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- EQUAL PROTECTION - mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor

and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement

 "Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of
SEXUAL DISCRIMNINATION employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent,
163 SCRA 386, 1988 just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs. DRILON its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy
their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the
FACTS: Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates
 The Department of Labor and Employment issued Department have adequate protection, personally and economically, while
Order No. 1, Series of 1988 in the character of "GUIDELINES away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has
WORKERS”. precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
 The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.  The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the
(PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the
Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
challenges its Constitutional validity. freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction,
 On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the economic way of life.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment  Petition dismissed.
informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor
Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan,
Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged
"guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the
99 PHIL, 1856
Philippine State.
WON Department Order No. 1 in the nature of a police power measure
 This is a case of kidnapping with murder involving the Huks,
is valid under the Constitution, assailing:
members of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, the military
 "discrimination against males or females;"
arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to  Counsel for Faustino del Mundo, alias Commander Sumulong,
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" admits that the said accused ordered the killing of the victim,
 and that it is violative of the right to travel Marciano T. Miranda, 41, the barrio captain of Barrio Balitucan,
 it is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking Magalang, Pampanga, who was an alleged army informer and
power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in who was opposed to the candidacy of Rogelio Tiglao, a provincial
character. board member.
 The kidnapping and killing were politically motivated. Miranda
HELD: refused to support Tiglao, the candidate for Congressman of the
 The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the Huks. He supported Rafael Lazatin, the Nacionalista candidate.
contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract ISSUE: Del Mundo contends that he should be convicted only of
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal medium and that the
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" trial court erred in convicting him of the said complex crime and in
under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided
that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) HELD:
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not  Del Mundo did not testify in his defense. As already stated, the
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all trial court convicted him of kidnapping with murder together with
members of the same class. Pangilinan, Macasaquit and Cabrera, sentenced him to reclusion
 As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the perpetua and ordered him to pay an indemnity of P17,000 to
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, Miranda's heirs. Macalino and Meneses were acquitted. Salas
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions died during the pendency of the case. Only Del Mundo appealed.
marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The His counsel de oficio contends that there was no intention to
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, deprive Miranda of his liberty and no premeditated plan to kill him.
even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies  That contention is not well-taken. The fact is that Miranda was
of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent forcibly removed from his barrio and deprived of his liberty for
Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional several hours and was then brought to another place where he
rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In was killed. While under interrogation, his grave was already being
fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts. prepared. The fatal blow, which was inflicted upon him, caused
 The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel him to fall into his grave.
does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among  We find that there was a conspiracy to liquidate Miranda and that
other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be the kidnapping was utilized as a means to attain that objective.
provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid From the surrounding circumstances, it maybe inferred that Del
implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to Mundo masterminded the kidnapping or induced it and that, as
"afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent observed by the Solicitor General, the killing was intended to
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the terrorize the supporters of Lazatin.
Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable  Miranda was a public officer. His kidnapping is covered by article
simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have 267(4) of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of
stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a reclusion perpetua to death for that offense.
valid qualification thereto.  The killing of Miranda was murder because his hands were bound
 Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. when he was mortally assaulted (U.S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209
1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that and other cases).
police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean  Even without taking into account evident premeditation, the death
that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have penalty has to be imposed because article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code requires that the graver penalty for kidnapping, which  In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in
is more serious than murder, has to be meted out to Del Mundo connection with their official functions must be accessible to the
 However, inasmuch as Del Mundo is now seventy-eight (78) public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental
years old, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon him. affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an
 WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified in the sense opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have
that the death penalty imposable on Del Mundo is commuted to entrusted the affairs of the government are honesty, faithfully and
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in article competently performing their functions as public servants.
40. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free flow of
thought; but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that the
85 PHIL 648, 1950 public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting
PEOPLE vs. ISNAIN them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate in the
affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and
FACTS: effective manner.
 Accused was caught in the act of stealing coconut while his two  With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority
other companions managed to ran away. emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of
 Accused admitted to committing the said crime the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest. We may also add that
ISSUE: The only question raised with much earnestness by his "ill-gotten wealth," by its very nature, assumes a public character.
attorney de oficio is that article 310 of the Revised Penal Code Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly
classifying as qualified theft, the stealing of coconut is unconstitutional, originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes,
because it punishes the larceny of such products more heavily than the therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon reconveyance
taking away of similar produce, such as rice and sugar, and thereby they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the
denies him the equal protection of the laws. satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be
adjudged by competent courts. Another declared overriding
HELD: consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is
 In the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier that it may be used for national economic recovery. The foregoing
penalty is to encourage and protect the development of the disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right to
coconut industry as one of the sources of our national economy.3 respondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at
Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of vision is concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. Petition
unobstructed, coconut groves can not be efficiently watched granted.
because of the nature of the growth of coconut trees; and without
a special measure to protect this kind of property, it will be, as it 111 SCRA 433, 1982
has been in the past the favorite resort of thieves.4 There is NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
therefore, some reason for the special treatment accorded the
industry; and as it can not be said that the classification is entirely FACTS:
without basis, the plea of unconstitutionality must be denied  Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the
 The crime is punished by article 309, paragraph 5, in connection validity of the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan,
with article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through
Commonwealth Act No. 417. (Republic Act No. 120, enacted after falsification of public and commercial documents committed in
the offense, is not applicable.) The penalty is prision correccional connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in
to its full extent. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the several cases. Upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash
appellant should be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 4 on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. Respondent Court
years and 2 months of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2 denied such motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed
months of prision correccional. Thus modified, the appealed the next day; it met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari
decision will be affirmed, with costs. so ordered. and prohibition

GR No. 130716, December 09, 1998 ISSUE: WON Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the
CHAVES VS. PCGG respondent Court is violative of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
 Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former HELD:
government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses  To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end
and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and
treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's property. Those adversely affected may under such
economy," alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can
several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired
sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit
the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support
deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the in reason. To quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the laws
reported execution of a compromise, between the government operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
these assets. manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
 Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue
correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
involving the national interest, demands that respondents make protection and security shall be given to every person under
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous.
PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He  The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set
claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten forth in his memorandum thus: " 1. The Sandiganbayan
wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it proceedings violates petitioner's right to equal protection,
has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be because - appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a
greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. mere matter of discretion; - appeal likewise was shrunk and
limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts
ISSUE: WON the government, through the Presidential Commission and trial evidence; and - there is only one chance to appeal
on Good Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the proposed conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the
terms of a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are
their alleged ill-gotten wealth. entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts
and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and
HELD: thereafter to the Supreme Court." ,that is hardly convincing,
considering that the classification satisfies the test requiring that it mandate of his office. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
"must be based on substantial distinctions which make real for lack of merit
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally
to each member of the class. The Constitution specifically
mentions the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan
precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot [G.R. No. 157279. August 9, 2005.]
be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. GIOVANNI PALMA ET AL.
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have
been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present FACTS:
Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the  PNB was formerly a government owned and controlled
accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a corporation but on 26 May 1996, it was already privatized and
public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection incorporated as a private commercial bank.
clause of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is  R.A. 6758, 'An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and
dismissed. Position Classification System in the Government' took effect on 1
July 1989 covering all government owned corporations. Section
GR No. 142030, April 21, 2005 12 thereof provides for the consolidation of allowances and
GALLARDO VS. PEOPLE additional compensation into standardized salary rates, but
certain additional compensation were exempted from
FACTS: consolidation. In the present case, the Salary Standardization
 Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public Health Law clearly provides that the claimed benefits shall continue to be
Workers (PHWs) of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, filed with the Office granted only to employees who were "incumbents" as of July 1,
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn letter-complaint charging 1989.
herein petitioners Mayor Gallardo, the vice mayor, Sanggunian  "The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
Bayan members, all public officers of the Municipality of Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10) to
Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with violation of Section 3(e) of implement R.A. 6758. On 12 August 1998, the Supreme Court, in
Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged refusal to appropriate in the case of Rodolfo S. de Jesus, et al. of the Local Water Utilities
the municipal budget the amount representing payment of the Administration (LWUA) vs. Commission on Audit held that DBM-
mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan CCC No. 10 was ineffective due to its non-publication in the
accruing to the complaining PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
differential and magna carta benefits.  "In view of the declaration made by the Supreme Court in the
 The information filed with the Sandiganbayan stated that herein above-mentioned case, a petition for mandamus was filed by
petitioners caused undue injury to the Public Health Workers respondents on 20 December 1999. Respondents alleged, that
(PHWs) of the Municipality of Bansalan, by refusing to perform they are employees hired by PNB on various dates after 30 June
their duties to include an appropriation in the municipal budget for 1989; that from the dates of their respective appointments until 1
the payment of the mandatory statutory obligations of the January 1997 they were unjustly deprived and denied of the
Municipality of Bansalan due to the complaining PHWs in the allowances being enjoyed by other employees of PNB. According
nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits in to respondents, the declaration that DBM-CCC No. 10 was
the aggregate amount of P3,833,798.10. ineffective paved the way to their entitlement to the
 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan allowances/fringe benefits. The withholding of their entitlement to
granted the motion. A special prosecutor recommended the the same benefits is an unfair discrimination and a violation of
dismissal of the case but Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto respondents' rights to the equal protection clause of the
disapproved the recommendation. The Sandiganbayan denied Constitution since incumbents or employees of PNB who were
petitioners’ motion. already in the service as of 1 July 1989 received the benefits and
allowances. To rectify the injustice against respondents issued
ISSUE: WON the petitioners are denied due process and not accorded General Circular No. 1-312/97 on 14 March 1997, extending the
the equal protection of laws. benefits to respondents effective 1 January 1997. But
Respondents contend that extending to them the
HELD: allowances/fringe benefits meant that they are entitled to the
 Petitioners claimed that they were denied due process because payment of the same and, hence, they should be given their
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disapproved the allowances reckoned not only from 1 January 1997 but from the
recommendation of the special prosecutor. date of their respective appointment, to which PNB did not accede
 The Ombudsman, contrary to the investigating prosecutor’s to. The trial court ruled in favor of the Respondents, and the Court
conclusion, was of the conviction that petitioners are probably of Appeals denied petitioner’s appeal. Thus, this instant petition.
guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to
conduct an investigation anew. Whatever course of action that the ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are entitled to the questioned
Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove the fringe benefits
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an
exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional HELD:
mandate.[17] Generally, courts should not interfere in such  The respondents were not entitled to the benefits because they
exercise. were hired only after JUNE 30 1989. An incumbent is a person
 The equal protection clause requires that the law operates who is in present possession of an office.
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all  Finally, to explain what July 1, 1989 pertained to, we held in the
persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being prior cases as follows: The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial
different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. It only to determine that as of said date, the officer was an
allows reasonable classification. If the classification is incumbent and was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling
characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may him to its continued grant." Respondents were not deemed
be treated differently from another. Simply because the incumbents as defined by settled jurisprudence. Petitioner was
respondent Ombudsman dismissed some cases allegedly similar correct in contending that by extending the assailed benefits to
to the case at bar is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or respondents on January 1, 1997, it was not thereby admitting that
caprice on his part, absent a clear showing that he gravely the latter were priorly entitled to them. It contends that its
abused his discretion in pursuing the instant case. The privatization on May 27, 1996 enabled it to grant benefits as it
Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he believed there deemed fit. It could not have granted them while it was still a
were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo government agency, because RA 6758 barred such grant as an
trial. On the other hand, he recommended the filing of illegal disbursement of public funds. It allegedly accorded them
appropriate information against petitioners because there are those benefits, not because it had finally acceded to their
ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was only exercising his interpretation of the law, but because it was only then that — as a
power and discharging his duty based upon the constitutional private entity — it could legally do so.
 The collateral attack on the constitutionality of RA 6758 due to liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
alleged violation of the equal protection clause cannot prosper, allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly — not shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not
collaterally. Furthermore, the constitutional issue was not raised in identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
the trial court; hence, it cannot now be availed of on appeal to this or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
Court. Besides, the arguments of respondents rest upon the same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is
validity of Section 12 of RA 6758. How then can they now equally binding on the rest. With the lack of real and substantial
challenge the very basis of their arguments? distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the
 A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the
competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the
pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the
raised at the earliest opportunity. Respondents not only failed to equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as
challenge the constitutionality of RA 6758; worse, they used it in an outlaw.
seeking compensation from petitioner. The settled rule is that  Wherefor, the continued operation and implementation of the last
courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is held
advance of the necessity of deciding it. unconstitutional.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
[G.R. No. 56515. April 3, 1981.]
[G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004.] UNITED DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION (UNIDO), vs. COMMISSION
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ON ELECTIONS
Petitioner United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), in two letter-
FACTS: requests to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated March 10
Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653 or the New and 17,1981, asked for exactly the same opportunity, the same prime
Central Bank Act, petitioner Central Bank Employees Association, Inc., time and the same number of television and radio stations all over the
filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Bangko Sentral ng country to be used in its campaign for "NO" votes in the plebiscite for
Pilipinas (BSP) and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the the amendments to the 1973 Constitution proposed by the Batasang
President, to restrain them from further implementing the last proviso in Pambansa as that utilized by President Marcos in his nationwide
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is "Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" in campaigning for "YES" votes on the
unconstitutional because the classification of BSP employees provided proposed constitutional amendments. The Commission, in its
by law is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and violative of the equal Resolution of March 18, 1981 denied petitioner's "demand'' being of
protection clause of the Constitution. The thrust of petitioner's the view that the President's remarks on the proposed amendments in
challenge is that the assailed proviso makes an unconstitutional cut the forementioned radio-television program carried live by twenty-six
between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers (26) television and two hundred forty-eight (248) radio stations
or those exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 6758 or the Salary throughout the country were initiated under his leadership and capacity
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file as President/prime Minister in the exercise of his constitutional
(Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the prerogative to determine the program and guidelines of national policy
coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). Petitioner contended that the pursuant to Article IX, Section 2 of the Constitution and not as the head
classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based of any political party. Petitioner's Motion for reconsideration proved
on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on futile, hence this present action, assailing the Comelec's resolutions as
the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner further contended contrary to the Constitution, unjust, unfair and inequitable for violating
that the assailed proviso is also violative of the equal protection clause the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play, the same not
because after it was enacted, the charters of the Government Service conducive to insure a free, orderly and honest elections.
Insurance System, Land Bank of the Philippines, Development Bank of
the Philippines and Social Security System were also amended, and ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC violated the equal protection clause
their respective personnel were all exempted from the coverage of the for denying UNIDO the same air time in Media as that of the President
SSL. Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of Government in campaigning for the “NO” votes in the plebiscite for the amendments
Financial Institutions (GFI), the BSP rank-and-file employees are also to the 1973 Contstitution.
discriminated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not a provision of law, initially valid, can become The Supreme Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that when the
subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continued President spoke in the nation-wide program "Pulong-Pulong sa
operation would violate the equal protection of the law Pangulo" on March 21, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President-
Prime Minister and not as the head of the KBL; and that what petitioner
HELD: asks cannot be granted for being beyond what the charter, the laws
 Supreme Court held that with the passage of the subsequent laws and pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate, for being more than
amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial what the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of privilege inherent in the head of state to directly dialogue with the
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, constitutes invidious sovereign people when the occasion demands, for being impractical
discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the BSP. under prevailing circumstance, and for its failure to join in the petition
 The Supreme Court struck down the assailed proviso and held the television and radio stations as indispensable parties, thereby
that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the depriving the Court of jurisdiction to act.
charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions Appeal dismissed.
(GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section
15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes 227 SCRA 703 (1993)
invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of PJA VS PRADO
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The disparity of treatment *no case digest submitted*
between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other
seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious 248 SCRA 700, 1995
discrimination. No one can, with candor and fairness, deny the OLIVAREZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total *no case digest submitted*
exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was
withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes GR No. 127410, January 20, 1999
without any rational basis. The Court emphasized that the equal TIU VS. COURT OF APPEALS
protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it *no case digest submitted*
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005
TORRES, as Executive Secretary, et al  The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment
FACTS: of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to
On March 13, 1992, RA No. 7227 was enacted, providing for, among human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities."
other things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person,
Subic military reservations and their extensions into alternative "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
productive uses in the form of special economic zones in order to [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in and good faith."
particular and the country in general. The law contains provisions on  The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of
tax exemptions for importations of raw materials, capital and employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code
equipment. After which the President issued several Executive Orders provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
as mandated by the law for the implementation of RA 7227. Herein regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both
petitioners contend the validity of the tax exemption provided for in the the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its
law. primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment
opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders issued by President for and conditions of employment.
the implementation of the tax exemptions constitutes executive  In this case, the point-of-hire classification employed by
legislation. respondent school to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires is an invalid classification. There is
HELD: no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by
 To limit the tax-free importation privilege of enterprises located foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of
inside the special economic zone only to raw materials, capital according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public
and equipment clearly runs counter to the intention of the policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
Legislature to create a free port where the “free flow of goods or  The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
capital within, into, and out of the zones” is insured. jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
The phrase “tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,
capital and equipment” was merely cited as an example of skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be
incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its
Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim "international character" notwithstanding. If an employer accords
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that
impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne
apply when words are mentioned by way of example. It is obvious by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one
from the wording of RA No. 7227, particularly the use of the employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain
phrase “such as,” that the enumeration only meant to illustrate why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would
incentives that the SSEZ is authorized to grant, in line with its be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against
being a free port zone. that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee
 The Court finds that the setting up of such commercial is treated unfairly.
establishments which are the only ones duly authorized to sell
consumer items tax and duty-free is still well within the policy GR. No. 143076. June 10, 2003
enunciated in Section 12 of RA No. 7227 that “. . .the Subic PHILRECA vs. DILG
Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining,
industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to FACTS:
generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own
to attract and promote productive foreign investments.” However, behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and
the Court reiterates that the second sentences of paragraphs 1.2 existing under PD 269 which are members of petitioner Philippine
and 1.3 of Executive Order No. 97-A, allowing tax and duty-free Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other
removal of goods to certain individuals, even in a limited amount, petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1
from the Secured Area of the SSEZ, are null and void for being (ILECO 1) and Isabela 1 (ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric
contrary to Section 12 of RA No. 7227. Said Section clearly cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, as amended, and
provides that “exportation or removal of goods from the territory of registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from
Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes the payment of all National Government, local government, and
under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of municipal taxes and fee, including franchise, fling recordation, license
the Philippines.” or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in any
court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.
G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000 From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects
ISAE v. Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing envisioned by PD 269, as amended, the Philippine Government, acting
through the National Economic council and the NEA, entered into six
loan agreements with the government of the United States of America,
FACTS: through the United States Agency for International Development
Private respondent, International School Inc. is a domestic educational (USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loan
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application
personnel and other temporary residents. The school hires both foreign of the loan and any property or commodity acquired through the
and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying them as proceeds of the loan.
foreign-hires and local-hires. The local-hire faculty members of said Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code
International School, mostly Filipinos, complained against the better their tax exemptions have been validly withdrawn. Particularly,
treatment of their colleagues who have been hired abroad. These petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234 of the said code.
foreign-hires enjoy certain benefits not accorded the local-hires which Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges
include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave granted to all persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives
travel allowance and a salary rate 25% higher than that of the local- duly registered under RA 6938, while Sec. 234 exempts the same
hires. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by cooperatives from payment of real property tax.
the school is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher
salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. ISSUES:
1. WON the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234)
ISSUE: Whether or not the classification employed by the respondent violated the equal protection clause since the provisions unduly
school constitutes racial discrimination. discriminate against petitioners who are duly registered
cooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA 6938
or the Cooperatives Code of the Philippines? FACTS:
2. Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the  Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994
loan entered into between the Philippine and the US was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide
Governments? an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood
donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was
HELD: approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and
1. No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18,
a law based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995,
reasonable must (a) rest on substantial classifications; (b) Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the
germane to the purpose of the law; c) not limited to the existing Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated
conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).
class. We hold that there is reasonable classification under the  Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial
Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out
between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act,
cooperatives under RA 6938. extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under Secretary.”
PD 269 and those under RA 6938. In the former, the government  Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall
is the one that funds those so-called electric cooperatives, while effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period
in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as source of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years
of funds. after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be
a. Capital Contributions by Members – Nowhere in PD 269 does it based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood
require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital. supply and demand and public safety.”
Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a member of an  Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of
electric cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00 1994, petitioners have already been operating commercial blood
membership fee is required which is even refundable the moment banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled “An Act Regulating
the member is no longer interested in getting electric service from the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the
the cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood
covered by the cooperative. However, under the Cooperative Processing Laboratories.”
Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for  The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the
registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood
accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer banks and blood processing laboratories.
elected by the subscribers showing that at least 25% of the  On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to
authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with application for
the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid- the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
up share capital be less than P2,000.00. restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives – The extent constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its
of government control over electric cooperatives covered by PD Implementing Rules and Regulations.
269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary
source of funds of these electric cooperatives. Amendments were ISSUES:
primarily geared to expand the powers of NEA over the electric 1. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 constitutes undue
cooperatives to ensure that loans granted to them would be delegation of legislative powers
repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA 2. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules
6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent violate the equal protection clause
organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation. 3. Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local
Government Code is germane to the purpose of the law. The
Constitutional mandate that “every local government unit shall HELD:
enjoy local autonomy,” does not mean that the exercise of the  Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are
power by the local governments is beyond the regulation of constitutional and valid.
Congress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the legislative  Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994
intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local government units is complete in itself.
and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically  It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature
provided therein. intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has
Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these
classification as these exemptions are not limited to existing is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country.
conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class.  The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the
2. No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions,
prohibition on the impairment of the obligations of contracts does that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and
not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. The
prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719,
existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial. broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. In this regard,
Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a change the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the
in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not Act when said phase-out period was extended in accordance with
with respect to non-parties. the Act as laid out in Section 2.
The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport  What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the
to grant any tax exemption in favor of any party to the contract, laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will
including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions simply shift the cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,
tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but
to the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or
withdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sec. 193 and capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be
234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which
not impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or the make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the
beneficiary under the loan agreements as, in fact, no tax law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d)
exemption is granted therein. must apply equally to each member of the class.
 We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the
GR Nos. 133640, 133661 and 139147, 25 November 2005, following reasons: First, it was based on substantial distinctions.
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH Second, the classification, and the consequent phase out of
commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law,
that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe then Department of Public Works and Communications on
blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood February 19, 1968, that bans the use of bicycles, tricycles,
transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a pedicabs, motorcycles, or any nonmotorized vehicle on limited
commodity. Third, the Legislature intended for the general access highways. The Court explained that since the tollway is
application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the not an ordinary road, the same “necessitates the imposition of
peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to guidelines in the manner of its use and operation.”
apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies  On the other hand, the Court declared unconstitutional and in
equally to all commercial blood banks without exception. violation of “The Limited Access Highway Act” (RA 2000)
 The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the Department Orders 74 and 215 released by the Department of
State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as well as the Revised
concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the Toll
in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and Regulatory Board (TRB). Department Orders 74 and 215, dated
preserve public health and safety. April 5, 1993 and June 25, 1998, respectively, declared the North
 Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the and South Luzon (DO 74), and the Manila-Cavite Toll
constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Expressways (DO 215) as limited access facilities. The Court
Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that explained that at the time DPWH issued these orders, it no longer
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of had authority to regulate activities related to transportation.
constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a  In contrast, AO 1 was issued in 1968 by the then Department of
wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by Public Works and Communications when it had the authority to
petitioners, is for Congress to determine. regulate limited access facilities.
 Likewise, the Court upheld the decision of the Makati City
GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006 Regional Trial Court, Branch 147 declaring DO 123, which limits
Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways access to the above expressways to only 400cc motorcycles, as
unconstitutional for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate
FACTS: the said order.
 On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for Temporary G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000
Restraining Order and Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 01- People vs. Jalosjos
034. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the following
administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions FACTS:
of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access Highway Act" The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of
enacted in 1957: Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his
a. DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968; conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
b. DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993; appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
c. Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
Regulatory Board (TRB). convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of
 Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be
issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215 represented.
declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as
limited access facilities. ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to
 Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives
2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the
said administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary HELD:
injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on  Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights
Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by
Expressway under DO 215. law.
 On June 28, 2001, the trial court, thru then Presiding Judge  The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members
Teofilo Guadiz, after due hearing, issued an order granting of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the
petitioners’ application for preliminary injunction. On July 16, Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a
2001, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court, restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
conditioned upon petitioners’ filing of cash bond in the amount of special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
P100,000.00, which petitioners subsequently complied with. meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
 On July 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued implication or equitable considerations.
Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine  The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should
displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
facilities (toll ways). Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
 Upon the assumption of Honorable Presiding Judge Ma. Cristina members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were required to legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with
file their respective Memoranda. Petitioners likewise filed [their] a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
Supplemental Memorandum. Thereafter, the case was deemed merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To
submitted for decision. allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
 Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued the committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually
assailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
their petition; but it was denied by the trial court in its Order dated appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a
June 16, 2003. mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
 Hence, this petition.
GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008
ISSUES: Trillanes vs Pimentel
1. Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulations contravene RA
2000 FACTS:
2. Whether AO 1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional  At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300
heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces
HELD: of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
 The Supreme Court declared constitutional AO 1, issued by the Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation
of the President and key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued  Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,# the United
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the
of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16,
rebellion.[1] A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and
and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the
militant soldiers that evening. extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan
 In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary
Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice
with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A of (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Makati.  Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought
 Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the
detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in RTC of Manila, Branch 25.# The TRO prohibited the Department
the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his
2007. extradition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent
 Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment
"Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend and supporting evidence.
Senate Sessions and Related Requests”  The Court held that private respondent was bereft of the right to
 The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his process.
requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to  Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United
three.[7] The trial court just the same denied the motion. States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with
 The present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition
the trial court, and for prohibition and mandamus.  In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for
the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to
ISSUE: Whether or not the "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests”  Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez
constitutional. filed before it an “Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,”# which
prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for
HELD: hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the
 The functions and duties of the office are not substantial case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior
 It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less  In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in
than the Constitution provides. case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
 All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by amount of P100,000.
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before  The Court directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.#
recognizance as may be provided by law. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
 It is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of ISSUE: Whether or not being an elected member of the House of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid Representatives is compelling enough for the Court to grant his
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. request for provisional release on bail.
 He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case
against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released HELD:
on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners  After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they
not practice their profession nor engage in any business or have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in danger to the community; and (b) there exist special,
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by
detention. the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail
 Petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a
detention prisoners who have also been charged with non- special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of
bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar
former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social facts of each case.
functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more  In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a
serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner question of constitutional equal protection.
harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.  The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shall any person be
 In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment denied the equal protection of laws.’ This simply means that all
of detention prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government
being placed under Senate custody or house arrest, yet he at the may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person.
same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.\ Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
 Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and  The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from]
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant prison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate of the people’ are
to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to
accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002 charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
USA vs PURGANAN function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
 A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the
call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different equal protection clause of the Constitution.
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
 A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or HELD:
otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or  The petitioners’ contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the
against groups or types of individuals. Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue
 The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly  The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not
assert that their interests are disregarded. absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the
 We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions differently from the other.# The Court has explained the nature of
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and  The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
all those belonging to the same class. oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
GR No. 147387, December 10, 2003 territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
Farinas vs Executive Secretary equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
FACTS: to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
 The petitioners come to the Court alleging in the main that protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in those who do not.
its title.  Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
 According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
constitutes a proscribed rider. definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
 Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the conditions.# On the other hand, appointive officials hold their
use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure# while
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of  Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is
the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the that appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil
Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006. political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under
 The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take
repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving part in political and electoral activities.
intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to  By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus
appointive officials, thus: Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two
 SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
person holding a public appointive office or position, including tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his of this classification.
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.  Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
 They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored
against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the
holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue  In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched
in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve
for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute.
been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the
they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on
upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
 The respondents petitions contending, preliminarily, that the determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the
petitioners have no legal standing to institute the present suit. limits of legislative power.# No such transgression has been
 Invoking the “enrolled bill” doctrine. The signatures of the Senate shown in this case.
President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill  WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED
and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both
houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill GR No. 1288845, June 01, 2000
 The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, *no case digest submitted*
as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a
proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, “An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices,” is so broad
that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election
exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by
elective officials.