vs. SY GONZALES


G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988

Facts:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 leaving behind properties here in the
Philippines.Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales et al filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration alleging that they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego. The
petition was opposed by Yao Kee et al alleging that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased
whom he married in China. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the opposition. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, modifying the decision declaring the marriage of Sy Kiat
to Yao Kee as not has been proven valid in accordance with the laws of China. Hence, both parties
moved for reconsideration to which the Supreme Court granted.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat is valid in accordance with Philippine
laws.

Ruling:
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proven as any other fact. To establish the
validity of marriage, the existence of foreign law as a question of fact and the alleged marriage must
be proven by clear and convincing evidence.For failure to prove the foreign law or custom and
consequently of the marriage, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat in China cannot be
recognized in the jurisdiction of Philippine courts.

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EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW

FLORESCA vs. PHILEX MINING CORP.


G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985

Facts:
Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations
at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of
the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and
regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of
the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to
the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also
petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they
can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the WCA.

Issue:
Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.

Ruling:
Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the
WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming
benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency
due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a
remedy. However, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the
amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would
go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous
reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man’s
survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

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EQUITY IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW

URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

Facts:
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was convicted for violation of Sec. 1 of CA No. 142, as amended
by RA 6085 otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases” by the RTC of Davao City
which was affirmed by the CA. Allegedly petitioner when asked by his counsel to take his letter of
request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm’s messenger Oscar Perez had
personal matters to attend to, instead of writing his name wrote the name “Oscar Perez” when he
was requested to sign. However, Loida Kahulugan who gave him the copy of complaint was able to
know through Josefa Amparo that petitioner is not Oscar Perez. Loida reported the matter to the
Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. Petitioner comes
for review of his conviction to the SC as he reasserts his innocence.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Cesario Ursua should be acquitted on the ground that he was
charged under the wrong law.

Ruling:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has
decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil
sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The
court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.

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APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS, EXCEPTION

ASAALI vs. COMMISSION OF CUSTOMS


G.R. No. L-24170 December 16, 1968

Facts:
The SC held that petitioner be acquitted of the crime charged. Time and again the SC has
decreed that the statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evil
sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in
mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The
court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers.

Issue:
Whether or not the interception and seizure by custom officials on the high seas is valid on
the contention that the seizure was affected outside our territorial waters.

Ruling:
The SC held that it is a settled doctrine of International Law that a state has the right to
protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas.
The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its application and enforceability not only within the

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Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone but also outside of its jurisdiction while on
Philippine ship.

NATIONALITY/CITIZENSHIP THEORY

LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente,
in Nabua, Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for
the US and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo became an American citizen on
November 30, 1943. Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo was granted by the US
Navy to visit his wife in the Philippines and found out that Paula was living in with Lorenzo’s
brother Ceferino. In December 1945, Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate saying
that the child was illegitimate, and the father’s name was left blank.
On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a written agreement, dissolving their marital
union, suspending his support upon her, and waiving his authority to file a case of adultery against

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her. Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in 1951 which was granted in 1952.On
January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno, in the Philippines; after which, they bore three
children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo executed a will, bequeathing all his property to
Alicia and three children. Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985.

On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a petition for letters of administration
over Lorenzo’s estate, contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse.In 1987, the RTC
granted her petition, stating that Lorenzo’s divorce decree was void and inapplicable in
the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of
their conjugal properties, and one-third of the estate – the two-thirds would be divided equally
among the illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal administrator of the estate.

Issue:
Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente.

Ruling:
Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues arising from the case are governed by foreign
law. The CA and RTC called to the for the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the
law of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, the Philippine law. Most US laws follow the domiciliary
theory. Thus, the Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will. The case
was remanded to the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

INCIDENTS OF SUCCESSION, EXCEPTION

MICIANO vs. BRIMO


G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Facts:
Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano,
the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one
of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo’s opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo’s will which are not in

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accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in
violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
disposition.
Ruling:
Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must
govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator.
Therefore, the testator’s national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil
Code.Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described
as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible
conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the
testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.

The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such
manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

RENVOI

AZNAR vs. GARCIA


G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

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Facts:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided
for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his
death. In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia
(illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code,
California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of
the domicile. On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased
must apply, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything under California law.

Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the
successional rights of his heirs.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that
there are two rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians
domiciled in California and the conflict rule for Californians domiciled outside of California.
Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. The case
was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings – the determination of the successional
rights under Philippine law only.

RENVOI

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BELLIS vs. BELLIS
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

Facts:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife
whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one
disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his
illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the
ground that they have been deprived of their legitimates to which they should be entitled, if
Philippine law were to be applied.

Issue:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of
the illegitimate children.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the
Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.The parties admit that the
decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.

Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may
be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

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RENVOI

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK vs. ESCOLIN


G.R. No. L-27860 March 29, 1974

Facts:
Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the
Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary
provisions she had made in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws
of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one group contended that the
Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group contended that no renvoi was possible).

Issue:
Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to
be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of
her death (and not said law at any other time).

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FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS

ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a
citizen of the United States; they were married in Hong Kong in 1972. Thereafter, they established
their residence in the Philippines and begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982, and that petitioner has re-
married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita,
Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and
that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss
the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.

Ruling:
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to

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their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by
his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

FORMS, SOLEMNITIES OF CONTRACTS, AND WILLS

BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA vs. AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION


G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing
institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. As borne by the records, BANTSA and
BAIL on several occasions granted three major multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans to the
following corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A. and
(3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., all of which are existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private.

As security, the latter mortgaged a property located in the Philippines owned by herein
respondent ARC. ARC is a third party mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages, dated 17
February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of land including improvements thereon, located at
Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.

The debtors failed to pay. Thus, petitioner filed collection suits in foreign courts to enforce
the loan. Subsequently, it filed a petition in the Sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose the said mortgage,
which was granted.

On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig RTC, Branch 159, an action
for damages against the petitioner, for the latter’s act of foreclosing extra-judicially the real estate

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mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal
loan.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the
recovery of the loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.

Ruling:
Yes.In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against
the mortgage debtor either a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In
other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of
action can by no means be impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.In the instant
case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
said foreign law would still not find applicability.Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is
contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or
order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of
law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.

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PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER


G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000

Facts:
Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law from 1984-19988. During his last year, 1st
semester, he failed to take the regular final examination in Practical Court 1where he was given an
incomplete grade remarks. He filed an application for removal of the incomplete grade given by
Prof. Carlos Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after
the payment of required fees. He took the exam on March 28, 1988 and on May 30, 1988 the
professor gave him a grade of 5.The commencement exercise of UE College of law was held April
16, 1988, 3PM. In the invitation, his name appeared. In preparation for the bar exam, he took a
leave of absence from work from April 20- Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class review in FEU.
Upon learning of such deficiency, he dropped his review classes and was not able to take the bar
exam. Jader sued UE for damages resulting to moral shock, mental anguish, and serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the
1988 bar examinations due to UE’s negligence.

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Issue:
Whether UE should be held liable for misleading a student into believing JADER satisfied
all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case. Can he claim moral damages?

Ruling:
Supreme Court held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and this liable to respondent for
the latter’s actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their
academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should
not have been awarded moral damages though JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he
was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations as
what Court of Appeals held because it’s also respondent’s duty to verify for himself whether he has
completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student,
he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation with his
academic achievement are in order. Before taking the bar examinations, it doesn’t only entail a
mental preparation on the subjects but there are other prerequisites such as documentation and
submission of requirements which prospective examinee must meet. Wherefore, the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification. Petitioner is ordered to pay
respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal
interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award
of moral damages is deleted.

PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

GF EQUITY, INC. vs. VALENZONA


G.R. No. 156841 June 30, 2005

Facts:
GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer, W. Steven Uytengsu, hired Valenzona
as head coach of the Alaska basketball team in the PBA under a contract of employment. He was
tasked to coach at all practices and games scheduled for the Alaska team, coach exhibition games,
coach if invited to participate in any all-star game, attending every event conducted, play-off games,
etc.

He was also tasked to comply with all requirements respecting to the conduct of its team and
players, to implement. He also agreed to report from time to time as fixed by the corporation in
good physical condition, give his best services, loyalty, to be neatly and fully attired in public and to

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conduct himself on and off the court according to the highest standards of honesty, morality, fair
play and sportsmanship, and not to do anything detrimental to the best interest of the corporation.

He also agreed to endorse the corporation’s products in commercial advertising,


promotions, will allow himself to be taken pictures with others for still photographs, motion
pictures or TV. For his services, he will be paid P35, 000.00 monthly, net of taxes, provide him with
a service vehicle and gasoline allowance. The contract was for two (2) years starting January 1, 1988
to December 31, 1989, with the condition that if at any time during the contract, the coach fails to
exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the contract can be terminated by the
corporation. (Paragraph 3)

Before signing the contract, Valenzona consulted his lawyer who pointed out that the
contract was one-sided, but still, Valenzona acceded to the terms of the contract as he had trust and
confidence in Uytengsu who recommended him to GF Equity.

Alaska placed third both in the open and all-Filipino PBA Conference in 1988, he was
advised of the termination of his services by way of a letter dated September 26, 1988, invoking their
right as specified in paragraph 3 of the contract and to return the service vehicle no later than
September 30, 1984. He will still be paid the balance of P75, 868.38 for his services. Six (6) years
after or on July 30, 1994, Valenzona’s counsel demanded from GF Equity payment of compensation
arising from the arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment. But GF Equity refused the
claim. Valenzona filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint for breach of contract with damages,
ascribing bad faith, malice and disregard to fairness and to the rights of the plaintiff by unilaterally
and arbitrarily pre-terminating the contract without just cause and legal and factual basis. He prayed
award for damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit. He
challenged the condition in paragraph 3 as lacking the elements of mutuality of a contract, a clear
transgression of Art. 1308 of the NCC and reliance thereon did not warrant his unjustified and
arbitrary dismissal.

GF Equity maintained that it merely exercised its right under the contract to pre-terminate
Valenzona due to incompetence, and that he was guilty of laches, in any event, complaint should be
instituted before a labor arbiter. The trial court dismissed the complaint on June 28, 1997 and it
declared Valenzona as fully aware of the bargain. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and ordered
GF Equity to pay him damages. The CA concluded that GF Equity abused its right by arbitrarily
terminating Valenzona’s employment, finding Valenzona’s claim for damages as valid. The court
ordered GF Equity to pay compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.

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Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not, the CA concluded wrongly from established facts in a manner violative of
applicable laws and established jurisprudence.

Ruling:
GF Equity argued that it entered into a contract protected by law, as it was not contract to
law, morals, good customs public policy or public order, hence, no bad faith. Valenzona is guilty of
laches for his unexplained inaction of six (6) years.

In the case at bar, paragraph 3 gives GF Equity the unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate
the contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness, or reasonableness, or even lack of bass of its
opinion. To validate the paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for void
contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor.

Laches applies to equity, prescription applies to law. The claims was filed within the
statutory period of prescription, doctrine of laches cannot be applied. The action was filed for
breach of contract, way well within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years, considering he filed the
action six (6) years from the date of his cause of action.

Valenzona is entitled to recover actual damages, however, award for moral damages,
exemplary damages, must be set aside, as there is no showing that GF Equity acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive manner. Attorney’s fees are awarded because GF Equity refused to
pay the balance of Valenzona’s salaries therefore to protect himself, was compelled to litigate.

PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

GO vs. CORDERO
G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010

Facts:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation
(Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting
various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson,

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an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing Director of Aluminium
Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).

After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is
the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship; Cordero was able
to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of
Agreement dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825
for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement
between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totaling US$328,742.00, or
22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.

However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was
informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran
engine from their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told
Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second engine to the Park
Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to
confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls.
Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and
Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25.
Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson
who even made Cordero believe there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express
Liner.

On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson,
Go, Tecson and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in
violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving
him of his due commissions. Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction
over his person and failure to state a cause of action, asserting that there was no act committed in
violation of the distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial court on December
20, 1999. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his answer within the period
granted by the trial court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion to dismiss based on failure to state a
cause of action was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26, 1999. Subsequently, they filed
their Answer denying that they have anything to do with the termination by AFFA of Cordero’s
authority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines. On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero
who stopped communicating with Go in connection with the purchase of the first vessel from
AFFA and was not doing his part in making progress status reports and airing the client’s grievances
to his principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly to Australia and attend
to the documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines. In any case, Cordero no

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longer had cause of action for his commission for the sale of the second vessel under the
memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997 considering the termination of his authority by
AFFA’s lawyers on June 26, 1998.

On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January 29,
2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and
setting aside the trial court’s orders of execution pending appeal.The case before the Supreme Court
is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go (G.R. No. 164703)
and Cordero (G.R. No. 164747).

Issue:
a) Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents for breach of
contract; and
b) Whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid
commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal,
AFFA.

Ruling:
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because
only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for
breach but for inducing another to commit such breach. The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a
contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.

The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued by
Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents
were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson. In fact,
evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and recognized Cordero as such
exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the Philippines. In that capacity as
exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding
Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA.

The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot
be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract
can be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for
the balance of petitioner Cordero’s commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the
amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of

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the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24,
1998 until the same is fully paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be
recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

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PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA


G.R. No. 180764 January 19, 2010

Facts:
Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the
Revenue Collection and Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her
courtesy resignation from that post on January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5, 2001, she withdrew her resignation,
claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against her will on orders of
her superior.

Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent
Rosqueta’s position. Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo
warranto, and injunction against petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of
Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner Villanueva,
Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order before the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the
implementation of the RTC’s injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA
eventually dismissed the petition before it.

But the RTC dismissed respondent Rosqueta’s complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva
committed no wrong and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that
Villanueva had validly and legally replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the
Bureau’s centennial anniversary. But the CA reversed the RTC’s decision, holding instead that
petitioner Villanueva’s refusal to comply with the preliminary injunction order issued in the quo
warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral damages from him.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in damages to
respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo
warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy
Commissioner of the Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer.

Ruling:
Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in
the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad
faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of right
or duty.

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But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him.
Surely, a government official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a
court of law had to be obeyed, especially since the question of Valera’s right to replace respondent
Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved. That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction
shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the eyes of the law the Deputy
Commissioner.
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS

ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO vs. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING


CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184315 November 25, 2009

Facts:
In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleges that in the last quarter of 1994,
Chronicle Publishing Corporation ("Chronicle Publishing" for brevity) published in the Manila
Chronicle a series of defamatory articles against him. In two of the subject articles (November 10
and 12, 1993 issues), he was imputed to be a "Marcos crony" or a "Marcos-Romualdez crony,"
which term according to him is commonly used and understood in Philippine media to describe an
individual who was a recipient of special and underserving favors from former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos and/or his brother-in-law Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez due to special and extra-
ordinary closeness to either or both, and which favors allowed an individual to engage in illegal and
dishonorable business activities.

The subject articles insinuated that he personally and intentionally caused the failure of
Benguet Corporation and that if even if he ever assumed control of Oriental, it would suffer the
same fate as the former. According to him, at the time he assumed chairmanship of Benguet
Corporation, it was already experiencing financial downturns caused by plummeting world prices of
gold and unprofitable investments it ventured into. Moreover, one of the articles portrayed him as
being an unfair and uncaring employer when the employees of Grepalife Corporation, of which he is
the Chairman, staged a strike, when the truth being that he had nothing to do with it. And that if his
group takes over Oriental, it will experience the same labor problems as in Grepalife.

In their Answer, the defendants deny liability claiming that the subject articles were not
defamatory since they were composed and published in good faith and only after having ascertained
their contents. In any event, they claim that these articles are privileged and/or constitute reasonable
and balance[d] comments on matters of legitimate public interest which cannot serve as basis for the
finding of libel against them. They likewise alleged that they were acting within the bounds of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of libel.

Ruling:

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In sum, this Court upholds the ruling of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the
subject articles contain defamatory imputations. All of the following imputations: (1) the labeling of
Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who took advantage of his relationship with the former President to
gain unwarranted benefits; (2) the insinuations that Yuchengco induced others to disobey the lawful
orders of SEC; (3) the portrayal of Yuchengco as an unfair and uncaring employer due to the strike
staged by the employees of Grepalife; (4) the accusation that he induced RCBC to violate the
provisions of the General Banking Act on DOSRI loans; and (5) the tagging of Yuchengco as a
"corporate raider" seeking to profit from something he did not work for, all exposed Yuchengco to
public contempt and ridicule, for they imputed to him a condition that was dishonorable.

There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory imputation, where
there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable motive for making such imputation.In the
instant case, there is preponderance of evidence showing that there exists malice in fact in the
writing and publication of the subject libelous articles. When malice in fact is proven, assertions and
proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being
qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching to
a defamatory imputation.

Neither is there any reason for this Court to reverse the findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that there was actual malice on the part of the respondents. As held by the courts
a quo, Yuchengco was able to show by the attendant circumstances that respondents were animated
by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, as shown by the timing and frequency of
the publication of the defamatory articles. Finally, even if we assume for the sake of argument that
actual malice was not proven in the case at bar, we nevertheless cannot adhere to the finding of the
Court of Appeals in the Amended Decision that the subject articles were fair commentaries on
matters of public interest, and thus fell within the scope of the third type of qualifiedly privileged
communications.

In view of the foregoing, this Court is constrained to grant the instant Petition and reinstate
the Decision of the trial court, as previously affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its original
Decision. This Court, however, finds the award of damages in the total amount of One Hundred
Million Pesos by the trial court to be rather excessive given the circumstances.

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DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996

Facts:
Respondents owned a parcel of land wherein a two-door apartment was erected. Said
property was surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioners, spouses Custodio and spouses
Santos. As an access to P. Burgos Street from the subject property, there are two possible
passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distant
from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously
mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from
plaintiff Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said
passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has
to be traversed. Petitioners constructed an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in
width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is
also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended
said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the
apartment because there was no longer a permanent access to the public street. Respondents then
filed an action for the grant of an easement of right of way. The trial court ordered the petitioner to
give respondents a permanent access to the public street and that in turn, the respondent will pay a
sum of Php 8,000.00 to the petitioner as an indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. On
appeal by the respondent to the CA, the decision of the trial court was affirmed, such that a right of
way and an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages were given to the respondents. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the award of damages is proper?

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Ruling:
No. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal
wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely
part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the
loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of
which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff. There must be a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it.

In the instant case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the
claim of respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right.
In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied,
it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3)
There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within
their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to
enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that “(e)very owner may
enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any
other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.”

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There
was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The
fact that respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very
decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners
not to interfere in the exercise of said right. The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a
legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no
legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and
though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s
favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no
redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful
means.

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Persons and Family Relation
DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION vs. CALDERON


GR. No. 156168 December 14, 2004

Facts:
Jose T. Calderon is a businessman engaged in several business activities here and abroad,
either in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. He is also a stockholder of
PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveler, who travels
at least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, Equitable Banking
Corporation is one of the leading commercial banking institutions in the Philippines, engaged in
commercial banking, such as acceptance of deposits, extension of loans and credit card facilities,
among others.Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable
International Visa card. The said Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within
and outside the Philippines.

The credit limit for the peso transaction is twenty thousand pesos; while in the dollar
transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00,

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the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.In April 1986, Calderon together with
some reputable business friends and associates went to Hongkong for business and pleasure
trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to
Gucci Department Store located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel Hongkong. There and
then, Calderon purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his
total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said
items in cash, he used his Visa card to effect payment thereof on credit. He then presented and gave
his credit card to the saleslady who promptly referred it to the store cashier for verification.

Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other
shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought
the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not
honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.Deeply
embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the
Gucci goods and items that he bought.

Issue:
Whether or not Calderon can be indemnify with damages.

Ruling:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was
not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was
injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition
of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be
the proximate cause of the injury.

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Persons and Family Relation
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA

HOTEL NIKKO vs. REYES


GR. No. 154259 February 28, 2005

Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the Court
of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for damages

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through the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary
damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorney’s fees.

Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on
October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend,
approached him and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotel’s former manager’s
birthday was being celebrated. He consented and carried the latter’s present. At the party, when he
was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and asked
him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati
policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.

Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he
claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant
wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied
Amay Bisaya’s claim that she invited him to the party.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Lim’s conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for
damages caused to plaintiff.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered
through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith,
must be his to bear alone.

The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession
that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the
party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been
no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that
must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left
the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the
petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.

LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO

EDUARDO MANUEL vs. PEOPLE

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GR. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.

Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975,
who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was
never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the
latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil
wedding in BaguioCity without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of
their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married
when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s
defense being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done
because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he
had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The
Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10
months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable
for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTC’s
decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for
moral damages was affirmed.

Hence, this petition.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that
petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as
there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of
the Family Code.
b) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the
award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice
or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good
faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates
malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the

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requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a
judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the
present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The
court rules against the petitioner.

The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and
after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused
injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general
welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s
perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of
the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

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Persons and Family Relation
LIABILITY EX-MALEFICIO OR EX-DELICTO

SONNY D. ROMERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 167546 July 17, 2009

Facts:
On April 1, 1999 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner driven by petitioner Sonny Romero
and the Apego Taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor Jose
Fuentebella Highway at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for Naga
City while the taxi was going in the opposite direction of Partido Area. The collision resulted in the
death of Gerardo Breis, Sr., Arnaldo Breis, Gerardo Breis, Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin Breis and Jimmy
Padua. Luckily, Edwin Breis and his son Edmund Breis survived although they sustained serious
injuries.

As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Ocampo, Camarines Sur. After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted
petitioner of the crime charged in a decision dated November 9, 2000. Petitioner was, however, held
civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the total amount of P3,541,900 by way
of actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of earning
capacity.

Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur which on July 17,
2001, affirmed the MTC judgment in toto. Refusing to give up, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On March 3, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s acquittal freed him of civil liability?

Ruling:
In view of the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, the Supreme Court agrees with
the conclusion of the CA that petitioner was acquitted not because he did not commit the crime
charged but because the RTC and the MTC could not ascertain with moral conviction the wanton
and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus at the time of the accident. Put differently,

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petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, his civil liability for the death, injuries and damages arising from the collision is another
matter. While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by
preponderance of evidence. In other words, the failure of the evidence to prove negligence with
moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that there was preponderant
evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly liable.

ACTS CONTRA BONOS MORES

CECILIO PE ET AL. vs. ALFONSO PE


G.R. No.L-17396 May 30, 1962

Facts:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man
and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of
Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents
in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral
relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant
became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952,
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to
pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not
only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They
exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for
each other but also the extent to which they had carried their relationship. The rumors about their
love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed
deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant
and Lolita continued nonetheless.

Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at
54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After
she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone.
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note,
written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be

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that of defendant's. The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI
but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts. The trial court said: "In the
absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who
deliberately induced such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes
inexplicable mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply
fell in love with each other, not only without any desire on their part, but also against their better
judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them. This is specially so with
respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective
damages.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's
affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or
trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the
fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed
free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the
two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan
but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit
affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house
and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a
Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she
disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of
events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning
the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has
caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

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Persons and Family Relation
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.


G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

Facts:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in
the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger
than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one
evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies; they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on
board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad
advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child,
Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. On October 4, 1954,
Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages
for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to
support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion,

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said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a
month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month.

The judgment of the RTC is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the
natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to
the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day
of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of four thousand five hundred
pesos (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
as moral damages; and the further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as attorney's fees for
plaintiff, with costs against defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were
increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.

Issue:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
marry?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the petitioner
is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than
the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former
high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with
petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of damages.

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Persons and Family Relation
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

BEATRIZ GALANG vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.


G.R. No.L-17248 January 29, 1962

Facts:
Rodrigo courted Beatriz in 1953 and they, thereafter, became engaged, albeit Rodrigo's
mother was opposed to their marriage; that on April 15, 1955 Rodrigo and his father went to her
house and her marriage with Rodrigo were arranged, with the concurrence of her mother, appellant
Maximino Quinit having agreed to give dowry and to defray the expenses of the marriage, with the
exception of the wedding dress of appellee; that they agreed to have the marriage celebrated in

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Baguio, for which reason on April 27, 1955, appellee, Rodrigo and the latter's father left for Baguio;
that upon arriving at Colorado Falls, however, Maximino made them alight from the bus and took
them to the house of Adolfo Dagawan with whom Maximino agreed that appellee and Rodrigo
would stay in said house, Maximino to pay P5.00 daily for their lodging and asked Dagawan to make
all arrangements for their wedding in Baguio and to act as their sponsor; that after making these
arrangements Maximino left, while appellee and Rodrigo remained in Dagawan's house where they
lived as husband and wife until May 9, that on May 7, appellee and Rodrigo, accompanied by
Dagawan, went to Baguio to secure a marriage license but failed because Rodrigo did not have a
residence certificate, although both prospective contracting parties signed the corresponding
application; that on May 9, on the pretext that he going to their hometown to get his residence
certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado Falls and never returned; that when appellee returned to their
hometown (Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that Rodrigo's parents had sprinted him away
because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was unsavory.

The Court of First Instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the Court of Appeals
considered her evidence unworthy of credence, and, hence, absolved Maximino Quinit.

Issues:
Whether or not Rodrigo and Maximo Quinit are liable for damages due to the alleged breach
of promise to marry?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the reason that mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.In the light of the clear and manifest intent
of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral
damages made by the Court of First Instance is, accordingly, untenable.

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

Facts:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the

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petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later courted
her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilou’s house to secure approval of her
parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his apartment. Marilou was
a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started
maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the apartment while he was in
school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner administered a
drug to abort the baby.

Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he
is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage or agreed to
be married neither sought consent and approval of Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked
Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his
passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses.

Issue:
Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.

Ruling:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The
court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his
malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court
found that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and
womanhood.

Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have
carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding preparation
expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.

Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

WASSMER vs. VELEZ


G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

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Facts:
Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be
saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But
the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed, that he is
returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.

Issue:
Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?

Ruling:
Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant
must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that
"any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

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BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

NATIVIDAD vs. TUNAC


G.R. No. 143130 July 10, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up together in Barangay
Quiling, Talisay, Batangas where their respective parents resided. At age nineteen (19), the two
became lovers. One day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him to his boarding house in Pasig City to get
the bio-data which he needed in connection with his application for employment. Upon arrival at
the boarding house, they found no one there. Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside his room and,
once inside, started kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the loss of
her virginity, but Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her.

Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant sometime in June 1992.
Ronald reassured her, again promising her marriage. True enough, on October 31, 1992, Ronald and
his parents, accompanied by several relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's house and
asked her parents for the hand of their daughter.The two families agreed to have the wedding in
January 1993 but Elsa's sister had gotten married that year so they postponed it. Meanwhile, Elsa
started living with Ronald in the house of the latter's family while waiting for the baby to be born.
Unfortunately, on December 19, 1992, Elsa gave birth to a premature baby which died after five (5)
hours in the incubator. After Elsa's discharge from the hospital, the two families decided that Elsa
should go back to her parents so her mother could take care of her during her postnatal period.
During said period, Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house.

It seems that after Elsa's miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's attitude towards the
former occurred. In January of 1993, the Natividads confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald
informed Elsa that he no longer wanted to get married to her. Petitioners succinctly contend they
are suing respondents not merely because Elsa became pregnant but because Ronald reneged on his
promise to marry her after their agreement had already been much publicized in their town.

Issue:
Whether or not Ronald performs moral seduction.

Ruling:
In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by Ronald, much less by
his parents. Form the narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is that the two became
lovers before they engaged in any sexual intercourse. Also, the moral seduction contemplated by the
Code Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil Code is one where the defendant is in a
position of moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. We fail to see any of these circumstances in
this case.

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In addition, as the trial court noted, marriage plans were in fact arranged between the
families of the parties. That their relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after Elsa's
miscarriage, is already beyond the punitive scope of our laws. This is simply a case of a relationship
gone awry.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT

SHINRYO (PHILIPPINES) COMPANY, INC. vs. RRN INC.


G.R. No. 172525 October 20, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. (hereinafter petitioner) is a domestic
corporation organized under Philippine laws. Private respondent RRN Incorporated (hereinafter
respondent) is likewise a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws. Respondent filed a
claim for arbitration against petitioner before CIAC for recovery of unpaid account which consists
of unpaid portions of the sub-contract, variations and unused materials in the total sum of P5,
275,184.17 and legal interest in the amount of P442, 014.73. Petitioner filed a counterclaim for
overpayment in the amount of P2, 512,997.96. The parties admitted several facts before the CIAC.
It was shown that petitioner and respondent executed an Agreement and Conditions of Sub-
contract. Respondent signified its willingness to accept and perform for petitioner in any of its
projects, a part or the whole of the works more particularly described in Conditions of Sub-Contract
and other Sub-contract documents.

On June 11, 2002, the parties executed a "Supply of Manpower, Tools/Equipment,


Consumables for the Electrical Works-Power and Equipment Supply, Bus Duct Installation" for the
Phillip Morris Greenfield Project (hereafter Project) covered by Purchase Order Nos. 4501200300-
000274 and 4501200300-000275 amounting to P15,724,000.00 and P9,276,000.00 respectively, or a
total amount of P25,000,000.00. The parties also agreed that respondent will perform variation
orders in the Project. In connection with the Project, petitioner supplied manpower chargeable
against respondent. Respondent was not able to finish the entire works with petitioner due to
financial difficulties. Petitioner paid respondent a total amount of P26,547,624.76. On June 25, 2005
[should read 2003], respondent, through its former counsel sent a letter to petitioner demanding for
the payment of its unpaid balance amounting to P5,275,184.17. Petitioner claimed material back
charges in the amount of P4,063,633.43. On September 26, 2003, respondent only acknowledged
P2,371,895.33 as material back charges. Thereafter, on October 16, 2003, respondent sent another
letter to petitioner for them to meet and settle their dispute. On January 8, 2004, respondent sent
another letter to petitioner regarding the cost of equipment rental and the use of scaffolding.
Thereafter, on August 12, 2004, petitioner sent a letter to respondent denying any unpaid account
and the failure in their negotiations for amicable settlement.

Issue:

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Whether or not the Claimant's claim for inventory of excess materials is constitutes to unjust
enrichment.

Ruling:
No, the court of appeals committed a grave reversible error in affirming that the CIAC
award for the values of inventoried materials considering that respondent RRN has no basis to claim
because Engr. Bonifacio admitted that respondent RRN failed to establish whether the materials
came from respondent or from petitioner and that it was petitioner that actually installed the said
materials as part of remaining works that the petitioner took over from respondent rrn. The claim
for the value of inventoried materials is a doubled claim or a doubled entry because in the
computation of the final account, respondent RRN was credited the full contract price and the cost
of variations which included the inventoried materials.
Despite petitioner's attempts to make it appear that it is advancing questions of law, it is
quite clear that what petitioner seeks is for this Court to recalibrate the evidence it has presented
before the CIAC. It insists that its evidence sufficiently proves that it is entitled to payment for
respondent's use of its manlift equipment, and even absent proof of the supposed agreement on the
charges petitioner may impose on respondent for the use of said equipment, respondent should be
made to pay based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Petitioner also questions the amounts
awarded by the CIAC for inventoried materials, and costs incurred by petitioner for completing the
work left unfinished by respondent.

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UNJUST ENRICHMENT

CAR COOL Philippines, Inc. v. USHIO Realty and Development Corporation


G.R. NO. 138088 January 23, 2006

Facts:
On December 19, 2005, USHIO Realty and Development Corporation filed an ejectment
case against CAR COOL Philippines Inc., to recover the possession of a parcel of land at Quezon
Avenue. USHIO Realty contends that despite several and repeated demands and notices from the
former owners of the land, spouses Lopez, and also from the new owners, USHIO Realty, CAR
COOL still failed to vacate the property. On December 3, 1995 USHIO Realty sent the final
demand to CAR COOL, giving a non extendable 15 days within which to vacate the property. CAR
COOL refused to vacate the property, hence the ejectment case.

The Metropolitan Trial Court rendered in the ejectment case in favor of USHIO Realty.
CAR COOL appealed to the Regional Trial Court which rendered a decision affirming the decision
of the MeTC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification, granting
rentals to USHIO Realty.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages by way of rentals and
attorney’s fees in favor of USHIO Realty

Ruling:
USHIO Realty as the new owner of the property has a right to physical possession of the
said property. Since CAR COOL deprived USHIO Realty of its property, CAR COOL should pay
USHIO Realty rental as a reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.

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Contrary to CAR COOL’s contention the payment of damages in the form of rentals for the
property does not constitute unjust enrichment.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

ELEGIR vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.


G.R. No. 181995 July 16, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a commercial
pilot, specifically designated as HS748 Limited First Officer, on March 16, 1971. In 1995, PAL
embarked on a refleeting program and acquired new and highly sophisticated aircrafts. Subsequently,
PAL posts a bid for the opening of slots for the crew of the new aircrafts. Elegir was one of those
awarded with the opportunity.

Elegir, along with 7 other pilot, were sent for training in Seattle, Washington, United States
of America on May 8, 1995 for the necessary training of his skills and knowledge to handle the new
aircraft. He completed his training on September 19, 1995. On November 5, 1996 after rendering 25
years, 8 months, and 20 days of continuous service, the petitioner applied for an optional retirement
authorized under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and the Airline Pilots
Association of the Philippines (ALPAP). PAL asked him to reconsider his retirement in that the
company has yet to recover the cost of his training. In the event that he finally decides to leave, PAL
will deduct the unrecovered cost of his training from his Retirement Pay. He decided to leave

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thereafter. Elegir’s counsel sent PAL a letter of correspondence stating that the cost of training
should not be deducted from his retirement pay.

Issue:
Whether or not PAL had the right to reimburse themselves from Elegir’s retirement pay the
amount unrecovered from his training.

Ruling:
PAL had the right to be reimbursed. According to Article 22-23 of the New Civil Code, they
had the right to demand payment since Elegir will unjustly enrich himself at the expense of PAL.
Unjustly enriching is unduly profiting one’s self on something which does not meritoriously belong
to him, this is well enshrined in the Latin maxim, “Nemo cum alteriusdetrimentolocupletaripotest”.
Elgir has the right to retire since he has reached a certain number of flight hours which is considered
a long stay in PAL, but his bid for the vacancy and his subsequent training sponsored by PAL was
put to waste when he decides to have an early retirement from PAL after his training. It would be
unfair for PAL if Elegir has gained new skills for the service of PAL but then leave even after PAL
has still not even recovered the cost of training.

PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE

VALENZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. L-56168 December 22, 1988

Facts:
Carlos Telosa is a farmer and a fisherman. He had very limited education. Telosa initiated a
loan with the Rural Bank of Lucena with a contract of mortgage. The mortgage covered a parcel of
land measuring 50,000 square meters. Several months later the Rural Bank of Lucena experienced
financial distress. The Central Bank appraised Rural Bank of Lucian’s shareholders. It was found out
in its investigation that key officers of the bank had certain anomalies or had resorted to unsound
banking practices which were prejudicial to the government, the public, and its creditors.

Rural Bank of Lucena has then undergone liquidation. It had received orders to turn its non-
monetary assets into cash to satisfy claims. Among one of the accounts it decides to liquidate was

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the Telosa account in the amount of Php 5000.00. Rural Bank of Lucena sent for a demand letter
asking for the payment of the account. Carlos Telosa thought that he owes the bank only Php
300.00 and not Php 5000.00, so Telosa filed a protest on the demand received. Meanwhile Carlos
Telosa died in January 13, 1968. The rural bank claiming that the payment was not fully paid
petitioned the foreclosure the Telosa’s land to satisfy the claim. The lot was then sold to the highest
bidder and was consequently registered in the Registry of Deeds on September 11, 1972. Telosa now
pray for the annulment of the land back to them because they have already paid the loan of Php
300.00.

Issue:
Whether or not the state can intervene via parenspatriae for the return of the Telosa’s land.

Ruling:
The state can protect its citizens; it is a supreme power the state can exercise at any time the
rights of its citizen is being prejudiced. The bank took advantage of the Telosa’s by making a
document that was not the contract that they have agreed upon. Needless to state in this regard the
particular transaction was one of the fraudulent and anomalous transactions involving the officer of
the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. The state can intervene because there has been a preponderance of
proof that the loan only amounts to Php 300.00 and not Php 5000.00. By virtue of the power of the
state the bank was ordered to return the land it extra judicially settled.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 120706 January 31, 2000

Facts:
Sometime in 1985, the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas are living in an apartment
being leased to them by Florence “Bing” Concepcion, who also resides in the same compound
where the apartment was located. Nestor was engaged in the business of supplying government
agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and other fixtures on a cash or credit
basis. Bing joined the venture and contributed capital on the condition that after her capital
investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between her and Nestor.

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Sometime in the second week of July 1985, Rodrigo Concepcion the brother of the deceased
husband of Bing accosted Nestor at the latter’s apartment and accusing him of having adulterous
relationship with Bing. Rodrigo threatened that should something happen to Rodrigo’s sick mother,
in case the latter learned of the affair, he would kill Florence.

As a result of the incident, Nestor felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that
he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence also ceased to do business with him by not
contributing capital anymore so much so that the business venture was no longer feasible. To make
matters worse, the relationship between Allem and Nestor has soured from the doubt of fidelity and
frequent bickering and quarrels. Allem even expressed her desire to leave her husband. Nestor was
forced to demand from Rodrigo damages and a public apology.

Issue:
Whether or not Nestor’s right to privacy had been shattered by Rodrigo and is Nestor
entitled to damages.

Ruling:
The court has ruled that Nestor is entitled to damages. Although the defendant claims that
there was neither violation done that was enlisted under Article 26 and 2219 of the New Civil Code
which constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation nor does it involve prying into the
privacy of another’s residence, it was still adjudged that the act done was form of that manner. The
Code commission stresses in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The
sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human
amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every county,
is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly
humiliated, in short if human personality is not exalted then the laws are indeed defective, thus,
under this article, the right of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations
of a person’s dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. There is no question that Nestor
suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation as a
proximate result of petitioner’s abusive, scandalous, and insulting language. Nestor, therefore is
entitled to damages.

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RIGHT TO PRIVACY

PADALHIN vs. LAVINA


G.R. No. 183026 November 14, 2012

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Facts:
Lavina and Nestor were both diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul
General, respectively. In the course of their stay at Kenya , the residence of Lavina was raided twice.
Prior to the raids, BienvenidoPasturan delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers in the
ambassador’s residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would come to take
photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein. The first raid was conducted while Lavina and his
wife were attending a diplomatic dinner. Officials from the Criminal Investigation Division
Intelligent Office of Kenya took picture of Lavina’s house with the aid of Lavina’shouse helpers.
The second raid again took place when Lavina was not present at the house, pictures were taken.

Lavina received information from the DFA in Manila that an investigation team was sent to
Kenya to inquire into the complaints filed against him by the employees of the Philippine Embassy
in Kenya, own one hand, and his own complaint against the spouses Padalhin. The investigating
team comprised by Manalo, Ebdalin, and Dizon entered the Lavina residence without any search
warrant, court order or letter from the DFA Secretary. Lavina alleged that the team destroyed
cabinet locks, damaged furniture and took three sets of carved ivory tusk. Lavina subsequently filed
before the RTC for damages against the spouses Padalhin, and the 3 members of the investigation
team.

Issue:
Whether or not the unwarranted search and seizure made by the petitioners violated Lavina’s
right to privacy.

Ruling:
The Article 26 of the civil code state the instances when a person’s right are disturbed. There
is no doubt that the unwarranted seizures done where against Lavina’s privacy rights. The act was
defended by Padalhin stating that he had no malice or bad faith when he ordered the search and
seizure. The Supreme Court ruled that Nestor’s surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith.
If it were true that Lavina kept the ivories in his diplomatic residence then, his behavior deserves
condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code
prescriptions concerning the privacy of one’s residence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his
supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Damages are in order against the Padalhins.

NON-FEASANCE, MISFEASANCE, MALFEASANCE

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PHILEX MINING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 125704 August 28, 1998

Facts:
On August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liability for the
2 , 3 , and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd of 1992 in the total amount of P123,821.52.
nd rd

In a letter dated August 1992, Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating it
has pending claims for VAT input/refund for taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount
of P119,977,032.02 plus interest. Therefore these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied
against the tax liabilities. BIR stated that it was the mistake of its employees who in investigating tax
claims are seen to drag their feet needlessly.

Issue:
Whether or not the malfeasance of the employee justified the non-payment of the taxes due
by Philex.

Ruling:
The BIR being a collector of taxes has the right to demand for due taxes. The non-payment
of Philex cannot be justified by the lapse of duty by the tax collector. The Officer having a mistake
cannot be a reason not to pay because it was in neglect of his duty. Philex regardless has to pay the
taxes. The taxes in the first place could not be subject to legal compensation because taxes cannot be
offset against claims of taxes by the government; the relationship of the government and its
taxpayers is not a debtor-creditor relationship.

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CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL

MANANTAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001

Facts:
In the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal WilfredoAmbrocio decided to catch shrimps
at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased, Ruben Nicolas, who told him that they
should borrow the Ford Fiera of George Manantan. So Ambrocio and Manantan came to get
Nicolas at the Manantan Technical School.

When they arrived at the farm they had drank beer. At about 12:00 they went home. Then at
about 2:00 or 3:00 P.M., Miguel Tabangin (Defense Witness), Nicolas, and Ambrocio returned home
with a duck. They ate and drank up to 8:00 in the evening. Manantan, soon after, invited the others
to go bowling in Santiago. They went to Santiago and were not able to bowl but rather decided to go
to a night club. They decided to go home after the festivities.

Manantan drove the car. Tabangin sat with Manantan at the front seat while Nicolas and
Ambrocio sat at the back seats. Manantan was driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour
along the middle of the highway because he was about to overtake a tricycle when they met a
jeepney with bright lights on. Manantan tried to swerve the car to the right to avoid the collision but
was no able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the
center of the road. The men were brought to the hospital but unfortunately Nicolas died. Ambrocio
suffered minor injuries to his head and legs.

The parents of the deceased filed a criminal case against Manantan but the case was ruled in
favor of Manantan for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The parents of the Ruben Nicolas
now seek for the enforcement of civil liability against Manantan. Manantan argues that he can be
held no longer be civilly liable since he was acquitted of the crime.

Issue:
Whether or not a suit for civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of an accused.

Ruling:
The answer at the case at bar is in the affirmative. The acquittal of Manantan was due to
reasonable doubts therefore civil action can prosper. There exist two types of acquittal, the first is

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acquittal because the accused was not the author of the crime or there is no crime while the second
is the acquittal due to reasonable doubts. In the former the criminal and civil liability is extinguished
while in the latter the criminal aspect is the only one extinguished since civil liability merely requires
preponderance of evidence. The case prospers in pursuance of article 29 of the New Civil Code.

EXTINGUISHMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY BY ACUITTAL

NUGUID vs. NICDAO


G.R. No. 150785 September 15, 2006

Facts:
The accused, Clarita Nicdao is charged with fourteen counts of violation of Batas
PambansaBilang 22 otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law. Sometime 1996 from April to
August thereof, Clarita Nicdao and her husband went to Emma Nuguid. The petitioner asked if they
could borrow money to settle some obligations. Due to their close relationship, Nuguid lent the
Nicdao spouses money.

Nuguid released the loan in installment of One Hundred Thousand Pesos until the amount
reached to an aggregate of One Million One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos. Nuguid, to show good
faith in her part, issued Hermosa Saving Bank open-dated check in the same amount as the loan.
The checks are to be deposited in Nuguid’s account upon non-payment of the amount within one
year. In June 1997, Nuguid, together with Samson Ching, demanded payment of the loan but
Nicdao refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Nuguid then decided to deposit the checks in her
account in Ching’s account since it was Ching whom Nuguid got the money to loan to Nicdao. The
checks were all dishonored because of it being drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF).

A verbal and written notice of dishonor was sent to Nicdao. This was to give them chance to
make good on their loan as represented in the checks. The notice was for naught. Hence, a
complaint was brought against Nicdao for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. In the Regional
Trial Court Nicdao was found guilty of and was sentenced to pay the principal plus interest and
suffer imprisonment of one year per bouncing check for a total of 14 years. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision due to substantial fact that was overlooked by the trial court. Nuguid now filed
for a petition to the Supreme Court raising the issue for civil liability.

Issue:
a) Whether or not the civil liability was also extinguished upon the acquittal of Nicdao of the
violation of B.P. 22.
b) Whether or not interest is enforceable in the contract.

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Ruling:
The civil liability was extinguished due to the findings of the Supreme Court that Nicdao has
already made overpayments of the amount due. The acquittal was due to the reason that the crime
was non-existent already since payment were made over and above what was agreed upon. The
criminal and civil liability will not persist since there the checks were only to be deposited upon non-
compliance of the payment of the principal debt

Interest was being enforced by the Nuguid in the case. It was one of the reasons why the
debt of Nicdao was continually rising as payment are applied first to interest. The interest was
unconscionable. The Court ruled that since the interest was not stipulated in writing, the debt
remained in its principal amount. The principal was actually paid in full already as per Article 1956 of
the Civil Code.

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CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM DELICT

PEOPLE vs. AGACER


G.R. No. 177751 January 7, 2013

Facts:
The victim, CesarioAgacer, was clearing and preparing the soil bedding section of his farm in
preparation for the rice seedlings intended for the coming planting season. Genesis Delanter, his
brother Andy, Rafael, and brother Roden were at the nearby rice field harvesting the palay that
Cesario had raised.

Suddenly, Florencio, Eddie, Elynor, Franklin, and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, came out of
the nearby banana plantation and went in the direction of Cesario. The group of men then
surrounded Cesario and intimidated him. Cesario felt the hostilities and tried to get away. But the
accused started fire on Cesario’s harvest which prompted Cesario to return for his burning crops.
While Cesario was trying to put the fire out, Florencio ordered to go near Cesario. Eddie did what
was told and pulled out a shotgun from the rice sack that he was holding and shot Cesario on the
left portion of his chest. As Cesario fell, they fired then another shot inflicting mortal wounds on
Cesario. The gang of men then fled the scene. The Supreme Court affirmed the guilt of the accused.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil liability of the brother’s arose upon the final judgment of the
Supreme Court of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court found them guilty and since the civil action for damages was deemed
instituted in the criminal action then their civil liability has also been proven. According to Article

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100 of the Revised Penal Code, Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Also
Article 20 of the Civil Code states that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. And the same is strengthened
finally by Article 1161 of the Civil Code which states that civil obligation arising from criminal
offenses shall be governed by the penal laws. Underlying this principle is that a person who is
criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has
dual character; First, as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order,
and second as an offense against the private person injured by the crime.

DEATH AS A MODE OF EXTINGUISMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY

PEOPLE vs. BAYOTAS


G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

Facts:
The accused, Rogelio Bayotas, was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June 19,
1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction the accused
died. The findings of the National Bilibid Hospital declared him dead on February 4, 1992.

The Supreme Court in its resolution dated May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal but then required the Solicitor General to file its comment on Bayotas’ civil liability arising
from the crime. In the Solicitor General’s comment the civil liability hasn’t yet expired. The solicitor
general based its judgment on the case of People vs. Sendaydiego. The counsel of the accused-
appellant had a different view; where the death occurred after final judgment the criminal and civil
liability shall be extinguished.

Issue:
Whether or not the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the accused. According to the Supreme Court, the
controlling statute was Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision states that death
extinguishes the criminal aspect. In the case at bar, there was no reservation of an independent civil

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action against the accused; the criminal and civil aspects are therefore considered as instituted in the
criminal action. Since the civil action was anchored with the criminal case then it follows that the
death dissolves both civil and criminal liability.

The Solicitor General’s dependence on the Sendaydiego case was misplaced. What was
contemplated in the Sendaydiego case was the civil liability arising from other sources of obligation
other than delicts. It is therefore safe to say that what death extinguishes is criminal liability and civil
liability arising from delict only.

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

CANCIO vs. ISIP


G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002

Facts:
The accused, EmerenciaIsip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of B.P. 22, also known
as the Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One of the B.P. 22 cases was dismissed due to it
being deposited before 90 days from the date written on the check. The other two cases of B.P. 22
were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga and were then dismissed due to the
failure of the prosecution to prosecute the crime.

Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
After failing to present its second witness, the prosecution dismissed the Estafa case. The
prosecution reserved its right to file a separate civil action from the said criminal cases. The court
granted the reservation. The criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed without prejudice to the civil
action. On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for the collection of the sum of
money, seeking to recover the amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases. Respondent then
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that the petition is already barred by the doctrine
of Res Judicata.

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Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action regardless of the dismissal of
the criminal case of estafa.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The reservation for civil action
was made by the prosecution on time. According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is a
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.

In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly based on culpa contractual. The cause of action
was the breach of the respondent’s breach of the contractual obligation. Evidently, the petitioner
was seeking to make good the value written on the checks in exchange for cash. The case was not
anchored the criminal aspect of estafa but on the civil aspect of culpa contractual. As such, it is
distinct and independent from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless
of the result of the criminal proceedings.

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM ACQUITTAL

HEIRS OF GUARING vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997

Facts:
On November 7, 1987, the car driven by TeodoroGuaring Jr. collided with the Philippine
Rabbit Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas and with a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez,
along the North Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga. As a consequence, Guaring
died.The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the Court of Appeals where the
accused was acquitted based on reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out that the
deceased was the one who acted negligently. The accused the claimed appealed in the court that the
civil case filed against him be extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal liability
necessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liability, since his civil liability aroused from his
criminal liability. The petitioners disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should pursue.
This was then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

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Whether or not the civil liability of the accused is extinguished due to his acquittal.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt,
which means that the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was
based on quasi-delict. Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-delict, the
acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a
finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that the
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused
is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious
mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil
liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was
acquitted.Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for the civil case of the said
incident must continue for the recovery of damages of the victim’s heirs. The case was remanded to
the trial court to determine the civil liability of the accused.

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION)

ARAFILES vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC.


G.R. No. 150256 March 25, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner CatalinoArafiles seeks a review of the CA decision which dismissed his complaint
for damages against respondent’s publisher Philippine Journalists Inc, Manuel Villareal Jr., Editor
Max Buan Jr. and reporter Romy Morales. Respondent Morales wrote a report that appeared on
People’s Journal Tonight, which related how EmelitaDespuig, an employee of the National Institute
of Atmospheric Sciences (NAIS) of PAG-ASA, lodged a complaint against petitioner, a
NAIS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with attempted rape and the
supposed details of the rape. About a year after the report was published, Arafiles instituted the
complaint for damages, alleging that on account of the “grossly malicious and overly sensationalized

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reporting in the news item”, his reputation as a director of NAIS was injured, that he became the
object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist and
that the news deferred his promotion.

Issue:
Whether or not the article published constitute a libelous material, which would make the
editors liable for defamation.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the news article is not malicious.In actions for damages for
libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined
and viewed as a whole.In order to ascertain the meaning of a published article, the whole of the
article must be considered, each phrase must be construed in the light of the entire publication. The
headlines of a newspaper must also be read in connection with the language which follows.The
presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational
manner, but it is not per se illegal.

Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the
headline and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of
the NIAS actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita. The succeeding paragraphs, in
which petitioner and complainant Emelita were eventually identified, sufficiently convey to the
readers, however, that the narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at
the police headquarters.Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation,
but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said
right or abused the freedom of the press.

The newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the preparation of
stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their deadlines; and consistently with
good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for
honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.

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INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION)

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGANCES vs. ARGOS


G.R. No. 130362 September 10, 2001

Facts:
Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial director respectively of
the International Flavors and Fragrances Incorporated (IFFI) filed a libel case against Hernan H.
Costa, the managing director of IFFI after being described by the latter as pesona non grata in his

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personal announcement after termination of their services. They later filed a separate civil case for
damages against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig wherein IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. The Regional Trial Court granted IFFI’s
motion to dismiss for respondent’s failure to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court granted Argos and Pineda’s petition
which was later affirmed by the appellate court.

Issue:
Whether or not Argos and Pineda could sue IFFI for damages based on subsidiary liability in
an independent civil action.

Ruling:
IFFI, petitioner contends that respondents did not allege that IFFI was primarily liable
for damages and on the contrary, the complaint was replete with references that IFFI was being
sued for its subsidiary capacity. Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in cases of
defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. As ruled in Joaquin vs. Aniceto however, article 33 contemplates an
action against the employee in his primary capacity. It does not apply to an action against the
employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability as such liability arises only after conviction of the
employee in the criminal case or when the employee adjudged guilty of the wrongful act. Thus, the
Supreme Court granted IFFI’s petition for dismissal.

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (DEFAMATION)

RUIZ vs. UCOL


G.R. No.L-454404 August 7, 1987

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Facts:
AgustinaTagaca, laundry-woman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an
administrative charge against defendant-appelleeEncarnacionUcol, a midwife in the health center of
Sarratt, Ilocos Norte. In an answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was a mere tool used by
Atty. Ruiz to get back to her because of a case filed by Ucol’s husband against Ruiz. She was also
alleged to have made remarks that Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges. The said
case was dismissed but Ruiz decided to file his own criminal case against Ucol based on the alleged
libelous portions of Ucol’s answer. After the trial, the lower court rendered judgment acquitting
Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Instead of appealing
the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages. Ucol moved for a motion
to dismiss on the ground of res judicata which was then granted by the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte after being remanded by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Whether or not Ruiz is barred by the criminal case of libel from filing a separate civil action
for damages.

Ruling:
Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata in the case, since the decision of the trial
court did not pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal case. Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives
an offended party in cases of defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action distinct from
the criminal proceedings is not without limitations. The Supreme Court found that the appeal of
Ruiz is without merit as records of the trial court manifest that the suit being charged by Ruiz to be
a harassment suit on the followinggrounds. (1)Ruiz had something to do with the administrative
complaint, (2) Ruiz filed a criminal case for libel against Mrs. Ucol’s answer in the administrative
case after the administrative case’s dismissal, (3) Ruiz acted as a private prosecutor in the criminal
caseactively handling as a lawyer the very case where he was the complainant, and (4) After Ucol was
acquitted, Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols by filing a civil action for damages.

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)

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VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO
G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007

Facts:
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad
valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior
to the effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and
“More”, all manufactured by Fortune, as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand
subject to the 55% Ad Valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were
already covered. In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance
of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law
and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to
dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she
acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts.
She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or
bad faith.

Issue:
Whether or not an independent civil action under Article 32 of the Civil Code would prosper
against the petitioner.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner can be subject to a civil action under Article 32
of the Civil Code. The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person
may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which
he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be
a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its
consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity
for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by
the mantle of immunity for official actions. Under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil
liability may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior
public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate
public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or negligence.

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The decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law, which prevails over a general law,
the Administrative Code. A quasi-delict has been defined as the commission or omission of an act
by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person,
property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in quasi-delict is
determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the offender, and there are circumstances
under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes
given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act
itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the
absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s
legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil
intent.

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INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)

COJUANGCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999

Facts:
Eduardo Cojuangco is a known businessman-sportsman owing several racehorses which he
entered in the sweepstake races on March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won
the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes
together with the 30% due for trainer and grooms. Unfortunately, the winnings were being withheld
on the advice of Presidential Commission on Good Government Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz.

The Chairman of PCSO and the Private Respondent, Fernando O. Carrascoso, offered to
give back the winnings but it was refused by the petitioner for the reason that the matter is already in
court. The trial court held that Carrascoso had no authority to withhold the winnings since there was
no writ of sequestration evidencing the orders of PCGG. Carrascoso feared that if he did not
withhold the winning he would be liable for neglect of duty. Carrascoso maintained that bad faith
did not attend his acts therefore he is not liable for damages. In fact, Carrascoso stated that he
returned the principal amount of the winning evidencing his good faith. Petitioner begs to differ.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages for the violation of his constitutional rights
to due process.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that petitioner is entitled for damages in accordance with Article 32
of the Civil Code. Article 32(6) of the Civil Code provides that any public officer or employee, or
any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages, in this case the right against deprivation of property without due process of law.

Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as


arbitrary or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from
PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the

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properties of petitioner. Although it is true that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral
and exemplary damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, the Court nevertheless
states that bad faith is not necessary in praying for damages in Article 32 of the Civil Code. Under
the Article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith.To be liable, it is
enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties.

A little exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically
for the sequestration of the racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any
such writ covering his racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing
of a prima facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process.The withholding of the
prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a
violation of his property rights without due process of law.

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INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (VIOLATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS)

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. CASTILLO


G.R. No. 182976 January 14, 2013

Facts:
Respondents are spouses engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling fluorescent
fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal fabrication under the name and style of Permanent
Light Manufacturing Enterprise. In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter
Legaspi , Fully Phased Inspectors of Meralco sought permission to inspect Permanent Lights electric
meter. Ignacio and Legaspi, together with an employee of Permanent Light, proceeded to check the
electric meter. Upon inspection, the MERALCO inspectors noticed that the electric meter was
tampered and right there and then took down the meter. It was found out that indeed the meter has
been tampered with.

Permanent Light agreed to pay the deficient bills. MERALCO installed a new electric meter.
The respondents alleged that the electric meter registered unusually high readings. The petitioners
are now requesting that the old electric meter be re-installed since it shows a more accurate reading.
The respondents also pray for damages since the electric meter was allegedly removed without
following the required procedure. The RTC ruled in favor of respondents entitled to damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision stating that the petitioner abused its rights when it
disconnected the electricity of Permanent Light. The petitioners raise the issue of damages to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not MERALCO is liable for damages in for the violation of the constitutional
rights of the respondent.

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Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Permanent Light is entitled to exemplary damages for the
violation of their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court based its judgment on Section 4 of
Republic Act 7832 which provides that taking down of tampered electric meter should be personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy
Regulatory Board. MERALCO failed to show evidence that there was an officer of the law or a duly
authorized representative of ERB therefore there is no prima facie evidence that the meter is
tampered and they have no right to disconnect the electric meter. Besides, even if there is prima
facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7832 provides that even if
flagrante delicto, there must be still be a written notice or warning to the owner of the house or the
establishment concerned. In light or the following the Supreme Court awards exemplary damages to
Permanent Light for the recompense of their injured rights. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for
awards of damages in cases where the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of
property without due process of law are violated.

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)

BARREDO vs. GARCIA


G.R. No. 48006 July 8, 1942

Facts:
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a horse-drawn carriage
thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against
Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted.
After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo, the owner of the taxi and the
employer of Fontanilla. The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code which provides that
negligence of employers in the selection of their employees can be civilly liable. Barredo assailed the
suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed
against Fontanilla primarily and not him.

Issue:
Whether or not Barredo can be civilly liable for the crime committed by his employee.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Barredo can be civilly liable. He is primarily liable under
Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his
rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and

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has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was
shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him, something he
failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action,
Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages
arising from a criminal act, but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee under Article
1903.

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION (QUASI-DELICTS/TORTS)

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY vs. TANGCO


G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006

Facts:
On November 3, 1997, Evangeline Tangco went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch,
Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advice of the bank's cashier as she would sign a
specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the
same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank,
and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot
Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.

Respondent filed a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting
Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under quasi-delicts.

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Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that respondent is entitled to damages. It ruled that while it may be
conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly of
Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it
required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under
the law; that supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for
the protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also
the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

CITY OF PASIG vs. COMELEC


G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999

Facts:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
separated from its mother Barangay Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted
and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City of Pasig passed
and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City.
Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.

Meanwhile on Sep. 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating
Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.Immediately
upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the
respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the COMELEC on June 19, 1996, and

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March 12, 1997, respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the
COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of
boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas
included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case. Hence, the scheduled plebiscites
should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the
court.

Issue:
Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled due to a prejudicial question of territory.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that this is an exception to the general rule of prejudicial questions
and that the suspension or cancellation of the plebiscite be granted. A case involving a boundary
dispute between Local Government Units presents a prejudicial question which must first be
decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.While it may be
the general rule that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not
come into play where both cases are civil, in the interest of good order, the SC can very well suspend
action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely interrelated/linked to the first.

A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly
identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Primarily
becauseterritorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending civil case, until and unless such issue is
resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be
an exercise in futility.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE


G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner was married to Charmaine Felix on June 16, 1973. After 24 years of marriage and
having four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on ground of psychological
incapacity. Charmaine on the other hand filed a criminal complaint for concubinage against
petitioner and his paramour. To forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the criminal
complaint, petitioner filed for the suspension of the criminal case on concubinage arguing that the
civil case for the nullification of their marriage is a prejudicial question.

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Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage under psychological incapacity is a
prejudicial question to the criminal case of concubinage.

Ruling:
The rationale on the existence of prejudicial questions is to avoid two conflicting issues. Its
requisites are 1) that a civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal action and 2) the resolution of the issue determines whether or not the criminal action will
proceed. In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage
void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the
proof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as there
is no such final judgment the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore he who cohabits with a woman not his wife risks being prosecuted for concubinage.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

MERCED vs. DIEZ


G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of his marriage to Elizabeth Ceasar alleging that
he married Elizabeth by reason of force, threat and intimidation upon his persons by Elizabeth’s

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relatives. Elizabeth on the other hand filed a criminal complaint alleging that petitioner has been
previously married to one Eufrocina Tan. He now files a petition for the suspension of the criminal
case on grounds of prejudicial question.

Issue:
Whether or not an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question.

Ruling:
In order that a person may be held liable for the crime of bigamy, the subsequent marriage
must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the
contracting parties must be freely given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal
and void. Since the validity of the second marriage is in question, subject of the action for bigamy,
cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless all
the elements concur, it is necessary then that a decision in a civil action must first be secured.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

DONATO vs. LUNA

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G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

Facts:
An information for bigamy against herein petitioner was filed. It is alleged that petitioner
married Rosalindo Maluping on June 30, 1978, he however married for the second time with Paz
Abayan on September 26, 1978. Prior to the trial for the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to
suspend on grounds of a prejudicial question. He claims that the civil case for the nullity of his
second marriage is a prejudicial question.

Issue:
Whether or not the civil case for nullity of marriage is a prejudicial question to the criminal
case of bigamy.

Ruling:
The issue of the nullity of the marriage in the civil case is not determinative of petitioner’s
guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It is noteworthy that the complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit was filed by Paz
Abayan, the second wife. He who contracts a second marriage before a judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The case for annulment of marriage
can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is
proved that the petitioner’s consent to marriage was obtained through duress, violence or
intimidation. Such is not the case at bar. Petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to
evade the prosecution of the criminal case. Records reveal that prior to petitioner’s second marriage
he had been living with private respondent as husband and wife for more than five years. He only
came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through force, threat and
intimidation one year from the solemnization of the second marriage.

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PREJUDICIAL QUESTION

TENEBRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Less than a year after,
petitioner told Leticia that he has been previously married and that he is leaving to live with his first
wife, Hilda Villareyes. On January25, 1993 petitioner contracted yet another marriage with Nilda
Villegas. Ancajas learned of this third marriage she verified if the petitioner is truly married to Hilda,
to which it was affirmative. She then filed a criminal complaint of bigamy against herein petitioner.
His marriage to Ancajas however was subsequently nullified on ground of psychological incapacity
while the criminal complaint was pending. He now raises the defense that the bigamy is not
committed in lieu of the nullity of the marriage.

Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of the nullity of marriage on ground of psychological
incapacity bars the prosecution of the crime of bigamy.

Ruling:
A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void; the
nullity of the second marriage is not per se an argument for avoidance of criminal liability for
bigamy. The declaration of nullity is absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned. There is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null
and void purely because it is a second marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on
ground of psychological incapacity. Although the judicial declaration for nullity of marriage retroacts
to the date of the celebration of marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned,
the marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is the liability of incurring criminal
liability for bigamy.

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PRESUMPTIVE CIVIL PERSONALITY

GELUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R.No . L-16439 July 20, 1961

Facts:
Peitioner and Nita Villanueva were lovers. Before they were married Nita got pregnant to
which she had got an abortion from private respondent Oscar Lazo. After Nita’s marriage with
plaintiff, she again became pregnant but due to her work priorities, she again had again had abortion
with the same doctor. She had a third abortion done by the same. The plaintiff now sues an award
for damages against Doctor Oscar alleging that he did not know of, nor gave his consent to the
abortions. He is suing for damages for the unborn child.

Issue:
Whether or not an action for damages can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child.

Ruling:
No action for damages could be instituted in behalf of the unborn child on account of the
injuries it received; no such action could derivatively accrue to its parents. No transmission of rights
can take place from on due to the lack of juridical personality. Article 40 of the Civil Code limits the
application of the presumptive civil personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive. However, moral damages could be awarded for the illegal arrest of the
normal development of the fetus on account of distress and anguish attendant to is lost, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations. The records do not bear such case. It is clear that the
husband is only intent on recovering money from the doctor.

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RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT

CATALAN vs. BASA


G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007

Facts:
Feliciano Catalan was discharged from military service due to his psychological incapacity of
schizophrenia on October 20, 1948. He married Corazon Cerezo on September 1949. On June 1951
he donated a parcel of land to his sister Mercedes Catalan. On December 1953 Feliciano was
declared incompetent and BPI was appointed as his guardian. Mercedes sold the properties to herein
respondents in 1979. In 1997, BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian filed an action or declaration of
nullity od documents and recovery of possession and ownership alleging that the donation to
Mercedes was void ab initio as Feliciano not of sound mind when he effected the donation, ipso
facto, the sale to herein respondents are void ab initio.

Issue:
Whether or not Feliciano’s donation is void for lack of consent due to incapacity.

Ruling:
In order for a donation to be valid, the donor’s capacity to give consent at the time of the
donation is existing. There lies no doubt that insanity impinges on consent freely given. However
the burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it, if no sufficient proof to
this effect is presented, capacity is presumed. The evidence presented by petitioners was insufficient
to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in
question. A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed
capable of attending to his rights.

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RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT

DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 127540 October 17, 2001

Facts:
Paulina Rigonan owns three parcels of land. She allegedly sold them to spouses Felipe and
Concepcion Rigonan who claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners who claim to be her
closest surviving relatives allegedly took possession of the properties. Petitioners claim that the sale
was void for being spurious as well as lacking consideration.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale was void.

Ruling:
At the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of
advanced age and senile. She died an octogenarian. The general rule is that a person is not
incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities.
However when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person
from properly , intelligently and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably
incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony shows that at the time of the execution of the deed,
Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She played with her waste and urinated in
bed. Given these circumstances, there is sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to
the sale of and the price for her parcels of land.

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RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT

MENDEZONA vs. OZAMIZ


G.R. No. 143370 February 6, 2002

Facts:
Petitioners own a parcel of land and to remove a cloud on their said respective titles caused
by the inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens initiated a suit. They ultimately trace their
ownership to a deed of sale executed by Carmen Ozamiz. Respondents are now impugning the deed
of sale, alleging that Carmen Ozamiz was incapacitated at the time of the execution of the sale.

Issue:
Whether or not the deed of sale is void due to the incapacity of the seller.

Ruling:
The testimonies on record all made sweeping statements which failed to show the true state
of mind of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the execution of the disputed document. It has been held
that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of
physical infirmity. Only when such age or infirmity impair her mental faculties to such extent as to
prevent her from properly, intelligently and fairly protecting her property rights is she considered
incapacitated. Respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time of the sale on April
28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz has allegedly lost control of her mental faculties.

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Persons and Family Relation
RESTRICTIONS OR MODIFICATION ON CAPACITY TO ACT

OPOSA vs. FACTORAN


G.R. No. 101083 July 10, 1993

Facts:
Petitioners are all minor duly represented and joined by their respective parents. The minors
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. They seek
to cancel all existing timber license agreements and restrain the Secretary of DENR from issuing
anymore TLAs in the protection of our forest reserves and nature in general.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have the requisite standing and capacity to sue.

Ruling:
Petitioner minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. The court finds no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for other of their

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generations and for succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

KINDS OF DOMICILE

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS


G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner filed for the candidacy of the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte. Private respondent who was then the incumbent representative filed a petition for the
cancellation and disqualification alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement
for residency.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner satisfies the residency requirement or not.

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Persons and Family Relation
Ruling:
Domicile includes the twin elements of 1) the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed
place and 2) animus manendi or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence implies the
factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a
given area. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves
the intent to leave when the purpose which the resident has taken up his abode ends. If a person’s
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile. It is thus quite normal for an individual to have
different residences but have only one domicile. These concepts however have evolved in political
law to be used synonymously. When the Constitution however speaks of residence in election law, it
actually means only domicile. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Based on the evidence, petitioner clearly only had
numerous residences, but maintained her domicile to be in Leyte.

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

ARUEGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 112193 March 13, 1996

Facts:
Jose Aruego Sr. had an amorous relationship with Luz Fabian out of this were born two
children. Jose died on March 30 1982. After his death private respondents filed a case for declaration

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of acknowledgement as illegitimate children. Petitioners herein are challenging such action
interposing that under the Family code the method by which respondents can prove their filiation
has already prescribed, that his while the putative parent is alive.

Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case.

Ruling:
Respondents are establishing their filiation by “open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child” under the Civil Code which provides for four years before the
attainment of age of majority. The Family Code on the other hand provides that such manner of
establishing filiation can only be brought within the lifetime of the parent. The Family Code cannot
be applied in the case. Retroactive application cannot be applied if a vested right is impaired or
prejudiced in the process. The right of action of the minor child for recognition has been vested by
the filing of complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior effectively of the
Family Code.

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

BERNABE vs. ALEJO

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Persons and Family Relation
G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002

Facts:
Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo. The son
was born on September 1981. The Fiscal died on August 1993. On May 1994, Carolina in behalf of
Adrian filed a complaint for Adrian to be declared and acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and such entitled to his share in the estate. Petitioners are challenging the petition on
grounds that the action has prescribed on ground that the Family code has retroactive application
and hence, the manner of proving filiation by “open and continuous possession of a status of a
legitimate child” must have been brought within the lifetime of the putative parent.

Issue:
Whether or not the Family code finds a retroactive application in the case.

Ruling:
The right to an action for recognition which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code
has already vested to Adrian prior the enactment of the Family Code. A vested right is one which is
absolute, complete and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. Certainly the retroactive
effect of the family code finds no application in this case.

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Persons and Family Relation
DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE

ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA


G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent got married on March 1959. They had eight children. On
December 1992, respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their children. On
January 1994, petitioner filed a separate case for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and
judicial separation of property with a plea for support and pendent lite. On April 1994 the parties
executed a compromise agreement. Respondent wanting to marry again filed a declaration of nullity
of his marriage with petitioner on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner was never served
the summons because of misrepresentation. She was declared in default and the marriage declared
void and null. Petitioner now seeks a new trial and nullification of the decision declaring the
marriage void on ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not there is basis for a new trial.

Ruling:
Petitioner was never served the summons; the trial court never gained jurisdiction of her,
hence the decision null and void. Article 48 of the Family Code states that in cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage the court shall order the appearance of the prosecuting
attorney to avoid collusion and in Rule 18 Section 6 of the Rules of Court, it is expressly stated that
there can be no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or legal separation. The court just did
the opposite as mandated by the aforementioned provisions of law. Our Constitution is committed
to the basic policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on
the policy that marriage is not a mere contract but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The motion for a new trial is granted.

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Persons and Family Relation
DEFINITION AND NATURE OF MARRIAGE

ABADILLA vs. TABILIRAN


A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner is the assigned clerk of court at the sala of herein respondent Judge. Respondent
stands charged with gross immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption unbecoming of a Judge. It is
alleged that he has scandalously and publicly cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during the existence
of a previous marriage, represented himself as single in the marriage contract with Priscilla. He also
caused the registration of his three illegitimate children as legitimate.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of the charges.

Ruling:
Respondent is guilty of gross immorality for having scandalously and openly cohabited with
said Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita Tabiliran. It makes
mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. It is not only a civil
contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently every intendment of the law leans towards legalizing matrimony.
Respondent Judge is dismissed from service.

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Persons and Family Relation
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE

DELA ROSA vs. HEIRS OF RUSTIA VDA. DE GUZMAN


G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006

Facts:
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died not only intestate, but they died without
descendants. Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Herein petitioners and respondents are their
respective relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate. The alleged heirs of Josefa consist of her
half and full-blood siblings, nephews. On Guillermo’s side, his sisters, nephews and nieces,
illegitimate child and de facto adopted child. The petitioner for letters of administration stated that
Guillermo and Rustia were never married. Josefa Delgado estate claimants are her natural siblings.
Josefa was the daughter of Felisa by one Lucio Ocampo with five other children without the benefit
of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of the
claimants in Josefa’s estate. If Luis Delgado is the legitimate child of Felisa she is barred from
inheriting from Josefa by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and between Felisa
and Ramon.

Ruling:
Every intendment of the law leans towards legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.Always presume marriage. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo and Josefa. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not
always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage arises other
evidences may be presented just as herein. The certificate of identity issued to Josefa as Mrs.
Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa Rustia, the declaration under oath of
Guilermo that he was married to Josefa buttress the presumption of the existence of marriage.
Guillermo and Josefa are married. Anent the marriage of Felisa by Ramon, the factors and evidence

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presented sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Hence Luis Delgado can
inherit from Josefa.

PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE

EUGENIO vs. VELEZ


G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

Facts:
Herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that their sister,
Vitaliana, was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by herein
petitioner in his residence in Misamis Occidental. Unknown to respondents, Vitaliana has died and
petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana reasoning that the corpse cannot be the subject
of habeas corpus proceedings. As her common law husband, petitioner now claims custody over
Vitaliana’s body.

Issue:
Whether or not the common law husband has custody over Vitaliana’s body instead of the
immediate relatives.

Ruling:
Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for years as husband and wife may be considered legally mauled in common
law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. Notwithstanding, such relationship produces a
community of property and interest and there is authority in case law that exists to the effect that
such form of co-ownership requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any
way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Herein petitioner had a subsisting marriage with another
woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from legally marrying Vitaliana. Custody of the
dead body must be awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the
Revised Administrative Code.

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Persons and Family Relation
PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE AND VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE

BALOGBOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 83598 March, 7, 1997

Facts:
Petitioners are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Geneveva Arnibal who died intestate.
They had an older brother named Gavino but he died predeceasing their parents. Private
respondents on the other hand are the alleged children of Gavino with Catalina Ubas and as such
are entitled to inherit from the estate of their grandparents. Petitioners aver that Gavino did not
marry hence barring respondents from inheriting from the estate.

Issue:
Whether or not there the presumption of marriage between Gavino and Catalino was
successfully overcome.

Ruling:
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption is rebutted only by cogent
proof of which the petitioners failed to do so. Although a marriage contract is considered primary
evidence of marriage the failure to present it is no proof that no marriage took place. Private
respondents proved through testimonial evidence that Gavino and Catalina were married and that
their children were recognized as legitimate children of Gavino. The law favors the validity of
marriage because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of it is a
matter of constitutional concern.

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Persons and Family Relation
LEGAL CAPACITY

SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner avers that he is a male transsexual. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation culminating with sex reassignment surgery in Thailand.
From then on, petitioner deposed himself as female and got engaged. He now seeks to have his
name in his birth certificate changed and his sex from male to female.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can change the entry of sex in his birth certificate.

Ruling:
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.
However a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. R.A. 9048 does not
sanction such change of name under such cause. It is further a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. However no reasonable interpretation of the
provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

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A person’s sex is an essential requisite in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. To grant the changes sought by the petitioner will substantially reconfigure
and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment.

LEGAL CAPACITY

REPUBLIC vs. CAGANDAHAN


G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner was born on January 1981 and was registered as a female in the birth certificate.
While growing up she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed with Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a condition where a person thus afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics. While maturing it was the male characteristics that continued to develop and
be pronounced and hence, he deposed himself as a male person. He now seeks to alter his name of
Jennifer to Jeff.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for the change of name can be effected.

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Persons and Family Relation
Ruling:
Respondent undisputedly has CAH which involves intersex anatomy. The court is of the
view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reasons thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering
that his body produces high levels of male hormones there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being male. The petition is granted.

AUTHORITY OF SOLEMNIZING OFFICER

BESO vs. DAGUMAN


A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211 January 28, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner and Bernardito Yman got married on August 28, 1997 by herein respondent
Judge. After the wedding herein petitioner was abandoned by her husband hence prompting her to
check with the Civil Registrar to inquire regarding the marriage contract to which it was found out
that the marriage was no registered. She now filed this administrative complaint against herein
respondent Judge alleging that the marriage was solemnized outside of his jurisdiction.

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Persons and Family Relation
Issue:
Whether or not the Judge has authority to solemnize the marriage.

Ruling:
Article 7 of the Family Code provides that the Judge can solemnize a marriage within the
court jurisdiction. Considering that the respondent Judge’s jurisdiction covers the municipality of
Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize the
marriage in the City of Calabayog where herein marriage was solemnized.

AUTHORITY OF A SOLEMNIZING OFFICER

MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO


A.M. No.MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002

Facts:

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On 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized petitioner’s marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is
outside his territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband
passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast
properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions
of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge should be sanctioned for solemnizing marriage with
lack of marriage license and beyond his jurisdiction?

Ruling:
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional
trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of
respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the
marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects
him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for
violating the law on marriage.

The respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.

MARRIAGE LICENSE

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Persons and Family Relation
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARAvs.ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and
COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 167746 August 28, 2007

Facts:
On December 8,1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto Alcantara (petitioner)
went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage
for them. They met a person “fixer” who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage was likewise celebrated
without the parties securing a marriage license. The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City
Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel. However, there was a marriage license obtained in Carmona,
Cavite but neither of the parties is a resident of Carmona, Cavite and they never went to the said
place to apply for a license with its local civil registrar. Petitioner and respondent went through
another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila on March 26,
1983 utilizing the same marriage license. The marriage license number “7054133” is not identical
with the marriage license number which appears in their marriage contract. There is also a case filed
by the respondent against herein petitioner before the MTC of Mandaluyong for concubinage.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the petitioner and respondent is void.

Ruling:
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of Family
Code, the applicable law would be the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article
53 of the same Code. The law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent
on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In the case at bar, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. Moreover, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage
license was issued further validating the fact that a license was issued to the parties herein.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the
contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to
the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not
affect the validity of the marriage. The court still holds that there is no sufficient basis to annul their
marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but
the parties or party responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally, administratively liable.

The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal
civil registrar, which states that the marriage license number issued to the parties is No. 7054133,
while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number

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7054033. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere typographical error. It therefore
does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license
to the parties.

The authority of the solemnizing officer shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will
be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. The solemnizing officer is not duty-
bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the
local civil registrar. All the said officer needs to know is that the license has been duly and regularly
issued by the competent official. Lastly, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil
marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularities or defect attended the civil wedding.
The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the RTC of Makati City is affirmed.

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Persons and Family Relation
MARRIAGE LICENSE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.COURT OF APPEALS and


ANGELINA M. CASTRO
GR No. 103047 September 2, 1994

Facts:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin
Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she
was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4
months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with
the consent of Cardenas.

The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter
wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a
declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage
license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig.

Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient
to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their
marriage?

Rulings:
The court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals that the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not
issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not
supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar
circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings,
which he chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

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Persons and Family Relation
MARRIAGE LICENSE

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑOvs.SUSAN YEE CARIÑO


GR No. 132529 February 2, 2001

Facts:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages; the
first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño, with whom he had two children.
And the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño with whom he had
no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. In November 23, 1992,
SPO4 Santiago Cariño passed away under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and
burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.

On December 14, 1993, respondent filed the instant case for collection of sum of money
against the petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was
solemnized without the required marriage license confirmed by the marriage certificate of the
deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and a certification dated March
9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Manila stating that they have no record of
marriage license of the spouses Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao Cariño who allegedly married in
the said municipality on June 20, 1969.

Issue:
Whether or not the two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño are
valid in determining the beneficiary of his death benefits?

Ruling:
Under the Civil Code which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage
and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders a marriage void ab initio. In the case
at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license was indispensable to the validity
of their marriage. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears

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no marriage license number and as certified by the Local Civil registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
their office has no record of such marriage license. The certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data to the
issuance of a marriage license. Therefore, the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the said requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

The declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The
fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. To reiterate, under article 40 of Family Code,
for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.

Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would
not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, is governed by the
provisions of articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code, wherein, the properties acquired by the
parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. By intestate
succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs and respondent, not
being the legal wife is not one of them. Conformably, even if the disputed “death benefits” were
earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. There is no allegation of bad faith in the present
case; both parties of the first marriage are presumed in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject
“death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the
other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his
children.

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MARRIAGE LICENSE

FILIPINA SYvs.COURT OF APPEALS


GR No. 127263 April 12, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years
old. Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their
conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody
of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC
of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property.
Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of
separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May
1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC Manila
convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days
imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to
Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of Appeals
denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner for
the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the
time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and marriage certificate is contained in
their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of
issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous.

Issues:

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a) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony?
b) Whether or not the private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said
marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?

Ruling:
A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio.
The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably
show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage
contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet
neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona.

From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the
ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case, there being no
claim of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between
petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the
psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner
to respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.

Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner
Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage
license at the time of celebration.

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Persons and Family Relation
MARRIAGE LICENSE

JAIME O. SEVILLA vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS


G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006

Facts:
On 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of
the Philippines, Jaime and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a
certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father
of Carmelita caused Jaime and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the
Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to
Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

On March 28, 1994, a complaint was filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC. In its
Decision dated January 25, 2002, the RTC declared the nullity of the marriage of the parties for lack
of the requisite marriage license. Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision

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dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court. Jaime filed a Motion
for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated
6 April 2005.

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

Issue:
Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties
herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question?

Ruling:
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not
exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing
the certifications, is effectively rebutted.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage
License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just
cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we
cannot easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of
the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Therefore, the instant petition is denied.

MARRIAGE LICENSE

SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS


G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

Facts:
Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991,
and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was
at his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-
law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of
said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not
know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did

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not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area.
In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their
marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage
license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage
license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed thus their
marriage on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision
to the Court of Appeals.

The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but the same was denied
by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008 hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of the
RTC granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage?

Ruling:
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and
Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria
and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967
was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do
not appear in the document.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his
motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not
make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed
to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab
initio.

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The petition is therefore granted.

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ


A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

Facts:

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Herminia Borja-Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her
husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When
respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated.” For
this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of
the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May
1999.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered
to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt
with more severely.

Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the
complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law?

Ruling:
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he
stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzano’s and
Payao’s subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which
were subscribed and sworn to before him.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a
void and bigamous marriage. The maxim “ignorance of the law excuses no one” has special
application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be
conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and
elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

The recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED,with


theMODIFICATIONthat the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque
Sanchez is increased to P20,000.00.

MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT

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ENGRACE NIÑAL vs. NORMA BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April
24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for
lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of
the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who
could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the second marriage is covered by the exception to the requirement of a
Marriage license?
b) Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father’s
marriage void after his death?
Ruling:
The second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element. In this
case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time
Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty
months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at
the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the
marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife".Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack
a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution,and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in
relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary,

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the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment is legitimate.
MARRIAGES EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUIREMENT

JUVY N. COSCA vs. HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR.


A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

Facts:
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October
5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal
solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in
consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received; (5)
infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of filing fees from
exempted entities.

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite
marriage license. Thus, these couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the
marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license. It is alleged that
respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July, 1992,
when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents
likewise made it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the
Notarial Register will show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were
notarized during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each
document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account for the difference.
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge
forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell
Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on
October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she
gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge. Finally, respondents are charged with
collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is
exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued,
respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the
same in her personal account.

Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge and the clerk of court were responsible of the
complaints charged?

Ruling:
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an

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example of integrity, uprightness and honesty.Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a
necessity. It applies, without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its
personnel, they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a
Court of justice.

On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the
formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

The Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon.
Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will
definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby dismissed from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch,
agency or instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

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MARRIAGE CEREMONY

LUCIO MORIGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004

Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were board mates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978). After school
year 1977-78, LucioMorigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, LucioMorigo
was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an
exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left
again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In
1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada.
Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in
Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria
Jececha Lumbago at the Virgensa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol to seek the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage
with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993,
appellant was charged with Bigamy in the Information filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The RTC of Bohol rendered a decision finding Lucio
Morigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in
Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage
ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and
executory. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC decision on the criminal case.

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Issue:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held
that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. As the
dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was
no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of
the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never married."

The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case
No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory. The first element of bigamy as a
crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married
"from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument
to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being
an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot
be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted
of the instant charge.

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Persons and Family Relation
THREE-FOLD LIABILITY

MARILOU NAMA MORENO vs. JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE


A.M. No. MJT-94-963 July 14, 1995

Facts:
On October 4, 1993, Marilou and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge
Bernabe. Marilou avers that Respondent Judge assured her that the marriage contract will be
released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the Respondent
Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage contract because the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claims that Respondent
Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her.

In his comment,Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno
to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant.The Respondent Judge
contends that he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law
when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a desire to help a begging
and pleading complainant who wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her pregnant
condition. In order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the marriage
ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage license was definitely forthcoming since the
necessary documents were complete.

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In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator
recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a
marriage license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions be imposed against him.

Issue:
Whether or not the Respondent Judge is guilty of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of
the law by solemnizing the marriage without the required marriage license?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Respondent Judge, by his own admission that he solemnized
the marriage between complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has
dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence"and to his promise to be "faithful to the law."

Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at
most, would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him completely. Good intentions
could never justify violation of the law. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00
and is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

THREE-FOLD LIABILITY

RODOLFO NAVARRO vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTAY


A.M. No. MJT-96-1088 July 19, 1996

Facts:
On September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first
wife. It is also alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between FlorianoDadorSumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigaodel
Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of
Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and
Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte.

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigaodel Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint


respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy for exhibiting gross
misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.

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Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct, as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated;
prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension
of the law. The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient
in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and
competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic
legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. It is not too much to expect them to know and
apply the law intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While magistrates may at
times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons.

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorga is considered bigamous and void,
there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda. The Office of the
Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void,
and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate
a deeper understanding of the law.

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MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB vs. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.


G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999

Facts:
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob
and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-appellee on the other
hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an
Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting
the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. During the proceedings

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for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo, the defendant-appellee Pedro sought to
intervene therein claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole
surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his
adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a
complaint for injunction with damages questioning appellee's claim as the legal heir of Alfredo. The
Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of Pedro Pilapil and against TomasaGuison. Such
decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff TomasaVda. De Jacob and deceased
Alfredo E. Jacob was valid?
b) Whether or not defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the existence of a valid marriage is established. It has been
established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the marriage was
exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code.The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption
took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.

On the second issue some considerations cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged
Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that
he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were
criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch
where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order
did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he
recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that
he performed thereafter. In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as
an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record
that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably
negate the alleged adoption of respondent. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the
person claiming such relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence
presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

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FOREIGN DIVORCE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRASUS L. IYOY


G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

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Facts:
Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones
Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children – Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie,
Calvert, and Carlos – who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage,
respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was "hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant." In 1984, Fely
left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the
youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left
for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed
divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned,
through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom
she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family,
staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because
he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely
returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus,
Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons.
Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using
the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as "Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus."
At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent
Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally
alleged in his Complaint that Fely’s acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly
demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code.

On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of
respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision
affirming the trial court’s declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the
finding of psychological incapacity of Fely?
b) Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable to
the case at bar?

Ruling:
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his
testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other
corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the

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recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,
such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of
Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband’s surname. Even considering
the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus’s Complaint filed with the
RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness
that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the
couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a
Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for
the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same
Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for
divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws,
then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely
could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

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FOREIGN DIVORCE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III


G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts:
On May 24, 1981, CiprianoOrbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son
and a daughter, KristofferSimbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986,
Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000,
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition,
the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not CiprianoOrbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be
alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his
former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence
sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. Nevertheless, we are
unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced
by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we
are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is

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now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE

ALICE REYES VAN DORN vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.


G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

Facts:
The petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established
their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December
18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner
be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree affected the property regime of the parties?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. The case involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,

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recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

EFFECTS OF FOREIGN DIVORCE

EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS


G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a
son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo;
that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse,
his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real

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properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent
does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be
liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner
Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this
was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no
legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at
the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked
the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal of the petition. On
February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the two motions to dismiss.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It
held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998

Issues:
a) Whether or not the venue was properly laid in the case
b) Whether or not respondent Felicidad has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for
letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their

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wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.
Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proven. The case therefore is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on the evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce between Felicisimo and Merry Lee.

ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND PROOF

GERBERT R. CORPUZ vs. DAISYLYN TINOL STO. TOMAS


G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

Facts:
Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn
T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert
left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man.
Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior
Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8,
2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce,
Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the
divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the
marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign
divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

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Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not
file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s. In its October 30, 2008 decision,
the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under
Philippine law.

Issue:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court qualifies its conclusion that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily
strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law
have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof,
either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
Foreign Service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the
RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law. The
petition was granted and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

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ACTION FOR RECOGNITION AND PROOF

GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A. RECIO


G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

Facts:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. Petitioner – a Filipina – and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino."

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Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided
on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the
ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed
the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is,
respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce
decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more martial union to nullify or annual.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven?
b) Whether or not the respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated. Fortunately
for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel
for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification.Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.
Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act
of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the
Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from
the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied
him to Philippine personal laws.

On the second issue, the Supreme Court held that there is absolutely no evidence that
proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court
shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)

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Exhibit "A" – Complaint;(b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio
(Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;(c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D.
Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;(d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the
City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick
A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;(b) Exhibit
"S" – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of
Australia;(c) Exhibit "3" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;(d) Exhibit "4"
– Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;and Exhibit
"5" – Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia
Recio since October 22, 1995. Based on the records, the Supreme Court cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner
on January 12, 1994. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. The case is
thus remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

NO MARRIAGE LICENSE

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.


A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

Facts:

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Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. In December 1991,
upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of
his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with
whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and
liabilities.

For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the
filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which
was disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he
admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage
ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage
for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went
through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied
for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his
care and custody as a single parent.

Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California
on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he
was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code apply to respondent considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article
40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by
the application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. Respondent made a
mockery of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman,
who beget him five children. Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to

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the practice of law in 1963. It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness
for membership in the legal profession.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his
behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his
private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his
everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary.

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BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE


G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

Facts:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in
the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner
herein. On November 18, 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.Thereafter, petitioner filed
a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Orlando. Respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando
from his first marriage, filed a similar petition. The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In
support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner. On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. Furthermore, it took
note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City
filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner.

On June 26, 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for
the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent.
The CA held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of
this Decision. On June 20, 2008, the CA denied her motion.Hence, this Petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce is valid.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as
1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein we said:It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage.

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first
be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree

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itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept
in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship
in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and
civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their
former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
laws.

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to
ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B.
Catalan.

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BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

FE D. QUITA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN


G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

Facts:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May
1941. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On July 23, 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three
(3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On April 16, 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate
of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to be
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda,
all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for
the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon
motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. Later
Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.

On the scheduled hearing, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The
prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted. On November 27, 1987
only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present
proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis
who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth.
Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records

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of birth that she and Arturo were married on April 22, 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it
was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the case should be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
b) Who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of
law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establish facts and admissions of
the parties?

Ruling:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo.
This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and
testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the
ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen
when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect.
Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would
become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and
Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning
under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit
from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.

The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D.
Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court
modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan
children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all
surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court
however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the
hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the
present petition for forum shopping is denied.

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BIGAMOUS/POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

VERONICO TENEBRO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004

Facts:
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant
Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling
which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified
from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner which was confirmed by
Villareyes.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. On November 10, 1997,
the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.

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Issues:
a) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the Court a quo convicting
petitioner of the crime of bigamy despite non-existence of the first marriage and
insufficiency of evidence.
b) Whether or not the Court erred in convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy despite
the clear proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been
declared null and void.

Ruling:
The Court held that after a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the assailed judgment. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements
of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove
the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. All three of these documents
fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. The documents issued by the National Statistics Office merely attest
that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage. The marriage contract
presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as
to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a
condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of
bigamy.

Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. The State’s penal laws
protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special
contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character
of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code
into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence
of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and
marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the

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solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).Under Article 5 of the Family Code,
any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37and 38may contract marriage.As such, we rule that the third and fourth
requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted
marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. The
act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not
look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its
permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the
State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.

BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

VICTORIA S. JARILLO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 164435 September 29, 2009

Facts:
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding
ceremony. On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in a church
wedding ceremony. Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-
93582 for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court. On appeal to the
CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in toto. In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch

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140, rendered a Decision dated March 28, 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 and 1975 marriages to
Alocillo null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision
became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked
said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction. Hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in rendering their decision.

Ruling:
Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.

Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense
in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous
one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated
because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo,
which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed
valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner’s marriage to Uy
make any difference. Petitioner’s defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.

Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty under the
Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken. The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that
the accused shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised
Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance
attendant to the commission of the crime. However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering
that petitioner’s marriage to Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment to be void ab initio
on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner was subjected to
manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the penalty imposed by the lower courts.

Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment


from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.

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BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

FLORENCE TEVES MACARRUBO vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARRUBO


A.C. No. 6148 February 27, 2004

Facts:

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Florence Teves Macarrubo (complainant), by herself and on behalf of her two children, filed
on June 6, 2000 a verified complaint for disbarment against Atty. Edmundo L. Macarubbo
(respondent) with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), alleging that respondent deceived her
into marrying him despite his prior subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza.

Complainant averred that he started courting her in April 1991, he representing himself as a
bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which was celebrated on two occasions; and that
although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded
in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his previous marriage was void. Complainant
further averred that respondent entered into a third marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino;
and that he abandoned complainant and their children without providing them any regular support
up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living conditions. After hearing during which both
complainant and respondent took the witness stand, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a
Report and Recommendation that the said respondent is suspended for three months for gross
misconduct reflecting unfavorably on the moral norms of the profession.

The final disposition of the present administrative case is now before this Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Edmundo Macarrubo is guilty of gross misconduct.

Ruling:
Thus, if the acquittal of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative
case against him, or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not affect its course,then
the judgment of annulment of respondent's marriage does not also exonerate him from a
wrongdoing actually committed. So long as the quantum of proof - clear preponderance of evidence
- in disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.

The disturbing fact that respondent was able to secure the annulment of his first two
marriages and is in the process of procuring the annulment of his third bears noting. Contrary to the
finding of the Investigating Commissioner, respondent, by his own admission, contracted a third
marriage.

Such pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage and


family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of
values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our
nation as a whole. This must be checked if not stopped. As officers of the court, lawyers must not
only in fact be of good moral character but must also be perceived to be of good moral character
and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such, including that which
makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage, outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community.

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There can then be no other fate that awaits respondent, as a consequence of his grossly
immoral conduct, than to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

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BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL vs. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY


G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986

Facts:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for
the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic
Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia,
for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo
A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church
in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that
said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly
forced to enter said marital union.

Issue:
Was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition devoid of merit.There is no need for petitioner to prove
that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to
be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent
she was still validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID
(Art. 80, Civil Code).

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded
VOID under the law.

The petition is dismissed.

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Persons and Family Relation
BIGAMOUS/ POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGES

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES vs. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO.


G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012

Facts:
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. On January
24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano
(Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an
Amended Decision declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. On May 14,
2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with
the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent.

On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint) alleging that her marriage with
Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak
of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the crime of
bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second
marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed.

On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order dismissing the case. Dissatisfied, a
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a
Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial
declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation
that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage
cannot be considered criminal.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against
respondent.

Ruling:
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy. The elements of the
crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead

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according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would
be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.

In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in
1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet
been annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were
alleged in the Information. Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first
marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change
the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus,
respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense
charged were sufficiently alleged.

Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

The petition is granted.

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VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO NOLASCO


G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993

Facts:
Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a
British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that chance meeting
onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until
they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his
seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in San
Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime
in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing
him that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica
had left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to
return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship
docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing
spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and
Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among
friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica
Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be
declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.The
trial court granted Nolasco's petition.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision,

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holding that respondent had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse
had already died.

Issue:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Ruling:
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code
which provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

The Family Code prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition
for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there
are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.

The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife
with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.In the case at bar, the
Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain
Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
belief that she was already dead. The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined
to give any information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent too
convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the
alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him.
Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from
their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during
trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case,
admissibility is not synonymous with credibility

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Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage like an ordinary
contract. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law
that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead.

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 159614 December 9, 2005

Facts:
On March 29, 2001, Alan B. Alegro filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 27, for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife, Rosalia (Lea) A.
Julaton. On May 28, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Motion to Dismissthe petition, which was, however, denied by the court.
At the hearing, Alan adduced evidence that he and Lea were married on January 20, 1995 in
Catbalogan, Samar.He testified that, on February 6, 1995, Lea arrived home late in the evening and
he berated her for being always out of their house. Alan narrated that, when he reported for work
the following day, Lea was still in the house, but when he arrived home later in the day, Lea was
nowhere to be found.However, Lea did not return to their house anymore.Sometime in June 1995,
he decided to go to Manila to look for Lea, but his mother asked him to leave after the town fiesta
of Catbalogan, hoping that Lea may come home for the fiesta. He failed to find out Lea’s
whereabouts despite his repeated talks with Janeth. Alan decided to work as a part-time taxi driver.
On June 20, 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station.
After Alan rested his case, neither the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor nor the Solicitor General
adduced evidence in opposition to the petition. On January 8, 2002, the court rendered judgment
granting the petition.

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Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the petition.

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse
has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a
well-grounded belief. Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act.
It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight
degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or
circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life
which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends
to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence
evidence on the ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded
belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and
extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.In sum, the Court finds and so holds that the
respondent failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the RTC,
that his spouse Rosalia (Lea) Julaton was already dead.

VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

NENITA BIENVENIDO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LUISITA CAMACHO and


LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO
G.R. No. 111717 October 24, 1994

Facts:
Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On February 6,
1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved, Aurelio P. Camacho contracted
another marriage with respondent Luisita C. Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since
1953 and by whom he begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito) born on
May 22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and Luisita had been
living since 1958.

There were instances during Luisita and Aurelio's marriage when, because of their quarrels,
one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In her case Luisita stayed on those
occasions at various times in Davao City, Hongkong or Japan.In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita
T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged from her husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and

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apparently won her heart because from June 1968 until Aurelio's death on May 28, 1988, he lived
with her, the last time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout Delgado Street, Quezon City. Petitioner's
daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelio's son, Chito, who lived with them for about a
year in 1976.

On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in which they
were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette Infante-Moñozca. In the deed of
sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in
his name, Aurelio was described as single.On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of
the property in favor of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioner's name on January 11, 1985.
Between 1985 and 1987 Nenita and Luisita came to know each other. On May 28, 1988, Aurelio
died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan and Aurelio's account in the PCI Bank, took care of the
funeral arrangements. Respondent Luisita was then in the United States with respondent Chito,
having gone there, according to her, at the instance of Aurelio in order to look for a house in San
Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin them. Upon learning of the death of Aurelio she
and her son Chito came home on May 30, 1988. She had the remains of Aurelio transferred from
the Loyola Memorial Chapels, first to the St. Ignatius Church and later to the Arlington Memorial
Chapels. Luisita paid for the funeral services.

Respondent Luisita was granted dealt benefits by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the
surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership of the house and lot on Scout
Delgado Street in which Nenita had been living. The two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but
efforts to settle their dispute failed.

On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, seeking the annullment of the sale of the property to petitioner and the
payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of sale was a forgery and that in any event
it was

On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to
petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of sale in favor of petitioner to
be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in estoppel in not claiming the property until
1988 despite knowledge of the sale by the late Aurelio who had represented himself to be single.
Respondents moved for a reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion. On appeal the
respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
and declared respondents to be the owners of the house and lot in dispute.

Issue:
Whether or not Aurelio’s marriage to respondent Luisita is valid.

Ruling:

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The Supreme Court findsthe petition to be meritorious. This Court finds that the
presumption of the validity of the marriage between Aurelio and Luisita has not been successfully
assailed by appellee. Art. 83 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by
a competent court.

In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and
Aurelio's marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They failed to
discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears. What applies in this case, therefore, is the
general rule, i.e., since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velaso, his subsequent
marriage to respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous.Consequently, there is no basis for
holding that the property in question was property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late
Aurelio because there was no such partnership in the first place. In the second place, until otherwise
shown in an appropriate action, the sale to petitioner must be presumed. Petitioner's ownership is
evidenced by a deed of absolute saleexecuted with all the solemnity of a public document and by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name.Petitioner is in possession
of the property. It was error for the Court of Appeals to annul petitioner's title at the instance of one
whose marriage to the seller is void.

Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of
cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While petitioner knew
respondent Chito to be Aurelio's son way back in 1976, there is nothing to show that she knew
Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary, Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as
petitioner was concerned, Chito could have been Aurelio's child by a woman not his wife. There
was, therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals' ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in good faith of
the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was married to Luisita.

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VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

Facts:

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On July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in
Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.He met the private complainant
Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City
for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while
Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led
to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his
way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was single.
Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them
that their son was still single.Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of
March 1996. They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61. It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo
was "single."

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint
efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting
1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina
was jobless, and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.Sometime in January
2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial
support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National
Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She
secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage contract.She was so embarrassed and humiliated
when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy. On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of
the RTC with modification as to the penalty of the accused.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of
the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided under Article
41 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to
preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by law.The phrase "or before the absent
spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were of
the impression that "in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death
after an absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of
marriage should be a justification for bigamy."

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For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony:
(a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the
former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of
the second marriage or subsequent marriage.It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage.

The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the
benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good
faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.The requirement of judicial declaration is also for
the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of the
highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital
relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed
and the causes specified by law.The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest,
safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing
essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving
State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on
every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent
parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death
of the absent spouseafter the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the
requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the
death of the first spouse.

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VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO


G.R. No. 160258 January 19, 2005

Facts:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were married on June 12, 1987.
Because of her husband’s violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and decided to
go back to her parents together with her three (3) children. In order to support the children, Gloria
was compelled to work abroad. From the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991,
Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of
his relatives. On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified
petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the summary petition,
rendered judgment granting the same. In a decision dated September 23, 2003, the Court of
Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure, denied the Republic’s appeal and accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC decision.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals duly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal on a final
and executory judgment of the Regional Trial Court
b) Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code were established in this case.

Ruling:
The Court rules against petitioner Republic. Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI:
SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, sets the tenor for cases
covered by these rules. In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and
executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic’s
appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.

An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision


of law, is immediately final and executory. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the
petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to
appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. But, if only to set the records straight and for the
future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTC’s decision dated November 7,
2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG
to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals

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acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that
ground.

The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal on ground of
lack of jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was
immediately final and executory.

As it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss
the erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision
of law, the judgment was not appealable.

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VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO


G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000

Facts:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land with an
estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein respondent Marietta
Calisterio.Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James
William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on
11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958,
without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.

On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of


Teodorico, filed a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico
Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of
Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio
being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void.

Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with James
Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more
than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the
surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the
decedent.

On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C.
Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of the intestate
estate of Teodorico. On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of
petitioner Antonia. On 31 August 1998, the appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta is
valid, that, in turn, would be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.

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Ruling:
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New
Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee,
though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of
the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the
first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. A
judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed
period of absence is met.

In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James
William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered
into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having
been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding
the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.

The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to
indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its
dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions
— one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased
spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased,
concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being
entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation
in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in
their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces except only in
representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The
appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its judgment,
successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is
invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother.

It is hereby DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to
petitioner to the exclusion of her own children.

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VALID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA


G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012

Facts:
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus)
at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in Paranaque where both were then working.
The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in
the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric
Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from
that time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to
locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s
whereabouts, to no avail. After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus
declared presumptively dead. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
presumptively dead.

In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,the CA ruled that a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding.

Issues:
a) Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision
of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is

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immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to
ordinary appeal.
b) Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that
respondent presented.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirms the CA ruling with regard to the first issue.Clearly, a petition for
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the
Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a
petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court
therein shall be immediately final and executory.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family
Code/By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine
of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence
does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court
of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in
the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that
respondent had presented. The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest
to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-
founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great
many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.

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Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent
Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. Nevertheless, we are
constrained to deny the Petition. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to
prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or
reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and
executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law."

MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40

ROBERTO DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

Facts:
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition for
"Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto
Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others
that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center Bldg., as evidenced by a
Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona,
Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969
which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime in
1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up to the present, she
has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines only when she would
avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the
present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence;

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out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total amount of
approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of Roberto;
sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting
with another woman; she further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties
without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her
brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and refused
to turn over the possession and administration of said properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact;
and he is not authorized to administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their
marriage.

On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appealsdismissed the petition. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.

Issues:
a) Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
b) Whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain
real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.

Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while
the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As
such, it is from the beginning.Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the
marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41. The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument
and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together
with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties."

The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage,
one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing
them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is
brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's
properties. Accordingly, the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the
lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP
No. 1989-J.

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MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.


Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92706 March 29, 1995

Facts:
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house,
which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door

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to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Thereafter, respondent
prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him.

Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has
five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. For his
part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the
administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was
disputed by De Castro. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he
admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage
ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage
for lack of a marriage license.

Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage
ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.
Ongkiko abandoned respondent 19 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a
single parent. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes,
that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of an immoral and illegal act by cohabiting with De
Castro.

Ruling:
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 is applicable to
remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the
date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given
"retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws."

This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not
shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. Respondent is
the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and
employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who begot him five children. His failure to
secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith. It is
evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.

While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan
Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he
was already in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must
be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but

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also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also
judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his
judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be
overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

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CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

Facts:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral,
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. After the celebration of their marriage
and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother. In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so
together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the
defendant to join them. They stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there
was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But
during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them.

She claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a
urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989. The results of their physical
examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's
examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was
given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated."After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads: ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as void. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual
communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds the petition to be bereft of merit.The case has reached this Court
because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no

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collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent)
have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. Appellant
admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation,
and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding
on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other.
The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the
action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.If a
spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes
to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his
or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is
the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the
integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared
less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In
the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy
is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That
is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a
long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

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This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

LEOUEL SANTOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA


ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

Facts:
Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia.
The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia
Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was
christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen,
Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family
affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like
when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia
would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia
called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon
the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow
get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was
ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).

Issue:
Whether or not Leouel’s marriage with Julia can be declared invalid.

Ruling:
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to
adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow

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some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code
Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No.
106429, 13 June 1994); thus:The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity
for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties,
to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no
juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's
enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision. So the progress was from psycho-sexual to
psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however,
incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials
of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic
cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists
of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a
farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this
inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of
offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of
assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The
canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul
II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that
the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be


reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in

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Article 1 of the Family Code. The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic
nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can
always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

The petition is denied.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999

Facts:
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were
married and three children were born to them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional
Trial Court, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground
of psychological incapacity of the latter. She claimed that private respondent, after they were
married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs
with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her
health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). Petitioner prayed that for having
abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the
total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that
she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located in Cavite.

On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for annulment
of marriage filed by petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30,
1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the
ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.

Ruling:

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In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held:"Psychological incapacity" should
refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity"
to the most serious cases of personality, disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under
Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality
or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance
that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in
every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

The Court, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals
whose conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private
respondent's psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and
even finality.

The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's
contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support,
and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may
more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property
regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.

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Persons and Family Relation
CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

YAMBAO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 184063 January 24. 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao and respondent Patricio E. Yambao married on December
21, 1968. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage and three children raised into adulthood,
petitioner filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, praying the marriage be
declared null and void due to her husband’s psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code. Petitioner claims that her marriage is marred by bickering, quarrels and recrimination
because of the respondent’s difficulty to find a stable job, failure in the family business, refusal to
change children’s diapers while petitioner was still recovering from her Caesarean operation,
insecurity and jealousy towards acquaintances and relatives, eating and sleeping all day, gambling,
and threats to kill her. She then consulted with a psychiatrist who concluded that the respondent
suffered from Dependent Personality Disorder. On February 9, 2007, the Regional Trial Court
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On April 16, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Regional Trial Court’s Decision; hence, this petition for review before the Supreme Court.

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Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence establishes the respondent’s
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

Ruling:
No. Though there are existing antecedents, assumptions, predilections, or generalizations,
this case must be treated uniquely, given its facts and idiosyncrasies. For marriage to be annulled
under Article 36 of the Family Code, it must be proven that the incapacitated spouse manifested
mental, not physical, incapacity causing him or her to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants. The spouse must suffer from a mental incapacity so severe that he is and becomes
unaware of his marital and familial obligations. Psychological incapacity must be judged according
to:
(a) gravity,

(b) juridical antecedence, and

(c) incurability.

Article 36 considers incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations as totally different from mere difficulty, refusal, neglect or ill will in the performance of
marital obligations. Incapacity is defined as:

(a) true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage;

(b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the
community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and

(c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.


All marriages go through “bickerings, quarrels and recrimination” and rough patches. In this
case, the respondent may not be the ideal husband for petitioner’s exacting standards but they have
gone through 35 years of marriage and have raised 3 children into adulthood “without any major
parenting problems”. Moreover, respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused the
petitioner or their children. These facts do not prove psychological incapacity.

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GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MOLINA


G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

Facts:
On April 14, 1985, Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondent was married to Reynaldo Molina at
the Church of Saint Augustine, Manila. From their marriage was borne a child named Albert Andre
Olaviano Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo started exhibiting signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility”. He preferred to spend more time with the company of his friends and peers on
whom he squandered money, he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, ;and he was never

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honest with the family finances. These circumstances led to frequent quarrels between the petitioner
and respondent. In February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, making Roridel the
sole breadwinner.

On October 1986, they were both estranged from each other. In February 1986, Roridel
moved back to Baguio with her parents and a few weeks later Reynaldo abandoned Roridel and left
Albert in her custody. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife because of Roridel’s strange behavior and insistence to leave his group of friends
eve after their marriage, Roridel’s refusal to perform some of her marital duties like cooking meals,
and Roridel’s failure to run the household and handle their finances. On May, 1991, the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio rendered judgment and declared the marriage void. The Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not “opposing and conflicting personalities” is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

Ruling:

No. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. In this case, there was no clear showing of the psychological
incapacity but the mere showing of difficulty, refusal, neglect and irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities which do not constitute psychological incapacity. In this case, it is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons.
Essentially, it must be shown that they are incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not
physical, illness. Although there was evidence that the couple could not get along or are
incompatible with each other, there was no evidence of the gravity of the psychological incapacity;
neither its juridical antecedence nor incurability. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological, not physical.

The following guidelines must be proved in invoking psychological incapacity:


(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically or clinically identified,
b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

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(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

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Persons and Family Relation
BARCELONA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 130087 September 24, 2003

Facts:
Diana M. Barcelona, petitioner, and Tadeo R. Bengzon, respondent were legally married at
Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship. They established their residence at Quezon City and
begot five children. The couple had frequent quarrels because Diana was from a rich family, was a
disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house playing tennis all day. During a family
crisis where Diana suffered from several miscarriages and during sickness of a child, the petitioner
would withdraw herself and would not talk to the husband. During her pregnancy, she would insist
the husband to offer her more freedom and leave their conjugal dwelling. The husband would
eventually leave and the both of them would eventually become estranged from each other.

On March 29, 1995, respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for Annulment of
Marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. On July
21, 1995, respondent filed a second Petition for Annulment of Marriage against the petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the second petition fails to state a cause of
action and that it violated Supreme Court Circular No. 04-49 in failing to state the filing of a
previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination and status.

On September 18, 1996, in an Order (first Order) Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo deferred
resolution of the Motion until the parties have ventilated their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on January 21, 1997, the trial court through Pairing
Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison issued an Order (second Order) denying the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that when the ground for dismissal is the complaint’s failure to state a
cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. According to
Judge Pison, a perusal of the allegations in the second petition shows that petitioner has violated
respondent’s right, thus resulting to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner’s claim
that respondent was guilty of forum shopping explaining that when respondent filed the second
petition, the first petition was no longer pending and was dismissed without prejudice.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with the Regional Trial Court’s decision that the allegations
in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven true as
well as the decision that the respondent has not committed forum shopping.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the second petition for annulment sufficiently states the cause of action.
b) Whether or not the respondent violated Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-49
in failing to state the filing of a previous petition for annulment of marriage, its termination
and status.

Ruling:

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Yes. The second petition states a legal cause of action since it states the legal right of
respondent, the correlative obligation of the petitioner, and the act or omission of the petitioner in
violation of the legal right. After Santos and Molina, the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages provided that expert opinions need
not be alleged, to wit:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages –


x x x.
(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

No. The first petition was already dismissed without prejudice. Therefore, there is no litis
pendentia since respondent has already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition
when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal
order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal “without prejudice”.

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Persons and Family Relation
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

TONGOL vs. TONGOL


G.R. No. 157610 October 19, 2007

Facts:
On August 27, 1967, petitioner Orlando G. Tongol and respondent Filipinas M. Tongol
were married. From their marriage they begot four children.

On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the Regional Trial Court, Makati a verified
petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on the ground that she is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.

In his petition, Orlando stated that he and Filipinas’ marriage was objected by the latter’s
family. The continuous interference of Filipinas’ parents, their attempts to break up their union and
their influence on Filipinas made their marriage an unhappy one. Because of the influence of
Filipinas’ parents, she regarded Orlando with contempt. When Orlando started a junk shop
business, he was met with ridicule, instead of encouragement, from his wife. Eventually, his junk
shop business flourished and became profitable enough for Orlando to embark on a new business
venture by putting up a pharmaceutical company. Filipinas became interested and began to interfere
with the operation of the business; however, the employees of the company were aloof. She also
resented that her husband was getting along with the employees and, as a result, was the subject of
their frequent and continued quarrels. She even suspected Orlando of diverting the income of his
business to his relatives. The continued fighting persisted and affected their children.

Filipinas, in her counter-petition claimed that the marriage was, indeed, fruitless; however,
this was the fault of Orlando’s psychological incapacity. In 1990, Orlando decided to live separately
from Filipinas and on May 13, 1994, Orlando and Filipinas filed a petition for dissolution of their
conjugal partnership gains, granted by the Makati Regional Trial Court.

Evidence for Orlando consisted of his testimony, his sister’s, his employee’s, and Dr. Cecilia
Villegas’ psychological examination of both parties. Meanwhile, evidence for the respondent only
consisted of her testimony.

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Regional Trial Court’s decision in toto.

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Issue:
Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling:
No. First, psychological incapacity must be more than just “difficulty”, “refusal” or
“neglect”. Second, the personality disorder or psychological incapacity of the respondent must be
grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Third,
there was no evidence that the psychological incapacity is incurable. Fourth, the psychological
incapacity considered in Article 36 must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage like, in this case, the family business. Marriage
obligations must correspond to the management of the household and the provision of support for
the family. Fifth, marital obligations must not only include the spouse’s obligation to the spouse but
also that to her children. No evidence was shown that the respondent was negligent in the rearing
and care of her children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family Code. Although, the respondent
exhibited Inadequate Personality Disorder, there was no evidence to prove that, indeed, the
respondent was incapacitated or incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

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Persons and Family Relation
GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

MARCOS vs. MARCOS


G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000

Facts:
Petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos married twice. First was on
September 6, 1982, with Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu as solemnizing officer of the marriage held at
the Municipal Court of Pasig and second was on May 8, 1983 by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar,
Command Chaplain at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila. They
were both military personnel. They begot 5 (five) children. Wilson left military service in 1987 and
started a business that did not prosper. Brenda put up a business until she was able to put up a
trading and construction company.Their frequent quarrels stemmed from the petitioner’s urges on
respondent to be gainfully employed to convince their children that their father, as the breadwinner,
is the head of the family and a good provider. Because of Wilson’s failure to provide for his family,
he began beating the children for slight mistakes and forcibly having sex with his already weary wife.
The tipping point was when they had a quarrel on October 16, 1994 when she did not want him to
stay in their house anymore. Wilson became violent and inflicted physical harm on her and her
mother. The following day, Brenda and her children sought refuge at her sister’s house. On October
19, 1994, she was diagnosed with contusions from the bitter quarrel. The Regional Trial Court found
respondent to be psychologically incapacitated. The Court of Appeals negated the Regional Trial
Court’s ruling.

Issues:
a) Whether or not personal medical or psychological evaluation is a requirement for the
declaration of psychological incapacity.
b) Whether or not the demeanor or behaviors of the respondents determine psychological
incapacity.

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Ruling:
No. The guidelines in Santos and Molina do not require that a physician examine the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated even if the root cause be “medically or clinically
identified”. What is most important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination is not necessary.

No. Although the respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, these do not necessitate psychological incapacity. The
evidence presented do not zero in on the Santos and Molina guidelines on psychological incapacity.
The behaviors can be attributed to the respondent’s loss of employment for a period of more than
six years. It was from this that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support and leave the family home. Therefore, his psychological incapacity can be traced to this
certain period and not before the marriage nor during the inception of the marriage. Equally
important, the condition was not proven to be incurable, especially now that he is again gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

TE vs. TE
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009

Facts:
In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te decided to court Rowena Ong
Gutierrez Yu-Te after seeing her in a Filipino-Chinese association in their college. He decided to
court Rowena after learning that her close friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst
towards their families and developed a closeness with each other. In March 1996, Rowena asked
Edward that they elope despite being bickering about being young and jobless. Edward eventually
gave in to Rowena’s plans, left Manila, and sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000 pension. He
provided the traveling money and she purchased their boat ticket. Because of their house
accommodation, daily sustenance and joblessness, their pension lasted for only a month. After
Edward proceeded to his parents’ home, Rowena kept on telephoning him and threatening him that
she would commit suicide. Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.

On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to court to get married. He was 25 years
old and she was 20. They continued to stay at her uncle’s place but he Edward was being treated like
a prisoner. In one instance, Rowena insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live
independently but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted that Edward go home
else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle
and stayed with his parents. His family hid him from Rowena when she called. In June 1996,
Edward was able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edward’s persistence that they live together,

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she decided that they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage with Rowena on the ground
of psychological incapacity.

On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted an investigation report
stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between the parties and therefore,
recommended trial on the merits. Upon the findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological
incapacity of Edward (dependent personality disorder) and Rowena (narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder), the Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void. However, the
Appellate Court reversed and set aside the Trial Court’s decision on the ground that the clinical
psychologist did not examine the respondent and merely banked on the testimony of the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity given
the petitioner’s totality of evidence.

Ruling:
Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. The psychological
assessment adequately, sufficiently and decisively points to Edward’s dependent personality disorder
and Rowena’s narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder. Also, the Regional Trial Court viewed,
at first-hand, the witnesses’ deportment. With Edward’s affliction of dependent personality disorder,
he cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love and respect and
rendering help and support because he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from
others, allows others to make most of his important decisions, tends to agree with people even when
he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone
and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. The petitioner followed everything dictated
to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a
person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.Rowena’s
affliction with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital
obligations.

This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her
intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.Moreover, as shown in
this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner
with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.Both parties being afflicted with grave,
severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April 23,
1996 is thus, declared null and void, reversing and setting aside the decision of the appellate court.

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GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

AGRAVIADOR vs. AGRAVIADOR


G.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010

Facts:
In 1971, Petitioner Enrique A. Agraviador met respondent Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador at a
beerhouse where Erlinda worked. The petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of
Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. They soon entered a common-law
relationship. On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent married in a ceremony officiated
by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo Manila. The petitioner’s family was apprehensive
because of the nature of the respondent’s work and that she came from a broken family. They begot
four (4) children. On March 1, 2001, Enrique filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition of the
nullity of his marriage with Erlinda. Petitioner alleged that Erlinda was carefree, irresponsible
immature and whimsical, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away
from their conjugal dwelling for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care

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of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the
family name Agraviador in her activities. Enrique also claimed that Erlinda refused to have sex with
him since 1993 because she became “very close” to a male tenant in their house, discovered their
love notes, and even caught them inside his room several times. Respondent denied that she
engaged in extra-marital affairs and maintained that it was Enrique who refused to have sex with her.
She claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry
their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of
their son at the hospital before he died. The Regional Trial Court ordered to investigate if collusion
existed between parties. On November 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court then allowed the
petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary
evidence as well as a certified true copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation
report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac which found that respondent was afflicted with mixed personality
disorder. The Appellate Court, however, reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court’s decision
on the grounds that the psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the mental incapacity
was serious, grave and permanent.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent’s psychological
incapacity.

Ruling:
No. The petitioner’s testimony established “difficulty”, “refusal”, and “neglect”. However, it
did not reveal utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Patac’s psychological report only enumerated the respondent’s behavioral defects but
failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity
must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Additionally,
the Molina case set stricter guidelines in establishing psychological incapacity:
(1) The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
a. Medically or clinically identified,
b. Alleged in the complaint,
c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and
d. Clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children.

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(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.

These guidelines were incorporated with the basic requirements established in Santos. In
Marcos v. Marcos, it was no longer necessary for the defendant or respondent spouse to be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to
introduce expert opinion under Article 36 of the Family Code so long as gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, Ting vs. Velez-Ting, and
Suazo vs. Suazo. the Molina precedent was flexibly applied (yet never abandoned) instead of used as
a strict criteria or “straightjacket”.

GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

MARABLE vs. MARABLE


G.R. No. 178741 January 17, 2011

Facts:

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In 1967, petitioner Rosalino L. Marable and respondent Myrna F. Marable met while still
classmates studying at Arellano University. He only became attracted to her only after they
happened to sit beside each other in a passenger bus. Despite having a girlfriend, petitioner courted
the respondent and eventually became sweethearts with Myrna demanding more love, time and
attention from Rosalino who appreciated this gesture. On December 19, 1970, the two eloped and
were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. This was followed by a
church wedding on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison. They begot
five children. The relationship turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels increased when their eldest
daughter transferred from several schools because of juvenile misconduct and had an unwanted
teenage pregnancy. Rosalino then sought for peace, love and affection from a relationship with
another woman. Myrna eventually found out about the affair. These aggravated their quarrels. Their
business ventures failed. Rosalino felt unloved, unwanted, and unappreciated; felt indifferent toward
the respondent; left the conjugal home; gave up all properties; and converted to Islam after dating
several women. On October 8, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage with respondent on grounds of psychological incapacity. Petitioner also alleged that his
family background from a poor family and his father being a compulsive gambler and womanizer,
made him obsess for attention and strive for success only to find himself in misery and loneliness
because of the void in his relationship with his family. To support these, petitioner presented the
Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag and stated that he suffered from Antisocial Personality
Disorder. The Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision annulling the marriage while the Court of
Appeals reversed the said decision.

Issues:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore
rendering the marriage null and void.

Ruling:
No. The findings of Dr. Tayag’s psychological report merely made a general conclusion that
the petitioner suffered from Anti-Social Personality Disorder; however, it failed to prove the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. It also failed to fit into the framework of the Molina Doctrine.
Moreover, there was no factual basis that the petitioner was a socially deviant, rebellious, impulsive,
self-centered and deceitful person. In fact, he was proven to act responsibly during the marriage by
working hard to provide for his family especially his children. Petitioner also tried to make it appear
that his family background was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs when,
actually, he was simply dissatisfied with his marriage. He was also shown to have learned from his
extra-marital affairs and has immediately terminated them.

In short, petitioner’s marital infidelity, their squabbles, and conflicts in child-rearingdoes not
appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of
performing his spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is
not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.It must be shown that
the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.That not being the case with

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petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological
incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court
of Appeals,the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

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GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

AURELIO vs. AURELIO


G.R. No. 175367 June 6, 2011

Facts:
On March 23, 1988, petitioner Danilo A. Aurelio and respondent Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio
were married. They begot two sons. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The psychological assessment revealed that
respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic features as seen from her
quick changes in temperament, self-indulgence, intolerance, and inability to delay her needs. On the
part of the petitioner, it has been revealed in the same assessment that he suffers from Passive
Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder as seen from his lack of drive to discern the plight of
his working wife, consistent jealousy and distrust toward his wife, arrogance and insensitivity toward
his wife. These findings were found to be grave, incorrigible, and incurable. On November 8, 2002,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. On January 14, 2003, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
Decision denying the motion. On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
and found that respondent’s petition for declaration for nullity of marriage complied with the
Molina Doctrine and that the merits of the case depend upon the proofs presented in trial. On
February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed the Regional Trial Court decision to the Court of Appeals via
petition for certiorari. On October 6, 2005, Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.

Issues:
Whether or not the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

Ruling:
Yes. For a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to be valid, it must comply with the
standards or criteria set by the Molina Doctrine. Petitioner asserts that the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is invalid because it did not comply with the following cited in the Molina
Doctrine: (a) root cause of the psychological incapacity, (b) gravity of such illness, and (c) non-
compliance of marital obligations. First, the root cause of the psychological incapacity was stated
and alleged in the complaint. The root cause being their family backgrounds, as determined by a
competent and expert psychologist. Second, the petition establishes that the respondent suffers from
Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Features as well as the petitioner suffers from
Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder which are conditions that are allegedly grave,
incorrigible and incurable. Lastly, the Court also finds that the essential marital obligations were not
complied with. Petition for dismissal is denied.

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GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DE QUINTOS, JR.


G.R. No. 159594 November 12, 2012

Facts:
Eduardo De Quintos, Jr. and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos were married on March 16,
1967 in civil rites solemnized by the Municipal Mayor of Lingayen Pangasinan. They were not
blessed with children due to Catalina’s hysterectomy after her second miscarriage. On April 6, 1998,
Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, citing Catalina’s
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Eduardo testified that
Catalina’s psychological incapacity manifested when she always left their house without his consent;
engaged in petty arguments with him; constantly refused to do household chores or take care of
their adopted daughter; gossiping with the neighbors; gambling; and abandoning their conjugal
home to live with Bobbie Castro. A neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes revealed
that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Psychiatric Disorder and was not curable. These
manifested through her immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her
marital obligations. Catalina did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given
her share in the conjugal house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.The Regional Trial
Court ruled in favor of Eduardo; however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court.

Issues:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore
rendering the marriage null and void.

Ruling:
No. First, Catalina’s supposed behavior was not corroborated by others and, therefore, was
not established. Eduardo’s testimony was self-serving. Second, Dr. Reyes’ neuro-psychiatric
evaluation was ostensibly vague on the root cause, gravity, and incurability of the disorder. Dr. Reyes
merely established that Catalina was immature and childish and that her immaturity and childishness
could no longer be treated due to Catalina’s reaching of an age of maturity. Thirdly, Dr. Reyes had
only one interview with Catalina and, therefore, lacked depth and objectivity which would have been
achieved if her report corroborated not only with Eduardo’s statements but also with interviews by
other persons. Fourth, no proof was made to establish the natal or supervening disabling factor
which effectively incapacitated Catalina from complying with her basic marital functions. In this

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case, the Court cited Santos and Molina in setting the criteria or standards to dispute psychological
incapacity.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC vs. ENCELAN


G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2009

Facts:
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children, Maricar and
Manny. To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12,
1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin
Perez. Sometime in 1991, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived with
Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC
a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s
psychological incapacity.

Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an
associate in her promotions business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and
that she left their home because of irreconcilable differences with her mother-in-law. At the trial,
Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home.
He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he
learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.

Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima
Flores of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering
from any form of major psychiatric illness," but had been "unable to provide the expectations
expected of her for a good and lasting marital relationship"; her "transferring from one job to the
other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her
ambitions"; and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a
good marital and family relationship."

In its June 5, 2002 decision, the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding
sufficient basis to declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The CA originally set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding that Lolita’s abandonment of the

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conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness.
In its amended decision,the CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious psychological
incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital
obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
OSG filed the present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
No. In interpreting Article 36 of the Family Code, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations", not merely the refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage),
gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.Cesar testified on the dates when he
learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home, as well as his
continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair, but he
merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling.Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a
disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations.No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity
and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.

Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers does not suffice
as a consideration for the conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage – psychologically
incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a
wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work
relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their marital
counterparts. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a
reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by facts.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

MENDOZA vs. REPUBLIC


G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner Arabelle J. Mendoza and private respondent Dominic C. Mendoza met in 1989
upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. They had been next-
door neighbors in the apartelle they were renting while in college – she, at Assumption College while
he, at San Beda taking a business management course. After a month of courtship, they became
intimate which led to the pregnancy with their Daughter Alyssa Blanca. They got married when she
was eight months into her pregnancy in civil rites solemnized in Pasay City, June 24, 1991, after
which they moved to her place, remaining dependent on their parents for support.

Dominic remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished
college in October 1993. She took on various jobs, being the one with the fixed income, she
shouldered all of the family’s expenses (i.e., rental, food, other bills and their child’s educational
needs). In September 1994, she discovered his illicit relationship with Zaida, Dominic’s co-
employee at Toyota Motors. Eventually, communication between them became rare until they
started to sleep in separate rooms, thereby affecting their sexual relationship.

In November 1995, Dominic gave her a Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday present and later
asked her to issue two blank checks for the car’s insurance coverage, only to find out that the checks
were not paid for the car’s insurance coverage but for his personal needs. Worse, she also found out

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that he did not pay for the car itself, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost
of the car, leaving her to bear the balance.

To make matters worse, Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with
P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 and estafa, for which he was arrested and incarcerated. She and her mother bailed him out of
jail, but discovered that he had also swindled many clients some of whom were even threatening her,
her mother and her sister.

On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal home because Arabelle asked him
for "time and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation,
causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to
live in another place concealed from him.

On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition for the declaration of the nullity
of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition. In the RTC, petitioner
presented herself as a witness, together with a psychiatrist, Dr. Rocheflume Samson, and Professor
Marites Jimenez. On his part, Dominic did not appear during trial and presented no evidence. On
August 18, 2000, the RTC found all characteristics of psychological incapacity – gravity,
antecedence, and incurability as set forth in Molina and declared the marriage between petitioner and
Dominic an absolute nullity. On March 19, 2003 the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing
the judgment of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent’s psychological
incapacity.

Ruling:
No. The findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, self-serving and uncorroborated because
only Arabelle was evaluated. Dr. Samson even conceded that there was a need to verify her findings
concerning Dominic’s psychological profile which were colored by Arabelle’s ill-feelings toward him
during her evaluation. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity. Santos v. Court of Appeals sets the guidelines for psychological incapacity
as characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." These guidelines do not
necessarily require the root cause to be “medically or clinically identified” by a physician or a
psychologist. What is important is that totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to. Finally, petitioner contends that the Court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 rendered
appeals by the OSG no longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly requires the OSG
to actively participate in all stages of the proceedings as seen in its provisions.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC vs. GALANG


G.R. No. 168335 June 6, 2011

Facts:
On March 9, 1994, respondent Nestor Galang and Juvy married in Pampanga. They lived in
Nestor’s father’s house in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Nestor worked as an artist-
illustrator at the Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, stayed at home
as a housewife. Christopher is their only child.

On August 4, 1999, Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage because she was a
kleptomaniac and a swindler. The respondent’s testimony showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up
early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the

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house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d)
stole the respondent’s ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e)
falsified the respondent’s signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up false stories in order to
borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.According to the respondent, Juvy
suffers from “mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love
and affection towards him and their child.” He posited that Juvy’s incapacity was “extremely
serious” and “appears to be incurable.Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally manifested,
on October 18, 1999, that he found no evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the
case for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999. The respondent presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations.

Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist,
who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote
Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not respond.

On January 22, 2001, the RTC nullified the parties’ marriage. On November 25, 2004, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto explaining that Juvy’s indolence and lack of responsibility
coupled with her gambling and swindling undermined her capacity to comply with her marital
obligations. The testimony of psychologist Anna Liza S. Guiang characterized Juvy’s condition as
permanent, incurable and existing at the time of celebration of her marriage with respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent’s psychological
incapacity.

Ruling:
No. The testimony of the petitioner only showed isolated incidents, not recurring acts.
Psychological incapacity must be more than difficulty, refusal or neglect. It is essential that he or she
must be shown to be incapable of complying with the responsibility and duty as a married person
because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage – had to be shown. The psychological test was uncorroborated and one-sided;
therefore, biased towards Juvy’s negative traits. First, the psychologist did not identify the types of
psychological tests to determine the root cause of Juvy’s psychological condition. Second, the report
failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvy’s condition. Lastly, the report failed to prove
incurability. The psychologist’s testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvy’s
early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the
symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the
history of Juvy’s psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

OCHOSA vs. ALANO


G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011

Facts:
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa met Bona J. Alano in August 1973 – he, a young lieutenant
in the AFP; she, a 17-year-old 1st year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that

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culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on October 27, 1973 before the Honorable
Judge Cesar S. Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they incur
any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they found an abandoned and
neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona
Celeste Alano Ochosa.

During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine archipelago
as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her
hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment, except in one (1)
occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4) days.

Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the Security Escort
Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City
where they resided with their military aides.In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged
participation in the failed coup d’etat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.

Even at the onset of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country,
Bona had illicit relations with other men. Bona entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever
Jose was out of their living quarters at Fort Bonifacio. On one occasion, Bona was caught by
Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Jose’s driver, Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of
Bona’s sexual infidelity circulated in the military community. When Jose could no longer bear these
rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.During their confrontation,
Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose.
Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.In
1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently supporting the needs
of Ramona.

Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking to nullify his marriage to
Bona on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential obligations of
marriage.In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and nullified the
parties’ marriage. The OSG appealed with the CA which granted the appeal, reversed and set aside
the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.

Ruling:
No. There is inadequate credible evidence that her “defects” (sexual disloyalty with Jose,
sexual promiscuity with other men) were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the
marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the jurisprudential

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requisite of “juridical antecedence.” Verily, Dr. Elizabeth E. Rondain evaluated Bona’s
psychological condition (Histrionic Personality Disorder) indirectly from the information gathered
solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the
information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient
corroboration. It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Jose’s
assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and was, in fact,
living with him for the most part of their relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her
away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was
constantly away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A reasonable
explanation for Bona’s refusal to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other parts of
Mindanao may be simply that those locations were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt
as to Bona’s desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in
their conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the following decade. In view of the foregoing, the
badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can
only be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception
of the said marriage.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

CAMACHO-REYES vs. REYES


G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of
the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. Petitioner and
respondent got marriedon December 5, 1976. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.Thereafter, they lived with the
Ramon’s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by Ramon’s parents, and
the couple’s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs.

Financial difficulties started. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance ofP1,500.00
from respondent stopped because Ramon resigned from his family’s business. Because of this,
Ramon engaged into (1) a fishpond business in Mindoro and eventually, (2) a scrap paper and carton
trading business which both failed..To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility,
petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. After two (2) years of struggling, the
spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with Maria Socorro’s mother where petitioner
continued to carry the financial burdens

Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties’ marriage was a surgical operation on
petitioner for the removal of a cyst where respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and
simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as
she was wheeled into the operating room.

As a last resort, petitioner approached respondent’s siblings and asked them to intervene,
Adolfo Reyes, respondent’s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage
encounter group, invited, sponsored and scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and
respondent, but these did not improve the parties’ relationship as respondent remained
uncooperative. In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological
assessment; however, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist’s
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of
respondent’s siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. With the de facto separation, the
relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent’s relationship with his children.

Finally, in 2001, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latter’s psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC affirmed petitioner. CA reversed and
set aside RTC’s decision.

Issue:

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Whether or not the totality of evidence established psychological incapacity therefore
rendering the marriage null and void.

Ruling:
Yes. The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of Dr. Estrella T.
Tiongson-Magno and Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. The clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s
assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other
informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner),
testified on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning
the period of time they knew him. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan’s recommendation that respondent
should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent’s psychological
incapacity is incurable.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective
testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2)
these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing
the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid
money obligations.

It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has personality
disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages.
Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a
finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’
psychological incapacity. In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the
factual antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all
point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an
inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his:
(1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the
family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

TORING vs. TORING


G.R. No. 165321 August 3, 2010

Facts:
Petitioner Ricardo P. Toring was introduced to Teresita M. Toring in 1978 at his aunt’s
house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousin’s teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons
at his aunt’s house. They became sweethearts after three months of courtship and eloped soon
after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her.

Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the
City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.

On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for
annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration
of their marriage. Before the RTC, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the
psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, and
his and Dr. Albaran’s respective testimonies.

Ricardo alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squanderer – that she was very
extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly
sent money to his wife to cover the family’s living expenses and their children’s tuition. However,
not only did she fail at paying the rent, utilities and other living expenses, she also she incurred debts
from other people and failed to remit amounts collected as sales agent of a plasticware and
cosmetics company. Also, during one of his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresita’s stomach
was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she refused. Her
miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the
child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita were
characterized by “withdrawals”; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his wife transpired,
as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo
reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single, and went out on dates
with other men when he was not around.

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Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran diagnosed Teresita with Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

Issue:
Whether or not Teresita should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with
essential marital obligations.

Ruling:
No. Dr. Albaran’s psychological evaluation merely relied on Ricardo and Richardson’s
testimonies. The mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with the
results of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, does not constitute
sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to
them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the
allegedly incapacitated spouse’s condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent
occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.
Richardson, the spouses’ eldest son, would not have been a reliable witness as he could not have
been expected to know what happened between his parents until long after his birth. He merely
recounted isolated incidents. The root cause must be alleged and not just the manifestations during
the marriage described as “refusal”, “difficulty” or “neglect”.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

LIGERALDE vs. PATALINGHUG


G.R. No. 168796 April 15, 2012

Facts:
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four
children. Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 o’clock in the morning. Her
excuse was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town, but admitted later to have
slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. In the midst of these, Silvino’s deep love for her, the
thought of saving their marriage for the sake of their children, and the commitment of May to
reform dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her. May was
back again to her old ways. This was demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned
that she was nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment
drinking beer with a male lover. Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then
lived separately. Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation.
The psychologist certified that May was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations; that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after
marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable. On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the
marriage of Silvino and May null and void. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision.

Issues:
(a) Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
jurisdiction.
(b) Whether or not May is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

Ruling:
No. On procedural grounds, the Court agrees with the public respondent that
the petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this

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petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy, this petition deserves
outright dismissal.In order to avail of the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the petitioner must clearly show that the public respondent acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary or
whimsical exercise of power. These were not proven in the close scrutiny of the records.

No. (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2)
the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity
must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity
must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5) such illness must be
grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage (Republic v. Court of Appeals). The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the
totality of the evidence presented during trial. An adulterous life is not tantamount to psychological
incapacity as contemplated in Article 36. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

SUAZO vs. SUAZO


G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010

Facts:
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents
of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some
friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after
finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelito’s marriage
was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of
Biñan.

Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito’s parents
after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked
for Angelito’s relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was
most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted
because of Jocelyn’s efforts.

Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with
whom he has since lived. They now have children.

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Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She claimed
that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her
complaint that from the start of their marriage until their separation in July 1987, their relationship
has been marred with bitter quarrels that caused unbearable physical and emotional pain inflicted
upon by Angelito; that one of the main reasons for their quarrels was Angelito’s refusal to work, his
indolence and excessive drinking; and that Angelito’s psychological incapacity started at the time of
their marriage and proves to be continuous, permanent and incurable.

In the RTC, Jocelyn reiterated the incidents of her physical beating by Angelito but told the
Court that she was not treated violently before the marriage. Maryjane Serrano, Jocelyn’s aunt,
corroborated Jocelyn’s testimony. The psychologist testified that Angelito haed Chronic Antisocial
Disorder which was permanent and incurable. The RTC annulled the marriage on the grounds
provided by Santos v. Court of Appeals. The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not Angelito is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

Ruling:
No. Both the psychologist’s testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively
show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelito’s alleged psychological condition. The
psychologist derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her
cause cannot of course be doubted. Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito’s habitual drunkenness,
gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical beatings she received from him – all of
which occurred after the marriage.

Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent
behavior, assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the
earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the
marriage, not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these
beatings exactly took place – whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or
months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the law and
its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while
indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity.
Standing alone, physical violence does not constitute psychological incapacity.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

ASPILLAGA vs. ASPILLAGA


G.R. No. 170925 October 26, 2009

Facts:
Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they were students at
the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of the Philippines, respectively. Rodolfo
courted her and five months later, they became sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to
study Japanese culture, literature and language. Despite the distance, Rodolfo and Aurora
maintained communication.

In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got married. They begot
two children, but Rodolfo claimed their marriage was “tumultuous.” He described Aurora as

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domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained
that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and made crucial family decisions
without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless, suspicious, given to nagging and
jealousy as evidenced by the latter’s filing against him a criminal case (concubinage) and an
administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7, 1995, a petition for annulment
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred
that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket
to Japan to enable her to assume her teaching position in a university for a period of three
months. In August 1991, upon her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan,
Rodolfo brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his
concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfo’s cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of
their marriage and their eventual separation. In May 1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home
to live with Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children.

Psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Eduardo Maaba revealed that both parties suffered
psychological handicaps traced from unhealthy maturational development. Both had strict,
domineering, disciplinarian role models. However, respondent’s mistrust, shallow heterosexual
relationships resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation of marriage. RTC
found the parties psychologically incapacitated. The CA reversed and set aside the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the parties are psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations.

Ruling:
No. Psychological incapacity is not mere “difficulty”, “refusal”, or “neglect”. Noteworthy, as
aptly pointed out by the appellate court, Rodolfo and Aurora initially had a blissful marital union for
several years. They married in 1982, and later affirmed the ceremony in church rites in 1983,
showing love and contentment with one another after a year of marriage. The letter of petitioner
dated April 1, 1990 addressed to respondent revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple
continued during their marriage for about eight years from the time they married each other.

From this, it can be inferred that they were able to faithfully comply with their obligations to
each other and to their children. Aurora was shown to have taken care of her children and remained
faithful to her husband while he was away. She even joined sales activities to augment the family
income. She appeared to be a very capable woman who traveled a lot and pursued studies here and
abroad. It was only when Rodolfo’s acts of infidelity were discovered that the marriage started to
fail. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one’s
marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage null and
void. At this juncture while this Court is convinced that indeed both parties were both found to
have psychological disorders, nevertheless, there is nothing in the records showing that these

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disorders are sufficient to declare the marriage void due to psychological incapacity. Incurability was
not proven. Incompatibility or irreconcilable differences could not be equated with psychological
incapacity.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

ALCAZAR vs. ALCAZAR


G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009

Facts:

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Petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar alleged in her Complaint that she was married to
respondent Rey C. Alcazar on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the
latter’s residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back
to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s abode at 2601-C Jose Abad
Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left
for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While
working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by
letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a
year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent
was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by
respondent of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines,
the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to
see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of
respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was
informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of
consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage
pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was
also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.

During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and
clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses. The psychologist diagnosed the respondent
to have Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The RTC denied petitioner’s complaint for annulment of
her marriage. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. The CA affirmed RTC’s
decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Rey is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations.

Ruling:
No. Article 46 of the Family Code contemplates an annulment of marriage on the ground
ofincapacity to consummate specifically denoting the permanent disability on the spouses to
perform and complete the act of sexual intercourse. What petitioner was actually seeking was the
declaration of nullity of marriage contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Nevertheless,
Article 36should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a

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party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her
mother’s testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to
work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half later, he
directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and not with petitioner in
Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for
abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into respondent’s psychological
state. Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on information provided by
petitioner.

Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of
respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly
impartial. The psychologist failed to trace Rey’s experiences in childhood, did not describe the
“pattern of behavior” that led her to conclude that, indeed, Rey was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality disorder; and did not relate how this rendered him “truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.”
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

NAJERA vs. NAJERA


G.R. No. 164817 July 3, 2009

Facts:
On January 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation as
Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.Petitioner alleged that she and
respondent are residents of Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the United
States of America (U.S.A). They were married on January 31, 1988. They are childless. Petitioner
claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity became
manifest only after marriage.

On June 29, 1998, the RTC issued an Orderterminating the pre-trial conference after the parties
signed a Formal Manifestation/Motion, which stated that they had agreed to dissolve their conjugal
partnership of gains and divide equally their conjugal properties.Psychologist Cristina Gates testified
that the chances of curability of respondent’s psychological disorder were nil. Its
curability depended on whether the established organic damage was minimal -- referring to the
malfunction of the composites of the brain brought about by habitual drinking and marijuana,
which possibly afflicted respondent with borderline personality disorder and uncontrollable
impulses.Further, SPO1 Sonny Dela Cruz, a member of the PNP, Bugallon, Pangasinan, testified
that on July 3, 1994, he received a complaint from petitioner that respondent arrived at their house
under the influence of liquor and mauled petitioner without provocation on her part, and that
respondent tried to kill her. The complaint was entered in the police blotter.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the totality of the evidence
submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage .The root cause of respondent’s
alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

HALILI vs. SANTOS- HALILI


G.R. No. 165424 June 9, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner and the respondent married on July 4, 1995 at the City Hall of Manila. After the
wedding, they continued to live with their respective parents and never lived together but
maintained their relationship nonetheless.Petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City a
petition for the nullity of their marriage on the ground that the respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. He also pointed out that they never lived
together as husband and wife and they never consummated their marriage. On April 17, 1998, the
Regional Trial Court declared thatthe marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is null and
void. The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, on January 26, 2004. The Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court on the ground that totality of
the evidence presented failed to established petitioner's psychological incapacity. The petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court for reconsideration. On June 9, 2009, the Supreme Court set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is sufficient to prove that the petitioner
suffered from psychological incapacitywhich effectively prevented him to comply from his
essential marital obligations.

Ruling:
Yes, because ultimately the psychologist sufficiently established that petitioner had
psychological condition that was grave andincurable and had a deeply rooted cause and that already
existed at the time of the celebration of his marriage to the respondent.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

PARAS vs. PARAS


G.R. No 147824 August 2, 2007

Facts:
On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros
Oriental. They begot four (4)children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased), Dahlia, and
Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosa filed with the Regional Trial
Court a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He
courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica." Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved
her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages
in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her
family who paid for her medication. Also in 1984, their son Raoul was electrocuted while Justo was
in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest
house as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with the death of the children, the
entire family went to the United States. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and
left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica"
and other businesses heavy in debt and he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land.
At other times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free
of charge. His act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that
prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988,
Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a babygirl, Cyndee Rose,
obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras.

He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did
not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar
crop loan before the bank’s authorized employee. He did not abandon his family in the United
States. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus,
he immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his children’s education. At first, he
resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal
assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there were times
he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. What caused the inevitable
family break-out was Rosa’s act of embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did
not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his
birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. This was further aggravated when she denied
his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area. As
to the charge of concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his
Law Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain GrelleLeccioness. Cyndee Rose
Ching Leccioness is not his daughter.

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After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of
the marriage. On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present
case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to
decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo’s alleged defects oridiosyncrasies "were sufficiently
explained by the evidence," Rosa contends that this Court’s factual findings in A.C. No.
5333 fordisbarment are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred
in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime
in May, 1993

Issues:
a) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present
case;
b) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root
cause of Justo’s alleged psychologicalincapacity is necessary; and
c) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of
Justo.

Ruling:
A reading of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved.
In fact, the appellate court evenassumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are
insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's alleged
infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true,such
traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by
themselves, these grounds areinsufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable
psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do notmanifest that he was truly in
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person.
Whilethey may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily
show ‘incurability’, such that while hisacts violated the covenants of marriage, they do
not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity
which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacitymust be psychological -- not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince thecourt that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known theobligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of suchincapacity need be given here
so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, neverthelesssuch root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may begiven by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

ZAMORA vs. ZAMORA


G.R. No. 141917 February 7, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married on June 4, 1970 in Cebu City. After their marriage,
they lived together at No. 50-AGorordo Avenue, Cebu City. The union did not produce any
child. In 1972, private respondent left for the United States to work as anurse. She returned to the
Philippines for a few months, and then left again in 1974. Thereafter, she made periodic visits
to Cebu Cityuntil 1989, when she was already a U.S. citizen. Petitioner filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of marriage anchored on thealleged "psychological incapacity" of private
respondent, as provided for under Article 36 of the Family Code. To support his position,he alleged
that his wife was "horrified" by the mere thought of having children as evidenced by the fact that
she had not bornepetitioner a child. Furthermore, he also alleged that private respondent abandoned
him by living in the United States and had in fact become an American citizen; and that throughout
their marriage they lived together for not more than three years. Respondentdenied that she refused
to have a child. She portrayed herself as one who loves children as she is a nurse by profession and
that shewould from time to time borrow her husband’s niece and nephews to care for them.
She also faulted her husband for the breakup of their marriage, alleging that he had been unfaithful
to her. He allegedly had two affairs with different women, and he begot at leastthree children with
them. On June 22, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision. The plaintiff consented to defendant’s
trip to theUnited States in 1974. She [defendant] wanted to earn money there because she wanted to
help her husband build a big house at theBeverly Hills, Cebu City. The plaintiff himself admitted
that he has a child, and the court is also convinced that he has two children.However, nothing in the
evidence of plaintiff shows that the defendant suffered from any psychological incapacity or that she
failed tocomply with her essential marital obligations. There is no evidence of psychological
incapacity on the part of defendant so that shecould not carry out the ordinary duties required in
married life. Neither has it been shown that there was an incurable defect on thepart of defendant.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and substance affecting the
result of the present case;
b) Whether or not the presentation of psychologists and/or psychiatrists is still desirable, if
evidence in this case already showsthe psychological incapacity of private respondent;
c) Whether or not private respondent’s refusal to live with petitioner under one roof for more
than twenty (20) years, her refusalto bear children with petitioner, and her living a solitary
life in the United States for almost three (3) decades are enough indications of psychological
incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
The Courts merely said in that case that "the well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons withexpertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even

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desirable." However, no expert opinion is helpful or even desirable todetermine whether private
respondent has been living abroad and away from her husband for many years; whether she has a
child;and whether she has made her residence abroad permanent by acquiring U.S. citizenship.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, waspsychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if suchincapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.

A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts
showing that either or both partieswere psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

FERRARIS vs. FERRARIS


G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006

Facts:
Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couple’s relationship before the marriage and
even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively
short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of
Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began
when Armida started doubting Brix’ fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls
from women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-
called marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armida’s lack of trust in him and her constant
naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper and
jealousy. Armida presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and
a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brix’s “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever
they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family.

Issue:
How shall psychological incapacity be proven?

Ruling:
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, refers to aserious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanentas to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all
people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain
personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the
human personality. However, the rootcause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly
demonstrate.Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner’s evidence showed that
respondent’s alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation
of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the
couple’s relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or
so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented
with her life in the company of respondent.

Infact, by petitioner’s own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband.
Their problems began when petitionerstarted doubting respondent’s fidelity. It was only when they

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started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began towithdraw into his shell and
corner, and failed to perform his so- called marital obligations. Respondent could not
understandpetitioner’s lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Respondent could not relate to heranger, temper and jealousy.At any rate, Dr. Dayan
did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder
called"schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." Notably, when asked as to the
root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan’s answer was vague, evasive
andinconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" She stated
that there was a history of respondent’s parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this
input on the supposed problematic history of respondent’sparents also came from petitioner. Nor
did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disablingfactor" on
the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent’s character that effectively
incapacitated him fromaccepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. We
find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever
they quarreled, the violenttendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
and lack of support, and his preference to spend moretime with his band mates than his family, are
not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal orunwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.

While petitioner’s marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however isnot always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not anull and void marriage. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decreesmarriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be"protected" by the state. Petition dismissed with finality.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

ANTONIO vs. REYES


G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

Facts:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in
1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a
subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months
later. Reyes persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate
child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated
in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November
1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void
anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their
marriage null and void.

Ruling:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as
opposed to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony
presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme
jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wife’s
behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondent’s fantastic ability to invent,
fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that
made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been medically
or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the
sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore,

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Reyes’ case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior
remain unchanged.

Hence, the court concludes that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration
of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO


G.R. No. 158896 October 27, 2004

Facts:
Juanita Carating-Siayngco was married to Manuel Siayngco. Their marriage did not produce
children however, the adopted a boy. Manuel, after being married for 24 years filed a petition to the
court seeking the nullification of their marriage by reason of psychological incapacity exhibited
through over domineering attitude and causing him embarrassment and humiliation. The lower
court denied his petition. The CA on the other hand reversed the decision relying on the doctor’s
findings that both parties are psychologically incapacitated.

Issue:
Whether or not one or both of the parties were proven psychologically incapacitated
sufficient to warrant the nullification of their marriage.

Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative. Manuel’s relationship with another was caused merely by his
sexual infidelity which does not fall within the purview of psychological incapacity. This action
caused by his desire to have children which he himself admitted. The testimonies of the
doctor failed to show that this infidelity is caused by a psychological illness or disorder. It is
necessary that it his by reason of a psychological disorder that he will be completely unable to
perform his marital obligations. With regard to Juanita, Manuel failed to show that her actions
constitute psychological incapacity that would render her unable to perform her marital obligations
and that a doctor has in fact stated otherwise. The evidence adduced failed to show sufficiently that
the couple or either of the spouse were psychologically incapacitated, rather it showed that they were
merely having the marital trouble of becoming strangers to each other and wanting to get out of it.
The marriage thus cannot be declared null and void

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

VILLALON vs. VILLALON


G.R. No. 167206 November 18, 2005

Facts:
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where
it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his
psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.On September 25,
1996, respondent filed an answerdenying petitioner’s allegations. She asserted that her 18-year
marriage to petitioner has been “fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more
growth in their relationship” and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community
standards. Petitioner’s success in his professional life aided him in performing his role as husband,
father, and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioner’s commitment to his paternal and marital
responsibilities was beyond reproach.

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged
psychological disorder of “Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder” with “Casanova Complex”.
Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as “a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and
occupational functioning” with main symptoms of “grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness,
thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality.” A person
afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and
thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with “Casanova Complex” exhibits habitual
adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision which was
denied in an order dated October 28, 2004. Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Villalon is null and void on the grounds of psychological
incapacity of the husband.

Ruling:
No, the totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the
fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their
separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged
in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave
psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The

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same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological
disorder rooted in petitioner’s personal history. The petition has no merit.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005

Facts:
July 12 1992, Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground that he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The Regional Trial Court in its
decision declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio. The
court ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a
regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the
necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed
before the Court of Appeals and while the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals, upon
respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000. The Court
of Appeals dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision.
Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.

Ruling:
The general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property
regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since
the properties ordered to be distributed by the court were there, both by the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have
been included or involved in said distribution.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC vs. QUINTERO-HAMANO


GR No. 149498 May 20, 2004

Facts:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and
Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a
month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave
birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After
a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped
giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned
from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child.

Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the
petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a
motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.

Issue:
Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment
was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other
evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.

Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at
bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. It cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due
to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. In
proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinction between an alien spouse and a
Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged

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to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules
to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.

OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

DEDEL vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004

Facts:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996 and May 20, 1967 in
a civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four children. David instituted a case for
the nullity of their marriage on account of Sharon’s psychological incapacity to perform basic marital
obligations. He claimed that Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several men including a dentist in
the AFP, a lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command, and a Jordanian national. Despite the
treatment by a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian,
whom she married and with whom she had two children. When the Jordanian national left the
country, Sharon returned to David bringing along her two children by the Jordanian national. David
accepted her back and even considered the illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon
abandoned David to join the Jordanian national with her two children. Since then, Sharon would
only return to the country on special occasions. Dra. Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted
a psychological evaluation of David and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a
perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his
best in whatever he does.

On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse even bringing with her the two children of the
Jordanian to live with David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of the said disorder
amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. The trial
court declared their marriage null and void on the ground of the psychological incapacity of Sharon
to perform the essential obligations of marriage. While the Court of Appeals set aside the trial
court’s judgment and ordered the dismissal of the petition. David’s motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not Sharon’s infidelity is equivalent to psychologically incapacity.

Ruling:
No. Sharon’s infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity. Psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be

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truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
The law intended to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Sharon’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity.

It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality, which make
the respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not
merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon
by David are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code not for declaring a
marriage void. The grounds for legal separation, which need not be rooted in psychological
incapacity, include physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Decision affirmed. Petition is denied.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC v. DAGDAG
G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001

Facts:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20
years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage
certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20,
1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week
after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for
months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he
was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He
would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical
injuries to her.

In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from
him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and
remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino
could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of
general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel
appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.

The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to
manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should
he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating
Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without


waiting for the investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of
Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January
2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor
General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is
not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court holding that “Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to
perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.”

Issue:

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Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling:
Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on September 7, 1975. They begot
two children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He
would from time to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for a few months. He was always drunk
and would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and inflict physical injuries on her if she
refused. On October 1993, he left his family and was never heard from him again. Erlinda was
forced to work and learned that Avelino was imprisoned and that he escaped from jail. Erlinda filed
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Since
Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication. Upon trial, Erlinda presented
Virginia Dagdag who attested to the psychological incapacity of Avelino. The trial court rendered a
decision in favor of respondent without waiting for the prosecutor’s manifestation. The Court of
Appeals affirmed trials’ court decision. The court contented that Erlinda failed to comply with
guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor
testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation that
the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. The investigating prosecutor was
likewise not given an opportunity to present controversy evidence since the trial court’s decision was
prematurely rendered.

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OTHER JURISPRUDENCE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

PESCA vs. PESCA


G. R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001

Facts:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She contends
that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to perform his marital
obligations starting 1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible
husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends
daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o’clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop
or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he
chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children.
The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.

Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned home to
give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. On the
morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence
of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical
injuries.

Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their marriage to be null
and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn
reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner still subsists.

Issues:
a) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.
b) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina
should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.

Ruling:
The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely no evidence
showed and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Article 36
of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. Psychological incapacity, as laid down in the
case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and further explained in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina, refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly

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incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The
rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet” – that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The
latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.” The petition was denied.

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GROUNDS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

MALLION vs. ALCANTARA


GR No. 141528 October 31, 2006

Facts:
Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking a declaration of nullity
oh his marriage with Editha Alcantara due to psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition.
As the decision attained finality, Mallion filed another petition for a declaration of nullity of
marriage, this time alleging that his marriage was null and voiddue to the fact that it was celebrated
without a valid marriage license.

Issue:
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the grounds ogf lack
of marriage license?

Ruling:
Res judicataapplies.

Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action which is the nullity
of marriage. When the second case was filed based on another ground, there is a splitting of a cause
of action which is prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the first marriage had no marriage
license because in the first case he impliedly admitted the same when he did not question the
absence of a marriage license.

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PROPER ACTION AND PROCEDURE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE

LEONOR vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R No. 112597 April 2, 1996

Facts:
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari assailing the validity of the judgment of the lower
court. It was shown that she was married to the private respondent and they had three kids. While
her husband was studying and working abroad, he cohabited with another woman. This prompted
her to file for separation and alimony against her husband. Her husband in return filed a divorce
case against her in Swiss Courts, contending that their marriage was void for absence of valid
marriage certificate. The Swiss Court held infavour of the private respondent. Subsequently the
Private Respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the marriage certificate in the Philippines.
The trial court granted his petition and denied Petitioner’s appeal. The Petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari in the CA, but the latter denied the same. She filed this petition with the
Supreme Court to assail the validity of CA’s decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring the marriage null and void?

Ruling:
Yes. Rule 108 as the basis of the private respondent’s contention is untenable. The Court
explained that the Rule only applies to cases concerning typographical or other clerical errors in the
marriage contract. It does not apply to cases where the status of the parties and their children shall
be affected. The Supreme Court held in favour of the petitioner contending that “A void judgment
for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all”.

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PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

LLAVE vs. REPUBLIC


G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011

Facts:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under
the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage
contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been
representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and
her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the
declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

Issue:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

Ruling:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their marriage
was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized
under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between
Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one
marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its
effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed
by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and
divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.”
But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in
civil and Muslim rites.”

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Persons and Family Relation
PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

ENRICO vs. HEIRS OF MEDINACELI


G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007

Facts:
Spouses Uelogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-medicani were married on June 14 1962.
They had seven children, herein respondents. Trinidad died on may 1 2004 and on august 26 2004,
Eulogio marries petitioner Lolita Enrico on february 10 2005. respondent filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage between Eulogio and Lolita on two grounds:
1) that the marriage was entered into without the requisite marriage license and
2) lack of a marriage ceremony due to Eulogio's illness.

Enrico contended that she has been living with Eulogio for 21 years hence exempt from
getting a marriage license under Art. 34 of the Family Code. More importantly, she sought the
dismissal of his action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file
an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant to AM 02-11-10 SC which provides in
sec. 2 (a) that the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of a void marriage may be filled solely
by the husband or the wife. The heirs invoked the ruling in the case of Ninal vs. Bayadog.

Issue:
a) Whether or not the marriage between Eulogio and Enrico is exempt from securing marriage
license.
b) Whether or not the respondent heirs can assail the validity of said marriage after the death of
Eulogio.

Ruling:
Petition is dismissed.

Under Art. 34 of the family code, a man and a woman who have been living together for at
least five years without any legal impediments are exempt from securing a marriage license. The said
exemption cannot possibly apply because the second marriage contracted by Eulogio with Enrico
took place barely 3 months after Trinidad dies. Moreover, the respondent heirs have no standing to
assail the validity of the second marriage even after te death of their father, Eulogio.

While it is true that Ninal vs. Bayadog allowed the heirs therein to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of the Father's 2nd marriage after the death, the court held that the same rule
cannot be applied for the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the family code.

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Nonetheless, the heirs are not left without remedy. They can still protect their successional
rights as compulsory or intestate heirs of Eulogio by questioning the validity of his second marriage
with Enrico, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate deceased father filed in the regular courts.

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PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

CATALAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,
Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.
On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting
marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with
damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity
of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy?

Ruling:
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all,
she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce
or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes
absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired
American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence

Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the
foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce
decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial
court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.

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PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG


G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa.
One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an
affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.

After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license.

Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code (now Article
34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to exempt the future
spouses from securing a marriage license.

Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party was involved
at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.

Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal
and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled.

In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their wedding day. From the
time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20

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months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse.

The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third
party as being one as “husband and wife”.

Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such
element.
PARTIES FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

CARLOS vs. SANDOVAL


G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

Facts:
Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each have three
parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents
Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land were
registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action
against respondents before the court a quo. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage
between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive
father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title,
including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

Issue:
a) Whether or not Court of Appeals should apply the Rule 35 of the Rules of Court
b) Whether or not both parties should file for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages

Ruling:
The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed. Carlos argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings. Petitioner is misguided.
Whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct in
reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage

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A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party
outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition
for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The
Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
PARTIES

ABLAZA vs. REPUBLIC


G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010

Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950,
thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license.
He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity
of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano,
due to the marriage being void ab initio.

Issue:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother

Ruling:
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

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Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or
illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding
to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges
upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children
(legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir.
The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.

APPEARANCE OF THE STATE

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN


G.R. No. 155409 June 8, 2007

Facts:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married
life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned
bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her
paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent
and the latter’s paramour. Consequently, both the private respondent and her paramour were
convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from one (1)
year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum penalty, to three (3) years, six
(6) months and twenty one (21) days, medium of prision correccional as maximum penalty.

Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15,
2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as Civil
Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner.

During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a
Compromise Agreement. The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the
respondent judge in the assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously
dated January 2, 2002.

Issue:

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Whether the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

Ruling:
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the
civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any
interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice
to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. Where a
subsequent marriage is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent spouse; while Article 63
applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a proceeding where
the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of psychological capacity.

Article 2035 of the Civil Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement
partially divided the properties of the conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not
deal with the validity of a marriage or legal separation. It is not among those that are expressly
prohibited by Article 2035. Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is
tantamount to a circumvention of the law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal
properties is misplaced. Existing law and jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.

Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or
for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion
holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of
all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant
to Article 136 of the Family Code.

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APPEARANCE OF THE STATE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMA CUISON-MELGAR


G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006

Facts:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic Church in
Dagupan City. Their union begot five children. On August 19,1996, Norma filed for declaration of
nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations. According to Norma the manifestations of Eulogio’s psychological
incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, laziness, and
abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985.

Issue:
Whether or not the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is in the nature
contemplated by Article 36.

Ruling:

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The Supreme Court set aside and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The
marriage between Norma and Eulogio is valid. The immaturity, habitual alcoholism, laziness,
jealousy and abandonment of respondent do not constitute psychological incapacity. The Court
ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of
some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage – had to be shown. A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the
psychological incapacity.

APPEARANCE OF THE STATE

FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN vs. PHILIPP T. SIN


G.R. No. 137590 March 26, 2001

Facts:
On January 4, 1987, Florence and respondent Philipp Sin, a Portuguese citizen, were married
at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel, Manila. On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the
RTC, Pasig City, a complaint for “declaration of nullity of Marriage” against Philipp. Trial ensued
and the parties presented their respective evidences.

Issue:

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Whether or not the court erred in not ordering a prosecuting attorney or fiscal on behalf of
the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.

Ruling:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that “in all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his
agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an evidence
that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals.

APPEARANCE OF THE STATE

EMILIO R. TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996

Facts:
Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972. Lopez alleged that at
the time of the marriage. Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with the

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essential marital obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in violent fights.
Emilio was also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a womanizer and gave minimal support to
the family. Likewise, he became spendthrift and abusive of his administration of the conjugal
partnership by alienating some of their assets without Victoria’s consent. Attempts for reconciliation
failed because Emilio’s refusal to reform. In the prayer of Victoria for annulment of marriage, she
further prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.
At variance, Emilio denied the imputation against him. Thereafter, trial ensued and Victoria
presented four witnesses including documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of
Emilio’s relationship with other women, his apprehension for illegal possession of drugs and copies
of prior church annulment decree. After Victoria rested her case, reception for Emilio’s evidence
was scheduled. It was postponed and on the reset date, he failed to appear. The court then declared
Emilio to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision.

On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Victoria’s
marriage to Emilio and awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for
relief from judgment but was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstance of
the case where petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance during the hearing.

Ruling:
Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for relief from
judgment. Under the rules, a final and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may
be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the
petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause
of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a
timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. Furthermore, the failure of counsel to notify
his client on time of an adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal there from is negligence that
is not excusable. Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to inform the trial court of his
client’s confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled
hearings. Indeed, a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy, allowed only in
exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy.

APPEARANCE OF THE STATE

MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCHOTORENA


A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861 July 30, 2004

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Facts:
Mrs. Macias asserts before the Court that the respondent judge's actuations constitute bias,
partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge. Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and
conclusive from the records is that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure. For
these administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction him.

The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals' Decision which states that the
respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias' right to due process when he proceeded with the
trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was
filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending resolution.

The respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Section 1, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure, which states that: "After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be the
duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial." Considering that
the last pleading was Mrs. Macias' Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first
resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias' motion to set the case for pre-trial.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and incompetence.

Ruling:
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance
of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of either dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding
six (6) months or a fine of more than Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) may be imposed. With this, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found
GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier withheld from his
retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of the OCA is DIRECTED to immediately
release to the respondent judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) from
the aforesaid retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its further retention.

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DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

PACETE vs. CARRIAGA


G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994

Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as
for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in
her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo;
that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she
learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to
file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The
court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17, 1980.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision.

Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists.
If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care
that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.”

The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to
emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58
of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must “in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide
the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the
parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by
the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action

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for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is
no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.
FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS

MARBELLA-BOBIS vs. BOBIS


G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000

Facts:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce Javier.
Without said marriage having been annulled the same respondent contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Imelda Marbella- Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain
Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner’s complaint a n information for bigamy was files against
respondent. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.
Respondent filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the
pending civil case as a prejudicial question.

Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of the marriage
posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case of respondent

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ordered the Trial Court to immediately proceed with the Criminal Case.
A pending civil case is not a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. I t is a question based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused.

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FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS

TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

Facts:
In 1977, private respondent Edgardo Reyes married Ana Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil
ceremony. A church wedding ensued. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relatives want to declare
their marriage null and void ab initio lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding was also
declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.

In 1979, before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, Edgardo Reyes
married Ofelia Ty in a ceremony officiated by a judge, then a church wedding followed. In 1991,
Edgardo reyes filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court praying that his marriage with Ofelia
be declared null and void on the ground that here was no marriage license when they got married.
He also averred at that time he married Ofelia, the decree of nullity of the marriage to Anna Maria
was rendered only when his civil marriage to petitioner, Ofelia Ty, null and void ab initio. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision

Issue:
Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly

Ruling:
The second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before the case of
Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon, wherein there
was no need for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and consent, before
such person may contract a second marriage. The first marriage of private respondent being void for
lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case therefore, the Court concluded that private respondent’s
second marriage to Ofelia Ty is valid.

Moreover, the provision of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied where to do so
would prejudice the vested rights of a party and her children. As held in Jison versus Court of
Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there is impairment of vested rights.

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Petition granted, judgment and resolution declared valid and subsisting.

EFFECTS

VALDES vs. RTC AND VALDES


G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

Facts:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971. Begotten during
their marriage were five children. In a petition dated June 22, 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage pursuant to article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing the parties following
the joinder of issues, the marriage of Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez is declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground of their mutual Psychological Incapacity to
comply with their essential marital obligations. The three older children shall choose which parent
they would want to stay with, the younger children shall be placed in the custody of their mother.
The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties.

Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification on that portion directing compliance with Articles
50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage.” Parenthetically,
during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain
with their father Antonio Valdes.

Issue:
Whether the trial court failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of a
family dwelling in a situation wherein a marriage is declared null and null and void because of
Psychological Incapacity on the part of either or both parties to the contract.

Ruling:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of cause thereof, the
property relation of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 137 or Article 148. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have

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obtained through their joint efforts.The rules set up to govern liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and
voidable marriages are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exist between common-
law spouses.

EFFECTS

ALAIN M. DIÑO vs. MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO


G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

Facts:
Alain M. Diño and Ma. Caridad L. Diño were childhood friends and sweethearts. They
started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and
respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor
Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. Petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against respondent. Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the
time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt
of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period.
Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with
petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also
learned that on 5 October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara. The Office of
the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of collusion between the parties
and the case was set for trial on the merits. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist,
submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. Dr.
Tayag found that respondent's disorder was long-lasting and by nature, incurable. In its 18 October
2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was
psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.

Issue:

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Whether or not the trial court made mistake when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties.

Ruling:
Yes, petitioner's marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. What governs the liquidation of properties owned in common
by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. The property relations of parties in a
void marriage during the period of cohabitation are governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of
the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Partition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. It is not necessary to liquidate the
properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

FRAUD, ARTICLES 45 PARAGRAPH 3 AND 46, FC

VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006

Facts:
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the crime of Illegal Falsification of Public
Documents. It appears that petitioner Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several
parties and among them is the IBC 13. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner. IBC 13
appealed to National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). IBC 13 filed a surety bond but this
document was found to be falsified. The two complaints for falsification of document was brought
before Manila prosecutor’s office and dismissed the charges against Atty. Eulalio Diaz III and
respondent Villadores. The petitioned filed for review of the case with the DOJ, the latter affirmed
the dismissal of Atty. Diaz III but ordered the inclusion of respondent Villadores as an accused in
the two criminal cases. Accordingly, the original informations were amended to include the
respondent among those charged. Following the arraignment, the private prosecutor, Rico and
Associates, filed a new Motion to Admit Amended Informations alleging damages sustained by the
petitioner as a result of the crimes committed by the accused. The motion was admitted by the trial
court. The respondent moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Subsequently,
respondent moved for the disqualification of Rico and Associates and the appellate court
pronounced that petitioner did not sustain any damages for the crime committed by the respondent

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and the same has redounded to his benefit. Rico and Associates opposed such pronouncement since
it is a mere obiter dictum.

Issue:
Whether or not the pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner Villanueva is not an
offended party is a mere obiter dictum.

Ruling:
The pronouncement of appellate court that petitioner Villanueva is not an offended party is
not a mere obiter dictum. An adjudication on any point within the issue presented by the case
cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although
incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of
the case and led up to the final conclusion and to any statement as to matter on which the decision
is predicated. Hence, in the instant case, the pronouncement of the appellate court is not an obiter
dictum as it touched upon a matter clearly raised by respondent Villadores in his petition assailing
the admission of the amended informations. Argument on whether petitioner Villanueva was the
offended party was, thus, clearly raised by respondent. The body of decision contains the discussion
on that point and it clearly mentioned certain principles of law.

FRAUD, ARTICLES 45 PARAGRAPH 3 AND 46, FC

ANAYA vs. PALAROAN


G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970

Facts:
Plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on December 4, 1953; that defendant
Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on January 7, 1954 on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several
months prior to their marriage he had a pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that
“the non divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of the defendant
that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly
commenced…Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them
constituted ‘FRAUD’’ in obtaining her consent, She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and
for moral damages.

Issue:

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Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship
with anither woman is a ground for annulment of marriage

Ruling:
Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of
the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the Article, providing that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as
to chastity” shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage.

FRAUD, ARTICLES 45 PARAGRAPH 3 AND 46, FC

BUCCAT vs. MANGONON DE BUCCAT


G.R. NO. 47101 April 25, 1941

Facts:
On March 1938, Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat first met, then they
came engaged September of the same year. After few months later, on November 26, 1938, they got
married.However, after 89 days of their marriage dated February 23, 1939, Luida gave birth to a son.
After knowing this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her. On March 23,
1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married
Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.

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The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.

Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage be granted on the grounds that
Luida concealed her pregnancy before the marriage?

Ruling:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in
which the State is interested and where society rests.In this case, the court did not find any proof
that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. It was
unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s condition
considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical
manifestation, ie. enlarged stomach ) when they got married.

SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant.

FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE

VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006

Facts:
Respondent Villadores is one of the accused in the amended in formations in Criminal Cases
entitled, “People of the Philippines v. Atty. Tomas Bernardo, Roque Villadores, Alberto Adriano
and Rolando Advincula for Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Manila. It appears

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that petitioner Villanueva Jr. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against several parties among them
IBC 13.When the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner Villaneva Jr. IBC 13 appealed to the
National Labor Relations Commission. Thus the two complaints for falsification of public
document were filed before the Manila City Prosecutor’s Office. The charges against Respondent
Villadores and Atty. Eulalio Diaz 111 were dismissed by the City Prosecutors Office.

Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in failing to appreciate that Francisco Villanueva Jr. was in
fact an aggrieved party.

Ruling:
Francisco Villanueva is not the offended party in these cases. It must be underscored that it
was IBC 13 who secured the falsified surety bond for the purpose of the appeal it had taken from an
adverse judgment of the labor case filed by Villanueva. We see no reason how Villanueva could have
sustained damages as a result of the falsification of the surety appeal bond and its confirmation letter
when it could have redounded to his own benefit if the appeal would be dismissed as a result of the
forgery. If there be anyone who was prejudiced, it was IBC 13 when it purchased a fake surety bond.

FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE

MACCARUBO vs. MACCARUBO


A.C. No. 6148 February 27, 2004

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Facts:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo. Complainant Florencie
Maccarrubo averred that she was started courting by respondent Atty. Edmundo Maccarrubo in
April 1991, he representing himself as a bachelor; that they eventually contracted marriage which
was celebrated on two occasions administered by Rev. Rogelio J. Bolivar, the first on December 18,
1991 in the latter’s Manila office, and the second on December 28, 1991 at the Asian Institute of
Tourism Hotel in Quezon City; and that although respondent admitted that he was married to Helen
Esparza on June 16, 1982, he succeeded in convincing complainant, her family and friends that his
previous marriage was void. Complainant further averred that respondent entered into a third
marriage with one Josephine T. Constantino; and that he abandoned complainant and their children
without providing them any regular support up to the present time, leaving them in precarious living
conditions. But respondent filed a petition for nullity of marriage since it was contracted with
vitiated consent.

Issue:
Whether or not the disbarment case be dismissed basing it from the court’s declaration of
nullity of the marriage.

Ruling:
While the marriage between complainant and respondent has been annulled by final
judgment, this does not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety. He and complainant
started living as husband and wife in December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting, as it
was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage was annulled, rendering him liable for
concubinage. Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is required for the
continued right to practice law as a member of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and is
a public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage. Hence the respondent was disbarred
for gross misconduct.

FORCE, INTIMIDATION, UNDUE INFLUENCE

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REYES VS. ZABALLERO
G.R. No. L-3561 May 23, 1951

Facts:
This case originated from a loan of P6,500 with interest at 10 per cent per annum payable in
advance, made by Dr. Ceasar Reyes to Agripino Zaballero on October 1, 1942. Zaballero secured
the payment with a first mortgage on ten parcels of land.

The installments due for 1942 and 1943 totaling the sum of P1,300 plus interest were paid in
Japanese Military Script and the Payments were unreservedly accepted. On November 30, 1944,
Zaballero offered to pay the third installments and its interests which fell due on October of the
same year, but Reyes refused to accept on the ground that it was immoral and unjust that the
payment be made in Japanese Military notes which had considerably devaluated, and that he had an
option according to the contract to have the payment in Philippine or United States currency.
Zaballero announced that the next day he would tender the whole balance. Reyes, acting upon
advice given by his attorneys to whom he had meanwhile resorted for guidance, received the money
and executed the notarial deed of release of the real estate mortgage. On the same day, he received
payment, the mortgagee (Reyes), executed an affidavit in secret, without defendants’ knowledge,
before a Notary Public stating that he had accepted under protest the payment of P5,200 plus
interest in the sum of P612, and that he had deposited the whole amount paid by the debtors.

Issue:
What constitutes Duress or Intimidation?

Ruling:
According to the Civil Code, there is Duress or intimidation when one of the contracting
parties is inspired by a rational and well-grounded fear or suffering an imminent and serious injury
to his person or property, of his spouse, descendants and ascendants. Mere reluctance does not
detract from the voluntariness of one’s acts. There is a distinction between a case where a person
gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where he, in reality,
gives no consent at all, as where he executed a contract or performs an act against a pressure which
he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of the law when
he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally speaking
he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as when
he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law.

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IMPOTENCY, ARTICLE 45 PARAGRAPH 5, FC

ALACAZAR vs. ALACAZAR


G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009

Facts:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The
petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a
marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the
marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his
being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half
of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being
void ab initio.

Issue:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother

Ruling:
`Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as
having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

Pursuant to the provisions of the old Civil Code, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or
illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding
to the deceased's estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges
upon a prior determinationof whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children
(legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir.
The petition is returned to the RTC for further proceedings of the case.

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Persons and Family Relation
IMPOTENCY, ARTICLE 45 PARAGRAPH 5, FC

VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006

Facts:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married
on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial
court a petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him
into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage;
that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private
respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which
states:1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and 2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and
attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s fees and costs, but reduced the
award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of
Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant petition for review based
on the following assigned errors:

Issue:
Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent

Ruling:
The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not
disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a
bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the
rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way.
For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon appellant, what with the fact
that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his school nor the police regarding
the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his
predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage.

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IMPOTENCY, ARTICLE 45 PARAGRAPH 5, FC

JOEL JIMENEZ vs. REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES


G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez in a complaint prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the
defendant Remedios Cañizares upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was too
small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her
genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that
reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married.

Defendant however failed to submit her answer within the required period. Thereafter, the
Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit to a physical examination by a competent
lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation. This was not followed by the
defendant however. Moreover, the defendant was not present during the scheduled hearings.
Because of this, the judge ordered a judgment annulling the marriage of the parties. The city attorney
then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that defendant’s impotency has not been
satisfactorily proven since the defendant refused to undergo the physical examination.

Issue:
Whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband-plaintiff.

Ruling:
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The
state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The
security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every
member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law,
not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to
exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage.

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In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole
testimony of the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the
annulment of his marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be
deemed to have been satisfactorily established, because from the commencement of the proceedings
until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her refusal to be
examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the
presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because
women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority.

"Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in


favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and
wife.
GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION

ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG vs. LUCITA G. ONG


G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006

Facts:
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong and Lucita G. Ong were married on July 13,
1975 They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of
majority. Thereafter, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation alleging that her life with William
was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct; William would
also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt;
whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box
her; on December 9, 1995, William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain,
he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to
her sister’s house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their
parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano
for treatment of her injuries.

William for his part denied all the allegations. While he admits that he and Lucita quarreled
on December 9, 1995, at their house at Tondo, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their
Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office below.

Both the lower courts and the appellate court issued a decree of legal separation due to the
repeated physical abuses felt by both Lucita and their children. William on the other hand maintains
that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership of
properties belonging to the conjugal partnership which were acquired through his sole efforts also,
William reiterated that Lucita cannot file the petition since it Lucita who abandoned their conjugal
dwelling.

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Issue:
Whether nor not the defenses of William are valid.

Ruling:
William posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order
for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to
destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings could
control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. What
benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’ financial interests at
the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal
separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. The claim of William
that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-
abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his
reputation then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief from the courts, but
because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.

Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a
decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code
which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal
separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable
cause for more than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive
conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

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GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION

FROILAN C. GANDIONCO vs. HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA


G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987

Facts:
Private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed a complaint against petitioner for
legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages.
Private respondent also filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for concubinage. Respondent
Judge then issued a decree ordering petitioner to provide support to the private respondent.

In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the
incidents consequent thereto, such as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in
view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him the private respondent since the civil
action arises from the criminal action of concubinage. Petitioner also argues that his conviction for
concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or
succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.

Issue:

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Whether or not the contention of petitioner is valid, that the civil action for legal separation
should first be suspended and that he must first be convicted before deciding upon the said civil
action.

Ruling:
A civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise
from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent
spouse, among others. An action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but
is aimed at the conjugal rights of the spouses and their relations to each other.

Also, a decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof
by preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or
conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao has been modified, as that case
was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds
the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such
former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a criminal
action. That requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil
Code, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in
Francisco v. Tayao.

GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION

PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG


G.R. No. 82606 December 18, 1992

Facts:
Petitioner was legally married to Jose Jo alias Ho Hang.However, in 1980, the petitioner filed
a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal property, in addition to an earlier action for
support, also against him. The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. Thereafter, the judge
rendered a decision of legal separation between the spouses and further ordered the payment of
support by Ho Hang to petitioner. However, there was no definite disposition for the judicial
separation of their property. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals
seeking for the judicial separation of their conjugal properties.

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Persons and Family Relation
The Court of Appeals however dismissed the complaint for judicial separation of property
for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by
Article 178 of the Civil Code since the separation of the conjugal property was agreed by the
spouses.When their motions for reconsideration were denied, both parties came to this Court for
relief.

Issue:
Whether or not the courts erred in finding that the judicial separation of property was not
allowed.

Ruling:
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal
dwelling without any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a
period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her
whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling.Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial separation on either
of these grounds: 1. Abandonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and 2. Failure of one
spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the family without just cause, even if she said spouse
does not leave the other spouse.

The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the
petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned
from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he
had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the
determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give
financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by
the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by Article 128, for the
fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply with his obligations to the family as husband
or parent. Apart from refusing to admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City,
Jo has freely admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many children by them. It was his
refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that prompted her to file the actions against
him for support and later for separation of the conjugal property, in which actions, significantly, he
even denied being married to her. The private respondent has not established any just cause for his
refusal to comply with his obligations to his wife as dutiful husband.

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CONDONATION/PARDON

EDUARDO ARROYO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 96602 November 19, 1991

Facts:

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Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri,
and Eduardo Arroyo committed on 2 November 1982 in the City of Baguio. Both defendants
pleaded not guilty and after trial, the RTC convicted petitioner and Mrs. Ruby Vera Neri of adultery.
According to the facts of the case, the accused Ruby Neri in the company of a friend went to Baguio
City and proceeded at Mines View Park Condominium. At 7:00 in the evening, co-accused Eduardo
Arroyo entered the unit and thereafter proceeded inside the master's bedroom where Ruby Neri and
her friend was waiting. Ruby Neri's friend was thereafter instructed to leave the room. After 45
minutes, both Ruby Neri and Eduardo Arroyo came out from the room and joined Ruby Neri's
friend at the living room.

Both Ruby Neri and Eduardp Arroyo filed a motion for reconsideration contending that a
pardon has been extended by Ruby Neri's husband and that her husband had later contracted
marriage with another woman. As proof of this, Ruby Neri showed the Affidavit of Desistance
made by Dr. Neri.

Issue:
Whether or not the Affidavit of Desitance executed by Dr. Neri signifies pardon.

Ruling:
The rule on pardon is found in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
"ART. 344. The crime of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both parties, if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned
the offenders."

While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense that consent
is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit affair, nevertheless, for
either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint. In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed only on 23 November 1988
while the compromise agreement was executed only on 16 February 1989, after the trial court had
already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides that the
crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint, once the
complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of
our law on adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private
honor of the offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such
enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and
the family in the preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here
involved is of the most fundamental kind.
The same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in Article 149:
"The family, being the foundation of the ration, is a basic social institution which public policy

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cherishes and protects." Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice
or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.

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CONDONATION/PARDON

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ


G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956

Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to defendant
Leonila Ginez. Immediately after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved
to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and
informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan.

Afterwards, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from some anonymous writers
informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. Benjamin Bugayong then went to Asingan,
Pangasinan and sought for his wife. Both husband and wife then proceeded to the house of Pedro
Bugayong, a cousin of Benjamin, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and
wife. Then they returned to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and
wife. On the third day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he
received that she had committed adultery but, instead of answering his query, she merely packed up
and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her. After that and
despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her.

Benjamin then filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, who timely filed an
answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint and stating than she was condoned by
her husband.

Issue:
Whether or not there was condonation in this case.

Ruling:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal
separation. A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, clearly shows that there
was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of infidelity amounting to
adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities
amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her
and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that
she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and
together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in
the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all these
facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was
effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred
almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery.It has been

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held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that
'a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is
ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the husband'. In the lights of the
facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above quoted, and of the various
decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that there is condonation.

CONDONATION/PARDON

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA


G.R. No. L-3047 May 16, 1951

Facts:
A complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata, his wife,
and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during
the period from the year 1946 to 1947. The complaint was filed on March 14, 1947 whereby
Dalmacio Bondoc knows his codefendant to be a married woman. The defendant wife entered the
plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months which penalty she served. In the same court,
on September 17, 1948, the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous acts
committed by his wife and her paramour from March 1947 to September 1948. Each of the
defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the
defendants and quashed the second complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not the second complaint be quashed for double jeopardy.

Ruling:
A second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first
complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if
the second complaint places the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,
the adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be
absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his
codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him
against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the
time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this
defendant was a married woman and he continued to have carnal knowledge of her.

Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the
wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was
granted because the pardon refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts.

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The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby
reversed and set aside, and trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in
accordance with law, with costs against the appellees.

CONDONATION/PARDON

JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO


G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are
now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant
carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty
culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city
defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June,
1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another
man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery
in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff a petition for legal separation. Defendant poses as defense
that plaintiff condoned her adulterous acts with Nelson Orzame since plaintiff never sought for her
after having discovered her adulterous acts.

Issue:
Whether or not plaintiff condoned the acts of defendant.

Ruling:
We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after
the latter had left him in 1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with
Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had
discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring her
home. Hers was the obligation to return.

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Two decisions are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court inferred
the husband's consent to or condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful
examination, a vital difference will be found: in both instances, the husband had abandoned his wife;
here it was the wife who "left" her husband.

Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the
appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects.

CONSENT AND FORMS

SOCORRO MATUBIS vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES


G.R. No. L-11766 October 25, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943. For failure to agree on how
they should live as husband and wife, the couple agreed to live separately from each other, which
status remained unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into
an agreementwhich provides among others that “neither of them can prosecute the other for
adultery or concubinage or any other crime arising from their separation.”
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado and said
Asuncion gave birth to a child. It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion deported themselves
as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community.
Plaintiff thereafter filed an action for legal separation against the defendant. The trial court
however dismissed the action on the ground that under Art. 102 of the new Civil Code, an action
for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the
plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when the cause
occurred. The plaintiff became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her husband with Asuncion
Rebulado in January, 1955. The complaint was filed on April 24, 1956. The present action was,
therefore, filed out of time. Also, article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the legal separation
may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent
to the adultery or concubinage. As shown in the facts, the plaintiff has consented to the commission
of concubinage by her husband as proven by their “agreement.”

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff condoned the acts of the defendant.

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Ruling:
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date
on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when
cause occurred.The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By
the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation
in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant
did not even press this matter in her brief.

The very wording of the “agreement” gives no room for interpretation other than that given
by the trial judge. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff are necessarily the import of the
agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but expressed. Article 100 Civil
Code, specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having
condoned and/or consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.

CONSENT AND FORMS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL


G.R. No. L-48183 November 10, 1941

Facts:
On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married the compliant Elena
Ramirez Cartagena and after seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged
incompatibility of character, to live separately each other and on May 25, 1935 they executed a
document which in part recites “en completa libertad de accion en calquier acto y todos concepto.”

On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, secured a decree of divorce from the civil
court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. Subsequently, he contracted another
marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel and since then they lived together as husband and wife.
Complainant then instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy and the other for
concubinage. The accused posed as defense the act of condonation made by the complainant.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid condonation in this case.

RULING:
The Court believes and so holds that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of
concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint in which they

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agreed to be "en completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while illegal
for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of
concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no doubt
that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other.

The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides: The offended party
cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive,
nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.As the term "pardon"
unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been intended
agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical
difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as
the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to
come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. We, therefore, hold that the prior
consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the
offense.

The Court reiterate that the agreement should be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to
do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the
tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest
policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. If there is anything
morally condemnatory in a situation of his character, the remedy lies not with us but with the
legislative department of the government. What the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits
of our authority.

CONSENT AND FORMS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. URSULA SENSANO


G.R. No. L-37720 March 27, 1933

Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had one child.
Shortly after the birth of his child, the husband left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where
he remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the support of
herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she could call, she struggled
for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal day when she met the accused Marcelo Ramos
who took her and the child to live with him.

On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo
Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to four months and one day. The court, in its decision,
stated the following: "In the opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat
cruel in his treatment of his wife having abandoned her as he did." After completing her sentence,
the accused left her wife. She thereupon appealed to this municipal president and the justice of the
peace to send for her husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the

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house of the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a faithful wife if he would take her
back.

He refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where she wished, that he
would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the
second time, she and her child went back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year
1924) and they have lived with him ever since. The husband, knowing that she resumed living with
her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as
husband. Shortly thereafter he left for the Territory of Hawaii where she remained for seven years
completely abandoning his said wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented the
second charge of adultery here involved with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to
obtain a divorce.

Issue:
Whether or not the husband is still entitled to his relief

Ruling:
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he signed the
complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case
and his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between
the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.We
cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years of acquiescence on his part
in the adultery of his wife is explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which
period it was impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is no merit in the
argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any action against the accused during the
said seven years.
RATIONALE OF RECRIMINATION/MUTUAL GUILT

BENEDICTO vs. DE LA RAMA


G.R. NO. L-1056 December 8, 1903

Facts:
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on July 1891.Both were happily living together until
August of 1892 when the defendant without any previous warning, took his wife to the house of her
parents and left her there. It was found out that in plaintiff’s complaint for separation, she charges
defendant of committing adultery with Gregoria Bemejo. The lower courts believed such adulterous
acts committed by the defendant.

On the part of the defendant however, he stated that the reason why he left his wife was
because he received a letter made by the plaintiff herself, addressed to a Spanish civil guard named
Zabal who was her lover. When the defendant asked plaintiff regarding the said letter, she admitted

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the genuineness of the letter, fell upon her knees, and implored him to pardon her. That same day
he took her to the home of her parents, told what had occurred, and left her there. The mother
testified that about a year after her daughter was returned to her she heard that the defendant
believed that illicit relations existed between Zabal and the plaintiff on account of a certain letter.

Issue:
Whether or not mutual guilt was committed by both parties in this case

Ruling:
It is expressly provided in Law 8, title 2, partida 4, as follows: “For the sin of each one of
them is of itself a bar to an accusation against the other.”The Court’s conclusion is that neither one
of the parties is entitled to a divorce. Section 497authorizes us in cases of this kind "to make such
findings upon the facts and render such final judgment as justice and equity require." The judgment
below is reversed, and we find from the evidence the following facts: The allegations of the
complaint as to the marriage of the parties and as to the acts of adultery committed by the defendant
are true as therein stated except as to the date of the adultery committed with Gregoria Bermejo.
The plaintiff, in the summer of 1892, at Talisay, in the Province of Occidental Negros, committed
adultery with one Zabal, a corporal of the civil guard.

As conclusion of law from the foregoing facts we hold that neither party is entitled to
judgment of divorce against the other; that judgment be entered that the plaintiff take nothing by
her action or the defendant by his cross demand, and that neither party recover of the other any
costs either in this court or the Court of First Instance.

COLLUSION

JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO


G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are
now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant
carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty
culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city

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defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June,
1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately.

On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another
man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery
in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation.

Issue:
Whether or not collusion existed in this case.

Ruling:
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement between husband and wife for
one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having committed,
a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the purpose of enabling the
other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the
parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce.

In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a
matrimonial offense had been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring
about a legal separation even in the absence of grounds therefor. Here, the offense of adultery had
really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not have falsely told the
adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband
requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.

In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact
that the guilty party confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence
necessary to prove it

PRESCRIPTION

WILLIAM H. BROWN vs. JUANITA YAMBAO


G.R. No. L-10699 October 18, 1957

Facts:

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On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while
interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment
camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl.
Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment. Thereafter
the spouse lived separately. Yambao however testified that after liberation, Brown lived martially
with another woman and had begotten children by her.

The court denied the legal separation filed on the ground that Brown’s action had already
prescribed.

Issue:
Whether or not the action had already prescribed.

Ruling:
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred,
because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of
his wife's adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the
new Civil Code, action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one (1) year from and after
the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such
cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and
conclusion.

The courts can take cognizance of prescription as a defense because actions seeking a decree
of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law
that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.

PRESCRIPTION

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JOSE DE OCAMPO vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO
G.R. No. L-13553 February 23, 1960

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married in April 5, 1938. They begot several children who are
now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant
carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty
culture, where she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city
defendant was going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June,
1952, when defendant had finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then they had
lived separately.

On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another
man by the name of Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery
in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition for legal separation. Both
lower and appellate courts denied the petition on the ground that there was confession of judgment.

Issue:
Whether or not there was confession of judgment.

Ruling:
Art. 100 of the Civil Code do not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by
the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of
judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and
confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's
demand. This is not present in this case. Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant
constituted practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery
independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based
on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action
ipso facto, any defendant who opposesthe separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely
to prevent it.

The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally
separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she
refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not
order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion,
which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.

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PRESCRIPTION

ELENA CONTRERAS vs. CESAR J. MACARAIG


G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970

Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952. Out of their Marriage, three
children were born. All the children are in the care of plaintiff wife.In September, 1962, Avelino
Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with one Lily
Ann Alcala. Defendant would be away for a month, and would be home for three days. During
these times defendant was home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos’ report in her desire not to
anger defendant.

Plaintiff also heard rumors that Lily Ann Alcala gave birth to a baby. Plaintiff then entreated
her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his
family. Defendant however told his father that he could not do anything. Thereafter, plaintiff met
with Lili Ann Alcala. The latter informed that former that she was willing to give defendant but it
was defendant who refused to break relationship with her.

In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff went to talk to defendant at his place of work
where plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal
home, assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could
no longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.On December 14, 1963,
plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation.

Issue:
Whether or not prescription has already set in

Ruling:
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year
after the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the
essence of the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable
social institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its
status.The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article 102
of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or
from December 1963. After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the
law, the only time when appellant really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the
early part of December 1963 when plaintiff pleaded the defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala.

From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the
preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer

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leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under
obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the
legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced. The one year prescriptive period is
thus followed in this case.

PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION

AIDA P. BAÑEZ vs. GABRIEL B. BAÑEZ


G.R. No. 132592 January 23, 2002

Facts:
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil Case
No. CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Bañez and
respondent Gabriel Bañez on the ground of the latter’s sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their
conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondent’s
one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children.

Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal before the appellate court. Petitioner however
contends that an action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken.
She concludes that respondent’s appeal should have been dismissed for his failure to file the record
on appeal within the reglementary period.

Issue:
Whether or not multiple appeals form part of the procedure for legal separation cases.

Ruling:
In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of
multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same
lessor-lessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be
violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals.

The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will
necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation,
such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation.
They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to
or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation.
Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.

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PROCEDURE OF ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION

CARMEN LAPUZ SYvs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY


G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

Facts:
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against
Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934; that they had
lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that
they had no child; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named
Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a
decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S.
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

Respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio however counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab


initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage,
celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. On May 31,
1969, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. Respondent moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the death abated the action for legal separation.

Issue:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal
separation, abate the action

Ruling:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its
Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in
its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself “...
When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved.

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The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of
the suit (Article 244, Section 3).” The action is absolutely dead

Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for
divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The
action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the
parties to such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of
separation beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of
the parties to the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are
almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final
decree, abates the action.

However, it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
(or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of
the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy
from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the
offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of
the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and
intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a
claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section
17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the
deceased party.

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MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD

LUIS MA. ARANETA vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION


G.R. No. L-9667 July 31, 1956

Facts:
The main action was brought by the husband against his wifefor legal separation on the
ground of adultery. The wife however filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three
minor children, a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her
passport. The husband opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and alleging
that the wife had abandoned the children. The respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition
granting custody of the children to the wife and a monthly allowance of P2,300.00 for support for
her and her children.

The main reason given by the judge, for refusing the huisband’s request that evidence be
allowed to be introduced on the issues, is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code,
which reads as follows: “ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six
months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.”

Issue:
Whether or not the six month cooling-off period be followed

Ruling:

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It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is
evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses.
The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only fan their already inflamed
passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity
for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy,
does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of
the children and alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105,
Civil Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the
circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice may
be caused.

Take the case at bar, for instance. Why should the court ignore the claim of adultery by the
husband in the face of express allegations under oath to that effect, supported by circumstantial
evidence consisting of letter the authenticity of which cannot be denied. And why assume that the
children are in the custody of the wife, and that the latter is living at the conjugal dwelling, when it is
precisely alleged in the petition and in the affidavits, that she has abandoned the conjugal abode?
Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to the
custody and alimony pendente lite may be lawfully exercised.

Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force
provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is,
evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means
conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be
allowed that the court may determine which is best for their custody.
MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD

LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS vs. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR.


G.R. No. L-34132 July 29, 1972

Facts:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner filed in the sala of respondent Judge against respondent
Clemente Ramos for legal separation, on concubinage on the respondent's part and an attempt by
him against her life being alleged. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive
property, then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente Ramos. There
was an opposition to the hearing of such a motion based on Article 103 of the Civil Code.
Thereafter, petitioner received an order of respondent Judge granting the motion of respondent
Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction. That is
the order complained of in this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal
separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the

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court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary
remedy to such a suit.

Ruling:
After a careful consideration of the legal question presented, it is the holding of this Court
that Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary
injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period.The court where the action is pending
according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is
precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that
an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were
otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. That the
law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself are
discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the
petition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and
manage their respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership
property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which
case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to
dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court."There
would appear to be then recognition that the question of management of their respective property
need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be
appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation
from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties may in the
meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more
reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of
concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of
what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by
him.
MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD

ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR.


G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994

Facts:
In Concepcion Alanis’ complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete on 30 April
1938; that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion; that she learned of such marriage only on 01 August 1979; that during her marriage to
Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several
motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in his name and
Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other dummies.

The defendants asked for a motion of extension if their time to file their answers, which was
granted by the judge. However, defendants still failed to file their respective answers. Thus, Alanis

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asked that defendants be declared in default which was approved by the judge. Thereafter, Alanis
submitted all evidences favoring her. Thus, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of default is proper

Ruling:
Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists. If there is no
collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state
attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages,
under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be
made to depend upon the parties themselves.

It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal should be allowed to focus
upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are
fully justified or not. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off"
period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further underscored by the
inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 6. No defaults in actions
for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. — If the defendant in an action for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to
intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to possible
jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage relation and its avowed
intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone
dictate.

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NECESSITY OF TRIAL AND INTERVENTION OF STATE

ENRICO L. PACETE vs. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR.


G.R. No. L-53880 March 17, 1994

Facts:

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Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as
for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in
her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo;
that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she
learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was
impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.

The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to
file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the
plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The
court received plaintiffs’ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980.
After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its decision
on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to be null and
void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

Ruling:
The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists.
If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care
that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.” The above stated provision calling for the
intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of
annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere
contract.

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an
action for legal separation must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off” period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile. The significance of the
above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage
or for legal separation. Therefore, “if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether
or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in
order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.”
LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE

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Persons and Family Relation
SAMSON T. SABALONES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REMEDIOS GAVIOLA-
SABALONES
G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994

Facts:
As a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive
tours of duties, petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios
Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years.
Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and
their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot
located at #17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, belonging to the conjugal
partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years old, very sick and living alone without any
income, and that his share of the proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his
hospitalization and medical treatment. In her answer, the private respondent opposed the
authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.

The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost
nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged,
much less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he
merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or
he should at least be given his share of the rentals.

In her prayer, she asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order the
liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein because of his
adultery. She also prayed that it enjoin the petitioner and his agents from a) disturbing the occupants
of the Forbes Park property and b) disposing of or encumbering any of the conjugal properties. The
petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the
conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the
other because no right will be violated. In support of this contention, he cites Art. 124 of the Family
Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the injunction ha permanently installed the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets.

Ruling:
The Court has carefully considered the issues and the arguments of the parties and finds that
the petition has no merit. We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an
administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing
the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into account the evidence
adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife's administration
pending resolution of the appeal.

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The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as
clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above
quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the
absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third
person to act as the administrator.

While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such
designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the
conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was
in effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the
preliminary injunction now under challenge.

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LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE

REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and


TERESITA MASAUDING
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995

Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City
where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was employed as a
nurse in a local hospital. Teresita left for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. Reynaldo was
sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison
officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband
and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born. While they were on a brief vacation
in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States,
their second child, a son, this time, and given the name Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate. Instead of giving
their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the
children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but
because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to
Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug and her family.

Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus starting the
whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus.
It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have
sole parental authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and
to be approved by the Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over the children be
granted.

Ruling:
The SC dismissed the writ of habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain the custody of
the children to the father. The illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused

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emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values against the
children.

The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they
prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children
understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional
growth by her behavior.

LEGAL SEPARATION PENDENTE LITE

CARMEN LAPUZ SY vs.EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO


G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972

Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August
1953. They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had
lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her
husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the
ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced
their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already
scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her
counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal
separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period
provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal
separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario
Lapuz.

Issue:
Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate
the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

Ruling:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights
are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree
itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a

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decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and
the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be
no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the
questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either
the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION

ELISEA LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHIPPINES


G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962

Facts:
On May 10, 1960, Elisea Laperal filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio (Sp Proc. No.
433) a petition which reads: That petitioner's maiden name is ELISEA LAPERAL; that on March
24, 1939, she married Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria; that in a partial decision entered on this
Honorable Court on January 18, 1958, in Civil Case No. 356 of this Court, entitled 'Enrique R.
Santamaria vs. Elisea L. Santamaria' Mr. Enrique Santamaria was given a decree of legal separation
from her; that the said partial decision is now final; That during her marriage to Enrique R.
Santamaria, she naturally used, instead of her maiden name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria; that aside
from her legal separation from Enrique R. Santamaria, she has also ceased to live with him for many
years now; That in view of the fact that she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique R.
Santamaria and has likewise ceased to live with him for many years, it is desirable that she be allowed
to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name, to wit: ELISEA
LAPERAL.

Petitioner respectfully prayed that after the necessary proceedings are had, she be allowed to
resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of
Baguio on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the
Civil Code, and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific
provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his
husband.

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Ruling:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no
severance of the vinculum. The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may
cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of
the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and
Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion
for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of
Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory
provision of Art. 372.

Petition was dismissed.

DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION

SIOCHI vs. GOZON


G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010

Facts:
Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in this case
is a 30,000 sq. m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of
the couple is conjugal partnership of gains.Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a notice of lis
pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon. While the legal separation case was still pending,
Alfredo entered into an agreement with Mario who paid P5 million in earnest money and took
possession of the property. Title still with notice of lis pendens.

Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and liquidated. Alfredo, the guilty
spouse, did not receive his share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred.
Cavite RTC ruled land in Malabon as conjugal property. Alfred executed a Deed of Donation over
the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the name of Winifred without
annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi, nor the notice of lis pendens filed by
Elvira, the wife. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to sell the lot.
Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT was issued to Inter-Dimensional
Realty. Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in Malabon) to Annul donation to
Winifred, Annul the Sale to Inter-Dimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of
land. Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and
declared void the sale by Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-Dimensional. However, Court of Appeals

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Persons and Family Relation
said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered into without the
consent of Elvira, Alfredo’s wife; and, (2) Alfredo’s ½ undivided share has been forfeited in favour
of Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid?

Ruling:
The SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void.
Under Art 124 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers, however do not include the power to dispose or encumber the
properties which require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The agreement is
void in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that the
CA erred in saying that the ½ undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred. As
regards Mario’s contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by
Elvira’s acceptance before the offer is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently
donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the offer was already
withdrawn.

The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his ½ share in the conjugal
property as a result of the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal
separation) in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the
guilty spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net profits of the property. The Court said,
“Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.” Thus, as regards this
point, the CA erred. Inter-Dimensional says it is a buyer in good faith. SC says no. Inter-
Dimensional knew of the notice of lis pendens.

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Persons and Family Relation
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

PELAYO vs. LAURON


G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001

Facts:
On November 23, 1906, a physician named Arturo Pelayo filed a complaint against Marelo
Lauron and Juana Abellana. On the night of October 13th of the same year, the plaintiff was called
to render medical assistance to the defendant’s daughter-in-law, who was about to gie birth. After
the consultation of Dr. Escaño, it was deemed that the operation was going to be difficult for child
birth, but regardless, Dr. Pelayo proceeded with the job of operating on the subject and also
removed the afterbirth. The operation went on until morning, and on the same day, visited several
times and billed the defendants the just amount of P500 for the services rendered to which
defendants refused to pay. In answer to the complaint, counsel for the defendants denied all of the
allegation and alleged as a special defense, that their daughter-in-law had died in consequence of the
said childbirth, that when she was alive she lived with her husband independently and in a separate
house without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she gave birth she was
in the house of the defendants, her stay their was accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances.
Therefore, he prayed that the defendants be absolved of the complaint with costs against the
plaintiff.

Issue:
Can the defendants be held liable to pay for the obligation?

Ruling:
No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by contracts,
by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or
negligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined in
the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones. Obligations arising from contracts
have legal force between the contracting parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their
stipulations. (Arts. 1090 and 1091.) The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was
comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses were bound by way of mutual
support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something
(art. 1088), and spouses were mutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but
that, when either of them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other was
under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order that health
may be restored, and he or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is jeopardized. The
party bound to furnish such support was therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the
medical expert for his professional services. In the face of the above legal precepts, it was
unquestionable that the person bound to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional
services that he rendered to the daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, was the
husband of the patient and not her father and mother- in-law of the defendants herein.

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RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

NANCY GO and ALEX GO vs COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 114791 May 29, 1997

Facts:
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film
their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go
said it’s not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video after their honeymoon. The
newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding video
because the copy has been erased. The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancy’s husband,
Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their
favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they
erased the video tape because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim
their wedding tape within 30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said
wedding tape because they only made their claim after two months; that her husband should not be
impleaded in this suit.

Issue:
Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.

Ruling:
Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their claim
after the wedding but were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that
their honeymoon is to be done abroad and won’t be able to return for two months. It is contrary to
human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the
fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering the sentimental
value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded — a wedding which in our culture is a
significant milestone to be cherished and remembered — could no longer be reenacted and was lost
forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the
mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the Ongs suffered and which
under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil
Code. Anent the issue that Nancy Go’s husband should not be included in the suit, this argument is
valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or
engage in business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that it was only
Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay
the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.

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RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

ARROYO vs. VASQUEZ-ARROYO


G.R. No. 17014 August 29, 1921

Facts:
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They
lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went
away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she
was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn
prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for
counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was
granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal
rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal
home and live with him as his wife.

Issues:
a) Whether or not defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home
b) Whether or not plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order
or permanent mandatory injunction

Ruling:
The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to
defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her
husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present. Courts should move with caution
in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the
de facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as
impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under
obligation to return to the domicile. “When people understand that they must live together…they
learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they
become good husbands and wives…necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it
imposes…” (Evans v. Evans)

On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of
property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose
than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have
done this with much criticism. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant
absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to
support.

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RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

ILUSORIO vs. BILDNER


G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000

Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period
of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six children. In 1972, they separated from bed
and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he was in Manila and in
Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo City for five
months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that their mother overdosed their father with an
antidepressant drug which the latter’s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC of Antipolo City a
petition for guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to the latter’s advanced
age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City
and instead lived in a condominium in Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio
City. With these, Erlinda filed with CA a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband
and also for the reason that respondent refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband
and prohibiting Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City.

Issue:
Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband
to live with her in conjugal bliss.

Ruling:
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person there from if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant
of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. No
court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other
means process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s
free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

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RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

GOITIA vs. CAMPOS-RUEDA


G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916

Facts:
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and immediately
thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about
a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant,
and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant, were legally married in the city of Manila. They established their
residence 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together. The allegations of the complaint were
that the defendant, one month after they had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With
these refusals, the defendant got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed.
Unable to induce the defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her,
plaintiff was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents. The
plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action.

Issue:
Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile.

Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties and
obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which
defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the object of a marriage is defeated
by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to
the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. The law provides that defendant, who is
obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, the option given by law is not absolute.
The law will not permit the defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the
wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the
defendant, Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of
the conjugal home.

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Persons and Family Relation
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES: MARITAL COMMUNICATION RULE

CUENCA vs. CUENCA


G.R. No. L-72321 December 8, 1988

Facts:
Private respondents Restituto Cuenca and Meladora Cuenca claimed ownership over the
subject parcels of land on the ground that they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and
Maria Bangahon, both deceased, owners of the subject parcels of land. They alleged that some of the
parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are conjugal properties of Maria and
Agripino They also alleged that Agripino Cuenca and Engracia Basadre were not legally married
because at the time they lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar.

On the other hand, the petitioners (defendants below) Diosdidit, Baldomero, Filomeno
Elpidio, Aida, Anita and Engracia Vda.de Cuenca denied the legitimacy of the marriage between
Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children of the
couple. They claimed that Agripino Cuenca and their mother Engracia Basadre were legally married
and that they are the legitimate children of the couple. They contend that the subject parcels of lands
are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.

That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to rice with irrigation under
the present possession of the heirs, bounded on the North by Mariano Agagdang on the East by
Clerencia Tagonsod on the South by Suatan River and on the West by Mariano Agagdang containing
an area of 1.2500 hectares, more or less, under Tax Dec. 3055, assessed at P250.00 by the property
records of Agusan.

That parcel of land situated in Rendon, Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut, under the
present possession of the heirs, bounded on the North by Maximo Bangahon, on the East, by Sergio
Pagar, on the South, by Macaria Agagdang on the West, by Folgencio Buyan, containing an area of
1.1722 hectares, more or less, assessed at P670.00 by Tax Dec. No. 4026 of Agusan belong to Maria
Bangahon as her inheritance from her parents. This declaration against interest is further reiterated
by Agripino Cuenca in that judicial settlement and sale executed by him on October 19, 1950. These
two documents, as rightly contended by the plaintiffs, are ample proofs that the properties in
question described in par. 2 of the complaint, belong exclusively to Maria Bangahon as her
paraphernal property, a fact declared by no less than the husband himself in a declaration against his
interest. It was error for the trial court to unceremoniously brush aside the importance of the
declaration of Agripino Cuenca in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon.
These public documents carry sufficient evidentiary weight to prove the origin of the properties in
question and the nature of their ownership as properties brought into the marriage by Maria

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Persons and Family Relation
Bangahon to Agripino Cuenca as against the bare testimony of the defendants and their witnesses,
More importantly, Juan Buyan and former Judge Francisco Ro.

Issue:
Whether or not the parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia

Ruling:
The records show that defendant Bartolome Sanchez upon manifestation of his counsel is
no longer a necessary party as Engracia Basadre-Cuenca has repurchased that portion of the land in
question sold to Bartolome Sanchez making plaintiffs' claim against defendant Bartolome Sanchez
moot and academic.

Our review of the evidence shows that Agripino Cuenca in his lifetime expressed in the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria Bangahon executed on June 13, 1950 before Notary
Public Francisco Ro. Cupin (Exh. "C") that:

Parcel of agricultural land situated in Pinamangculan Butuan, Agusan, planted to coconut,


under the present possession of the heirs of Maria Bangahon, bounded on the North, Lot No. 3062,
Lucio Plaza, Lot No. 4319, A. Cuenca, portion of Lot No. 3063, in the possession of A. Cuenca, on
the south Road, on the West by Lot No. 3057, S. Dumanon 3058, B. Adormio, 3059, A. Cuenca and
east portion of Lot No. 3063, containing an area of six (6) hectares, more or less (This is a portion
of Lot No. 3063, Pls-22 of Cad. of Municipality of Butuan which parcel of land belongs exclusively
to Maria Bangahon during her lifetime and which property is separate from the conjugal property of
the marriage of said Maria Bangahon and Agripino Cuenca. Article 160 of the New Civil Code
provides that "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," In the cases of Philippine
National Bank v. Court of Appeals, (153 SCRA 435 [August 31, 1987); Magallon v. Montejo (146
SCRA 282 [December 16, 1986]) and Maramba v. Lozano (20 SCRA 474 [June 29, 1967]) this Court
ruled that the presumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and does not
operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.

In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do
not show that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during
the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the homestead
claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. The fact that these parcels were
surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner
Engracia Basadre is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels were the conjugal
properties of Agripino and Engracia. Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered
by the documents are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora Cuenca or respondent
Restituto Cuenca. The presumption cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of only one spouse

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and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Under the circumstances of this case, the non-
applicablility of the presumption should also be upheld.

In the light of these findings a new trial would only be an unnecessary exercise and
ineffective. The documents sought to be presented during a new trial would not in any way change
the result. The motion for new trial was correctly denied although not for the reason given by the
respondent court.

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Persons and Family Relation
RELATION BETWEEN SPOUSES: PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH
OTHER

ARCABA vs. VDA. DE BATOCAEL


G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001

Facts:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots
in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the
property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of
him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s cousin Luzviminda and
petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store.

Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and
Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while
Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said
she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.

A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrument denominated “Deed of


Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who
accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in
consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years.” Thereafter,
Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a
deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces,
nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife
of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be
declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Ruling:
Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together
as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made
by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.

Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and


Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is
considered null and void.

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Persons and Family Relation
RELATION BETWEEN SPOUSES: PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH
OTHER

MATABUENA vs. CERVANTES


G.R. No. L-28771 March 31, 1971

Facts:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena
donated to respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death of Felix
Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the
Civil Code “Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.”

The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation
was made at the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply
cohabitating.

Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.

Ruling:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of
the law is as much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason
for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of
undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason
why this prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.
The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to
Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the
disputed property because the relationship between Felix and Respondent were legitimated by
marriage.

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Persons and Family Relation
RELATION BETWEEN SPOUSES: PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION TO EACH
OTHER

HARDING vs. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY


G.R. No. 12707 August 10, 1918

Facts:
In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as a
gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell and Co which was the duly authorized
representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union in the Philippines. The car’s value was
estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the Luneta Garage. The car was
bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The mechanic, considering some repairs done, estimated the
value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding to Smith, Bell
and Co. She also disclosed that the value was an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as
an agent for Smith, Bell and Co).

In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but
Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the representations and averments made as to the cost
of the car were false; and that said statement is a warranty. Commercial Union also stated that the
car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is void under the Civil
Code.

Issue:
Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.

Ruling:
Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by Mr.
Harding to his wife.

The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The
evidence does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the evidence shows that the cost of the
car is more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then thereafter,
Luneta Garage made some repairs and body paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr. Server attested
that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was effected.

Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of
the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in
the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large
extent matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued policies
must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated value.

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Persons and Family Relation
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY (COMPONENTS)

NAVARRO vs. ESCOBIDO


G.R. No 153788 November 27, 2009

Facts:
Private respondent (Karen Go) files a complaint with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
replevin against petitioner (Navarro) for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under lease agreement.
Petitioner maintains among others in the case at bar that the complaints were premature because no
prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before the
complaints for replevin were filed.

Issue:
Whether or not prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

Ruling:
No. Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of
replevin is filed since we cannot liken a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.

For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:

Sec. 2.Affidavit and bond.


The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who
personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is
entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfullydetained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of
detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant
to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed
under custodialegis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.

The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the
property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party
if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover
from the applicant in the action.

The SC held that there is nothing in the afore-quoted provision which requires the applicant
to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of
replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

377
Persons and Family Relation
378
Persons and Family Relation
ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY PROPERTY (COMPONENTS)

VILLANUEVA MIJARES vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 143286 April 12, 2000

Facts:
Felipe Villanueva left a 15,336-square-meter parcel of land in Kalibo, Capiz to his eight
children: Simplicio, Benito, Leon, Eustaquio, Camila, Fausta and Pedro. In 1952, Pedro declared
under his name 1/6 portion of the property (1,905 sq. m.). He held the remaining properties in trust
for his co-heirs who demanded the subdivision of the property but to no avail. After Leon’s death in
1972, private respondents discovered that the shares of Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta and Maria
Baltazar had been purchased by Leon through a deed of sale dated August 25, 1946 but registered
only in 1971. In July 1970, Leon also sold and partitioned the property in favor of petitioners, his
children, who thereafter secured separate and independent titles over their respective pro- indiviso
shares.

Private respondents, who are also descendants of Felipe, filed an action for partition with
annulment of documents and/or reconveyance and damages against petitioners. They contended
that Leon fraudulently obtained the sale in his favor through machinations and false pretenses. The
RTC declared that private respondents’ action had been barred by res judicata and that petitioners
are the “legal owners of the property in question in accordance with the individual titles issued to
them.

Issue:
Whether or not laches apply against the minor’s property that was held in trust.

Ruling:
No. At the time of the signing of the Deed of Sale of August 26,1948, private respondents
Procerfina, Prosperedad, Ramon and Rosa were minors. The